Peace without impunity: World-view in the settlement of civil wars[☆]

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Abstract

Peace processes can bring to the fore a host of normative and practical questions that produce heated public disagreement. These disagreements can generate political obstacles to the successful negotiation and implementation of settlements. Here, I argue that public dissatisfaction with peace processes is in part rooted in core, fundamental differences in world-view, which have been found to inform how citizens form preferences over a wide array of security-related policy issues. Drawing on an original survey fielded at the height of the Colombian peace process, I show that the core values that guide people's everyday lives have implications for how they think about and behave during peace processes. Results from a conjoint experiment indicate that individuals with more fixed, or 'authoritarian', world-views hold strong preferences for more punitive agreements than individuals who score low on these qualities. These same individuals were also more likely than their counterparts to abstain from the 2016 peace referendum, though surprisingly not more likely to vote against than in favor. The study sheds light on the micro-foundations of public barriers to conflict-termination and suggests core, fundamental differences underlie public discord on the merits of conflict negotiations.

Keywords: Peace agreements, civil war, public opinion, political psychology

Public intransigence to conflict-termination is often chalked up, in both popular and scholarly discourse, to its distributive consequences: partisans want their side to get as much as they can when the war ends, and for no concessions to be made to the opposing side. Yet even among civilians who are on the "same side" of a civil war – or among those who stand to lose or gain equally in a brokered agreement – there is often heated debate about how an armed conflict should end. Some polls, for instance, find near-even splits *within* Jewish Israeli and Palestinian populations on the question of a two-state solution (Rasgon, 2018).

Understanding the source of these disagreements should be particularly important to political scientists. Armed conflicts increasingly take root in countries that are more democratic than authoritarian (Matanock and Garcia-Sanchez, 2017), settings where leaders are likely to be constrained by public pressure. Even when peace processes are elite-led or not subject to popular vote, a narrow base of public support can create additional commitment problems if combatants sense there is political capital for a post-peace rehashing of agreement terms (Flores and Nooruddin, 2011). Beyond the negotiating table, there is also growing evidence that broad public buy-in matters for the successful *implementation* of settlements(McKeon, 2005; Nilsson, 2012). In short, a disaffected public can both narrow the set of choices available to negotiators and undermine the implementation of whatever terms combatants agree on, suggesting that broad support for conflict-termination increases the likelihood that peace will last.

Here, I draw on a growing body of research in international relations which indicates that "world-views" – a collection of deeply held, mutually-reinforcing core values – structure much of how people think about war and peace (Hurwitz and Peffley, 1987;

Kertzer and Rathbun, 2015; Stein, 2015; Hetherington and Weiler, 2018).[1]Models of foreign policy preference formation argue that core values inform general orientations towards cooperation and militarism in international affairs, which in turn have implications for attitudes toward specific foreign policy issues (Holsti and Rosenau, 1990; Kertzer and Rathbun, 2015). Research in this vein has found support for psychological characteristics shaping attitudes toward a host of policy issues in international relations, including counter-terror responses (Hetherington and Suhay, 2011), the use of military force (Kertzer and Zeitzoff, 2017), and trade protectionism (Johnston, 2013).

I hypothesize that a person's world-view should also inform how they evaluate negotiated settlement schemes. World-views matter in these contexts because conflict negotiations bring to the fore thorny normative questions about how the participation and behavior of combatants in (costly, painful) wars should be addressed in the post-conflict society (Gibson, 2002). Reaching settlement often requires granting policy concessions to combatants, a proposition that can clash with deeply-held expectations that morally transgressive behavior be punished and not rewarded. In governing how people evaluate and respond to normative transgressions in their daily lives, world-view should also shape how comfortable people are in "trading-off" justice for peace. These differences in world-view, in turn, should help explain dissatisfaction with peace processes.

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[1]World-views, values, dispositions, and personality types are distinct concepts in political psychology, although in practice there is often slippage across these terms in the literature. Here, I conceptualize values as abstract goals (e.g., equality) that generate behavioral dispositions (e.g., a tendency to support restrictions on freedom). A world-view is a collection of core value that are prioritized in an individual and that can be self-reinforcing (Hetherington and Weiler, 2018; Feldman, 2003).

To test these claims, I focus on the recent peace process between the Colombian government and representatives of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)[2]. In October of 2016, Colombian citizens were tasked with participating in a high-stakes referendum vote on the fate of a peace agreement signed by the two sides; if passed, the agreement would have ended one of the longest-running and bloodiest armed conflicts in the world. By contrast, a failed vote meant a high degree of uncertainty about the future of the peace process and the real prospect of a return to arms[3]. The referendum would go on to narrowly fail, in the face of opposition and surprisingly high levels of abstention (Arjona, 2016). I use data from an original survey fielded at the height of the peace process (Tellez, 2019*a*), just two months after the vote. The sample captures responses from more than 20 cities in the more central and urbanized parts of the country, a setting where the FARC has historically received little to no support.[4] As a result, I am able to explore the preferences of a set of citizens who are effectively on the "same side" of the war yet who exhibited significant disagreement and contestation over the merit of the peace process.

The results support the notion that world-view moderates how citizens evaluate settlement schemes. Using a conjoint experiment that asked participants to choose among peace agreements with randomly varying attributes, I show that citizens who

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[2]"Peace without impunity" was a common refrain in protests and social media in opposition to the peace process.

[3]Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos famously said there was "no plan B" should the referendum fail.

[4]Nationally representative samples from LAPOP find little open support for the group; experimental approaches meant to elicit sensitive responses reach similar conclusions (Matanock and García-Sánchez, 2018). In their first outing as a political party the FARC won a mere 0.33% of the vote (Daniels, 2018).

hold more fixed, or 'authoritarian', world-views[5] – who are less tolerant of moral ambiguity and more aggressive toward groups who threaten the social order (Hetherington and Suhay, 2011; Feldman, 2003; Hetherington and Weiler, 2018) – were substantially less likely to support agreements that treated combatants leniently than those with more 'fluid' world-views. The findings bearing on voting behavior during the referendum are somewhat more ambiguous; people with more fixed world-views were significantly more likely to abstain during the peace process than vote in support of the peace agreement, though not more likely to to vote against than vote in favor. While unexpected, additional testing suggests child-rearing is not tapping into a general propensity to vote, and further analysis indicates abstainers most closely resembled "No" voters in their settlement preferences. It may be that if the success of peace-building depends, at least in part, on broad, public buy-in (Nilsson, 2012), the lack of support signaled by abstention could ultimately be as problematic as a "No" vote.

The study expands a burgeoning research agenda at the intersection of political science and psychology that explores how citizens evaluate security policy but that has paid less attention to internal conflicts (Kertzer and Tingley, 2018, p.325). In doing so, the article makes four contributions. First, the failed Colombian peace referendum sharply illustrates how a divided public can stall conflict-termination efforts. The results of the study suggest these divisions can be especially difficult to overcome given their grounding in clashing world-views and efforts by elites to emphasize these differences (Hetherington and Weiler, 2018). Second, while a mature literature on the termination of civil wars has emphasized first-strike advantage and relative power disparities (Wal-

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[5]The child-rearing scale used here to characterize individual world-view is also discussed in the political psychology literature as 'authoritarianism' (Hetherington and Suhay, 2011) or 'need for security' (Johnston, 2013). I follow Hetherington and Weiler (2018) in largely using the less normatively charged dichotomy of 'fixed' and 'fluid'.

ter, 1997; Fearon, 1998), the current study points to public opinion dynamics as an additional source of commitment problems in conflict-termination. Third, the study sheds light on the micro-foundations of public opinion models that assume stable, consistent preferences for managing conflict (e.g., 'hawks' vs. 'doves') (Schultz, 2005), and in the process speaks to the roots of public division in societies at war. Finally, while initially painting a bleak picture for practitioners looking to balance realistic settlement terms against public demands, the findings also suggest improvements in public support can be made at the margins despite world-view differences by incorporating reform provisions that boost social welfare.

The context of the Colombian peace process also makes contributions to varied strands of research on the political psychology of war. For one, the vast majority of experimental research on values and security-policy preferences has been conducted in Global North countries, which presents a significant challenge to generalizability in this literature (Perez and Hetherington, 2014). Further, experimental evidence from countries experiencing *ongoing* conflict negotiations is rare. The timing of the current study is opportune as participants are actively thinking and forming opinions about an actual, high-stakes peace process, rather than imagining hypothetical security scenarios.

Values and World-Views in the Study of Wartime Preferences

Understanding how civil wars end has long been of interest to political scientists. Drawing on bargaining models of war from the international relations literature (Fearon, 1994), prominent accounts have argued that informational asymmetries, commitment problems, and other factors inherent to bargaining processes are significant barriers to conflict-termination in civil wars (Walter, 2009; Mattes and Savun, 2010). Yet while domestic audiences figure prominently in models of bargaining and conflictual behavior

in the international arena (Tomz, 2007), public opinion has remained relatively absent in accounts of civil war dynamics and conflict-termination.[6]

In spite of this, historical trends indicate there is reason to believe publics matter in conflict-termination. Since the 1970s, civil conflicts have tended to sprout in countries with more democratic institutions, while negotiated settlements have become the most common form of conflict-termination in the post-Cold War period (Matanock and Garcia-Sanchez, 2017). State actors subject to electoral pressures may thus face significant constraints at the negotiating table if public opinion radically diverges from elite preferences (Kertzer and Zeitzoff, 2017). Moreover, qualitative and correlational evidence indicates that generating public buy-in for peace processes is important to the durability of agreements (McKeon, 2005; Paris, 2004; Nilsson, 2012). Key aspects of conflict-termination, such as the demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants, crucially depend on local trust and support for the post-conflict transition. The public should thus matter to scholars of subnational conflict, both as a way to understand the bargaining process and as a way to promote peaceful post-conflict transitions.

Scholars seeking to understand the role of the public in international affairs have increasingly turned to unpacking the micro-foundations of foreign policy attitudes (Kertzer, 2017). Part of a "turn" in international relations towards psychology and behavioral economics[7], the past two decades have produced a substantial body of evidence showing that world-views and values structure much of how foreign policy preferences are formed. In contrast to public opinion models that suggested the foreign policy pref-

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[6]Civilian attitudes *have* played an important role in the literature on counterinsurgency and terrorism (Lyall, Blair and Imai, 2013; Bueno de Mesquita and Dickson, 2007), yet this literature has tended to focus more on patterns of support among civilians for the warring sides, less on the role that public disunity can have in derailing conflict-termination.

[7]See Kertzer and Tingley (2018) and (Hafner-Burton et al., 2017) for helpful overviews.

erences of the public were either: a) uninformed and largely incoherent (Holsti, 1992; Lippmann, 1955) or b) effectively elite-led due to informational asymmetries (Berinsky, 2007; Baum and Groeling, 2009), these bottom-up models argue that even low-information individuals are still guided in their evaluations by general orientations (Hurwitz and Peffley, 1987; Kertzer and Zeitzoff, 2017).[8] More specifically, this line of research argues that the values people draw on to make everyday decisions map onto general orientations towards militarism and cooperation in international affairs (Rathbun et al., 2016).

The micro-foundations of public preferences in *subnational* conflict are, however, much less systematically developed. Research on civilian attitudes in civil wars has tended to focus more narrowly on the mechanisms linking victimization and broad political outcomes and attitudes (Bauer et al., 2016; Hirsch-Hoefler et al., 2016; Dorff, 2017). What work has explicitly considered values and psychological processes tends to focus on how values affect broad orientations towards conflict-termination or antipathy to out-groups (Halperin, Canetti-Nisim and Hirsch-Hoefler, 2009; Canetti-Nisim et al., 2009), rather than specific conflict-termination schemes. Importantly, the actual content of agreements have remained largely absent from such accounts even as research indicates the design of agreement matters for public support (Matanock and Garbiras-Díaz, 2018). As a result, it is often unclear what aspects of conflict-termination schemes people are responding to, or how civilians form preferences among competing policy goals.

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[8]Though see also recent work on misperceptions, false beliefs, and conspiratorial thinking in civilian attitudes (Nyhan and Zeitzoff, 2018*b*,*a*).

How World-views Shape Division During Negotiations

Here, I present an account of how an individual's broader world-view can inform their attitude toward negotiated settlements. I conceptualize a world-view as a set of core values that an individual prioritizes and draws on in their daily life, while acknowledging that some of the literature also characterizes these general orientations as personality types (Hetherington and Weiler, 2018; Feldman, 2003). My expectation is that an individual's wold-view will come to bear on the terms under which they would support a negotiated settlement. This process has implications on their willingness to support conflict negotiations more generally; if an individual's world-view constrains the set of settlement terms that they find acceptable then the person will, on the whole, be less amenable to conflict negotiations than people who don't hold those values.

While there are many dimensions along which citizens might evaluate the prospect of conflict negotiations, they are often faced with one central dilemma: most people want to see the conflict come to an end, and yet negotiations often require that warring actors be granted clemency and/or other unpopular political concessions to incentivize disarmament (Gibson, 2002). Provisions such as amnesty, or political concessions that appear to 'reward' combatants, may violate deeply-ingrained expectations that retribution be taken against those perceived guilty of wrong-doing (Vidmar, 2002; David and Choi, 2009). On the other hand, conflicts that have to be negotiated will almost inevitably involve some level of concession to the warring sides (Toft, 2010).

The moral question civilians must evaluate then is whether the 'good' of ending the war outweighs the 'bad' of allowing (out-group) combatants to go unpunished. Various factors might shape this calculation, including previous conflict experiences or how exposed one is to the potential for future combat (Beber, Roessler and Scacco, 2014). I contend, however, that how civilians answer this question will also critically depend

on their broader world-view, and particularly their priors about how society should respond to social transgressions. For some, bad behavior *must* be punished, and this perspective carries over into broad aspects of social and political life, such as responses to crime or adherence to social norms (Sargent, 2004). Others experience normative transgressions much less acutely, and are less demanding of punishment for actors who disrupt the social order. These dispositional differences in response to normative transgressions should help determine how people evaluate the trade-off between peace and justice at the heart of conflict negotiations.

One way of characterizing these dispositional differences is in terms of 'fixed' and 'fluid' world-views, or what is more conventionally discussed in the literature as authoritarian and non-authoritarian personalities (Hetherington and Weiler, 2018).[9] People who hold 'fixed' world-views, or who analogously score high on 'authoritarianism', tend to see the world as a threatening and dangerous place that necessitates a strict social order (Duckitt, 2001; Lavine et al., 2002). They also tend to display a cognitive style characterized by rigidity, dogmatism, and intolerance of nuance and ambiguity (see Jost et al. (2003) for a meta-analysis). More importantly for the purposes of conflict-resolution, prioritizing social order leads individuals to have strong, adverse responses to groups who violate social norms, and ultimately to support the use of sanctions and other punishment to discourage future violations (Feldman, 2003). As a result, research has shown that people who score high on authoritarianism are more likely to endorse punitive responses to terrorism and support restrictions on the civil liberties of political dissidents (Hetherington and Suhay, 2011; Cohen and Smith, 2016; Tibon and Blumberg,

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[9]I follow Hetherington and Weiler (2018) in using the 'fixed'/'fluid' dichotomy to avoid the potentially pejorative and politically charged 'authoritarianism', though I use the terms interchangeably throughout. As discussed by Hetherington and Weiler (2018), these two ideal-type world-views are defined by an opposing set of core values.

1999). They also perceive norm violators as more threatening and less justified in their actions than their counterparts (Halperin and Bar-Tal, 2011).

'Fixed' vs. 'fluid' world-views are a useful dichotomy for understanding how values inform conflict-termination attitudes. For one, fixed (or authoritarian) world-views and their correlates are widely studied and well-validated in the literature. Longitudinal studies of twins have found authoritarianism to be highly stable and rooted partly in genetic[10] factors (Ludeke and Krueger, 2013). Recent work has also found that authoritarianism influences public mood across many countries (Cohen and Smith, 2016; De Regt, Mortelmans and Smits, 2011). Moreover, authoritarianism has been shown to be a driving force in public disagreement over important domestic policy issues, and there is reason to expect they should matter in the context of civil wars (Hetherington and Weiler, 2009; Halperin and Bar-Tal, 2011). Of course, I also recognize that the opposing set of values that comprise the fixed/fluid dichotomy are conceptually and empirically related to other, specific values (e.g., vengeance in Stein (2015)) or sets of values (e.g., conservation in Schwartz (1992)) that might also be used to understand differences in disposition towards conflict-termination.

It is worth clarifying that these differences in world-view are not simply reducible to political ideology. People who hold fixed world-views may go on to adopt politically conservative ideologies, especially in Western societies where preserving a stable social order is a traditional objective of the right (Jost et al., 2003). However, research suggests people sort along partisan lines to match their social identification and dispo-

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[10]Whether authoritarianism is largely genetically determined (Ludeke and Krueger, 2013) or learned (Altemeyer, 1988; Feldman, 2003)is beyond the scope of this paper. I contend that the world-views discussed here are deeply ingrained, either through genetic influence or through early socialization in the family. Most importantly, I conceptualize these world-views to be causally prior to the many political beliefs or attitudes that correlate with conflict-termination preferences.

sitions, and that there is no necessary correspondence between world-view and partisan affiliation (Mason, 2015; Hetherington and Weiler, 2018). In addition, while older measures of authoritarianism included items that directly capture social conservatism (Altemeyer, 1996), newer scales (like the one used here) avoid this confounding by asking respondents about non-political topics (Feldman, 2003).

These core differences in world-view, which organize much of how people respond to normative transgressions, should also manifest in the realm of conflict negotiations. Overall, given their deep aversion to groups that threaten the social order, individuals who hold more fixed world-views should prefer settlement terms that are punitive and place more restrictions on combatants. World-view should also have implications for what happens when negotiated settlements are reached. Negotiations (almost by definition) imply some level of concessions to the warring sides (Toft, 2010), many of which might be broadly unpopular. How willing an individual is to accept those concessions in exchange for peace should be partly a function of how rigid or flexible they are in their general orientation, with individuals who hold more fixed world-views being less comfortable accepting these trade-offs than their counterparts. The result is that, in the average peace process, people who hold more fixed world-views will likely be less supportive of agreements.[11]

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[11]Another way to conceptualize these differences is in terms of differing conceptions of justice, where people with fixed world-views prefer a more punitive, 'eye for an eye' style of justice while those with fluid world-views prefer more restorative or conciliatory approaches, which mirrors writing on moral evaluations of foreign policy (Rathbun et al., 2016). While differing conceptions of justice need not translate into varying levels of support for peace processes, in practice agreements involve concessions that should, all else equal, render those with strong demands for punitive terms less supportive of peace agreements more broadly.

H1. People with fixed world-views will prefer more punitive settlement terms than people with fluid world-views.

Empirical Strategy

The Colombian Peace Process

The Colombian armed conflict is a multi-party war stretching back to the early 1960s, rendering it one of the oldest ongoing conflicts in the world. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, negotiations successfully demobilized some of the smaller armed groups active in the country, though peace with the largest organizations – the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN) – remained elusive (Nasi, 2009). A failed peace process in the late 1990s helped bring to power *mano dura* political figure Alvaro Uribe, spurring a decade of intense combat between the FARC, military forces, and varied paramilitary organizations (Nasi and Rettberg, Forthcoming). In 2012, however, Uribe's successor – Juan Manuel Santos – began a series of secret talks with FARC leadership in Havana, Cuba, ultimately resulting in a signed peace agreement between the two sides in 2016.

Negotiations in Cuba hinged on six broad points (La Silla Vacia, 2017). These included: agrarian reform, including potential land redistribution; the nature of FARC electoral participation and the creation of new Congressional seats in conflict-afflicted areas (Matanock and Garbiras-Díaz, 2018); the reintegration and disarmament process, such as how FARC members would destroy weapons and demobilize; reforms to the country's counter-narcotic policy and the prosecution of drug-related crimes in the conflict; transitional justice, including the creation of a truth and reconciliation process, the prosecution of war-related crimes, and victims' reparations; and finally how the agreement would be implemented.

The signed agreement was subject to a popular referendum vote in October of 2016 with a simple yes/no question that, if approved a plurality of voters, would turn the agreement into law. The referendum infamously failed to pass by an incredibly thin margin (Spagat, 2016), sending the agreement back to the negotiating table for revisions.[12] Broadly speaking, the re-negotiation process resulted in the FARC making more concessions on a variety of issues, and the new agreement was sent to Congress for approval instead of a new referendum.

The 2016 Colombian peace process is a particularly interesting context to study how values and world-views shape public division in civil conflicts. Apart from the fact that public opinion directly impacted the course of the peace process, conflicts around the world are increasingly taking place in more democratic countries where leaders, subject to electoral pressures, may be constrained by public responses to conflict negotiations, or seek to use public input to legitimize agreements (Matanock and Garcia-Sanchez, 2017). Moreover, while the 'anti-peace' coalition ultimately included varied political interests (Arjona, 2016), there was significant debate within the public on both the merit of negotiation itself but also the terms of the signed agreement.

Survey

Data for the study comes from a survey fielded between November and December of 2016, a few months after the peace process referendum vote (Tellez, 2019*a*). Census data from the National Department of Statistics (DANE) was used to develop a sampling frame targeting voting-age adults. The 1,000 captured responses were distributed over 20 municipalities in six major populated regions, with the resulting sample consisting of large and mid-sized cities across Colombia's urban-leaning center. The sample has

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[12]Among referendum voters, 49.78% voted in favor, 50.22% voted against. Overall turnout was 37.43%.

the advantage of representing the most heavily populated and electorally valuable segments of Colombia, although the results cannot speak directly to the more peripheral, rural, and conflict-afflicted parts of the country.

The timing and geographic coverage of the sample presents a number of advantages for testing the effect of values on conflict-termination preferences. For one, the fact that the peace agreement was subject to popular referendum allows us to measure how respondents feel about a particular peace process and not a hypothetical one. Furthermore, the mostly urban and central nature of the sample provides a cleaner test of how values inform negotiation preferences: on the whole, urbanite Colombians are much more similar to each other in terms of what they stand to gain or lose in the peace process than they are to rural Colombians who face greater conflict exposure (Arjona, 2016). This gives us more confidence that differences in world-views are not being confounded by differences in personal stake in the conflict.

Measuring World-Views

To measure fixed and fluid world-views I use a scale that asks respondents to make four comparisons of values they would rather see in children, pitting values associated with rigidity and respect for authority against individualism (Hetherington and Weiler, 2009). This scale has largely supplanted the traditional "authoritarianism" scale in response to criticisms that the latter conflates political conservatism with adherence to authority (Stenner, 2005). Importantly, the scale fits the conceptualization of world-views discussed in this study: a set of highly personal values that guide everyday life (i.e., beliefs about the best way to raise children) that ultimately shape conflict-termination preferences. I assign respondents a score from 0 to 4 based on how many authoritarian qualities they choose.

One of the benefits of using the child-rearing scale to measure differences in world-view is its decidedly 'pre-political' nature. Use of scales or items that directly measure respondent views on punishment and social transgressions might inadvertently capture conflict effects as well; for example, it is likely that the lengthy and costly Colombian conflict might have pushed some segments of the population to believe that harsh, punitive responses are necessary to address social issues. It is less likely, however, that the conflict could have an impact on people's beliefs about child-rearing. Instead, a combination of impulses beyond individual's control and learned responses from upbringing and life experiences produce the divergent world-views measured by the child-rearing scale (Hetherington and Weiler, 2018).

Cronbach's alpha for the four items is .58 and the mean (scaled between zero and one) is .73.[13] Cronbach's alpha is relatively low but not inordinate for the short version of the child-rearing scale scale used here and in other studies (Hetherington and Suhay, 2011).[14] As a point of reference, I leverage data from the Latin American Public Opinion Poll's 2012 cross-national surveys, where a similar scale was implemented for a nationally representative sample of citizens across Latin America. Figure A.3 shows that the sample average is similar to that found across the LAPOP surveys, while Table A.2 shows that Cronbach's alpha is moderately higher in the sample than across the

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[13]Reliability worsens if any one measure is dropped from the scale, indicating that it is preferable to use all four items in the measure.

[14]While it is always better to obtain less noisy measures of a construct, there is reason to expect low reliability will not lead to faulty inference in this particular instance. A recent study finds that short batteries tend to produce coefficient estimates that are closer to zero and less precise than estimates from longer batteries (Bakker and Lelkes, 2018). In the current study, this trend would bias *against* rejecting the null.

LAPOP surveys. Figure A.2 presents the distribution of responses in the sample against the LAPOP 2012 samples and also demonstrates they are similar.

Conjoint Experiment

In order to test how differences in world-view shape evaluations of negotiated settlements I rely on a discrete-choice conjoint experiment (Hainmueller, Hopkins and Yamamoto, 2014). In the experiment, participants are shown two hypothetical peace agreements and asked to choose which they would rather see implemented in the country.[15] The terms of the peace agreement are randomly determined, allowing me to estimate the effect that any one term has on the probability that an agreement is chosen in the comparison task. Moreover, since the effect of all attribute levels are measured on the same scale, the relative importance of each attribute can be determined. Participants completed five comparison tasks. Figure A.1 in the Appendix provides a snapshot of what participants saw in a comparison task.

To establish the universe of all possible agreements that a respondent might encounter in the experiment I examined the signed Colombian peace agreement and extracted the most relevant dimensions over which the FARC and the Colombian government debated (Presidencia de la Republica, 2016). I focus on six key dimensions discussed in the agreement: transitional justice (the extent to which armed combatants face jail time); reparations (the extent to which victims are compensated for losses); electoral participation (the extent to which armed combatants are allowed to participate in elections); reintegration (whether armed combatants receive economic assistance in reintegrating); land reform (extent to which land is redistributed to landless peasants); and drug policy reform (approach used by government in counter-narcotic

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[15]The experiment was administered in person on tablets. Participants were able to look at the tablet and compare the two agreements side-by-side before choosing.

efforts). While other dimensions were discussed during negotiations, these are easily the most important as they define key aspects of the post-conflict transition (La Silla Vacia, 2017). For each of the six key dimensions of the agreement I establish three potential terms, or levels, that a dimension can take on in the experiment. This gives each dimension an ordinal quality, allowing me to test how an individual's world-view moderates preferences for "strengthening" or "weakening" different agreement dimensions.

The conjoint experiment and the set of potential terms are summarized in Table 1.[16]

Table 1: Conjoint experiment attributes and levels.

Provision Type	Attribute	Levels
Transitional Justice	Retributive Justice	FARC members don't go to jail, Only human right violators go to jail, All FARC members go to jail
Transitional Justice	Reparations	FARC do not make reparations of victims, FARC ask forgiveness from victims, FARC give monetary reparations to victims
Political	FARC Elections	Demobilized fighters cannot compete in elections, Demobilized fighters can compete in elections, Demobilized fighters can compete in elections and have 5 guaranteed seats in Congress
Reintegration	Economic Assistance	No help from the government for demobilized, A salary equivalent to 90% of minimum wage for two years, A salary equivalent to 2 times the minimum wage for two years
Reform	Land Distribution	No transfer, Small transfer of land to landless peasants, Large transfer of land to landless peasants
Reform	Drug Policy Reform	Aerial fumigation, Manual eradication, Cultivation substitution program

Results

World-Views and Peace Agreement Preferences

I begin by discussing the results of the conjoint experiment. My interest here is in testing whether an individual's world-view significantly moderates the types of agree-

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[16]While most war crimes were committed by state actors and paramilitary groups, punishment or other restrictive settlement terms for these actors were not under serious consideration during the peace process.

ments they support. As a result, I follow the strategy in (Hainmueller, Hopkins and Yamamoto, 2014) for estimating average marginal component effects (AMCE), and interact a respondent's child-rearing score with an indicator for each of the terms included in the hypothetical agreement. To ease interpretation, I first treat each agreement dimension as ordinal (on a scale from 1 to 3), which allows me to test whether world-views moderate preferences for strengthening or weakening agreement *dimensions* (e.g., harsher or more lenient retributive justice terms).

Figure 1 plots the coefficient estimates from the model interacting the child-rearing score with each agreement dimension (full regression table in Appendix Table A.3). The results indicate that world-views significantly moderate people's preferences in three of the six agreement dimensions: retributive justice provisions, reintegration provisions, and electoral provisions. On the whole, people who score high on the child-rearing scale are much more likely to prefer agreements with more punitive retributive justice terms than those who score low. Those with fixed world-views are also less likely to support agreements that provide insurgents with higher levels of reintegration assistance, or grants them more concessions to participate in politics. On the other hand, world-views do not seem to consistently moderate preferences for land reform, drug policy reform, or victims' reparations.

These patterns are largely consistent with the expectation that individuals with more fixed world-views will have preferences for more punitive and restrictive conditions for agreements than their counterparts. Questions of how insurgents will be punished (retributive justice) or what they will gain from negotiations (electoral and reintegration provisions) clearly animates people differently based on their broader world-view. By contrast, varying world-views do not appear to produce differences in attitudes toward land and drug policy reform, issues that are less directly linked to the

Figure 1: Coefficient estimates for model interacting child-rearing score with each agreement dimension. Outcome is whether the relevant agreement was chosen in choice task. Standard errors clustered at participant-level.

punishment of insurgents. Interestingly, people with fixed world-views do not seem to be differentially responsive to terms that boost reparation efforts.

To further unpack which *terms* are driving preferences, I estimate a model interacting the child-rearing score with an indicator of each individual term that appeared in the experiment. To address concerns about multiple comparisons, I use a Bayesian variable selection method, LassoPlus, that zeros out all but the most robust interaction effects among a large set of potential interactions (Ratkovic and Tingley, 2017). Appendix Figure A.5 presents consistently non-zero effects from the model.

The results indicate that for the three dimensions that interact with views on child-rearing, it is consistently the most extreme level that produces significant differences. The effects are substantively large and produce sharp divisions among respondents.

For people with more fixed world-views, an agreement that sends all FARC members to jail is almost 12% points more likely to be chosen in the experiment than one that grants amnesty (Figure 2). Meanwhile, the same provision has no effect on people at the low end of the scale. We see similar patterns with respect to the size of economic assistance packages for demobilized fighters and electoral participation, where those with fixed world-views prefer agreements that restrict benefits and punish combatants.[17] That the child-rearing scale only significantly interacts with these more extreme agreement terms could indicate that world-views play a more prominent role when comparing starkly different settlement schemes.

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[17]These patterns are similar if we calculate marginal means and differences in marginal means instead of AMCEs as suggested in Leeper, Hobolt and Tilley (2018) (Figure A.6).

Figure 2: Average marginal component effects of agreement terms across child-rearing scale levels.

The results paint a potentially bleak picture of public divisions over conflict negotiations; if world-views are deeply ingrained, is there anything that can be done to improve public support for agreements? I explore this question more substantively in Figure 3. I estimate the predicted probability of a profile being chosen in the experiment that closely resembles the actual peace agreement (in red) as well as predicted probabilities for agreements that contain slight modifications (in green), at both high (scoring four out of four) and low (scoring one out of four) levels of the child-rearing scale.

While it is evident that increasing jail-time will please those with more fixed world-views, there is room to make improvements that does not involve dealing with the

difficult question of amnesty. Making land reform provisions more robust and reforming drug policy to provide peasants with incentives to transition to the licit economy are popular among those who score low on the child-rearing scale and (at worst) don't seem to decrease support among their those at the other end of the scale. Importantly, these are both terms which the FARC favored in negotiations (La Silla Vacia, 2017), making them more feasible to negotiate than terms bearing on transitional justice, where FARC leadership is less likely to make concessions.

Figure 3: Predicted probability of an agreement being chosen by respondents, comparing the actual agreement (red) against modified agreements (green).

World-Views and Voting Behavior

Next, I move beyond general preferences and examine how differences in world-view manifested in voting behavior during the peace process. I use a question that asked respondents how they voted (if at all) during the October referendum[18]. The referendum asked voters whether they were in favor of the signed agreement being implemented, with the understanding that a plurality of favorable votes would turn the agreement into law, while the consequences of failure were highly uncertain. Approximately one-third of the sample abstained from the vote and, indeed, abstention was significantly higher during the referendum than during prior elections (Arjona, 2016). As a result, I treat vote choice as a categorical variable with three values (voting yes, voting no, or not voting; reference category is "vote yes"), and fit multinomial logit models to estimate how differences in world-view shaped vote choice.

Analyzing vote choice during the October 2016 referendum presents a number of advantages. A key part of the argument is that an individual's world-view will moderate how comfortable they are with allowing transgressions to go unpunished. Since most brokered agreements will likely contain unpopular or controversial concessions, what is at stake is how willing a person is to put aside their misgivings and support the opportunity for peace.[19] The expectation then is that for most agreements, people who hold

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[18]The timing of the survey (*after* the referendum vote) may raise concerns that respondents are experiencing biased recall. The survey was fielded only about 6 weeks after the vote, which may weigh against this concern, as studies of biased recall in vote behavior often consider longer time periods (Joslyn, 2003). Of course, this concern cannot be fully dispelled and I simply note it here.

[19]Indeed, part of what is striking about the Colombian case is that while surveys leading up to the referendum showed that the individual agreement provisions were almost universally unpopular (Matanock and Garbiras-Díaz, 2018; Matanock and Garcia-Sanchez, 2017), many citizens ultimately voted in favor of the agreement.

more fixed world-views should be less likely to support it than others. The high-stakes of the October 2016 referendum is a particularly salient context in which to explore how comfortable people are in putting aside justice concerns for an opportunity at end a long and bloody conflict.

I control for various factors that could confound the relationship between world-view and vote choice. These include variables that might predict both views on child-rearing and voting behavior, particularly predictors of voter turnout, including age; gender; an indicator of whether the respondent had voted in an election in the pre-vious five years; and income, based on the National Statistical Agency (DANE) five-level characterization of citizen's socioeconomic level. Given the politicized nature of the peace process I also control for whether respondents self-identify as supporters of ex-President Uribe, a staunch opponent of the peace process who generally embodies an aggressive, military solution to the conflict.

Figure 4 plots predicted probabilities for each of the three vote choice categories, moving across the child-rearing scale (regression results available in Appendix Table A.6). Interestingly, I find no significant difference in the probability of voting either 'yes' or 'no' across the child-rearing scale. Instead, what we see is a substantial turnout gap where the probability of abstention rises dramatically in respondents' child-rearing scores, from approximately 10% for respondents with the most fluid world-views to 40% for their more rigid counterparts. Respondents with the most fixed world-views are, in fact, more likely to be predicted to abstain than to vote in either direction, although there is a lot of uncertainty in these estimates. These results are robust to including a set of controls bearing on voter turnout as well as to fitting the model to a subset of likely-voter respondents who reported voting in a recent election (Appendix Table A.6). Moreover, world-view does not appear to significantly predict having voted in a prior

Figure 4: Predicted probability of vote choice category, moving across child-rearing score levels.

election (Appendix Table A.7). In all, this suggests that the relationship between world-views and abstention is something over and above a *general* tendency to participate.[20]

A key question in light of these findings is whether abstention can be interpreted as a refusal to support the peace process. In one obvious sense, not voting for a policy (all else equal) is less supportive of that policy than voting for it. More generally, however, abstention represents a lack of investment that is problematic from the perspective of

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[20]The results are also robust to whether or not I include a control for support for Uribe, a factor strongly correlated with vote choice and which is plausibly causally downstream ('post-treatment') from world-views (Appendix Table A.6).

peace-building. A key motivation behind the use of referendums is to stave off future spoilers who seek to undermine the settlement (Matanock and Garcia-Sanchez, 2017). Overwhelming support for the agreement signals that the agreement has broad legitimacy, while weak turnout or substantial opposition present opportunities for post-hoc 'renegotiation' of the agreement.[21] From the perspective of conflict-termination, then, non-voters can be as problematic as no-voters. Moreover, while the tally of votes in favor and against might matter in any particular referendum, the broader challenge negotiators and peace advocates face is mobilizing support among broad segments of civil society (McKeon, 2005; Nilsson, 2012).[22] Finally, if we compare the estimated peace agreement preferences of abstainers and no-voters we see that there are striking similarities between the two groups (Figure 5), which suggests that the choice of abstention is not merely a matter of people being indifferent to the agreement that was on the table.

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[21]The question of turnout was particularly salient in the Colombian case, where the agreement needed to pass a minimum turnout threshold to be legally binding. Although the referendum represented a historic vote that received unprecedented media coverage, turnout was historically *low* (38%) compared to the last presidential election (49%).

[22]A different question is on the implications for vote totals if a subset of voters that is likely to oppose agreements (those with fixed world-views) tend to sit out of referendums. On the one hand, this dynamic may, unexpectedly, make passing agreements via referendum easier. On the other hand, low turnout may undermine the legitimacy of the agreement or give actors a sense that there is opportunity for future reneging. More broadly, however, referendums are rarely used in peace processes, and the focus of this paper is less on the particularities of referendum voting and more on the factors that shape support or opposition for peace agreements.

Figure 5: Predicted probability of an agreement being chosen by respondents, comparing 'yes' voters, 'no' voters, and abstainers. The actual agreement (red) against modified agreements (green).

Conclusion

Contrary to top-down accounts of public opinion, a growing body of work suggests public mood can exert force on varied political processes (Kertzer and Zeitzoff, 2017). In societies at war, an antagonistic public mood can both constrict the set of choices available to negotiators and derail implementation of whatever terms armed actors agree on. This is particularly true in deeply divided societies or where incumbents face significant political challenge. Embattled elites may use public input – in the form of public referendum, for example – to strengthen and institutionalize peace agreements,

even if such public input has the potential to backfire (Matanock and Garcia-Sanchez, 2017). Even in cases where referendums are not used to solidify settlements, however, an ambivalent public has the potential to exacerbate commitment problems by opening doors to future reneging (Flores and Nooruddin, 2011). These dynamics make it important to understand the roots of public dissatisfaction with conflict-termination schemes.

The study considers the micro-foundations of public support for peace agreements and suggests that deeply ingrained world-views help structure wartime public opinion. Peace agreements present civilians with a trade-off between ending the conflict and potentially letting groups they see as deserving punishment walk away unscathed. I show that people who hold fixed world-views are particularly uncomfortable with forgoing punishment, and further that this demand for more punitive settlement terms reduces their level of investment in peace processes. This finding supports the notion that the *design* of peace agreements has important implications for public support, and particularly, how agreements balance competing goals.

While shedding light on the role of world-views in wartime public opinion, the current study is also open to critiques that present avenues for future research. For one, the complexity and length of peace agreements means that publics are ultimately dependent on elites and the media to condense and describe an agreement's contents. This opens the door to framing strategies that can potentially push public opinion at the margins (Chong and Druckman, 2007; Carlin, McCoy and Subotic, Forthcoming), for example by emphasizing the retributive shortcomings of an agreement and obscuring more universally appealing terms. On the other hand, differences in world-view may moderate the effectiveness of framing strategies by anchoring individuals in favor or in opposition to conflict negotiations. Work that explicitly considers how values and elite cues interact in wartime public opinion is thus needed.

Second, it is likely that public demand for punishment will depend on how egregiously the group in question behaved throughout the course of the war (Wayne, 2019). This is particularly relevant with respect to authoritarianism, where the degree to which a group is perceived as violating the social order shapes demands for punishment. Perceptions of wrong-doing may be a function of individual knowledge, personal exposure to the conflict, or media representations of the war (González, 2015). While the current study cannot manipulate perceptions of the FARC, future work that, for example, experimentally reminds participants of egregious armed group behavior might be particularly illustrative.

Third, while the sample captures preferences among the electorally powerful central parts of the country, there are also concerns about whether results generalize to more rural, peripheral, and conflict-afflicted areas. How conflict-exposure, world-views, and preferences interact is particularly important given that some work suggests proximity to conflict increases support for reconciliation (Tellez, 2019*b*). Another possibility is that, just as there is cross-national variation in what values societies prioritize (Schwartz, 1992), there may be differences between urban and rural citizens in how they conceptualize child-rearing. My hypothesis is that in areas at risk of conflict resurgence, the desire for safety might overwhelm considerations of right and wrong, such that world-view clashes are more salient in the (relatively) safer center. If true, this suggests the need for varying approaches to the promotion of peace-building across the center-periphery divide.

Finally, the nature of the Colombian civil war – a non-identitarian conflict where the main rebel group, the FARC, holds little popular support – raises questions about how the findings presented here travel to contexts where civilians are mobilized along the major cleavage of the war. I expect that differences in world-view would produce similar divisions among *co-partisans* in highly-identitarian conflicts, such that those who

oppose conciliation and demand more punishment on either side of the war will trend towards authoritarianism. Similar work in other contexts, however, is needed to test this conjecture.

Acknowledgments

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