

Challenge Questions

Q: Record any observed symptoms of infection from initial detonation. What are the main symptoms of a WannaCry infection?

A:

- Desktop wallpaper changed
- Notification systems are infected, countdown timer and pay buttons
- Many files on the system are encrypted with the extension .WNCRY

Q: Use FLOSS and extract the strings from the main WannaCry binary. Are there any strings of interest?

A:

```
\\172.16.99[.]5\IPC$  
\192.168.56[.]20\IPC$  
http://www.iuqerfsodp9ifjaposdfjhgosurijfaewrwergwea[.]com  
taskdl.exe  
taskse.exe  
C:\%s\%s  
mssecsvc.exe  
%s -m security  
C:\%s\qeriuwjhrf  
C:\%s\%s  
tasksche.exe
```

Q: Inspect the import address table for the main WannaCry binary. Are there any notable API imports?

A: ReadFile, CreateFileA, InternetOpenA, Sleep, InternetOpenUrlA, GetAdaptersInfo, GetPerAdapterInfo, CreateServiceA, StartServiceA, OpenServiceA, OpenSCManagerA, CryptGenRandom, CryptAcquireContextA, v.v.

Q: What conditions are necessary to get this sample to detonate?

A:

- Malware tries to connect a url:
http://www.iuqerfsodp9ifjaposdfjhgosurijfaewrwergwea[.]com
- If connection is not established => ransomware payload is executed.
- If connection is established => the program exits
- In a lab environment, inetsim must be turned off

Q: Network Indicators: Identify the network indicators of this malware

A:

- Attempted access of the weird URL
- Flood of numerous SMB connection requests
- taskhsvc.exe opens port 9050 to a LISTENING state

Q: Host-based Indicators: Identify the host-based indicators of this malware.

A:

- New directory with a random character name is created in C:\ProgramData\
- Directory is set to hidden
- This directory contains many artifacts from Wanacry
- A new service is created to start tasksche.exe as a persistent executable

Q: Use Cutter to locate the killswitch mechanism in the decompiled code and explain how it functions.

A:

```
1 int __stdcall WinMain(HINSTANCE hInstance, HINSTANCE hPrevInstance, LPSTR lpCmdLine, int nShowCmd)
2 {
3     void *hInternetOpenA; // esi
4     void *hInternetOpenUrlA; // edi
5     CHAR kill_switch_url[57]; // [esp+8h] [ebp-50h] BYREF
6     int v8; // [esp+41h] [ebp-17h]
7     int v9; // [esp+45h] [ebp-13h]
8     int v10; // [esp+49h] [ebp-Fh]
9     int v11; // [esp+4Dh] [ebp-8h]
10    int v12; // [esp+51h] [ebp-7h]
11    __int16 v13; // [esp+55h] [ebp-3h]
12    char v14; // [esp+57h] [ebp-1h]
13
14    strcpy(kill_switch_url, "http://www.iuqerfsodp9ifjaposdfjhgosurijfaewrwergwea.com");
15    v8 = 0;
16    v9 = 0;
17    v10 = 0;
18    v11 = 0;
19    v12 = 0;
20    v13 = 0;
21    v14 = 0;
22    hInternetOpenA = InternetOpenA(0, 1u, 0, 0, 0);
23    hInternetOpenUrlA = InternetOpenUrlA(hInternetOpenA, kill_switch_url, 0, 0, 0x84000000, 0);
24    InternetCloseHandle(hInternetOpenA);
25    if ( hInternetOpenUrlA )
26    {
27        InternetCloseHandle(hInternetOpenUrlA);
28    }
29    else
30    {
31        InternetCloseHandle(0);
32        wanacry_entry_point();
33    }
34    return 0;
35 }
```