



# Interest arbitrage under capital controls: Evidence from reported entrepôt trades<sup>☆</sup>

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## ARTICLE INFO

### Article history:

Received 13 October 2017

Accepted 22 March 2021

Available online 27 March 2021

### JEL classification:

O24

F23

F33

G15

G18

G12

### Keywords:

Capital controls

RMB Interest arbitrage

Entrepôt trade

Trade finance

## ABSTRACT

Capital controls segment the offshore credit market of Chinese renminbi from the onshore market. Using a novel administrative data set, we provide evidence that firms arbitrage the onshore-offshore interest differentials using bank-intermediated “entrepôt trades,” which supposedly re-export imports with little or no processing. Onshore-offshore interest differentials drive renminbi inflows from entrepôt trades, which strongly predict 1-year-forward outflows to settle bank-issued letters of credit. The patterns and timing of entrepôt trade flows are consistent with lending by onshore banks and borrowing from offshore banks through bank-intermediated trade finance. A larger interest differential allows transactions with a lower value to be profitable and induces entry into arbitrages. Our findings suggest that renminbi interest arbitrages are feasible but costly under capital controls.

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## 1. Introduction

In this paper, we investigate how China's opening up the use of its currency in international trade settlements affects the effectiveness of its capital controls. We provide evidence that Chinese firms report fictitious “entrepôt trades” to circumvent capital controls. These are trades that re-export imports with little or no processing. Since entrepôt trades involve both capital inflows to and outflows from China, they are ideal for circumventing capital controls. Moreover, we show how the letter of credit (hereafter L/C), which is a bank-issued instrument commonly used in bank-intermediated trade finance, enables the interest arbitrage of the renminbi (hereafter RMB, or Chinese yuan) across onshore and offshore markets.

An arbitrageur in China may deposit an amount of RMB in an onshore bank, earning interest at the onshore rate. At the same time, the arbitrageur uses the deposit as collateral for the issuance

of an L/C to an offshore bank with a 1-year maturity and a prescribed beneficiary—namely, the supposed “seller” in the entrepôt trade. The offshore “seller” may then discount the L/C into cash at the offshore rate plus a bank charge. Through a related party—i.e., the offshore “buyer” in the entrepôt trade—the discounted L/C flows back onshore as the cash payment to the arbitrageur acting as an entrepôt trader. If the onshore rate is sufficiently higher than the offshore interest rate, the interest arbitrage described above would be profitable.

Using administrative data on entrepôt-related capital flows from a populous province in China, we show that the onshore-offshore interest differentials for RMB strongly correlate with RMB inflows from entrepôt trades. Moreover, RMB inflows from entrepôt trades closely predict 1-year-forward RMB outflows to settle L/Cs. The timing and characteristics of the associated capital flows are consistent with RMB interest arbitrage through entrepôt trades.

Our findings suggest that onshore-offshore RMB interest arbitrage is feasible but costly. The amount of capital and the number of firms participating in interest arbitrage are driven by onshore-offshore interest differentials, which determine arbitrage profitability. In addition to examining the aggregate value of entrepôt trades, we also examine the size distribution of transactions that settle L/Cs. Fixed costs of entrepôt trades have a larger impact on the profitability of arbitrages with low L/C value than on the

<sup>☆</sup> We thank the referees, Geert Bekaert (the editor), Pasquale Della Corte, Wenxin Du, Cho-hoi Hui, Lorena Keller, Paul Kofman, Yuelin Liu, Xiangjun Ma, Mathieu Parenti, Prasada Rao, Kam Ki Tang, Shino Takayama, Chuanqi Zhu, and participants at the 2020 AFA Annual Meetings for helpful comments and suggestions. Any errors are ours.

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profitability of arbitrage with high L/C value. We find that onshore-offshore interest differentials have a larger impact on 1-year-forward L/C settlements with relatively low transaction value. Meanwhile, we do not find similar patterns for 1-year-forward outflows through wire transfer. Because forward L/C settlements are associated with interest arbitrage while forward wired outflows are not, these results support the presence of fixed costs from using L/Cs and *entrepôt* trades to arbitrage.

Furthermore, we find that a high-interest differential also encourages more firms to engage in *entrepôt* trades; some of the additional *entrepôt* traders are new entries from the beginning of our data set. Since a significant onshore-offshore interest differential exists during a 3-year interval, our findings suggest that the interest arbitrage identified in this paper is limited in its ability to equalize RMB interest rates across the Chinese mainland border.

Our paper contributes to several strands of literature. First, it adds to the literature that investigates the effectiveness of capital controls.<sup>1</sup> Rather than focusing on the effectiveness of imposing capital controls as emergency measures, our paper shows how relaxing some aspect of capital controls may have unintended consequences for capital flows. Our findings suggest that investors may often bypass capital controls, which limits their effectiveness. Therefore, our paper also contributes to the literature on how firms that engage in international trade may circumvent capital controls and, more broadly, regulation and taxation.<sup>2</sup> Moreover, our paper is related to an emerging literature that studies the important roles of financial intermediation in international trade (Schmidt-Eisenlohr, 2013). We show that bank instruments for trade finances may be exploited by trade intermediaries for interest arbitrage.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we discuss the background related to China's capital controls and the RMB's offshore market, illustrate in greater detail how firms may use L/C-financed *entrepôt* trades to arbitrage under capital controls, and describe our data. We present our main findings in Section 3, and Section 4 concludes.

## 2. Background

### 2.1. Capital controls and RMB offshore markets

China has long maintained strict controls on capital flows. The Chinn-Ito index, which measures *de jure* financial openness and is updated to 2018, ranks China's capital accounts among the least open. But tight *de facto* capital controls may be increasingly difficult and costly due to the large volume of trades China now engages in (Prasad and Rajan, 2008). Therefore, policymakers have stated that a gradual and prudent liberalization of capital accounts is a long-term goal. Several policies have been put in place. In particular, for several years the Chinese government has been promoting the use of the RMB for the settlement of international transactions.

The People's Bank of China (hereafter PBC) announced in July 2009 that commercial banks in Shanghai and 4 other cities may provide services for settling cross-border trades in RMB.<sup>3</sup> In June 2010, this pilot program was extended to 20 provinces, including the province in our data set, and all trading partners. In August 2011, China opened cross-border RMB settlements to all other

provinces. A crucial goal of RMB internationalization is to foster an active offshore RMB market. To this end, the PBC established a number of offshore RMB clearinghouses and swap lines with the central banks of several offshore RMB trading centers.

In 2009, virtually none of China's trades were settled in RMB. By 2014, however, almost 20% of goods trades—and about a quarter of service trades and other current-account transactions—were settled in RMB (IMF, 2015). Since China opened up cross-border settlement of trades, offshore RMB deposits have grown rapidly. In 2014, offshore financial institutions had close to 2.5 trillion RMB on deposit, which equals about 1.5% of onshore deposits (IMF, 2015).

Hong Kong intermediates a significant portion of China's trades (Feenstra and Hanson, 2004) and has a head start on the RMB international-settlement business based on favorable policies from Beijing. Given these advantages, Hong Kong has become the primary offshore RMB center, accounting for about half of offshore deposits in 2014.<sup>4</sup>

Capital controls segment onshore and offshore RMB markets, allowing onshore and offshore interest rates to diverge. In Fig. 1, we plot the 3-month interbank offered rates in Shanghai and Hong Kong and their differences. Between mid-2012 and mid-2015, onshore interest rates are higher than the offshore rates for most of the sample period. Onshore-offshore interest rate differentials could be large at times, peaking at 3% around late 2013 and early 2014. The persistent and significant onshore-offshore interest differentials provide opportunities for arbitrage if capital controls can be circumvented. In the following section, we will explain how *entrepôt* trades and bank intermediation facilitate such interest arbitrage.

### 2.2. Interest arbitrage through *entrepôt* trades

*Entrepôt* trades re-export imported goods with little or no processing or repackaging; they match buyers and sellers across the globe, reduce transportation costs, and facilitate evasion of tariffs and other trade barriers.<sup>5</sup> As an *entrepôt* port, for example, Hong Kong intermediates a large portion of China's exports (Feenstra and Hanson, 2004).

Mainland China does not have an *entrepôt* port, and thus Chinese firms usually do not enjoy the advantages of engaging in large-scale *entrepôt* trades. However, Chinese firms may report fictitious *entrepôt* trades to circumvent capital controls. Moreover, L/Cs, which are the dominant instrument for bank-intermediated finance for international goods trades, could enable cross-border interest arbitrage using fictitious *entrepôt* trades.

An L/C is a written document, issued by one bank to another, often overseas, at the request of a buyer of goods. The issuing bank of an L/C guarantees a particular payment to the seller when prescribed documents have been presented. While the payment is due at the maturity of the L/C, the seller may discount its L/C for cash at the overseas bank (Willsher, 1995; McLaughlin, 1949).

Whereas cash in advance (importer finance) and open accounts (exporter finance) are more popular for trades between developed countries, the bank-intermediated L/C is most popular in developing countries such as China and India. About one-third of firms state that the L/C was a top payment method for transactions


<sup>1</sup> See, e.g., De Gregorio et al. (2000); Jinjark et al. (2013); and Mitchener and Wandschneider (2015).

<sup>2</sup> See, e.g., Auguste et al. (2006); Fisman and Wei (2004); Fisman et al. (2008); and Davies et al. (2018).


<sup>3</sup> In addition to Shanghai, the other 4 pilot cities are all in Guangdong province: Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Zhuhai, and Dongguan. As a pilot program, these services were initially limited to a select set of firms in each city and settlements with Hong Kong, Macau, and 10 Southeast Asian countries.

<sup>4</sup> Two other major offshore RMB centers, Taiwan and Singapore, are far behind Hong Kong in RMB deposits. Since 2013, Hong Kong has consistently accounted for more than 70% of RMB offshore or cross-border payments (SWIFT, 2016). See Cheung and Rime (2014) for more details on Hong Kong's role in RMB internationalization.

<sup>5</sup> See, e.g., Feenstra and Hanson (2004); Andriamananjara et al. (2004); and Fisman et al. (2008). Some duty-free ports, such as Hong Kong, Singapore, and 17<sup>th</sup> century Amsterdam, exploit their geographic, institutional, and economic advantages to specialize in *entrepôt* trade, and become known as *entrepôt* ports.



**Fig. 1.** RMB Interbank Offered Rates and Shanghai-Hong Kong Rate Differentials. *Notes:* The figure above plots the daily interbank offered rates of Chinese yuan in Shanghai and Hong Kong, as well as their differences. The term for both interbank offered rates is 3 months.



**Fig. 2.** How to Arbitrage under Capital Controls through Entrepôt Trades. *Notes:* This chart illustrates how an onshore firm may report entrepôt trades and use L/Cs to conduct interest arbitrage. The solid red lines represent RMB capital flows. The dashed red lines represent the issuance of an L/C or delivery of documents, as prescribed in the L/C. The horizontal dashed line in the middle demarcates Mainland China (onshore) and the rest of the world, including Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan (offshore). (For interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)

with China in 2010 (Schmidt-Eisenlohr, 2013). The popularity of L/Cs highlights banks' important intermediary role in international trade with countries that have weak contractual or legal institutions.

Fig. 2 illustrates how to arbitrage using fictitious entrepôt trades and L/Cs. An L/C-issuing bank in China typically requires that L/Cs be fully collateralized. To initiate a round of arbitrage, the arbitrageur needs first to deposit some amount of RMB, denoted by  $K$ ,

at an onshore bank. The deposit could be interest-bearing at an onshore rate. The onshore bank then issues an L/C of  $K$  to an offshore bank. The L/C would specify the beneficiary—the offshore “seller”—and the documents to be delivered by the seller for  $K$  payable at the L/C's maturity. The typical maturity of RMB L/Cs is 360 days, which is twice the maturity of typical dollar L/Cs used in China. Upon notification of the L/C's issuance, the offshore “seller” delivers the required documents for acceptance and discounts the L/C at

an offshore bank. Hong Kong banks typically charge the prevailing interest rate in the offshore market plus a fixed rate for discounting L/Cs.

Suppose the offshore interest rate is  $r_h$  and the discounting charge is at a rate of  $d$ ; then the discounted L/C yields  $K/(1+r_h+d)$ . A related party—the offshore “buyer”—could then wire the proceeds from the discounted L/Cs back to the arbitrageur onshore. The arbitrageur deposits the returned fund at the onshore rate, completing one round of arbitrage. The annual return of one round of arbitrage,  $r_a$ , is therefore:

$$r_a = \frac{Kr_s + \frac{K}{1+r_h+d}(1+r_s)}{K} - 1 = r_s + \frac{r_s - r_h - d}{1+r_h+d}. \quad (1)$$

If the onshore-offshore interest differential net of L/C discounting premium is positive—namely,  $r_s > r_h + d$ —an arbitrageur could earn a return higher than the onshore interest rate. Moreover, the returned inflow  $K/(1+r_h+d)$  at the onshore bank could fund another round of arbitrage.<sup>6</sup>

### 2.3. Risks and transaction costs

Export prices may change between the import agreement with the seller and the export agreement with the buyer, and buyers may not honor their contracts. These risks of price movements and counterparty defaults could be eliminated or substantially reduced if the buyer and seller are subsidiaries or related parties of the arbitrageur. Therefore, it is important that an arbitrageur controls offshore subsidiaries as the buyer and the seller.

Moreover, controlling offshore subsidiaries speeds up the entrepôt trades as interest arbitrages. Even though an L/C matures in 1 year, the L/C beneficiary—i.e., the “seller”—could fulfill the L/C-prescribed documentary delivery any time before the maturity and cash out by discounting the L/C. Because L/C discounting is the borrowing leg of the arbitrage, delays are costly.

Establishing offshore subsidiaries is therefore a fixed cost for engaging in interest arbitrages. Because large manufacturing companies and commodity trading companies often have offshore companies, particularly in Hong Kong, they are likely to have an advantage in engaging in interest arbitrages. In our data, these firms engaged in entrepôt trades with L/Cs earlier than other firms and accounted for a large share of these trade flows.<sup>7</sup>

By discounting the L/C, the offshore bank assumes a counterparty risk from the onshore bank that issues the L/C. The offshore bank charges a discounting premium  $d$  to compensate for assuming the counterparty risk, as well as any administrative costs. Typically, Hong Kong banks charge  $d = 1/8\%$ .<sup>8</sup> In addition to proportional charges, offshore banks charge fixed fees when offshore “sellers” discount the L/Cs for cash. Moreover, onshore banks may charge miscellaneous fees for the issuance of L/Cs.

Between mid-2012 and mid-2015, the onshore-offshore interest differential averaged 1.38% and peaked at 3% around late 2013 and

<sup>6</sup> In a frictionless world in which each round of arbitrage could be completed instantly and there are no transaction costs, the arbitrageur repeats infinite rounds but obtains a finite sum of capital  $K'$  in a year:

$$K' = \sum_{i=0}^{\infty} \frac{r_s K}{(1+r_h+d)^i} = \frac{r_s(1+r_h+d)K}{r_h+d}.$$

Thus, the maximum rate of return to arbitrage  $r_a^\infty$  is

$$r_a^\infty = r_s + \frac{r_s - r_h - d}{r_h + d}.$$

<sup>7</sup> See Online Appendix C for more details.

<sup>8</sup> See, for example, <http://www.dbs.com.hk/corporate/financing/trade-financing/export-services/letter-of-credit-negotiation-discounting>.

early 2014. If discount premium  $d = 1/8\%$  and there are no transaction costs, the return to one round of arbitrage,  $r_a = r_s + \frac{r_s - r_h - d}{1+r_h+d}$ , averaged 5.66%, or 1.22% in excess of the average onshore interest rate. During most of this period, the onshore-offshore interest differential was higher than a discount premium of  $d = 1/8\%$ . Thus, one round of arbitrage would be profitable before any transaction costs.

With fixed costs, the initial arbitrage capital  $K$  must be sufficiently large to be profitable. For example, if there is a fixed cost of a quarter-million yuan, a 1.22% excess return would require at least 20 million yuan of arbitrage capital to be profitable. However, as in typical currency carry trades, arbitrageurs may lower the capital outlay by leveraging up. Moreover, as explained in the last section, after one round of arbitrage, the returned inflow  $K/(1+r_h+d)$  could again be deposited at the onshore bank to initiate another round of arbitrage. In Online Appendix D, we show the extent to which the arbitrage return may be higher if an arbitrageur carries out multiple rounds of arbitrages.

The counterparty risks of the L/C issuing banks were low but fluctuated over our sample period. For example, a 1-year credit default swap (CDS) for the Bank of China was, on average, quoted at about 40 basis points during our sample period but briefly reached 70 basis points in mid-2013. Offshore L/C discounting banks may adjust their discounting premiums for counterparty risks. If so, the interest differential would need to be higher, perhaps by 40 basis points more than otherwise, for the arbitrage to be profitable. Anecdotal, the discounting premium may not be very high, because large state-owned banks issued the majority of L/Cs in China. A substantial share of these L/Cs were discounted by their offshore affiliates in Hong Kong. Unfortunately, we do not observe the actual discounting premium.

The presence of fixed costs suggests an economy of scale in interest arbitrage using L/Cs and entrepôt trades. Another source for the economy of scale is that a larger deposit enjoys higher interest rates. Although deposit rates in China were capped at a relatively low level during our sample period, banks offer higher interest rates for large deposits to circumvent interest rate regulations (He et al., 2015; Shen and Bian, 2017; Tan et al., 2016) through CDs for institutional investors, wealth management products, etc. Perry and Weltewitz (2015) show that the 3-month Shanghai Interbank Offered Rates closely track the weighted average rate of return from bank wealth management products. However, there might be a small variation in interest rates across banks for deposits of different sizes.<sup>9</sup>


As illustrated in Fig. 2, an arbitrageur deposits a lump sum in a bank and uses it to underwrite L/Cs. The larger the deposit, the higher the rate the deposit earns. If an arbitrageur does not have sufficient funds for high-yield deposits, he may need to raise funds for the arbitrage. The higher the interest differential, the easier it is for the arbitrageur to raise sufficient funds to make the arbitrage profitable.

If a substantial share of deposits that underwrite L/Cs are put into money market instruments that have a round-number face value, we would see significant bunching of L/C outflows around round numbers. For example, certificates of deposit for institutional investors in China require a minimum deposit of 10 million yuan and are typically denominated in multiples of 10 million.

Fig. 3 shows that this is precisely what we find for entrepôt outflows settled through L/Cs (left subplot). Note that L/Cs are not expected to be issued at round-number values. Moreover, if these

<sup>9</sup> The Hong Kong Interbank Offered Rate, however, should proxy for the discounting interest rate for L/C well. This is because L/C-issuing onshore banks are the counterparties and have low default risk; L/C discounting rates in Hong Kong typically use the Hong Kong interbank lending rate plus fixed basis points.





**Fig. 3.** Round-number Bunching of L/C Outflows. *Notes:* The histograms above plot the truncated distribution of L/C transaction amounts. Histograms on the left and right plot outward L/C settlements for entrepôt trades and regular one-way trades, respectively.

L/Cs settle real entrepôt trades, it is unlikely that there is substantial bunching at round numbers. Indeed, if we focus on L/C settlements for regular one-way trades, we find only a very modest amount of bunching around round numbers (right subplot). The round-number bunching of L/C payment amounts also provides corroborating evidence that a substantial portion of the entrepôt trades are fictitious.

The PBC is responsible for regulating across-border settlements and capital controls, but mainly through commercial banks. The PBC could direct commercial banks to follow administrative procedures, but lacks authority to punish any firms or individuals who engage in fictitious entrepôt trades. The PBC may, however, refer arbitrageurs who violate PBC policy to court. Therefore, there is a small legal risk in arbitrage through entrepôt trades.

In a typical carry trade, traders profit from interest rate differences by borrowing a low-interest currency and lending a high-interest currency. Carry trades are risky because of exchange rate fluctuation between the opening and closing of currency positions. To hedge against the exchange rate risk, traders may long a forward contract for the low-interest currency simultaneously as they convert the low-interest currency to the high-interest currency at spot price. The hedging cost is the forward premium of the low-interest currency over its spot price. No arbitrage implies the covered interest parity (CIP)—that is, the currency forward premium equals the interest rate differential.

Onshore and offshore RMB are nominally the same currency. In practice, onshore RMB (CNY) and offshore RMB (CNH) are akin to two currencies, given that each has its own interest rates and exchange rates. The possible divergence of CNY and CNH in their exchange rates presents a risk. The onshore-offshore interest differential may reflect such foreign exchange (FX) risk.

In the onshore-offshore RMB interest arbitrage enabled by entrepôt trades, the L/C transfers onshore funds offshore *at parity* in 1 year when the L/C matures. Through a related party—i.e., the seller in the entrepôt trade—the L/C is discounted at the offshore rate for cash, which then flows back onshore. The RMB returning from offshore to onshore is, again, converted *at parity*. Therefore, entrepôt trades with L/Cs facilitate RMB interest arbitrage by (i) bypassing capital controls and (ii) converting spot and forward onshore/offshore RMB *at parity*.

To complete one round of arbitrage, the offshore RMB may flow back onshore within a few weeks, if not days. However, there may be an FX risk in the onshore-offshore RMB interest arbitrage to the extent that there may be delays for offshore RMB flowing back onshore. The offshore bank that discounts the L/C may have exposure

and funding requirements for both onshore and offshore RMB, and they may pass on the FX risk cost on to the arbitrageurs.

To account for the potential FX risk, we define a CNH basis related to CNY similar to the cross-currency basis in Du et al. (2018):

$$x = \log(1 + r_s) - [\log(1 + r_h) - \rho] \approx r_s - (r_h - \rho),$$

where  $\rho$  is the forward premium of CNY against CNH.<sup>10</sup>

If the CIP holds for onshore and offshore RMB, then

$$1 + r_s = (1 + r_h) \frac{S}{F}, \quad (2)$$

where  $S$  is the spot exchange rate of CNH/CNY and  $F$  the 1-year-forward exchange rate of CNH/CNY. These rates are expressed in units of offshore RMB per unit of onshore RMB.

Under CIP, the forward premium  $\rho = \log(F) - \log(S)$  should offset the interest differentials between CNY and CNH. Accordingly, the CNH basis  $x$ , being the log difference between the two sides of the CIP equation, is zero. In other words, CIP implies a net cost of swapping low-interest CNH for high-interest CNY. A positive CNH basis suggests that the onshore RMB rate is higher than the synthetic RMB interest rate by swapping the offshore RMB interest rate into onshore RMB.

For a liquidly traded currency pair, one could hedge the FX risk with a forward currency contract. CNH/CNY forward and spot contracts are not traded. But using traded spot and forward contracts for CNH/USD and CNY/USD, we could impute the implied hedging costs.<sup>11</sup>

The gray line in Fig. 1 represents the onshore-offshore interest differential after adjusting for the CNH/CNY forward premium—namely, the CNH basis  $x$ . Interestingly, the gray line follows the green line closely, which suggests that the CNH/CNY forward premium/discount is small relative to the CNY-CNH interest differential. With  $\rho \approx 0$ , the FX-hedged interest differential  $x$  is close to the unhedged interest differential:

$$x \approx (1 + r_s) - (1 + r_h) \frac{S}{F} \approx r_s - r_h.$$

Moreover, despite the higher interest rates of onshore RMB, the forward premium of onshore RMB,  $\rho$ , is often positive. In other words, the low-interest offshore RMB often had a negative implied

<sup>10</sup> For modest interest rates, as in our data, the log-linear approximation above has small approximation errors.

<sup>11</sup> See Online Appendix B for more details. We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this.

forward premium, which is opposite under CIP. While it is not directly comparable due to distinct regulatory and FX regimes, our finding echoes the large and persistent CIP deviations for G-10 currencies in the post-crisis period (Du et al., 2018).

## 2.4. Data description

Our primary data set consists of all RMB inflows and outflows reported from entrepôt trades from 2011 to 2016 in a coastal province of China. This province has one of the largest economies and highest income levels in China. As of 2016, the provincial per capita GDP in either nominal terms or at purchasing power parity is similar to that of Poland and Argentina, and the province's population is larger than both countries. We obtained our data from a provincial division of the PBC.

Our data include payment and receipt dates, transaction value of the trades, identifiers of recipients and payers in China, and settlement means for receipts (inflows) and payments (outflows). Cross-border RMB transactions for entrepôt trades are reported and categorized separately from those for the usual one-way trades, i.e., import or export. The PBC requires that RMB inflows match RMB outflows for entrepôt trades, but expects weaker documentary evidence of actual trades for entrepôt trades than one-way trades. For example, entrepôt trades do not need customs-clearing documents for cross-border RMB settlements.

Most RMB receipts from reported entrepôt trades are settled through wire transfers. In Table 1, we tabulate the shares of wire transfers in RMB inflows from entrepôt trades by year. As shown in the upper panel, 98.5% of inflows from entrepôt trades are settled by wire transfers. The share of wire transfers varies little, ranging from 96.1% in 2011 to 99.1% in 2014 and 2015. However, RMB inflows from entrepôt trades vary widely. The second column of the upper panel of Table 1 shows total entrepôt inflows. Total inflows start from the lowest value in 2011 at 67.2 billion yuan—which is equivalent to 10.4 billion U.S. dollars in the same year—to a peak of 294 billion yuan in 2014 before declining to 84.5 billion yuan in 2016. In the next section, we will show that the entrepôt inflows move with the onshore-offshore interest differentials of RMB.

Wire transfers, however, settle a minority of RMB outflows from reported entrepôt trades. In the lower panel of Table 1, we show the shares of entrepôt outflows paid through wire transfers and other means. From 2011 to 2016, only 22% of entrepôt payments

denominated in RMB are paid through wire transfers; the primary settlement method for entrepôt outflows is the L/C. During our sample period, L/C settlements account for 76.6% of entrepôt outflows of RMB. Other means, such as old-fashioned mail transfers, account for only 1.3% of settled outflows. Therefore, the L/Cs' share of RMB payments to foreign sellers negatively correlates with the share of wire transfers, which varies widely from 40% in 2011 to 8.5% in 2014. As we will report in the next section, RMB inflows and 1-year-forward outflows each year have similar magnitudes, except in 2015 and 2016.

We also downloaded the on-shore and off-shore interbank lending interest rates and the exchange rates for the Chinese yuan against the U.S. dollar from Bloomberg. Following (Dooley and Isard, 1980) and (Herrera and Valdés, 2001), we focus on interbank rates with 3-month maturity. For onshore interbank lending interest rates, we use the annualized 3-month Shanghai Interbank Offered Rates for RMB, as in Chang et al. (2015), who study optimal Chinese monetary policy with capital controls. For offshore interbank lending interest rates, we use the annualized Hong Kong Interbank Offered Rates for Chinese Yuan (hereafter CNH HIBOR), as well as our calculation of the CNH HIBOR from individual interbank-offered rates before the introduction of CNH HIBOR fixing.

The Hong Kong Treasury Markets Association (TMA), in partnership with Thomson Reuters, launched CNH HIBOR fixing in June 2013. The fixing calculates the CNH HIBOR based on the interbank-offered rates provided by the 16 regional and global banks most active in offshore RMB lending markets. The CNH HIBOR is published at 11:15 AM Hong Kong time on each trading day. Since the introduction of CNH HIBOR fixing, it has become a widely used benchmark for interest pricing in offshore markets for RMB lending and interest-rate derivatives. Before introduction of the fixing, the TMA published the interbank-offered rates of the 13 banks most active in offshore RMB lending markets. We collected these interbank-offered rates of individual banks from the TMA and calculated the pre-fixing counterpart of the CNH HIBOR similarly to the post-fixing formula, i.e., by taking the average of all rates after dropping the highest and lowest three rates. The TMA interbank-offered rates for 13 individual banks are available from August 6, 2012, to the introduction of CNH HIBOR fixing.

In Fig. 1, we plot the CNH HIBOR before and after the fixing using a blue line. The pre-fixing calculation of CNH HIBOR connects smoothly with the post-fixing CNH HIBOR at the introduction of the fixing, which suggests that our calculation captures the offshore RMB interbank lending market similarly to the post-fixing measure. Introduction of the CNH HIBOR coincided with a spike in interbank lending rates. However, as can be seen in Fig. 1, the spike also coincides with a spike in onshore interbank lending rates, as measured by the Shanghai Interbank Offered Rates (red line), which suggests that the spike is not an artifact of CNH HIBOR fixing or our calculations. As shown in Fig. 1, onshore and offshore RMB interest rates have converged since mid-2015. Therefore, we focus on entrepôt trade samples from July 2012 to July 2015 for inflows and July 2013 to July 2016 for outflows.

In addition, we obtain daily values of regular imports, exports, inflows, and outflows under capital accounts for our sample province from the provincial division of the PBC.

## 3. Interest differentials and reported entrepôt trades


### 3.1. Aggregate RMB flows

As suggested in Section 2.4, RMB cross-border flows from entrepôt trades vary greatly between 2011 and 2016. In this section, we show that entrepôt inflows and outflows are strongly associated with onshore-offshore interest differentials.

**Table 1**  
Shares of RMB Flows Settled by Letter of Credit and Wire Transfer.

Inflow				
Year	Amount (billion ¥)	Letter of Credit	Wire Transfer	Other
2011	67.2	0.003	0.961	0.035
2012	123.1	0.006	0.978	0.016
2013	227.1	0.004	0.981	0.015
2014	294.1	0.003	0.991	0.006
2015	255.7	0.005	0.991	0.003
2016	84.5	0.014	0.985	0.002
Total	1,051.6	0.005	0.985	0.010
Outflow				
Year	Amount (billion ¥)	Letter of Credit	Wire Transfer	Other
2011	14.0	0.567	0.400	0.032
2012	96.5	0.737	0.249	0.013
2013	127.9	0.801	0.174	0.025
2014	271.3	0.907	0.085	0.009
2015	353.9	0.733	0.255	0.012
2016	208.9	0.647	0.343	0.009
Total	1,072.5	0.766	0.221	0.013

Notes: Exchange rates for Chinese yuan per U.S. dollar ranged from 6.041 to 6.956 and averaged 6.336 between 2011 and 2016.



**Fig. 4.** Onshore-offshore Interest Differentials, RMB Inflows, and 12-Month-Forward L/C Outflows. *Notes:* The figure above plots the onshore-offshore RMB interest differential (dashed green line), RMB inflows from entrepôt trades, and 12-month-forward RMB outflows to settle L/Cs. Inflows and outflows are monthly aggregates in billion yuan (left scale). Interest differentials are in percentages (right scale). (For interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)

We argue that the rise of RMB inflows from reported entrepôt trades is driven by interest arbitrage. According to the flow chart in Fig. 2, a round of arbitrage ends with discounted cash flowing back onshore. To initiate another round of arbitrage, the arbitrageur deposits the returned cash into a bank, earning an onshore interest rate, and uses the deposit as collateral for a new L/C issued to an offshore entity and its associated settlement bank. As an RMB L/C typically has 1 year to mature, inflows from entrepôt-enabling arbitrage should highly correlate with outflows from entrepôt trades 12 months forward.

We restrict our sample to the period before mid-2015. The onshore-offshore interest gap had mostly converged by mid-2015. Moreover, there was a policy shift in the Chinese FX regime in August 2015, which caused a sudden and sizable depreciation of the Chinese yuan against the U.S. dollar. The policy shift also led to a sharp divergence of onshore and offshore exchange rates of the RMB against the U.S. dollar. As discussed in Online Appendix A, the exchange rate of offshore RMB followed closely that of onshore RMB before the August 2015 policy shift, but deviated substantially in the months following the shift. Possible FX arbitrage and capital flight after August 11, 2015 may confound RMB flows from interest arbitrage.

Moreover, we focus on 12-month-forward L/C settlements for outflows. As discussed above, L/Cs settlements are unrelated to exchange rate arbitrages but crucial for interest arbitrages, which during our sample period require lending onshore and borrowing offshore. An L/C, which is underwritten by an onshore deposit and could be discounted offshore for cash at the offshore rate, does just that.

In Fig. 4, we plot the monthly entrepôt-related RMB inflows and 12-month-forward outflows settled by L/Cs, along with average onshore-offshore interest differentials. Starting from mid-2012, differences between the Shanghai Interbank Offered Rate and the Hong Kong Interbank Offered Rate for RMB widen and peak around late 2013 and early 2014. Gradually, interest-rate dif-

ferentials drop, reaching close to zero in July 2015. RMB inflows from entrepôt trades follow a similar pattern. At the peak of the onshore-offshore interest differential in early 2014, about 40 billion yuan each month flow into the province in our data under entrepôt trades, which is three times larger than the monthly inflow in mid-2012 when the interest differential is close to zero. The dashed blue line in Fig. 4 represents 12-month-forward L/C outflows, which clearly comove with the inflows represented by the solid red line.

To estimate the magnitude of the interest differentials' effects on entrepôt flows, we next regress the log inflows and log 52-week-forward L/C outflows on the interest differentials using daily flows. In the left panel of Table 2, we report estimates for entrepôt inflows. In the right panel of Table 2, we report estimates for 52-week-forward L/C outflows.<sup>12</sup> In all regressions in this paper, we use the heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) standard errors of Newey and West (1986). To be conservative, we allow the maximum lag allowed for autocorrelation to be 365 days. Leaving the maximum lag to be 31 days, as in the default setting, or doubling the length of the maximum lag gives quantitatively similar results that remain highly statistically significant.

The univariate estimate in Column (1) of Table 2 suggests that a 1-percentage-point increase in the onshore-offshore differential of interbank-offered rates between Shanghai and Hong Kong induces an increase of 19 log points, or 21% in RMB inflows, from reported entrepôt trades. The estimate is statistically significant at the 1% level. As there could be day-of-the-week effects, we add a set of indicator variables to indicate the day of the week and report the estimates in Column (2). The point estimate is unchanged in both magnitude and statistical significance. In Column (3), we additionally control for the onshore-offshore differentials of the Chi-

<sup>12</sup> If the day 52 weeks forward of the interest rate differential is a non-trading day, we use the L/C outflow of the next trading day.

**Table 2**  
Onshore-offshore Interest Differentials and RMB Inflows and Outflows.

	Inflow				Outflow (L/C, 1-Year Forward)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Interest Rate Differential	0.190*** (0.070)	0.190*** (0.069)	0.207*** (0.068)	0.213*** (0.057)	0.294*** (0.058)	0.292*** (0.061)	0.279*** (0.062)	0.286*** (0.056)
Exchange Rate Differential			-4.127 (2.519)	-2.933 (2.396)			3.417 (2.516)	4.362* (2.360)
Export				0.246*** (0.046)				0.127 (0.158)
Import				-0.191* (0.105)				-0.159* (0.092)
Capital Account Inflows				0.036* (0.019)				-0.016 (0.022)
Capital Account Outflows				0.050*** (0.012)				0.040** (0.019)
Day of Week Fixed Effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
R <sup>2</sup>	0.172	0.228	0.236	0.286	0.133	0.281	0.282	0.289
Observations (days)	698	698	698	697	698	698	698	697

Notes: Newey-West heteroskedasticity-autocorrelation robust standard errors with a lag of 365 days are in parentheses. Constants are included in all specifications, but not shown. Export, Import, Capital Account Inflows, and Capital Account Outflows are daily values in logarithms for our sample province. \*  $p < .10$ ; \*\*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*\*  $p < .01$ .

nese yuan exchange rate against the U.S. dollar. The estimated effect of interest-rate differentials increases slightly, to 23% (21 log points), and remains statistically significant at the 1% level. We do not find that onshore-offshore exchange rate differentials significantly affect entrepôt inflows in the sample period, which is from August 6, 2012, to July 31, 2015. To further control for potentially confounding macroeconomic variables, we include the logarithm values of daily import and export settlements for regular one-way trades, as well as capital inflows and outflows under the capital account.<sup>13</sup> As reported in Column (4), our main estimate after controlling for these macroeconomic variables is quantitatively similar and remains significant at the 1% level.

Onshore-offshore interest differentials are estimated to have a larger effect on 52-week-forward L/C outflows for entrepôt trades, ranging from 32.2% to 34.2% (27.9 to 29.4 log points). In Columns (5), (6), (7), and (8), we report the estimated effects with the same controls as those included in Columns (1) to (4), respectively. Standard errors for key coefficient estimates in forward L/C outflow regressions are typically smaller than those in inflow regressions. Therefore, the estimated effects of interest differentials are all significant at the 1% level across specifications. The estimates' larger magnitude and greater precision likely reflect the fact that forward L/C outflows more closely capture the activities of interest arbitrage.

RMB inflows from interest arbitrage may not react to interest differentials on the same day. Similarly, there might be a few days' gap between when an arbitrageur deposits cash as collateral for an L/C and issuance of the L/C. Therefore, potential delays and uncertainty in the timing of arbitrage activities may introduce biases by mismatching interest differentials and inflows and forward outflows. To address these concerns, we estimate the effects of 1-day-lagged and the 1-week moving average of interest-rate differentials on inflows and forward outflows. Estimates for inflows and outflows change little and remain significant at the 1% level. These robustness tests suggest that the uncertain timing and potential delays associated with interest arbitrage are unlikely to qualitatively bias our estimates, possibly due to series correlation in the interest differentials.

Moreover, we obtain quantitatively similar and statistically significant estimates as those reported in Table 2 if we replace

the interest differential either (i) with CNH basis as detailed in Section 2.3 and Online Appendix A; or (ii) with the interest differential minus the Bank of China 1-year CDS spread.

### 3.2. Interbank certificates of deposit regulation

Although a number of macroeconomic variables have been controlled for in Table 2, one may still be concerned that the correlation between RMB inflows and outflows from unobserved factors from entrepôt and onshore-offshore interest differentials remains spurious due to omitted variables. In this section, we exploit a policy shock to identify the potential causal impacts of onshore-offshore interest differentials on RMB cross-border flows from entrepôt trades.


Over the last decade, China slowly liberalized its tightly controlled credit market. On December 7, 2013, the PBC announced its interim provisions on for interbank certificates of deposit management. The reform allowed deposit-taking institutions to issue negotiable interbank certificates of deposit (CDs), which amounted to the first money market instruments whose interest rates were freely determined by the credit market. The provisions also standardized the maturities of these interbank CDs. In the medium and long run, the reform allowed the interbank lending market to be more responsive to market conditions and better management of liquidity risk.

In the short run, however, the reform raised interest rates in the interbank lending market for two reasons. First, before the reform, banks relied on short-term borrowing in interbank markets to meet their liquidity needs. Smaller banks also relied on the interbank market to borrow short and lend long, which created maturity mismatches and liquidity risk. Standardizing CD maturities and the introduction of negotiable interbank CDs means that smaller banks must now borrow money of longer maturity to finance their operations. After these changes, they would also need to offer higher interest rates in the retail market to attract deposits.

Second, the reform also designated the largest state-owned banks as market makers in CD markets. Through their vast network of branches and brand names, large state-owned banks attract retail deposits at lower rates and typically lend in the interbank market. When the interbank CD market matured, smaller banks would, and did eventually, become the predominant issuers. As the interbank CD market started, however, the issuance of CDs by the

<sup>13</sup> These capital inflows and outflows are mainly driven by foreign direct investments and overseas direct investments.





**Fig. 5.** Introduction of Interbank Certificates of Deposit. *Notes:* The figure above plots onshore-offshore interest rate differentials and RMB inflows from entrepôt trades around the introduction of interbank certificates of deposit. The blue circles represent weekly average of interest rate differentials. The red diamonds represent the weekly RMB inflows from entrepôt trades. The horizontal axis represents the number of weeks since or before the introduction of the interbank certificate of deposit. The blue and red dashed lines are local linear fits of the blue circles and red diamonds, respectively, on either side of week 0, when the interbank CDs was introduced. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)

largest state-owned banks withdrew liquidity and raised the cost of borrowing for smaller banks.<sup>14</sup>

In Fig. 5, the horizontal axis represents the number of weeks related to the announcement of the interbank CD reform; the vertical axis on the left indicates onshore-offshore RMB interest rate differentials, and the vertical axis on the right indicates the RMB inflows from entrepôt. As shown by the blue circles, the interbank CD reform induced a sharp increase in the Shanghai Interbank Offered Rate, which benchmarked for the interbank CDs per the interim provisions. As shown by the red diamonds, RMB inflows from entrepôt trades also increased following the increase in interest differentials, though with increased volatility and some delays. The increased volatility and delays may partially be due to the timing. For example, outliers 4 to 8 weeks after the reform coincide with the Gregorian New Year and Chinese New Year holidays.

Fig. 5 naturally suggests a fuzzy regression discontinuity (RD) design, in which time is the running variable. The policy shock provides an instrumental variable for the potentially endogenous interest differentials. To implement the fuzzy RD design, we control for a quadratic polynomial of the running variable and use the 81-week event window, as in Fig. 5. We find that a 1-percentage-point increase in the onshore-offshore interest differential induces a rise of 27% (24 log points) in RMB inflows for reported entrepôt trades. The 2SLS estimate is statistically significant at the 10% level. Controlling for the New Year holidays with an indicator variable leads to a larger estimate of 49% (40 log points), which is significant at the 1% level.<sup>15</sup>

### 3.3. Distribution of RMB flows and entry to arbitrage

The persistent onshore-offshore interest differentials during our sample period suggest that the interest arbitrage identified in this paper is insufficient to close the interest differentials quickly. The onshore-offshore interest gap may primarily be influenced by onshore and offshore RMB lending markets, general international trade, and foreign direct investments. RMB flows from entrepôt trades by Chinese firms are likely to be small relative to other factors that determine onshore and offshore interest rates and, hence, their gaps.


Several factors limit interest arbitrage through entrepôt trades. First, there might be delays at each step of the arbitrage identified in Fig. 2. These delays lower the return on arbitrage compared with that in a frictionless world. Second, it may be costly to obtain entrepôt-related documents to circumvent capital controls. Third, it may be costly to obtain start-up capital to initiate the first round of arbitrage. These frictions in RMB interest arbitrage not only limit the extent to which arbitrage activities reduce arbitrage opportunities, but also have implications for the distribution of transaction values in entrepôt-enabled arbitrage.

In the presence of fixed costs, the low end of the distribution of arbitrage flows would be more affected by arbitrage returns. On the one hand, a lower interest difference means that a larger denominated L/C is required to cover the fixed costs and break even. Thus the repeated arbitrage rounds, in which arbitrage flow declines in each round, may stop earlier. Therefore, for

<sup>14</sup> For example, on December 12, 2013, China's 4 largest state-owned banks, along with China Development Banks, issued 19 billion in interbank CDs.

<sup>15</sup> We use HAC standard errors with a lag of 4 weeks. We have a strong first stage, and a weak instrument is easily rejected. One may be concerned that the imprecise

timing of the policy shock's effects on interest rates and RMB inflows may bias our estimates. We could assess the robustness by dropping one or two weeks of observations right after the policy announcement. If we use such a "donut-hole RD" (Barreca et al., 2011), we obtain similar estimates.



**Fig. 6.** Onshore-offshore Interest Differentials on the Distribution of RMB Outflows. Notes: The figure plots the estimates of  $\delta_\tau$  in Equation (3), which are the quantile effects of onshore-offshore interest differentials on the distribution of RMB outflows at various quantiles indicated by  $\tau$ . The thick blue line, the thin orange line, and the thin green line represent, respectively, the quantile effects on 1-year-forward outflow settling L/Cs, on 1-year-forward RMB outflows through wire transfers, and on contemporary outward wire transfers. The dashed lines in corresponding colors indicate 95% confidence intervals using Newey-West HAC standard errors with a lag of 365 days. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)

existing arbitrage capital, there may be a negative correlation between the break-even threshold and the interest difference. On the other hand, a high arbitrage return likely draws capital into arbitrage.<sup>16</sup>

To assess how the arbitrage return affects the distribution of arbitrage flows, we estimate the following quantile regression:

$$Q_\tau(Y_{it}) = \delta_\tau D_t + X_t' \beta_\tau, \quad (3)$$

where  $\tau \in (0, 1)$  indicates a specific quantile;  $Q_\tau(Y_{it})$  measures the  $\tau$  quantile of RMB flows of transaction  $i$  in period  $t$ ;  $D_t$  is the difference between interbank rates in Shanghai and Hong Kong measured in percentages; and  $X_t$  is a vector of control variables, including the onshore-offshore RMB exchange-rate differential and day-of-the-week indicator variables, as in Table 2.

In a setting in which group-level random or fixed effects are present, the traditional (Koenker and Bassett, 1978) estimator would be biased (Hausman et al., 2016). In a panel or group setting in which the key explanatory variable of interest varies at a group level, Chetverikov et al. (2016) propose a 2-step quantile estimator that is consistent in the presence of such group effects. Therefore, we estimate the impacts of the interest differential on the distribution of log value of entrepôt trade transactions using (Chetverikov et al., 2016). In particular, we calculate the  $\tau$  quantile of RMB flows of transaction  $i$  on day  $t$ , i.e.,  $Q_\tau(Y_{it})$ , in the first step. In the second step, we regress quantile values  $Q_\tau(Y_{it})$  on the interest differentials and control variables, as for those in Table 2. The consistency of this estimator requires that the number of transactions in a day be sufficiently large. But the asymptotics allows the number of observations/transactions per day to grow at a slower rate than the rate at which the number of days in the sample period grows. This estimator also allows us to account for serial correlation in the errors term using (Newey and West, 1986) HAC standard errors. Chetverikov et al. (2016) show that standard heteroskedasticity robust errors are valid for their 2-step estimator.

We measure arbitrage transaction values using the log value of 1-year-forward outflows for reported entrepôt trades settled with bank-issued L/Cs. Issuing, claiming, and discounting L/Cs is likely to accrue some fixed costs. For example, a typical L/C discounting service at a Hong Kong bank charges a fixed service rate on top of the discount rate linked to the prevailing market interest rate. A minimum fee is charged, however, if the transaction value is insufficiently large. Moreover, inflows are typically transferred via wire transfer, which is relatively less costly to carry out. Firms often split and combine chunks of RMB when they wire their proceeds back onshore. As shown in Online Appendix Figure A.2, distributions of transaction values differ for inflows and L/C outflows, particularly at the low end of their distributions. Due to space constraints, we do not plot the distribution of outflows that include both L/C outflows and wire-outward transfers, which is quite similar to the distribution of L/C outflows.

Fig. 6 reports the point estimates and confidence intervals of  $\delta$  at various quantiles. As shown by the blue lines, the quantile effects of the interest differential exhibit a hump shape as one moves across quantiles. Interest differentials have the highest impact around the 35<sup>th</sup> percentile of the outflow distribution. A 1-percentage-point increase in interest differentials increases the 35<sup>th</sup> percentile of forward L/C outflows as much as 75 log points (212%), which is equivalent to doubling the 35<sup>th</sup> percentile. Throughout the quantiles from 0.05 to 0.95, quantile effects, as measured by  $\delta_\tau$ , are significant at the 5% level. While quantile effects are more precisely estimated in the upper quantiles, they appear to be larger in the bottom half of the distribution. But at the lowest estimated quantile, i.e.,  $\tau = 0.05$ , the effects of the interest differentials are modest, which is likely driven by the entry of arbitrageurs with small start-up capital and, hence, transaction values. Therefore, the quantile effects' pattern is consistent with the considerable fixed costs associated with carrying out interest arbitrage.

As a placebo test, we also estimate two specifications in which the outcome variables are the log value of outflows for entrepôt trades paid by means other than L/C, which is mostly wire

<sup>16</sup> See Online Appendix D & E for more detailed discussion.

transfers. If the main driver of these entrepôt trade flows is arbitrage activities, the interbank interest differences between Shanghai and Hong Kong should not affect contemporary or 1-year-forward outflows through wire transfers. We report the point estimates and confidence intervals of  $\delta$  in these two placebo specifications at various quantiles in Fig. 6, along with our main quantile effects estimates. As expected, interest differentials do not have statistically significant effects on different quantiles of 1-year-forward or contemporary outflows via wire transfers; in addition, the point estimates are usually small compared with those from the main quantile specification.

To examine which margins drive increases in entrepôt trades when interest differentials are high, we carry out some decomposition analyses. In particular, we first decompose the increase in daily entrepôt trade flows into the number of transactions and the average value of a transaction. We then further decompose the extensive margin of transactions into the number of trading firms and the number of transactions per firm—i.e., the extensive and intensive margins regarding trading firms.

As detailed in Online Appendix E, our findings suggest that the entry of new firms may account for a substantial part of the increase in entrepôt trades when interest differentials are high. Therefore, we further examine arbitrageurs' entry. We identify new firms as those that appear in our sample for the first time since the beginning of the sample on January 1, 2011. For more details, see Online Appendix E.

Overall, the results in Appendix Table A.2 suggest that a higher interest differential induces the entry of more new firms in absolute and relative terms and increases the transaction volume attributed to entering firms. For example, assuming quadratic trends, a 1-percentage-point increase in interest differentials increases the number of new firms by 0.8 and the share of new firms by 0.01. For comparison, the average number of entering firms is two per day, and the average share of new firms is 5%.

In sum, the findings in this section suggest that there are considerable fixed costs involved in using entrepôt trades to conduct interest arbitrage across onshore and offshore RMB markets.

#### 4. Concluding remarks

Historically, dollar-denominated instruments for trade finance contributed to the rise of the U.S. dollar in international trade (Eichengreen and Flandreau, 2012). China's central bank appears to follow this historical lesson by promoting RMB-denominated L/Cs for trade finance. However, we find that RMB-denominated L/Cs facilitated interest arbitrage across onshore and offshore credit markets of RMB. As a result, China's capital controls became less effective and statistics on the rise of RMB-denominated trades were inflated.

Since L/C-assisted interest arbitrage relies on entrepôt trades to circumvent capital controls, trade intermediaries were well positioned to exploit these arbitrage opportunities. Future studies may shed light on whether such arbitrage opportunities promote or crowd out the adoption of RMB as the invoicing currency in international trades.

#### Supplementary material

Supplementary material associated with this article can be found, in the online version, at doi:[10.1016/j.jbankfin.2021.106129](https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2021.106129).

#### CRedit authorship contribution statement

**Jiafei Hu:** Conceptualization, Methodology, Investigation, Resources, Formal analysis, Writing - original draft, Writing - review & editing, Visualization, Project administration. **Haishan Yuan:** Conceptualization, Methodology, Investigation, Resources, Formal analysis, Writing - original draft, Writing - review & editing, Visualization, Project administration.

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