
Shogunal Politics

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SHOGUNAL POLITICS

*Arai Hakuseki and the Premises of
Tokugawa Rule*

KATE WILDMAN NAKAI

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To My Parents
Sophie Kulchar Wildman
and
Samuel Goodnow Wildman

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Preface

Arai Hakuseki stands at the intersection of two key issues in Tokugawa history: the nature of the bakufu as a political institution, and the role of Confucianism in Tokugawa political life. As personal advisor to the sixth and seventh Tokugawa shogun, Tokugawa Ienobu and Ietsugu, Hakuseki (1657–1725) played an important part in bakufu politics between 1709 and 1716. Although brief, this span of years fell within a larger historical epoch, ranging from the 1680s to the 1730s, which saw several developments of significance to the history of the bakufu. During those decades a deepening fiscal crisis and a contest for power between the shogun and the major *fudai* (vassal) daimyo, the traditional backbone of the Tokugawa house, brought two new groups to the fore of bakufu politics. One was the circle of attendants surrounding the shogun who worked to increase his personal authority, and theirs as his agents, relative to that of the bakufu old guard. The other was the body of low-ranking bureaucratic specialists who dealt with the day-to-day problems of bakufu administration in an age of financial exigency and growing social complexity. The interplay between these different interests and circumstances resulted eventually, according to current interpretations, in the reshaping of the fundamental power structure of the bakufu. Through this reshaping, the shogun emerged with increased autocratic authority, the technical experts assumed greater prominence within a rationalized bureaucratic mechanism, and the bakufu acquired more fully defined powers as a national government.

During his period of bakufu service, Hakuseki was involved directly in these developments. As a member of the group around the shogun,

he participated in major policy decisions concerning currency, foreign trade, and local administration. Simultaneously, he endeavored to enhance the shogun's authority both within the bakufu administrative structure and as a national ruler. Indeed, more than any other pre-*bakumatsu* political figure, he attempted to make the bakufu into a monarchy and the shogun into a full-fledged national sovereign. His efforts in this direction included a new version of the basic bakufu code defining the relations between the shogun and the daimyo, shogunal adoption of the title of king in relations with Korea, and a general enlargement of the monarchal connotations of the symbols of shogunal authority.

These circumstances make Hakuseki and his program obviously relevant to an understanding of the evolution of the bakufu. The researcher who attempts to probe further into that relevance, however, immediately confronts a contradiction; namely, while the next shogun, Yoshimune, the major architect of the mature structure of bakufu rule, continued the fiscal and trade policies associated with Hakuseki, he promptly reversed the measures through which Hakuseki had sought to make the shogun a more king-like figure. What should we make of that contradiction?

By and large, scholars have taken two approaches to this question. Those who have dealt with Hakuseki within the framework of a survey of the evolution of Tokugawa rule have tended to stress those aspects of his program that survived and to play down the significance of those that did not.¹ Conversely, those who have focused on Hakuseki as an individual generally have concentrated on the specific points of his program and have given only passing attention to the surrounding context. When they have taken up the failure of much of Hakuseki's program to survive, most have been content to deplore that failure or to affirm its appropriateness; few have attempted to plumb fully the ephemerality of Hakuseki's efforts.²

The present study seeks a different approach. It rests on the premise that we can learn as much about the dimensions of the Tokugawa political order from those of Hakuseki's measures that failed to be accepted into it as from those that contributed positively to the ongoing evolution of the bakufu. By exploring the total range of Hakuseki's program against the background of the larger trends of the time, it should be possible to enlarge not only our understanding of the features of the

“shogunal autocracy” and “rationalized bureaucratic mechanism” characteristic of the early-eighteenth-century bakufu, but also our perception of the underlying dynamics of the Tokugawa system of rule. In particular, a consideration of the circumstances surrounding Hakuseki’s abortive efforts to enlarge the monarchal authority of the shogun should enable us to grasp more fully the precise dimensions of the ambiguous distribution of power and authority which continued to distinguish the Tokugawa political order despite those eighteenth-century developments.

The founders of the bakufu claimed for it a dominant national role as the central government of Japan. At the same time, however, they also shared the substantive powers of governance with the 260-odd daimyo domains (*han*), a fact that has led contemporary scholars to identify the Edo period as that of the “bakufu-*han*” (*bakuban*) state. Similarly, despite their effective control of the court, the Tokugawa shogun continued to divide the symbolic attributes of a legitimate national ruler with the tenno in Kyoto. In seeking to transform the shogun into a national monarch, Hakuseki challenged this ambiguous distribution of power and authority. Yoshimune’s reversal of Hakuseki’s innovations in this area served, by contrast, to reaffirm the centrality of that divided allocation to the Tokugawa system of rule. By exploring Hakuseki’s aims for the shogun and the obstacles he encountered in trying to realize them, we, in turn, can gain a clearer understanding of the actual contours of the bakufu as a national political institution.

Hakuseki’s endeavors and writings provide a similar insight into the role of Confucianism in Tokugawa political life. Both in formulating his program and seeking to justify it, Hakuseki drew inspiration from various tenets of Confucian political theory. Most particularly, his efforts to clarify the ambiguities of the *bakuban* state and enhance the monarchal authority of the shogun were founded on an uncompromising commitment to the Confucian premise that the ruler should exercise a comprehensive and undivided sovereignty over the realm. Likewise, to justify his attempt to make the shogun a king in name as well as substance, and his consequent challenge of the ill-defined apportionment of sovereign authority among the tenno and the shogun, Hakuseki relied above all on the Confucian assumption that sovereignty, while not properly

divisible between two rulers, could be transferred legitimately from one regime to another. Building on that proposition, he held that the shogun should exercise the comprehensive kingly authority that once had been possessed by the *tenno*.³

Hakuseki developed such views most fully through his historical works; marshaling his arguments in a highly polemical fashion, he engaged in a far-reaching reinterpretation of the body of traditional assumptions about the role of the *tenno* and the nature of shogunal rule. In effect, he endeavored to recast Japanese political history into something comparable to that of ancient China, the seedbed of the Confucian premises he sought to realize in his political program. Through this Sinicized reinterpretation of Japanese history, he attempted not only to confirm the universal validity of Confucian political theory but also to defend his vision of what the contemporary Japanese polity could and should be.

Other Tokugawa thinkers also attempted to apply Confucian assumptions which had evolved in the socio-historical environment of China to the quite different contemporary Japanese situation. But perhaps no other Tokugawa intellectual figure adhered so uncompromisingly to the full implications of the original Confucian vision of the ruler. This circumstance had important consequences for Hakuseki's place in Tokugawa intellectual history. If the iconoclastic nature of Hakuseki's efforts to transform the shogun into a king put that enterprise outside the mainstream of Tokugawa political developments, the theoretical structure he erected to defend his efforts likewise belonged to the far reaches rather than the central sphere of Tokugawa intellectual history. The fact that Hakuseki had no immediate intellectual heirs testifies to this situation. His position did not attract a body of disciples who might have further developed his ideas. And, while later thinkers felt the impact of his views on sovereignty and legitimacy, they showed themselves more concerned to counter than to build on his arguments.

For Hakuseki, this state of affairs represented a second defeat. From the point of view of modern researchers, however, it is not without its advantages. Just as they can use the mixed fate of Hakuseki's political program to cast light on the contours of the Tokugawa structure of rule, researchers may seek in Hakuseki's peripheral intellectual position evi-

dence about the determinants of Tokugawa thought. The arguments Hakuseki formulated to challenge the pattern of divided sovereignty characteristic of shogunal rule threw into heightened relief the frame of reference of Tokugawa and pre-Tokugawa concepts of legitimacy. Likewise, his efforts to evaluate Japanese history and the contemporary situation according to Confucian norms illuminated the extent to which it was possible, or not possible, to incorporate the dynamics of an originally Chinese system of thought into the Tokugawa context. A consideration of his efforts, therefore, can establish the basis for a more precise understanding of the impact of Confucianism on Tokugawa intellectual life.

Despite the potential of Hakuseki's endeavors to enlarge our understanding of these fundamental issues in the history of Tokugawa thought, previous researchers by and large have not considered them from this perspective. Those who have taken up the philosophical roots of Hakuseki's political program generally have limited themselves to pointing out his commitment to the Confucian ideal of benevolent rule. By contrast, those who have addressed the significance of his place in the history of Tokugawa thought have tended to demarcate his political aims from his intellectual activities. Indeed, identifying Hakuseki as the advocate of a rationalistic world view, many have seen his intellectual significance as lying in his capacity to distinguish between scholarship and politics. As Hani Gorō put it in the seminal statement of this perspective, Hakuseki's "rationalistic confidence in the principles and systematic structure of scholarship" as something universal and unalterable enabled him to transcend the constraints of his environment and engage in a "quest for the truth based on objective evidence."⁴

Both these approaches to Hakuseki's intellectual outlook entail problems. On the one hand, as suggested above, Hakuseki absorbed from Confucian political thought far more than a commitment to the ideal of benevolent rule. On the other, to identify Hakuseki as a rationalist devoted to a positivistic pursuit of the truth is to obscure central characteristics of his scholarly activities. Those activities, particularly his historical works, far from being objective and disinterested, consistently were oriented towards specific, if often complex, political ends. To ignore this fact is not only to misread their import but also to overlook one of

their most intriguing and informative aspects. Further, facile description of Hakuseki as a rationalist carries the danger of imputing to him an orientation that he, in fact, did not share. Both East and West, "rationalism" has been associated with the philosophical conviction that man can apprehend reality through his innate capacity to reason. Hakuseki, however, who evinced little interest in issues such as the nature of man's rational faculties or the relationship between ratiocination and knowledge, hardly sought to expound a philosophical position of this sort.

In light of these problems and in hopes of going beyond the existing understanding of Hakuseki's place in the history of Japanese thought, in this work I have stressed neither the idealistic qualities nor the rationalistic implications of his intellectual activities. Instead, I have emphasized a dimension of his outlook that has not yet received the attention it deserves, namely, a characteristic tendency to develop his argument on several different levels at once.

Hakuseki's perspective on the world around him, unlike that of many intellectual or political figures, changed little over time. To be sure, the available evidence about his views dates largely from one particular phase of his life. His political activity was concentrated within the brief span of years between 1709 and 1716, when he was in his fifties; most of his extant writings also date from that period or from the subsequent final decade of his life when he was in retirement. This perhaps accounts partially for the evident lack of change in his perspective. Even when this reservation is granted, however, his activities and writings show remarkable consistency both in their underlying purpose and in their governing structure of assumptions. But, if Hakuseki appears before us, Athena-like, fully formed (a circumstance that leaves little point to dividing consideration of his endeavors into chronological stages), he also challenges the researcher to come to terms with a notable talent for pursuing several distinct ends and arguments simultaneously.

This propensity was closely related to the nature of the environment in which Hakuseki sought to set forth his program. The complexity of the Tokugawa political context often required him to meet critics on one front while propounding his own views on another. Likewise, his own efforts to apply the premises of an originally Chinese system of thought to the contemporary Japanese situation inevitably entangled him in a

variety of contradictions. To deal with these circumstances, Hakuseki, much like a juggler endeavoring to keep numerous balls aloft at the same time, created an intricate, multi-layered argument. To evaluate accurately what he sought to accomplish through his historical and other writings, we, in turn, must delve beneath the surface of the juggler's art. Resisting a false resolution of innately contradictory elements, we need to sort out what was fundamental to Hakuseki's position from what was secondary, distinguish the red herring and forensic parry from the main thrust, identify the interplay of concerns and premises that underlay these various dimensions of what he wrote. Through this process we should attain a fuller understanding of Hakuseki's aims and methods. At the same time, we may hope to illuminate more clearly the contours of the interaction between Tokugawa politics and thought.

With these various purposes in mind, I have adopted a three-part structure. In the first section—Chapters 1 through 4—I take up the variety of background factors that shaped Hakuseki's perspective. On the assumption that many of the distinctive features of his outlook reflected the particularities of his situation, I try to pay special attention not only to the place of the shogunal circle in bakufu politics of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries but also to the nuances of Hakuseki's position within that circle.

In the second section—Chapters 5 through 8—I address the various dimensions of his political program. Beginning with an examination of the fiscal and economic policies associated with Hakuseki, I go on to analyze his approach to the role of the bakufu in popular governance and to the structure of bakufu administration. In the final chapter of this section, I take up his efforts to reshape the symbolic manifestations of shogunal authority. This arrangement serves to locate Hakuseki's endeavors along a spectrum ranging from those that were most enduring to those that proved most ephemeral. Through it I attempt to identify as precisely as possible the continuities and discontinuities between what Hakuseki sought to do and the general trends of bakufu policy in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century. Simultaneously, I try to illuminate the common thread running throughout the different segments of his program.

The final section—Chapters 9 through 12—considers Hakuseki's justi-

fication of his program. In this section I attempt to separate out the multiple strands of the arguments he put together to defend his efforts against their critics and to advance his own vision of what shogunal rule should be. To bring the consideration of both Hakuseki's program and the arguments underlying it to a full circle, I conclude this section, and the study as a whole, by examining some of the problems raised by Hakuseki's efforts to apply the norms of Chinese Confucian political theory to the Tokugawa context.

Having stressed the need to evaluate Hakuseki's writings against the background of the context to which they were addressed, I shall close this brief introduction with some remarks about the nature of the major sources for this, or any other, study of Hakuseki. Hakuseki produced, among other works, an autobiography, *Oritaku shiba no ki*, in which he described his family background, his early life, and the major events and policy decisions of the period when he was involved in bakufu affairs.⁵ All who deal with Hakuseki or this period of bakufu history necessarily must begin with this autobiography and return repeatedly to it. At the same time, the researcher must remember that *Oritaku shiba no ki*, reflecting both Hakuseki's tendentious disposition and the intrinsic nature of the autobiographical form of literature, does not offer a disinterested view of the events and human relations it depicts. Written at a time when Hakuseki's own involvement in bakufu affairs had come to an end, when rivals he temporarily had vanquished were being shown renewed favor, and when measures he had instituted were being overturned one by one, *Oritaku shiba no ki* was intended to provide an account of his aims and actions for "the day one hundred years hence when history shall pass impartial judgment."⁶

To make full use of *Oritaku shiba no ki* without being bound by it, wherever possible we must seek other sources to correct and amplify its account of events. Two works have proven particularly valuable: the diary Hakuseki began to keep upon entering the service of Tokugawa Ienobu in late 1693 and the letters of Muro Kyūsō, a Confucian scholar whom Hakuseki brought into the bakufu in 1711.⁷ Hakuseki's diary is, by and large, a laconic record of his schedule rather than a full description of his activities and thoughts. But, at certain crucial moments in his career, it goes into greater detail. Through comparison of the dif-

ferences between the diary and autobiography accounts of these moments, it becomes possible not only to adjust the autobiography's version of specific events but also to estimate the kind of modifications and embellishments likely to be found in other parts of it as well.⁸ Kyūsō's letters, written as a kind of informal intelligence report for his former lord, serve a similar function. Notable both for their vivid detail concerning bakufu politics and for their sympathetic but not unobjective observations about Hakuseki's activities during the reign of Letsugu, they offer an extremely useful alternative perspective for this period.

If *Oritaku shiba no ki*, Hakuseki's diary, and Kyūsō's letters constitute the central sources of information about Hakuseki's position within the context of early-eighteenth-century bakufu politics and the contemporary issues with which he concerned himself, the primary sources for reconstructing the theoretical basis of his program and his use of Confucian premises are his memorials and historical works.⁹ To make effective use of these materials two operations are necessary: Keeping in mind their fundamentally polemical nature, we must consider their content against the background of Hakuseki's political endeavors on the one hand and in light of the central referents of the Confucian political tradition on the other. These procedures will enable us to disentangle the various strands of argument Hakuseki wove into an intricate and resilient fabric. It also will make it possible for us to discern in that fabric levels of meaning that hitherto have gone unperceived.

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ONE

The Contours of Bakufu Politics

The political program set forth by Hakuseki was the product of two sets of factors, one general to the age and the other particular to him. Factors particular to him include the nature of his relationship to those he served—Tokugawa Ienobu and the *sobayōnin* (grand chamberlain) Manabe Akifusa—and his acceptance of various premises of Confucianism. The most significant factor general to the age was the shape of bakufu politics characteristic of the last decades of the seventeenth century and the first of the eighteenth. The following four chapters examine, one by one, these different aspects of the background to Hakuseki's program, setting the stage for later consideration of their interaction in the program itself. Of all the background elements, the political context looms largest. It set the overall parameters within which Hakuseki's policies took shape. And it is relative to those parameters that Hakuseki's policies assume historical significance. Thus, our survey of what underlay Hakuseki's efforts begins with evaluating the structure of bakufu politics.

The bakufu in the early eighteenth century was a camp divided. On one side stood the *rōjū* (senior councillors) and other important bakufu officials, spokesmen for the interests of the major Tokugawa vassals, the *fudai* daimyo and large *hatamoto* (bannermen); on the other stood the shogun and various individuals associated personally with him.¹ Tension between such groups was inherent in the structure of the bakufu, but it had been heightened and brought into the open by the policies of the fifth shogun, Tsunayoshi. The reign preceding that of Tsunayoshi had

seen an expansion in the power of the *rōjū* and *fudai* relative to that of the shogun. Tsunayoshi, who until his succession in 1680 had been daimyo of the cadet domain of Tatebayashi, upon becoming shogun set about to redress the balance. To that end he promoted men immediately loyal to himself, creating new positions for them such as that of *sobayō-nin*. At the same time, he also cultivated ties with rank-and-file members of the bakufu bureaucracy like the later *kanjō bugyō* (fiscal-judicial commissioner), Ogiwara Shigehide, who in the latter part of Tsunayoshi's reign came to have a dominant voice in bakufu financial affairs.

This pattern remained basically unchanged under Tsunayoshi's successor, his nephew Ienobu. Also a newcomer to bakufu politics, Ienobu followed his uncle's example in ruling through his attendants rather than in concert with the *rōjū*. Due to Ienobu's deathbed stipulations in 1712, his attendants went on to play a central role during the three-and-a-half-year reign of his young son, Ietsugu, as well. As a consequence, the friction between the shogunal circle and the representatives of *fudai* interests characteristic of Tsunayoshi's reign continued unresolved throughout the reigns of Ienobu and Ietsugu. As Hakuseki was closely associated with the shogunal circle, these circumstances greatly influenced his perspective on the bakufu.

SHOGUN AND FUDAI

Considered from a national perspective, the head of the bakufu, the shogun, combined in himself two not fully congruent forms of national authority. In one sense, the shogun was an incipient national monarch whose power over the daimyo was expressed most graphically in his ability to confiscate their territorial holdings or shift them from one area to another virtually at will. In another sense, the shogun was little more than a feudal hegemon who exercised direct fiscal and judicial authority over the populace only within the areas held immediately by the bakufu (*tenryō*) and who left the daimyo free to administer their domains as they saw fit. Much the same ambiguities characterized the internal organization of the bakufu, consisting of the shogun, his immediate vassals (the *fudai* daimyo, *hatamoto*, and *gokenin*), and, to some extent, the houses of daimyo related to the Tokugawa line. Like other Sengoku

daimyo, Ieyasu had succeeded in tightening his control over his vassal band without making himself into an autocrat. Major vassals, in particular, retained both considerable autonomy and a sizable voice in affairs relevant to the welfare of the house to which their fate as well as that of their lord was bound. This characteristic remained embedded in the structure of the bakufu and had a significant impact on the evolution of bakufu politics in the first century of Tokugawa rule.²

INITIAL ORIENTATIONS. In the opening decades of the Tokugawa period, the day-to-day administration of bakufu affairs was handled primarily by the shogun and a small band of men closely associated with him, the so-called *kinju shuttōnin*, or “specially promoted personal aides.” As the institutional framework of the bakufu took shape, the Tokugawa shogun continued to utilize and promote such *shuttōnin* as a key means of extending their personal power. The third shogun, Iemitsu, for instance, who presided over the regularization of the structure of bakufu offices, made effective use of *shuttōnin* like Matsudaira Nobutsuna and Hotta Masamori, whose ties with him dated to their childhood when they had been assigned to the service of the equally youthful Iemitsu as pages. Owing their rise to Iemitsu, they could be counted on to advance the shogun’s interests from the various strategic offices to which he successively assigned them.³

In the early 1600s, while the first shogun looked to the *shuttōnin* to assist them in the management of administrative matters, the important *fudai* were largely busy elsewhere. On the one hand responsible for supervision of the various guard units into which the Tokugawa band of vassals was organized, on the other they necessarily had to devote much of their attention to the consolidation of the domains newly assigned them as part of the Tokugawa scheme for achieving a geographical distribution of daimyo favorable to Tokugawa interests. Thus, in the first years of Tokugawa rule, the major *fudai* did not routinely hold posts in the as yet primitive bakufu administrative apparatus. As that apparatus developed and was regularized, however, representatives of the major *fudai* came to play a central part in it. If one dimension of the process of regularization was expansion of the authority of the shogun as head of the bakufu administrative framework, another was the establishment

of offices reserved for important *fudai* which institutionalized their traditional advisory role.⁴

The most important of these offices was that of *rōjū*, a collegial post held usually by four or five *fudai* daimyo of lord-of-a-castle rank and possessing domains of medium to large size. According to the specification of the functions of the *rōjū* issued in 1634, the *rōjū* were responsible in particular for handling matters pertaining to the imperial court, the daimyo, the allocation of fiefs, bakufu finances, shrines and temples, relations with other countries, and major construction projects. They were supposed to endorse and transmit orders issued by the shogun and to meet regularly with the officials who staffed the bakufu bureaucracy and when necessary with the daimyo or their representatives. Acting in concert with other important bakufu officials, they also came to serve as the ultimate court of appeal for judicial cases referred to the bakufu. Those appointed as *rōjū* were expected to be from families with longstanding ties to the Tokugawa.⁵ That fact, together with the collegial nature of the post, ensured that the *rōjū*, in carrying out their responsibilities, would act as spokesmen for the interests of those vassals who constituted the traditional backbone of the Tokugawa house.

In the first half century of the bakufu, the power and authority of the shogun and *fudai* thus developed concurrently along two distinct axes. During the reign of Iemitsu, which saw the institutionalization of both axes, a balance between them was maintained. In the following reign, that of Iemitsu's son, Ietsuna, however, that balance began to disintegrate. Ietsuna was only 11 when he became shogun, and he suffered from poor health throughout his reign of twenty-nine years, a situation that favored further consolidation of the position of the *fudai* within the bakufu. Such a tendency was reflected in the growing emphasis on *kakaku* (hereditary family status) as an essential qualification for office. Since one's *kakaku* was determined by the history of one's family relationship with the Tokugawa, with the highest *kakaku* reserved for those families who had served the Tokugawa since the days of Ieyasu's ancestors in Mikawa, the significance ascribed to *kakaku* served to underwrite the hold of the *fudai* on the most important bakufu offices.

Various developments during the reign of Ietsuna testified to the increased weight given to *kakaku*. As Asao Naohiro points out, it was

visible two years after Ietsuna's accession in the elevation of the 30-year-old Sakai Tadakiyo to the premier seat among the *rōjū*, by-passing his seniors in age and service. The promotion of the scion of the main line of the foremost of the Mikawa *fudai* clearly affirmed the centrality of *kakaku* to bakufu politics. In 1659, the role of *kakaku* as a determinant of office was further reinforced by the routinization of entrance into the bakufu guard units according to family background and by the specification of the antechambers at Edo Castle to be used by *fudai* officials of various categories. The continuing association between a vassal house and a particular antechamber became a ready indicator of the place of that house in the hierarchy of *kakaku*.⁶

THE IMPACT OF THE SUCCESSION OF TSUNAYOSHI. The implications of these developments for the relations between the shogun and his leading vassals became evident in the next reign. In 1680, Ietsuna died without issue and was succeeded by his younger brother, Tsunayoshi, daimyo of the cadet domain of Tatebayashi. Tsunayoshi's accession introduced several new elements into the existing contours of bakufu politics. For one, he brought with him a sizable band of vassals, including some 500 of samurai (*shibun*) rank. The domain of Tatebayashi had been created for Tsunayoshi during his childhood out of bakufu territory and lands acquired by shifting the daimyo holding them to other areas. The Tatebayashi retinue had been formed in a similar fashion by taking on bakufu retainers, their excess sons and siblings, and otherwise unattached samurai. When Tsunayoshi became shogun, the Tatebayashi domain was reabsorbed by the bakufu; the Tatebayashi retainer band likewise was incorporated into the body of bakufu vassals. Many Tatebayashi retainers were assigned to the bakufu reserve forces (*yorai* and *kobushin*), but others were given positions in Tsunayoshi's personal staff, one of the guard units, or within the bakufu bureaucracy, most particularly the offices concerned with fiscal matters. Although about 60 percent of the Tatebayashi retinue were former bakufu retainers or the younger sons or brothers of bakufu retainers, many of the Tatebayashi people given positions had no previous ties to the bakufu, and, as a whole, Tsunayoshi's vassal band represented a foreign element vis-à-vis the existing body of bakufu vassals.⁷

Tsunayoshi's personal political perspective also contributed to tension between him and the *fudai*. To judge from his actions after becoming shogun, Tsunayoshi, 34 years old at the time of his accession, had already formed a strong sense of the authority proper to a ruler. The Tatebayashi house was less autonomous in organization than the three collateral (*sanke*) houses, and, throughout his tenure as daimyo of Tatebayashi, Tsunayoshi had remained permanently in Edo.⁸ Viewing the business of domain administration from a remove perhaps encouraged him to develop an abstract, theoretical concept of the relationship between the ruler and his subjects and ministers. An interest in Confucianism reinforced that tendency. Tsunayoshi's resulting view of the shogun as rightly an autocrat inevitably led him to look less than positively on the power acquired by the *fudai* during the reign of Ietsuna.⁹

Tsunayoshi took a symbolic step towards redressing the latter situation shortly after his succession when he relieved Sakai Tadakiyo of his position as *tairō* (Tadakiyo had been elevated from *rōjū* to *tairō*, a position closely associated with the *rōjū* which was filled only irregularly, in 1666) and took back from him his allotted residence in front of the main gate of Edo Castle. When, shortly thereafter, Tadakiyo died, Tsunayoshi reduced the domain inherited by Tadakiyo's heir by 20,000 *koku* and put him under house arrest for errors made by his late father while in office.¹⁰ The power exercised by Tadakiyo in the latter years of Ietsuna's reign was such that he was known popularly as the main-gate shogun; Tsunayoshi's quick action against this representative of *fudai* power served as ample warning of his intent to seize the initiative from the *fudai* and to make clear the role of the shogun as the supreme authority within the bakufu.¹¹

A series of similar moves followed. Tsunayoshi's reign was marked by an unusually high incidence of punitive actions against daimyo and *hatabo*, with *fudai* figuring disproportionately among the daimyo so affected.¹² At the same time, Tsunayoshi set about creating institutional counterweights to the power of the *fudai* within the structure of the bakufu bureaucracy. Going against tradition, he appointed a number of *tozama* (outside) daimyo (most of small size) to bakufu office, even appointing some to positions like *jisha bugyō* (commissioner for temples and shrines) and *wakadoshiyori* (junior councillor).¹³

Similarly, Tsunayoshi sought to establish with some *fudai* of lesser *kakaku* than the Mikawa old guard a relationship comparable to that seen in earlier reigns between the shogun and the so-called *shuttōnin*. Most notably, in the first years of his reign Tsunayoshi showed particular favor to Hotta Masatoshi, who had been appointed *rōjū* the year before Tsunayoshi's accession. Tsunayoshi began to cultivate Masatoshi, the third son of Hotta Masamori, one of the *shuttōnin* promoted by Iemitsu, in the context of his attack on the position of Sakai Tadakiyo. Masatoshi was awarded the residence in front of the main gate taken away from Tadakiyo and, at the end of 1681, he also received the post of *tairō* formerly held by Tadakiyo. By the end of the next year, Tsunayoshi had more than tripled the size of Masatoshi's domain.¹⁴

Neither of these strategies, however, had as much impact on the shape of bakufu politics as did two other measures associated with Tsunayoshi: the creation of the post of *sobayōnin* (grand chamberlain) and the forging of links through his *sobayōnin* with the staff of the bakufu fiscal offices.

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE POST OF SOBAYŌNIN. In creating the post of *sobayōnin*, Tsunayoshi raised the rank and perquisites of some of his attendants and strengthened their role as the intermediaries through which communications between the *rōjū* and the shogun were to be channeled. From the beginning of the Tokugawa period, the shogun had been surrounded by attendants of various kinds, but in early reigns there had been no rigid division between service as an attendant and the holding of administrative posts in the bakufu bureaucracy. Many of the early *shuttōnin* combined both functions or moved easily from one to the other in accordance with the changing needs of their master. Hotta Masamori was a case in point.¹⁵ During the reign of Ietsuna, however, this practice came to an end, and it was established that people holding posts like that of *sobashū* (chamberlain), at the time the most important category of attendant, were not to assume other responsibilities concurrently. The duties of the *sobashū* came to be defined as staying in rotation on 24-hour duty at Edo Castle, managing the shogun's personal household, supervising affairs within the castle after the *rōjū* and *wakadoshyori* had left for the day, and conveying messages between the shogun and *rōjū*. At the same time, in the context of the specification of the

links between *kakaku* and office that took place in Ietsuna's reign, it became established that the position of *sobashū* was primarily a *hatamoto* post with a status that ranked it below the *wakadoshiyori*.¹⁶

When Tsunayoshi became shogun he installed Makino Narisada, formerly *karō* of the Tatebayashi domain, as *sobashū*.¹⁷ The next year, 1681, perhaps with the idea of using Makino as a foil against the *rōjū*, Tsunayoshi created for him the new post of *sobayōnin*, elevated him in court rank, and increased the size of his domain. Narisada's duties as *sobayōnin* did not change significantly from what they had been as *sobashū*, but the perquisites of rank and income granted him established the position of *sobayōnin* as a daimyo post ranking above the *wakadoshiyori* and carrying a status comparable to that of the *rōjū*.¹⁸

The assassination of Hotta Masatoshi in 1684 resulted in a further development of the role played by the *sobayōnin* in bakufu politics. Not only did that event put a stop to the use of Masatoshi as a latter-day *shutōnin* and thereby lead Tsunayoshi to rely more exclusively on the *sobayōnin* as a check against the power of the *fudai*; it also was responsible for a rearrangement in the physical quarters assigned the *rōjū* which in effect enhanced the political function of the *sobayōnin*.

Masatoshi's assassination, by one of the *wakadoshiyori*, occurred within Edo Castle on one of the two days a month when bakufu vassals gathered at the Main Enceinte for formal audience with the shogun. Up until this time, the *rōjū* had occupied chambers adjacent to the living quarters of the shogun, enabling them to communicate readily with him. After the assassination, however, the chambers designated for use by the *rōjū* were removed to a more distant spot. The reason given for the move was to avoid danger to the shogun in the event of a similar incident in the future; the move also reduced the direct contact between the shogun and the *rōjū*, leading to greater reliance on the *sobayōnin* to relay communications between them.¹⁹

This enhanced role as intermediary between the shogun and *rōjū* was a vital ingredient in the power acquired thenceforth by the *sobayōnin*. It enabled them to represent the shogun vis-à-vis the bakufu administrative staff and, by controlling access to him, to exert influence over both the formation of policy and the processing of routine government affairs. This phenomenon and the power it gave to the *sobayōnin* became

most apparent after 1688 when Yanagisawa Yoshiyasu (1658–1714) was appointed to the post. Yoshiyasu, the son of the chief fiscal officer (*kanjō gashira*) of the Tatebayashi domain, began his career in the Tatebayashi years as a member of Tsunayoshi's personal guards (*koshōgumi*). When Tsunayoshi became shogun, he appointed Yoshiyasu to his household staff (*konando*), from which position Yoshiyasu was promoted to *sobayōnin*. In 1694, Tsunayoshi elevated Yoshiyasu to lord-of-a-castle rank, declared his duties and status to be comparable to those of the *rōjū*, and ordered him to participate together with the *rōjū* in the deliberations of the *hyōjōsho*, the supreme judicial office of the bakufu. Four years later, his status was made equivalent to that of the *tairō*, elevating him above the *rōjū*. In 1701, Tsunayoshi granted Yoshiyasu and his son use of the character *yoshi* in their personal names and of the original Tokugawa surname, Matsudaira. Three years later, after Ienobu became Tsunayoshi's heir, Tsunayoshi followed up these favors by awarding Yoshiyasu 150,000 *ku* in the Kōfu domain held previously by Ienobu.²⁰ Parallel to his promotion of Yoshiyasu, Tsunayoshi secluded himself more and more from the conduct of bakufu business and, issuing orders through Yoshiyasu, began to indulge increasingly in the idiosyncratic measures like the edicts requiring compassion for living things (*shōrui awaremi no rei*) for which his reign became notorious.

Tsunayoshi's assertive use of the *sobayōnin* brought about an open polarization between the two axes of bakufu politics, one centered around the person of the shogun and the other around representatives of the interests of the *fudai*. The *fudai*, seeing in the symbols of status given the *sobayōnin* a challenge to the *kakaku* system underwriting their place in the bakufu, reacted to them with hostility. At the same time, the very creation of the post of *sobayōnin* testified to the strength of *kakaku* as a basic element of the bakufu order. Tsunayoshi could promote Yoshiyasu to a status equivalent to or greater than that of the *rōjū* and grant him perquisites associated with the posts of *rōjū* and *tairō*, but he could not disregard the association between *kakaku* and office to the extent of making Yoshiyasu *rōjū* or *tairō*. In this regard, the situation of the *sobayōnin* within bakufu politics differed fundamentally from that of the earlier *shuttōnin*.²¹

This circumstance had significant consequences for the way in which

those who reached the position of *sobayōnin* sought to advance their power. Although the *sobayōnin*, as intermediaries between the shogun and *rōjū*, obtained an opportunity to participate in the formation of policy and influence the processing of bakufu business, they were prevented from acquiring the direct administrative authority over the bakufu bureaucracy and band of vassals that was the prerogative of the *rōjū* and *wakadoshiyori*. In the words of Tsuji Tatsuya, the *sobayōnin*,

as newly taken on vassals, lacked the power-intrinsic to those from the established family cliques. Indeed, the absence of such power might be termed their distinctive characteristic. And, while they stood at the heart of the governing process, structurally speaking they did not possess the means to control the administrative mechanism. Consequently they did not possess that authority exercised by a senior official over his subordinates.²²

Instead, to counterbalance the official jurisdictional authority over bakufu personnel possessed by the *rōjū* and other leading bakufu officials, the *sobayōnin* were forced to capitalize on their privilege of access to the shogun and consequent ability to isolate him from others. They also sought to cultivate informal ties with particular elements within the bureaucracy. This latter aspect of *sobayōnin* power constituted the second institutional innovation of Tsunayoshi's reign to have a lasting impact on bakufu politics.

DEVELOPMENTS WITHIN THE KANJŌ OFFICES. The main element of the bakufu bureaucracy with which Tsunayoshi's *sobayōnin* concentrated on developing ties were staff members of the bakufu fiscal offices, the *kanjō bbugyō*, and the various offices under its immediate jurisdiction. Several factors encouraged this trend. The economic developments of the second half of the seventeenth century—the growth of a commercial economy, the social changes it fostered in both the cities and the countryside, the financial difficulties experienced by the *bushi* class in general, the growing gap between the fiscal resources of the bakufu and its expenditures—made the fiscal offices (which also had responsibility for general administration of bakufu territory) the most important within the bakufu bureaucracy. Upon becoming shogun, Tsunayoshi moved quickly to consolidate his control of this area of government. Almost immediately

he established a special standing committee under Hotta Masatoshi to supervise matters pertaining to the administration of bakufu territory. Two years later, he set up a special audit office (the later *kanjō ginmiyaku*) to check and improve performance in the handling of financial affairs.²³ At the same time, he appointed a substantial number of Tatebayashi retainers to positions in the bakufu fiscal offices. Fukai Masaumi estimates that, from 1683 on, former Tatebayashi retainers made up approximately 25 percent of the general staff of the fiscal offices and, in the 1690s, constituted half the section heads (*kanjō kumigashira*) under the *kanjō bugyō*.²⁴

Although, at the beginning of his reign, Tsunayoshi moved in the direction of setting up a channel of control over fiscal matters under one of the *rōjū*, namely Hotta Masatoshi, Masatoshi's assassination put an end to that strategy. Instead, with the incorporation of former Tatebayashi retainers into the *kanjō* staff, Tsunayoshi and his attendants relied more on informal connections to exercise influence over bakufu financial affairs. This trend was particularly strong after the appointment to *sobayōnin* of Yanagisawa Yoshiyasu, whose father had been *kanjō gashira* of the Tatebayashi domain and who consequently had personal ties with many of the *kanjō* staff members brought in from Tatebayashi.²⁵

For their part, the members of the fiscal offices also had reason to respond positively to being cultivated by the shogun and his *sobayōnin*. In the early years of the Tokugawa period, it was possible for the holder of a lesser post in the hierarchy of offices concerned with fiscal administration to be promoted to the top position in that hierarchy, that of *kanjō bugyō* (known at the time as *kanjō gashira*). With the solidification of the *kakaku* order, however, such opportunities disappeared. Among the features of the *kakaku* structure was a fundamental distinction between "generalist" positions reserved for high-ranking vassals and "specialist" posts assigned retainers of lesser status. The position of *kanjō bugyō* was regarded as belonging to the former category and came to be a standard rung on the ladder of promotion ascendable by *hatamoto* of middle- and high-status background. By contrast, the fiscal offices under the *kanjō bugyō* were viewed as "specialist" posts. Those who staffed those offices usually spent their entire careers in them and, by and large, their sons were also expected to continue the family specialization in financial administration.²⁶

For those who staffed the bakufu fiscal offices, therefore, the clash between the *fudai* and the shogunal circle over the issue of *kakaku* had direct bearing on their own situation. Association with the shogun and his *sobayōnin* held out a possibility for them to overcome the restrictions of the *kakaku* order. Such indeed proved the case. When Tsunayoshi created the post of *ginmiyaku*, he appointed to it experienced staff members of the fiscal offices. Eventually, breaking with the *kakaku* pattern of the previous several decades, he promoted two such *ginmiyaku* appointees to the post of *kanjō bugyō*.²⁷ One of these was Ogiwara Shigehide, who dominated the management of bakufu finances from the mid-1690s on. However, although people like Shigehide had cause to side with the *sobayōnin* against the established *fudai*, there were significant differences in their respective places within the bakufu political structure. The *sobayōnin*, having no direct administrative authority over the fiscal offices, were forced to rely on informal ties of patronage to maintain their connections with the staff of those offices. But the heads of those offices, especially ones who had risen from the ranks, possessed a powerful bureaucratic base. A politically adroit *kanjō* official like Shigehide was able to turn this situation to advantage, a circumstance that was to have an important impact on the shape of bakufu politics during the following reigns, those of Ienobu and Ietsugu.

THE REIGN OF IENOBU

The polarization between the shogunal circle and the representatives of the leading *fudai* that had built up during Tsunayoshi's reign continued unabated in the reigns of Ienobu and Ietsugu. If anything, various circumstances conspired to intensify it. Like Tsunayoshi, Ienobu came into bakufu politics from the outside. Until his designation as Tsunayoshi's heir in late 1704, he was daimyo of the cadet domain of Kōfu, set up for his father, Tsunashige, elder brother to Tsunayoshi, at the same time and in the same manner as the Tatebayashi domain had been created for Tsunayoshi. As had been true earlier for the Tatebayashi domain, the Kōfu lands and retainer band were dissolved and incorporated into bakufu territory and the bakufu vassal band when Ienobu moved into the Western Enceinte as Tsunayoshi's heir. In a repetition of what had occurred

when Tsunayoshi became shogun, a significant number of Ienobu's Kōfu retinue were given places in Ienobu's immediate entourage of attendants and personal household staff and in the *kanjō* offices.²⁸ Of these, a high percentage had no prior ties, or only tenuous ones, with the bakufu. (Fukai Masaumi estimates that 70 percent of the Kōfu retainers who took up positions in Ienobu's immediate entourage and 82 percent of those taken into the fiscal offices were of non-bakufu retainer origin.)²⁹

By the end of Tsunayoshi's reign, a place for the *sobayōnin* as spokesman for the shogun had been established within the structure of bakufu politics. At the same time, the explicit role of the *sobayōnin* as the shogun's man led to the assumption that, as was not true of the *rōjū* and other regular bakufu officials, the *sobayōnin*'s career was tied to that of the shogun he served. Consequently, when Tsunayoshi died, his attendants retired, leaving open a space in the political structure ready made to be filled by the men coming with Ienobu from Kōfu. This circumstance, in addition to the general parallels between Ienobu's situation and Tsunayoshi's as newcomers to bakufu politics, undoubtedly laid the ground for continuation of the pattern of *sobayōnin* politics—and the polarization in bakufu politics it fostered—under Ienobu.

It also seems likely that Ienobu's prior experience of factional politics as daimyo of Kōfu further disposed him to stay within rather than break out of the pattern of *sobayōnin* politics. Ienobu's succession as daimyo of Kōfu was somewhat irregular. He was born in 1662, prior to his father's official marriage to the daughter of a Kyoto noble, the product of a liaison between Tsunashige and an attendant in the service of Tsunashige's nurse. Ienobu's presence being regarded as awkward, it was arranged for him to be brought up by one of the Kōfu *karō*, Shinmi Masanobu, rather than as Tsunashige's son. But Tsunashige's official consorts failed to bear him a surviving heir. Consequently, when Ienobu was 8 years old, Tsunashige took him back and obtained permission from the bakufu to establish him as heir to the Kōfu domain.³⁰

This sequence of events led to an outbreak of factional infighting within the Kōfu retinue. Two of the *karō* asserted to the bakufu that Ienobu had in fact died some time earlier and that the child Shinmi presented to Tsunashige as his son was a substitute. They added that Tsunashige had been showing signs of instability, making his judgment on this

matter open to question. The bakufu dismissed the complaint of the *karō* as inspired by jealousy and took punitive action against them. It also continued to keep a close eye on affairs within the Kōfu house. When, eight years later, in 1678, Ienobu succeeded Tsunashige as daimyo upon the latter's death, the bakufu declared that it would not be wise for Shinmi to be closely involved henceforth in the conduct of domain government and ordered him to retire as *karō*.³¹ In 1689, the bakufu again took direct punitive action against two of the Kōfu *karō*. On these occasions, the bakufu replaced the disgraced Kōfu *karō* with new ones posted from the bakufu. On other occasions as well, Kōfu *karō* were appointed by the bakufu rather than the daimyo, making clear that the *karō* were accountable primarily to the bakufu, not the daimyo. The edict issued on the occasion of Shinmi's enforced retirement reflected this assumption: It noted that the bakufu would post an "advisor" (*fusō*) to Ienobu and that "in all matters there will be direction from the bakufu."³²

Thus, Ienobu's authority as daimyo was blurred, shared with the *karō* who represented not so much (as would be the case in an ordinary domain) the interests of the leading vassals of the house headed by Ienobu as those of an outside force. The delicacy of his own position in this situation seems to have accustomed Ienobu from early on to rely heavily on those he could regard as his own men. In particular, he developed a close relationship with Manabe Akifusa, the son of a No actor in the entourage of Tsunashige. Akifusa had been apprenticed as a child to the Kita school of No, and it was presumably as an actor that he first came to the attention of Ienobu, who, like his uncle, Tsunayoshi, was passionately fond of the No. In 1684, at age 18, Akifusa became a page (*koshō*) to Ienobu, four years his senior. From page he rose to the position of *yōnin* (chamberlain) to Ienobu, a position in domain government roughly comparable to that of *sobashū* in the bakufu.³³

When Ienobu became Tsunayoshi's heir, the three Kōfu *karō* were appointed as his *sobashū*, and Akifusa was given the status of captain of the heir's rear guards (*nishinomaru okubangashira*). Within a couple of months, however, he joined the ranks of Ienobu's *sobashū* (the former *karō*), and soon he had eclipsed the latter. At the beginning of 1706, he was awarded status equivalent to the *wakadoshiyori*. By the end of 1706, he had been given a status above the *wakadoshiyori* and immediately

below the *rōjū*. Upon his accession as shogun, Ienobu granted Akifusa status equivalent to that of the *rōjū* and various perquisites appropriate to such a status, including, in mid-1710, the castle of Takasaki, headquarters of a domain of 50,000 *koku*.³⁴ His position underwritten by such symbols of status, Akifusa played a role in Ienobu's reign very similar to that taken by Yoshiyasu under Tsunayoshi.

The privileges and power granted Akifusa, who was of much lowlier origins than previous *sobayōnin*, was another source of friction between the shogunal circle and the *fudai*. Of Tsunayoshi's main *sobayōnin*, Makino Narisada had served as *karō* in Tatebayashi, and Yoshiyasu's father, who had originally served Iemitsu's ill-fated younger brother, Tadanaga, had held the important position of *kanjō gashira* in the Tatebayashi domain. The privileges granted Yoshiyasu, who acquired status equivalent to the *tairō*, a domain of 150,000 *koku*, and honorary court rank and office one level above that achieved by Akifusa, may have been more sizable than those awarded to Akifusa, but, in terms of the point from which each started, Akifusa's promotion entailed the more blatant disregard for the niceties of *kakaku*.

The *rōjū* were not slow to show their displeasure. A year and a half after Ienobu's succession and only a few days before the promotion of Akifusa to the rank of "lord-of-a-castle," the *rōjū* Ogasawara Nagashige, in office since 1697, abruptly resigned. Nagashige earlier had taken exception to a plan by Tsunayoshi to give a pike (*naginata*) to Yoshiyasu, asserting that such a gift was a privilege reserved for certain families.³⁵ The official reason given for his resignation at this point was trouble with his eyes. But, according to the *Tokugawa jikki*, the official bakufu annals, it was commonly rumored that the real reason

was his distaste for the fact that Manabe Akifusa, having risen from the status of a No player to that of privy advisor, was ranked alongside the major vassals responsible for the administration of the government. Thus he resigned his position on the pretext of eye disease and thereafter kept within closed gates and refused contact with the world.³⁶

The shogunal circle made some efforts to deflect *fudai* hostility to Akifusa. Most notably, shortly after Ogasawara Nagashige's resignation and the grant of Takasaki Castle to Akifusa, Ienobu appointed a second

sobayōnin, “presumably for a certain reason,” as Hakuseki put it.³⁷ This second *sobayōnin*, Honda Tadayoshi, 20 years old at the time of his appointment, was heir to the main line descended from Honda Tadakatsu, one of Ieyasu’s most important vassals, and thus was of impeccable *fudai* lineage. In terms of *kakaku* he was fully qualified to act as the peer of the *rōjū*, and one suspects that this background was the reason for his appointment. Presumably, the idea was to neutralize *rōjū* hostility for Akifusa by linking the latter to Tadayoshi. (As to why, despite his lineage, Tadayoshi should have been willing to accept such a role, the answer perhaps lies in the fact that he and his house were indebted to Ienobu. Tadayoshi’s predecessor had died in 1709 at the age of 12, leaving the main house liable to extinction. Instead Ienobu had given Tadayoshi, originally from a branch house, permission to continue the main line.)³⁸

In accordance with the rationale behind his appointment, however, Tadayoshi acted as a *sobayōnin* in name only. He appeared next to Akifusa on formal occasions, but seems to have taken little part in the actual process of government. The substance of the function of the *sobayōnin* continued to be monopolized by Akifusa, operating in concert with a group of lesser attendants (including two of his brothers) responsible directly to him. Consequently, the appointment of Honda Tadayoshi could hardly defuse the tension that continued to build up between the shogunal circle and the *fudai* in the course of Ienobu’s four-year reign.

SOBAYŌNIN AND FUDAI IN THE REIGN OF IETSUGU

In late 1712, Ienobu died after an illness of several months and was succeeded by his son, Ietsugu, not yet 3½ years old at the time. This development further complicated the relationship between the *fudai* and those whose power derived from their association with Ienobu.

THE ROLE OF A CHILD SHOGUN. As head of the Tokugawa house as well as the bakufu bureaucracy, the shogun occupied a central place both symbolically and substantially in the structure of Tokugawa rule. An adult shogun who chose to exercise the authority vested in his position could be extremely powerful, as was illustrated by the inability of bakufu officials and the daimyo to protest effectively against Tsunayoshi’s

detested injunctions to show compassion to living things. To abolish the injunctions required action by another shogun, namely Ienobu.

The accession of a child did not affect the symbolic weight accorded the role of shogun. Muro Kyūsō, whose letters to friends in Kaga provide both a vivid and reasonably detached picture of the workings of bakufu politics in this period, in his description of Ietsugu's daily audience with the *rōjū*, offered evidence of the reverence inspired by even a 3-year-old shogun:

Every day his lordship comes out [from the rear quarters, the *ōokn*] to receive the *rōjū* in audience. A quilt is spread on the dais [reserved for the shogun] and at its side is placed his lordship's sword rest. His attendants lead him by the hand as far as the dais, and he climbs up onto the quilt. His sword is placed for him on the sword rest, and, his short sword having been placed at his side, he takes it up by himself and puts it in place at the left-hand side of his waist. He meets with the *rōjū* one by one; as soon as the audience is over and they are about to take their leave, "Uncle (*jii*)!" he calls out, and, when they come back, he gives each of them a scrap of paper or something else of the sort which he has with him. All are said to receive it with tears in their eyes.³⁹

Ietsugu's sudden decision a year after his accession to share part of his dinner with the *tairō*, Ii Naomori, evoked a similar response:

[One evening] one of his lordship's personal attendants appeared unexpectedly at the Ii residence. "What is the matter! Tell me!" Lord Ii commanded the messenger from the castle. The messenger replied that his lordship had been eating dinner and had just begun to eat a broiled whiting filet when he asked, "Has Uncle Ii already eaten?" When he was told that Lord Ii had returned home, he commanded that, if Lord Ii had not finished dinner, he should be given the filet. Immediately it was put in a box, wrapped up, and sent in the care of one of his lordship's attendants to the Ii residence. Lord Ii is said to have been most grateful and to have distributed gifts to his retainers in honor of the occasion. Afterwards he summoned the messenger from the castle and presented him with a meal as well as five pieces of gold and paper swords [as a ceremonial token gift].⁴⁰

But, although the symbolic authority of the shogun remained unchanged, a child obviously could not exercise personally the substance of shogunal power. Consequently, the position of the *sobayōnin* and other attendants, whose influence over bakufu affairs rested on the identification of their actions with the personal will of the shogun, was

much weaker than it had been during the reigns of Tsunayoshi and Ienobu.

THE ROLE OF THE SOBAYŌNIN. The question of the role of the *sobayōnin* in the absence of an adult shogun had figured implicitly in the shogunal circle's deliberations over what to do about the succession in the event of Ienobu's death. In the late fall of 1712, as Ienobu's health steadily worsened, three possibilities evidently were considered: to pass the succession to Ietsugu unincumbered; to designate Tokugawa Yoshimichi, head of the Owari house, first in rank among the three collateral houses (*sanke*), as Ienobu's heir with the intent that Yoshimichi should abdicate in favor of Ietsugu upon the latter's coming of age; or to ask Yoshimichi to move into the Western Enceinte as both regent to Ietsugu and his heir in the event that Ietsugu died before reaching adulthood.

The last two options would have preserved an authoritative voice at the center of bakufu politics, but they did not guarantee that that voice would speak on behalf of those whose interests had been linked to the person of Ienobu. Hakuseki, consulted on this matter "privately through Akifusa," took note of this danger in advising adoption of the first course. In his letters Muro Kyūsō gave an account of Hakuseki's reasoning. "In antiquity," Kyūsō reported Hakuseki as saying,

if a ruler died while his heir was still in the womb, until the birth of the child there was what was known as paying honor to the left-behind garment. It was possible to preserve order in the realm simply by placing on the throne a garment that had been worn by the ruler. And, in a case such as this when there is an heir to the main line already of 4 [i.e., 3 by Western count] years of age, should the succession go elsewhere, it would simply give rise to doubts among the people. In particular, those people who came with his lordship from Kōfu are not likely to agree. From the day of his lordship's death, divisions will appear. And, should the charge of the realm be given temporarily over to the lord of Owari, whenever Lord Ietsugu should so much as spit up a little milk, people will be shaken in their steadfastness. If conflicting loyalties develop, it is far more likely to be a source of disorder than having a child as ruler. What trouble should there be? The only course is to establish his young lordship as ruler, and, when matters of grave import to the realm come up, settle them upon consulting with the three collateral houses through the *rōjū*.⁴¹

Hakuseki's advice was accepted: Instead of setting up an interregnum or appointing a formal regent, Ienobu instructed the *rōjū* and *tairō* orally that his personal attendants should continue to hold their current posts during the reign of Ietsugu and left written orders that the *rōjū* and other officials should maintain the policies of his reign as the axis of Ietsugu's.⁴² In effect, these instructions put into Akifusa's keeping the suit of clothes to be placed on the throne, a prerogative manifested on Ietsugu's first meeting with high bakufu officials and first audience with the assembled Tokugawa vassals, when he appeared held in Akifusa's arms.⁴³

In the first weeks of Ietsugu's reign, *sobayōnin* control of his person and reference to the will of Ienobu formed the basis for a kind of balance of power between the *sobayōnin* and the *rōjū* in which Akifusa retained the upper hand. Three weeks after Ienobu's death, Kyūsō described the power structure surrounding Ietsugu as follows:

At present, it appears that in all matters the *rōjū*, Lord Manabe Akifusa, and Lord Honda Tadayoshi are acting [jointly] as regent (*sesshō*). The [*tairō*] Li Naomori appears to play a more important role than before and acts as an intermediary between the collateral houses and the *rōjū*. In the deliberations over governmental matters that have taken place, it appears that Lord Manabe is the most knowledgeable, and it is said that ultimately the other *rōjū* follow his views. It also is said that his late lordship's testament declared that Lord Manabe, having long served close to the person of his lordship, was familiar with his lordship's views and commanded that, in consequence, after his lordship's death Lord Manabe should continue to be consulted about everything as before...⁴⁴

But, in the long run, the position of Akifusa in the reign of Ietsugu was not strong enough to keep the inherent tension between him and the “other” *rōjū* from widening into open conflict. A half year after writing the above letter, Kyūsō described in detail a confrontation between Akifusa and the dean of the *rōjū*, Tsuchiya Masanao, in office since 1687. The evidence this second letter offers about the dynamics of bakufu politics in this period makes it worth quoting at some length. The confrontation developed out of Tsuchiya's complaint that the *rōjū* as a group and himself personally as their dean were not being accorded the deference due them. This situation, said Tsuchiya, was something Akifusa

“could correct if you so wish.” As a specific measure, he suggested changing the policy, based on Ietsugu’s youth, that the *rōjū* should take turns staying on night duty at Edo Castle so as to be ready for any untoward event. Such a requirement, he said, detracted from the prestige of the *rōjū* when what was needed during the reign of a minor was the opposite,

to increase the authority of the *rōjū* for his lordship’s sake. If we are treated as insignificant, it will detract from the might of his lordship. . . . At this point it is no longer appropriate for us personally to stay on night duty. There should be no problem with our place being taken by the *wakadoshiyori*. Should something untoward occur, we all live in the vicinity of the castle and should have no trouble in dealing with it.

Akifusa marshaled a variety of arguments against this challenge in the name of *rōjū* prestige. “Your concern for his lordship’s benefit in this regard is most laudable,” Kyūsō quoted him as replying to Tsuchiya.

However, I have my doubts whether an increase in the prestige of the *rōjū* would be to his lordship’s benefit or detrimental to it. His late lordship’s injunctions warn against forming factions and contesting for power. At the moment it may appear that an increase in your authority will redound to the benefit of his lordship, but, in my opinion, it will make for difficulties when his lordship becomes an adult and takes back the authority temporarily granted you. It also will probably cause trouble in what is said outside. And, for your own sake, too, is it not likely to cause difficulties when this enhanced authority that you have acquired is suddenly taken back? And, if for that reason his lordship does not reassume this authority, it will not redound to his benefit at all. . . . As for your statement that it is at my discretion to find some way of distinguishing you from the other *rōjū*, I simply do not understand what you mean. Is it your idea that I should say that such was the command of Lord Ienobu? In even the slightest matter I cannot “follow my own discretion” if it means falsifying his late lordship’s injunctions.

To the contrary, Akifusa went on to argue in a somewhat more mollifying tone, it was precisely the limits of his own authority that made imperative the continued night duty of the *rōjū*:

His lordship being a child, if all goes well, there is no problem, but, should anything happen, it will be of the utmost gravity. If, at such time, one of you is not present at the castle, it is possible that orders will not be followed.

Honda Tadayoshi and myself are in charge of matters pertaining to the rear quarters and are unfamiliar with the handling of matters in the outer sections of the castle. And take even an insignificant issue where there is no major cause for concern but where it would not be good for his lordship's sake for it to be bruited about; if one of you is at the castle and can give orders immediately, the matter can be taken care of directly without word of it getting out.

On the other hand, Akifusa continued on a firmer note,

it would be possible to reduce the burden on each of you by expanding the number of *rōjū*. As you surely recall, Lord Ienobu during his illness was very concerned about this matter and spoke to the *rōjū* about it, saying that he was considering designating a regency-general (*sō orusu yaku*), to which the *rōjū* responded that, while his concern was understandable, there was no need to create such a post. "Since we will be there, there is no need to worry," you said, and, as a result, he felt satisfied and that he could rest easy, and the matter was dropped. However, at that time he did indicate the people who should be appointed as *rōjū* in such an eventuality, and at this point to place them in office would, I feel, accord with his wishes.⁴⁵

The confrontation between Akifusa and Tsuchiya Masanao showed that Akifusa could use references to the intent of Ienobu to hold the line against an immediate increase in the authority of the *rōjū*. But, as is indicated by Tsuchiya's pointed remarks about Akifusa's ability to change established policy "if he so wished," too heavy a reliance on that ploy could backfire. By drawing attention to the fact that Akifusa spoke for a specter rather than a shogun in his majority, it left him open to charges that he was using the name of the shogun as a cover for actions taken on his own initiative.

To compensate for his vulnerability in this regard, Akifusa concentrated increasingly on consolidating his position in the area that, as he declared to Tsuchiya, was his primary sphere of responsibility—management of the affairs of the rear quarters. To this end, he developed closer ties with the women associated with Ienobu—Ten'eiin, Ienobu's main consort, and Gekkōin, the mother of Ietsugu—seeking in these ties a substitute for the backing of an adult shogun. But this strategy, too, had disadvantages. It embroiled Akifusa in the backbiting and factional divisions endemic to the politics of the female quarters.⁴⁶ More seriously, it also encouraged gossip, readily fueled by *fudai* hostility to Akifusa,

that his connection with the rear quarters was not limited to devoted attendance upon Ietsugu. The account of Ietsugu's reign found in the *Sannō gaiki*, a satirical but evidently informed critique of the reigns of Tsunayoshi, Ienobu, and Ietsugu, offers a sample of such gossip:

King Shō [i.e., Yūshōin, Ietsugu's posthumous name], being a child, lived in Lady Gekkō's quarters. Akifusa alone attended him, without differentiation as to day or night, and as a consequence became intimate with Lady Gekkō. At first this was kept secret, but later they were discovered sleeping together, and thereafter they did not trouble to hide their relationship. It reached the point that Akifusa would take off his court dress and, wearing a robe, sit with Lady Gekkō around the brazier talking privately. The king, seeing this, said to his nurse, "Lord Akifusa acts like the king [i.e., my father]." Thereupon behavior in the women's quarters grew lax, and no distance was kept between men and women. In the morning when servants cleaned the place where the personal attendants and personal doctors [tō Ietsugu] had stayed on night duty, they would find [women's] combs and earrings left behind there. Akifusa was aware of this but dared not prohibit it; through it he sought to divert censure of himself. The disorder within and without the king's palace was unprecedented.⁴⁷

Such gossip was fueled further by one of the most notable scandals of the Edo period. At the beginning of 1714, a high-ranking attendant in the service of Gekkōin, a woman by the name of Ejima, was discovered to have stopped by a kabuki theater on her way back from a pilgrimage to Ienobu's tomb on Gekkōin's behalf, and, in the investigation that followed, it came out that she had been carrying on an affair of some duration with the leading actor of the day, Ikushima Shingorō. Muro Kyūsō described the quick punishment meted out to both the principals and those implicated, whether by relationship in the case of the attendants or by profession in the case of the theater-owners, as reflecting positively on Akifusa and Gekkōin; but the incident hardly enhanced Akifusa's position in dealing with the *rōjū*.⁴⁸

The polarization between the shogunal circle and the *fudai*, rooted in the political developments of Tsunayoshi's reign, thus continued unabated throughout the reigns of Ienobu and Ietsugu. It was only in the following reign, that of Yoshimune, that a resolution of the tension was achieved, marking the final stage of the era of bakufu politics that began with the reign of Tsunayoshi.

*THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOBAYŌNIN POLITICS
IN THE REIGN OF YOSHIMUNE*

In the spring of 1716, Ietsugu fell ill. According to the author of the *San-nō gaiki*, his illness was aggravated by the failure of Akifusa and Gekkōin to take proper care of him.⁴⁹ Whatever the truth of the matter, on 1716/4/30, Ietsugu died. With his death, the line of Hidetada and Iemitsu came to an end. A council of the *rōjū* and the three collateral houses selected Tokugawa Yoshimune, daimyo of Kii, as Ietsugu's successor; an imprimatur for the selection was provided by Ienobu's main consort, Ten'eiin, who declared it to be in accordance with instructions left by Ienobu.⁵⁰

Thus chosen by those representing the traditional core of the Tokugawa house to continue the shogunal line, Yoshimune moved quickly to repair relations with the leading *fudai*. He did away with the challenge to their position posed by the endowment of the *sobayōnin* with the symbols of high feudal status. Upon Yoshimune's accession, a change of the inner guard occurred comparable to that effected seven years earlier when the Kōfu circle had replaced Tsunayoshi's attendants. After the burial of Ietsugu, his personal attendants, beginning with Akifusa, were formally relieved of their official duties. In their stead men from Kii were appointed to staff the new shogun's personal household.⁵¹ Yoshimune did not, however, appoint anyone to the post of *sobayōnin*. His most important attendants were given the new title of *goyō toritsugi* (shogunal liaison) and their perquisites were kept modest. The new *goyō toritsugi* received the same size stipend as they had in Kii, in the range of 1,000 to 2,500 *koku*. Not until ten years later did Yoshimune raise the stipends of his two leading attendants to 10,000 *koku*, the minimal indicator of daimyo status and far below the income level achieved by Yanagisawa Yoshiyasu and Manabe Akifusa.⁵²

While thus playing down the position of his attendants, Yoshimune also took steps to show respect for the *fudai* and their traditional place in the Tokugawa order. In relieving Ienobu's and Ietsugu's attendants of their duties, Yoshimune singled out Honda Tadayoshi for special consideration, speaking to him personally and declaring that, given his "prominent family background and youth," he should continue to dedicate

himself to serving the bakufu.⁵³ Yoshimune also summoned for consultation leading members of the *fudai* who had previously gone into retirement. Among those favored in this way were Sakai Tadataka, the son of Tadakiyo, and Ogasawara Nagashige. The former responded by calling upon Yoshimune to terminate various innovations inaugurated in the previous three reigns and to restore the scions of the *fudai* to their rightful place. Ogasawara Nagashige declared that the new atmosphere within the bakufu had brought about a restoration of his eyesight as well.⁵⁴

But, underneath this demonstration of regard for the *fudai* and their concerns, Yoshimune continued to make effective use of his attendants in dealing with the bakufu bureaucracy. He used them to gather information and to provide a direct, if informal, channel of communication between the shogun and the lower ranks of the bakufu bureaucracy.⁵⁵ In effect, by maintaining shogunal involvement in bakufu affairs through his attendants while paying due heed to the symbols of *fudai* authority, Yoshimune forged a combination of traditional and more recent patterns of shogunal rule. Other elements in the contours of bakufu politics dating to Tsunayoshi's reign persisted into that of Ienobu and eventually were incorporated into the structure of shogunal rule realized under Yoshimune, most notably the close linkage between the shogunal circle and the staff of the *kanjō* offices. But, before considering that matter, we need to examine more fully the position of Hakuseki within the context described above.

TWO

Jusha and Yoriai

Hakuseki entered the bakufu as a member of the Kōfu retainer band. He was, moreover, one of the group of attendants and associates immediately surrounding Ienobu. That in his political program he should have tried to advance the interests of the shogunal circle against those of the old-guard *fudai* is thus only natural. As we shall see, such a strategy constituted a central feature of the reforms in bakufu institutions associated with Hakuseki. But to view Hakuseki simply as a representative of the former Kōfu vassals or as a spokesman for *sobayōnin* politics would be to ignore important nuances of his situation and thereby to oversimplify the thrust of his efforts.

Those who have written on Hakuseki have almost universally assumed an identity of interests between him and Ienobu and Manabe Akitusa. This is true of both those who see the era of his influence as an interlude of idealistic "civil" rule and those who regard it as one stage in the growth of shogunal autocracy. In fact, however, Hakuseki's outlook on bakufu politics did not totally coincide with that of Ienobu and Akitusa; most crucially, his situation was quite different from that of Akitusa and the other attendants around Ienobu. This circumstance colored his view of bakufu politics and hence the measures he advocated as much as did his association with the Kōfu circle. To read accurately his political program and the implications it carried for the evolution of bakufu rule, we thus must look more closely at the particularities of Hakuseki's position within the general context of bakufu politics described above.

As an individual, Hakuseki was at a disadvantage within the *kakaku*-oriented political structure of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries in two ways. First, he personally lacked the family background requisite to holding high and influential position. And second, the positions he did hold, both within the Kōfu retinue and later in the bakufu, were marginal and isolated ones which did not tie directly into any established power base. In the following two chapters we shall examine in some detail these dimensions of Hakuseki's situation.

FAMILY BACKGROUND

Like a substantial number of Tokugawa *bushi*, including the Tokugawa themselves, Hakuseki traced his ancestry to the Nitta branch of the Seiwa Genji, and he believed his grandfather, Arai Kageyu (?–1609), to have come originally from Kōzuke, the native province of the Nitta. In fact, the origins of Hakuseki's immediate line are obscure. In the final version of his genealogy, compiled two years before his death, Hakuseki still could do no better to establish his grandfather's ancestry than to rely on the supposition that Kageyu could be identified with a second son in a different Arai genealogy who had "moved to another province . . . and died in unknown parts."¹

Whatever Kageyu's origins, sometime in the last decades of the sixteenth century he seems to have formed a connection with the Tagaya, regional lords who were extending their power in Hitachi during those years. According to Hakuseki, Kageyu did not enter Tagaya vassalage but, as a former local leader of established reputation, was treated by them as an honored guest. A miscalculated alliance on the eve of the battle of Sekigahara, however, brought the rise of the Tagaya to an abrupt end and set Kageyu adrift again. In 1601, when Hakuseki's father, Masanari (1601–1682), was born, Kageyu evidently was living in retirement on some undeveloped land in the area previously under Tagaya control.²

The vicissitudes of the Arai family continued into the second and third generation. Hakuseki's father roamed for eighteen years throughout Japan, taking temporary service in several *bushi* retinues in turn until eventually, at 31, he found a more stable position with Tsuchiya Toshinao, a small *fudai* daimyo. Hakuseki wrote that, taken on originally in

a temporary capacity, Masanari ultimately won the trust of Toshinao and rose to a position of some importance in the Tsuchiya house. At the time of Hakuseki's birth, in 1657, Masanari was stationed permanently in Edo as a police officer in the Tsuchiya Edo residence.³

Hakuseki asserted that Tsuchiya Toshinao showed such regard for Masanari and treated the young Hakuseki with such favor that other retainers speculated that Hakuseki was Toshinao's illegitimate son.⁴ Nevertheless, the relationship with the Tsuchiya proved unenduring. In 1677, Tsuchiya Toshinao died and was succeeded as daimyo by his son, Yorinao. According to Hakuseki, there had been bad feelings between Toshinao and Yorinao. This circumstance fostered a factional dispute within the domain, and Masanari, who had gone into retirement upon Toshinao's death, became implicated in an attempt to replace Yorinao with Yorinao's son. Yorinao "began to say untrue things, and, depriving my father of the pension he had given him and closing the road of service to me, he banished us from his house."⁵

The law of the bakufu was that a daimyo was "not to take into his retinue one barred from service by the latter's former lord."⁶ Thus Yorinao's action might well have prevented Hakuseki from reentering service as a *bushi* for the rest of his life. Two years later, however, in 1679, a number of irregularities in the behavior of Tsuchiya Yorinao came to the attention of the bakufu authorities. Yorinao was declared mentally unbalanced and his domain confiscated.⁷ The confiscation automatically released Hakuseki from the bar to service, making him eligible to seek entry into another *bushi* retinue. In 1682, Hakuseki secured a position with Hotta Masatoshi who, favored by Tsunayoshi with new grants of land, was in the process of expanding his vassal band as well.⁸

This second period of service was no more lasting nor happy than the first. In *Oritaku shiba no ki*, Hakuseki described his relationship with the Hotta as "ungratifying." He noted that, from the time he entered the Hotta retinue, he was not "known personally" by the lord and that little use was made of him. Elsewhere he referred to this period of his life as a time of "temporary service" (*wataribōkō*).⁹ Such remarks indicate that his status within the Hotta retinue was not high. To make things worse, the assassination of Hotta Masatoshi in the fall of 1684, two and a half years after Hakuseki entered his retinue, brought an immediate decline

in the fortunes of the Hotta house. Masatoshi's heir was removed from his bakufu post, becoming simply another *fudai* daimyo without office. He was awarded a domain of 130,000 *koku*, like his father, but Tsunayoshi effectively reduced the Hotta strength by ordering them to undergo domain transfers in two successive years. The moves put a severe strain on Hotta finances. According to Hakuseki, all the Hotta retainers had their stipends reduced, and "as a consequence, there were not a few who renounced their stipends and left the domain." In 1691, a little less than a decade after entering the Hotta retinue, Hakuseki likewise obtained release from Hotta service and left.¹⁰

By this time, Hakuseki, who first had conceived an interest in Confucianism at the age of 17, when by chance he came across a copy of Nakae Tōju's *Okina mondō*, and who had pursued his studies more systematically after leaving the Tsuchiya house, had formed an association with a scholar of some repute. This was Kinoshita Jun'an (1621-1698), whom Tsunayoshi brought into bakufu service in 1682. Through Jun'an's recommendation, in late 1693, at age 36, Hakuseki obtained a position with Ienobu as a Confucian scholar (*jusha*).

As the above discussion illustrates, Hakuseki thus stood as a "newcomer" even among the Kōfu vassals who were eventually incorporated into the body of bakufu retainers. Of unexceptional family background, he had no prior connection with either the bakufu or one of the related Tokugawa houses. Unquestionably he lacked the kind of pedigree that in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries was essential to obtain an established position of power in the bakufu. Not only was Hakuseki at a disadvantage regarding his hereditary *kakaku*, or lack thereof; both within the Kōfu retinue and later the Kōfu circle within the bakufu he also was poorly situated in terms of the position he held. As noted, Hakuseki entered Ienobu's retinue as a *jusha*. He continued to serve as a *jusha* until 1699, when he was transferred to the status of *yoriai* ("reserve force"), which technically was a category of retirement. In fact, of course, Hakuseki did not retire at that point. Nevertheless, for the rest of his life, including his years of activity in the bakufu, Hakuseki's formal status continued to be that of *yoriai*. Thus, to grasp the nature of Hakuseki's place in the group around Ienobu we must explore the ramifications of what it meant to be a *jusha* and a *yoriai* in the mid-Tokugawa period.

THE ROLE OF THE JUSHA

The position of the *jusha* in the early and mid-Tokugawa period was bound up with the attitude of the *bushi* elite towards Confucianism. Frequently it is assumed that the founders of the bakufu actively promoted Confucianism, or, more particularly, Zhu Xi Neo-Confucianism, because the Confucian projection of a static and hierarchical natural order offered philosophical justification for the similarly static and hierarchical social structure on which Ieyasu and his successors sought to base their power. To be sure, the concern of the *buke* rulers of the late Sengoku and early Tokugawa periods to ensure social stability and legitimize their authority created an atmosphere in which Confucian concepts took on a heightened relevance. As has been pointed out by a number of scholars in the past two decades, however, the bakufu did little to further knowledge of Confucianism among either the *bushi* class or society at large.¹¹ From 1630 on, the bakufu granted financial support to a semi-private school for the training of Confucian scholars headed by Hayashi Razan (1583–1657) and his sons. But it took almost another hundred years before the bakufu made any institutional provision for the education of bakufu retainers in general.¹²

The situation was much the same in the daimyo domains. Of the *han* schools for which the date of founding is known, only four were established before 1687, and those did not necessarily meet with an enthusiastic reception. When, for instance, in 1641, the Okayama domain created an academy where *bushi* of the domain could join together to study Confucianism and practice martial skills, some bakufu leaders reacted negatively. Evidently they feared that such an assemblage of *bushi* for some common pursuit might have subversive consequences.¹³ Hakuseki perhaps had such incidents in mind when, in later years, he wrote that, in his youth, “even people in positions of authority regarded those who spoke of the teachings of Confucianism like believers in Christianity.”¹⁴

Hakuseki may have indulged in hyperbole in such statements. Nevertheless, his own early education demonstrated that, during the first half century or so of the Tokugawa period, there was no general assumption either within or without the bakufu that those with knowledge of “the teachings of Confucianism” had an important role to play in society.

According to Hakuseki, his formal education consisted largely of training in penmanship. He noted that, “as there was no one available to instruct me properly how to read,” his early schooling was confined to the epistolary manuals (*ōrai mono*) used from the middle ages on for primary education.¹⁵ It was only through his chance reading of Tōju’s *Okina mondō* that he “learned of the existence of such a thing as the Way of the Sages.” His father, whom Hakuseki depicted as a samurai of the old school—fearless, stoic, taciturn—had earlier rejected suggestions that Hakuseki be put to study with a proper teacher, and, when Hakuseki, his interest in scholarship aroused by his encounter with *Okina mondō*, attempted to pursue study of the Four Books and Five Classics on his own, he found it prudent to conceal such activities from his father.¹⁶

The position awarded the scholar in early Tokugawa government accorded with this generally limited appreciation of the social value of Confucian learning. The career of Hayashi Razan offers an instructive example. The bakufu’s employment of Razan in the first decade of the seventeenth century is often taken as a symbol of the commitment of the bakufu leaders to Confucianism. In fact, however, the conditions under which Razan entered bakufu service point up the limited interest of the bakufu leaders in both Confucianism and the Confucian scholar. Ieyasu and his successors employed Razan for his general erudition rather than for any particular knowledge of Confucianism. The role they envisioned for him was one comparable to that Gozan Zen monks had played in bakufu affairs since the time of the Ashikaga shogun. Razan was assigned to assist in the drafting of diplomatic correspondence and other documents which required literary skills, to manage the bakufu library, and to serve as a companion of the shogun’s leisure hours by lecturing when asked on texts and historical events of general interest. As Wajima Yoshio notes of the last, what was expected of the lecturer on such occasions was to be a good storyteller. “Even if the content of the conversation involved Confucian matters, the main emphasis had to be on conveying them in an interesting way.”¹⁷

Because Razan’s employers expected him to take on functions traditionally performed by Buddhist priests, they treated him as a quasi priest rather than a regular retainer. Among other things, they required him to shave his head and assume the priest-like name of Dōshun when he

formally entered bakufu service in 1607. And when, two decades later, the bakufu leaders rewarded Razan for his labors on behalf of the bakufu, they did so by granting him the title of *hōin*, an honor originally granted high-ranking Buddhist priests and later extended to those whom, like doctors and Confucian scholars, the leaders of the bakufu regarded as playing a socio-political role analogous to that of the priest. Thus, the leaders of the bakufu dealt with Razan as a member of a specialized fraternity set apart both from regular bakufu retainers of *bushi* background and from those vassals responsible for government as such.

In the course of the next half century, the situation of the Confucian scholar in Tokugawa government improved somewhat. The middle decades of the seventeenth century saw a heightened value given to the cultural activities associated with scholarship. This development, together with the concurrent increasing specification of roles within the retinues of the shogun and daimyo, led domain and bakufu leaders to distinguish the position and status of the Confucian scholar from that of the doctor and other priest-like attendants with whom he previously had been associated. The "scholar" (*jusha*) became a recognized professional category. Likewise it became accepted that a daimyo of any standing should maintain at least two or three *jusha* within his retinue to oversee his library, take care of matters requiring literary expertise, and occasionally lecture before him on one of the Confucian classics.

The accession of Tsunayoshi in 1680 gave further impetus to this development. Tsunayoshi, who had a taste for scholarship and who, in his own way, envisioned himself as a sage king, added to the corps of bakufu *jusha* and set them to work on projects with an identifiably Confucian tone, such as compilation of a code of mourning practices. He also created a place for Confucian activities within the regular cycle of bakufu ceremonial affairs. From the time he became shogun, he had his *jusha* lecture regularly at least three times a month. He often lectured himself on the Confucian classics to daimyo and bakufu officials summoned for the occasion, between 1693 and 1700 giving a total of 249 lectures on the *Book of Changes* alone.¹⁸

In 1690, Tsunayoshi made the shrine to Confucius, hitherto privately maintained by the Hayashi family, an official bakufu institution. The following year, when the image of Confucius was moved to the new

shrine at Yushima, Tsunayoshi inscribed the plaque to be mounted on the main hall, changed the name of the hill on which the shrine stood to Shōheizaka, Shōhei (Changping) being the name of Confucius's native village, and endowed the shrine with fief lands of 1,000 *koku* to provide for its upkeep. He also put a definitive end to the treatment of bakufu *jusha* as quasi priests. On the occasion of the opening of the Yushima shrine, he granted Hayashi Nobuatsu (1644–1732), Razan's grandson, permission to let his hair grow and to take a *bushi* name. And, in place of the priest-like title of *hōin*, Tsunayoshi arranged for Nobuatsu to receive the same type of honorary court rank and title (*kan'i*) awarded regular bakufu vassals of high status. The title granted Nobuatsu, *dai-gaku no kami* (rector of the university), henceforth was awarded hereditarily to the head of the Hayashi family.¹⁹

Two years later, in late 1693, Tsunayoshi also gave Kinoshita Jun'an permission to let his hair grow and to take a *bushi* name; one of the earliest entries in Hakuseki's diary takes notice of this event.²⁰ Such actions were the basis for Hakuseki's willingness to attribute some improvement in the status of Confucians from the time when "even people in positions of authority regarded those who spoke of the teachings of Confucianism like believers in Christianity" to the reign of Tsunayoshi, a shogun of whom he usually spoke in highly critical terms.²¹

The improvement in the treatment of the *jusha* remained, however, within clear-cut limits. Tsunayoshi, in the words of the compilers of the *Tokugawa jikki*, the official bakufu annals, in rectifying the treatment of bakufu Confucian scholars as quasi priests, "demonstrated that throughout the nation the Way of the Confucian is that of ruler, lord, and gentleman."²² In fact, Tsunayoshi did not go quite so far. The Confucian scholar had been demarcated from the priest and awarded treatment that formally identified him instead as a member of the samurai class. But the *jusha* was not therefore equated with the high-ranking vassals who hereditarily oversaw government matters within both the *han* and the bakufu. To the contrary, the specification of roles and statuses that helped bring about the independence of the *jusha* from the priest served as well to separate him from those who were regarded as properly responsible for the major affairs of government.

As touched on in Chapter 1, the evolving *kakaku* structure incorpo-

ated a distinction between “generalist” and “specialist” positions, the former usually associated with high feudal status and the latter with lower status. The post of *jusha* fell on the dividing line between these categories. As far as the formal indicators of status went, some *jusha* did quite well. By 1700, Hayashi Nobuatsu received a stipend of 1,500 *koku* and in addition, as noted above, held the *kan'i* title of *daigaku no kami*.²³ Both the form and size of his stipend and the court title located him in the middle to upper ranks of the *hatamoto* class of bakufu vassals, the core of the Tokugawa house. Kinoshita Jun'an received a stipend of 300 *hyō*, equivalent in amount to 300 *koku*, a respectable sum, if considerably more modest both in form and size than that granted Hayashi Nobuatsu.²⁴

Such favorable treatment of *jusha*, however, particularly in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, was not universal. Dazai Shundai (1680–1747) refused to accept a position because he could not obtain service at the 200-*koku* level. As he put it, “200 *koku* is the standard stipend of a samurai. A stipend less than 200 *koku* is not enough for one to act in the world at large as is expected of a samurai, and in one's private life one cannot carry out the ancestral rites, care for one's parents, and provide for one's wife and children. In such circumstances, how could one be regarded as a samurai?”²⁵ Shundai's mentor, Ogyū Sorai, eventually received a stipend of 500 *koku* from Yanagisawa Yoshiyasu, Tsunayoshi's favorite attendant, but, when he entered the service of the Yanagisawa in 1696, it was at 15 *ninbuchi* (equivalent in amount to a third of a stipend of 200 *koku* and granted in a form that denoted the recipient to be of insignificant status).²⁶

More critically, when it came to the actual roles open to the *jusha*, even *jusha* like the Hayashi, who received the perquisites of high *bushi* status, were firmly relegated to the “specialist” end of the *kakaku* spectrum. The transmission of the post of bakufu *jusha* from generation to generation of the Hayashi family for the rest of the Tokugawa period testifies to the bakufu leaders' view of them as specialists rather than generalists. The same circumstance also effectively delimited the area of bakufu affairs with which the Hayashi were expected to concern themselves. The hereditary specialization of the Hayashi extended beyond a variety of ceremonial matters to the drafting of correspondence between the shogun and other countries and the revision of the basic bakufu

code, the *Buke shohatto*. But it did not encompass actual government administration or policy formation. Their position, and that of the Tokugawa *jusha* in general, continued to be very different from the socio-political role of the scholar as idealized in Confucian literature or as institutionalized in post-Song China.

HAKUSEKI AS JUSHA

The conditions under which Hakuseki entered the Kōfu retinue in late 1693 were standard for a *jusha*. Hakuseki entered Ienobu's service at a stipend of 40 *ninbuchi* (equivalent in amount to 200 *koku*). The Kōfu officials, negotiating through Jun'an, originally had offered 30 *ninbuchi* (equivalent to 150 *koku*), but, after some bargaining, they raised their offer to 40 *ninbuchi*. The amount put Hakuseki over the line Dazai Shundai was to specify as the minimum necessary to "act in the world as is expected of a samurai," but the form reflected the "specialist," and hence unprestigious, status of the *jusha*.²⁷

Hakuseki's duties in the Kōfu house were also typical of those of the *jusha*. In his oath, taken upon entering the Kōfu retinue, Hakuseki vowed that, "having been taken into service as a *jusha* . . . when summoned into the presence of his lordship and asked about matters concerning books, I will reply with utmost sincerity."²⁸ In line with this definition of his role, for the next decade and a half Hakuseki's responsibilities revolved around the explication and care of books. The first of his duties in this area was to lecture regularly before Ienobu on one or another of the central works of the Chinese intellectual tradition. Hakuseki began by lecturing on the *Book of Odes* (*Shi jing*). The lectures on the *Odes*, finished at the end of 1694, were followed by a series on the *Book of History* (*Shang shu*) and another series on the *Spring and Autumn Annals* (*Chun qiu*), given in alternation with lectures on Zhu Xi's *Outline and Commentary on the Comprehensive Mirror for Government* (*Zizhi tongjian gangmu*). The lectures on the last work continued until Ienobu's death in 1712.

The second of Hakuseki's duties was to oversee the management of the Kōfu library, including the acquisition of new books by purchase or transcription, the repair of damaged works, and the punctuation and

collation of texts. Third, at irregular intervals, both in response to requests from Ienobu and of his own volition, Hakuseki submitted reports to Ienobu on various subjects. He presented the first of these reports in mid-1694, a few months after entering the Kōfu retinue.²⁹ A brief essay on the development of the custom of using images of Confucius in rites honoring him, it perhaps was intended as a critique of the ceremonial practices recently inaugurated at the new shrine to Confucius at Yushima. The most ambitious of the projects Hakuseki undertook under Kōfu sponsorship was *Hankanpu*, a history of the daimyo houses which he initially submitted to Ienobu in 1702.

All these activities fell within the scope of duties regularly assumed by the officially employed Tokugawa *jusha*. There was, however, something that distinguished Hakuseki's position as Kōfu *jusha* from Confucian scholars serving in other domains. That is, the sphere of activities assigned the *jusha* loomed larger in the life of the daimyo of Kōfu than in the lives of most of his peers. As mentioned in Chapter 1, Ienobu seems to have had relatively little to do with the governance of the Kōfu domain. He lived permanently in Edo, and administration of the domain was handled by the *karō*, who remained in contact with the bakufu. Thus Ienobu, who was 31 in 1693, had more than ample hours of leisure, and listening to the lectures given by Hakuseki and the several other *jusha* in his service became an important means of occupying his days.

This circumstance points up both the opportunities and limitations of Hakuseki's situation in the Kōfu domain. On the positive side, the fact that Ienobu had few demands on his time meant that Hakuseki met him frequently. In the early years of his service, Hakuseki lectured on the average almost every other day. In later years, partly because of problems with his health, his lecture schedule was reduced. Even so, he generally lectured every three to four days. Altogether, in the fifteen years between 1693 and 1709, when Ienobu became shogun, Hakuseki gave close to 1,300 lectures before him.³⁰ This regular contact was invaluable in establishing the relationship with Ienobu that served as the foundation for Hakuseki's influence on bakufu affairs once Ienobu became shogun.

On the other hand, frequent contact did not translate directly into a

bond of great closeness. In *Oritaku shiba no ki*, Hakuseki stressed the intimacy of his relationship with Ienobu. Thus, for instance, he described the setting of his lectures before Ienobu as follows:

From the time he ruled as daimyo on through the time he ruled the realm . . . the regular lectures would start after the 15th day of the [1st] month and continue until the end of the 12th month. Except for unavoidable instances, he did not postpone a regularly scheduled lecture, not even on the customary seasonal festivals, and, needless to say, not on the regular ceremonial days. I frequently was sick, and, when he realized that I could not withstand great heat or cold, during very hot weather he would have me come after the sun went down, and the lecture would be given at night. In cold weather, the lecture would be held at midday, and a large brazier would be placed between his seat and mine. On very cold days he would have another brazier brought and placed at my back. If it rained or snowed on the day I was scheduled to lecture, he would always send a messenger to excuse me from coming.

While listening to the lecture . . . he would wear [formal dress]. He would descend from the dais where he usually sat, and my seat would be placed about 9 feet away from his. In the summer, even on the hottest days, he did not use a fan; even the mosquitoes, coming out in great numbers when it grew late, did not distract his attention. Just when it was, I forget, but once, I recall, he had a cold which caused his nose to run. Each time he wiped it he took the trouble to turn to the side before doing so. Given such a degree of respect on his part it can be readily imagined that, although the lectures tended to run over two hours, he remained attentive throughout.³¹

Hakuseki suggested that this close contact fostered a meeting of minds in which he and Ienobu cooperated in working towards a common goal. Elsewhere in *Oritaku shiba no ki*, he quoted Ienobu as describing the relationship between them as comparable to "what the Buddhists call separate manifestations of one body. If he makes an error, it is my error; if I make an error, it is his."³²

This portrayal of the bond between Ienobu and Hakuseki has been generally accepted at face value. But, in fact, the image of their relationship presented in *Oritaku shiba no ki* is idealized. The nature of the position of the *jusha* and the protocol that enveloped the lives of those of high status ensured that Hakuseki's contact with Ienobu remained formal, filtered through various categories of attendants who transmitted communications between the two, even when they were in the same room. A graphic picture of this situation is provided by Hakuseki's

notation in his diary of the physical arrangements for the first lecture he gave before Ienobu after the latter moved into the Western Enceinte of Edo Castle as Tsunayoshi's heir in 1704. "His lordship was seated on the lower level of his sitting room. I took my place on the far side of the corridor outside his room with my lectern near the edge of the corridor. Seated on the corridor to his right were his pages, to his left Lord Akifusa was in attendance."³³ The glimpse we get here of Ienobu surrounded by attendants and pages, while Hakuseki arranges his lectern on the far side of the corridor outside Ienobu's room, undoubtedly offers a picture of the atmosphere of the lectures more realistic than the account in *Oritaku shiba no ki*.

If Hakuseki's frequent contact with Ienobu should not be equated with a relationship of great closeness, it also should not be interpreted as leading directly to his being consulted on matters of government. To the contrary, as suggested above, the frequent contact was a by-product of Ienobu's own detachment from government. Hakuseki may have seen his purpose as educating Ienobu to rule, but those around Ienobu, and probably Ienobu himself, did not conceive of Hakuseki's function in that light. For them, Hakuseki was employed essentially as one more companion of Ienobu's leisure hours.

Muro Kyūsō, writing two decades after Hakuseki entered the Kōfu retinue, has provided us with an oblique picture of this situation:

Arai says that, years ago, when he first began to serve the Kōfu house as teacher, his late lordship asked what works it would be appropriate for him to hear expounded. Arai asked in reply what his intent was regarding the lectures; did he see them as a temporary means of whiling away the hours (*tōbun no onagusami*) or was his purpose to study systematically the principles of the classics? When Arai knew that, he said, he could give his opinion. The lectures were not conceived of as something temporary, was the reply; it was his lordship's intent to engage in study as a long-term matter. If that was the case, Arai said, he would like to begin by lecturing on the *Odes*.³⁴

The *Odes* were regarded traditionally as the first of the classics. By noting that he had "begun at the beginning" in his instruction of Ienobu, Hakuseki undoubtedly intended to emphasize the seriousness of the endeavor. Nevertheless, his description in a letter written in his last years of how he went about presenting the *Odes* to Ienobu suggests that the

circumstances he confronted were not so different from those noted by Wajima Yoshio for a somewhat earlier period: "Even if the content of the conversation involved Confucian matters, the main emphasis had to be on conveying them in an interesting way." "In the *Odes*," Hakuseki wrote,

there appear a great many names of birds and animals and plants, and also of various artifacts. The study of these things in itself constitutes a field of learning, but for rulers and gentlemen to probe the minute details of such things as if they were textual scholars does not accord with the principle of putting matters of first importance first. Further, were I to have gone into all those things in my lectures it would have taken up half the day, and at times I might have ended up acting out things like a pantomimist, which would have been vulgar and inappropriate. Thus I suggested that pictures of these things should be made. These I submitted one by one prior to the day of the lecture, and his lordship having studied them carefully, in the lecture I needed only to touch briefly on what the names referred to and could devote myself to elucidating the meaning of the poems.³⁵

To move from offering illustrated lectures on the *Odes* to offering advice on matters of government was not a natural development; it required not only time and a change in Ienobu's circumstances, but also considerable maneuvering and cultivation of Ienobu's interests on Hakuseki's part. Some consideration of the consequences of Hakuseki's transfer in 1699 from the status of *jusha* to that of *yoriai* will corroborate this point.

HAKUSEKI AS YORIAI

The status of *yoriai* (reserve force) applied originally to retainers who for some reason—age, health, or a misdeemeanor—were not on active military duty. In line with this tradition, poor health served as the formal justification for the change in Hakuseki's status from *jusha* to that of *yoriai*.³⁶ Throughout his years of service, Hakuseki suffered from debilitating bouts of chronic diarrhea, and his physical condition was particularly poor in 1697 and 1698. The true motive for the transfer, however, was not the state of Hakuseki's health. Daimyo and the bakufu also used appointment to *yoriai* as a means of promoting to a somewhat

more distinguished status people who stood outside the regular ladder of office. Hakuseki's appointment was of this nature. His duties did not change, but his place in the hierarchy of Kōfu vassals was elevated a notch. Accordingly, beginning in 1702, on successive occasions Hakuseki received an increase in his stipend and saw it converted into more prestigious forms. This process continued after 1704, when Ienobu became Tsunayoshi's heir and the Kōfu retainer band was incorporated into the body of bakufu vassals. At that juncture, Hakuseki was transferred from the Kōfu to the bakufu *yorai*. In 1709, when Ienobu became shogun, he granted Hakuseki a fief of 500 *koku*. Two years later, he increased the fief to 1,000 *koku*. The same year, 1711, Ienobu arranged for Hakuseki to be granted honorary court rank and office: the 5th rank, junior grade, and the post of *Chikugo no kami* (governor of the province of Chikugo). Together these indicators of status put Hakuseki in the upper middle reaches of the *hatamoto* class.

Hakuseki's appointment as *yorai* was thus unquestionably a sign of growing favor from Ienobu. Nevertheless, at least initially, the favor reflected an enhanced appreciation of Hakuseki's existing function as a companion of Ienobu's leisure hours rather than of his potential to play some more significant role. This can be seen by considering the background of the two Kōfu *yorai* vassals with whom Hakuseki thenceforth was grouped. One, about Hakuseki's age, was a fencing master; the other, considerably older, was an equestrian.³⁷ Linking Hakuseki with these two tagged him not as someone expected to advise Ienobu generally on political or administrative matters but as a purveyor of specialized instruction.

The handling of Hakuseki's situation when Ienobu was designated as Tsunayoshi's heir offers even more telling evidence that he continued to be seen as a peripheral rather than central member of Ienobu's entourage. Tsunayoshi designated Ienobu as his heir on 1704/12/5. The same day, Ienobu moved from the Kōfu residence outside Sakurada Gate to the Western Enceinte, the heir's quarters. Almost immediately the process began of merging the Kōfu retainer band into the corps of bakufu vassals. Over the next three weeks, Hakuseki reported in his diary the transfer to Ienobu's new retinue and the elevation in rank of Manabe Akifusa, Ienobu's pages (*koshō*), members of his household staff (*konando*), and

the Kōfu chamberlains (*yōnin* and *sobashū*). On 12/12 Hakuseki noted as well that the assignment of former Kōfu officials to the various guard units attached to the Western Enceinte was “all complete.”³⁸

But, throughout this process, there was no word about what was to be done about Hakuseki or the other *yoriai* and *jusha*. The matter was settled only after the other two *yoriai* on 12/24 directly requested their former superior (*shihai*) to arrange for their appointment to Ienobu’s new entourage. Hakuseki declined to request appointment, but he achieved much the same end by sending word to the former superior the next day that in not joining the others he had no intention of seeming to set himself apart. Thus, should his failure to request appointment be looked at askance, he added, he hoped his former superior would speak up for him.³⁹

A day later, the matter was taken care of: Hakuseki, the two other *yoriai*, and the four Confucian tutors by then maintained by Ienobu were formally transferred to Ienobu’s new entourage.⁴⁰ Nevertheless, the delay in his appointment compared to that of Akifusa and the other former Kōfu retainers clearly indicates that, in late 1704, Hakuseki was not yet regarded as a central figure in Ienobu’s retinue.

The four years between Ienobu’s designation as Tsunayoshi’s heir in the final month of 1704 and his accession as shogun in the 1st month of 1709 seem at last to have brought a change in the conception of Hakuseki’s role. That change was evident during the first month after Ienobu’s accession when Hakuseki played a part very different from the bystander’s role he had been forced to assume in the month following Ienobu’s designation as heir. The first day of Ienobu’s reign, when Hakuseki went with the other shogunal vassals to offer his respects to Ienobu, he took with him a memorial detailing “three matters that should be dealt with immediately.” He presented further memorials on the following days. By the end of the month he had volunteered or been asked for advice on a wide range of issues. Among other things, he was consulted during this period on the style of the inscription on the stone casing of Tsunayoshi’s coffin and on the disposition of the corpses preserved in salt of people who had died while in criminal custody for failure to observe the injunctions requiring compassion to living things. On the other end of the spectrum of political affairs, he also proffered recommendations

during this same initial month concerning revision of the basic bakufu code and the desirability of establishing a fourth cadet house of the imperial family and allowing imperial princesses to marry outside the imperial family.⁴¹

Hakuseki's enhanced place in the circle around Ienobu was reflected also in his participation in various bakufu ceremonies when he was lent the appropriate court dress and sat, together with Manabe Akifusa, behind Ienobu within the screens separating the shogun from the others present.⁴² As a consequence of such arrangements, Hakuseki later wrote to an acquaintance, "I came to be referred to jokingly as the little star behind the Heavenly Throne Constellation."⁴³ He further served on occasion as the shogun's personal envoy. Thus, in late 1710, Hakuseki traveled to Kyoto in that capacity to observe the accession ceremonies for Nakamikado Tenno, and the next year he went to Kawasaki, the second post-station out of Edo, to greet the Korean embassy coming to offer felicitations to Ienobu upon his accession.

Perhaps the most significant evidence of the transformation in Hakuseki's role was the decreased emphasis put on what had been originally his main function: lecturing before Ienobu. Hakuseki presented his first lecture subsequent to Ienobu's succession in the 4th month of 1709; when asked to lecture the following month, he requested to be excused because of lack of time to prepare. The following year, this situation was acknowledged formally: Hakuseki was told that he should ask to be excused from lecturing whenever he was busy with government affairs.⁴⁴ By the spring of 1712, so great a premium was put on Hakuseki's advice that, when a severe bout of his chronic diarrhea kept him at home for over a month, after "repeated inquiries as to whether [he] had recovered enough to attend," on five occasions during the month Ienobu sent one of his personal attendants to Hakuseki's house to take care of pending business.⁴⁵

Muro Kyūsō's first letter from Edo to his correspondents in Kaga, written a month later, provides a firsthand picture of Hakuseki at the height of his influence. To Hakuseki's complaints about the precarious state of his health Kyūsō had suggested that he retire from active service long enough to regain his strength. To which, Kyūsō wrote, Hakuseki responded:

Such would be difficult to do. Just recently, Lord Manabe Akifusa requested me to come to the castle, sending me a list in his own hand of points about which he wished to confer with me. They were all things to be taken care of after personal consultation with me at the castle, and were not the sort of things that could be handled by a reply written at home. Just as is indicated by the saying "Each day of government brings 10,000 things that must be attended to," in affairs concerning the provinces [Akifusa] asks me to consider various points beginning with the pertinent precedents, and, after I submit my findings, we discuss them together. His lordship dislikes anything that is not worked through completely. Consequently, whatever I am asked to do or suggest on my own, I write out, and the matter is decided upon consultation together [with Akifusa]. Thereafter, the details are written out in an order to be handed down to the *rōjū*, officials, and [daimyo of the] various provinces. In the case of the recent embassy from Korea, there were myriad details to attend to, and it would have helped to have an assistant, but, had I had someone to assist me, the plans might have leaked out before they were complete, and so I took care of everything on my own.⁴⁶

In his capacity as *yoriai*, Hakuseki came to exercise a significant influence on bakufu politics. Behind that development lay not only, as we shall see, Hakuseki's own efforts, but also, of more fundamental structural importance, the changed circumstances of Ienobu and Akifusa. The move from the Kōfu residence to the Western Enceinte and then to the Main Enceinte meant for them a shift from little involvement with government to a situation in which they had to deal with a host of administrative and political problems. That change, plus their general lack of preparation for handling such matters, created the context in which Hakuseki was able to carve out a role for himself as advisor and strategist.

The significance of this development should not be minimized. Nevertheless, if we are to locate Hakuseki's place within bakufu politics with some precision, we also should recognize what did not change in his situation even after Ienobu became shogun. Most crucially, while Ienobu increased Hakuseki's stipend and arranged for him to be awarded title and rank, he did not give him a regular position either within the bakufu bureaucracy or within his personal household. Hakuseki's formal status continued to be that of a retainer on inactive duty. This situation was disadvantageous to Hakuseki in various ways. For one, in a socio-political structure built around the correspondence between

status, position, and perquisites, Hakuseki stood out as an anomaly. This circumstance was a source of repeated friction with those concerned to defend their own place in the status structure. Thus, for instance, when, in 1710, Hakuseki was given special permission to use eight of the gates to Edo Castle, night or day (a privilege normally reserved for high-ranking officials who would be expected to attend immediately in case of an emergency), the *rōjū* protested extension of such a prerogative to a person of Hakuseki's irregular status as "unprecedented."⁴⁷

Another fundamental disadvantage of Hakuseki's ongoing status as *yoriai* was that it meant he totally lacked institutional power. Generally speaking, as discussed in Chapter 1, the institutional authority of the attendants to the shogun was weak compared to that of the holders of regular office within the bakufu bureaucracy. Nevertheless, the attendants did occupy a specific niche within the overall structure of bakufu rule, and they could exercise whatever authority was vested in that niche. By comparison, as a former *jusha* formally in retirement, Hakuseki had no official niche, no specified duties. His position as an extra, outside the regular range of offices, was graphically illustrated on the occasions when he observed bakufu ceremonies as "the little star behind the Heavenly Throne Constellation." Having no recognized position and lacking even the requisite rank (at least until he was granted the honorary office and rank of *Chikugo no kami* in late 1711), Hakuseki, unlike Ienobu's attendants, could not take an official part in these ceremonies. Not only was it necessary for him to be lent the clothes that an attendant would possess by virtue of rank and position, but also, at times, some pretext had to be devised for his presence, as on the occasion of the masses for the first anniversary of Tsunayoshi's death when Hakuseki was given the nominal role of assistant to the attendant responsible for carrying Ienobu's shoes.⁴⁸

Hakuseki's appointment as *Chikugo no kami* may be seen as a belated effort to rectify this situation, necessitated by the plan to have him meet publicly with the Korean envoys. Yet, Hakuseki's appointment as *Chikugo no kami* obviously had bearing only on his ceremonial status; it did not enhance his substantive power at all. Hakuseki's position as *yoriai* meant that, whatever his ceremonial status, he could affect the course of bakufu politics only in an indirect and private manner, by winning the ear of Ienobu or Akifusa.

SOME QUESTIONS REMAINING

Viewed in the light of the general situation of the Tokugawa *jusha*, Hakuseki's rise was remarkable; arguably no other Tokugawa *jusha*, including Hayashi Razan, exercised a comparable influence on bakufu politics. Yet, Hakuseki exerted that influence within severe constraints. In evaluating the implications of Hakuseki's program, we shall need to take into account those constraints and the way in which they shaped Hakuseki's perspective on bakufu politics. First, however, some other dimensions of Hakuseki's situation deserve consideration.

Reflection on the peculiar mixture of opportunities and restrictions that marked Hakuseki's career in Ienobu's service leaves one with some questions. Even in the *kakaku*-constricted environment of the mid-Tokugawa period, was the anomalous status of *yoriai* the only option possible for Hakuseki other than the more circumscribed position of *jusha*? Were his obscure family background and his tag as a scholar insurmountable barriers to acquiring a position of greater power and influence? It seems likely that such was not the case. Even for the *jusha* tied by background to a peripheral functional specialization, one potential route to advancement remained open. The *jusha*'s personal association with his lord made it possible for him, and for others in a similar situation, like those who instructed the lord in one accomplishment or another, to move into the category of personal attendant.

A number of the *jusha* taken on by Tsunayoshi, including the son of Kinoshita Jun'an and the younger brother of Ogyū Sorai, were transferred to the ranks of Tsunayoshi's personal attendants (*kinju*). Funabashi Marekata, another *jusha* taken on by Ienobu at the same time as Hakuseki, was transferred to the staff of Ienobu's personal household (*konando*) when Ienobu became Tsunayoshi's heir. Eventually, Funabashi became a chamberlain (*yōnin*) to Ienobu's widow, Ten'ein. The fencing master who preceded Hakuseki into the ranks of Kōfu *yoriai* also was appointed to the *konando* when Ienobu moved to the Western Enceinte. Dohi Motonari, Hakuseki's one disciple, assigned him when Dohi entered Ienobu's entourage as a child, first became a bakufu *jusha* when Ienobu was designated as Tsunayoshi's heir; attached eventually to Yoshimune's second son, Tayasu Munetake, as a *jusha*, Dohi became one

of Munetake's personal attendants, rose to the position of *yōnin*, and ended his career in the respectable "outer" position of *bangashira* (chief of guard unit) in the Tayasu house.⁴⁹

None of these *jusha*-become-attendants achieved the power of an attendant like Manabe Akifusa; however, their failure to do so does not reflect limitations imposed by their low *kakaku*. Certainly Akifusa himself was from no more prestigious background than they. Thus, had Hakuseki been appointed as an attendant, he might well have acquired much greater authority than he did. Why was he not?

According to Hakuseki's own account, that Ienobu did not appoint him, unlike Funabashi and the fencing master, to the circle of attendants was an indication of respect. He remarked of the transfer of Funabashi and the fencing master to the *konando*, "Whatever its function today, the position to which these people were assigned was one that in ancient times was held by eunuchs; it was not the sort of post that a gentleman (*shikunshi*; Ch.: *shijunzi*) would consider worthy of him."⁵⁰ Perhaps that was so, but the circle of attendants was also the place where power was then coalescing. Muro Kyūsō acknowledged as much when, after Ienobu's death, he criticized the shogun for not having made Hakuseki an attendant:

The problem lies in Lord Ienobu's putting insufficient trust in Arai. What I said to Arai the other night was that the manner in which the sages of antiquity Tang of Yin and Wu of Zhou utilized [their ministers] Yi Yin and Taigong Wang was to share the heavenly endowment with them, share the heavenly rank with them, and set them above others. Unless that is done, the people of the realm will not submit [to the minister]. Had Lord Ienobu given Arai a position comparable to that of Lord Honda Tadayoshi, commanded him to serve in the same capacity as Lord Manabe, and endowed him with a large stipend, at this time one might expect the *rōjū* to consult regularly with him about matters. Of course, he is not a Yi Yin or Taigong Wang; however, neither was the lord a Tang of Yin or a Wen or a Wu. The facts of the matter are, if one wishes truly to make use of a worthy (*kenjin*), one must grant him authority and might if it is not to come to naught.⁵¹

Kyūsō's words pinpoint the disadvantages inherent in Hakuseki's unchanged status as *yoriai*. Thus, to grasp the full dimensions of Hakuseki's position in the group around Ienobu, we need to probe beneath

Hakuseki's explanation of why Ienobu did not assign him to his personal staff. Rather than respect for Hakuseki, two other causes seem more likely: one, the passive attitude of Ienobu criticized by Kyūsō; and, two, the situation and interests of Manabe Akifusa. By examining more closely these factors and the bearing they had on Hakuseki's relationship with Ienobu and Akifusa, we shall enlarge our perspective on the circumstances within the Kōfu circle that shaped Hakuseki's outlook and approach to bakufu politics.

THREE

Associates and Rivals

The nature of Hakuseki's relationship with Ienobu and Akifusa affected his impact on bakufu politics in two senses. First, it was the key to his access, or lack of access, to a position of influence. Second, whether, or to what extent, his recommendations were utilized depended largely on their attitudes. The record of positions awarded Hakuseki was mixed: In some ways Ienobu and Akifusa showed Hakuseki unusual favor; in others they did not. Much the same was true of the use made of his views. *Oritaku shiba no ki* emphasized the extent to which Ienobu relied on Hakuseki's counsel, and its account generally has gone unquestioned. In fact, however, Hakuseki's voice was not always heard. In areas where the shogun acted as an individual—such as certain categories of judicial decision—or in matters having to do with the style of shogunal rule, Hakuseki's views carried weight with Ienobu and Akifusa. But, particularly during the reign of Ienobu, Hakuseki had far less say than often is assumed in substantive matters like the forging of bakufu fiscal policy.

In subsequent chapters we shall examine in light of this situation the content of the program advanced by Hakuseki. Here our task is to demonstrate more fully the fact of this uneven utilization of Hakuseki's proposals and to examine further the context that accounts both for it and for Hakuseki's failure to obtain a more substantial institutional position. To this end, in this chapter we shall pursue the following argument:

(1) While, as discussed above, the structure of bakufu politics incorporated the potential for an individual shogun to exercise great power,

whether or not a shogun did so depended to a considerable degree on his character and will. In these regards Ienobu does not figure among the most notable of Tokugawa shogun. His quite passive outlook on the world helps explain why Hakuseki was kept in such an ambiguous situation throughout his career in Ienobu's service; it also was something that Hakuseki had to take into account when formulating his own political strategy.

(2) Because of the nature of Ienobu's personality, the attitude of Akifusa, Ienobu's closest confidante and associate, became a key determinant of Hakuseki's situation. Akifusa's attitude was complex. Not well-educated and with little experience of government per se, Akifusa found Hakuseki valuable as a source of information and advice. He also moved skillfully, however, to ensure that Hakuseki remained subordinate to himself. Hakuseki's ambiguous status served that purpose. In addition, once Ienobu became shogun, Akifusa showed himself ready to fit into the already established pattern of ties between the shogun's attendants and the *kanjō bugyō*. This circumstance was a major impediment to Hakuseki's exercising influence in areas of bakufu policy that fell within the jurisdiction of the *kanjō bugyō*.

(3) The complexities of Akifusa's dealings with Hakuseki were mirrored in the equally varied nuances of Hakuseki's attitude towards Akifusa. In practical terms totally dependent on his connection to Akifusa, Hakuseki sought ceaselessly to reverse the balance of their relationship. That effort necessarily locked him as well in a life and death struggle with the dominant figure in the *kanjō bugyō*, Ogiwara Shigehide. Hakuseki's eventual victory in that struggle seemed to augur an expansion of his influence within the shogunal circle; that development was cut short, however, by Ienobu's death soon after. In the ensuing years of Ietsugu's reign, marked by the stalemate in the relations between the shogunal circle and the *rōjū* noted in Chapter 1, Hakuseki's influence declined steadily.

THE CHARACTER OF TOKUGAWA IENOBU

Two quite different images of Tokugawa Ienobu have come down to us. One is that purveyed by Hakuseki and Muro Kyūsō, who, overtly at

least, presented Ienobu as a *meikun*, an “enlightened ruler,” committed to mastering the Way and concerned foremost for the welfare of the people in his charge. In *Oritaku shiba no ki*, for instance, Hakuseki noted the prompt attention Ienobu gave to correcting injustices resulting from the enforcement of Tsunayoshi’s edicts requiring compassion to living things:

[At the beginning of his reign] he had the criminal records of the previous reign brought him and every night he personally read through them until dawn. Out of these cases he granted amnesties to 956 people. . . . Those who [at the shogun’s urging] received amnesties from the daimyo of the realm and lords of lesser rank numbered 3,737 people. . . . A total number of 8,301 people received amnesties this year. Regarding the 5,599 of this total who [with the shogun’s encouragement] were pardoned by the daimyo and lesser lords, I have not heard of any comparable act of mercy since the present house came to rule the realm.¹

As reported by Muro Kyūsō, Ienobu was also open to criticism by the people—another trait of the sagely ruler. At the beginning of Ienobu’s reign, wrote Kyūsō, there had been a rash of anonymous lampoons and graffiti (*rakusho*). The *rōjū* had wanted to ban such things as subversive of public order, but Ienobu had stopped them, saying, “The people find it difficult to express directly criticisms of the ruler’s handling of affairs, but feel that if their views are put in an anonymous lampoon there is no need for reserve; consequently such lampoons are a way for the ruler to learn of popular feelings regarding his conduct.”²

A rather different portrait of Ienobu, however, exists side by side with the one of him as a *meikun*. *Bunbyō gaiki* (An unofficial account of the reign of King Bun [Ienobu]), a work of political gossip written presumably during Yoshimune’s reign, castigated Ienobu as a sexual profligate who ignored government affairs and abandoned himself to a life of pleasure. After cataloguing a series of sexual misadventures it continued:

He would lead his personal attendant, Manabe Akifusa, and his pages . . . to the rear quarters where he disported with them as if they were maids. . . . At the beginning of the year before he died, he stayed in the rear quarters day and night, not spending any time at all in the front. Consequently, there were mountainous piles of work left undone, and the *rōjū* and *wakadoshiyori* had to take care of matters by receiving orders from Manabe. As a result of such

administration, the daimyo and *hatamoto* forgot the martial arts and lost themselves in amusements. Those of intelligence, seeing this, said that the fortunes of the Tokugawa had run out.³

Sannō gaiki painted much the same picture, if in somewhat less lurid colors:

The king [Ienobu] did not like to study, but he had great respect for Confucianism. For this reason, he showed favor to Arai Hakuseki and in his free time had Arai explicate the classics. The king always wore formal dress, descended from his usual seat, and listened respectfully. The king was fair-skinned and beautiful of face and feature. He was very interested in matters of ritual. He was not pleased that his country had long abandoned use of court dress and that neither those of superior rank nor those of inferior rank followed the precepts of ritual. He wished to revive court dress and restore old customs and planned to do so with Arai. . . . The king did not like hunting or touring. He avoided audiences with his vassals, preferring to sleep, and never went out the castle gates. . . . The king liked sex. He showed favor to many women, and beauties in the rear quarters were counted by the hundreds. . . . The king liked the inner court. Whenever he had time free from the affairs of government, if it was during the day he would gather the female attendants in the inner garden, have them sing, engage in flower contests, and row boats on the pond. At night he would hold parties in his sleeping quarters. Manabe Akifusa joined in all these activities; several doctors likewise attended him. Akifusa never married nor did he keep a concubine. Day and night he remained at the king's palace. Once when Akifusa was given leave to go home, the king ordered a capable woman from the rear quarters to sleep in the place where Akifusa normally attended.⁴

It may be argued that such works tell us more about the contemporary forms of political criticism than they do about the character of Ienobu. A discreet corroboration of certain of their points, however, may also be found in the writings of Hakuseki and Kyūsō. *Sannō gaiki* commented about Ienobu's death at the age of 51 that, "while yet in his prime, [Ienobu] did not exercise restraint in going to the women's quarters, exhausted his vitality, and shortened his natural span of years."⁵ Kyūsō's letters, read between the lines, expressed a not too different view. Writing about the death of Tokugawa Yoshimichi, daimyo of Owari, in 1713 at the age of 25, Kyūsō noted: "His personal attendants acted badly when he was a child, and it is said that from the age of 12 or 13 he

came to know women sexually. If from childhood one sinks in the pit of passion, an early death is certain." He went on to say:

It may be said that the case of Lord Ienobu bears a certain similarity to this. There are people who attended closely upon him when he was a child whom he never made use of in later years. People found this puzzling, but the reason is that he was displeased by their having encouraged him as a child to do things not conducive to his health.⁶

Kyūsō also tells us that Ienobu was inclined to indulge in activities that Hakuseki and Kyūsō regarded as socially deleterious. According to Kyūsō, Hakuseki indirectly reproved Ienobu for his habits shortly after entering his retinue. After the lecture one day, he turned the conversation to a discussion of the current state of decay of social customs; instead of the noble customs of those in a superior social position influencing the behavior of their social inferiors, the opposite was true. "The customs of those in a superior position having degenerated," Hakuseki recollected himself to Kyūsō as having declared,

the customs of those in an inferior position increasingly shape the customs of those above. If one observes the customs prevalent in Edo today, the hairstyles and clothes of young men are all modeled after those of actors from Sakai-chō, while female attendants follow the lead of prostitutes of the Yoshiwara. When what is improper has come to have such power over people, no matter how one preaches adherence to what is correct, people will not follow it.

The only means of correcting their behavior was to apply the Way of the Sages: The ruler personally must adhere to what is correct. If he "sings and dances what is correct," the power of that example would draw the people away from the licentious influence of the gay quarter.

As Hakuseki recounted the situation to Kyūsō, Ienobu "nodded in agreement and said that his remarks were most appropriate." Kyūsō commented:

Seeing the tastes of his lordship, to reprove him indirectly for them in this way is an indication of Arai's abilities. According to what Arai said, his lordship never completely changed his habits, but, being remarkably honest and well-intentioned, for one or two years he made great efforts at reform.⁷

Hakuseki himself informs us that the author of *Sannō gaiki* was not the only one to associate Ienobu with elegant amusements such as flower

contests. Hakuseki wrote that, after Yoshimune's accession, Amenomori Hōshū, a fellow disciple of Kinoshita Jun'an, asked him if it was true as rumored that Ienobu

once asked if in China there indeed were things called "flower battles," to which you responded that the "elegant battles" held at the court of Tang Xuanzong had been termed such. Ultimately, it is said, you had an artist draw representations of these battles which you submitted to his lordship, as a result of which he conceived an interest in such activities and thereafter devoted himself to them.

As Hakuseki described his response:

I drew myself up and said, "That yet elucidating the words of Yao and Shun I was unable to make my lord a Yao or Shun may be put down to shortcomings on my part. But of the matters of which you speak, I know nothing".... I later heard that someone once presented his lordship with a copy of an old picture of "elegant battles" by Kanō Yōboku which he ultimately gave away. Difficult as it may be to believe, it would appear that the people of the world made this into my having had pictures painted of such a thing.⁸

Hakuseki also noted, however, that he found it necessary to remonstrate with Ienobu about the presence of geisha in the shogun's castle,⁹ and he failed, despite some strongly worded memorials on the subject, to convince Ienobu to abandon his fondness for the No, which Ienobu liked not only to observe but also to perform, a taste he shared with his uncle, Tsunayoshi. It was to that predilection that Hakuseki referred in his remarks, quoted by Kyūsō, about the necessity for the ruler to "sing and dance what is correct," if the decay of social customs was to be reversed. As the conclusion to that letter suggests, his admonishments fell largely on deaf ears.

The Ienobu who emerges from this melange of materials, while not necessarily the debauchee depicted by the *Bunbyō gaiki*, is a somewhat weak, dilettantish figure, whose deepest interests appear to have been esthetic. As a ruler, Ienobu pales in comparison to both his predecessor, Tsunayoshi, and the next adult shogun, Yoshimune. He appears to have possessed neither the former's daring and imagination nor the latter's energy and competence.¹⁰ Tsunayoshi, for instance, sought out people of a variety of backgrounds in his effort to create a counterbalance to the

power of the major *fudai*; Ienobu relied more exclusively on those with whom he had already developed a close association.¹¹ Similarly, the anecdotes about Ienobu's *meikun*-like activities are few in number and lackluster compared to the wealth of stories about Yoshimune's efforts to gather information, develop new crops, and improve the social conditions of the day.

Ienobu's personality and outlook suggest that he was not necessarily committed to a fundamental reform of bakufu rule. Or, more accurately, he probably was not prepared to pursue unreservedly such a reform. His passivity in this regard presumably helps explain why he did not establish Hakuseki in a more powerful position. It also meant that Hakuseki had to present his plans for the bakufu in such a way as to appeal to Ienobu's tastes. Despite his criticism of Ienobu's predilection for acting on the No stage, in the end Hakuseki was to be most successful when he took advantage of Ienobu's fondness for donning costume and mask and presenting on stage a series of carefully choreographed, ritualized motions.¹²

*RELATIONS BETWEEN HAKUSEKI AND MANABE AKIFUSA
PRIOR TO IENOBU'S ACCESSION*

Ienobu's succession as shogun was an accident of birth. Thus, in estimating his performance as shogun and the nature of his relationship with Hakuseki we need not assume that he possessed some particular political proficiency. In evaluating the role of Manabe Akifusa, however, we do have to take such a consideration into account. Akifusa's rise from No actor to *sobayōnin* unquestionably testifies to an ability not only to win the trust of his lord but also to thread his way through the intricacies of domain and bakufu politics. To judge from the evidence available, one source of his success was a skillful combination of deference and firmness. On repeated occasions, Akifusa showed himself ready to defer diplomatically to those of higher status and to be conciliatory in the face of open opposition. Simultaneously, however, he consistently held firm on matters of vital interest to himself. Kyūsō's account of the exchange between the *rōjū* Tsuchiya Masanao and Akifusa quoted in Chapter 1 provides a good example of Akifusa's political style. Summing up that encounter between Akifusa and the dean of the *rōjū*, Kyūsō wrote admiringly, "[Akifusa] is not the sort of person whom one would describe

as looming like a mountain; he is rather like a jewel, beautiful, gentle, and modest, and yet with a fine grasp of reality.”¹³ At the end of *Oritaku shiba no ki*, Hakuseki echoed, if in a somewhat more subdued tone, Kyūsō’s appraisal: “From his childhood Lord Akifusa had no free time, and thus was unable to engage in study, but there was something very fine about his character; there were many ways in which he could stand unashamed before the gentlemen of old.”¹⁴

This “official” evaluation reflected the reality that Akifusa was an essential ally for Hakuseki. Yet, at the same time, from Hakuseki’s perspective, Akifusa’s preferred political style was highly problematic. For one thing, it entailed a fundamentally opportunistic view of bakufu politics. When it seemed advantageous, Akifusa would solicit Hakuseki’s opinions and pursue the policies he recommended. But his commitment to those policies remained conditional, and, when another course seemed more appropriate to the circumstances of the moment, he did not hesitate to follow it instead. Moreover, in his relationship with Hakuseki, Akifusa adopted much the same approach that he used to good effect in his dealings with others. That is, he was ingratiating and sought to avoid any overt conflict, but he also guarded adroitly his key source of power—his monopoly of direct access to Ienobu—and saw that Hakuseki remained in a position of dependence upon himself.

The establishment of this pattern and the difficulty Hakuseki faced in trying to overcome it can be detected readily in the record of Hakuseki’s and Akifusa’s association prior to Ienobu’s accession as shogun. On two occasions during those fifteen years, Hakuseki mounted an explicit challenge to Akifusa’s preeminent place in the circle around Ienobu. In each instance, Akifusa responded with a conciliatory gesture, but simultaneously managed to strengthen his own position relative to Hakuseki’s.

The outlines of the first episode of this sort may be traced in Hakuseki’s diary for 1698 and 1699, five years after he entered the Kōfu retinue as a *jusha*. In the summer of 1698, his diary records, interjected among his regular lectures on the *Book of History* and the *Spring and Autumn Annals*, Hakuseki offered one on Ashikaga Yoshimasa (1436–1490, r. 1443–1473), the archetype of an esthetically inclined ruler, and the Ōnin War (1467–1477).¹⁵ What precisely he said on this occasion is not known, but on the assumption that it was not too different from the summation

of the reign of Yoshimasa found in *Tokushi yoron*, based on a series of lectures on Japanese history Hakuseki presented before Ienobu in 1712, it represented an overt effort to force a reordering of priorities within Ienobu's immediate entourage.

In *Tokushi yoron*, Hakuseki listed several evils dating from Yoshimasa's reign which had continued to exert a negative influence on later rulers. These included "a fondness for building palaces and elaborating gardens,"¹⁶ inclinations that Ienobu shared. Hakuseki further singled out the disintegration of government resulting from Yoshimasa's overreliance on personal attendants as one of the root causes of the Ōnin War. Likening the power and position of Yoshimasa's key attendant to that of the eunuchs and inner-court officials in periods of turmoil and governmental decline in China, he went on to declare:

In an era of proper rule, people holding such posts do not become involved in governmental decisions or have the opportunity to use the authority they thereby gain for their own advantage. The situation [where attendants exert influence over government] occurs when an extravagant and willful ruler, reluctant to confront his upright officials, appoints his personal attendants to act as transmitters of communications between him and his officials. To know that the evils of such a situation will lead in the end to upheaval throughout the realm one should consider what happened at the end of the Eastern Han and during the latter days of the Tang. Lord Ieyasu must have taken such events as a warning, for in former times [at the beginning of the Tokugawa period] no office with such a function was established.¹⁷

Parallel to this thinly veiled attack on the role of the *sobayōnin*, Hakuseki praised the approach to governance of Yoshimasa's son and heir, Yoshihisa (1465–1489; r. 1473–1489). According to Hakuseki, Yoshihisa, identified as "a superior ruler among the Muromachi shogun," took to heart the lesson of what happened under his father. He was diligent in his studies and had scholars present lectures on the *Analects* and elucidate for him the essentials of good government.¹⁸ By setting up Yoshihisa's approach to governance as a positive alternative to Yoshimasa's, Hakuseki clearly implied that Ienobu should pay more heed to him than to Akifusa.¹⁹

As reflected in the record in Hakuseki's diary, this aggressive move to stake out the ground of battle evoked a series of placatory measures

from Akifusa and Ienobu. Over the course of the next year and a half, he received various favors ranging from special gifts to being allowed to view the treasures of the Kōfu house on the occasion of their mid-summer airing. This string of favors culminated in the 11th month of 1699 in Hakuseki's elevation to *yoriai*.²⁰

These conciliatory gestures, however, did not change in any fundamental way the structure of the triangular relationship between Ienobu, Akifusa, and Hakuseki. In particular, as described in Chapter 2, the promotion to *yoriai* did not give Hakuseki any autonomous authority within the Kōfu retinue. Nor did it make him any less dependent than before on Akifusa as the intermediary between him and Ienobu. If anything, by taking him out of an institutional niche it weakened his position vis-à-vis Akifusa.

Hakuseki received symbolic warning of this situation shortly before his promotion to *yoriai*. From the 21st of the intercalary 9th month of 1699, Hakuseki suffered a bout of his chronic diarrhea, as a result of which his scheduled lectures were canceled. On the 25th, a note came from Akifusa saying, as Hakuseki reported it in his diary, that "his lordship is to view a private performance [of No] tomorrow the 26th, and that if able to come I should attend. I wrote back that, because of the diarrhea, I was uncertain of my ability to remain seated for a lengthy period of time; moreover, the lecture having been postponed, I wondered about the propriety of attending." The reply from Akifusa was that it was Ienobu's wish that, "even if unable to lecture," Hakuseki should come "tomorrow at dawn" for the No performance.²¹ Clearly, scholarship was not to take priority over those of Ienobu's leisure activities where Akifusa was his foremost companion.

Seven years later, in the spring of 1706, a year after Ienobu's designation as shogunal heir, Hakuseki initiated another challenge to Akifusa's preeminence in the circle around Ienobu, this time in the form of two memorials taking Ienobu directly to task for his fondness for the No and patronage of No actors. The immediate pretext for submission of the memorials was that, in the course of his lectures on Zhu Xi's *Tongjian gangmu*, Hakuseki had arrived by the 3rd month of 1706 at the reign of Zhuangzong of the Later Tang (r. 923–926), an emperor whose fondness

for actors and performing on the stage himself was said to have led to neglect of the affairs of state, and, in turn, to rebellion and his assassination. Upon completing his lecture on Zhuangzong, Hakuseki presented a memorial in which he set forth three dire consequences of a ruler's indulging himself in a liking for actors and the theater: By setting a bad example such indulgence encouraged the degeneration of social customs; it was a drain on the financial resources of the nation; and it caused people to lose respect for their superiors, since those who saw a ruler demean himself by assuming the role of an actor would no longer feel any awe towards him.²² Some days later, Hakuseki submitted a second memorial, documenting in more detail his assertion that the form of theater favored by Zhuangzong was comparable to the No.²³

One aim of these memorials was to remonstrate with Ienobu about his life of esthetic dilettantism, which evidently showed no signs of change, despite the weightiness of his new status. As Hakuseki put it some years later to Kyūsō, "While he resided in the Western Enceinte he might amuse himself in this way, but soon he would become lord of the realm, and what import would it have for the realm and later generations for him to engage in activities like performing the No?"²⁴

Equally to the point, however, the memorials also constituted a direct attack on the favored place Akifusa enjoyed in Ienobu's retinue. After decrying the consequences of a liking for the theater on the part of the ruler, Hakuseki went on to set forth the dangers of patronizing and promoting actors:

At the present time, what most causes the people of the realm to frown and their heads to ache is the promotion of actors and the ranking of them alongside people of proper samurai origin. This is a matter that requires great caution. . . . In recent years the younger sons and brothers of *gokenin* have no longer been taken into service as they were in previous reigns. [Nor are people of *rōnin* origin offered employment]. . . . The only people taken into service are actors. . . . Although retainers of hereditary status are enraged about sitting shoulder to shoulder and knee to knee with these actors, they dare not say anything about it. However, while at present there is no one who dares to complain for fear of bringing the wrath of his lord down upon him, when such things are transmitted down through the ages, what is likely to be the opinion of people of generations to come?²⁵

As with his earlier critique of Yoshimasa, in the memorial on the No Hakuseki also set up a positive alternative to the misguided promotion of actors. In this case, the alternative model was the employment by King Tang, the semi-mythical founder of the Shang, of Yi Yin, the low-born follower of the way of Yao and Shun. It was Tang's use of Yi Yin, Hakuseki pointed out, that enabled him to rule as a sage-king.²⁶ The implication again was clear: If Ienobu wanted to be known as a King Tang rather than as a Zhuangzong, it behooved him to reduce his reliance on the actor he had promoted and to give a larger role to the potential Yi Yin in his service.

The response of Ienobu and Akifusa to Hakuseki's offensive was, in many ways, like their reaction to the lecture on Ashikaga Yoshimasa seven years earlier. As Hakuseki put it to Muro Kyūsō in a conversation shortly after Ienobu's death, when Hakuseki submitted the memorials, Ienobu "was indeed angered, and for a while the situation was very delicate, but in the end, I was told, he felt that I had spoken the truth, and he showed me ever greater favor." As the reason for such greater favor, Hakuseki quoted an unnamed attendant: "He thought of you [Hakuseki] as like moxa cauterization. He might find you biting and hateful, but he knew that what you did was for his benefit, and consequently he never cast you aside."²⁷

Whether or not this statement precisely describes the situation, the memorials unquestionably were followed by a conciliatory show of "ever greater favor." Some ten days before presenting the memorials, Hakuseki had submitted a request for an official plot of residence land. Five months later, Akifusa privately informed him that his request had been granted.²⁸ Akifusa added that, as a special courtesy, Ienobu also was granting him use of a house to be reconstructed on the land and giving him 100 *ryō* for moving expenses. Ienobu could not give such assistance to all in a comparable situation, said Akifusa, but, knowing that Hakuseki was "in straitened circumstances and that it would be difficult for him to manage [the move] on his own resources," he was making him this gift. Hakuseki was not to mention it to anyone, lest those not similarly favored should find out.²⁹

On the same occasion, Akifusa also informed Hakuseki that the as yet unresolved question of who should have jurisdiction over him, the

sobashū (in charge of the affairs of Ienobu's entourage) or the *wakadoshiyori* (responsible for the affairs of bakufu retainers in general), had been settled in favor of the *wakadoshiyori*. (The problem was created by the ambiguities of the incorporation of Hakuseki into the heir's retinue as a *yoriai*.) However, Hakuseki noted in his diary, Akifusa, saying that Hakuseki was in "a special situation and should not be treated as an outsider (*tozamashū no nami*)," went on to promise "to arrange matters so that I need not go [to the *wakadoshiyori*] each time [I am due to receive my stipend] to obtain their verification."³⁰ The account in Hakuseki's diary of subsequent official transactions of one sort or another reflects a similar arrangement. On several occasions he noted that, although formally he should fall under the jurisdiction of the *wakadoshiyori*, because he served Ienobu personally (*gohōkō muki; gohōkō okumuki*), the matter was being channeled through Akifusa.³¹

These special arrangements could be taken as an honor, an indication of Hakuseki's close association with the inner circle around Ienobu. But, like the favors shown him seven years earlier, after the lecture on Ashikaga Yoshimasa, they did nothing to alter the structure of relations within that inner circle. To the contrary, in that they effectively reconfirmed Hakuseki's obligation to and dependence on Akifusa, they redounded as much to the benefit of the one negotiating the favor as to that of the recipient. Put bluntly, the anomalies of Hakuseki's situation directly served the interests of Akifusa. This fact undoubtedly explains in considerable measure why nothing was done to correct them.

HAKUSEKI AND AKIFUSA IN THE REIGN OF IENOBU

The insertion of the Kōfu circle into the center of bakufu politics added another element to the already complex relationship between Hakuseki and Akifusa. Confrontation with a set of political circumstances quite different from those to which he was accustomed motivated Akifusa to consult Hakuseki on a range of issues and made him receptive to various proposals advanced by Hakuseki. This circumstance provided Hakuseki with an opportunity to improve his position relative to Akifusa and thereby enlarge his influence over bakufu policy. Akifusa also accommodated himself, however, to the existing pattern of cooperation between

the *sobayōnin* and officials in the *kanjō bugyō*. In particular, he showed himself ready to work with the dominant figure in the *kanjō bugyō*, Ogiwara Shigehide. From Hakuseki's perspective, the links established between Akifusa and the *kanjō* officials were more than a little troublesome. Hakuseki disapproved of the policies associated with Shigehide; and the ties forged between Akifusa and Shigehide reduced Hakuseki's newly acquired leverage by providing Akifusa with an alternative source of information and guidance on policy measures. As a consequence, from the earliest days of Ienobu's four-year reign, Hakuseki became locked into a contest with Ogiwara Shigehide over who was to have the major say with Akifusa and Ienobu.

THE CONTEST WITH OGIVARA SHIGEHIDE. In tackling the subject of Hakuseki's relations with Ogiwara Shigehide, we need to exercise more than usual care in evaluating our sources. *Oritaku shiba no ki* offers the fullest description of Shigehide's role during the reign of Ienobu, and thus it is the *Oritaku shiba no ki* version of the struggle between Hakuseki and Shigehide that generally has figured in secondary accounts. While Hakuseki had the last word historically, however, he was hardly a disinterested observer. Moreover, he wrote *Oritaku shiba no ki* at a time when the policies associated with Shigehide had finally been reversed, and when it was of some importance to Hakuseki and others to link Ienobu to that reversal. Thus, we shall do well to be judicious in evaluating the account *Oritaku shiba no ki* offers of Shigehide's activities during the reign of Ienobu.

Ogiwara Shigehide (1656–1713) was an outstanding example of a technician who, triumphing over the restrictions of the *kakaku* order, managed to parlay his expertise into a position of power within the bakufu bureaucracy. He came from a family of relatively minor Tokugawa retainers who had been involved with financial affairs since his grandfather's generation. He was employed in the bakufu financial offices while still in his teens and, by age 27, rose to the position of section head (*kumigashira*). His abilities caught the attention of Tsunayoshi, who made use of Shigehide in his efforts to tighten control of the offices concerned with fiscal administration and to improve the state of bakufu finances. In 1687, Tsunayoshi appointed Shigehide to the fiscal-surveillance office later

known as the *kanjō ginmiyaku*. While in that post, Shigehide played a major part in the debasement of the gold and silver currency undertaken in 1695; the following year, he was appointed *kanjō bugyō*, the second individual promoted by Tsunayoshi to that post from the ranks of the fiscal offices.³²

The debasements associated with Shigehide (the initial debasement of silver and gold was followed in 1706 by a second debasement of silver) contributed to a spiraling inflation which proved impossible to halt. Nevertheless, for those directly involved, the benefits brought by the debasements outweighed this drawback. The immediate profit from the debasements was a source of personal wealth to the guilds responsible for minting gold and silver and to various members of the fiscal offices, including Shigehide. At the same time, it helped fill the growing deficit in bakufu finances and to pay for Tsunayoshi's lavish expenditures on buildings, shogunal processions, and animals. Consequently, Shigehide, maintaining close ties with Tsunayoshi and Yanagisawa Yoshiyasu on the one hand and with the minting guilds on the other, overshadowed the other *kanjō bugyō*. By the latter years of Tsunayoshi's reign, he was the dominant figure in bakufu fiscal affairs.

When Ienobu succeeded Tsunayoshi as shogun, Shigehide moved to establish comparable ties with Ienobu and Akifusa. A proposal to refurbish the shogun's private quarters prior to Ienobu's move to the Main Enceinte offered him an opening. According to *Oritaku shiba no ki*, when this issue came up for discussion, Shigehide painted a dire picture of bakufu finances. Stating that government expenses the previous year had been more than three times the bakufu's regular income, he pointed out that the bakufu also faced a variety of major extraordinary expenses. The shogun's quarters needed to be renovated in honor of their new inhabitant; the imperial palace in Kyoto, which had burned the year before, had to be rebuilt; and, in addition, the bakufu had to pay for the funeral ceremonies for Tsunayoshi, the construction of his mausoleum, and the ceremonies of shogunal accession. The only solution, Shigehide argued, was another debasement, the profit from which would alleviate the shortfall in regular bakufu income.³³

Ienobu, asserted Hakuseki, resisted Shigehide's proposal. Declaring, "How can I cause the people of the realm to suffer further?" he ordered

the *rōjū* and Shigehide to find some other way to solve the crisis and commanded Akifusa to summon Hakuseki and ask his opinion.³⁴ The recommendations that Hakuseki brought back two days later called upon the shogun to hold firm against further debasement. Hakuseki argued that Shigehide had in fact—by implication deliberately, so as to enhance the case for debasement—underestimated the current reserves by failing to include in them the tax rice collected the previous year. Thus, if Ienobu were to concentrate on the fundamental issues of governance, limit consumption, and adjust distribution of existing resources, “it will not be many years before the national finances are abundantly sufficient.” As for the extraordinary expenses facing the bakufu, Hakuseki recommended that the refurbishing of the shogun’s private quarters be postponed and matters that could not be put off, such as the funeral ceremonies and ceremonies of shogunal succession, be handled by paying part of the cost the current year and the rest the next. Similarly the deficit accumulated during the previous reign should be paid off gradually in the course of the next decade or so.³⁵

According to *Oritaku shiba no ki*, upon receiving these suggestions Ienobu was “greatly joyed” and Hakuseki was told that the shogun had commanded that the refurbishing of the Main Enceinte be postponed and that there be no further discussion of additional debasement of the currency. In fact, however, events proceeded rather differently. Shortly thereafter, Hakuseki wrote, Shigehide, “saying that last year’s tax income had been unexpectedly large,” declared that the various ceremonies could be managed without trouble and proposed and received permission to go ahead with the refurbishing as well.³⁶ While thus taking charge of these matters, at the beginning of the 3rd month of 1710, a year after Ienobu’s accession, Shigehide embarked on a further debasement of silver. This was followed a month later by a second debasement, and less than a year and a half later, in the 8th month of 1711, by yet a third debasement.

The exact circumstances behind these three debasements are murky. They never were announced officially. In *Oritaku shiba no ki* Hakuseki insisted that Shigehide undertook them on his own initiative, and, indeed, after the death of both Ienobu and Shigehide, members of the silver-minters’ guild were punished on grounds of having carried out

unauthorized debasements of silver.³⁷ Whether the matter was quite so black and white as Hakuseki argued, however, is open to question. As noted above, Hakuseki, writing at a time when the policy of debasement had been reversed, had an interest in linking the late Ienobu to an anti-debasement stance. By contrast, Shigehide, in ordering the silver-minters to undertake the 1710 and 1711 debasements, asserted that he was acting on private instructions from the shogun.³⁸ And a letter by Kyūsō, written in 1713, not long after the denouement of the matter, suggests that Shigehide's assertion may not have been entirely groundless:

If one traces this situation to its origins, the fault goes back to Lord Tsunayoshi. Having used up all the existing money, he adulterated the natural state [of the metals] and, as a result of that crime, suddenly passed away. The treasury being empty, Lord Ienobu began his reign face to face with a crisis. Whatever might be done about other things, as matters of immediate necessity there were the ceremonies of shogunal succession and the imperial coronation [of Nakamikado, who became tennō in the 6th month of 1709] and no funds to pay for them. His lordship was very troubled and commanded the *rōjū* to discuss ways of resolving the problem.

As the *rōjū* were unable to devise any plan, Ogiwara was summoned for consultation, and, being a very clever individual, he declared that there was no problem at all; his lordship should rest easy as he would find a way of meeting this emergency. As a result, the *rōjū* were overjoyed, and his lordship, too, felt relieved. Thereupon Ogiwara carried out a further debasement of the currency and used the profit from it to pay for the necessary expenditures. At that time, the concern of everybody, lord and vassal, was somehow to find a way to manage these critical ceremonies, and, since Ogiwara volunteered to take charge, there was no further consultation with others. Ogiwara became established as one of his lordship's intimates (*gobōkō no mono*), and, since his lordship was said to be satisfied, and since in all matters Ogiwara worked closely in consultation with Lord Manabe, everyone feared Ogiwara just as they had during the reign of Lord Tsunayoshi, the *rōjū* saying in one voice that without this person nothing could have been done.³⁹

Kyūsō's account is corroborated by the award to Shigehide at the end of 1710 of a 500-*koku* increase in fief (for a total of 3,700 *koku*) as a reward for the successful accomplishment of the building projects and ceremonial events.⁴⁰

Thus, the initial round of competition between Shigehide and Hakuseki for the support of Ienobu and Akifusa seems to have ended in a

victory for Shigehide. Ienobu and Akifusa, however “joyed” by Hakuseki’s proposed solution to the financial crisis at the beginning of Ienobu’s reign, clearly did not commit themselves to it. In the end, they left matters to the recognized financial expert, Shigehide, and, if they did not openly approve a further debasement of silver, neither did they look closely into how Shigehide found the funds to pay for the added expenditures.⁴¹

THE OUSTER OF SHIGEHIDE. Hakuseki remained unable to shake Shigehide’s sway over bakufu financial affairs until virtually the end of Ienobu’s reign. In the spring of 1712, he submitted a memorial directly attacking Shigehide. In a final memorial on the same subject written several months later, Hakuseki described himself as stating in this first memorial that

personally I was on neither intimate nor unfriendly terms with Shigehide; my remarks did not stem from personal likes or dislikes. But, having determined to put the interests of the realm foremost, I had to consider him an enemy with whom I could not exist together under heaven.⁴²

The response of Ienobu and Akifusa to this charge was hardly encouraging. According to *Oritaku shiba no ki*, Ienobu replied that, while he recognized Shigehide’s moral shortcomings, for the moment he knew no one else with the fiscal acumen to handle the nation’s finances.⁴³ In the end, Hakuseki succeeded in forcing Ienobu and Akifusa to break their ties with Shigehide only by adopting a different strategy: He abandoned his direct challenge to Shigehide’s fiscal policy and instead set in motion a flanking maneuver. At the same time, he mounted a new attack on Shigehide from a direction more favorable to himself.

The flanking maneuver was to convince Ienobu and Akifusa to revive the post of financial surveillance officer (*ginmiyaku*) “as it had existed in past reigns.”⁴⁴ The overt rationale for this recommendation, adopted at the beginning of the 7th month of 1712, was that the responsibilities of the fiscal offices were too weighty and diverse to be put in the charge of any one individual. At the same time, by calling for restoration of the *ginmiyaku*, Hakuseki in effect sought to use the lesson of Shigehide’s rise to power as a weapon against him. Despite Hakuseki’s imputation, the provenance of the *ginmiyaku* was not so ancient. As noted above, it had

been created by Tsunayoshi as one aspect of his effort to shake up the established power structure of the bakufu bureaucracy. To that end, the *ginmiyaku* appointees had been granted the prerogative to by-pass the officials heading the *kanjō bugyō* and report directly to the *rōjū* and shogun. Shigehide, who himself had been one of the early appointees to the post, had made use of this feature of it in his rise to power.⁴⁵ Presumably, recognition of the potential of the office to serve as a focus for the coalescing and voicing of opposition to the *kanjō bugyō* was a reason for its discontinuation in 1699, three years after Shigehide's promotion to the latter post. Likewise, it seems clear that Hakuseki looked to the reestablishment of the *ginmiyaku* to expose Shigehide to attack from within the fiscal offices.

Concurrently with this strategic move, Hakuseki launched an attack on Shigehide from a direction in which Hakuseki occupied a relatively strong position—the handling of judicial affairs. The *kanjō bugyō* was involved in judicial matters in two ways: It had appellate jurisdiction over legal cases arising in bakufu direct holdings (*tenryō*); and representatives of the *kanjō bugyō* sat, together with representatives from the other main administrative offices, on the *hyōjōsho*, the supreme judicial body of the bakufu. At the same time, the review of judicial matters was one area of bakufu administration where Hakuseki exercised considerable influence. Ienobu and Akifusa took a positive interest in the handling of judicial cases. Beginning in the 7th month of 1709, Ienobu revived Tsunayoshi's practice of sending one of his attendants to sit in on the deliberations of the *hyōjōsho*, and, from the next year on, Akifusa periodically attended the meetings of the *hyōjōsho*.⁴⁶ Moreover, Ienobu and Akifusa frequently consulted Hakuseki about problematic or complicated cases. As Hakuseki described the part he played in the judicial process, Ienobu

regularly had the records of the preliminary hearings of criminal cases held at the *bugyō* offices brought to him. After perusing them personally, he would send them down to me with orders to note my views on each case; if what I said differed from his own conclusions, he would further query me in detail before finally deciding the case.⁴⁷

As a result, Hakuseki was situated considerably better to challenge Shigehide over the handling of judicial affairs than he was to oppose

him in the area of fiscal matters. In the course of the second half of 1712, Hakuseki developed this advantage in a series of steps which brought increasing pressure to bear on Shigehide's role in the judicial process.

In the 6th month of 1712, plausibly at Hakuseki's urging, a shogunal directive was sent down to the *hyōjōsho* regarding procedural issues. Among other things, it urged "all members present to voice their views fully," and called upon them to record the proceedings and to request the advice of the shogun on questions difficult to resolve.⁴⁸

On 1712/9/5, when Ienobu was already ill with the malaise that would kill him a month later, Hakuseki succeeded in having him hand down another directive to the *hyōjōsho* and *bugyō*. This second directive criticized the members of those bodies for using improper procedures in gathering evidence and of being receptive to bribes from litigants, dilatory and evasive in responding to queries from the *rōjū* and shogun, and unduly influenced by a single voice. Regarding this last point the directive noted:

Although it is established precedent that, in hearing a case, all members of the council should voice their opinions without reservation, it has been heard that, in recent years, cases are decided without discussion among the members; the decision simply follows the first view expressed. If this is indeed the case, numerous as the members of the council may be, it is as though one person is making the decision, and the fundamental purpose of "joint deliberations" (*kengi*) or "collegial decision" (*hyōjō*) is lost.⁴⁹

Five days later, on 1712/9/10, Hakuseki made use of the trap he had laid. He submitted a memorial to Akifusa accusing Shigehide of forcing through the *hyōjōsho* decisions that arbitrarily favored litigants from bakufu territory at the expense of those from daimyo domains, thereby not only undermining the reputation for justice of the bakufu's courts and stirring dissatisfaction among the daimyo, but also flouting the directive just handed down that there should be full and open discussion of all cases heard. Hakuseki asserted that, when some of the others present at the *hyōjōsho* hearing, referring to the directive, had expressed reservations about Shigehide's handling of the cases, Shigehide had openly questioned the directive's validity and declared that, "if fully implemented, [the directive] would be an impediment to the handling of affairs,"

insinuating that some revisions should be expected once he had made clear his objections.⁵⁰

In the memorial, Hakuseki did not simply portray Shigehide as subordinate and destructive of the bakufu's reputation for judicial impartiality. He directly attributed Shigehide's ability to force arbitrary decisions through the *hyōjōsho* to the personal connections he had forged with Akifusa. His memorial was, in fact, as much an attack on the link between Shigehide and Akifusa as on Shigehide as an individual. This climactic move in Hakuseki's long contest for power with Akifusa gives an unparalleled picture of the realities of Hakuseki's situation vis-à-vis Akifusa and Ienobu, and as such is worth quoting at length:

The day after [questioning the validity of the directive], Shigehide, in front of all the members of the *hyōjōsho*, summoned [one of the castle pages]. "I have something to say to Lord Akifusa; please inform him of this," he said. "Lord Akifusa, too, said that when you came he wanted to meet with you," was the response. . . . During the time [Shigehide was talking with Akifusa in the rear quarters], the members of the *hyōjōsho* present the day before looked at each other. The one who had expressed his views then and the one who had responded to him appeared apprehensive, as if they were wondering what sorts of things he was saying to Lord Akifusa. With this the situation, if the cases coming before the *hyōjōsho* continue to be settled as they have up to now according to the desires of Shigehide, there will be no one who dares object.

The link between Akifusa and Shigehide evident in this scene was, Hakuseki asserted, a direct continuation of that previously established between Shigehide and Yanagisawa Yoshiyasu:

During the previous reign, when Shigehide came to the castle and when he left he always called at the house of Lord Yanagisawa. There was not a day in which his attendants, horses, and palanquin were not to be found before Yanagisawa's gate. His retainers boasted that Shigehide was the person Lord Yanagisawa most depended on and that the latter decided the affairs of the realm in consultation with him. Thus, not only the members of the *hyōjōsho*, but also the people of the realm, high and low, assumed that what Shigehide said accorded with the wishes of Lord Yanagisawa and, fearing the consequences of what would happen if they opposed him, dared not say a word.

Having thus relied on these powerful connections for some twenty years, from the time that his present lordship succeeded to the realm, each day Shigehide has come to the castle he has gone to the rear quarters, and usually he

stays until others have retired for the day. He constantly tells others, "Lord Akifusa has said that he wants to see me today," or "There are some things that I have to tell Lord Akifusa tomorrow." Thus, not only the members of the *hyōjōsho* but also the people of the realm, high and low, assume that what Shigehide says accords with the wishes of Lord Akifusa and, fearing the consequences of what will happen if they oppose him, dare not say a word. The situation is no different from what it was during the previous reign. It is not that people are in awe of Shigehide, it is the result of their awe for you, and, if one traces the source of that feeling, since it comes from their awe of his lordship, they conclude that not to oppose Shigehide will not be regarded badly.

Having condemned the consequences of the continued association between Shigehide and the shogun's foremost attendant, Hakuseki went on to call bluntly on Akifusa and Ienobu to choose between Shigehide and himself:

I had thought that, even within the existing circumstances, if Shigehide's powers were restrained somewhat, the evil he could do would be limited a little and the people of the realm given slight respite. Thus, although I was not asked to undertake the matter and it was presumptuous of me to do so, I submitted a draft of points that might appropriately be handed down to the *hyōjōsho*. Happily my suggestions met with his lordship's approval. . . .

Seeing how the directive had been received, however, Hakuseki continued: "I have reached a decision that at this point my service to his lordship must end. That I have come to this conclusion is not in the slightest because I am angered by my recommendations' having been flouted. I believe this is the doing of heaven, and I harbor no grudge." The ease with which Shigehide led the other members of the *hyōjōsho* to think that the recent directive probably did not reflect the true views of Akifusa and Ienobu indicated that no one had faith in their ultimate commitment to the Way. "If the people of the realm think in this way, when will it be possible for government to be correct and customs rectified? If heaven intended [for the Tokugawa] to bring peace to the realm, how could such be the case?" Ienobu, having listened to the lectures of Hakuseki and his other tutors for twenty years,

cannot but be well aware of the instances in which the nation has been destroyed as a result [of the ruler's employment] of an evil, small-minded person.

That nevertheless he continues to pursue the present course—might it not be termed what the *Great Learning* refers to as the error of “yet seeing evil being unable to withdraw from it”?

Knowing the “limitless enmity” still focused on the person of Tsunayoshi as a result of the deeds of Shigehide, that Ienobu should continue “to let this person have his way with the government of the realm” could only be a sign that heaven was preparing to move against the Tokugawa. Such could also be the only explanation why Akifusa, “knowing how during the previous reign Lord Yanagisawa was talked about by the world, should allow his authority to be utilized by Shigehide and should let him do as he likes with the government of the realm.” Given such evidence of heaven’s growing disfavor, “however much I exhaust my efforts and ability, no matter how loyally I serve, what positive effect could it have? Thus I have come to the conclusion that my service has already reached its limit.”⁵¹

Hakuseki’s tactic of concentrating on Shigehide’s mishandling of judicial matters and his frontal attack on the connection between Akifusa and Shigehide bore fruit. The next day, according to *Oritaku shiba no ki*, Akifusa reported to him that he had at once shown the memorial to Ienobu who, shocked and dismayed, had immediately ordered that Shigehide be removed from office.⁵²

As to why Ienobu and Akifusa moved now when they had not previously, one can only speculate. Perhaps they had become sufficiently dependent on Hakuseki’s advice in other areas to be willing to sacrifice Shigehide’s financial acumen if it was a question of choosing between the two. Perhaps Shigehide’s high-handed dominance of the *kanjō bugyō* and the increasingly irresponsible debasements for which he was responsible had come to seem a liability. The course of bakufu fiscal policy in the following years suggests that there was, by this time, quite widespread dismay within the bakufu over the effects of the debasements, and the revival of the post of *ginmiyaku* two months earlier may have brought disaffection with Shigehide within the *kanjō bugyō* to the surface. Perhaps Ienobu’s dismissal of Shigehide was the impulsive gesture of a dying man.

Viewed from one angle, the dismissal of Shigehide was an indication of the strength of Hakuseki’s influence. On the other hand, the roundabout strategy Hakuseki was forced to adopt and the fierceness of his

reproach of Akifusa and Ienobu reveal the fundamental weakness of his situation. Much the same was true of the consequences of Shigehide's removal. Theoretically that development held out the possibility for a quite radical change in the dynamics of Hakuseki's relations with Akifusa and Ienobu. But what should have been Hakuseki's moment of triumph proved a pyrrhic victory; what he gained from the elimination of his most significant rival was lost little more than a month later when Ienobu died. However temporizing it had been, Ienobu's backing had been a crucial ingredient in Hakuseki's ability to affect bakufu affairs. Ienobu's death not only left the Kōfu circle as a whole in a weak position, as discussed in Chapter 1; it further narrowed the ground for Hakuseki to exercise influence within that circle. At the same time, it introduced another complication into Hakuseki's already convoluted relationship with Akifusa.

HAKUSEKI AND AKIFUSA IN THE REIGN OF IETSUGU

Throughout the years of his attendance on Ienobu, Hakuseki held firmly to the premise that he served solely Ienobu, not those around him like Akifusa or the other attendants. In fact, protocol dictated that Hakuseki's recommendations and advice be communicated to Ienobu through one of the attendants, and Akifusa persistently acted as a crucial intermediary between Ienobu and Hakuseki. But, as long as Ienobu was alive, the fiction could be preserved that Akifusa functioned as Hakuseki's colleague, not his superior. Ienobu's death tore the veil from reality. Given Akifusa's assigned responsibilities as Ietsugu's personal guardian and the ill-defined nature of Hakuseki's formal position, the only role left for him was that of advisor to Akifusa.

In the last days before Ienobu's death, Hakuseki evidently made a final, unsuccessful effort to avert this fate. In *Oritaku shiba no ki*, he wrote that on 1712/9/27, when consulted regarding what should be done about the succession, he said to Akifusa:

"I had never thought that today would mark the end of my efforts to serve his lordship to the utmost of my devotion and strength, limited as they may be. Please be sure to tell his lordship that this is what I said." I said this with some-

thing in mind, but, the circumstances being such as they were, his lordship did not ask what I meant, and I, too, did not say anything further.

Hakuseki added in a parenthetical elaboration, "I thought that his lordship was sure to wonder about my statement that today my service to him had come to an end, and that I would then be able to say what I had in mind. But, since he did not pursue the matter, there were no grounds for me to say anything further."⁵³

One may surmise that what he "had in mind" on 9/27 was to push Ienobu to designate some formal role that would give Hakuseki a direct voice in affairs during Ietsugu's reign and free him of dependence on Akifusa for whatever influence he might have. To the end, however, Ienobu remained closed off to Hakuseki by the ring of personal attendants surrounding him. Hakuseki wrote of his last audience with Ienobu, on the 13th, the day before Ienobu's death: "Lord Akifusa being at his pillow and Murakami Masanao in attendance behind him, he did not say anything, but simply opened his eyes and gazed steadily in my direction. With that the more than twenty years of my daily meetings with him came to an end."⁵⁴

The developing consequences of Hakuseki's failure to obtain some formal autonomous position may be read in a number of letters written by Muro Kyūsō and Hakuseki in the first several months of Ietsugu's reign. In his initial evaluation of the distribution of power at the center following Ienobu's death, Kyūsō was quite optimistic about Hakuseki's potential role. Having noted that Ienobu's testament had declared that, "after his lordship's death, Lord Manabe should continue to be consulted about everything as before," Kyūsō added, "It is further said that his lordship left orders that Lord Manabe is to consult with Arai about everything."⁵⁵

In a letter written to an acquaintance a few weeks later, Hakuseki was far more gloomy about the possibility for him to affect the course of government affairs:

As for me, I feel like one just beginning to wake from a drunken stupor. Everything brings home to me anew the loss we have suffered, and I cannot begin to express my feeling of desolation and despair. . . . As you say, Lord Akifusa,

having served night and day in close attendance upon his late lordship for thirty years, knows very well the desires of his lordship. Consequently, his lordship left instructions with him as to how affairs were to be handled after his death, and also spoke to this effect to the *rōjū*, and left specific orders that, whatever the matter, large or small, it should be settled after consultation [with Akifusa] just as had been the case during his reign. . . .

Regarding myself . . . the morality of the gentleman, it is said, lies in "acting when used and storing within when not." The sages and worthies of old all acted in this manner. When the Way prevailed in the nation, they acted as wise; when it did not prevail, they were stupid. . . . At the present, one cannot say that the Way does not prevail in the realm; nevertheless, while there is a child as ruler, it is inevitably much the same as if the Way did not prevail. In my case, his late lordship, with his own view of things, had me serve close to him, even though formally I was of outside status. Not only did he ask my opinion on governmental matters large and small; there was nothing about which I hesitated to speak, and, of the things that I exerted myself to the utmost to accomplish, seven or eight out of ten by and large took shape along the lines that I recommended.

He died at dawn on the 14th, and until the evening of the 13th I was summoned into his presence and told that it was his wish that I should continue to serve after his death as before. But, without a ruler to utilize my views, to whom should I express them? What is there for me to say? From the beginning I have not occupied a set office; consequently, there is no capacity for me to serve in. Since Lord Manabe has, as I said earlier, been intimately familiar with his lordship's wishes since the time I was summoned into service twenty years ago, he continues without fail to ask my opinion on matters both great and small; and, as my lord left instructions that, for the moment, I should speak my thoughts to Lord Manabe, I view it as my unchanged duty to express myself unreservedly to him. But this is only if I am asked. It is not for me to give my views unsolicited. And, even if Lord Manabe believes my views correct, even he at this point is not in a position to impose them on others. Were he to, needless to say, he would only sow the seeds of dissension.

Even when, as was the case up to fifty or sixty days ago, his lordship heard my views without hindrance and ordered them implemented as matters of utmost importance, one or two out of ten failed to take shape as I had conceived them. And, now, I can only suggest my thoughts to Lord Manabe and he can only pass them on to the *rōjū*. Passing through all these layers and stages, how is it possible for anything of benefit to the nation to emerge? I think that even sage or worthy, were he in my situation, would at this time become stupid and keep his views to himself. Thus, I am resolved that henceforth I will no longer try to think ahead to the future of the realm. I will simply take things as they come. If I am consulted, I will express my views without reservation, but I

will no longer volunteer my opinions unsolicited. There are so many things that were on the point of fruition but yet unrealized; now they have all melted away like water. My hopes were simply in vain. The sorrow of it cannot be helped.⁵⁶

Writing a week or so later, Kyūsō was more blunt about the increasingly apparent difficulties of Hakuseki's situation:

Whatever effort he might make, Arai said the other night, it appears that the situation is against his achieving his aim. But, as a consequence, to take Lord Manabe as the object of his advice, and have Lord Manabe put forth his views, is there not a resemblance there to Wang Shuwen and the Shen faction? [Wang Shuwen, associated with the development of inner-court politics in the late Tang, parlayed an intimate association with the crown prince (the later Shunzong) into a transiently powerful faction upon the crown prince's accession. He ultimately was executed by Shunzong's successor, and, although his faction included a number of Hanlin Academicians and literary figures, he was condemned historically as a "mean person," the antithesis of the *junzi*.] To be sure, Lord Manabe is not a Shuwen, but, if because there is no ruler to utilize Arai, it becomes as if Arai is a member of Lord Manabe's faction, it will not be good.⁵⁷

It was in the context of these observations that Kyūsō went on to criticize Ienobu for not having given Hakuseki a position comparable to that of Akifusa's nominal colleague as attendant, Honda Tadayoshi.

The problem of being unable to exercise influence except through Akifusa was not simply one of psychological, or, in Confucian terms, moral, discomfort. As discussed in Chapter 1, the weakness of Akifusa's own position vis-à-vis the *rōjū* during Ietsugu's reign led him increasingly to defer to the *rōjū* in matters of the "outer court" and to concentrate instead on consolidating his own position within the inner court. In these circumstances, he was less and less inclined to push for measures Hakuseki advocated or even to turn to Hakuseki for advice. A letter written by Kyūsō in 1713 gives us a picture of what this situation meant in practical terms:

Arai submitted a detailed proposal for the promulgation of regulations calling for a reduction in *hatamoto* expenditures, but as of yet nothing has come from it. . . . There were five general measures and a variety of specific provisions. When Lord Ii and Lord Manabe saw it, they agreed that the measures were indeed appropriate. They said that they had nothing to add, but suggested

that to issue the whole set of regulations at once would be complicated and might well cause a reaction against them on the part of the various officials. Thus, it would be best to issue the five general measures first, and, once general agreement to them had been obtained, the specific provisions could be promulgated. The matter was discussed among themselves and others; the rest of the *rōjū* made objections, and then, before those could be resolved, Lord Kuze Shigeyuki was appointed *rōjū*, and, as a consequence, he had to be shown the proposal before anything could be decided. In the end, things dragged on without any agreement and have become hopelessly deadlocked.⁵⁸

Hakuseki's frustration over this general state of affairs was reflected in the increasingly all-encompassing criticism of the *rōjū* passed on by Muro Kyūsō in the course of the year. At the beginning of 1713, Hakuseki, describing the current situation to Kyūsō, depicted Akifusa as preoccupied with the details of his attendance on Ietsugu while the *rōjū*

concern themselves with no more than the immediate matter of the day. . . . If one says to them "How auspicious!" or "Era of peace," they are very happy. If one says that something is extravagant and thus is a source of impoverishment, the *rōjū* simply do not want to listen. It is a question of human disposition. To a sick person one is sure to say, "Your color is good; little by little you're getting better." Then the sick person is happy. If one says, "You don't look well; it is crucial to take care of yourself," even if the sick person agrees, he will not be pleased by one's saying so.

When Kyūsō demurred that, whatever their immediate response, the underlying concern of the *rōjū* for the fortunes of the Tokugawa house would ultimately make them see the value in the criticism, Hakuseki rejoined: "It is only those with learning who are prepared to see the value in criticism. One without learning will be happy to be told he is going to get better up until the day he dies."⁵⁹

Nevertheless, according to Kyūsō, at this stage Hakuseki was prepared to exempt some of the *rōjū* from blanket condemnation. Kyūsō reported another conversation from this period inspired by the sickness of one of the *rōjū*, Ōkubo Tadamasu. Hakuseki's opinion of Ōkubo was that "he is the sort of person that it doesn't matter whether he is there or not," but, stated Kyūsō, he was willing to agree with the latter's comment that it would be a cause for worry if it were Akimoto Takatomo,

one of the other *rōjū*, who was sick instead.⁶⁰ Two months later, Kyūsō was still reflecting cautious optimism about Akimoto as well as Akifusa:

As long as Lord Akimoto remains in good health, there is some hope. However, no matter what his own views, he cannot do anything on his own. In particular, should dissension arise among the *rōjū*, it would not be to his benefit, and consequently he seems to be taking great care about that at the moment. This is to be expected. Regarding Lord Manabe, he has turned out to show unexpected ability, and, because of that and his warm personality, at present the *rōjū* seem to continue to defer to him as they did during Lord Ienobu's life. Since he is totally absorbed night and day, however, in attending upon his young lordship, he does not involve himself with the matters of the outer court.

Despite these reservations, Akimoto and Akifusa were certainly to be distinguished from the likes of Ōkubo, not only in bad health but said to have "written recently in his own hand to eight daimyo to borrow money," and Tsuchiya Masanao, who "is only interested in the tea ceremony and the acquisition of rare tea bowls and canisters."⁶¹

By the middle of the year, however, the note of optimism had disappeared. Describing Hakuseki as tired and in poor spirits, Kyūsō reported his saying that, whenever he "proposes anything of even the slightest long-term significance," none of the *rōjū* agree. "Lord Akimoto is all right; particularly in his lack of greed he is far superior to the others, but he is the sort of person known as skillful at getting along with others, and in the end is of no use whatsoever."⁶² By the end of 1713, Kyūsō was describing the situation "as fitting the old phrase, 'a fatal illness and no good doctor.'"⁶³

Kyūsō's growing pessimism about the responsiveness of Akifusa and the *rōjū* to measures proposed by Hakuseki was accompanied by notices of the latter's increasing leisure. In the fall of 1713, Kyūsō wrote that Hakuseki, his time not being fully occupied with government work, was amusing himself writing poetry and fitting out an armor helmet in ancient style. Kyūsō added: "He is also a skilled painter. In short, he is a man of remarkable abilities. But, being a figure of heroic dimensions, what a pity it is that he should be left to amuse himself in poetry and craftwork!"⁶⁴ Kyūsō's references to Hakuseki's having free time at his

disposal are corroborated by Hakuseki's diary, which, by 1714, records him attending at Edo Castle little more than four or five times a month.

In the winter of 1714, the frustrations inherent in this situation led to one last round in the competition between Hakuseki and Akifusa as to who was to be the dominant figure in their relationship. Following the "third" (actually the second) anniversary memorial services for Ienobu, which marked the end of the formal period of mourning stipulated by Confucian practice, Hakuseki informed Akifusa that he wished to resign. In *Oritaku shiba no ki*, Hakuseki wrote that Akifusa "was greatly startled" by Hakuseki's declaration and arranged a meeting with the *rōjū* at which, one by one, they reiterated that he should take care of himself so that he could long continue to serve.⁶⁵ Fundamentally, however, this conciliatory gesture was true to the pattern of earlier clashes between Hakuseki and Akifusa. It smoothed things over without removing the root of Hakuseki's frustration. His diary quotes Akifusa as reporting that it was the view of the *rōjū* that Hakuseki "should be allowed to do as he wishes about formal attendance (*omotemuki tsutomekata no koto*) but should be urged to continue to serve (*gohōkō*) as he has up to the present."⁶⁶ "To be allowed to do as he wishes about formal attendance while continuing to serve" had been Hakuseki's official status since his appointment as *yoriai* in the Kōfu house fifteen years earlier. The decisive question remained the interpretation made of that status in practice.

In that regard, Hakuseki's activities fell into the same equivocal pattern after as before his request to resign. He continued to attend at Edo Castle four or five days a month and to be involved in the areas of government where Akifusa was accustomed to rely on him for advice, primarily judicial cases. His overall impact on policy, however, continued to decline, and increasingly he devoted his time to various works of scholarship rather than to immediate matters of governance. Thus, the final years of Ietsugu's reign were, in fact, a prelude to Hakuseki's definitive retirement upon Yoshimune's succession in the 5th month of 1716.⁶⁷

HAKUSEKI DURING THE REIGN OF YOSHIMUNE

As noted in Chapter 1, immediately upon his accession, Yoshimune formally relieved Ietsugu's personal attendants of their official duties.

Even that action reconfirmed the anomalous nature of Hakuseki's position. Since his official status within the bakufu had never been other than that of the retirement category of *yoriai*, he was not included in the list of people relieved of official duties.⁶⁸ In other ways, however, the remaining indications of his association with the shogunal circle were terminated one by one. He returned the keys to his office in Edo Castle and the books he had borrowed from the bakufu collection. The final step in the severance of his ties with the central arena of power came at the beginning of 1717, when he, along with the former personal attendants to Ienobu and Ietsugu, was ordered to give up his official residence. He was told that, in place of the residence in Ogawa-chō, east of the castle, granted him by Ienobu, he would be awarded residence land in Naitō Shinjuku, a remote suburb.⁶⁹

Under the official pretext that he needed time to build a house on the Naitō Shinjuku land, Hakuseki remained for several years within the city. For the moment, he moved to the popular quarters of the city east of the Sumida River. Several months later, having acquired some land from a friend, he moved back to Koishikawa in the sector of Edo north-east of the castle, the area where he had lived for most of his adult life. Twice burned out of the Koishikawa house, in 1721 he finally made the move to Naitō Shinjuku.⁷⁰ It was there that he died on 1725/5/19, in his 69th year.

During the close to a decade remaining in his life after Yoshimune's accession, Hakuseki's formal status continued to be that of a bakufu *yoriai* with a fief of 1,000 *koku*. As a *yoriai*, he maintained the communication with the bakufu required of a vassal, such as the obtaining of permission for the marriage of a child. Other than that, he had virtually no contact with the world of bakufu politics. Instead, observing the events of the opening years of Yoshimune's reign from a distance, he spent his time largely in writing and scholarship.

The circumstances discussed above had a fundamental impact on Hakuseki's political outlook. If Hakuseki's connection to the shogunal circle shaped the overall orientation of his program, the peculiarities of his own situation within that circle left a distinctive imprint on the policies he proposed and the strategies he pursued to secure adoption of those policies. On the one hand, the nature of his relationship to Ienobu

and Akifusa caused him to gravitate towards measures that would appeal to the interests of Ienobu and strategies that would compel Akifusa to lend his support. On the other hand, Hakuseki's isolated position affected his view of such matters as the bureaucratization and rationalization of shogunal rule, and it needs to be taken into account when considering the part he played in such major issues as fiscal reform. But, before those questions are considered, there is one final background factor to examine—the interaction between his personality and his adherence to Confucianism.

FOUR

Intellectual Influences, Psychological Disposition

In seeking to define the influence of Confucianism on a political figure and thinker, the most straightforward approach would be first to ascertain the nature of his Confucianism. To what school of Confucianism did he adhere? Where did he stand on the questions of interpretation or emphasis that separate one type of Confucian from another? But, in the case of Hakuseki, there is little point to such an attempt. Hakuseki did not leave to posterity the kind of materials from which a philosophical position can be readily derived. He showed little interest in the questions of the metaphysical structure of the universe, the origin and composition of the Way, man's nature, or the relationship between the individual and the Way that, from the Song on, have served as arbiters to distinguish one category of Confucian from another. He did not express his position on such matters in the form of original treatises. Nor did he develop his views through exegesis of the classics or the compilation of excerpts from the writings of earlier thinkers. It is doubtless for this reason that those who have set forth the major schematizations of the evolution of Tokugawa Confucianism current today by and large have not attempted to bring Hakuseki within the compass of their argument.

Rather than in speculative writings, Hakuseki manifested his character as a Confucian in the concrete political measures he advocated and in the historical works that provided a justification for his political program. In short, he was a Confucian "actor" rather than a Confucian "thinker." We shall be better able to evaluate fully the implications of his

Confucianism after considering his actions and the arguments he marshaled to support them. However, one factor in particular suggests that, before embarking on that task, we would do well to develop somewhat further a preliminary consideration of Hakuseki's intellectual orientation. As touched on in Chapter 2, Hakuseki was not "born" a Confucian. By his own testimony, he first became aware of the Way of the Sages at age 17, and he pursued his desire to learn more about the Way in the face of some opposition. Thus, there was an aspect of conversion, or at least conscious choice, in Hakuseki's identification of himself as a Confucian. It is valid to assume that the elements of Confucianism that had the power to evoke this response, interacting with his underlying personality or psychology, shaped his perspective on the world around him. If we can identify here those elements, we shall be better prepared to grasp the dynamics of Hakuseki's approach to bakufu politics. It will also sharpen our understanding of his approach to set aside those factors which, while often considered keys to the impact of Confucianism on Tokugawa politics and society, do not seem to have been particularly significant in the case of Hakuseki. We shall start with the latter task.

THE QUESTION OF INTELLECTUAL AFFILIATION

It is customary to assign Hakuseki to the Zhu Xi school of Confucianism. This is largely because his master, Kinoshita Jun'an, is identified as a Zhu Xi scholar and because Hakuseki, unlike thinkers such as Yamaga Sokō or Ogyū Sorai, took no specific moves to dissociate himself from the Zhu Xi outlook. But because Hakuseki did not explicitly break with the Zhu Xi approach to Confucianism does not mean that he took it as his own. In many cases, he took little interest, pro or con, in issues that held the attention of Zhu Xi and his followers. In others, his own perspective differed significantly from the Zhu Xi school.

Hakuseki accepted the existence of a Way which defined the proper course of behavior for ruler and subject alike. The assumption in his writings that heaven would favor those who cleaved to the Way and withdraw its support from those who did not suggests that he regarded this Way as in some sense "natural," inherent in the universal order of things. Certainly he made no attempt to redefine radically the Way as

something “artificial” or “created,” as did Ogyū Sorai. But at the same time, unlike most adherents of the Zhu Xi school, Hakuseki evidently felt little need to demonstrate philosophically the existence of the Way or to analyze what it was that grounded the imperative to realize the Way in the individual. In late 1713, when Hakuseki was 56, his friend Muro Kyūsō, noted for his commitment to Zhu Xi in philosophical matters, described somewhat disapprovingly Hakuseki’s cavalier approach to such matters:

Arai does not appear to give first importance to philosophical study (*keigaku*); nevertheless, he always says that philosophical study is essential to doing anything properly, and, being of superior ability, he is clear on the main points of the classics. I do have some questions about his grasp of the finer points. The other day he was saying that [Zhu Xi’s] *Jinsilu* is an outstanding work and that at present he often refers to it and is taking notes from it. He said that the chapter “On the Substance of the Way” [which sets forth “the original source of human nature and the substance and state of the Way”] is of no value, but he finds the chapters on “Correcting Mistakes” and “The Essentials of Learning” congenial. His approach may be gauged from the fact that he asserts the chapter on “Substance of the Way” to be of no value.¹

Hakuseki took a similarly tepid position on the matter of self-rectification, another central concern of Song-Ming Confucianism. To be sure, he did not share the institutional utopianism of those like Ogyū Sorai and Dazai Shundai who, doubting the individual’s innate capacity to realize the Way through self-rectification, looked instead to institutional reform as the only means to bring about an ideal social order. Unlike Sorai or Shundai, in his writings Hakuseki reiterated that the ruler must correct his own behavior as the first step towards the reform of social conditions. But Hakuseki’s affirmation of the importance of self-rectification remained at this formal, general level. He did not support it with even a sketchy consideration of the process or technique whereby self-rectification was to be effected.

It might be argued that, in the absence of an explicit discussion of such matters, Hakuseki’s many years of lecturing before Tokugawa Ienobu on Zhu Xi’s comprehensive history of China, the *Zizhi tongjian gangmu* (Outline and commentary on the comprehensive mirror for government), indicates an underlying commitment to Zhu Xi’s view of

the process of self-rectification. A redaction of an earlier work by Sima Guang, the *Zizhi tongjian* (The comprehensive mirror for government), the *Tongjian gangmu* sought to clarify the moral lessons implicit in Sima Guang's account so as to offer later generations of subjects and rulers a more sharply defined standard against which to measure their own behavior. There is no evidence, however, that Hakuseki viewed the *Gangmu* as superior to the *Tongjian* on this account. According to his autobiography, he proposed to lecture on either Sima Guang's work or Zhu Xi's, and the choice of the latter as the subject for the lectures was Ienobu's.² Hakuseki personally perhaps gave greater attention to the study of the *Tongjian*; elsewhere he writes that, as a young man, being too poor to purchase a copy of Sima Guang's work, he borrowed one and copied out some forty to fifty volumes of excerpts from it arranged according to subject.³ As far as Hakuseki's own historical writings are concerned, unlike contemporary works such as the Mito *Dai Nihonshi*, they reveal no particular sign of influence by Zhu Xi's concern to pass measured moral judgment on the actors in history. They rather are closer in tone to Sima Guang's "realistic" analysis of the dynamics of political change.

A fundamental orientation towards what we might term the sphere of politics, as opposed to that of morals or philosophy, is further suggested by the fact that the only "classical" Chinese work on which Hakuseki chose to write a commentary was Sunzi's explication of the art of war. In undertaking a commentary on the *Sunzi*, Hakuseki aimed to challenge the interpretation of that work advanced by Ogyū Sorai. According to Hakuseki, Sorai had sought to present the *Sunzi* as a model for government:

In recent years, people with a smattering of knowledge have produced commentaries intended for a popular audience in which they say the most unheard-of-things. I have heard that there is one person in particular who, priding himself on his knowledge of the *Sunzi*, makes himself out to be a teacher of the subject, indeed holds that government even in this age of peace should be approached from the perspective of the *Sunzi*. It appears that his pernicious idea that it reflects well on the *buke* to deceive and trick people, relying on one's own view of things and regarding the people as stupid, is widely influential.⁴

In his own commentary, Hakuseki endeavored to distinguish the “way” in the sense of strategy or tactics discussed by Sunzi from the greater Way of the Sages, who had sought to bring order to society as a whole.⁵ His argument confirms the supposition that, compared to Sorai, Hakuseki took a more conventional view of the nature of the Way. Nevertheless, despite his condemnation of what he took to be Sorai’s equation of the method of war and the method of government, his own interest in the *Sunzi* attests to a disposition to view the mechanism of government from an essentially tactical perspective. Hakuseki acknowledged that, even if Sunzi was not committed to the Way in the larger sense, what he had to say bore on various aspects of the functioning of government. Thus, he noted as significant Sunzi’s emphasis on the need for the ruler to “hold the hearts of the populace, making them willing both to die and to live for him, without any sense of fear.”⁶ Similarly, he declared on another occasion that the writings of the Legalists contained points “of use in governing the state,” even if, unlike Confucius, they did not commit themselves to extending the greatest good throughout society.⁷

All in all, Hakuseki’s interests set him apart both from the adherents of Song-Ming Confucianism and from the challengers of the latter tradition like Sorai. If he did not share Sorai’s iconoclastic interpretation of the Way and orientation towards institutional rather than personal rectification, neither was he animated by the drive for the moral perfection of self and society characteristic of Song-Ming Confucianism. His character as a Confucian thus should best be considered apart from the usual categorization of branches of Confucianism.

Hakuseki in fact decried the tendency of Confucian scholars both in China and Japan to divide into schools. The great merit of Confucius, Hakuseki asserted, was the balance and comprehensiveness of his approach to learning, epitomized in the aim set forth in the *Great Learning*—“to illustrate illustrious virtue, to renovate the people, and to rest in the highest excellence.” However, Hakuseki held, Confucius’s disciples had failed to preserve this crucial quality; each simply pursued the particular dimension of the Way of the Sages that he personally found congenial. The situation grew worse in later dynasties. The scholars of the Han, Tang, Song, Yuan, and Ming had all declared themselves adherents

of the learning of Confucius, “but in reality each, tracing his source to the [partial] teachings of one of Confucius’s disciples, sought to demarcate his school from that of other [Confucians].” The end result was the appearance of scholarly factions which, far from achieving the aim set forth in the *Great Learning*, had brought about social disorder and their own destruction. In this regard the proponents of the various branches of Confucianism were no better than the Buddhist sectarians who, despite their common debt to the teachings of Shakyamuni, mutually attacked each other as heretics. Nor had the Japanese Confucians “of recent times” overcome this shortcoming. To the contrary, they simply had propagated in a secondhand form the divisions and disputes that had developed within the Chinese tradition of Confucianism.⁸

Given Hakuseki’s evident distance from both the outlook of the Song-Ming branch of Confucianism and that of its challengers, what were the elements of Confucianism that attracted him and shaped his view of the world? They were of two sorts. One was the body of standard Chinese Confucian conceptualizations about the political order—the idea of the role of the ruler, the definition of what legitimized his authority, the identification of the necessary attributes of a stable regime. The following chapters will document the specific ways in which Hakuseki incorporated these notions in his approach to bakufu politics and his historical writings. Here we may note simply that, in many ways, what attracted Hakuseki to Confucian premises about the political order was less their congruence with the political reality of Tokugawa Japan than their differences. In the basic propositions set forth in the classics and shared by the vast majority of Chinese Confucian thinkers, Hakuseki, already at substantial odds with his environment, found a tool with which to appraise critically the contemporary political situation and guidance for an attempt to change it.

If one aspect of the appeal of Confucianism to Hakuseki was its potential as an intellectual weapon for dealing with the world around him, the other was the potency of the image, articulated particularly by Mencius, of the mission of the upholder of the Way and the upholder’s relations with society. Interacting with basic facets of his personality, this latter dimension of Confucianism generated much of the energy underlying Hakuseki’s political activities. Thus, while the impact on him of

Confucian propositions about the political order may best be considered in the context of an examination of the specifics of his program, it is first appropriate to take a closer look at the manner of the interaction between Hakuseki's personality and his perception of the characteristics of the upholder of the Way.

PSYCHOLOGICAL DISPOSITION

Everything we know of Hakuseki testifies to tremendous ambition and an aggressively competitive personality. In 1708, he expressed his view of life as a struggle for supremacy in a letter to Dohi Motonari, the boy recently assigned him as a disciple. Dohi, inspired by the acclaim won by a 12-year-old acquaintance for a series of poems about Kan'eiji Temple, had shown an interest in writing a complementary series using the same rhyme scheme. Hakuseki's response was blunt:

If you are thinking of writing a complementary series, don't. A complementary poem is almost always inferior to the original. Besides which, to allow [the 12-year-old] always to set the pace and to write only poems complementary to his is to play the role of a street entertainer's assistant. . . . One who seeks to make his name known must not allow others to take the lead in his chosen work.⁹

Various incidents from his autobiography confirm Hakuseki's personal adherence to such a principle. In describing his youth, he recalled, for instance, that at age 11 he convinced an acquaintance to give him lessons in swordsmanship, despite the demurral that he was still too young for such training. He added, "Once while I was practicing, a 16-year-old boy . . . said he would have a match with me. Picking up wooden swords, we fought three bouts and all three times I won. The people looking on laughed in amusement."¹⁰

Hakuseki's description of his efforts to reach the Kōfu residence by the Sakurada Gate of Edo Castle from his home in Yushima on the occasion of the devastating earthquake of 1703 provides another characteristic example of the strength of his competitive instincts. He noted that the ground was still quaking, buildings collapsing, fires breaking out, the air rent with the cries of the injured; but he centered his account not

constricted environment of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century. To Tokugawa observers, this tendency was one of Hakuseki's defining attributes. Thus, for instance, Hara Nensai, the late Tokugawa author of a collection of incisive if somewhat embellished biographies of Tokugawa Confucian scholars, described Hakuseki as declaring that "the man of determination who does not succeed during his lifetime in being enfeoffed as a feudal lord will become the king of hell after his death."¹⁴

Hakuseki evidently did not find the image of himself as a potential destroyer uncongenial. He readily noted that others perceived that quality in him. One instance is his account of his 1709 interview with Giovanni Battista Sidotti, an Italian priest who had attempted to enter Japan in contravention of the seclusion policy. According to that account, Sidotti described Hakuseki as "the sort who, were he from my country, could not stand not to do great things," and who therefore might readily embark on the conquest of another land.¹⁵

Even more striking is Hakuseki's assertion that a man who had studied military strategy under Yui Shōsetsu, author of an ill-fated uprising against the bakufu in 1651, had detected a resemblance between Yui and the youthful Hakuseki. Making this assertion in a letter written in his last years, Hakuseki displayed a noteworthy sympathy for a figure officially castigated as a rebel. One day, wrote Hakuseki, his informant

suddenly remarked laughingly that Yui looked very much like me and began to tell me about him. . . . Yui lived in a rented tenement about 30 feet in width in the back alley of the peddlers' quarters in the Kanda district. Twenty feet he used for a school teaching reading and writing to children while he lived in the other 10 feet. It was a quite desperate *rōnin* life, not knowing in the morning where he would be in the evening. Nevertheless, *batamoto* and daimyo retainers of high rank went of their own accord to him, and, in the midst of the noises of the back alley, he gave them lessons in military strategy. Among daimyo he took as a disciple only Itakura Shigenori, the second generation of his family to serve as *rōjū*; he declined all invitations from other daimyo to serve as their teacher. [Hakuseki's informant] heard this from Itakura.

All Yui's disciples, whoever they were, he said, had the utmost reverence for him and thought of him as if he were Sun or Wu [the two ancient masters of the art of war]. He seems to have been a tremendous monster, one in

ten thousand. His sort resembles the Chen She of old [a Qin general who fomented the rebellion that was the start of the Qin downfall]. . . . There is no longer anyone like him, and for that reason people today criticize him. One would never find that sort of person today. As it is said, when one fails, one is a Chen She; when one succeeds, a Han Gaozu. The methods of a hero must be measured by another standard; they cannot be spoken of within the Way of the gentleman.¹⁶

THE IMPACT OF CONFUCIANISM

In examining Hakuseki's political program, we should keep in mind his readiness to think of himself as a conquerer and his empathy for a symbol of rebellion against the existing order like Yui Shōsetsu. It is also important, however, to consider the impact on these underlying currents of his psyche of his encounter with the Way of the Sages, which seems both to have fed further the ambitions which were a crucial ingredient in his career and to have provided a framework for sublimation of his bent towards destruction into something more positive. More particularly, in the Confucian meritocratic ideal and acclamation of the potential of the individual upholder of the Way to shape the course of society, Hakuseki found an intellectual base which, while focusing his aspirations on constructive rather than negative goals, validated his drive to triumph over all rivals and nourished the sense of autonomy requisite to a sustained attempt to change what others regarded as established verities.

Hakuseki's deep attraction to the meritocratic currents of Confucianism is apparent from the name he gave his house: Tenshakudō, Hall of the Ennoblement by Heaven. The name came from a passage in *Mencius*:

There is ennoblement by heaven, and there is ennoblement by man. Those who are virtuous, upright, loyal and trustworthy, enjoy practicing good and never weary of it, are people ennobled by heaven. Princes, dukes, and the various courtiers—they are people ennobled by man. Men of antiquity strove to acquire ennoblement by heaven and ennoblement by man followed as a matter of course. Men of today strive to acquire ennoblement by heaven in order to gain ennoblement by man, and, once ennoblement by man is won, they discard ennoblement by heaven. Such men are very mistaken, and in the end are sure only to be lost.¹⁷

Mencius's dismissal of those who, despite their lack of virtue, enjoyed high status by birth, and exaltation of those who, innately worthy, properly should be awarded such status, provided Hakuseki with a congenial formulation of his own situation. Variants of the same meritocratic ideal, such as the story of Yi Yin, the lowborn tiller of the fields who came to the attention of King Tang, the founder of the Shang dynasty, similarly offered him a heroic model and a meaningful mission to adopt as his own. According to legend, Yi Yin played a crucial role in assisting Tang to cast out the degenerate Jie, last ruler of the Xia, and establish the Shang dynasty. As Mencius described him, Yi Yin's integrity was so firm that he could serve a less-than-worthy lord and by the force of his own determination "make his lord a ruler like Yao and Shun and see that his lord's subjects became such as the subjects of Yao and Shun." Had circumstances been different, Mencius suggested, Yi Yin himself would have become the ruler.¹⁸ Hakuseki's allusion on various occasions to taking on the task of Yi Yin makes clear the centrality of the legend to his own image of himself.¹⁹ His identification with Confucian heroes of this sort also is apparent in the affinity he manifested, as noted by Ulrich (Kemper) Goch, for the numerical combination in the *Book of Changes* which signifies that the ruler will succeed in bringing peace and order to the realm, but only with the assistance of "a great man."²⁰

Adoption of an Yi Yin-like identity had several consequences for Hakuseki's approach to bakufu politics. It spurred him to push and pressure Ienobu and Akifusa in the name of "making his lord a ruler like Yao and Shun and seeing that his lord's subjects become such as the subjects of Yao and Shun." It also nurtured the sense of autonomy essential to undertaking the task of transforming a less-than-worthy lord into a sage ruler. Evidence of such a sense runs like a thread through the history of Hakuseki's relationship with Ienobu. It is apparent, for instance, in the stance he assumed at the time of Ienobu's designation as shogunal heir, when Hakuseki was forced to sit at home while others were appointed one by one to Ienobu's new retinue. The delay in the resolution of his own situation on that occasion obviously bothered Hakuseki. A dream he recorded in his diary on 1704/12/14 of "two archaic forms" of the character for stipend indicates as much.²¹ Nevertheless, as men-

tioned in Chapter 2, he refused to join his fellow Kōfu *yoriai* in directly requesting appointment. After his situation had at length been settled, in an unusually long diary entry Hakuseki recorded his reasons for not joining them. Having been taken into service because of his knowledge of the classics, Hakuseki wrote, he should know the priority of values:

If my lord's virtue were not yet sufficient and if the people did not gladly submit to him, how could I wish to have even the largest of fiefs? To see, on the contrary, how the people have welcomed him with cries of joy was reward enough. I could not ask for anything more. . . . If his lordship continued to honor the classics and revere the Way of the Sages, he surely would not cast me aside. On the other hand, should his desire to follow the Way of the Sages weaken and he abandon his studies of the classics, what benefit would there be in my receiving even the largest of fiefs? It was not my part to urge his lordship to adhere to the Way of the Sages and to devote himself to the study of the classics. Only he could make that decision. To take the initiative and beg for appointment, even if it merely meant sacrificing something small to gain something large, was not my desire.²²

The same discrimination between service come what may and preservation of his own integrity as an upholder of the Way also colored the memorial in which Hakuseki castigated Ienobu about the continued employment of Ogiwara Shigehide. Reviewing in that memorial the options open to him, Hakuseki noted that, having declared Shigehide a mortal enemy of his lord, "an enemy with whom one cannot exist together under heaven," it might be thought incumbent upon him to strike Shigehide down. That act, he asserted, would not have been physically impossible:

Whatever the frailty of my years and the weakness of my body, I do not think that to cut down one person would require such a great feat of strength. But, despite my inadequacies, having set my mind in my youth on study of the teachings of the sages, in the past forty years I have learned at least the outlines of what constitutes the Way of the gentleman. However much I may wish to show my loyalty [by cutting Shigehide down], it is not my desire to die a dog's death in taking an unworthy person as my opponent.²³

Given the circumstances, he concluded, he had no option but to resign, for, if a gentleman and an evil person were ranked together at court, the

gentleman could not overcome the influence of the evil person, even as sweet-smelling grass cannot overcome the odor of a noxious weed or the fiercest flame continue to burn when placed in the same vessel with objects exuding moisture. “I may not be worthy of the name gentleman, but how can I myself allow the Way to be extinguished as the result of my being contained within the same vessel as an evil person?”²⁴

The influence on a political career of a strong sense of autonomy cannot be calculated precisely. However, the independent outlook sustained by his sense of being an upholder of the Way cannot but have enhanced the forcefulness of Hakuseki’s dealings with Ienobu and Akifusa, thereby adding to his impact on bakufu affairs. Adoption of the persona of a Confucian hero had another consequence as well: It reinforced an innate tendency to try, as Kyūsō noted, “to take care of everything on his own.”

By disposition, Hakuseki seems to have been inclined towards acting as a “lone wolf.” Such is suggested, for instance, by a poem written in his youth that makes an intriguing pair with the much later letter expressing sympathy for Yui Shōsetsu:

*The Qin hunted out the swords of the land
Melting them down to make the statues, truly lifelike, of Xianyang.
But too soon it was to declare the realm at peace;
East of the river was still one man studying swordsmanship.*²⁵

The one man was Xiang Yu, whose moves, like those of Chen She, helped bring about the downfall of the Qin, but who lost out eventually to Han Gaozu. Hakuseki’s isolated position within the bakufu without doubt encouraged the inclination, celebrated in this poem, to act as “one man” rather than in concert with others. At the same time, internalization of Confucian optimism about the capacity of a single autonomous figure of virtue to affect the course of affairs confirmed him in this tendency. Animated by such optimism and convinced of the rightness of his own vision of the Tokugawa order, Hakuseki pursued that vision with little concern for the views of others. Indeed, at times he seemed to be playing to an imaginary audience of Confucian cognoscenti rather than gearing his recommendations to the political figures who actually populated the world around him. That trait, we shall see, was responsible for both some of the boldest features of Hakuseki’s program and its gravest weaknesses.

THE COMMITMENT TO AUTHENTICITY

Before turning to an examination of the specific contours of Hakuseki's program there is one other aspect of his character as a Confucian that we should consider briefly: a concern for authenticity. As we have noted, Hakuseki showed little interest in fine points of philosophical interpretation, and he kept a distance from the various distinctive schools of Confucianism. Consequently, the issue of "orthodoxy" in the sense of adherence to a particular doctrinal interpretation is of little relevance to an understanding of the nature of his Confucianism. Among Tokugawa Confucians, however, Hakuseki was notable for his commitment to authenticity. That is, he evidenced a concern to uphold the internal consistency of Confucianism as a system of thought that had grown to maturity in the intellectual and political terrain of China. Likewise, he showed a strong distaste for the eclectic adaptation of Confucian propositions to the different intellectual and political environment of Japan.

While the drive for authenticity bore most significantly on the part played by Confucian ideas in Hakuseki's political program, it was by no means limited to that particular sphere of his activities. Rather, appearing to have had its source in the wellsprings of his personality, it colored the entire span of his endeavors. It is visible, for instance, in his approach to poetry, for which he won considerable fame prior to his period of activity in the bakufu. By briefly examining some of the points Hakuseki stressed in the writing of poetry, we can obtain a concise overview of the general importance he placed on adhering to what was authentic.

According to his autobiography, Hakuseki began to compose Chinese poetry shortly after he encountered Nakae Tōju's *Okina Mondō* and embarked on a study of the major works of the Chinese tradition.²⁶ In the beginning, he did not devote himself solely to poetry in the Chinese mode. He also achieved a certain reputation as a *haikai* poet. Indeed, many years later, he told Muro Kyūsō that, as a young man in the 1680s, he had been considered a rival of Matsuo Bashō, then just beginning to make a name for himself in the literary world of Edo.²⁷

At a certain point, however, Hakuseki left aside the composition of *haikai* as a public activity (although he continued to record in his diary *hokku* which had appeared to him in dreams). According to Kyūsō, what

spurred Hakuseki to abandon the public production of *haikai* was a sudden realization of the import of Mencius's statement that he had "heard of birds leaving dark valleys to remove to lofty trees, but not of their descending from lofty trees to enter into dark valleys." "A scholar should devote himself to the writing of Chinese poetry and prose," Kyūsō reported Hakuseki's saying. "To be fond of *haikai* is to descend from lofty trees to enter into dark valleys."²⁸

As Chinese poetry came to represent to Hakuseki a more authentic form of poetic activity than *haikai*, he also reached the conclusion that it was essential to write the most authentically "Chinese" Chinese poetry possible. As he put it elsewhere, "One should seek to write [Chinese prose and poetry] in such a way as to be readily comprehensible to the Chinese. Needless to say, since writing is something that originated in China, in its essence it is Chinese."²⁹ The determination to write Chinese poetry that adhered to the "essence" of the genre led Hakuseki to endeavor to master the archaic style of the high Tang, ornate in language and dense with allusion. A letter written in later life describing his method for making that style his own well illustrates the uncompromising nature of his quest for authenticity:

If one reads widely in the poetry of the early and high Tang, memorizes it and digests it thoroughly, then what one says will resemble it as a matter of course. . . . A poem is something that expresses feeling. If the poetry of the Tang permeates one's mind, one's feelings will pass through it as they spring forth, and will thus have a natural flavor of the Tang about them.³⁰

The commitment to the authentic visible in Hakuseki's literary activities carried over into his political endeavors as well. Once he accepted as universally valid the body of Chinese Confucian premises about the nature of the role of the ruler and the sources of the ruler's authority, he showed himself ready to pursue those premises unswervingly to their logical conclusions. Likewise he strongly resisted diluting their import by tailoring them to suit the particularities of the Japanese environment. This refusal to modify the innate dynamics of Chinese Confucianism was of crucial importance to Hakuseki's employment of Confucian political ideas as a weapon against the status quo. But if Hakuseki's concern for authenticity endowed his chosen weapon with a heightened potency,

it also gave it a double edge. Insofar as a significant gap existed between Hakuseki's vision of what was authentic and the parameters of bakufu rule, uncompromising pursuit of that vision stirred more opposition than it gained support. Thus, as we shall see, Hakuseki's commitment to authenticity contributed to the eventual defeat as well as the temporary success of his attempt to reshape the contours of Tokugawa rule.

FIVE

*Fiscal Exigencies: Approaches to the
Economic Foundations of Bakufu Rule*

Having surveyed the environment that molded Hakuseki's political outlook, we may now turn to an examination of the program he pursued during his years of bakufu activity. The major aim is to ascertain where Hakuseki's program fits in the general evolution of Tokugawa history. To what extent did it contribute to the shaping of the future course of bakufu rule? To what extent did it remain outside, or even run counter to, the mainstream developments of the day? In what ways does Hakuseki's position reflect general trends at work in Tokugawa politics and society? The influence of Confucianism? The particularities of his own situation? What does the correspondence, or lack of it, between his position and that of his predecessors and successors tell us about the nature of bakufu rule and of the impact of Confucianism on Tokugawa thought and politics?

To get at these issues it will be useful to divide Hakuseki's program into three categories: (1) policies concerning the fiscal foundations of bakufu rule; (2) approaches to the function and mechanism of governance; (3) measures pertaining to the symbolic definition of shogunal authority. Such a division will do more than simply sort out individual measures according to type. In effect, it also will position those measures along a spectrum of longevity. Among the policies associated with Hakuseki, those that dealt with fiscal matters proved the most enduring. By contrast, those directed at the definition, or redefinition, of shogunal authority did not outlive Hakuseki's period of influence or failed even

to gain implementation during it, while the record of his efforts in the area of popular governance and administrative strategies is mixed. The longevity, or lack of it, of a particular measure can in turn serve as an indicator of the degree to which that measure coincided with the main currents in the evolution of Tokugawa society and bakufu rule. By and large, those measures that won lasting acceptance spoke to broadly based concerns, while those that proved ephemeral were at odds in important ways with the general trends of the day. Thus, to categorize Hakuseki's policies according to their degree of impact as well as content should do much to clarify not only the nature of what he sought to do but also the implications of his endeavors in the context of Tokugawa government and society.

We shall examine the three subdivisions of Hakuseki's program proposed above with this hypothesis in mind. This chapter, which takes up Hakuseki's approach to fiscal affairs, focuses on four specific issues: restoration of the currency; regulation of foreign trade; administration of the bakufu's tax base, the *tenryō*; and rationalization of the post-station system. Analysis of the first three issues will show that, contrary to what is often assumed, in these areas there was substantial congruence between Hakuseki's position and that of other influential figures within the bakufu. Consequently, in examining the currency, trade, and *tenryō* policies associated with Hakuseki, we shall focus on that congruence and its implications, while at the same time taking note of whatever nuances distinguish Hakuseki's approach to these matters from that of his contemporaries. Consideration of the fourth issue, rationalization of the post-station system, will bring such nuances to the fore. Reflection on their ramifications in the context of this particular issue will set the stage for the following two chapters, which deal with the significance of similar nuances in Hakuseki's approach to the administration of popular affairs within the context of the *bakuhan* state. There, grasp of the distinctive features of Hakuseki's approach will be crucial to an accurate understanding of both the thrust of his program and its place in Tokugawa history.

RESTORATION OF THE CURRENCY

Of the fiscal measures associated with Hakuseki, the restoration of the currency to its original standards of metallic purity is the most famous, because that currency reform, begun during the reign of Ietsugu, took place against the backdrop of Hakuseki's fierce struggle with Ogiwara Shigehide during the reign of Ienobu and marked a dramatic reversal of previous bakufu policy. Throughout the reigns of Tsunayoshi and Ienobu, as manifested in the successive debasements of gold and silver between 1695 and 1711, the bakufu leaders had sought to expand the supply of money. By contrast, when in 1713 the bakufu embarked on restoration of the currency, it committed itself as well to a reduction of the amount of money in circulation. This latter strategy, remaining in force throughout the greater part of Yoshimune's reign, was an important part of the overall effort at retrenchment under Yoshimune; consequently, currency reform stands as a major link between the policies of Hakusèki's period of influence (generally known as the Shōtoku era) and those of the subsequent period (referred to as the Kyōhō era).¹

Hakuseki's efforts at currency reform are also famous because they were underwritten by a conscious philosophy of metallism set forth in a series of memorials detailing why and how the bakufu should embark on restoration of the currency. The correspondence between Hakuseki's argument in favor of restoration and the course of bakufu monetary policy from 1713 on has encouraged the assumption, on the one hand, that Hakuseki was the key figure behind currency reform and, on the other, that the reform reflects the clear imprint of economic philosophy on policy. Traditionally this assumption has carried mostly positive implications; Ogiwara Shigehide has been castigated for recklessly debasing the currency out of motives of personal greed, and Hakuseki has been acclaimed for setting priorities straight again. In recent decades, some have argued, to the contrary, that the debasements showed a realistic perception of the fundamental economic needs of the day and that Hakuseki's emphasis on metallic purity was too bound to abstract and outdated theoretical concepts.² Either way, Hakuseki has been regarded as the architect of the shift from debasement to restoration.

In fact, however, it is this last point that needs to be rethought if the

implications of the reform and Hakuseki's part in it are to be understood fully. The abandonment of debasement and the attempt to restore the original metallic purity of the currency may be interpreted more accurately as a broadly based policy change in which Hakuseki acted more as catalyst than architect. The forces behind currency reform transcended the interests of any particular group in or associated with the bakufu. Reform was as much a pragmatic response to the socioeconomic problems of the day as an outgrowth of intellectual theory.

THE BACKGROUND OF DEBASEMENT AND RECOINAGE. While sharp shifts in monetary policy characterized the four decades between the 1690s and 1730s, one factor was constant: a shortage of precious metals available for coinage. By common calculation the bakufu, in its early years, possessed enormous metallic wealth. Ieyasu left substantial amounts of gold and silver to his descendants, and the output of the bakufu gold and silver mines compensated for the portion of his legacy used up by Hidetada and Iemitsu. But, by the end of Iemitsu's reign in 1651, the output of the mines had dropped sharply. To meet the bakufu's financial needs, bakufu administrators turned to minting the reserves left by Ieyasu. By 1680, when Ietsuna's reign ended, the ordinary reserves had been exhausted, and minting began of the special store of ingots Ieyasu had set aside for use only for a military emergency.

In one sense, the debasement of the currency begun in 1695 was simply a continuation of this development. Moreover, although its immediate purpose was to enlarge bakufu income, debasement had the side effect of expanding the supply of money at a time when existing currency resources could not keep up with the demands created by commercialization of the economy—one of the by-products of peace and the Tokugawa system of rule.³ Thus, although debasement brought with it a sharp inflation, bakufu leaders continued to accept it as a necessity. As discussed in Chapter 3, Ogiwara Shigehide, the major author of bakufu monetary policy in the latter half of Tsunayoshi's reign, remained in power until the very end of Ienobu's reign, and, during the course of those four years, he carried out three further debasements of silver. In those debasements the percentage of silver in the silver coinage minted,

which prior to 1695 was 80 percent, was reduced successively to 41.6 percent, 32.6 percent, and, finally, 20 percent.⁴

The ousting of Shigehide on the eve of Ienobu's death, however, was the signal for a 180-degree change in bakufu monetary policy. Ienobu's testament called not only for a halt to further debasements but also for restoration of the gold and silver currency to its original levels of purity and worth.⁵ In the 10th month of 1713, a committee was set up under the supervision of the *rōjū* Akimoto Takatomo to oversee restoration of the currency, and, in the 5th month of 1714, the actual process of restoration began.

Recoining did not proceed smoothly. Ienobu's testament had acknowledged that the attempt to restore the currency was likely to encounter obstacles. "In general," the testament observed, "it is difficult to restore something broken to its original form. But, among such enterprises, restoration of [adulterated] currency to its original purity is the most difficult of all."⁶ That premonition proved accurate. Primary among the problems was the fact that virtually no new ore was being mined. Thus, restoring the currency to pre-1695 standards of purity meant a substantial reduction in the amount in circulation. Moreover, to secure the raw material for the new, restored gold and silver, it was necessary to convince the populace to surrender its existing debased currency for what, on the face of it, was a significantly smaller amount of restored currency, even if the latter had a higher gold or silver content.

Because of these problems, the restoration did not get fully under way until after Yoshimune's accession, and even then its course continued to be rocky. Furthermore, apart from procedural difficulties, the attendant restriction in money supply contributed to economic stagnation and a recession that depressed beyond tolerable limits the price of rice, the foundation of the *bakuban* economy. These negative consequences of the restoration were alleviated only by the eventual return, in the 1730s, to a policy of expanding the monetary supply through debasement.⁷

HAKUSEKI'S PART IN THE RESTORATION OF THE CURRENCY. The experiment with restoration thus turned out to be less than a success. What was Hakuseki's part in it? At the very least, Hakuseki helped pave the ground

for the restoration by composing the testament in which Ienobu ordered those responsible for government after his death to halt the debasement and to develop a policy for restoring the currency to its original state. The date of this particular section of the testament became the source of some controversy. While the other sections of the testament were formally read on 1712/10/14, the day of Ienobu's death, the section on restoration of the currency was not announced in full until 10/18. Moreover, while the other sections were dated 1712/10/9, the currency section was dated 1712/10/11.⁸

In *Oritaku shiba no ki*, Hakuseki presented a reason for the discrepancy. Ienobu had already, on the 9th, commanded the *rōjū* to announce on the 11th the shogun's desire to restore the currency to its original state; then, on the night of the 9th, his condition suddenly worsened. The deterioration of the shogun's condition spurred the writing of the other sections of the testament and, in the crisis, the promulgation of the order regarding the currency was postponed.⁹ Muro Kyūsō's analysis was that, "although Arai wrote the testament, the final version was not decided upon until his late lordship had personally scrutinized it and expressed his wishes regarding it. The sentences are Arai's sentences, but their intent is entirely that of his late lordship."¹⁰ Public opinion was somewhat more skeptical. In his autobiography, Hakuseki noted that someone attached a placard to the gate of his house declaring it "the place for fabrication of the testament on the currency."¹¹ Despite the controversy, the existence of the testament undoubtedly smoothed the path to currency restoration. By linking currency reform to the express desire of the late shogun, the testament reduced the problems of undertaking such a fundamental policy change during the reign of a minor. That, in the final days of Ienobu's reign, Hakuseki followed up his ouster of Shigehide by pressing for a shogunal commitment to currency reform was, therefore, of some consequence.

Hakuseki also contributed to the restoration by composing, in 1713 and 1714, a series of memorials in which he analyzed the negative economic effects of the debasements, answered the objections that could be made to an attempt to restore the currency, and set forth principles and procedures to be followed in carrying out the restoration.¹² In those memorials, reflecting his reading of Chinese economic writings, he argued

that interference with the purity of the currency, by disturbing the natural order, had led to natural disasters. But he also made a number of acute economic observations. He argued that inflation was the result not only of depreciation of the currency but also of expansion of the amount in circulation. In one of the earliest Japanese observations of the workings of Gresham's law, he pointed out that the simultaneous circulation of pre-1695 and post-1695 coins bearing the same face value had led to hoarding of the former. He remarked that economic disruption had resulted from the differential in the rate of debasement of silver and gold.¹³ His analysis of these matters may well have helped firm up the commitment of others to restoration of the currency.

Hakuseki's attention to the psychological dimensions of recoinage also probably had some impact on the procedures adopted for carrying out the restoration. Stressing the need for the bakufu to keep the confidence of the people if the restoration was to succeed, Hakuseki argued that the bakufu should not seek its own profit at the expense of the people, but should instead bear the cost of the recoinage.¹⁴ In fact, to encourage people to participate in the exchange process, it proved necessary for the bakufu to offer an incentive—pegging the value of the 1711 currency (the so-called *yotsutakaragin*), the most severely debased of the various issues, at twice its actual value.¹⁵ The precise connection between this decision and Hakuseki's call for the bakufu to bear the cost of the recoinage is not clear, but at the least his argument provided a philosophical rationale for the bakufu to absorb a loss in exchanging the newly minted silver for the debased issues.

Thus, Hakuseki's involvement with the restoration process was substantial. But this does not mean that he was, as is sometimes implied, virtually the singlehanded force behind it. Such an interpretation follows too uncritically the *Oritaku shiba no ki* account wherein Hakuseki contrasted his own recognition of the need for decisive action to the apathy or active opposition shown by the *rōjū* and others within and without the bakufu. The timing of the restoration alone suggests the need for caution in accepting at face value this version of the course of events. The actual process of restoration got underway when both Hakuseki's diary and the remarks of Muro Kyūsō show Hakuseki's participation in bakufu affairs to have declined sharply and when the polarization between the *rōjū* and

the Kōfu circle prevented the realization of various other measures advocated by Hakuseki. Clearly a policy shift as major as restoration of the currency could not have occurred without support from various quarters.

THE CONTRIBUTION OF OTHERS. Despite Hakuseki's criticism of the *rōjū* for not cooperating with the restoration process, one of those supportive quarters must have been the *rōjū*.¹⁶ As noted above, Akimoto Takatomo, who had also been in charge of a recoinage of gold during Ienobu's reign, headed the committee of bakufu officials overseeing the recoinage. His support for the restoration may perhaps be deduced from Hakuseki's and Kyūsō's relatively favorable appraisal of his performance as *rōjū*. Support for the restoration also came from mercantile groups. Certain privileged merchants, like the minters, who had been hit hard by the decline in the output of the mines, unquestionably profited from and thus favored the debasements.¹⁷ Others were not necessarily enthusiastic about the restoration with its attendant complications of exchanging coins of different metallic content but the same nominal value. For instance, Hakuseki condemned the money exchangers (*ryōgae*) for impeding the restoration process.¹⁸ Nevertheless, as he acknowledged, other merchants did favor and actively assist the restoration. A key part was played in particular by a Kansai merchant, Tani Yasutaka, who was perhaps from a family belonging to the Sakai drapers' guild (*ito wappu*).¹⁹ Tani devised the plan ultimately adopted for exchanging debased for new currency. It involved establishing a ratio between the real value of different issues of silver and gold and allowing them to circulate at their real values while the exchange of restored for debased currency was being effected.²⁰ Hakuseki agreed that this arrangement was more feasible than what he had proposed—a cumbersome procedure whereby paper notes would be issued as debased coins were surrendered, to be later converted into the restored currency.²¹

If one is to look for a single central figure behind the restoration, a more logical candidate than Hakuseki is an official in the *kanjō* offices, Hagiwara Yoshimasa, with whom Hakuseki worked closely. Like Ogiwara Shigehide, Hagiwara Yoshimasa rose to prominence from within the ranks of the *kanjō* offices because of his skill in handling fiscal affairs. He came from a family of low-ranking bakufu retainers hereditarily

involved in offices handling bakufu construction and financial matters. Appointed to the staff of the *kanjō bugyō* in 1692, with a stipend of 150 *hyō*, he first made a name for himself by contributing to the 1695 debasements carried out by Shigehide. It seems likely, however, that, perhaps as a result of contact over matters having to do with transportation, Hakuseki came to identify Hagiwara as a potential ally against Shigehide within the *kanjō* offices. When, subsequent to Hakuseki's recommendation, the post of *ginmiyaku* was restored in the 7th month of 1712, Hagiwara Yoshimasa was one of the two people appointed to the post. And, in the 10th month of the following year, when the ad hoc committee of bakufu officials was set up to oversee the restoration of the currency, Hagiwara was appointed to it.²² Serving, among other things, as the channel for bringing Tani Yasutaka into the process, he went on to play a key role in developing procedures for the recoinage. Hakuseki goes so far as to ascribe the ultimate accomplishment of the reform "largely to the efforts of this person."²³ Hakuseki did not often pay such tribute to another, which suggests that Hagiwara's involvement in the reform was of major proportions.

The multidimensional support for restoration indicates that a number of factors other than a philosophical commitment to metallism underlay it. Most critical were the negative consequences of the debasements. Whatever immediate profit the bakufu gained from the debasements and however much the currency demands of an expanding economy pressed against the limits of the supply of precious metals, by 1712 the debasements had produced a deleterious effect on the economic interests of a substantial and significant section of the populace. By then, five separate issues of silver with the same nominal face value but different metallic content were circulating simultaneously, complicating financial transactions of all sorts. Hoarding, as Hakuseki pointed out, was rampant, and the rate of exchange between silver, gold, and copper fluctuated erratically. Above all loomed the problem of inflation, which had a devastating impact on the finances of individual *bushi*, tied as they were to a fixed income defined in terms of bales of rice. We can see a microcosmic picture of this impact in the record Hakuseki kept of the changing rates for converting his stipend into cash and of various expenses he incurred.

In 1693, when he entered Ienobu's retinue, Hakuseki sold his rice

stipend for 22 *ryō* gold per 100 *hyō* of rice. In 1705, ten years after the first and a year before the second debasement of silver, he sold his stipend for 41 *ryō* per 100 *hyō*, but the debased *ryō* of 1705 was not worth half the non-debased *ryō* of 1693. Thus, the monetary value of his stipend effectively declined in those twelve years.²⁴ To add to the problem, from the 1690s on, growing consumer demand tended to push the prices of other goods up more rapidly than the price of rice, making Hakuseki's income and that of other *bushi* worth even less in real terms.²⁵ As a consequence, throughout the late 1690s and early 1700s, Hakuseki continued to be hard-pressed financially. At the end of 1700, when he finally managed to pay his landlord the back rent, the landlord wrote to say that the rent had been raised.²⁶ Hakuseki's debts in 1705 equaled close to a third of his regular income for the year, forcing him to put off paying his four servants and to borrow money from various sources.²⁷

It seems likely that, by 1712, the problems fostered by debasement had created considerable dismay within the bakufu over the existing monetary policy. This may well have figured in the ouster of Ogiwara Shigehide in the fall of that year. Certainly Shigehide's dismissal opened the door to consideration of ways to repair the damage. In that situation, the argument that it was innately improper to adulterate the currency perhaps swayed some to favor the admittedly uphill task of restoration. Yet, the background of the different people who played a central part in the restoration indicates that an *a priori* commitment to metallist economic theory may not have been as important as it seems at first glance. The career of Hagiwara Yoshimasa is a good example.

Hagiwara, acclaimed by Hakuseki as the key figure in the Shōtoku restoration, in fact participated in all the stages of bakufu monetary policy between the 1690s and 1740s. His rise within the *kanjō bugyō* began as a result of his contribution to the 1695 debasement carried out by Ogiwara Shigehide. Having participated in the debasement, he went on to cooperate with Hakuseki in the restoration of the currency. With the exception of a brief hiatus at the start of Yoshimune's reign, he continued for the remainder of his career to play a central part in bakufu financial administration. He was promoted to *Nagasaki bugyō* in 1736, the year the bakufu reverted to debasement, and, in 1743, when the reflationary monetary policy was in full force, he was further promoted to

kanjō bogyō.²⁸ Hagiwara's career thus testifies to a continuity underlying the dramatic twists and turns that characterized the surface of bakufu monetary policy during these decades; it suggests that overall those twists and turns, including the Shōtoku move from debasement to restoration, reflect not so much the shift from one economic philosophy to another as a flexible pragmatism in trying to deal with the ongoing contradictions of the mid-Tokugawa economy.

LONG-RANGE IMPLICATIONS. What should we conclude about the long-range implications of the Shōtoku currency restoration for the structure of bakufu rule? Hagiwara's career, like that of Ogiwara Shigehide, again severs to underline the key issue: The complexity and the importance of the economic problems confronted by the bakufu gave the technical experts in the *kanjō* offices increased political importance. Currency supply, the price of rice, the impact of inflation and depression had to be coped with, and dealing efficiently with such matters required skills and experience beyond those of the ordinary bakufu "generalist." Hakuseki, for instance, was bolder than most in tackling the causes of inflation and trying to establish the consequences of adopting one procedure for currency restoration over another. Yet he, like the vast majority of *bushi* outside those with a professional specialization in fiscal affairs, lacked the basic knowledge of arithmetic necessary to handle such issues with ease.²⁹

Consequently, the *kanjō* offices assumed growing importance within the organization of the bakufu. As noted in Chapter 1, during Tsunayoshi's reign the increased centrality of the *kanjō* offices was reflected in informal alliances between the shogunal circle and staff members of the *kanjō bogyō*. These alliances served as the structural foundation for the enlargement of shogunal power within the bakufu from the 1680s on. Manabe Akifusa's relationship with Ogiwara Shigehide during the reign of Ienobu represented a straightforward continuation of this pattern; Hakuseki's cooperation with Hagiwara Yoshimasa may be seen as a variation of it.

The magnitude of the economic issues of the early eighteenth century, however, transcended the structure of factional politics. The fact that currency restoration—and other economic reforms discussed below—was

accomplished within the context of the polarized politics of Ietsugu's reign shows that the necessity to cope with immanent economic problems could foster a working resolution of the tension between the bakufu old guard and the shogunal circle. In the next era of bakufu politics, the reign of Yoshimune, this working resolution ultimately was translated into an institutional realignment. Yoshimune, fusing a more low-key group of personal attendants with representatives of the *fudai* and overhauling the organization of the *kanjō* offices, succeeded in creating a new, more rationalized channel for the management of bakufu economic affairs.

Passively, at least, the Shōtoku currency reform helped prepare the ground for this development. Is there any evidence that currency reform, or more particularly Hakuseki's participation in it, contributed positively to the eventual institutional realignment? This question can be answered better after considering Hakuseki's approach to other matters falling within the jurisdiction of the *kanjō bugyō*. But, to anticipate, the conclusion seems "no." Hakuseki found it necessary to cooperate with *kanjō* officials in matters such as currency reform, but that cooperation remained on an informal, ad hoc level. He did not seek to transform his own relationship with a figure like Hagiwara into a more permanent structural link between the shogunal circle and the *kanjō* offices. The implications of his stance will come more sharply into focus after we examine the other major economic measures associated with his name.

REGULATION OF FOREIGN TRADE

Along with restoration of the currency, the other key fiscal reform traditionally attributed to Hakuseki is the formulation of a more restrictive and tightly regulated system of foreign trade. The issue of foreign trade was linked closely to currency supply. From the 1640s on, Tokugawa foreign trade was routed through three channels: Trade with the Dutch East India Company and Chinese traders was conducted under bakufu supervision at Nagasaki; the domain of Tsushima maintained trade relations with Korea; and the domain of Satsuma carried on trade with the Ryukyu Islands. Each channel operated somewhat differently, but they shared a common structure: Foreign products were imported in exchange

for Japanese gold, silver, and copper. Several factors converged to create this structure. On the one hand was the standing Japanese demand for Chinese raw silk and cloth, books, medicine, and other goods, for Korean ginseng, and for sugar. On the other was the availability of Japanese gold and, particularly, silver, desired by China, which was unable to supply its own needs domestically, and by the European traders, whose mercantilist views motivated them to minimize the outlay of European bullion in acquiring Chinese and other Asian products to sell in Europe.

As long as Japanese mines continued to produce large quantities of gold and silver, Japanese government leaders evinced no particular worry about this trade pattern. Indeed, they were concerned primarily to insure a steady supply of the foreign goods which had come to be seen as necessities of life in Japan and which brought wealth to the various groups involved in their domestic distribution. From the 1650s on, however, the declining output of the mines, coupled with the increasing domestic demand for currency, cast the established trade patterns in a new light, and bakufu leaders began to seek some way of reducing the outflow of metals while maintaining the inflow of desired foreign goods. Since the bakufu exercised direct control only over the foreign trade conducted through Nagasaki, bakufu efforts to adjust existing trade patterns were focused almost exclusively on the situation in that city.³⁰

THE BAKUFU AND THE NAGASAKI TRADE PRIOR TO THE SHÔTOKU ERA. Bakufu officials began their struggle to resolve the problems inherent in the Nagasaki trade by attempting to reduce the price of the goods imported. In 1655, they replaced the arrangement whereby a closed guild (the *ito wappu*) handled the purchase and distribution of the imported goods with an open-bid system. That in turn was abandoned in 1672 in favor of a new arrangement under which the *bugyō* and designated merchants decided jointly on the bid to be offered to foreign traders (the *shibō baibai* system). The *shibō baibai* system remained in effect until 1684, when it was decided to revert to the earlier pattern of granting monopoly privileges to the *ito wappu*.³¹ The alternation among these strategies testifies to their common lack of effectiveness in bringing down the price of import goods. Equally crucial, they alike failed to slow the outflow of silver.

In 1669, the *Nagasaki bughō* reported that the yearly outflow of silver was four times the volume produced annually by the silver minters' guild. A year earlier, the bakufu had attempted to ease the pressure on silver by reallowing the export of gold, prohibited since 1641, and instead setting an embargo on the export of silver. However, the prohibition of the export of silver was too extreme a measure to be readily enforceable. To the contrary, the pressure on Japanese metallic resources increased with the upsurge of Chinese participation in the Nagasaki trade following Qing suppression of Coxinga in 1683.³²

In the face of these problems, from 1685 on, bakufu officials made a concerted effort to find an effective means of reducing the outflow of silver. As it developed over the next decade, the strategy they adopted had four major objectives. One was to set a ceiling on the value of the goods imported each year, thereby limiting the maximum outflow of silver to that amount. The Chinese were to be permitted to bring in goods worth 6,000 *kanme* of silver and the Dutch to bring in goods worth 3,000 *kanme*. Second, the bakufu attempted to restrict the number of Chinese boats allowed to come annually to Nagasaki to engage in trade. In 1688, the number was set at 70 boats annually. Third, an effort was made to develop "commodity exports" (*shiromonogae*) as an alternative to silver. The commodity trade included such things as dried fish and other marine products (*tarwaramono*), but the most successful "commodity" was copper. Fourth, in 1697, an export-import office (the *Nagasaki kaisho*) was established to coordinate and regulate the various features of the trading process.³³ The combination of these measures succeeded in reducing the outflow of silver to about a tenth of what it had been.³⁴ Moreover, under the direction of Ogiwara Shigehide, the expansion of the commodity trade proved a new source of bakufu income, since in return for a fee (*unjō*) paid the bakufu, certain merchants were allowed to conduct trade in commodities outside the overall stipulated limits.³⁵ Reflecting this development, in 1698 the number of Chinese boats allowed to engage in trade was expanded to 80.

Various problems remained, however. Although copper was in fuller supply than silver, it was also a precious metal used for domestic currency, and it was not easy to secure the amount of copper needed to replace silver as the major export item. It also was not easy to enforce the

restrictions set on the number of Chinese boats that came to Nagasaki and on the size of their cargoes. In theory, those boats in excess of the specified number were to be sent back to their home ports with their cargoes undischarged. But the reluctance of the Chinese traders to comply with this order and the possibility for Nagasaki townspeople and officials within the *bugyō* office to profit from collusion with the Chinese meant that many of the goods not sold through official channels were disposed of through unofficial ones. The extra commodity trade allowed from 1694 on was intended partly to cut down on smuggling by reducing the surplus in available imports. The desire to limit smuggling also presumably figured in the establishment of the *Nagasaki kaisho*.³⁶

THE SHŌTOKU REGULATIONS. Hakuseki early concerned himself with the Nagasaki trade, recommending in mid-1709 a substantial further reduction and tighter control of the trade allowed.³⁷ That year, the ceiling on Chinese boats allowed to trade was put back to 59, effectively curtailing the expanded commodity trade. However, the major measures for regulation of the Nagasaki trade associated with Hakuseki were not adopted until five years later. In the 5th month of 1714, the same month the bakufu formally announced restoration of the currency, an edict drafted by Hakuseki informed the Chinese traders in Nagasaki and the daimyo of neighboring areas of the bakufu's intention to eliminate illegal trade.³⁸ The bakufu issued detailed measures for implementation of this policy at the beginning of the next year.

The 1715 regulations had two sides. On the one hand, they set further limits on the number of foreign ships allowed to call annually at Nagasaki and on the amount of trade the latter could negotiate. The number of Chinese boats was set at 30 and the number of Dutch at 2. The Chinese were to be permitted to conduct a trade in metals equivalent to 6,000 *kanme* in silver and a further 3,000 *kanme* worth of *tawaramono* trade. The Dutch were permitted 3,000 *kanme* worth of trade in metals. Of the trade in metals, the Chinese could take out of Japan 3,000,000 *kin* of copper annually and the Dutch 1,500,000 *kin*.³⁹

While thus tightening somewhat further the structural framework of the Nagasaki trade, the 1715 regulations also introduced a number of measures designed to ensure compliance with the officially stipulated

trade level by lessening the temptations to smuggle and the possibilities for collusion between the foreign traders and Nagasaki townspeople and officials. To prevent the coming of boats in excess of the stipulated number—a major problem with earlier attempts at regulation—a tally system was adopted. Under this system, doubtlessly inspired by the methods traditionally used by Chinese rulers to regulate foreign access to Chinese wealth, only the holders of tallies issued by the *Nagasaki bugyō* the previous year were allowed to trade at Nagasaki. The price offered the Chinese and Dutch for their goods was to be set by the *Nagasaki kaisho* upon consultation with leading Nagasaki merchants. The foreign goods were to be purchased by the *Nagasaki kaisho* in a single lot and then resold to Japanese merchants through a bid system. To reduce their motivation for graft or collusion in smuggling, the stipends of the staff of the *bugyō* office were increased. At the same time, a surveillance apparatus, consisting of a *metsuke* (inspector) posted from Edo, was established to act as a check on the *bugyō*. This surveillance official performed a function vis-à-vis the *Nagasaki bugyō* comparable to that of the *kanjō ginmiyaku* vis-à-vis the *kanjō bugyō*. Orders issued by the *bugyō* were to be countersigned by the *metsuke*, and the two were to act jointly in the hearing of complaints, the disbursement and collection of official funds, and the checking of cargoes.⁴⁰

The 1715 regulations proved durable. Affirmed explicitly early in Yoshimune's reign, they remained in effect essentially until the end of the Tokugawa period. In many ways they thus represent Hakuseki's most lasting contribution to the shape of later bakufu history. How should we interpret the implications of this fact and of the trade regulations themselves?

Compared to the Shōtoku currency reform, the 1715 trade regulations did not constitute a major turnaround in existing trade policy. Scholars, following Hakuseki's lead in *Oritaku shiba no ki*, frequently have presented the regulations as a reversal of the approach to the Nagasaki trade situation taken during the period of Ogiwara Shigehide's dominance of bakufu fiscal policy. As Yamawaki Teijirō has pointed out, however, bakufu administrators already had committed themselves during Tsunayoshi's reign to an attempt to restrict the outflow of silver, and their efforts had met with considerable success.⁴¹ With respect to the amount

of silver allowed to be exported, the 1715 regulations retained the ceiling established earlier. Given this continuity, the significance of the 1715 regulations is twofold. First, the 1715 regulations were more comprehensive and thoroughgoing than previous ones—evident in the effort to limit the outflow of copper as well as of silver, the more radical reduction in the number of ships allowed to trade, and the creation of an effective framework for enforcing the regulations. Second, consistent with this more thoroughgoing character, the 1715 regulations posited a fundamentally autarkic view of the national economy.

Earlier measures, while seeking to reduce the outflow of metals, also had sought to ensure the continued supply of desired foreign products. But, as the effort to limit the new copper commodity trade as well as the outflow of silver testifies, the 1715 regulations put retention of Japanese metallic resources ahead of the maintenance of high trade levels. They thereby also presumed an effort to develop domestic sources of hitherto imported goods. Pursued systematically under Yoshimune and later shogun, such an effort was an important underpinning of post-1715 bakufu trade policy.⁴²

THE PART OF HAKUSEKI. Thus, the Shōtoku trade regulations both strengthened the ongoing effort, dating from the 1680s, to regulate trade and limit the outflow of silver, and signaled the shift to a more autarkic trade policy. To what extent did Hakuseki as an individual further these developments? At the very least, Hakuseki contributed to the shift towards autarkism by setting forth a cogent rationale for the reordering of economic priorities. In a famous and oft-quoted passage, he noted that, among the types of wealth extractable from the soil, the five grains and the raw materials used for cloth were like the blood, flesh, and hair of the human body. Even if used excessively they were replenishable. But gold and silver were the “bones of the earth,” and “once removed, they will not grow again.”⁴³ According to his calculations, failure to remember this fact had led over the course of the preceding century to the loss of three-fourths of Japan’s silver and one-fourth of its gold to other countries. Why had the Japanese allowed their country to be robbed of its “bones”? The basic reason, Hakuseki argued, was an acquired taste for foreign goods:

Among foreign products, medicinal products are essential to the preservation of life, and thus cannot be done without for even a day. However, apart from this, it was only in the time of Lord Ieyasu that unnecessary foreign cloth and trinkets began to appear in large quantities. For the treasure of our country to be lost to pay for such things is intolerable.⁴⁴

It followed that one way to reverse this situation was to restrain the appetite for “unnecessary foreign trinkets.”⁴⁵

Hakuseki contributed as well to the movement to develop domestic sources for previously imported goods. At his recommendation, the bakufu promulgated directives calling for increased use of domestic thread in silk manufacture and for the development of sericulture throughout Japan, wherever the terrain was suitable, “be it bakufu territory or private domain.”⁴⁶ Hakuseki further urged that seeds be obtained of foreign agricultural products currently imported and experimentation undertaken to see whether they could not be cultivated in Japan. Two of the products he had in mind were sugar, obtained from Taiwan, and ginseng, a major article of trade with Korea. Among the correspondence between him and the court noble Konoe Motohiro, father-in-law to Ienobu, there is a letter asking for Motohiro’s cooperation in this endeavor:

Every year, a great deal of sugar is imported from the southern regions overseas. Although this is something basically inexpensive, the amount of currency that has left our country to pay for such products over the years has mounted up, and in the end the amount of currency available for circulation within Japan has declined. In antiquity neither cotton nor tobacco grew in our country. However, two hundred years ago, as the result of boats coming from the West, seeds of those products were planted here, and today the tobacco of our country is said to be superior to that of the Western countries.

Hakuseki went on to argue that, while the Dutch he had asked had asserted the Japanese climate to be unsuitable for growing sugar cane, the history of sugar cultivation in China and the Ryukyus suggested that, with careful attention to site selection, it should be possible to produce sugar in Japan. “The Dutch perhaps speak as they do because they have their own reasons not to want this product to be grown in our country.” Hakuseki requested Motohiro to use his connections with Satsuma to obtain samples of sugar cane, presumably from the Ryukyus. “If you would also share some of it with me, I would like to experiment with

planting it in some warm spots in my fief in Sagami.”⁴⁷

A congruence thus may be readily traced between Hakuseki’s views and the evolution of bakufu trade policy from the Shōtoku period on. However, many of the limitations to Hakuseki’s part in currency restoration apply as well to his role in trade reform. The timing of the Shōtoku trade regulations again suggests that, even if it took a concerted effort to push them through, they must have been underwritten by broadly based, cross-factional support. In many ways, acceptance of the need for tighter trade regulations was a natural concomitant of the decision to restore the currency, for that decision intensified the pressure on the domestic supply of precious metals. Equally important, as with recoinage, a person within the office directly concerned strongly backed the need for further regulation of the Nagasaki trade.

The involvement of that person, Ōoka Kiyosuke (1679–1717), is evidence that, even within the polarized political atmosphere of the Shōtoku era, concern for the state of bakufu finances could bring together people of varying origin. A member of a substantial *hatamoto* family of Mikawa *fudai* origins, with a history of service in the bakufu bureaucracy, Ōoka had served as administrative officer (*rusui*) for the Western Enceinte during the time Ienobu resided there as shogunal heir. In 1711, he was appointed as one of four *Nagasaki bugyō*.⁴⁸ In that capacity, he made a detailed survey of the existing trade situation, and correspondence between him and Hakuseki about the measures necessary to improve the situation reveals that Ōoka proposed many of the features contained in the 1715 regulations.⁴⁹ The timing of the regulations also points to the part Ōoka played in them. By the time the Nagasaki regulations were developed, the number of *Nagasaki bugyō* had been reduced from four to two people. It was customary for one *bugyō* to be posted to Nagasaki while the other remained in Edo. The regulations concerning Nagasaki were drafted while Ōoka was in Edo but were not formally promulgated until his tour of duty in Nagasaki when he could personally supervise their enforcement.⁵⁰

Ōoka also played a key role in ensuring continuation of the 1715 regulations after Yoshimune’s succession. In the first months of Yoshimune’s reign, some of the *rōjū* criticized the recently inaugurated regulations as having a negative impact on the supply and prices of foreign

goods. Six months after Yoshimune's accession, however, Hakuseki noted in his diary word from Ōoka that, after "complicated" discussions in the bakufu councils, it had been decided to retain the new regulations.⁵¹ According to Muro Kyūsō, one of the *rōjū* privately told Ōoka that, with the departure of the "demon," the trade measures were unlikely to find solid backing. But, when the *rōjū* showed little sign of moving to confirm the regulations, Ōoka went to Yoshimune, who voiced firm support for them.⁵²

These circumstances suggest that the Shōtoku trade regulations were the product of a broad range of factors and interests rather than the work of Hakuseki as an individual. At the same time, in Hakuseki's approach to foreign trade we can detect the glimmer of certain distant elements whose significance is enhanced when seen in the context of Hakuseki's total program. Primary among these was a view of foreign trade that was both nationalistic in spirit and national in orientation. The nationalistic dimensions of Hakuseki's attitude figured in his call for economic self-sufficiency and his suggestion that the Dutch would be willing to mislead the Japanese about the possibility of growing sugar in Japan so as to preserve Japanese dependence on imported sugar. The provisions for the tally system reflect this nationalistic quality in a somewhat more intriguing form. Given the historical place of tally systems in East Asian trade as a China-centered institution, the creation of a tally system focused on Japan constituted an effort to assert Japan's sovereignty as a nation vis-à-vis traders coming from other countries, including, most prominently, China. This implication was reinforced by the instructions given the *Nagasaki bugyō* in the 1st month of 1715 about how to handle promulgation of the new system to the Chinese traders. The instructions noted that, for the written orders to be handed down to the Chinese, "paper produced in this country should be used; for the oaths of compliance and the bids, too, paper of foreign origin should not be used."⁵³

HAKUSEKI'S APPROACH TO THE SATSUMA AND TSUSHIMA TRADE. Hakuseki's perception of foreign trade issues in *national* terms showed up most strikingly in an attempt to extend the regulation of such trade beyond what traditionally had been regarded as the sphere of bakufu interests. The bakufu had established early its authority over the foreign trade

channeled through Nagasaki, but did not concern itself directly with the other two channels of foreign trade that continued to exist even after the establishment of seclusion in the 1630s: Satsuma's trade with the Ryukyus and Tsushima's trade with Korea. Reflecting the incompletely centralized nature of Tokugawa rule, those channels continued to operate outside the system of regulation that gradually was devised for Nagasaki.

This situation had serious consequences for the effort to reduce the outflow of silver. Silver was a pivotal item in both the Satsuma and Tsushima trade, because their respective trading partners, the Ryukyus and Korea, used it in turn for their own tributary trade with China. Consequently, despite bakufu success, from the 1680s on, in reducing the amount of silver exported through Nagasaki, large quantities continued to flow out of Japan via the Satsuma and Tsushima channels.⁵⁴ On occasion, the bakufu called upon Satsuma and Tsushima to cooperate in correcting this situation, but such requests failed in the face of the assertions from the two *han* that preservation of existing trade levels was vital to their economic survival and the desire of the bakufu to ensure continued import of such products as Korean ginseng. The history of the "special Korean trade silver" testifies to the contradiction between the bakufu's policy for Nagasaki and the one it adopted for the Tsushima and Satsuma trade. Following the further debasements of silver in 1706 and 1710, Tsushima complained that the debasements were disrupting its trade with Korea (conducted largely through the medium of coined silver) and requested the bakufu to mint special coins of the former standard of purity for Tsushima to use in the Korea trade. The bakufu not only acceded to the request but, between 1710 and 1714, took a significant loss in supplying the special coins in return for a promise from Tsushima to attempt to secure more and better-quality ginseng.⁵⁵

Tashiro Kazui, who has brought these circumstances to light, argues that the structure of the *bakuhan* system, which allowed the daimyo administrative autonomy, plus the traditional bakufu dependence on Satsuma and Tsushima to handle diplomatic relations with the Ryukyus and Korea, made it virtually impossible for the bakufu to interfere with the trade routes out of Satsuma and Tsushima. She also points out that Hakuseki, in contrast to this general trend, sought in the area of foreign trade "to transcend the decentralization of authority inherent in the

bakuban system of government, treating Japan as a nation-state and effecting a *national* economic policy, however embryonic.”⁵⁶

Hakuseki dismissed as specious the plea of Satsuma and Tsushima that they had to continue the silver trade because the Ryukyus and Korea needed silver to present as tribute to China. The Ryukyus and Korea, he said, took silver to China not as formal tribute but as an item to be traded for profit on their tributary missions. That Satsuma and Tsushima should argue as they did indicated either that they were being deceived by their trading partners or were themselves deceiving the bakufu. In any case, whatever difficulties a reduction in the silver trade might cause the Ryukyus and Korea, that situation should hardly be given priority over resolving Japan’s own fiscal crisis. If limitation of the export of silver to Korea interfered with the supply of ginseng, an alternative source of supply should be sought through Nagasaki.⁵⁷

In line with these views, Hakuseki opposed the minting of special silver for the Korean trade. He also argued for an overall reduction in the amount of silver exported through Tsushima. Acting on his recommendation in 1714, when the restoration of the currency was implemented and plans for further regulation of the Nagasaki trade were being worked out, the bakufu requested Tsushima to reduce silver exports by a third to start with and eventually to halve them. Tsushima, however, opposed this demand vociferously. As a result, it never was enforced, and the outflow of silver through Tsushima continued at a high level for another twenty years.⁵⁸

This episode illuminates a key difference between Hakuseki’s approach to foreign trade and that generally current among the bakufu leadership. Those heading the bakufu may have been ready to tighten central control over economic areas which fell under the bakufu’s recognized sphere of authority but they hesitated to extend that control to matters which, though important to the national economy, had been recognized traditionally as coming under the jurisdiction of the daimyo. Acceptance of the contradiction in the relationship between the bakufu and the daimyo inherent in the *bakuban* structure remained fundamental to their outlook. By contrast, Hakuseki was ready to resolve that contradiction in favor of expansion of the bakufu’s authority over the economy of the

entire nation. His attitude points to a concept of the national polity, the jurisdiction of the bakufu, and the authority of the shogun as its head that differed both from traditional assumptions and from those manifested during Yoshimune's reign. The full implications of his perspective will come into focus when we examine the political measures that expressed it more explicitly. Before turning to those measures, however, we should consider two further aspects of Hakuseki's approach to economic issues.

APPROACHES TO ADMINISTRATION OF THE TENRYŌ

While the bakufu benefited financially from its monopoly over the issuance of currency and its control of the Nagasaki trade, its main source of income was the taxes collected from its direct holdings, the *tenryō*. Therefore the economic problems of the late seventeenth century naturally turned the eyes of bakufu administrators towards the mechanism by which taxes were levied and collected in bakufu domains. Beginning in the reign of Tsunayoshi and continuing into that of Yoshimune, those heading the bakufu engaged in an ongoing effort to readjust this mechanism. Their endeavors had fundamental bearing on the evolution in the structure of shogunal rule during this same period. They also illuminate how that evolution intersected with social and economic developments going on in the countryside. Hakuseki's part in the process of readjustment is less sharply defined than his role in restoration of the currency and the regulation of foreign trade. Nevertheless, when set against the developments that took place in the realm of local administration during the reigns of Tsunayoshi and Yoshimune, those of the Shōtoku era point up important facets of Hakuseki's approach to government.

PRE- AND POST-SHŌTOKU TRENDS IN LOCAL ADMINISTRATION. Administration of the *tenryō* was conducted under the supervision of the *kanjō bu-gyō* by local intendants, the *daikan*, of whom there were normally some 40 to 50.⁵⁹ The character of the *daikan* as an official and his relationship to the populace under his jurisdiction again illustrate the incompletely centralized nature of bakufu rule. While the *daikan* was responsible for dealing with all matters that affected the populace of the area under his

charge, his most important routine duty was to oversee the collection of agricultural taxes. In performing this function, he and his staff of assistants (*tedai*) worked closely with the peasant officials (*shōya*, *nanushi*, and so forth) drawn from the upper stratum of the village. Until the 1720s, each year the *daikan* and his *tedai* estimated that year's crop yield and set the taxes due from each village; the peasant officials then allocated the quota assigned the village among individual village households. In the fall, the villagers, led by the peasant officials, deposited their tax rice at the *daikan*'s office. The peasant officials were also responsible for apportioning work duties and any extraordinary levies among the members of the village.

These circumstances gave the relationship between the *daikan* and the peasant officials two dimensions. Viewed from one angle, the *daikan* and the peasant officials were potential antagonists; the *daikan* exercised the powers of the tax collector and the peasant officials represented the village obliged to pay the taxes he levied. On the other hand, the *daikan* and the peasant officials also could find grounds to cooperate to their common benefit and at the expense of the income forwarded to the bakufu above and collected from the ordinary peasants below.

Structural elements in the *daikan* system as originally set up and socioeconomic developments of the seventeenth century combined to enlarge this contradiction. The post of *daikan* was largely hereditary; consequently, by the late seventeenth century, many *daikan* came from families that had held the post for several generations. Some traced their ancestry to families that had been influential in the area since before the founding of the bakufu. The status of *daikan* as in effect hereditary lord of the area with which he was charged inevitably tempted him and his clerks to use the authority of the office for their personal benefit. Various features of the method of tax collection further encouraged such a tendency. In effect, as much a tax farmer as a tax official, the *daikan* derived his own income directly from a surtax collected with the regular taxes. Moreover, he did not forward the tax rice collected in the fall immediately to the bakufu storehouses. Instead he kept it at his office for a year, presumably to allow time for late payments, or, in some areas, the conversion of crop taxes into cash. Both these features of tax collection facilitated the diversion of taxes intended for the bakufu into the

hands of the *daikan* and the *tedai*. While this situation fostered peculation within the *daikan*'s office, changes in the social fabric of the village introduced stresses into the process of self-rule that operated under the supervision of the *daikan*. The development of cash crops and new patterns of labor utilization and landholding enhanced the socioeconomic position of those able to take advantage of them; they also weakened the solidarity of the village. Together these circumstances created a dysfunction in the system of local administration that made it a natural target for bakufu officials looking for ways to increase bakufu revenues.

Tsunayoshi addressed himself to the problem of the administration of the *tenryō* almost as soon as he became shogun. In the 8th month of 1680, three months after his succession, he put Hotta Masatoshi in charge of matters having to do with the governing of the peasantry and appointed a standing committee of bakufu officials to assist Masatoshi. Acting on his special responsibilities, Masatoshi issued a directive to the *daikan* ordering them to remember that "the populace is the foundation of the nation," to be diligent in fulfilling their duties, to refrain from making private use of the peasants under their charge and from "borrowing" money or rice from the peasants, and to see that their *tedai* did not engage in such practices either.⁶⁰ Two years later, the *kanjō ginmiyaku* was established, making it possible to check more fully on the performance of the *daikan* as well as on their superiors in the central fiscal offices.

Taking advantage of this tighter supervisory framework, Tsunayoshi also mounted an attack on the entrenched position enjoyed by many of the *daikan*. Beginning in 1681, he removed one *daikan* after another from office, punishing a large number with exile or death for dereliction in the performance of their duties, most particularly the failure to forward to the main bakufu offices the full tax yield. A total of 34 *daikan* suffered such a fate during Tsunayoshi's reign, 26 during the nine years between 1681 and 1689. A substantial percentage of their replacements were former Tatebayashi vassals.⁶¹

The effort during the first part of Tsunayoshi's reign to extend fuller central control over local administration tapered off in the latter years of his rule. The assignment of special responsibility for the administration of bakufu territory to a particular *rōjū* lapsed with Hotta Masatoshi's

death in 1684. Likewise, *kanjō ginmiyaku* no longer were appointed after Ogiwara Shigehide came to exercise dominant power within the *kanjō bbugyō*. Instead of pursuing further the transformation of the *daikan* into local officials fully accountable to higher authority, the shogunal circle tended to rely on the network of personal ties with fiscal officials cultivated by Yanagisawa Yoshiyasu and Shigehide to keep local administration in line. Nevertheless, the developments in the administration of bakufu territory during Tsunayoshi's reign set the stage for a more thoroughgoing restructuring of that sphere of government in later reigns.

The most significant steps in this direction were taken from the 1720s on under Yoshimune, who revived the practice of assigning one *rōjū* particular responsibility for overseeing the administration of bakufu lands. He further expanded the staff of the *kanjō bbugyō* and, by directing one group of *kanjō* officials to specialize in judicial matters and the other in fiscal affairs, rationalized the operation of the *kanjō bbugyō*. The creation of a chain of officials with specific responsibility for fiscal affairs pertaining to bakufu territory and answerable directly to the shogun established a framework for more effective supervision of local administration from above. At the same time, under Yoshimune institutional means were developed for constraining the independence of the *daikan* at its source. One key move in this direction was the shift from the custom of annually setting the tax rate upon assessment of that year's prospective crop yield (*kemi*) to a tax rate fixed for a number of years at a time (*jōmen*). The shift promised a more consistent tax yield; equally to the point, it reduced the opportunity for collusion between the staff of the *daikan*'s office and peasant officials in establishing the annual tax liability.

To limit the possibilities for peculation, the *daikan* were instructed to forward surtaxes along with the main tax, instead of retaining them for their own income; henceforth the *daikan* were paid an allowance out of bakufu coffers. Efforts were also made to speed up the process of forwarding upward the taxes collected. Through these measures the *daikan* was transformed from a tax farmer into something more closely approximating a salaried official of the bakufu.

SHŌTOKU DEVELOPMENTS. How does the approach to administration of the *tenryō* adopted in the 1710s under Ienobu and Ietsugu fit into the

context of these developments ranging from the reign of Tsunayoshi to that of Yoshimune? In many regards it stands as a link between them. Thus, for instance, the reigns of Ienobu and Letsugu saw the reestablishment of some of the measures designed to extend central control of the bakufu's tax base adopted early in Tsunayoshi's reign and then allowed to lapse. One such instance was the reestablishment of the post of *ginmiyaku*, which, as noted above, was restored in the 7th month of 1711 at Hakuseki's recommendation.

Hakuseki called for revival of the *ginmiyaku* in the context of his personal struggle against Ogiwara Shigehide. Clearly, however, he also saw the reestablishment of the post as a means of tightening up the administration of bakufu territory. In *Oritaku shiba no ki*, he noted that the year after the restoration of the post of *ginmiyaku* the amount of tax rice forwarded to Edo increased by 433,400 *hyō*, while the cost of repairs to waterworks and such declined by 38,000 *ryō*.⁶² (The precise tax income of the bakufu in these years is unclear. A few years later it averaged 1,375,400 *koku*; 433,400 *hyō* represents about 13 percent of this amount.)⁶³

Concurrently with the revival of the *ginmiyaku* the bakufu also took steps to identify and eliminate abuses arising from overly close cooperation between the *daikan*'s office and the peasant officials. A month after the reestablishment of the *ginmiyaku*, the bakufu dispatched circuit inspectors to examine local conditions in the *tenryō*.⁶⁴ The order announcing this event expressly warned the *daikan* and peasant officials against trying to keep ordinary peasants from presenting their grievances to the inspectors.⁶⁵ Eight months later, in the 4th month of 1713, building on the information thus gathered, the bakufu issued a comprehensive set of directives to the *daikan* and peasant officials which took them to task for ignoring this stipulation and for a host of other abuses of their authority. The *daikan* were accused of informing only the peasant officials rather than all the villagers of the village's tax liability for that year. Peasant officials were charged with failing to take account of the views of all the villagers in allocating among them the tax obligation assigned the village and with questionable practices in the handling of work projects levied on the village. The *daikan* were condemned for laxity in supervising the conduct of their *tedai* and in forwarding the taxes collected to the central bakufu offices.⁶⁶

The directives' admonitions against such practices were largely hortatory. Those same directives, however, set forth two concrete measures designed to forestall some of the abuses they identified. They abolished the general practice of having the *tedai* from the *daikan*'s office carry out a preliminary estimate of the size of that year's crop prior to the official estimate by the *daikan*. The directives noted that the custom had created an opportunity for collusion between the *tedai* and peasant officials and that the cost of entertaining the *tedai* on such occasions had added to the expenses of the village, expenses that the peasant officials often managed to pass off on the other villagers.⁶⁷ The directives also put an end to the designation of *ōjōya* (peasant overseers) in addition to the ordinary village headman. The directives declared that the cost of supporting the *ōjōya*, who had supervisory powers over several villages, was an added financial burden for the villagers. Moreover, the directive to the peasantry added: "Some among them are corrupt; they act arrogantly and pursue their private interests. They enter into collusion with *tedai* and officials of the *daikan* office and impose hardships on the peasants of lower status. . ."⁶⁸

This set of directives, far more comprehensive than those issued under Tsunayoshi or by any earlier shogun, established the theoretical framework for the systematic institutional reforms of the Kyōhō period. Reflecting this fact, one of the first orders to the *daikan* of Yoshimune's reign commanded them to "refer repeatedly" to the Shōtoku directives in carrying out their responsibilities.⁶⁹ Thus, together with currency restoration and the Nagasaki trade regulations, these directives to the *daikan* and peasant officials constitute an important point of continuity between the Shōtoku and Kyōhō eras.

The precise part Hakuseki played in the formulation of these directives is unclear. However, in tone they resemble others of a comparable nature that he drafted. Hakuseki earlier had recommended that something be done about the *ōjōya*, noting their existence as the source of problems of the same sort as those described in the directives. As we shall see, condemnation of the *tedai* of one office or another for exploitation of the people under the jurisdiction of that office also is a common theme in his writings. So it seems plausible that he participated in the drafting of the directives; unquestionably they were compatible with his views.

Considered broadly, then, Hakuseki's approach to administration of the *tenryō* fit into a general evolutionary trend running from the reign of Tsunayoshi to that of Yoshimune. It also, however, evidenced certain distinct features. The most striking of these was an ambivalence about development of the institutional framework necessary to establish effective central direction and coordination of local administration. The Shōtoku and Kyōhō periods present a sharp contrast here. During the latter, significant steps were taken to rationalize the operation of the *kan-jō bugyō* and to bring local administration under tighter central control. By comparison, relatively little of a concrete nature was achieved in this area during the Shōtoku period.

To clarify this point, it will be useful to distinguish between "negative" and "positive" reforms. As for "negative" measures aimed at checking entrenched interests that interfered with the functioning of the systems of local administration, Hakuseki moved forcefully. His call for revival of the *ginmiyaku* and abolition of the *ōjōya* is a case in point. He also was assertive about establishing standards of behavior for those who represented the bakufu at the local level; the blunt catalogue of abuses perpetrated by the *daikan* and peasant officials contained in the directives to those parties indicates as much. But a mentality that clearly was attuned to system and order did not, contrary to what one might expect, lead him actively to pursue bureaucratic rationalization. And, when it came to the translation of the theoretical framework for regulation from above into an effective administrative structure, he was hesitant and passive.

Because it is tempting to assume that the discrepancy between the history of administrative reform in the Shōtoku and Kyōhō periods was primarily a matter of opportunity and stages of development, it is important to stress these nuances of Hakuseki's position. Hakuseki's activities in local administration did not represent simply a preliminary articulation of principles that were concretely realized in the following era. They reflected an underlying orientation to governance quite different from that which took shape under Yoshimune. We can begin to get a sharper sense of this difference by considering Hakuseki's views on one final matter pertinent to fiscal administration: rationalization of the post-station system.

RATIONALIZATION OF THE POST-STATION SYSTEM

Set up to ensure bakufu representatives ready passage along the major highways radiating out of Edo, the post-station system combined elements of an obligatory labor service with a commercial facility. As the system was originally envisioned, the inhabitants of the post-stations were to supply sufficient horses and personnel to transport free of charge from one post to the next people traveling on bakufu service. The post-station residents were also expected to transport for certain fixed fees the daimyo and their retinues and other specified "official" groups. To provide the post-station population with the livelihood necessary to support their performance of these obligations, they were allowed to contract on the side to transport private individuals.⁷⁰ Immediate responsibility for seeing that each post-station performed its specified function lay with resident commoner officials. The operation of the system as a whole was supervised over the years by various bakufu offices, most notably the *ōmetsuke* (inspectors general), responsible, among other things, for overseeing matters having to do with security and communications with the daimyo, and the *kanjō* offices. Beginning in 1659, one *ōmetsuke* was officially appointed to act as *dōchū bugyō* (magistrate of roads); from 1698 on, a *kanjō bugyō* also served concurrently as *dōchū bugyō*.⁷¹

The requirement, from the 1640s on, that all daimyo come regularly to Edo for specified periods of attendance on the shogun put great pressures on these arrangements. The post-stations found it difficult to meet the added demand for horses and porters from within their own immediate resources. Consequently the custom developed of requiring peasants from the surrounding countryside to make up the deficit. In 1694, the bakufu formally institutionalized this practice, known as *sukegō*, or "assistance from neighboring villages." This arrangement reduced the burden on the post-stations of providing official and fixed-fee portage services, but quite naturally it was not popular with the peasantry of the areas bordering on the post-stations, and apparently it did not appreciably improve the supply of horses and porters. Soon abuses appeared. In particular the temptation was great for the inhabitants of the post-stations to pass provision of the obligatory services off on the *sukegō* villages and to concentrate themselves on supplying the more lucrative

private transport services. The situation was complicated further by the emergence of bands of hired porters headquartered in one of the major cities who, for a fee, offered transport services extending beyond the range of one post-station. The emergence of these bands reflected the enlarged demand for porterage created by the increasingly commercialized economy as well as by the institution of *sankinkōtai*. At the same time, often trouble broke out between the hired porters and the post-station inhabitants or *sukegō* villagers, and it was difficult to regulate the activities of the hired long-distance porters within the locally oriented framework of the post-station system.⁷²

The emergence of these problems pointed up the need for a more effective means of supervising the operation of the transport mechanism. To that end, in 1704 the bakufu ordered *daikan* who had a post-station or stations within their jurisdiction to assign two subordinates to each such station. Daimyo whose lands incorporated a post-station were commanded to do the same.⁷³ However, this arrangement proved unequal to the task. As pointed out in 1712 both by the *dōchō bugyō* and Hakuseki, who referred to his observations at the time of his trip to Kyoto in late 1710, the burden of supplying sufficient horses and men still weighed heavily on the post-stations and *sukegō* villages, and the demand for horses and porters continued to outstrip the supply.

Hakuseki and the *bugyō* thus shared a common perception of the fundamental problem with the post-station system. The solutions they proposed to resolve that problem, however, differed substantially, and the points on which Hakuseki disagreed with the *bugyō* are revealing of his overall orientation to the matter of administrative reform. The *bugyō* recommended creating a more centralized system of control. They asked to have a police force of low-ranking samurai, comparable to the *yoriki* and *dōshin* attached to the *machi bugyō* (Edo town magistrate), put at their disposal and proposed to exercise more direct supervision of the post-stations through this police force. In the 2nd month of 1712, their request was granted, and, according to a report made by the *dōchū bugyō* a few years later, this new arrangement resulted in much more effective supervision and smoother operation of the post-station system.⁷⁴

Hakuseki took quite a different view. In his perception, the problems of the post-1704 system were rooted in the assignment of *daikan tedai*

to each post-station. The *tedai*, he asserted, colluded with the inhabitants of the post-stations to press the *sukegō* villagers for more horses than were actually needed to fulfill the obligatory transport services and shared the profits that came from diverting the post-station horses into commercial transport.⁷⁵ Thus, like the *bugyō*, Hakuseki favored revoking the assignment of *daikan tedai* to the post stations. But he did not agree with the *bugyō* proposal to substitute for the *tedai* a central supervisory force with jurisdiction over the entire system. When, despite his objections, the *bugyō* proposal was adopted in the 2nd month of 1712, he complained that it simply perpetuated the problems created earlier by the appointment of the *tedai*.⁷⁶

The growing complexity of the post-station system and the nature of the varied demands put upon it clearly made some regulatory mechanism imperative. Given the lack of effective means for controlling the *daikan* and their *tedai*, to rely on the *tedai* to supervise the operation of the post-stations entailed obvious difficulties. Nevertheless, attaching *daikan tedai* to the post stations was one step in the direction of creating a mechanism for regulation of the post-station system. The arrangement devised by the *dōchū bugyō* went a step farther towards unifying administration of the post-stations and bringing them under closer central supervision. It fits in with the moves towards rationalization of local administration characteristic of the following Kyōhō period. Together these developments in management of the post-station system thus stand within the mainstream of the evolution of bakufu rule between the reigns of Tsunayoshi and Yoshimune.⁷⁷ Likewise, Hakuseki's objections both to the appointment of *tedai* and to the supervisory mechanism proposed by the *bugyō* indicate some of the ways in which he remained outside that mainstream. Consideration of the reasons for his objections should enlarge our understanding of the distinctive features of his perspective on bakufu politics.

While, in *Oritaku shiba no ki*, Hakuseki set forth the negative consequences of using *daikan tedai* to supervise the post-stations, he did not elaborate on the reasoning behind his assertion that the measures proposed by the *bugyō* perpetuated the same problems. However, we can reconstruct two factors which probably fueled his antipathy to both arrangements. One was the influence of Confucian ideas about how best

to achieve the reform of society. Confucian thinkers did not universally oppose the effort to improve social conditions through institutional regulation. Nevertheless, the weight of Confucian tradition favored reliance instead on good officials, educated in the Way, to transform the behavior of those around them through the influence of their own upright behavior.

When Hakuseki condemned the role played by *daikan tedai* in local government he clearly drew from this legacy of Confucianism. Analyzed within the framework of Confucian ideas about government, the *tedai* was not an official; he was a servant, an underling. Lacking education in the Way, he necessarily viewed society from a narrow and self-centered perspective. He could not possibly maintain the broad, upright, altruistic outlook that was the *sine qua non* of the good official. Consequently, his participation in local administration could only hinder, not advance, the implementation of the reforms set forth by those at the top of the administrative hierarchy. Separate from the question of the actual behavior of the *tedai* within Tokugawa government and society, the accumulated weight of Confucian misgivings about the *tedai* as a type naturally disposed Hakuseki to look upon them negatively.

Much the same applies to his objections to using a police force of *yoriki* and *dōshin* to supervise the post-stations in place of the *tedai*. From the standpoint of the Confucian image of the official, the difference between the *tedai* and the *yoriki* and *dōshin* was minimal. As underlings of inferior social status, the *yoriki* and *dōshin* also could not be expected to take the proper outlook on the duties assigned them. Consequently, to entrust them with major administrative responsibilities was to invite corruption and malfeasance.

The traditional Confucian suspicion of delegating responsibility to those who by definition lacked the qualities essential to the good official helps explain Hakuseki's lack of enthusiasm for rationalization of the system of local administration. In essence, rationalization meant that, while continuing to rely on underlings to conduct the business of government, the bakufu would use institutional means to keep them under stricter control. The influence of Confucianism, however, cannot alone account for Hakuseki's approach to this issue. For one thing, as we shall see in later chapters, there are certain ways in which his view of personnel

matters does not conform fully to the classic Confucian premise that the first step to reforming society is to find good men to govern. Equally important, the nature of his own position also inclined him to be dubious about bureaucratic rationalization. For Hakuseki, able to influence bakufu affairs only tangentially, enlargement of the bureaucratic infrastructure necessarily meant expansion of the power of a sector of government over which he had no direct authority. This circumstance, as well as Confucian theory, worked to make him play down the mechanics of extending central control over local administration even as he pursued the formulation of “negative” regulation designed to reduce the independence of local officials and the definition of standards which would remind local officials of their accountability to higher authority.

SIX

*Shogun, Daimyo, and Populace:
The Role of the Ruler in the Bakuhuan State*

The distinctive nuances detectable in Hakuseki's perspective on fiscal issues came to the fore in his approach to such questions as what posture vis-à-vis the population of the realm was proper to the bakufu as a national government and to the shogun as head of the bakufu. These questions bore on several aspects of Tokugawa rule. They spoke to the nature of the relationship between those who governed—a category encompassing both the leaders of the bakufu and the holders of individual domains—and those who were objects of governance. They pertained as well to the nature of the relationship between the shogun and the daimyo and of that between the shogun and those who staffed the offices of his administrative mechanism. In short, the question of how Hakuseki and other bakufu figures before and after him conceived of the role of the ruler was of direct relevance to their view of the fundamental character of the *bakuhuan* state.

Two intersecting elements shaped the relationship between governors and governed within the framework of the *bakuhuan* state. One was the primary interest of the governors in the populace as a source of tax revenue and labor services. Acting on this interest, their first concern in the administration of popular affairs was to ensure a consistent supply of the dues assigned to each village. However, those same governors also were heir to the assumption, prevalent since at least the Sengoku period, that those who claimed the authority to rule were responsible for guaranteeing a certain degree of popular welfare. This assumption led them to

present themselves as representatives of the public interest (*kōgi*), committed, ipso facto, to providing the basic mechanisms of protection and justice necessary to enable the people to live in relative security.

This latter stance in turn had important repercussions for the nature of the relationship between the shogun and daimyo. The *bakuhuan* system was built on the principle of daimyo autonomy. The bakufu asserted immediate authority only over the inhabitants of its direct holdings, the *tenryō*. Those who did not reside in the *tenryō* the bakufu regarded as accountable to the holder of the domain where they lived. This arrangement was based on the understanding that each feudal unit constituted an individual and self-contained public authority. But, at the same time, as rulers of national stature who were able to compel the submission of the daimyo, the Tokugawa also laid claim to a national *kōgi* authority transcending that of the daimyo. Consequently, while on the one hand the Tokugawa bakufu respected the autonomy of the daimyo, on the other it pledged itself implicitly to offer redress when merited to all the people of the nation, including those under the immediate jurisdiction of the daimyo.

The contradiction inherent in this situation was intensified by the economic and political developments of the latter half of the seventeenth century. A tendency to emphasize more than previously the *kōgi* dimensions of bakufu authority paralleled the expansion of the competence of the bakufu in areas like foreign trade and fiscal administration and the attempt to enlarge the personal power of the shogun within the bakufu. This development contributed to the reshaping of the structure of bakufu rule visible between the reigns of Tsunayoshi and Yoshimune. It also pointed up the conflict between reliance on the principle of daimyo autonomy and reservation of a distinct national role for the bakufu in the area of popular governance. In the end, the questions about the nature of the *bakuhuan* system thus raised were of too great consequence to be amenable to any fundamental resolution. Instead, the ultimate result, reached during Yoshimune's reign, was a working readjustment which left intact, for the moment, the basic contradictions in the Tokugawa approach to the administration of popular affairs.

We shall examine these issues from two angles. In this chapter we shall focus on the evolution in the concept of the national governmental

role of the bakufu, or more particularly that of the shogun, from the reign of Tsunayoshi to that of Yoshimune. In the next chapter, we shall concentrate on the development in the organization and operation of the bakufu administrative structure in the same period. Our aim is to identify the particularities of Hakuseki's approach to these matters compared to those who preceded and followed him and to examine the implications of his perspective for the larger course of the history of the Tokugawa bakufu.

PERSPECTIVES ON THE NATIONAL ROLE OF THE BAKUFU

In the early years of Tokugawa rule, the bakufu asserted its authority over the populace of the nation primarily in a residual rather than direct form. The bakufu manifested this residual authority most fundamentally when it required a daimyo to move from one domain to another. A daimyo thus ordered to move took with him his retainers (*kashin*), but the people he had governed up to that point, collecting from them taxes and labor services, remained behind to be assigned by the bakufu to another domainal lord—evidence that ultimate authority over the populace of a domain rested with the shogun.¹

Apart from such assertions of a residual authority, in what ways did the bakufu demonstrate on a routine basis its character as governor of the entire populace? First, by issuing orders applicable not just to *tenryō* inhabitants but to the people of the entire nation, the bakufu claimed for itself a normative role in the lives of the general populace. Second, by offering redress to the people for injustices received at the hands of others, including those with immediate jurisdiction over them, the bakufu asserted a transcendent judicial competence.

A key example of bakufu laws with a nationwide scope were the *kōsatsu*, edicts written on placards and posted prominently throughout the country. The *kōsatsu* covered various matters ranging from the prohibition of the sale of human beings and (from the 1630s on) the proscription of Christianity, to the rates allowed to be charged for porters and pack horses.² The bakufu insured their wide distribution by having the bakufu inspectors (*junkenshi*) sent out periodically to survey conditions in the *tenryō* and daimyo domains check that the *kōsatsu* were located in

appropriate places.³ As a consequence, the *kōsatsu* served as a permanent and highly visible expression of the bakufu's national power.

But, true to the ambiguities of the *bakuhan* order, the bakufu, particularly in the early decades of the Tokugawa era, also hedged in various ways demonstration of its national authority. In the early years of Tokugawa rule, the laws promulgated throughout the country by the bakufu tended to be clear-cut prohibitions or regulations that rested on a social consensus often of long standing. The bakufu at that time did not present itself, in the manner of a Confucian king, as the ultimate arbiter of the social and moral life of the entire populace. For instance, most laws, such as the Keian Edict (1649), in which the bakufu did seek to impress general behavioral norms upon the people, were addressed to the *tenryō*, not to the country as a whole. The eventual nationwide currency of the Keian Edict resulted from the daimyo promulgating it within their own domains on their own initiative rather than at the express direction of the bakufu.⁴ When the bakufu issued laws of nationwide scope, by and large it did not promulgate them directly but, nominally at least, respected the autonomy of the daimyo and *hatamoto*. Bakufu officials distributed copies of the laws in question to the daimyo and *hatamoto*, who then took responsibility for promulgating them within their own domains.⁵

Similar nuances characterized the mechanisms of judicial redress opened by the bakufu to the population at large. From very early, the bakufu granted that, under carefully specified circumstances, commoners could appeal directly to it about mistreatment received from the feudal authority in charge of them. For instance, in 1602 and 1603, the bakufu declared that, if the relationship between the peasants and their lord was so bad that the peasants were prepared to abandon their native village, they could lodge a direct appeal with the bakufu.⁶ But such actions were allowed as exceptions within the context of a general prohibition of direct appeals. Kimura Motoi argues that loopholes allowing direct appeals existed only because the bakufu judicial structure was not yet equipped to deal in a comprehensive manner with the problem of peasant protests. From the 1630s, he notes, reflecting the formation of a definitive hierarchy of judicial offices within the bakufu, the bakufu insisted that all appeals from the populace be routed through the appropriate chain of

command.⁷ This requirement did not foreclose the possibility of the bakufu's hearing complaints from the general populace against those with direct jurisdiction over them. But it did reemphasize jurisdictional autonomy as a fundamental principle of the *bakuhan* structure of rule.

The tension between the bakufu's claim of a national *kōgi* authority and its acknowledgment of daimyo autonomy in the administration of popular affairs represented a fundamental feature of the *bakuhan* system of rule. The balance between these elements did not, however, remain constant. The reign of Tsunayoshi marked the beginning of an effort to enlarge both the normative and judicial dimensions of the bakufu's *kōgi* authority.

DEVELOPMENTS UNDER TSUNAYOSHI

Tsunayoshi's efforts in the normative area were particularly distinctive. Influenced at least in part by his reading of Confucian texts, Tsunayoshi sought to establish the shogun as a sage-king who, by encouraging good and punishing evil, would bring about the moral transformation of society. To this end, to the *kōsatsu* posted nationwide Tsunayoshi added admonitions about striving to be loyal and filial towards one's superiors, harmonious in one's family relations, and considerate towards one's inferiors.⁸ He rewarded peasants recommended to him as examples of virtuous behavior and issued edicts warning about the evil consequences of the over-consumption of alcohol.⁹ Tsunayoshi endeavored to shape social customs not only among commoners but also the *bushi*. For instance, the mourning code (*bukki ryō*), first compiled during Tsunayoshi's reign, constituted an attempt to regulate the behavior of individual *bushi* throughout the country, regardless of their feudal affiliation, according to a single national standard.¹⁰

Unquestionably, the most striking of Tsunayoshi's efforts to extend the shogun's normative authority nationwide were the edicts requiring compassion to living things (*shōrui awaremi no rei*), issued in various forms and on diverse occasions from 1685 on at the express will of the shogun. The proclaimed purpose of these edicts, the subject of much criticism at the time and later because of their eccentric and excessive character, was to inculcate a habit of benevolence among the population.¹¹

In the context of relations between the bakufu and daimyo, the edicts had another significance. While some were directed primarily to the inhabitants of Edo, many applied to the daimyo domains as well as the *tenryō*.¹² As such, they manifested an expansion of the scope of the personal authority of the shogun. Tsukamoto Manabu suggests that, taken as a whole, the *shōrui awaremi no rei* constituted an effort to bring the rest of nature as well as the human world under the sway of the shogun's civilizing influence.¹³ At the very least, by imposing the personal will of the shogun on areas of life where it had not been felt previously, the *awaremi no rei* enhanced the autocratic dimensions of shogunal power.

Tsunayoshi also took steps to emphasize the shogun's residual judicial authority. In the 11th month of 1681, shortly after becoming shogun and sending out the shogunal inspectors traditionally charged at the beginning of each reign with surveying conditions throughout the country, Tsunayoshi confiscated the domain of a 30,000 *koku*-level daimyo; among the reasons noted for this action was that "word has reached [the shogun] that [the daimyo] has imposed harsh exactions upon his retainers and the people of his domain."¹⁴ At the beginning of the next year, Tsunayoshi reduced severely the domains of two other daimyo because "their administration of their domains consistently has been improper."¹⁵ Through such actions Tsunayoshi asserted that ultimate responsibility for the welfare of the populace of the nation lay with the shogun.

In the course of thus emphasizing the transcendent nature of the bakufu's *kōgi* authority, Tsunayoshi also introduced a new nuance into the principle of daimyo jurisdictional autonomy. In 1697, the bakufu promulgated what came to be known as the "edict on jurisdictional autonomy in criminal cases" (*jibun shioki rei*). According to Hiramatsu Yoshirō, this edict is the only formal statement on this subject issued by the bakufu in the course of the Tokugawa period.¹⁶ It may be interpreted in two lights. On the one hand, within certain limits it upheld the principle of daimyo autonomy. The version of the edict eventually included in the *Ofuregaki Kōpō shūsei*, the collection of bakufu edicts compiled under Yoshimune, specified that the daimyo should "follow the example of criminal judgments made in Edo" and should refer cases involving treason, arson, and people from other domains to the bakufu. Otherwise

the daimyo was responsible for passing judgments on acts committed by his retainers and the commoner inhabitants of his domain.¹⁷ Viewed from this perspective, the *jibun shioki rei* simply spelled out premises implicit in the daimyo-shogun relationship from the beginning. On the other hand, as Hiramatsu and Tsukamoto point out, the *jibun shioki rei* in its original form included infringements against the *shōrui awaremi no rei* among the types of case the daimyo were obliged to report to the bakufu.¹⁸ And, in that the *awaremi no rei* were an unprecedented and highly unpopular intrusion of shogunal authority into the jurisdiction of the daimyo, the issuing of an edict on jurisdictional competence that included a requirement to report *awaremi no rei* cases to the bakufu served symbolically to restrict further daimyo autonomy.

THE VIEWS OF HAKUSEKI

Hakuseki's approach to the issue of popular governance should be considered against the background of these developments in the reign of Tsunayoshi. Hakuseki's endeavors in this area, like those of Tsunayoshi, incorporated an expansion of the *kōgi* authority of the shogun as an essential feature. But they also aimed at a significant reorientation in the manner of expression of shogunal power. Tsunayoshi had emphasized the normative dimensions of the shogun's prerogatives as a national ruler. He had loomed over the people as a punitive figure and had asserted his power over the daimyo by commanding them to assist in the realization of his own vision of society. By contrast, Hakuseki put primary emphasis on the redress-offering aspect of bakufu authority. In his view, the shogun should be, and should be seen as, the refuge and protector of the people of the nation. His image of the triangular relationship between shogun, daimyo, and populace was summed up in the notice issued by Ienobu in the 8th month of 1711 after receiving the reports of the circuit inspectors:

According to what his lordship has learned about the administration of the provinces and districts from the reports of the circuit inspectors, there is no conspicuous evidence of good government in either bakufu territory or the vassal domains. He has heard that social customs have generally deteriorated, government weighs heavily on the people, and all four classes are in a state of

destitution. He is most troubled by such reports. However, since his reign is as yet new, and since he has some plan in mind, he has not yet pressed an inquiry into these matters. Henceforth, the officials on bakufu lands and the lords of the provinces and districts should all of their own accord take care that there is no negligence in their attention to government matters and that all four classes are able to pursue their livelihood in security. Should it later come out that standing evils have not been corrected, he has declared that he will deal with such instances most severely.¹⁹

The first duty of the shogun was to ensure the welfare of the people. To do so he should not seek to “set traps” for the people, who were by nature naive and short-sighted. Rather, he should hold rigorously accountable those responsible for administering popular affairs and strive to protect ordinary people from those who would harm or knowingly mislead them.

Underlying these divergent emphases in Tsunayoshi’s and Hakuseki’s approach to popular governance were two different perceptions of the fundamental political mechanism of society and of the position of the shogun. Viewing the sage as an autocratic didact and society as an inert entity to be acted upon by the sage, Tsunayoshi used his coercive powers to try to change directly the behavioral patterns of the people. Judged from the perspective of traditional Confucian political thought, Tsunayoshi’s performance as sage was quite unorthodox. It also had a mixed impact on the dynamics of the *bakuhan* structure. The very idiosyncracy of Tsunayoshi’s actions perhaps added to the aura of authority surrounding the shogun, but it also helped bring to the surface resentment over the arbitrary exercise of shogunal power.

While Hakuseki, too, envisioned the shogun as a sage-king, his concept of the role followed more closely than did Tsunayoshi’s the classic Confucian scenario. In his view, the sage was not an autocrat who, knowing what was good for the people, imposed on them norms of his own devising. Rather, the sage drew the people to him by the force of his concern for their welfare. As Mencius put it, quoting the *Book of History*, the people would turn towards the sage-king as towards clouds in a time of drought.²⁰ The support of the people confirmed that the ruler also enjoyed the backing of heaven. Enjoying the trust of the people and the backing of heaven, the sage eventually, subtly and through the power of

his own example, would be able to bring about the transformation of society. In the interim, the dual support of the people and of heaven was a key ingredient in the ruler's authority over lesser members of the ruling class. It legitimized his taking whatever action was necessary to ensure their cooperation in the task of fostering the welfare of the people.

Hakuseki's concept of the sage may have been philosophically more orthodox than Tsunayoshi's, but it was not necessarily better attuned to the realities of the *bakuhan* order. To the contrary, implicit in his vision of the shogun as sage was a qualitative differentiation between the role of the shogun and that of the daimyo that exacerbated the tension between the bakufu's claim of a nationwide *kōgi* role and its recognition of daimyo autonomy in the administration of popular affairs. Traditionally that tension had been moderated by the character of the shogun as a feudal hegemon. While the shogun claimed certain prerogatives as a national ruler in addition to those enjoyed by the daimyo, as lord of the *tenryō* he also operated in the national political structure as one daimyo, albeit a daimyo writ large. Because he acted within his own territory as a daimyo, the shogun necessarily respected the authority of the daimyo within their domains. But Hakuseki's vision of the shogun as sage implied reduction of the shogun's daimyo-like characteristics and expansion of his kingly qualities. And that development pointed ultimately towards the transformation of the *bakuhan* structure from a feudal hegemony into a national monarchy in which the shogun and daimyo played intrinsically different political roles. An examination of various of the concrete policies pursued by Hakuseki will point up these dimensions of his approach to the issue of popular governance.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE SHOGUN AND THE POPULACE. From the inauguration of Ienobu's reign, Hakuseki worked to realize his conviction that the shogun should be, and should be perceived as, the refuge of the people. As a step in this direction, at the beginning of the 2nd month of 1709, three weeks after Ienobu's accession, he recommended that Ienobu proclaim a general amnesty. In his autobiography, Hakuseki summarized his proposal as follows:

During the previous reign, those in charge of the administration of justice sought to apply the laws as severely as they could. Many people were sentenced to death and their families punished because they mistreated a bird or an animal. Others were exiled or banished from their native regions. The people have lost all sense of security. How many tens of thousands have seen their parents, their brothers, their wives, their children scattered and lost? Without a general amnesty what means is there to restore to the people a sense of life and hope?²¹

In recommending an amnesty directed particularly at those who had fallen afoul of the *shōrui awaremi no rei*, Hakuseki sought to repair the social damage caused by enforcement of the compassion edicts. The amnesty served another purpose as well. It contributed to reversing the general view of the shogun as an arbitrary despot and establishing instead an image of him as a figure who offered “the people a sense of life and hope.”

This dual aim—to give the people a sense of security and thereby restore, or establish, their confidence in the ruler—also figured in other of Hakuseki’s recommendations: for instance, his persistent argument for leniency in the application of the bakufu’s punitive powers. Under Tsunayoshi, the bakufu had increased the use of harsh punishments for crimes the shogun considered particularly serious. A striking example was the use of crucifixion or comparably severe punishments for someone who had contracted to adopt a child and later abandoned him.²² By contrast, Hakuseki argued repeatedly for reducing the application of such punishments.

In *Tokushi yoron*, for instance, Hakuseki listed the continued use of harsh punishments as one of the evils remaining from the era preceding Tokugawa rule. Hideyoshi, he wrote,

drawing from military law, originated what is called the one-penny execution. If a person stole even one penny, he was to be executed. The punishments for ordinary crimes being this severe, those who committed serious crimes were sentenced to things like seppuku, beheading, and beheading with exposure of the head. Punishments such as crucifixion and burning at the stake were devised. Death is death whatever its form. How is one who plots evil to be deterred by thought of the way in which he is to die? For this reason, there have never ceased to be wrongdoers in the nation. Today, a hundred years later, when it is time for cruelty to be overcome and killing left behind, should not the continued existence of harsh punishments be reconsidered?²³

Ienobu's last injunctions, drafted by Hakuseki, echoed the same point: "Remember that, although someone may have committed the most reprehensible of crimes, to search for extenuating circumstances, even though they may exist in only one case out of ten, and to reduce harsh punishments are crucial aspects of good government."²⁴

At the same time, another aspect of the sage's responsibilities towards the people was to protect them from those who would injure them. Thus, in arguing for leniency in the application of punishments, Hakuseki also necessarily held that the ruler should distinguish between instances where the innate "blindness" of the people led them to break the law unwittingly or to act over-impetuously and instances where malefactors knowingly did wrong or took advantage of the weakness of the ordinary people. In the former case, the ruler should be willing to forgive trespasses against even fundamental bakufu laws. But it was incumbent upon him to deal sternly with the latter category. A number of the judicial cases discussed by Hakuseki in *Oritaku shiba no ki* illustrate his concern to maintain both dimensions of what he saw as the shogun's sagely obligation to offer redress to the people.

One such case originated from a scheme by a Shinagawa innkeeper to procure girls for Edo brothels under the pretext of hiring them as maids for his inn. According to Hakuseki's account, an agent of the innkeeper convinced a destitute couple from Kii to bring their two daughters to Edo. In the course of the journey, the family, apparently unbeknownst to them, was caused to circumvent one of the barriers where travelers were supposed to present their credentials. When the family reached Edo, the innkeeper declared that the girls were too young to be useful as maids and, intimidating the parents with threats of what would happen to them if it became known that they had by-passed the barrier, arranged for the girls to be sold to the master of a brothel. Eventually the father, despite the efforts of the others involved to restrain him, reported the by-pass to the daimyo of his native domain, who referred the case to the bakufu. A protracted investigation ensued, in the course of which the father died in prison.²⁵

According to Hakuseki, the original judgment of the bakufu officials put primary emphasis on enforcing strictly the law against by-pass of a barrier. Thus, they stressed the culpability not only of those who had

directly assisted the family to by-pass the barrier but also of the father for not reporting the by-pass as soon as he became aware of it. The officials held that his corpse should be beheaded and handed over to the daimyo of Kii for exposure in his native village. The acts of the Shina-gawa innkeeper they treated as of secondary importance; they proposed sentencing him to banishment from Edo or exile.

Hakuseki, however, argued for a reverse apportionment of blame. The bakufu should not seek to make an example of so obviously a simple-minded figure as the father:

Since the father was unaware that they had by-passed the barrier, to have gone many years without reporting it cannot be considered a crime. He did fail to report it for a year after learning what had happened. But, seeing that the entire family was of such limited intelligence as to be deceived by the servant [of the innkeeper], he should not be castigated harshly for letting others trick him into delaying the report.

By contrast, Hakuseki held, the bakufu should deal severely with the innkeeper, who represented the kind of malefactor from whom the people should be protected:

The innkeeper should not escape death. The prohibitions against the sale of human beings promulgated reign after reign are meant for just such an eventuality as this. To declare that people his own servant had enticed [away from their native village] and caused to by-pass the barrier were from Suruga [i.e., the province on the Edo side of the by-passed barrier], and to sell them for a price of 150 *ryō*, giving 48 *ryō* 2 *bu* of that sum to others and keeping the remainder as his own profit—how can such a crime be regarded lightly? Moreover, had he not sent his servant out to buy maids in the first place, these crimes never would have occurred. The ultimate responsibility lies with him.²⁶

Another case that illustrates the stance Hakuseki felt the bakufu should take in dealing with wrongs involved the plundering of a wrecked ship by a large group of *tenryō* peasants. The crew of the ship, who happened, like the family in the previous case, to be from Kii, had drawn their swords to defend their merchandise and had wounded one of the peasants; they also evidently reported falsely that a coffer containing gold had been taken. The bakufu officials who heard the case proposed to punish the crew for these actions but held that the number of peasants

involved made it difficult to punish them all. Hakuseki again took the opposite view. The crew's behavior, he argued, was only what one would expect of the lower orders in such a situation. They "should not be condemned harshly." On the other hand, the bakufu should not refrain from punishing the peasants simply because such a large number had taken part in the plundering. As a just solution he suggested that the leaders of the peasants be punished, a fine levied on each house in each village from which a peasant participating in the plunder had come, and the resulting sum of money given to the crew members as compensation for their losses.²⁷

THE SHOGUN AND THE BAKUHAN SYSTEM. Hakuseki's call for the bakufu to act as a source of popular redress and protection in such cases had, like his recommendation for an amnesty at the beginning of Ienobu's reign, two aims. One was the realization of the sage's mission to ensure the welfare of the people. The other was the association of the shogun with that mission in the eyes of the populace. Insofar as these aims were directed at the *tenryō*, in other words, insofar as the shogun played the role of sage primarily in his capacity as daimyo, they did not conflict with the premises of the *bakuhan* structure. But, as Hakuseki saw the situation, the shogun could not properly confine to the *tenryō* his activities as a source of redress. The essence of the mission of the sage was that it extended to every corner of the realm. And insistence on this issue pointed inevitably towards a confrontation with the structure of the *bakuhan* system. Hakuseki's account of his proposal for an amnesty and the reaction to it illustrates these dimensions of his view of the shogun as sage. He argued that the amnesty should be truly national in scope:

Previous "general amnesties" have not extended to those under the jurisdiction of the daimyo and *hatamoto* houses of the realm. To call it a general amnesty is to fall into a false analogy. In such circumstances, the benevolence of the ruler is not felt widely throughout the realm. How can this fulfill the intent of what in antiquity was termed "succoring the people"?²⁸

In calling for an amnesty that extended the benevolence of the ruler throughout the realm, Hakuseki was in fact proposing an intrusion of

shogunal authority into an area where it had not previously been exercised. His description of the reaction of the daimyo and *hatamoto* to the amnesty makes clear this implication of the departure from the manner of “previous ‘general amnesties.’”

When the edict regarding the amnesty was first handed down to the daimyo and *hatamoto* of the realm, since there was no previous instance of such a thing, no one reported compliance with it. However, when his lordship further ordered them to write out in detail the circumstances of the cases [of those to whom the daimyo were granting amnesty], they each acted in compliance with this command.²⁹

The context in which the amnesty was announced reinforced its implicit message of an expansion of shogunal authority. The previous week the bakufu in effect had abolished the *shōrui awaremi no rei* by issuing an order removing them from the scope of criminal acts the daimyo were required to refer to the bakufu.³⁰ This measure appeared to withdraw what had been a spearhead in the assertion of the transcendent nature of the bakufu’s jurisdictional authority. The announcement of the general amnesty a week later conveyed, however, that the shogun was not yielding on that point.

Other aspects of Hakuseki’s approach to popular affairs also served to emphasize the national scope of the shogun’s authority. A key instance was his demonstrated willingness to have members of the populace seek redress directly from the bakufu, even when such action contravened the established principle that all appeals should be routed through the appropriate hierarchy of jurisdictions. His position on a plaint brought in 1710 by some 4,000 peasants from 85 villages in Echigo illustrates this consequence of his argument that shogunal benevolence should extend throughout the realm. The peasants came from a domain that recently had been subdivided, with some of it made bakufu holdings and another section assigned to the domain of Murakami. The division had been made in such a way that this latter section was separated from the remainder of the Murakami domain by the land newly attached to the *tenryō*. As Hakuseki presented the case in *Oritaku shiba no ki*, the manner of the division had caused the appellants, who came from the territory assigned the Murakami domain, various hardships, and the gist of

their appeal was to have the assignment reversed, with the lands closest to the Murakami domain attached to it and their lands incorporated in the *tenryō*. Their initial appeal to the nearest *tenryō daikan* was rejected, whereupon they appealed to the *kanjō bugyō* in Edo. As the *kanjō bugyō* officials did not respond, eventually the peasants appealed directly to one of the *rōjū*.³¹

The reaction of the *kanjō* officials to this situation, as Hakuseki described it, was to reiterate the principles of jurisdictional autonomy and of adhering to a strict chain of command in the submission of judicial appeals. They proposed that the peasants be handed over to the daimyo of the Murakami domain, who would be left to punish them and dispose of their fields and residence lands as he saw fit. Hakuseki, however, took a quite different position. Urging Ienobu to appoint “warm and compassionate” officials to reinvestigate the situation, he openly rejected the premises underlying the *kanjō* officials’ proposed resolution of the matter. In his account of this case in *Oritaku shiba no ki*, he summarized his recommendations to Ienobu as follows:

To where, at present, should the hapless people of the realm without any source of redress appeal? Ignoring this point, the officials of the *bugyō* wish to punish them for not accepting the original decision and for pressing their appeal. They have furthermore, taking at face value the rumors recorded in the materials submitted by the *daikan*, already decided that these peasants are guilty of treason. Such an attitude is hardly appropriate in one who should act as a parent to the people.³²

Hakuseki’s affirmation of the peasants’ action is striking. Presumably it was not unrelated to the fact that the image of “the hapless people of the realm” turning towards the shogun to obtain amelioration of their plight implied an expansion of the shogun’s kingly role vis-à-vis the nation.

Despite Hakuseki’s personal disposition towards the peasants and their action, the eventual outcome of this case was mixed. The plea of the peasants to be made part of the *tenryō* was not accepted on grounds that, “even if there was reason for their plaint,” it would set a bad precedent to grant such a request. But, while the peasants did not win their main demand, the bakufu offered them a symbolic concession. It took

up what had been a side issue in their plea, the oppression of the ordinary peasantry by the *ōjōya*, and summoned the latter for questioning. Reflecting the results of this inquiry, Hakuseki wrote, in announcing that the lands in question should remain attached to the Murakami domain, the bakufu also issued a warning to the *ōjōya* not to take advantage of their position of authority over the ordinary peasants.³³ The attention given the *ōjōya* issue in the Murakami case presumably contributed to the decision in 1713 to abolish the *ōjōya* system in bakufu territory. Moreover, contrary to the original inclination of the *kanjō* officials, no steps were taken to punish the peasants for continuing to press their plea after it had once been rejected. These concessions substantiated, to some extent, Hakuseki's efforts to establish the shogun as a source of redress for the entire nation.

THE SHOGUN AS NATIONAL RULER. In thus stressing the national dimensions of the shogun's authority over the populace, Hakuseki endeavored to differentiate between the political roles of the shogun and the daimyo. In essence, he sought to establish the basis for the shogun to act as a king rather than hegemon. The necessary other side of this effort was to reduce the daimyo-like aspects of shogunal rule. As noted above, the shogun was the daimyo of his own territory, the *tenryō*, as well as a national ruler, and, since it was difficult to demarcate fully these two aspects of his political role, his interests as daimyo naturally tended to figure in his decisions as national ruler. But, in Hakuseki's view, shaped by his reading of Confucianism, this situation could not serve as a stable foundation for Tokugawa rule. It inevitably would engender suspicion of shogunal motives among the daimyo and thus make it difficult to gain their cooperation in the transformation of society into the kingdom of a sage. Consequently, he persistently argued that the bakufu should be even-handed in dealing with issues that affected both daimyo domains and the *tenryō*. The bakufu should not pursue its own advantage at the expense of others, and it should not show favoritism to those with whom it was immediately associated.

The Murakami case also illustrates this characteristic of Hakuseki's political perspective. In his discussion of it, he noted that one of the factors behind the peasants' complaint was the way in which the bakufu

had divided the land at issue. For instance, the lack of contiguity between the main Murakami domain and the territory newly assigned it resulted from the bakufu's having allocated an area plagued with flood control problems to the Murakami domain instead of the *tenryō*. Regarding this situation he wrote:

Since the previous reign [of Tsunayoshi], whenever daimyo or *hatamoto* are transferred from one domain to another, it has been standard practice to take as bakufu territory fertile fields and forests and streams rich in resources and to assign the remainder as private domains. It is not only the peasants who suffer from such arrangements; the lords are also hurt by them.³⁴

Given Hakuseki's emphasis on the bakufu as a national institution of redress, he was particularly sensitive to the problem of partiality in cross-jurisdictional cases. The automatic referral of all such cases to the bakufu meant that bakufu officials heard any suits arising out of conflict between *tenryō* inhabitants and people from another domain, a situation that brought to the fore the potential contradiction between the shogun's "private" interests as daimyo and his "public" responsibilities as national ruler. Hakuseki concentrated the full force of his argumentative powers on this issue in his memorial of 1712/9/10 in which he charged Ogiwara Shigehide with undermining the foundations of Tokugawa rule. In that memorial he accused Shigehide of having intimidated the *hyōjōsho*, the main bakufu court, into deciding two cases involving *tenryō* peasants and inhabitants of another domain in favor of the former, simply because of their association with the bakufu. One was the case discussed above in which *tenryō* peasants had plundered the shipwrecked boat from Kii. Hakuseki asserted that Shigehide's partiality towards *tenryō* inhabitants lay behind the original proposal of the *hyōjōsho* to punish the crew for false testimony but to let the peasants go free because there were too many to punish.

The second case arose out of a quarrel in which samurai in the service of Niwa Tadashige, daimyo of the major domain of Nihonmatsu, had injured some peasants from nearby bakufu territory. Since, under Tokugawa law, a samurai had the prerogative to cut down a peasant who had insulted him, the main issue in the case was whether or not the peasants had acted in a provocative fashion. While Hakuseki evidently felt that

they had, Shigehide, according to him, “simply adopted what the *tenryō* peasants said and treated the statements of the Niwa samurai and their retainers and the Niwa peasants all as lies.”³⁵

In his discussion of the implications of Shigehide’s position, Hakuseki stressed the importance of bakufu courts’ transcending sectional interests and taking a truly national perspective:

In my opinion, these two cases are extraordinarily important. The reason I say this is that both involve conflict between *tenryō* peasants and people from a daimyo domain. Since the matter at stake is not minor, if the right and wrong of it is clearly established, even should it end with the Kii crew and the Niwa retainers being put to death, neither the lord of Kii nor Lord Niwa will have any cause for objection. But, if it is the *tenryō* peasants who were in the wrong and the innocent who are nevertheless punished, even if the lord of Kii or Lord Niwa do not complain, how can their retainers fail to harbor feelings of emnity? What will be the thoughts of the daimyo of the realm and their retainers when they hear of this matter? While the scale of the matter may not be the same, is the heart of the issue any different from what was at stake when, during the previous reign, the samurai of the realm were enraged by the handling of the Asano case?³⁶

Hakuseki’s argument here says much about his overall political stance. The premise behind his position in these cases was that the shogun and his officials should not discriminate between the *tenryō* and the daimyo domains; the shogun should act as a monarch seeking to ensure the welfare of the entire nation, not as a feudal hegemon protecting the interests of one particular region. What did this position mean for Hakuseki’s view of the *bakuhuan* structure as such? Conjoined with his emphasis on the bakufu serving as a national medium of redress for the populace, it clearly pointed towards a political structure quite different from the existing division of the country into separate feudal units under the general leadership of a hegemon. In effect, Hakuseki’s vision of the shogun ruling as sage over the realm implied a dissolution of the *bakuhuan* structure and its transformation into something more truly national in scope. The *bakuhuan* structure therefore could not encompass the realization of Hakuseki’s vision. Consideration of the further evolution in approaches to popular administration under Yoshimune will show that the radical

dimensions of Hakuseki's position necessarily set it at odds with the eventual course of bakufu policy in this area.

DEVELOPMENTS UNDER YOSHIMUNE

Following in the footsteps of his immediate predecessors, Yoshimune stressed both the normative and redress-offering aspects of the shogunal role. As an example of his endeavors in the former area, in 1721, he sponsored the publication of a Japanese translation of and commentary on the Sacred Edict of the founder of the Qing dynasty, the Kangxi Emperor. The commentary on this work, a collection of six moral maxims intended for the edification of the general populace, at Yoshimune's direction was written so as to be comprehensible to a commoner audience. To spread its influence farther, the *Edo machi bugyō* (town magistrate) summoned ten of the leading grammar-school teachers in Edo and, giving each a copy, suggested that it would be suitable material for students to use as writing practice.³⁷

Yoshimune gave equal attention to the operation of the mechanism of redress. For instance, the same year, 1721, the *rōjū* undertook a comprehensive survey of current *bugyō* practice in the handling of appeals. Following this survey, they called upon the *bugyō* to take a positive attitude towards certain kinds of appeals. The *rōjū* declared that the *bugyō* should not act as a court of first resort; thus they should reject cases which had not been previously brought before the appropriate jurisdictional authority. Simultaneously the *rōjū* directed the *bugyō* to take up cases where the appropriate jurisdictional authority had failed to act on the initial appeal or had refused to reconsider a protested decision.³⁸

The establishment of the *meyasubako* shortly thereafter further opened the door to the hearing of appeals. The *meyasubako* was a locked box set up in front of the *hyōjōsho*. Commoners could deposit in it complaints about wrongdoing or corruption on the part of officials and pleas for the hearing of cases obstructed at lower levels of jurisdiction. Periodically the shogun had the *meyasubako* brought to him; he personally reviewed its contents and directed the appropriate *bugyō* offices to deal with the items he considered worthy of attention. The establishment

of the *meyasubako* did not deny the premise that plaintiffs should respect the hierarchy of jurisdictions. The order announcing its establishment included a stipulation that one depositing a direct appeal in it should first declare his intention to do so to the official with jurisdictional competence over the case. Nevertheless, the creation of the *meyasubako* and the publicity given it by the bakufu constituted a strong official affirmation of the principle that high bakufu offices should serve as an institution of popular redress.³⁹

These developments built on the trends of the previous forty years. Between them and what Hakuseki sought to do, however, there was also a significant divergence in orientation. Yoshimune directed both his normative endeavors and his efforts to enlarge the mechanisms of redress primarily at the *tenryō* and the *hatamoto* domains, not at the nation as a whole. To be sure, the attitude taken towards *hatamoto* holdings under Yoshimune showed a readiness to bring the affairs of an important category of bakufu vassals under close shogunal supervision. For instance, the *rōjū*'s command to the *bugyō* to take up obstructed appeals explicitly included the inhabitants of *hatamoto* domains among those who might ask for the *bugyō*'s consideration of their case. But *hatamoto* holdings, while formally autonomous, were, as a practical matter, already administered largely by *tenryō* officials.⁴⁰ Thus, to extend the competence of the *bugyō* over those technically subject to *hatamoto* jurisdiction did not necessarily imply the expansion of bakufu authority over the traditionally far more independent daimyo domains. Compared to the situation in the three preceding reigns, the narrower focus of Yoshimune's normative and redress-offering activities made, in fact, for an ideologically more conservative stance towards the daimyo domains.⁴¹

This more conservative stance towards the daimyo was associated with another difference in Yoshimune's and Hakuseki's approach to the expression of the *kōgi* authority of the bakufu: the nature of the social target at which it was aimed. Sone Hiromi argues that there was a direct correlation between the enlargement of the bakufu mechanism for offering redress that took place under Yoshimune and the effort to expand the bakufu tax base in the same period. The latter effort meant that *daikan* and *hatamoto* were caught between pressure from above to increase the tax yield of the territory under their jurisdiction and protests against

this policy from below. They had no option but to refuse to hear peasant complaints regarding the tax policy imposed by their superiors. In this situation, the assumption of responsibility for the hearing of “obstructed complaints” by the upper reaches of the bakufu bureaucracy served three purposes. First, it acted as a safety valve; the process of carrying an appeal upward created an opportunity to temper, if not resolve, the confrontation between the peasants and those with immediate jurisdiction over them. Second, the fuller participation of central bakufu officials and the shogun in the plaint-hearing procedure helped maintain peasant expectations that the *kōgi* structure would protect the popular welfare, expectations that could no longer be sustained at the local level. And, third, since such expectations were vital to preserving the legitimacy of the entire governing system in the eyes of the populace, the demonstrated involvement of the shogun and his high officials in the judicial mechanism helped reinforce the authority of the ruling class vis-à-vis the populace.⁴²

Following Sone’s interpretation, we may say that Yoshimune’s efforts in the area of popular governance aimed primarily at more effective administration of the populace and resources of the *tenryō*. To that end, he sought to emphasize the role of the shogun as head of the *kōgi* structure, but he did not in any way envision the dissolution of the *bakuhan* system of rule. Rather, development of the role of the shogun was a means to strengthen the position of the intermediate figures who, within that system, as a practical matter had to handle the routine administration of popular affairs. By contrast, Hakuseki’s efforts were focused on the nation rather than the *tenryō*, and he showed far less interest than Yoshimune in the practical management of the populace.

For example, as Tsuji Tatsuya points out, there was no move in the Shōtoku period comparable to Yoshimune’s attempt to shape the mentality of the populace.⁴³ Essentially taking shortsightedness as the natural state of the lower orders, Hakuseki emphasized the need for governors to show compassion for the benighted more than the Confucian dictum to “educate” the people. His emphasis on the role of the shogun as a source of popular redress was an extension of this orientation. In the end, it reflected not so much an attempt to strengthen the position of the ruling class relative to the people as an endeavor to use the relationship between

the shogun and the populace as a lever for enlarging the authority of the shogun over the daimyo. The difference between Hakuseki and Yoshimune in these regards will become yet clearer when we consider the other key dimension of bakufu strategies of popular governance, the relationship between the shogun and those responsible for the day-to-day enactment of policies concerning the people.

SEVEN

The Shogun and His Officials: Perspectives on the Bakufu Administrative Structure

So far, we have discussed the evolution of Tokugawa governance in terms of the role of the bakufu as a national government. But equally important to an understanding of both the nature of Tokugawa rule and Haku-seki's program is the question of the internal dynamics of the bakufu administrative structure. Those dynamics reflected the changing relationship between the variables in bakufu politics characteristic of this period. That is, during the reigns of Iemitsu and Ietsuna, the *rōjū* secured an institutional role for themselves as supervisors of the process of making and implementing administrative decisions. In response to this situation, from the reign of Tsunayoshi to that of Yoshimune, the shogun and those associated with them made a concerted effort to grasp the initiative in the management of government. Reflecting the growing complexity of government and society, the same period witnessed the steady bureaucratization of the administrative process. On the one hand, the technical staff of the various bakufu offices played an ever larger role in the handling of the actual business of government; on the other, bakufu officials tended to put increasing weight on the accumulating body of precedents. This in turn spurred moves to codify and systematize bakufu laws and precedents so they could be used effectively in the conduct of government affairs.

These trends culminated in the reign of Yoshimune with the establishment of a pyramidal administrative structure which, resting on a solid bureaucratic base, gave due place to the *rōjū*, but also incorporated various

channels for input from the shogun at the top. The establishment of this structure marked the emergence of the mature form of the bakufu as a government institution.

What part did Hakuseki play in this developmental process? Hakuseki favored expansion of the role of the shogun in the governing process but not the tendency towards bureaucratization. His approach to the conduct of administrative affairs did not lead towards the orthodox pyramidal organization achieved under Yoshimune. Rather, if fully implemented, it would have resulted in a top-heavy structure in which the shogun and his personal advisors exercised great influence but the role of the bureaucracy remained shadowy and uncertain. Thus, in many ways, what Hakuseki tried to accomplish was peripheral to the mainstream of the evolution of the bakufu administrative mechanism.

BAKUFU ADMINISTRATION IN THE REIGNS OF IEMITSU AND IETSUNA: THE ROLE OF THE RŌJŪ

Two developments in particular testify to the institutionalization of the role of the *rōjū* during the reigns of Iemitsu and Ietsuna. One was a change in the format for issuing bakufu decrees; the other was the emergence of the *hyōjōsho* as a focal point of the bakufu administrative structure. In the early years of the bakufu, the shogun frequently issued commands in the form of personal orders that bore his name or seal. But, from the reign of Ietsuna on, with the exception of highly ritualized acts like the granting of fiefs or promulgation of the *Buke shohatto*, this custom disappeared. Instead, the *rōjū* endorsed and promulgated all shogunal orders to bakufu vassals and offices.¹

The development of the *hyōjōsho* also helped underwrite the centrality of the *rōjū* to the bakufu administrative structure. The *hyōjōsho* originated in the 1630s as a mechanism for handling judicial matters that involved more than one jurisdictional competence or that were too knotty or important to be handled by one administrative office. In the beginning, it was a standing committee whose members were drawn from the various offices, such as the three main *bugyō*, which typically would be involved in cross-jurisdictional cases. From the 1660s on, however, the *hyōjōsho* became a regular office, with its own building and permanent

staff in addition to the officials who sat on it ex officio.² The fact that the *hyōjōsho* brought together people from different offices gave it a significance within the bakufu bureaucratic structure beyond its original purpose of deciding judicial cases; it made the meetings of the *hyōjōsho* a logical place for settling upon and coordinating the implementation of major policy matters.³ For the same reason, the maturation of the *hyōjōsho* between the 1630s and 1660s contributed to the consolidation of the supervisory role of the *rōjū* during that period.

The *rōjū* involved themselves in the affairs of the *hyōjōsho* from the beginning. Until the Meireki fire of 1657, the *hyōjōsho* met at the residence of one of the *rōjū*, and the *rōjū* continued to oversee the operation of the *hyōjōsho* after it was established in its own building. From about that time, it became customary for the core members of the *hyōjōsho* to meet by themselves on the days for preliminary hearings, but one of the *rōjū* attended the *hyōjōsho* deliberations on the days set aside for second hearings. In addition, the regulations of the *hyōjōsho* issued in 1635 specified that the members should remand to the *rōjū* any cases that they could not decide among themselves.⁴ These institutional links with the *hyōjōsho* provided the *rōjū* with a key opportunity to coordinate the functioning of the bakufu bureaucracy. The part taken in the *hyōjōsho* hearings by the *rōjū* also confirmed the latter's role as an intermediary between the shogun and the bureaucracy. It was the *rōjū*, not the shogun, who supervised the activities of the *hyōjōsho*. Iemitsu preserved an independent window on those activities by sending one of his attendants to observe the *hyōjōsho* hearings.⁵ But Ietsuna was far less assertive about trying to maintain such checks on the authority of the *rōjū*.

ADMINISTRATIVE DEVELOPMENTS UNDER TSUNAYOSHI

From the reign of Tsunayoshi two developments impinged on the power of the *rōjū* thus consolidated during the preceding era. The more obvious was the effort of the shogun to establish that the bakufu bureaucracy was accountable to him personally. As noted in Chapters 1 and 5, Tsunayoshi moved quickly to tighten control over the Tokugawa vassal band and the administration of the *tenryō* by taking punitive action against a substantive number of daimyo and *daikan*. He similarly mani-

fested his direct authority over the Edo bureaucracy by disciplining a high percentage of bakufu officials. Fukai Masaumi estimates that Tsunayoshi's disciplinary measures affected 20 percent of the 5,000 *hatamoto* and that the percentage would be even higher if calculated in terms of the number of *hatamoto* on active duty.⁶ We may also see a political significance in the reasons given for the punishment of particular individuals. In earlier reigns, "objective" conditions, such as lack of a suitable heir or "erratic behavior" (*hakkyō*), figured high among the causes for loss or reduction of stipend. By contrast, under Tsunayoshi, the shogun's subjective evaluation of his officials' performance frequently was the decisive factor; over 50 percent of the punishments meted out to bakufu vassals in Tsunayoshi's reign were for "dereliction of duty" or "reasons [known to the shogun]."⁷

Tsunayoshi's assertive disciplinary policy was connected with another key feature of his approach to bakufu administration—strategic use of his *sobayōnin*. From the distribution of disciplinary actions according to year and from the fact that many of those punished were ranking members of the bakufu bureaucracy, Fukai surmises that Tsunayoshi's punitive measures prepared the ground for the expansion, from the late 1680s on, of the role of the *sobayōnin*.⁸ Among other things, Tsunayoshi used his *sobayōnin* to enlarge shogunal influence over key administrative organs like the *hyōjōsho*. Shortly after becoming shogun he sent Makino Narisada to attend the meetings of the *hyōjōsho*. From 1694, Yanagisawa Yoshiyasu, the key figure among his attendants, performed this function.⁹

The second development which contributed to a rearrangement of the power structure of the bakufu bureaucracy during these years was the growing influence of the professional technical staff within the various offices. To take the *hyōjōsho* as an example, from the mid-1660s, it became customary to keep formal records of judicial proceedings for later reference. Presumably, in the beginning, underlings of the various officials who sat on the *hyōjōsho* performed this job on an ad hoc basis. From 1685, however, staff members of the *kanjō bbugyō* assumed official responsibility for keeping *hyōjōsho* records, and the position of judicial clerk (*hyōjōsho tomyaku*) became a regular bakufu post.¹⁰

The regularization of the position of *hyōjōsho tomyaku* had several side effects. For one, it facilitated an attempt to sort through and edit the

judicial records that had accumulated up to that time. The first major effort in this direction occurred in the last decade of the seventeenth and first of the eighteenth century. Although ranking officials of the *bugyō* supervised the compilation, the *tomeyaku* played a key role in the actual work of compilation and editing.¹¹ The *tomeyaku* also came to take a central part in the judicial process itself. While formally the *bugyō* were responsible for interviewing the parties to a case and handing down a decision, in practice the *tomeyaku* conducted a preliminary investigation and drafted a judgment in accordance with the body of bakufu laws and precedents.¹² *Tomeyaku* involvement in the judicial process led as well to increased emphasis on adhering to established forms and procedures in the submission of suits—a clear indication of bureaucratization.¹³

These general trends continued during the reigns of Ienobu and Letsugu. Regarding judicial affairs in particular, as mentioned in Chapter 3, Ienobu involved himself quite directly in the handling of cases brought before the *bugyō* and *hyōjōsho*. Similarly, as we shall discuss more fully below, the *tomeyaku* continued to play a prominent part in the judicial process. In this sense, there was an ongoing line of development in bakufu administration from the reign of Tsunayoshi through that of Ienobu and Letsugu which culminated in an explicit reshaping of the bakufu bureaucratic structure under Yoshimune.

THE MATURE BAKUFU ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE UNDER YOSHIMUNE

In effect, Yoshimune presided over a synthesis and resolution of the various trends looked at above. He maintained, or carried even further, the momentum of direct shogunal involvement in the administration of popular affairs. Not only did he continue Ienobu's practice of reviewing the records of cases heard by the *bugyō*; in 1721 he arranged to observe personally the *hyōjōsho*'s conduct of fifteen cases. The proceedings, which went on from morning to dusk, were held on the grounds in front of Edo Castle in the presence of the *rōjū* and *wakadoshiyori* and with Yoshimune sitting behind a screen.¹⁴ The establishment of the *meyasubako* later the same year provided Yoshimune with another opportunity to gain direct information about the operation of the bakufu bureaucracy.

Yoshimune also encouraged the development and rationalization of the bakufu bureaucracy. As mentioned in Chapter 5, in 1722 he divided the *kanjō bogyō* into two sections, one responsible for judicial matters, the other for fiscal administration. He further sponsored large-scale compilations of bakufu edicts and judicial precedents. Both measures enlarged the capacity of the bakufu bureaucracy to cope with the increasingly complex social and economic phenomena of the day. Yoshimune pursued as well another innovation vital to the effective functioning of the bureaucracy: the development of a mechanism for promoting people of ability but low rank to positions of bureaucratic authority.

Prior to Yoshimune's reign, two interrelated problems stood as obstacles to the ready promotion of talent. One was the growing importance of *kakaku* as an organizational principle of *bushi* political and social life. As noted in Chapter 1, the idea of *kakaku* assumed a correspondence between the hierarchy of feudal ranks and the hierarchy of bureaucratic and military offices. The premise was that to hold a particular office one should be of a certain feudal rank, indicated most immediately by the size of one's feudal income. The problem was not simply one of symbolic status. Since officeholding was regarded as a part of the holder's feudal obligations to the shogun, he was expected to cover the costs of the office out of his own resources.

In theory, this obstacle to the promotion of talent could be overcome by increasing the hereditary stipend of an able figure of low rank. In actuality, however, this solution was impractical except on an occasional basis. Apart from the reluctance of those of high income and *kakaku* to see significant numbers promoted into their ranks, to increase permanently the stipends of those so elevated would have added to the growing financial difficulties of the bakufu.

During the reigns of Ietsuna and Tsunayoshi, efforts were made to improve conditions for officeholders by creating a system of supplementary grants (*yakuryō*) for certain offices. The main object of these efforts, however, was to alleviate the costs of holding office, not to promote talent. Under the first system, established in the mid-1660s, the size of the grants depended on the office, not the feudal income of the holder, and all appointees to the applicable offices received grants. In 1682, Tsunayoshi abolished this arrangement, but ten years later a revised version

was reestablished. In this second version, the size of grant still depended on the office rather than on the size of the officeholder's original income. However, only those officeholders whose original income fell below a certain level were eligible for the grants.¹⁵ In this sense the purpose of the grants shifted a little in the direction of the promotion of talent. But the fixed size of the grants meant that the system did not radically improve the conditions for officeholding for people whose original income was substantially lower than the specified level. Equally important, the very specification of an expected level of income made more explicit than before the premise of a correspondence between feudal income and eligibility for office.

It remained for Yoshimune to build on this foundation a means for promoting talent. The method devised was the so-called *tashidaka* system, instituted in 1723. Unlike the *yakuryō* system, the *tashidaka* system was geared to the income of the officeholder. Under it an officeholder whose feudal income fell below the level specified for the office was given a temporary supplement to bring him up to the specified level. Upon leaving office, the recipient of a *tashidaka* supplement reverted to his original feudal income. By making the *tashidaka* supplements temporary, Yoshimune managed not to challenge head-on the premises of the *kakaku* structure; he also avoided increasing the bakufu's long-term financial obligations. Thereby he found a way to promote talent within the premises of the existing bureaucratic structure. The subsequent pattern of appointments to key bureaucratic offices testifies to his accomplishment. The average original feudal income of appointees to the posts of *ōmetsuke*, *machi bugyō*, and *kanjō bugyō*—offices where the capability of the holder could have a direct impact on the functioning of the bakufu bureaucracy as a whole—was significantly lower after institution of the *tashidaka* system. The drop was particularly striking for the *kanjō bugyō*, the office most central to the operation of the bakufu administration.¹⁶

In these various ways Yoshimune brought together the trends towards direct shogunal supervision of the administrative structure and towards bureaucratization. The convergence of these developments created the institutional basis for the economic and social policies enacted by the bakufu in the Kyōhō period. But another factor also figured in this successful adjustment: reconciliation of the new institutional order with the

old. As we have just noted, Yoshimune managed to find a way of promoting talent without challenging the standing premises of the bakufu administrative structure. By neither promoting permanently significant numbers of low-ranking retainers to high rank nor ignoring *kakaku* criteria as a key qualification for office, the *tashidaka* system in effect confirmed the continued validity of *kakaku* as a fundamental element of Tokugawa government. Yoshimune took a similar strategy towards the *rōjū*: By formally affirming their traditional place at the center of the bakufu administrative structure, he reduced the polarization between the shogunal circle and the *rōjū* that hampered effective government action in the preceding reigns.

Immediately after his accession, Yoshimune declared to the *rōjū* that they should consult directly with him “whatever the matter”; he intended to do away with the practice dating from Tsunayoshi’s reign of using the shogun’s attendants to transmit communications between the shogun and *rōjū*.¹⁷ In 1725, he further explicitly informed the *bugyō* that, unless the shogun made a specific inquiry of them through his attendants, the *bugyō* should route all communications to him through the *rōjū*, not the shogun’s attendants. The object was to avoid the misapprehensions that could arise when the *rōjū* learned of something after the attendants had been informed or had already dealt with the matter.¹⁸

To a considerable extent, Yoshimune’s reaffirmation of the place of the *rōjū* in the administrative process remained on the level of formality rather than substance. Ōishi Shinzaburō and Fukai Masaumi have shown that, while Yoshimune paid due respect to the *rōjū*, when it came to the actual negotiation of policy decisions, he continued to make extensive use of trusted attendants who had accompanied him from Kii. Ōishi suggests that Yoshimune perfected a double policy formulation structure. Decisions were first hammered out in informal negotiations between the *bugyō*, sitting in concert in the *hyōjōsho*, and the shogun’s attendants. Through his attendants the shogun exerted considerable influence over the proposal that thus took shape. Once an agreement had been reached, the shogun, again, acting through his attendants, directed the *bugyō* to refer the draft of “their” proposal to the *rōjū*. After some further, relatively formalistic, refinement of the draft, the *rōjū* submitted it to the shogun and eventually transmitted the latter’s approval of it to the *bugyō*.¹⁹

We need, therefore, to distinguish between the official and the actual decision-making mechanism. But the recognition of the existence of a parallel informal structure is not to deny the significance of Yoshimune's deliberate reaffirmation of the centrality of the formal structure to the conduct of bakufu business. To the contrary, his skill in interweaving the formal and informal structures contributed to the achievement of a consensus within the bakufu bureaucracy, which in turn made possible formulation and implementation of a series of major policy decisions.

THE ORIENTATION OF HAKUSEKI

Where does Hakuseki fit in the evolution of approaches to bakufu administration that we have just traced? In many ways he was oriented towards a pattern quite different from that consolidated during the reign of Yoshimune. The following section will delineate some of the features that distinguish his outlook on administration from that which took shape under Yoshimune.

CONSULTATION WITH OTHERS AND THE PROMOTION OF TALENT. The perspectives of Hakuseki and Yoshimune on the bakufu administrative mechanism differed in respect to the degree of openness towards input by others into the formulation of policy. Yoshimune saw a positive value in wide consultation. Among the stated purposes of establishment of the *meyasubako* was to encourage even ordinary people to suggest measures that might improve social conditions and the conduct of government. In line with this purpose, Yoshimune implemented a number of suggestions submitted to him via the *meyasubako*. In other instances, he rewarded for forthrightness the person who made a proposal even while rejecting the proposal itself.²⁰

By contrast, as Tsuji Tatsuya points out, Hakuseki was far less open to suggestions from others.²¹ To be sure, there were occasions when he recommended seeking opinion widely. In 1713 he proposed to Akifusa that the bakufu ask the *hatamoto* for suggestions about how to reduce the trend towards extravagance and alleviate their financial burdens. It seems likely, however, that he regarded this procedure as a gesture that would prepare the ground for acceptance of his own proposals on the

subject, and he voiced substantial bitterness when things did not work out that way. His ultimate comment, voiced to Muro Kyūsō, was that “at present one cannot expect consultation with those below to yield a single suggestion of merit.”²²

Similarly, Hakuseki made little effort to develop means of recruiting and promoting talent. Early in his career, on the occasion of his memorial attacking the employment of actors, he criticized the bakufu for limiting the opportunities that once had existed for *rōnin* to find positions within the band of bakufu retainers.²³ In his unsuccessful proposal of measures to reduce the financial burdens of the *hatamoto*, he also pointed out that the costs of bakufu service presented a problem for those with small stipends and argued that a major factor behind those costs were the “unofficial *kakushiki* (status levels)” that had become attached to various bakufu positions, such as head of one of the guard units:

People say that the post of head of the *ōban* guards has the *kakushiki* of a daimyo of 100,000 *koku* or the *kakushiki* of a castle-holder. Consequently, irrespective of the appointee’s personal financial circumstances, he is expected to mount the size of retinue and to arm it in the manner appropriate to the *kakushiki* of a daimyo.

Hakuseki went on to declare that, “even though such a custom may be of long standing, is it not most improper?”²⁴ To help the *hatamoto* live within their means, the bakufu should explicitly eliminate such unofficial *kakushiki*.

In support of this argument, Hakuseki noted that the bakufu already distinguished between the size of the complement of men that vassals were supposed to supply in wartime and the lesser retinue they were expected to mount when attending the shogun on peacetime occasions, like the procession made by Iemitsu to Kyoto in 1634. In addition, during the reigns of Iemitsu and Ietsuna the bakufu had reduced both standards in accordance with the changing needs of the time. Consequently, Hakuseki proposed, a further reduction would be fully appropriate. In particular, in contrast to the existing situation, the bakufu should not expect those holding military or bureaucratic posts to mount retinues larger than those stipulated for off-duty *hatamoto* of the same

stipend level, nor should it impose on the heads of the guard units standards in this regard that were proportionately more rigorous than those applied to the regular members of the units.²⁵

Hakuseki's argument has certain elements in common with the reasoning behind the eventual establishment of the *tashidaka* system. In particular, his proposal that holders of posts like head of an *ōban* guard unit should take with them only the size of retinue appropriate to their original stipend, if implemented, might have opened the door to the appointment of people of lesser feudal status than was currently the case. There is, however, a significant difference between this proposal of Hakuseki's and the *tashidaka* system, which points as well to a divergence in overall orientation. Unofficial *kakushiki* of the sort Hakuseki decried may have added to the financial burdens of the *hatamoto*, but they also were prime emblems of high hereditary status. This was particularly true of the prestigious guard-unit posts, which early had been established as the preserve of the leading *hatamoto*. Reflecting this circumstance, and also the reality that the Tokugawa peace made the promotion of those with military talent less pressing than the promotion of those with administrative ability, posts like head of one of the *ōban* units remained largely unaffected by the adoption of the *tashidaka* system. If anything, the average original income of appointees to the post was higher after adoption of the *tashidaka* system than it had been previously.²⁶ The contrast with the situation regarding key bureaucratic posts serves as a further illustration of Yoshimune's adroit compromise with the principle of *kakaku*. By the same token, Hakuseki's focus on the costs of the guard-unit posts as a key to reduction of the financial burden of the *hatamoto* and his open attack on *kakushiki* that were emblematic of the existing status order indicate that, unlike Yoshimune, he was more interested in challenging the *kakaku* structure as such than in finding ways to promote talent.

Muro Kyūsō's report of a conversation with Hakuseki during this period concerning the recruitment of talent further points up Hakuseki's lukewarm attitude. Kyūsō strongly advocated developing methods for recruiting and promoting men of ability. Indeed, his description of the stipendary system of the Zhou dynasty, written at Yoshimune's request, served as the theoretical basis for the *tashidaka* system.²⁷ However,

when in 1713 Kyūsō remarked to Hakuseki on the importance of seeking out talent among the *hatamoto*, Hakuseki responded that there was little point to making such an effort; the *hatamoto* of the day not only were ignorant but also showed no interest in learning.²⁸

SHOGUN AND BUREAUCRACY: RESPECTIVE ROLES. Hakuseki's doubts about the value of broad consultation and lack of positive effort to find ways to promote talent within the bakufu bureaucracy went hand in hand with another characteristic which differentiates his view of bakufu administration from Yoshimune's. Yoshimune's efforts to promote talent on the one hand and integrate the *rōjū* into the decision-making process on the other demonstrate that, although he involved himself actively in the conduct of government, he did not expect people to regard the shogun as the embodiment of the bakufu. Yoshimune seems, rather, to have conceived of the shogun as an orchestrator responsible for coordinating the activities of a large body of officials. We may perhaps see a reflection of this outlook in the fact that Yoshimune's reign went down in history not only as that of an "enlightened lord," but also as a time of administration by "notable officials." For instance, the figure who, in popular legend, above all sums up the positive qualities of Kyōhō government is Ooka Tadasuke, who served Yoshimune as *Edo machi bugyō* for nineteen years (1717–1736) and as *jisha bugyō* for fifteen years (1736–1751).²⁹

Hakuseki, on the other hand, saw the shogun, assisted by himself, as the central figure in government. He envisioned the shogun as having an unmediated impact on the lives of the people and assumed that the positive response evoked from the populace by benevolent government should be focused on the individual person of the shogun. We may see a graphic illustration of this dimension of his image of the shogunal role in the story of a plea brought before the bakufu by the village of Yase, a hamlet at the foot of Mt. Hiei.

Yase had emerged in the early medieval period as a community of miscellaneous laborers attached to the holdings of Enryakuji, the immense temple situated on the mountain. The community also developed links with the nearby capital. Villagers sold firewood in Kyoto and acquired a hereditary function as palanquin-bearers to the court. Reflecting this connection, in the 1330s Godaigo Tenno granted the villagers

exemption from ordinary taxes. In the early Tokugawa period, the bakufu assigned a number of feudal interests, including the tenno, two temples and the bakufu Confucian, Hayashi *daigaku no kami*, fragmentary holdings in the village, despite its small size and lack of agricultural resources. Because of the intersecting jurisdictions, in practice bakufu *daikan* handled administrative affairs affecting the village. Economically the villagers survived primarily by cutting wood on Mt. Hiei and selling it in Kyoto.³⁰

In 1707, in the last years of Tsunayoshi's reign, another element entered this picture. Prince Kōben, abbot of the leading bakufu ecclesiastical institution, the amalgamated temple of Kan'eiji in Edo and Rin'nōji in Nikkō, and archbishop of the Tendai sect (*Tendai zasu*), requested the bakufu to close the mountain to the villagers because their woodcutting led to "the desecration by women, oxen, and horses of the sacred precincts of the temple devoted to protection of the nation."³¹ The bakufu carried out an investigation of the borders of Enryakuji and Yase and, at the end of 1708, the *rōjū* issued an order declaring that, as the archbishop requested, women, oxen, and horses should not intrude into the areas defined as belonging to the temple.³²

Immediately arguing that the closure deprived them of their traditional means of livelihood, the villagers lodged a protest with bakufu officials in Kyoto. When their appeal was not recognized, they dispatched several of their number to Edo to petition for a reversal of the closure on grounds that their ties with the court and Godaigo's edict underwrote their longstanding custom of cutting wood on the mountain. For over a year their efforts met with little success, but, in the summer of 1710, the bakufu responded finally to the villagers' plea. The decision handed down at this time did not explicitly reverse the earlier confirmation of the inviolability of Hiei's borders. However, it did allow that the villagers' "plea is not without basis," and therefore provided for an alternative solution: The various domain-holders with a proprietary interest in Yase were to be moved elsewhere and the village was to be exempted from all taxes.³³

As Hakuseki depicted the situation in *Oritaku shiba no ki*, this arrangement was personally enacted by Ienobu, who, declaring that it was pitiful to keep such impoverished people month after month in Edo,

interrupted other business to deal with the plight of the villagers. In addition, after asking Hakuseki for his recommendations, and hitting upon an ingenious solution to the knotty problems presented by the case, "as an act of special grace," the shogun personally wrote out the decision in simplified language so that the villagers could readily comprehend it.³⁴ Hakuseki's account of the subsequent development of this case illuminates the political consequences he hoped this "act of special grace" would bring. A few months later, he noted, in the winter of 1710, while in Kyoto to observe the enthronement ceremonies of Nakamikado Tenno, he visited Enryakuji. In the course of making his way up Mt. Hiei, he stopped briefly at Yase and had the opportunity to query the villagers personally about their reaction to the outcome of their plea:

While my attendants ate their noon provisions, I entered a house fronting on the road and rested on the veranda. The owner of the house was an old woman who said her son had gone to Kyoto. When I asked about the plaint, she replied that, after the confirmation of the borders, the villagers had lost their means of getting through the world. Now, however, they felt as if they had been brought back to life as a result of his lordship's grace, and they all prayed for the eternal prosperity of his reign.³⁵

Hakuseki's account of the Yase case provides a clear picture of his concept of the governmental role of the shogun. It also reveals a significant gap between that concept and the actuality of the position of the shogun within the bakufu administrative structure of the early eighteenth century. Hakuseki exaggerated the part played by the shogun in the Yase plaint in at least two ways. On the one hand, he enlarged the degree to which the resolution of the case reflected the personal imprint of the shogun. The decision to exempt Yase from taxes built on the precedent of Godaigo's edict. To reinforce the validity of that precedent, although bakufu *daikan* continued to oversee the affairs of the village, formally Yase was included as a total unit in the holdings of the tenno. Thus, in effect, Yase's historical relationship to the court provided the basis for working out a solution to the conflict between the villagers and Enryakuji. Hakuseki, however, did not mention these features of the case; he did not go into the history of the village or the existence of

Godaigo's edict. Consequently, his account implied that the shogun exercised a bolder initiative than in fact he did.

Hakuseki also exaggerated the role of the shogun by ignoring the part played in the case by other bakufu figures. The account of their plaint compiled by the villagers in 1716 points up this exaggeration. From the perspective of the villagers the key figure behind the resolution of the case was not the shogun, but rather one of the *rōjū*, Akimoto Takatomo. The villagers had made repeated appeals en masse to Akimoto when he went to Kyoto in 1709 in connection with the reconstruction of the imperial palace. In their view he was the only one of the many officials they called upon before and after who showed any sympathy for their situation. Moreover, when the bakufu at length acted on the Yase matter, Akimoto presided over the *hyōjōsho* session where the villagers received the edict that maintained the closure of the Hiei borders but exempted the villagers from taxes. And, even if the shogun had written the edict in simplified language as "an act of special grace," in accordance with bakufu practice it was signed by the *rōjū*, including Akimoto, not the shogun.³⁶ As a result, the villagers seized upon the person of Akimoto as their savior. After his death, a cult gradually developed in Yase to honor his spirit and invoke its continued protection of the village. Eventually the legend took shape that Akimoto, who died of illness in 1714 at the age of 66, had in fact committed suicide as an ultimate effort to convince the bakufu to do something about the villagers' plight.³⁷

The truth of the matter no doubt lies somewhere between Hakuseki's version and that of the Yase villagers. The fact that the shogun does not appear in the villagers' narrative does not mean that he, and Hakuseki, did not contribute to the settlement of the case. On the other hand, the villagers' account reminds us that, as a practical matter, the shogun had to act in concert with others, not as an isolated individual. Yoshimune's approach to bakufu administration paid due heed to this fundamental reality. Hakuseki's, by contrast, came close to ignoring it. As a consequence, his efforts to expand the role of the shogun in the conduct of government inevitably accomplished more on the level of theory than of substance.

THE QUESTION OF BUREAUCRATIZATION. Hakuseki's exaggeration of the role of the shogun connects directly with a third characteristic that differentiates his perspective on bakufu administration from Yoshimune's: a largely negative view of the trend towards bureaucratization. While Yoshimune encouraged that trend in various ways, Hakuseki, as we have already suggested in considering his views on the post-station system, regarded it balefully. In particular, he was critical of its impact on the judicial process. For instance, he voiced strong reservations about the tendency towards standardization in the *bugyō*'s approach to judicial cases. That tendency, he argued, led on the one hand to neglect of the particular features of individual cases and on the other to an inability to resolve cases that could not be dealt with routinely. The directive to the *hyōjōsho* of 1712/9/5 (touched on in Chapter 3) drafted by Hakuseki expressed just such reservations.

The directive began by noting that, originally, the members of the *hyōjōsho* had been expected to gather at dawn on the days set aside for their meeting and to continue their deliberations until the late afternoon. In recent years, however, it continued:

Although the number of cases to be heard has increased greatly, the members of the *hyōjōsho*, perhaps because they have become so expert in such matters and so skillful in their deliberations that they can reach a decision without delay, seem to disperse almost as soon as they have met. If cases are decided simply by relying mechanically on the law without full examination of the principles (*dōri*) involved, his lordship will think it most improper.

Hammering home the point, it added, "Rumors have been heard that the *hyōjōsho* and the *bugyō*, in considering cases, look only at written testimony and do not investigate where the principle of the matter lies, that they ignore the main issue and dig up secondary ones." At the same time, the directive also called the members of the *hyōjōsho* to task for unconscionably delaying judgment in cases they found difficult to decide and for not replying promptly and clearly to inquiries from the shogun about complex cases.³⁸ Similar complaints were reiterated in a directive to the *hyōjōsho* issued in the 4th month of 1716. The latter directive specified that, if the members of the *hyōjōsho* could not reach a decision on a case within one hundred days, they should remand it to the *rōjū*.³⁹

Hakuseki was even more critical of the growing role of the *tomeyaku*; he portrayed them as little more than a channel for corruption of the judicial process. For instance, in *Oritaku shiba no ki*, after describing what he regarded as a series of misjudgments on the part of the *bugyō* and *hyōjōsho*, culminating in the case of the family from Kii lured to Edo on false pretenses, he declared:

In recent years, such cases have all been decided simply by following the recommendations of the *hyōjōsho* clerks (*tomeyakunin*), people whose function is to record the day's proceedings. In this case, the innkeeper and the people from the brothel district all bribed these clerks with an eye to avoiding punishment, and the members of the *hyōjōsho*, in accordance with their practice, adopted the recommendations of the clerks. What sort of a thing is it to leave the administration of the justice of the realm up to the arbitrary judgment of people such as these clerks?⁴⁰

Such criticisms of the negative features of judicial bureaucratization were not limited to Hakuseki. Yoshimune maintained the above two directives as guidelines for the *hyōjōsho*, and an argument over the pros and cons of standardizing judicial procedures continued to reverberate throughout later bakufu legal history. While the staff of the *bugyō* took the typically bureaucratic position that it was more equitable to adhere to established criteria in deciding cases, those in the top echelons of government repeatedly called upon the *bugyō* not to apply the law mechanically.⁴¹

Nevertheless, when considered in the light of their overall perspective on the bakufu bureaucracy, Hakuseki's attack on the current practices of the *hyōjōsho* and Yoshimune's maintenance of the directives formulated by Hakuseki carried quite different implications. While Yoshimune endeavored to check on and improve the performance of bakufu officials, he took a basically positive view of the role of the bureaucracy in bakufu government. He thus recognized the dangers of trying to keep too tight a rein on the activities of his officials. A report by Muro Kyūsō on the shogun's remarks to the *kanjō* officials several months after installation of the *meyasubako* well illustrates these two sides to Yoshimune's approach to the bakufu bureaucracy. According to Kyūsō, Yoshimune told the officials that many people had deposited criticisms of the bureau-

cracy's conduct of affairs in the *meyasubako*. However, since he knew that not everything people said was to be believed, the *kanjō* officials could rest assured that the shogun would weigh all factors in evaluating such criticisms. Thus they should not let fear of objections from the populace interfere with the performance of their duties.⁴² This episode shows that, while Yoshimune developed strategies for keeping bakufu officials in line, he was prepared to allow them an essential degree of initiative. That combination made for a dynamic relationship between the shogun and the bureaucracy, which helps explain the substantial governmental achievements of the Kyōhō period.

By contrast, underlying Hakuseki's criticism of the impact of bureaucratization on the performance of bakufu officials was a suspicion of the bureaucracy as such that tended towards a polarized rather than dynamic relationship between the shogun and his officials. Hakuseki repeatedly castigated not only underlings like the *tomeyaku* but also ranking members of the bakufu bureaucracy for failing to show the compassion for the people and the judgment incumbent upon a good official. His comments on the consequences of a fire at the bakufu prison where people waiting the disposition of their cases were detained offers an example. The fire, which occurred early in 1716, had resulted in the escape of a number of detainees, including some who "had been in prison for sixteen or seventeen years, in the course of which the nature of the crime they had been accused of had been forgotten. Moreover, in many cases their relatives and connections had died in the interim, making it difficult to track them down."⁴³

When Akifusa asked his opinion on what to do about this situation, Hakuseki first of all took the *bugyō* to task for the existence of the problem. He noted that, while to escape from prison was unquestionably wrong,

when a member of the lower orders meets such a situation, it is his natural instinct to think that by fleeing he can escape the straits in which he finds himself. Moreover, how is it that these people confined to prison for many years without their crime being decided did not benefit from the great and ordinary amnesties proclaimed at various times in the past several years? To judge them all harshly now would be truly pitiable.

For the future he proposed establishing a policy that those who sought to escape under such circumstances would have the penalty for their original crime increased by one degree while those who did not attempt to escape would have the penalty for their original crime reduced by one degree. However, in this particular instance, he argued, the bakufu should

first release all those whose crime can no longer be ascertained; then, among the rest, the punishments of those who refrained from escaping should all be reduced by one degree; thereafter no further effort should be made to trace down the escapees as yet unaccounted for. The whole problem has arisen because of lack of compassion and insight on the part of the *bugyō* officials. I cannot say how improper this is.⁴⁴

Hakuseki did not express such an opinion only in this one instance. More frequently than not he depicted bakufu officials as behaving in a way to undermine popular trust. The conclusion to the 1712 directive to the *hyōjōsho* sums up this dimension of his perspective on the bureaucracy:

The office of the *bugyō* is where the government of the realm is conducted; the right and wrong of myriad affairs is decided there. Thus, if things continue as at present, it does not simply constitute malfeasance on the part of the *bugyō*; it warps the conduct of government and makes it impossible for the people to rest easily.⁴⁵

What does this picture of an antagonistic relationship between the people and the bakufu bureaucracy imply for Hakuseki's concept of the relationship between the bureaucracy and the shogun? In effect the shogun (and Hakuseki as his mentor) emerges as a figure whose mission is not so much to cooperate with and work through the bureaucracy as to protect the people from his own officials. Given Hakuseki's outlook, the bakufu bureaucracy inevitably was hostile towards his endeavors to improve the conduct of government. Muro Kyūsō reported that, during Ietsugu's reign, the *hyōjōsho* members responded to the criticism in the directive of 1712/9 that they tended to "disperse almost as soon as they have met" by grumbling that, "thanks to Arai," they were forced to sit aimlessly in council even after finishing their business, with nothing to do from early afternoon until it grew dark.⁴⁶ They also, he recorded

Hakuseki complaining, deliberately avoided discussing any cases of consequence on the days when Akifusa was scheduled to attend their deliberations.⁴⁷ Hakuseki noted in his autobiography that, when Ietsugu died, a month after the 1716 directive had been issued, one of the *rōjū* informed the *bugyō* that “now there is no need to adhere to the recent directive to report cases not resolved within one hundred days.” Hakuseki commented, “I heard that they were all happy about this. Those in the *bugyō* offices may well rest easily, but what about the tribulations of the people of the realm?”⁴⁸

We need not doubt Hakuseki’s commitment to lessening the tribulations of the populace. But it also is unquestionably true that his efforts to enlarge the direct role of the shogun in bakufu administration and his mistrust of the bureaucracy fostered a polarization between the bureaucracy and the shogunal circle that worked against realization of the ideal of extending sagely government throughout the realm.

THE GROUNDS FOR HAKUSEKI’S POSITION

Hakuseki’s approach to the administration of popular affairs thus put him at odds with developments that culminated in the reorganization of the bureaucracy under Yoshimune and, at the same time, subverted realization of his own ideals. What, then, caused him to take such an approach? The answer would seem to lie in a combination of factors. We can detect in his outlook the influence of Confucian premises about government; we also can see the pull of his personal circumstances and psychology.

Confucian notions clearly shaped, for example, Hakuseki’s remonstrations about trends in the handling of judicial matters. As we noted in discussing his views on the post-station system, the Confucian political tradition carried with it a distaste for relying on clerks to handle the business of government. Confucian thinkers, particularly those active from the Song period on, also regarded with distrust rigid application of the law. According to the classic Confucian ideal, it was incumbent upon the official to locate each matter he addressed in a comprehensive moral field. In dealing with judicial matters, he should consider the particularities of each case in the light of reason, formed and refined by his education in the Way. He thereby would be able to distinguish between

what was of primary importance and what was secondary and to find a resolution that maintained this scale of priorities. We can readily see the influence of such ideas in Hakuseki's criticism of the growing role of the *tomeyaku* and in his strictures to the *hyōjōsho* about the necessity to examine the *dōri* of each case and not simply rely mechanically on the law.

But, while Confucian premises played an important part in Hakuseki's approach to popular governance, we should note some distinctive nuances in his application of them. Hakuseki's vision of the role of the shogun as sage unquestionably was more orthodox than was Tsunayoshi's. On the other hand, there is a certain extremism, philosophically as well as practically, to his depiction of the shogun extending benevolence throughout the realm more or less single-handedly. His emphasis on the ruler's obligation to show compassion for the weak coupled with his essential disregard of the responsibility to educate the people also constitutes an imbalanced presentation of the classic Confucian ideal of government. The same may be said of his concentration on the negative aspects of bureaucratization at the expense of attention to the development of ways to recruit "good" officials.

It is in this imbalance that we can see the influence of Hakuseki's situation on his intellectual outlook. As we noted in Chapter 5, Hakuseki's place on the fringes of the bakufu administrative structure disposed him to regard with hostility the growing role of the bureaucracy in Tokugawa government. This hostility conditioned his reading of Confucianism in two quite different ways. On the one hand, it drew his attention to those elements in Confucian thought that stressed the negative dimensions of bureaucratization. On the other, it caused him to play down those, like the call for the active recruitment of good officials, that affirmed the centrality of the bureaucracy to the governing process.

We can perceive a similar conjunction of factors in Hakuseki's elaboration of the role of the shogun. His insistence on the national dimensions of the shogunal role, and his readiness in this context to challenge the ambiguity of the *bakuhan* structure, undoubtedly were fueled by aspects of Confucian political thought that we shall consider in more depth later. At the same time, the expansive character of Hakuseki's vision of the shogun as ruler bespeaks the intrinsically bold and aggres-

sive psychological outlook that we took note of in Chapter 4. His inclination to dispute established powers perhaps helps also to explain Hakuseki's emphasis on the redress-offering rather than the didactic function of the ruler. Both functions alike established an immediate tie between the ruler and the populace. But, in the context of the *bakuhan* system, enlargement of the redress-offering dimension of the shogunal role served more directly to increase the authority of the shogun relative to that of the daimyo.

Regarding Hakuseki's depiction of the place of the shogun within the bakufu administrative process, one must again take account of his own ambiguous position within the shogunal circle. His isolation from the bureaucratic chain of command quite naturally inclined him to stress the personal impact of the ruler on the conduct of government and thus to single out for emphasis those features of Confucian political theory that advanced a similar view. This is particularly true of his perspective on the shogun's judicial role. Justice was the area of popular governance where there was the greatest potential for the shogun to exercise a direct influence on the conduct of affairs. It also was the area where Hakuseki could most readily gain the shogun's ear.

It is clear that the interaction of Confucian precepts and situational factors in Hakuseki's approach to popular governance encouraged him to emphasize the abstract dimensions of shogunal authority at the expense of the substantive enlargement of shogunal power. To put the matter in this way, however, is not to deny the significance and interest of Hakuseki's efforts. As we shall see, his attempt to enhance the abstract authority of the shogun, carried into other areas of government, led him into a more open confrontation with the ambiguities of the *bakuhan* structure than that which we have delineated here. And that confrontation not only illuminated Hakuseki's political outlook; it also threw into relief the essential character of the bakufu and the nature of the interaction between the premises of Tokugawa rule and those of Confucian political thought.

EIGHT

The Creation of a King: Reshaping the Symbols of Shogunal Authority

Of all the policies associated with Hakuseki, the most controversial were those involving the redefinition of the symbols of shogunal authority. These included a variety of changes in bakufu ceremonial practices, the reshaping of the forms of protocol used in diplomatic intercourse between the shogun and the king of Korea, and revision of the *Buke shohatto*, the basic code governing relations between the bakufu and the daimyo. Contemporaries criticized these measures for breaking with the traditions of *buke* rule and for seeking “to turn Edo into something like the imperial court.”¹ Upon his succession, Yoshimune promptly reversed Hakuseki’s innovations in this area. As a result, these aspects of Hakuseki’s program had no lasting impact on the history of the bakufu, leading scholars in recent decades to regard them as essentially inconsequential. Tsuji Tatsuya, for instance, remarks that “the policies of the Shōtoku era abolished under Yoshimune did not have that much meaning even during Shōtoku.”² Despite their ephemeral existence, however, the measures abolished by Yoshimune, as well as other innovations that never got beyond the stage of a written proposal, were significant to the thrust of bakufu politics in the Shōtoku period. Central to what Hakuseki sought to do, they are vital to an understanding of the place of his efforts in the context of Tokugawa history.

Several concerns shaped Hakuseki’s attention to the symbolic expression of shogunal authority. One was the desire to resolve the ambiguity in the bakufu’s depiction of the role of the shogun and justification of

its existence. Just as the bakufu both claimed to act as a national government and limited itself to the role of a hegemonic leader of the daimyo, it took a contradictory approach to legitimizing the authority it exercised. On the one hand, bakufu leaders stressed the bakufu's preeminence as an autonomous political entity. On the other, they sought to take advantage of the imperial court's traditional role as a font of political legitimacy, thereby tacitly affirming the assumption that the court continued to possess, on the symbolic level at least, a national authority superior to that of the bakufu.

Hakuseki's desire to correct the ambiguity in the definition of shogunal authority sprang in considerable measure from his conviction that it was socially and politically deleterious. Social and political order, in his view, depended on the ruler's commanding respect as an incontrovertible monarch. This conviction intersected with his determination, as a member of the shogunal circle, to enlarge the authority of the shogun and reduce that of the *fudai* old guard. A new bakufu ceremonial and diplomatic protocol could be used to surround the shogun with a more imposing aura of authority. Since existing ceremonial practices had become part of the *kakaku* status system underlying the entrenched position of the *fudai*, changes in those practices also offered a means of challenging the *fudai* hold on power. Furthermore, emphasis on such matters served to enlarge Hakuseki's own voice within shogunal councils. Ceremonial was an area where he, as a Confucian scholar, could claim undisputed expertise; it also was an area where he could consolidate a direct line of communication between himself and the shogun.

Hakuseki's endeavors towards redefinition of the symbols of shogunal authority thus cast light on the overall thrust of his program. They have another significance as well. More clearly than any other aspect of his program they reveal the impact on him of specific Confucian political concepts. Confucian theory impressed upon Hakuseki the importance of clarifying the basis of the shogun's authority and provided him with an arsenal of methods for doing so. Thus Hakuseki's efforts in this area and the problems he encountered can tell us much about the interaction between Confucian theory and Tokugawa socio-political reality.

We shall pursue this issue first by examining the structure of bakufu legitimacy as it had evolved up to the Shōtoku era and the premises with

which Hakuseki approached the symbolic definition of shogunal authority. Thereupon we will take up some of the concrete innovations intended to enhance the legitimacy and political authority of the shogun by making him a more specifically monarchal figure and to transform the daimyo from the feudal associates of a hegemon into the obedient subordinates of a king.

THE STRUCTURE OF BAKUFU LEGITIMACY

The legitimacy of the Tokugawa bakufu rested on an aggregate of elements. In the early 1600s, the claim of the Tokugawa to national hegemony was not yet uncontested. The memory of the Toyotomi polity was kept alive until 1615, and the daimyo who under the Toyotomi had been peers of the Tokugawa did not necessarily view the extension of Tokugawa power with enthusiasm. Consequently, during the first decades of Tokugawa rule, the Tokugawa leaders relied to a substantial extent on links with the imperial court to reinforce their authority vis-à-vis the daimyo. The first three shogun went up to the capital to receive investiture as shogun and thus as head of the *bushi* of the nation. Both Ieyasu and Hidetada used Kyoto as the setting for political moves that bore significantly on their relations with the daimyo, thereby implying, symbolically at least, that they were acting with imperial sanction. Ieyasu utilized the occasion of Gomizunoo Tenno's coronation in 1611 to extract oaths of loyalty from twenty-two western daimyo and to issue a three-article forerunner of the *Buke shohatto*, calling upon the daimyo to be loyal to the shogunal house and not to harbor outlaws within their domains. Similarly, Hidetada first issued patents of fief to all the daimyo simultaneously at the time of his visit to Kyoto in 1617, and chose the occasion of his sojourn in Kyoto in 1619 to take punitive action against Fukushima Masanori, a major Toyotomi daimyo, for engaging in an unsanctioned expansion of his castle in Hiroshima. Hidetada further consolidated Tokugawa ties with the imperial house by installing his daughter as a consort to Gomizunoo. And, to enhance the effectiveness of the traditional aura of authority surrounding the court which they thus sought to share in, the Tokugawa also contributed financially to the revival of the court from the extremities into which it had descended

during the Sengoku period. Ieyasu and Hidetada rebuilt and enlarged the imperial palace and, when Gomizunoo's daughter (Hidetada's granddaughter) became tenno upon the abdication of her father in 1629, the bakufu sponsored the restoration of various ceremonies connected with the coronation which had fallen into abeyance.³

The founders of the bakufu also recognized, however, the dangers of tacitly subordinating themselves to the court by relying too heavily on its legitimizing powers. Thus, while with one hand the first shogun sought to shelter themselves under the authority of the court, with the other they endeavored to establish their preeminence and preserve their independence. In 1613 and 1615, the bakufu issued codes regulating the parameters of court activity. The Tokugawa also took steps to control the award to *bushi* of ranks and court offices within the age-old imperial *kan'i* system. By now, that system was devoid of substantial content, but, in the absence of alternative indications of public civil authority, it remained symbolically potent, and the first shogun attempted to restrict the capacity of the system to establish unmediated links between the court and the *buke* class. In 1606, Ieyasu ordered the court not to award *kan'i* to any *bushi* unless the bakufu had recommended him for the honor. Article 7 of the code issued to the court in 1615, the *Kinchū narabi ni kuge shohatto*, further stipulated that the *kan'i* awarded to *bushi* were to be regarded as separate from those granted *kuge*. Through these two measures the bakufu not only sought to forestall the formation of direct links between the daimyo and the court, but also to free the *kan'i* system, a key endower of social and political status, from control by the court and to make it available to manipulation by the Tokugawa for their own ends. In accordance with this intention, from 1620 *buke* names no longer appeared in the *Kugyō bunin*, the court list of holders of high (generally 3rd rank and above) court rank. Thereafter, the shogun was not listed among the ranks of the high court nobility, a symbolic indication that, while he received high rank, as well as his appointment as shogun, from the tenno, he was not an official of the court duty bound to carry out the latter's commands.⁴

To reinforce their domestic political legitimacy and establish its autonomous nature, the first Tokugawa shogun also, as Ronald Toby has shown, made extensive use of diplomatic relations. Particularly they

availed themselves of the political recognition conferred by embassies from the rulers of Korea and the Ryukyus. Ieyasu made a point of insisting that the first Korean embassy, of 1607, present itself to Hidetada in Edo before calling on himself, in retirement in Sunpu. Thereby he “stressed the institutional nature of bakufu power and the hereditary nature of the shogunal office.”⁵ Similarly, Hidetada was able to utilize the fortuitous arrival of the Korean embassy of 1617 in Kyoto during his stay there to balance bakufu reliance on the symbolic authority of the court with a demonstration to the court and the assembled daimyo that the Korean king recognized him as the ruler of Japan.⁶ Embassies from the Korean and Ryukyuan kings to congratulate each new shogun on his accession—sent at bakufu request—came to parallel investiture by the tenno as one of the rituals of succession whereby the shogun’s legitimacy was reconfirmed.

Another important move towards establishing an autonomous font of legitimacy for the bakufu was the creation of a cult centered around Ieyasu. Shortly before his death, Ieyasu had informed three key advisors, including the Tendai monk Tenkai and the Zen priest Süden, that he should be buried at Kunōzan in Sunpu and that, after a year, a small hall should be erected at Nikkō to enshrine his spirit so that he could act as the protector deity of the eight Kanto provinces.⁷ The focus on the eight Kanto provinces reflects the centrality of that region to Tokugawa power. At the same time, according to the *Tokugawa jikki*, Ieyasu did not forget the still unstable western provinces. He instructed the person in charge of overseeing the memorial hall at Kunōzan that his memorial image (*shinzō*) should be placed facing west so as to pacify and protect the western provinces.⁸

The burial rites at Kunōzan were carried out according to the then standard Yoshida Shinto ritual. Shortly thereafter, however, largely at the instigation of Tenkai, it was decided that Ieyasu should be enshrined as a *gongen* (avatar) in the Tendai affiliated Sannō Ichijitsu Shinto tradition.⁹ Tenkai went up to Kyoto to make arrangements for the bestowal of Ieyasu’s title as a *gongen*. Out of four titles proffered by the court, the bakufu chose that of Tōshō daigongen (great avatar illuminating the east), and, early in 1617, an imperial envoy presented this title before Ieyasu’s grave at Kunōzan. Immediately thereafter, Ieyasu’s remains were

removed from Kunōzan to Nikkō where, on the first anniversary of his death, they were reinterred in the newly built Tōshō shrine in the presence of the shogun, Hidetada, the assembled daimyo, and envoys from the court.¹⁰

The deification of Ieyasu established a bakufu-centered sanctioning authority. Arguably the following years, and particularly the 1630s and 1640s, saw an increasing emphasis on such autonomous sources of legitimacy instead of reliance on connections with the court to reinforce the position of the bakufu. As Asao Naohiro points out, Iemitsu, the third shogun, made only one trip to Kyoto after assuming sole leadership of the bakufu upon the death of his father, Hidetada, in 1632. On the occasion of that trip, in 1634, Iemitsu led a massive procession of daimyo and their assembled forces (according to the *Tokugawa jikki* the forces accompanying Iemitsu totalled 307,000 men) and engaged in a lavish display of bakufu wealth and largess. Asao contends that, in contrast to the frequent shogunal trips to Kyoto in the first three decades of Tokugawa rule, undertaken to further the consolidation of Tokugawa power, this one was intended to demonstrate that consolidation had been achieved. Of symbolic note, Iemitsu's 1634 sojourn was the last shogunal visit to Kyoto until the *bakumatsu* period.¹¹

Similarly, the 1630s witnessed the strengthening of the major bakufu-centered pillars of shogunal legitimacy. In those years, the bakufu developed a comprehensive structure for the management of foreign relations, including the adoption of a title for the shogun, *taikun*, designed to point up the autonomy and majesty of the shogun as ruler of Japan.¹² Parallel to this development in the area of diplomatic relations, Tenkai and Iemitsu carried out a significant elaboration of the Ieyasu cult. The shrine to Ieyasu at Nikkō was completely rebuilt at bakufu expense, while in Edo the bakufu erected the immense temple of Kan'eiji as an affiliate of the Nikkō shrine, the headquarters of all the Tendai temples in the eastern half of the nation, and the major center of bakufu religious activities.¹³

The weight of the Ieyasu cult was enhanced further by the elevation in 1645 of the status of the Tōshō shrine from a *sha* (a term used of shrines in general) to a *miya* (*gū*; a term reserved for certain particularly prominent shrines, such as the Ise shrines or the Hachiman shrines).

The imperial proclamation announcing this change declared that henceforth unceasing reverence should be shown for the Tōshō deity throughout the land. In line with this declaration, the court agreed the following year to send an imperial envoy to make offerings at the Nikkō Tōshōgū on an annual basis.¹⁴ In the same period, the bakufu persuaded the Korean and Ryukyuan embassies to extend their journey to Nikkō and to present offeratory objects which, displayed prominently before the shrine, served to impress upon those who called at the Tōshōgū that awe for Ieyasu extended beyond the shores of Japan.¹⁵

Too great an emphasis, however, on these moves towards an autonomous sanction for shogunal rule carries the danger of oversimplifying the bakufu's approach to legitimizing its power. Even as they sought to strengthen bakufu-centered sanctioning agents, bakufu leaders continued to rely also on the time-tested capacity of the court to confer legitimacy. Indeed the two strategies were inextricably interwoven. The bakufu might insist upon the separation of *buke* from *kuge kan'i* and the necessity for *buke* recipients of *kan'i* to be recommended to the court by the shogun. Nevertheless, the court remained incontestably the source of *kan'i*. Thus, while the different levels of *kan'i* became important indications of status in the feudal hierarchy focused around the shogun, they also linked the recipient to a symbolic order centered upon the *tenno*. This was true even after the bakufu adopted in the reign of Tsunayoshi the practice of specifying *buke kan'i* awards before the formal appointment was issued by Kyoto.¹⁶ A retainer of Tsunayoshi's contemporary, the independent-minded Tokugawa Mitsukuni of Mito, noted that, every New Year's morning, Mitsukuni put on the court dress appropriate to his *kan'i* rank and made an obeisance in the direction of Kyoto. The retainer added that Mitsukuni instructed his close vassals: "My lord (*shunkun*) is the *tenno*. The present shogun is the head of my family (*sōshitsū*). One must take care not to misunderstand this situation."¹⁷ The anecdote vividly attests to the complex nuances in the triangular relationship between shogun, *tenno*, and high-ranking members of the *buke* class fostered by the bakufu's utilization of the near thousand-year-old *kan'i* structure.

Similarly, while elaboration of the Tōshō cult was intended to strengthen the position of the bakufu by exalting the divine status of

Ieyasu, the accomplishment of that end required the mediation of the court. It was the tenno who both conferred on Ieyasu's spirit the title of *gongen* and who elevated his status as such to nationwide prominence. Asao argues that, while from 1646 on the tenno annually sent envoys to offer his respects at the Tōshōgū in Nikkō, just as he did to his ancestral shrine at Ise, the bakufu did not post envoys to Ise. He concludes that this imbalance testifies to the bakufu's success in establishing the preeminence of the Tōshōgū.¹⁸ But, contrary to Asao's assertion, the bakufu *did* send regular envoys to Ise. The dispatch of parallel bakufu envoys to Nikkō and Ise constituted one of the ceremonial events of the new year.¹⁹ The envoys from the court added to the air of sanctity surrounding the Nikkō Tōshōgū, but they are better perceived as one side of a reciprocal arrangement than as a unilateral concession on the part of the court.²⁰

A comparable phenomenon characterized other aspects of the Tōshōgū cult. Tenkai fabricated a grandiose theology for that cult, but, to give Kan'eiji a stature comparable to that of Enryakuji, long affiliated with the court and the traditional headquarters of the Tendai sect, he sought to install an imperial prince as his successor as abbot of the temple. His plans were thwarted by Gomizunoo Tenno, who refused to make his son a disciple of the bakufu "country priest." Eventually, after Tenkai's death, a compromise was reached whereby the prince in question first entered the tutelage of one of the prince-abbots attached to Enryakuji and then came down to Edo to serve as head priest of the Nikkō complex. Eventually he was appointed to the newly created abbacy of Rinnōji, encompassing both Nikkō and Kan'eiji, and also designated archbishop of the Tendai sect.²¹ The presence of a prince-abbot made it possible for the bakufu to reduce the authority of Enryakuji and to extend its own influence over the Tendai sect. But this strategy, like the deification of Ieyasu, points up the paradox that the bakufu had to borrow the spiritual authority of the court to create something of comparable potency.

Various points may be adduced to account for this intertwining of autonomous and court-dependent strategies of legitimization and for the consequent ambiguity they implanted in the symbolic relationship between the bakufu and the court. Bitō Masahide suggests that the success

of the early modern political rulers in breaking the power of the religious institutions that had been a central component of the medieval state not only left their power “naked” vis-à-vis the populace but also limited the efficacy of their efforts to disguise that nakedness through measures such as self-deification. This situation, he argues, made the traditional polity headed by the *tenno* an essential element in the *bakuhan* structure of rule.²²

It is also possible to see the contradictions inherent in this intertwining of strategies as a legacy of the process of political consolidation. The shogun and their advisors did not follow an overarching theoretical program for legitimizing Tokugawa rule. They made step-by-step pragmatic decisions in a constantly evolving situation and evidently felt little need to reconcile any resulting inconsistencies. Tokugawa utilization of the *kan'i* system illustrates this circumstance. The potency of the *kan'i* system lay in its capacity to confer a publicly recognized symbolic political authority on the holder. Prior to the extermination of the Toyotomi, manipulation of this capacity offered the Tokugawa a means of extending control over Toyotomi vassals who did not yet acknowledge the Tokugawa as their feudal lord. Thus, while choosing to rule as shogun rather than claim, as had Hideyoshi, the posts of *kanpaku-daijōdaijin*, the pinnacle of the *kan'i* system, Ieyasu upheld that system and sought to secure the ability to manipulate it to his own advantage by stipulating that no *bushi* was to receive *kan'i* without the recommendation of the Tokugawa.²³ The elimination of the Toyotomi and consequent enrollment of all the *bushi* of the nation as the direct or rear vassals of the Tokugawa reduced the need of the Tokugawa to rely on such devices to expand their power. Nevertheless, by then the *kan'i* system was an established element of the Tokugawa political status structure. Consequently, the shogun continued to honor it, even as they attempted to play down its attendant implications that public political authority derived from the *tenno* rather than the shogun.

The concurrent sustaining of intrinsically distinct strategies of legitimation characterized subsequent reigns as well. For instance, Tsunayoshi, who, as we have seen, sought to enlarge the national authority of the shogun, endeavored to embellish the Tōshōgū as the spiritual backdrop of the bakufu. At the same time, he sought to restore various defunct

emblems of the spiritual and political centrality of the court. Tsunayoshi undertook the expansion and completion of the Kan'eiji temple complex and the repair and refurbishing of both Kunōzan and the Nikkō Tōshō-gū. (Among other things, Tsunayoshi replaced the stone sepulchre containing Ieyasu's remains with the present bronze one.)²⁴ On the other side of the balance, Tsunayoshi sponsored an effort to identify and restore the tombs of the tenno. The identification of 66 of the 78 tombs attributed to tenno from the first, Jinmu, to the 103rd, Gohanazono (r. 1428–1464), results from this undertaking.²⁵ Equally significantly, Tsunayoshi restored the ceremony for designation of the crown prince (*rit-taishi shiki*) and the most solemn of imperial rituals, the *daijōsai*, the grand ceremonial offering of the first fruits to Amaterasu ōmikami, which, theoretically held once each reign, marked the full transmission of imperial sacral authority to the reigning tenno. The former ceremony had not been performed since the 1340s, the latter since the 1460s.²⁶

Considered in light of the rise of loyalism to the throne and the rapid disintegration of bakufu authority in the *bakumatsu* period, this kind of ambiguity in the bakufu approach to legitimization constituted a latent weakness. But, for most of the Tokugawa period, the inconsistency was not dysfunctional; from the early to the last decades of Tokugawa rule it posed no readily perceptible threat to the stability of the bakufu. Hakuseki, however, saw in it something highly problematic, and the attempt to correct the situation constituted the boldest of his efforts to restructure the form of shogunal rule.

Several factors served to focus Hakuseki's attention on this matter. What principally caused him to take issue with the existing strategies of shogunal legitimization and shaped his efforts to redefine those strategies were various basic premises of Chinese Confucian political thought.

BASIC PREMISES OF CONFUCIAN POLITICAL THOUGHT

From Confucianism Hakuseki derived two principles which had a fundamental impact on his approach to the symbolic definition of shogunal authority. One was the belief that the ruler should exercise a comprehensive and unambiguous authority over the realm; the other was the conviction that ceremonial practices and protocol—what Confucians

referred to as *rei* (Ch.: *li*)—were a primary means for clarifying and sustaining that authority.

THE PRINCIPLE OF COMPREHENSIVE AUTHORITY. The assumption that the realm should be unified under the rule of one figure who combined in his person military and civil, sacerdotal and temporal authority was fundamental to Confucian political thought. “Unification” did not necessarily mean the centralization of authority. In the minds of generations of Confucian thinkers, such unification was fully compatible with the feudal ideal of the ruler entrusting immediate jurisdiction over a particular section of the realm to his hierarchical subordinates. What was crucial was the preservation of the hierarchy and the consequent recognition of the ruler as the sole ultimate source of authority. Only in such circumstances could social order be preserved. As the *Analects* put it:

When the Way prevails in the realm, ritual and music and punitive military expeditions proceed from the Son of Heaven. When the Way does not prevail in the realm, ritual and music and punitive military expeditions proceed from the feudal lords. When these things proceed from the feudal lords, as a rule, the cases will be few in which they do not lose their power in ten generations. . . . When the rear vassals [of the feudal lords] control the affairs of state, as a rule, the cases will be few in which they do not lose their power in three generations.²⁷

A millennium and a half later, in his comprehensive history of China, Sima Guang made much the same point. Categorizing different types of ruler, Sima Guang declared that simply to establish a measure of social order and to maintain altars to the deities of the soil and grain was insufficient to be considered a king, in other words, a “true” ruler. The king was someone “who united the myriad states and who set up laws and institutions and issued commands that no one within the realm dared to disobey.” When the king was no longer able to exercise such authority, various contenders for power appeared. Sometimes one of them was strong enough to invoke respect for the nominal Son of Heaven as a means of establishing himself as the leader of the other feudal lords. But such a figure could only be considered a “hegemon,” not a king, and the emergence of such a phenomenon heralded the descent into social and political chaos.²⁸

In line with this perspective, Sima Guang began his history with an event which demonstrated that the ruler, by failing properly to preserve an unambiguous authority, contributed to the spread of disorder. Starting where the *Zuo zhuan* (the commentary on the *Chun qiu*, the history attributed to Confucius) had left off, Sima Guang pointed out that the Zhou king had abrogated the hierarchical order on which his own authority rested by admitting to the ranks of the feudal lords three “rear vassals” who had usurped the authority of their erstwhile lord and dismembered their native state. That abrogation invited further usurpations and led inevitably to the final destruction of the Zhou ruling house.²⁹

The influence of such ideas on Hakuseki is readily apparent. It may be seen most compactly in the historical works where he, like Sima Guang and, according to tradition, Confucius, set forth his views on what made for a stable and legitimate political regime. We shall discuss Hakuseki’s historical works more fully below in considering the arguments he set forth to justify and defend his program. Here we may simply introduce some of the evidence they, and most particularly *Tokushi yoron*, his account of the decline of imperial power and the rise of the *buke* from the Heian to the Tokugawa period, provide of his absorption of the Chinese premise that the ruler, to be a true ruler, should preserve an undivided, unambiguous, and autonomous authority.

Emulating Sima Guang, Hakuseki began *Tokushi yoron* with an event that, like the Zhou king’s abrogation of the hierarchical order, introduced an equivocal element into the ruler’s authority and opened the door to its disintegration. This was Montoku Tenno’s designation of his infant son by the daughter of Fujiwara no Yoshifusa, the later Seiwa Tenno, as crown prince. Hakuseki stressed that, not only was it unprecedented to appoint an infant as crown prince; in bowing to pressure from Yoshifusa and selecting Seiwa as his heir, Montoku passed over three elder sons by other mothers. He thus presented Montoku’s contravention of the proper hierarchical order as responsible for the succession of a minor upon the death of Montoku eight years later and for the development that paved the way for usurpation of the substance of imperial power by the Fujiwara, assumption of the post of regent by Yoshifusa.³⁰

Beginning his account with this event, Hakuseki proceeded to show

how a line once acknowledged as legitimate could lose its legitimacy. The argument he pursued was precisely that of Chinese Confucians like Sima Guang, namely, that the ruler's failure to uphold the norms of the natural order undermined his own authority by compromising his ability to maintain social order and compel the obedience of all within the realm.

The corollary to this premise was that a ruler whose substantive historical position qualified him to act as a "king," a "true" ruler, to fulfill his mission as such had to manifest the dignity appropriate to the figure at the pinnacle of the political and social hierarchy. In Confucian terminology, he had to bring about the congruence of "name" and "substance." More concretely, to establish his legitimacy, he had to clarify his role as the proper source of the symbols as well as the substance of sovereignty, thereby demonstrating his possession of the comprehensive authority that Confucius referred to under the rubric of "ritual and music and military expeditions."

Examining previous *buke* regimes, Hakuseki held that they had failed to carry out this essential responsibility of the ruler. Instead of adhering to "the principle of according with change" and adopting the symbols of authority appropriate to those changes, they had followed the mistaken course of the hegemon: They had attempted to assert their preeminence over other contenders for power by "raising up" a powerless emperor "and issuing edicts in his name."³¹ In so doing, however, they had called into question the legitimacy of their rule; they had failed to create the unambiguous framework of authority that would arouse "true reverence for the ruler" in his nominal vassals and therefore had not established a solid basis for lasting order and the perpetuation of their rule.³²

The lesson Hakuseki thus derived from his reading of Chinese Confucian political historiography was that the shogun should cease trying to "utilize awe for the imperial house to control the realm."³³ Given the shogun's actual role in Japanese society, it was imperative for him to unify name and substance and to clarify the foundations of his rule by assuming the patents of undivided authority appropriate to a legitimate king.³⁴

THE FUNCTION OF RITUAL. In Confucianism Hakuseki also found set forth the specific means to clarify the foundations of Tokugawa rule, namely, the shogun should adopt the *rei* suited to his substantive position as ruler of the realm. Several factors spurred Hakuseki to stress the importance of *rei*. One, the civil-sacerdotal authority to which *rei* pertained was precisely the weak point of Tokugawa sovereignty. If no one doubted that “military expeditions”—in other words, military and punitive powers—issued from the shogun, his place as the source of “ritual and music,” as illustrated by the ambiguities of the *kan’i* system, was far more open to question. To assume the comprehensive authority of a true ruler it was necessary, above all, for the shogun to establish *rei* that would manifest his status as an autonomous monarch.

Second, the Confucian tradition saw *rei* as a crucial instrument for accomplishing the mission of the true ruler, the transformation of society. *Rei*, according to the majority of Confucian thinkers, were not man-made symbolic structures; they possessed a magical capacity to bring the human socio-political order into alignment with the underlying natural order. One may certainly find in Hakuseki’s writings evidence of such a view. For instance, in *Saishikō*, a memorial on religious ritual, Hakuseki expounded on the magical efficacy of *rei*:

Heaven and human beings are fundamentally of the same spiritual substance (*ki*; Ch.: *qi*), and the interaction between them is stronger than that between the moon and the tide. Thus, when there is harmony in the human realm, the spiritual substance of heaven and earth is naturally maintained in its proper harmony as well. When there is disharmony in the human realm, the harmony of heaven and earth also cannot be maintained. . . . When yin and yang are not in harmony, the production of the 10,000 things cannot follow its proper course. When heaven and earth are not in their proper position, the 10,000 things cannot be brought to their natural state of maturity. What keeps heaven above and earth below is *rei*. What sets forth yang and brings yin into harmony with it is *gaku* (Ch.: *yue*; music). Consequently *rei* and *gaku* are not simply instruments used by the former kings to teach and transform the people. They are also what establish heaven and earth in their proper position and harmonize yin and yang.³⁵

Third, this “idealistic” or “mystical” evaluation of *rei* was reinforced by what, in more contemporary terms, we may call an attunement to

the psychology of power, a persistent feature of Hakuseki's observations concerning the position of the ruler. On various occasions, he reiterated that the ruler's authority was a function of his image in the eyes of others. For instance, in his early memorial attacking Ienobu's fondness for performing the *No*, Hakuseki stressed the negative impact such behavior had on the psychological relationship between the ruler and those who observed his performance. When the ruler assumed the part of an actor on the stage, he evoked emotions in the viewer appropriate to the character he was playing rather than to himself as ruler. If he played an evildoer, he evoked feelings of hatred. If he played someone humble, he evoked feelings of condescension:

Those with perception see this situation as tragic, but others, caught up in the emotion of the moment, simply think, "How interesting!" "How terrible!" without any residual feeling of awe. It is not that they do not know that they should revere and be in awe of their ruler. However, their growing accustomed to [thinking of the ruler in terms of the roles he plays rather than as a ruler] inevitably breeds feelings of contempt for him.³⁶

Similarly, one of the points made by Hakuseki in arguing for a general amnesty to celebrate the inauguration of Ienobu's reign was that amnesties should not be proclaimed, as currently the case, in the context of funeral ceremonies for the dead shogun. "If such is the case, will not the criminals of the realm all secretly hope for misfortune to befall the nation?" A general amnesty should rather be linked positively with the new reign through promulgation in conjunction with the ceremonies of shogunal accession.³⁷

Keenly aware of the psychological dimensions of authority, Hakuseki saw *rei* as the central means of instilling in ministers and subjects the appropriate attitude towards the ruler. In the memorial on the *No*, he drew a direct connection between the establishment of appropriate *rei* and the maintenance of a proper distance between superiors and inferiors. "In the age of former kings, they paid special attention to 'name' and 'implement.' 'Name' refers to a hierarchy of ranks like Son of Heaven, feudal lord, court minister, and court official. 'Implement' refers to the standards [of court dress, and so forth] established for each position in that hierarchy." The reason why the former kings made the appointments

of those of high rank more lavish than the appointments of those of low rank was not because of a taste for luxury. “By thereby making themselves noble and establishing appropriate standards of use for each according to his station, they sought to forestall usurpations of *rei*.” The negative consequences of failing to prevent such usurpations, Hakuseki pointed out, were attested to by Confucius, who remarked of a contemporary political upstart who had eight troupes of ritual dancers, the number stipulated for the Son of Heaven, perform in his ancestral hall, “If he can bear to do this, what can he not bear to do?”³⁸

As against such negative consequences of failing to uphold appropriate *rei*, in *Buke kan'i shōzoku kō*, a collection of memorials proposing changes in the official dress and rank systems used by the bakufu, Hakuseki related the positive results brought about by the establishment of *rei* as reflected in the experiences of Han Gaozu, the founder of the Han dynasty:

In antiquity, at the beginning of his reign, Han Gaozu, observing the effects of the excessively harsh laws of the Qin, sought to make everything uncomplicated and direct. The people who held office during his reign were all fierce and experienced warriors, fresh from having fought in a hundred battles. They had no idea of such a thing as the *rei* of court; they became drunk and quarreled over whose martial exploits were greater, going so far as to draw swords and strike a pillar. Gaozu was greatly troubled by this and, following the advice of a scholar named Shusun Tong, he commanded that scholars of ritual from the state of Lu should be summoned and put in charge of the matters of court. The scholars were summoned and, taking some one hundred senior officers and disciples, they made a practice stage in the field in the shape of a palace, like our cordoned off arenas today, and there they studied *rei*. In the 7th year of Han, the Changle Palace was built and there Gaozu held audience and received tribute. From the rulers of principalities to the most lowly officials, all presented tribute in order, and there was none who did not tremble in awe and reverently correct his posture. After the ritual wine was distributed, and from the reception of tribute to the completion of the drinking of the wine, there was not a single person who failed to observe *rei*. Gaozu, greatly delighted, declared, “Today I know what the dignity of the Son of Heaven is.” This was the start of the majesty of Han officialdom.³⁹

Rei, one might say, clothed the ruler in the garb of a monarch, figuratively as well as literally; it elevated him above his vassals and erstwhile

peers, causing them to tremble in awe of him. Thereby it enabled him to know the dignity and authority of a king and as such to rule effectively.

The centrality of *rei* to the comprehensive authority of a true king, the traditional Confucian belief in the magical efficacy of appropriately instituted *rei* to establish order in human society, and shrewd observation of the capacity of *rei* to endow the ruler with the dignity of a king in the eyes of his subordinates provided the rationale for Hakuseki's emphasis on the importance of *rei*. One may hypothesize, however, that two other factors gave added force to his call for the shogun to adopt suitable *rei*. One, the revision of existing bakufu *rei* would further the interests of the shogunal circle by countering the entrenched power of the leading *fudai*. The act of revision itself would dislodge many central elements in the *kakaku* structure supporting the position of the *fudai*. Simultaneously, clarification of the comprehensive and autonomous nature of the shogun's authority and the adoption of *rei* manifesting his true role within the realm would elevate his position relative to that of his major vassals. It thereby would check the arrogance that Hakuseki, in decrying Yoshimune's abolition of his innovations in the area of *rei*, was to refer to as "the inevitable sickness of those with hereditary stipends."⁴⁰

Second, the adoption of new *rei* offered Hakuseki an important means of creating leverage for himself in his relations both with the bakufu establishment and within the shogunal circle. *Rei*, Hakuseki pointed out, enabled the ruler to "know the dignity of the Son of Heaven." As the experience of Han Gaozu showed, however, *rei* accomplished this function by tying the attributes of kingship to a set of precedents and principles distinct from the ruler himself and transcendent of his immediate environment. To surround himself with the appropriate *rei* Han Gaozu had had to call in scholarly experts from the state of Lu. For Ienobu it was Hakuseki who possessed the essential expertise in "authentic" *rei*. Hakuseki said as much in a concluding note to one of the memorials which make up his *Buke kan'i shōzoku kō*:

There is a saying that the realm is a great implement (*taiki*). Now, something like a small box can be made by someone without any particular knowledge of the way of the carpenter. But to construct a great mansion or a towering pavilion is impossible without having studied the way of the carpenter. How much more true this is of the great implement of the realm. If one has not

mastered its way, how can one speak of the means of governing it? What is called *reigaku* is the measure and carpenter's ink for governing the realm. I may be dull and unqualified to speak of governing, but the words I speak have all been transmitted from the former kings. They are not my own invention.⁴¹

Insofar as this argument won acceptance, the expert on *rei* inevitably acquired a new importance. In the same memorial, Hakuseki pointedly referred to the benefits he suggested would accrue from overlooking the admitted difficulties of "adopting the views of one against the opinions of many" in the area of *rei*. At the start of the Tang, he noted, Wei Zheng, advisor to Taizong, had recommended following the kingly Way of the Sages. All of Taizong's other advisors had sided with those who argued that such was impossible in the present age. Nevertheless, "the emperor alone followed Wei Zheng's recommendation, and when, three years later, the great peace of Zhenguan [627–649] was achieved, he was delighted by the efficacy of that recommendation."⁴²

On yet another level it is possible to see Hakuseki's stress on matters of *rei* as taking adroit advantage of Ienobu's inclinations towards esthetic pursuits. In many ways, the elaboration of new kingly *rei* offered Ienobu the opportunity to indulge those inclinations. Having gained Ienobu's commitment to the revision of bakufu ritual, Hakuseki could use that commitment as a shield behind which to advance other elements of his program. He could even profit from the antagonism his innovations aroused among the bakufu old guard. By intensifying the polarization between the shogunal circle and the bakufu establishment, the antagonism further isolated Ienobu and Akifusa. Arguably, the greater their isolation the larger was Hakuseki's opportunity to make them dependent on him as the charter of the course of the shogunal circle.

HIS MAJESTY, THE KING OF JAPAN

Although Hakuseki did not distinguish them in such a manner, for purposes of analysis we may divide into two categories the measures through which he endeavored to overcome the ambiguous weak points in the shogun's legitimacy as a true monarch. One category consisted of measures

intended to clarify the shogun's status as a national monarch by endowing him with the appurtenances of authentic kingship; the second category aimed to make explicit the comprehensive nature of the shogun's authority as king.

MONARCHAL IMPLEMENTS. Hakuseki's efforts to surround the shogun with the physical aura of a king, to accomplish for Ienobu what Shusun Tong had for Han Gaozu, took various forms. Among other things, he attempted to establish in Edo the "implements," the styles of dress and architectural embellishments that would demonstrate it to be the court of a king. For instance, he undertook to revise the style of court dress worn by the shogun on ceremonial occasions and that prescribed for bakufu vassals. Up to Ienobu's reign, the shogun customarily wore *hitatare* for most ceremonial occasions. *Hitatare*, a robe with a kimono-style collar and worn tucked inside long divided skirts (*nagabakama*), originated in the dress of commoners during the Heian period. Adopted by the Kamakura *bushi* as their everyday dress, *hitatare* also came to be worn by court nobles as a type of private, non-official dress, and eventually the Muromachi bakufu made a more elaborate and decorative form of *hitatare* into bakufu court dress. At Hakuseki's direction, however, the shogun substituted for *hitatare* the more aristocratic *nōshi*, the classical round-collared ordinary court dress of the Heian nobles and emperor, worn over *sashinuki* (divided skirts gathered at the hem).

Changes in the garb of the shogun's retainers, the daimyo and *hatabo*, accompanied his adoption of a more regal style. Thus, in the 5th month of 1712, when Ienobu went to Kan'eiji for the services commemorating the 33rd anniversary of Ietsuna's death, he was preceded by attendants dressed in the costume of imperial court guards. Of wider import, *kariginu*, by origin the everyday informal dress of Heian courtiers and, like *nōshi*, round-collared and worn over *sashinuki*, previously a prerogative of bakufu retainers of the 4th rank and above, was stipulated as the official formal dress for those of the 5th rank as well.⁴³

The effect of these changes was to surround the shogunal court as a whole with a new note of grandeur and, through the absorption of *rei* associated with the Kyoto court, to elevate the stature of the bakufu relative to that of Kyoto. Other changes instituted by Hakuseki had the

same intended consequence. He had special furnishings for the shogun's reception hall made in Kyoto. He had built within the walls of Edo Castle a formal multi-pillared roofed gate (*yotsuashi mon*), a characteristic feature of the residences of imperial princes and the highest ranks of court official, where they were used to add a note of solemnity when receiving state visitors. And, as the "music" of the shogunal court, in place of No, associated with the bakufu since the days of the Ashikaga, he sought to substitute *gagaku*, the music of the ancient imperial court.⁴⁴

KING IN THE EYES OF THE WORLD. The most dramatic of Hakuseki's efforts to establish the shogun as a king in the eyes of others pertained to the delineation of the status of the shogun vis-à-vis the world outside Japan. Most of the changes in bakufu *rei* just mentioned were carried out in the context of preparations for reception of the embassy sent by the Korean king in 1711 to congratulate Ienobu on his accession. In addition, through revision of various aspects of the established procedures for entertaining the Korean envoys, Hakuseki sought directly to elevate the position of the shogun as national ruler. Most significantly, by changing the protocol governing the exchange of communications between the shogun and the Korean king, Hakuseki was able to see the shogun declared a king in name as well as substance and to establish more unequivocally the subordination of the daimyo, including the *fudai*, to him. The events surrounding the Korean embassy thus became the centerpiece of his efforts to transform the shogun into an explicitly monarchal figure. Furthermore, from Hakuseki's personal point of view the Korean embassy more than any other event in his bakufu career provided him with the opportunity to play an explicitly central role in the conduct of bakufu affairs.

RELATIONS WITH KOREA PRIOR TO IENOBU. As noted earlier, the bakufu from its inauguration had viewed embassies from Korea and the diplomatic recognition they signified as an important source of legitimization. Consequently, the bakufu continued to maintain diplomatic relations with Korea through Tsushima, even after the seclusion edicts of the 1630s, and to lavish substantial sums of money upon the reception of periodic embassies from the Korean king. However, in making use of

relations with the Korean king to enhance the legitimacy of the shogun as ruler of Japan, the Tokugawa faced a knotty problem that was to be of particular consequence to Hakuseki—how to refer to the shogun in formal communications with Korea.

This problem arose because East Asian diplomatic terminology was Chinese in origin and reflected Chinese assumptions about protocol. According to those assumptions, there was one universal ruler, that of China, who from the Qin on was referred to as “emperor” (*huangdi*; J.: *kōtei*). Below the Chinese emperor were rulers of principalities and states not under his direct jurisdiction, who theoretically were supposed to locate themselves appropriately in the universal political hierarchy by paying tribute to the Chinese emperor and receiving patents of office in return. The Chinese referred to these rulers as “kings” (*wang*; J.: *ō*). Adjusting themselves to these assumptions, Korean rulers traditionally entered into tributary relations with China; they called themselves and were referred to by others as kings. The Japanese, however, from early times resisted the implications of political subordination to China inherent in Chinese diplomatic terminology. From the late sixth century on, the Japanese ruler refused to accept the diplomatic title of king. Instead he referred to himself as an emperor (*tennō*; Ch.: *tianhuang*), and thus of equal status with the Chinese emperor.

The emergence of the shogun as the dominant national political figure in Japan added new complications. While the title of shogun, or *seii tai shōgun*, came to be important domestically because of the actual powers acquired by its holder, its connotations were unimpressive in the context of Chinese government terminology, and it did not fit readily into the established categories of East Asian diplomatic usage. The third Ashikaga shogun, Yoshimitsu, resolved this issue by adopting the title of king of Japan (*Nihon kokuō*) and assuming tributary status in relations with the Ming. The Koreans, following this usage, likewise referred to Yoshimitsu as king. He and his successors, however, in contrast to their dealings with China, refrained from identifying themselves as kings in diplomatic correspondence with Korea, evidently so as to avoid the implication that they recognized the Korean king as their equal as a fellow vassal of the Ming. Instead they referred to themselves simply, without specific title, as “Minamoto so-and-so of Japan.”⁴⁵

Ashikaga usage of the title of *kokūō* became the subject of much controversy, in part because, by assuming the stance of a tributary and accepting enfeoffment as king of Japan, Yoshimitsu appeared to be acknowledging Japanese subordination to China, in part because of other implications of the title *wang*. While, in the post-Qin era, *wang* as a specific title came to be used for a ruler one rank below the Chinese emperor, it earlier had served as the title of the rulers of China, and it continued to carry connotations of “supreme national ruler.” Thus, by accepting enfeoffment from the Chinese emperor as king of Japan, Yoshimitsu not only acknowledged his subordination to the Chinese emperor; he also called into question the nature of his relations with the Japanese *tenno*, and might even be seen as declaring himself monarch of Japan in place of the *tenno*.

The next major Japanese figure in East Asian diplomatic history, Toyotomi Hideyoshi, who operated in the guise of highest court minister rather than of shogun, avoided these particular problems by referring to himself by his court title of *kanpaku-daijōdaijin*, although he also accepted references to himself as “king of Japan.”⁴⁶ His successors, Tokugawa Ieyasu and Hidetada, who did rule as shogun, like Hideyoshi accepted being addressed as “king of Japan,” but did not call themselves king. By and large they omitted titles and signed their diplomatic communications as Minamoto no Ieyasu, or Hidetada, of Japan.

Relations with Korea were disrupted by Hideyoshi’s invasions. The Tokugawa, because they valued diplomatic relations as an instrument for legitimizing their rule and because they regarded Korean mediation as the key to direct access to trade with China, sought to correct this situation. The island domain of Tsushima, dependent on trade with Korea for economic survival, was even more anxious to see diplomatic relations resumed. Thus, when Korea demanded as a condition that the initial move should come from Japan in the form of an official letter from Ieyasu, the Tsushima officials, led by one of the *karō*, Yanagawa Shigenobu, complied by forging a letter in which Ieyasu “signed himself” king of Japan. The authenticity of this letter was questioned in Korea, but the government nominally accepted it at face value and, in 1607, sent an “embassy of reply” in return.⁴⁷

In the letter responding to this embassy, which the Tokugawa counted

as inaugurating relations between them and Korea, the shogun, Hide-tada, signed himself without a title, but Tsushima evidently remedied this detail to preserve consistency with the earlier forgery.⁴⁸ On the occasion of the 1617 embassy, the daimyo of Tsushima informed the bakufu that the Koreans, suspicious about Hidetada's failure in the previous instance to use a title commensurate with his status, had asserted that this called into question the Tokugawa claim to have unified the country. Thus, he argued, the shogun should adopt the title of king. The bakufu refused this request on the recommendation of its chief advisor on such issues of protocol, the priest Sūden; he declared that the shogun had never used *ō* as a self-appellation in communications with Korea because Korea was a barbarian state, and it would be improper for the shogun to equate himself with the ruler of such a state.⁴⁹ Thereupon Tsushima again resorted to forgery.

The Tsushima deception was continued on the occasion of the next embassy, sent in 1624 to offer congratulations upon the accession of Iemitsu. But, eleven years later, as the result of a quarrel between the daimyo of Tsushima and the domain elder most directly responsible for the forgeries, it came to light. The Tsushima retainers primarily responsible were punished, and the bakufu took the occasion to settle upon a definitive protocol for dealings with Korea. It was agreed that the shogun would not use any title in signing himself. For the title of address it was at length decided, most plausibly at the recommendation of Hayashi Razan, who had succeeded Sūden as the major bakufu advisor on such issues, to use the term *Nihon koku taikun* (great prince of Japan). *Taikun* appears in the Chinese classics as a descriptive term for the ruler. The characters were also used occasionally to transcribe the term *ōkimi*, a title used by the rulers of the fifth- and sixth-century Yamato state. As a title for the shogun, however, *taikun*, which had not been used previously in formal diplomatic intercourse, lacked the ticklish associations of *kokuō*. Iemitsu's advisors seem to have chosen it with the intent of establishing the shogun as an entity apart from the standard categories of East Asian diplomacy, in particular, of defining his status as distinct from that of the Korean king, and at the same time endowing him with a lofty, although non-specific, aura of authority.⁵⁰

The Koreans accepted the change, although not without opposition,

and in the embassy of 1636 addressed the shogun as *taikun*. In his reply, Iemitsu signed himself simply Minamoto no Iemitsu of Japan. The same forms were followed in the embassies of 1643, 1655, and 1682.

Contemporaneously with the regularization of the title for the shogun, standard forms of protocol for receiving the Korean embassy were established. The bakufu had shown ambivalence about putting itself on the same diplomatic plane as the Korean king, a stance illustrated by its maintaining of the pretense that the Korean king spontaneously sent embassies and tribute articles to the bakufu while the bakufu did not send return embassies to Korea. Nevertheless, Ronald Toby argues convincingly, the protocol for reception of the Korean embassy rested fundamentally on the idea of parity.⁵¹ He points out that adoption of the principle of parity characterized the language and format of the letters exchanged between the Korean king and the shogun. It applied as well to the exchanges of communications and gifts between Korean government officials and the *rōjū*, which the embassy also entailed. "Whether it was the shogun, the senior council, or the daimyo of Tsushima, each corresponded only with an opposite number who was at least putatively a status peer, and each used language of respect for the other and depreciation for himself that mirrored the usage of the opposite number."⁵² We may add that, from an internal perspective, the direct involvement of the *rōjū* and other daimyo in the reception of the embassy reinforced the image of the bakufu as a feudal structure encompassing the semi-autonomous daimyo as well as the shogun. Daimyo situated on the route traversed by the embassy assumed responsibility for banqueting the Koreans along the way, and the *rōjū* and three collateral houses (*sanke*) played a central role in the reception of the embassy at Edo Castle. It was this body of established diplomatic practices that Hakuseki set out to revise.

HAKUSEKIS REVISIONS. Hakuseki began research into the past history of relations with Korea virtually as soon as Ienobu became shogun early in 1709, and, in spring of the next year, he proposed a number of changes in protocol for the anticipated embassy. Central among these was the recommendation that the title of *taikun* be abandoned. Instead, Hakuseki asserted, the shogun should both be addressed as and sign himself

as *Nihon kokuō*. Hakuseki marshaled two somewhat contradictory arguments against the title of *taikun*. One, its association with the *tenno* made application of it to the shogun smack of lese majesty, and, two, the Koreans used it domestically as a title for princes other than the crown prince. Thus, in Korean eyes, the shogun, by assuming the title of *taikun*, subordinated himself to the Korean king. As we have seen above, comparable, if not stronger objections could be made about the title of *kokuō*; it seems clear that Hakuseki sought to focus attention on the shortcomings of *taikun* primarily for polemical reasons. The real reason behind his advocacy of changing to *kokuō* was less the deficiencies of the term *taikun* than the positive, from Hakuseki's perspective, connotations of *kokuō*, which clearly indicated its holder to be a national monarch and which was, in addition, the title of the "true" kings of Confucian legend.⁵³

Having won Ienobu's approval for the change from *taikun* to *kokuō*, Hakuseki proceeded to maneuver things so as to make it appear that the change had been initiated by the Koreans. In the 2nd month of 1711, he informed Tsushima that the shogun "has privately decided to sign himself *Nihon kokuō Minamoto no Ienobu* in the letter of reply on the occasion of the coming embassy, and thus would like to have the Koreans directed to address the letter to be brought by the embassy to 'His Majesty, the King of Japan' (*Nihon kokuō denka*)."⁵⁴

At least in part this strategy reflected the delicate problems involved in breaking with an earlier, and definitive, bakufu policy decision. The letter to Tsushima continued:

However, since, during the reign of Lord Iemitsu, the Koreans were commanded to change the title of address from *ō* to *taikun*, should his lordship now command them that, this choice being inappropriate, they should revert to the former *kokuō*, it would give the impression that he was displaying the mistake of his grandfather. He is most uncomfortable about this. Nevertheless, it is most fundamentally not his wish to let such personal feelings impede rectification of a matter which affects the way in which Japan appears before the world. . . . Since it would create all sorts of problems, not to mention the aforesaid implications regarding his lordship's grandfather, it is his lordship's decision not to conduct a formal inquiry [into the 1635 change to *taikun*]. Consequently, he will not issue an order [to make the change to *kokuō*]. Rather, the lord of Tsushima should privately inform the Koreans that there

will be no objection and it will accord with the wish of his lordship if they address their letter to "His Majesty, the King of Japan."

In addition to the desirability of effecting the change in the most filial manner possible, should the Koreans protest the change, it would be most unfortunate if it appeared that they were contesting an order from the shogun. Thus "the lord of Tsushima should endeavor not to give the impression that this is an official order . . . it is his lordship's wish that the entire matter be handled privately."⁵⁵

The problems involved in changing established bakufu policy probably were not the only reason for Hakuseki's insistence on this round-about strategy. The evidently spontaneous recognition of Ienobu as a king by the Koreans would help to convey that Ienobu's succession constituted the appearance of a true king, acknowledged by foreign peoples and the populace of Japan alike.

Hakuseki also carried out significant changes in the protocol for reception of the embassy. His major thrust was to play down the implication that the *rōjū* and daimyo participated in the reception as semi-autonomous figures. To this end, Hakuseki called for abolition of the exchange of formal letters and presents between the *rōjū* and the *yejo*, the office of the Korean government responsible for overseeing such embassies; the appointment of non-related daimyo rather than *sanke* to serve as hosts to the envoys on the occasion of the banquet provided by the shogun for the embassy; and the requisitioning of daily provisions for the Koreans on the road to Edo and back in place of formal banquets sponsored by the daimyo.

In calling for these changes, Hakuseki insisted that the existing protocol placed the shogun's government on a lower plane than that of the Korean king. Thus, regarding the abolition of the exchange of letters and gifts between the *rōjū* and the *yejo*, Hakuseki argued that the *rōjū* played a far more important government role than the *yejo*. If gifts were to be exchanged it should be either between the *rōjū* and Korean government officials of comparable stature or between the *yejo* and bakufu officials of more minor status. But, he pointed out, such a restructuring of protocol was likely to cause bad feelings among the Koreans. Consequently, it would be better simply to abolish the exchange.⁵⁶ In the case of the

substitution of daily provisions for banquets, Hakuseki argued that such an arrangement would accord with the reception of Japanese envoys in Korea during the time of the Ashikaga as well as alleviate the financial burden such embassies placed on the daimyo.⁵⁷

Despite Hakuseki's objections to the existing protocol arrangements, those arrangements were, as we noted above, predicated on an assumption of parity between the bakufu and the Korean government. Here, again, Hakuseki's arguments appear to be colored by polemics which conceal only partially ends other than those that the changes were supposed to accomplish. Overtly, the abolition of the exchange of letters between the *rōjū* and the *yejo* was intended to show respect for the *rōjū*. The ultimate consequence, however, was to remove the *rōjū* as participants in their own right in the reception of the embassy. Much the same may be said of the substitution of the provision of daily supplies for banquets on the road. In the memorial urging that change, Hakuseki made clear that parity with Korea was not his only concern. The relative distance between the shogun as ruler and the daimyo as his subordinates was also an issue. "If the reception of the envoys on the road is this lavish, the banquet offered in the shogun's palace will be nothing more than what they have already experienced. What will there be left to offer to fulfill the *rei* of honoring them with a state banquet?"⁵⁸ As for reducing the financial burden on the daimyo, lists of the supplies and supplementary gifts provided by them suggest that the outlay involved was hardly less than it would have been for a banquet.⁵⁹ The key difference was that the daimyo responsible for providing the supplies no longer acted as a host in his own right but simply as a quartermaster for the shogun. Thus, the changes in protocol carried out in the name of establishing parity between Korea and Japan served to diminish roles for the shogun's vassals from semi-autonomous entities to officials carrying out the bidding of "His Majesty, the King of Japan."⁶⁰

The Korean embassy thus provided Hakuseki with a major opportunity to present the shogun as a king in name as well as substance, to establish more unequivocally the shogun's authority over the daimyo, and to impress upon the shogun's most important vassals that they were his subordinates rather than his associates. The embassy also gave Hakuseki a chance to increase his own leverage within the bakufu. As noted above,

Hakuseki, his diary indicates, brought up the matter of plans for the embassy at least as early as the 6th month of 1709 and was well into detailed plans for it by the end of that year.⁶¹ When arrangements for the reception of the embassy began to be discussed officially, the *rōjū* in charge urged that Hayashi Nobuatsu, whose family had handled diplomatic protocol for the bakufu since the reign of Iemitsu, should be asked to do the same for this embassy. According to Hakuseki's autobiography, "Nobuatsu thereupon was ordered to write out a draft of his proposal, and submitted two fascicles." By this time, however, the stage presumably was well set. Hakuseki continued, "When his lordship had Nobuatsu queried about certain points in his proposal, he, not knowing the first thing about such matters, was unable to reply with any clarity. Thus his lordship sounded out my views and ultimately commanded me to take charge of this matter."⁶²

Once designated by Ienobu as planner and director of the reception of the embassy, Hakuseki was in a position to make others do his bidding. He made full use of this authority. In informing the Tsushima officials of the planned change in the title of the shogun and directing them to convey "unofficially" to the Koreans that the latter should likewise change the forms of address of the letter from the Korean king, Hakuseki promised rewards if things worked out smoothly and threatened to transfer the Korea trade to Nagasaki, where it would be handled directly by the bakufu rather than through Tsushima, if they did not. When the Tsushima officials protested that they could not undertake such a change in established policy without direction from the *rōjū*, Hakuseki produced a confirmatory order signed by the *rōjū*.⁶³

The assignment to Hakuseki of an official role as planner of the embassy also led to the elevation of his formal status relative to other bakufu retainers. So that he would be able to deal with the Koreans on an official basis, the week before they reached Edo he was granted the *kan'i* of junior 5th rank, lower grade, *Chikugo no kami*.⁶⁴ Ienobu presented him with the appropriate court dress and sword, and formally commanded him to greet the envoys at the post station of Kawasaki on the outskirts of Edo.⁶⁵

As official planner of the embassy, Hakuseki dealt with the Koreans in much the same way as he did with Tsushima. The delay caused by

Tsushima's reluctance "privately" to convince the Koreans to change the title by which they addressed the shogun and by the subsequent exchange of communications with Edo over this matter meant that the Tsushima envoys ultimately assigned to negotiate the change did not arrive in Korea until the embassy had already departed from Seoul. After some debate, occasioned by the manner and timing of the request, the Koreans complied and rewrote the letter.⁶⁶

Upon reaching Tsushima, the embassy was informed of other revisions of protocol, but a number of significant changes, including the removal of the *sanke* as hosts at the state banquet, were not announced to the Koreans until they reached Edo. There they were presented with a set of "instructions for the envoys" composed by Hakuseki, which declared that, previously in Japan, *rei* for the reception of envoys had been of an ad hoc and unsystematic nature, but

now, succeeding to the accumulation of a hundred years of virtuous accomplishments, is the time to establish *rei*. . . . His majesty has thus commanded his officials to establish appropriate *rei* for the reception of guests. They have investigated former practices and ancient *rei* and established parity between the two countries. The envoys may wonder at changes from previous practice. Thus an emissary has been designated to clarify this for them. . . . Does not the *Book of Rites* state, "Adherence to the *rei* means to act in a manner appropriate to the situation; one sent as an envoy to another country should follow the customs of that country"?⁶⁷

The instructions went on to inform the Koreans of several changes, including the hosting and seating arrangements for the banquet. The Koreans, who had complained about other changes, protested that this last one constituted a slight to them on the part of the Japanese, and, up to the moment when the banquet was scheduled to begin, refused to take their assigned places. When the persuasions of the Tsushima officials to accept the change proved of no avail, Hakuseki confronted the Koreans directly, communicating through the medium of written Chinese that the banquet would be canceled if the envoys did not yield.⁶⁸ Ultimately, the envoys, their Tsushima escorts, the bakufu officials, and attendant daimyo found themselves following a scenario composed by Hakuseki, stipulating in minute detail who should stand where and do what.⁶⁹

REVISION OF THE BUKE SHOHATTO

Parallel to his efforts to endow the shogun with the visible attributes of authentic kingship, Hakuseki endeavored to establish more fully the comprehensive nature of the latter's authority as a national monarch. A key step was revision of the *Buke shohatto*, which served, so to speak, as the constitution of the *bakuhan* state. First issued in 1615, following the extermination of the Toyotomi, it set forth the obligations of the daimyo to the bakufu. Simultaneously it implicitly defined the nature of the authority of the shogun over the daimyo. It thus was a key instrument for routinization and legitimization of Tokugawa rule. Each adult shogun underlined this dimension of the *Buke shohatto* by reissuing it upon his accession.

While the basic function of the *Buke shohatto* remained the same, its content did not. Each shogun up through Ienobu revised it to a greater or lesser degree, a circumstance which makes the successive versions of the *Buke shohatto* valuable indicators of the evolution in the theoretical conception of the relationship between the shogun and the daimyo. Hakuseki's version is particularly revealing. For Hakuseki, revision of the *Buke shohatto* provided an opportunity to declare that the shogun was more than a military hegemon and to establish definitively that the head of the bakufu rightly possessed the comprehensive authority of a true king. His version thus constitutes a central element of his endeavor to redefine the symbols of shogunal authority.

THE BUKE SHOHATTO PRIOR TO THE REIGN OF IENOBU. The 1615 version of the *Buke shohatto* reflected at once the aims of the Tokugawa at that time and the limitations to their actual national power. The main text and the commentary appended to each article drew extensively from the body of previous Japanese codes, including both documents of national scope, such as Shōtoku Taishi's Seventeen-Article Constitution and the *Kenmu shikimoku*, and the codes issued by individual Sengoku daimyo such as the Gohōjō and the Chōsokabe.⁷⁰ Through such citations the main compiler of the code, the priest Süden, presumably sought to stabilize and legitimize Tokugawa rule by locating it within the parameters of Japanese political tradition.

Overall, however, the thrust of the 1615 code testified to the essentially hegemonic nature of Tokugawa rule. It aimed primarily at limiting the opportunities for the daimyo to engage in subversive activities or to become involved in quarrels with each other. Thus it called on the daimyo not to harbor people with treasonous inclinations within their domains, not to form factions, not to engage in any repairs of their castles or new constructions without the approval of the bakufu, and not to form marriage ties among themselves without bakufu sanction. Compared to the articles dealing with such matters, the prescriptions of the code concerning the civil administration of the daimyo's domains were general and non-specific.⁷¹ In the words of Hiramatsu Yoshirō, the 1615 code "put primary emphasis on establishing a horizontal order among the daimyo, keeping them from intruding into the domains of others, and isolating them. Regarding the daimyo as individual generals, in these ways it sought to limit their capacity for independent action."⁷²

The 1635 version of the *Buke shohatto* issued by Iemitsu added a number of measures designed to subject the daimyo more thoroughly to the authority of the bakufu. The second article incorporated the requirement that the daimyo should pay attendance on the shogun in turn (*sankinkōtai*), and articles were added about not acting on one's own initiative in times of disturbance, acceding without protest to any punitive measures handed down by the bakufu, and remanding to the bakufu disputes between people of different domains which could not be resolved amicably by the holders of the domains concerned.

The 1635 version also brought the daimyo's administration of his domain more explicitly under shogunal purview than had previously been the case. It called upon the daimyo to pay careful attention to the administration of their domains and not to make excessive demands upon the domain inhabitants; to keep roads, post-stations, and ferries in good operating condition; to refrain from establishing private barriers or other impediments to lawful free passage through their domains; and to follow bakufu policy in dealing with religious groups and institutions.⁷³

The trend towards incorporation of the daimyo within a national governmental structure headed by the shogun continued in the 1683 version, issued by Tsunayoshi. In addition to the *Buke shohatto*, Iemitsu had issued codes to the *hatamoto* in 1632 and 1635, and the 1635 code was

reissued in much the same form by Ietsuna in 1663. However, Tsunayoshi discontinued the practice of issuing a separate code to the *hata-moto*. Instead, the 1683 *Buke shohatto* incorporated several elements from the *hatamoto* code. Most notably, the first article of the 1683 *Buke shohatto* followed the example of the *hatamoto* code in emphasizing the importance of loyalty, filial piety, and adherence to *rei*. Thus, the opening article of the 1683 *Buke shohatto* read: “Encourage the civil and military arts and loyalty and filial piety; bring society into conformity with *rei* and rectitude.” (By contrast, earlier versions had simply called upon the daimyo to “practice single-heartedly the civil and military arts and the way of the bow and horse [i.e., the way of the warrior].”)⁷⁴ The call upon the daimyo to encourage loyalty and filial piety fit in with the contemporary addition to the *kōsatsu* mounted throughout Japan of the exhortation to be loyal and filial, which, as we saw, represented an assertion of the nationwide scope of the moral authority of the shogun. At the same time, as Asao Naohiro points out, it extended to the daimyo what was already required of the far less independent *hatamoto*.⁷⁵ Together with the adoption of the practice of issuing the same code to the *hatamoto* and the daimyo, this article served to establish more firmly the subordination of the daimyo to the bakufu.

The 1635 and 1683 versions of the *Buke shohatto* stopped short, however, of asserting that the shogun enjoyed a comprehensive national authority over the daimyo. The order of the articles in the 1683 version testified that the bakufu continued to regard the daimyo primarily as vassals invested with semi-autonomous domains whose foremost obligation to the shogun was military service. Article 3, following the provisions for *sankinkōtai* in Article 2, stated, “Keep in readiness men, horses, and weapons in proportion to your station.” The following articles restricted daimyo initiative in such matters as the repair of castles and the conclusion of marriage ties and established certain sumptuary standards for the different ranks of daimyo. Governance in general was not referred to until Article 13:

Be upright in the governance of your domains; do not allow conditions in the provinces and counties to deteriorate. Do not allow roads, post-stations, bridges, and boats to break down; keep the means of free passage open. Note:

Apart from cargo ships, the prohibition against maintaining large ships stands as previously promulgated.⁷⁶

The conjunction of a general statement about upright government and specific stipulations about keeping roads open and not maintaining large ships reflected the still unsystematic and incomplete nature of the authority over the daimyo claimed by the shogun. By contrast, Hakuseki's version of the *Buke shohatto*, promulgated in 1710, the year after Ienobu's accession, represented a formal challenge to the hegemonic character of the *bakuhan* state structure. In it he attempted to impress upon the daimyo that they were not the autonomous cohorts of a hegemon. Their domains constituted elements within a national polity headed by a monarch possessing a comprehensive authority over the realm.

HAKUSEKIS VERSION. Hakuseki's version of the *Buke shohatto*, like previous versions, did not refer explicitly to the powers of the shogun. Instead, it delineated the scope of shogunal authority by implication in the course of setting forth the duties of the objects of the code, the daimyo and *hatamoto*. Thus, to establish the comprehensive nature of the shogun's authority as a national ruler, Hakuseki first of all stressed the similarly comprehensive nature of the responsibilities of the *hatamoto* and daimyo as governors of their individual domains. The first article of Hakuseki's version called upon the daimyo to contribute to the rectification of society: "Master the way of the civil and military arts, make clear the moral principles underlying human relations, and rectify social customs."⁷⁷ In this it followed the example of the 1683 code. But, whereas the 1683 code did not touch again on the administrative responsibilities of the daimyo until Article 13, Hakuseki's version proceeded to elaborate on that very point. Article 2, equivalent to Article 13 of the 1683 code, read: "Devote yourself to the governance of your domain, be it a province or county, and of your house; do nothing to anger or grieve your retainers or the populace of your domain." The position of this article at the head of the code and the admonition to "do nothing to anger or grieve" those over whom the daimyo and *hatamoto* exercised an immediate authority established that the shogun took the welfare of the

entire realm as his proper responsibility. Simultaneously, it emphasized that, while the first duty of the daimyo and *hatamoto* was to govern appropriately the domains with which the shogun had entrusted them, their administrative authority was not autonomic; it derived from the delegation of the sovereign prerogatives of the shogun.

Article 3, which dealt with the feudal obligations of the daimyo and *hatamoto* to the shogun, pointed up the comprehensive nature of the shogun's authority from another angle. Previous versions of the *Buke shohatto* had manifested the hegemonic character of the *bakuban* state by putting priority on the military dimensions of the obligations of the *hatamoto* and daimyo. By contrast, in Article 3, Hakuseki stressed that the daimyo had civil as well as military obligations to the bakufu. "Keep in order the men and horses necessary for performance of your military duties; store in readiness the materials necessary for fulfillment of your civil obligations."

Not only did Hakuseki specifically add civil responsibilities to the existing stipulation concerning the military duties of the daimyo and *hatamoto*; in his commentary on this article he emphasized that all daimyo and *hatamoto*, not just those serving in the bakufu bureaucracy, had "civil obligations":

Daimyo and *hatamoto*, large and small, have civil duties (*kuji no shokuyaku*). Such include guard duty [at bakufu castles, Kyoto, Osaka, and so forth], and construction projects. Also included are fire-fighting, the provision of banquets [for envoys from the court or abroad], serving as envoys, and all other such responsibilities. . . . In times of peace one has civil duties, and in times of war one has military duties; these are the established duties of the *buke*.

The insistence that civil duties were a routine rather than extraordinary obligation served to expand the scope of the feudal tie linking the shogun to the *hatamoto* and daimyo. By extension, it affirmed as well the civil dimensions of the shogun's authority as a national ruler.

The 4th and 5th articles continued the balanced emphasis on the civil as well as the military dimensions of the relationship between the shogun and the daimyo and *hatamoto*. Article 4 dealt with *sankinkōtai*, while to Article 5, covering the building and repair of castles, Hakuseki added the clause from Article 13 of the 1683 code regarding keeping

roads and other means of communication in good repair, and the clause from Article 15 prohibiting private barriers and other "impediments to free passage." In effect, this revision replaced an article with a specific military orientation with one of much broader import which called on the shogun's retainers to function in all regards as responsible units of the national polity.

The following three articles proceeded to elaborate on the nature of the tie between the shogun and his vassals set forth in the preceding articles. In essence, all three emphasized the subordination of the daimyo and *hatamoto* to the monarchal figure of the shogun by imposing on the entire body of shogunal vassals a code of behavior appropriate to a civil servant. Articles 6 and 7 were new additions. Article 8 had a precedent in an article of the 1615 code subsequently deleted; however, in its overall import it, too, was new. Article 6 expanded upon the responsibility of the daimyo and *hatamoto* to act as upright public officials, accountable in all regards to the shogun:

When performing a function, large or small, or serving as head of a guard unit, do not presume upon your authority to intimidate others or use your public function to pursue your private interests. Be conciliatory towards your fellows and make decisions collegially. Do not obstruct the passage of information upward and communicate the true feelings of those below you. Showing neither partiality nor favoritism, strive to master the duties inherent in your office and perform your public function with diligence and precision.

Article 7 admonished the *hatamoto* and daimyo to avoid even the suspicion of misconduct in the performance of their duties:

To offer bribes and seek to borrow the influence of those in powerful positions, to engage in private schemes and pursue personal connections is to open the road to corruption and obstruct the correct path. Such are the means by which government is destroyed. All should be strictly avoided. Note: In seeking direction from the shogun, address your inquiry to the one designated as having jurisdiction over you, whether bakufu official (*bugyō*) or guard captain (*kashira*). If your report is presented as confidential or as a private scheme, even if there is merit to it, no particular favor may be expected in return.

Article 8 called on the shogun's vassals to adhere to similarly strict norms in their personal life. Referring to Article 2 of the 1615 code,

which had cautioned the daimyo against drinking in groups and other dissipations (and to comparable articles in the Nara and Heian imperial codes), Article 8 of Hakuseki's version went on to adumbrate a general code of behavior appropriate to those charged with assisting the shogun in his mission of effecting the moral transformation of society:

The ancient codes clearly prohibited drinking in groups and abandoning oneself to dissipation. To seek to outdo others in ostentatious luxury, paying no heed to the standards of *rei*; lacking all sense of shame, to be greedy for profit; to discuss indiscriminately the abilities and deficiencies of others; to gossip about the policies of the day—there is nothing which sets a more negative example or has a more deleterious effect upon general social behavior. Henceforth all are to be strictly prohibited.⁷⁸

Just as Hakuseki's endeavors to surround the shogun with monarchal *rei* implied the shogun's assumption of a new level of national authority, his version of the *Buke shohatto* pointed towards the transformation of the shogun's vassals from the semi-autonomous associates of a hegemon into obedient officials whose power derived from the administrative functions they performed on behalf of the monarch. Together, these efforts to redefine the symbols of shogunal authority were fully in line with the dissolution of the existing *bakuhan* order projected by Hakuseki's vision of the role of the shogun in popular governance. Their implications in this regard would have been even more apparent had another change proposed by Hakuseki gone beyond the paper stage: reshaping of the *kan'i* system.

REORIENTATION OF THE KANI SYSTEM

Hakuseki saw three particular problems with the *kan'i* system. First, as suggested by the anecdote concerning Tokugawa Mitsukuni cited at the beginning of this chapter, it linked the recipient of *kan'i* to a symbolic order centered upon the *tenno* rather than the shogun. It thus introduced a major ambiguity into the shogun's authority as a national ruler. In *Tokushi yoron*, Hakuseki sharply delineated this problem. "The term *minister* refers to a subject who serves the ruler in an official capacity." Formally the grant of *kan'i* established the recipient as an imperial "minister," obliging him to serve the *tenno*. Not only that; the grant

of *kan'i* to both the shogun and his important vassals blurred the essential distinction in their statuses. "When both lord and vassal hold the post of minister to the king, in substance they may be lord and vassal, but in name they are both ministers of the king. In such a situation, how can the vassal truly revere his lord?"⁷⁹

Second, the *kan'i* received by important bakufu vassals had become a central element of the *kakaku* structure which sustained the power of the leading *fudai* vis-à-vis the shogun. For example, from the reign of Iemitsu on, the *kan'i* of *jushii ge jijū* (junior 4th rank, lower grade, court secretary) had become a distinctive prerogative of the *rōjū*.⁸⁰ Reflecting this development, when Tsunayoshi sought to elevate the stature of his *sobayōnin* relative to the *rōjū*, one of the strategies he used was to raise their *kan'i* to *jushii ge jijū*. In Hakuseki's view the establishment of a fixed association between the *rōjū* and a *kan'i* that distinguished them from the majority of other daimyo would only encourage arrogance on their part:

Under the current ruling house, positions like that of *rōjū* encompass responsibility for the vital affairs of the realm; their function is no different from that performed by court ministers (*daijin*) in the age of the court, or by the *shikken* and *kanrei* during [earlier] *buke* eras. Nevertheless, during the first two reigns of this house they were referred to [modestly] as *hōsho renpan shū* (board of cosigners), their rank was the 5th, and their stipends amounted to little more than 10,000 *ku*. Might not one say that Lord Ieyasu, examining the lesson of past history, established this as a standard for later ages? It would appear that, taking as a warning what happened to the Ashikaga, who ultimately were destroyed as a result of the arrogant usurpation of their prerogatives by the *kanrei*, Lord Ieyasu followed the example of the early Kamakura [when the *kan'i* of even the most important bakufu vassals were low]. His action in this regard is comparable to Taizu of the Ming not appointing a prime minister. Did he not have some farsighted purpose in mind?⁸¹

Thus, the incorporation of *kan'i* into the *kakaku* structure had negative implications for intra-bakufu politics. A third problem with the system was the implications about the bakufu's role as a national government conveyed by the type of *kan'i* awarded *bushi*. Within the *kan'i* structure as a whole, the *kan'i* granted *bushi* were of no great significance. In terms of *kan'i*, even the *rōjū* ranked no higher than the middle-to-lower

ranges of the court nobility. The inevitable consequence was the diminution of the stature of the government in which they served in the eyes of the court nobility and other nations. "The court nobility cannot but look scornfully upon the office they hold. And, as for people from China or Korea or the Ryukyus, when they hear that the officers of state of our country (*wagakuni shissei no daijin*) hold court ranks and offices of this sort, they must laugh in derision."⁸²

Hakuseki was not the only Confucian scholar to see such problems in the Tokugawa utilization of the *kan'i* system. A decade or so after Hakuseki made the observations quoted above, Ogyū Sorai, who, despite various differences with Hakuseki, also advocated enhancement of the national stature of the bakufu, set forth much the same points in a memorial to Yoshimune. Regarding the link between the court and the daimyo established by the grant of *kan'i*, Sorai wrote:

Although the daimyo of the realm are all vassals of the shogun, since proclamation and certification of their *kan'i* comes from Kyoto, there are doubtless those who at the bottom of their hearts think of the tenno as their true lord. If they do not get over the feeling that they became vassals of the shogun for the moment simply out of fear for his might, in later generations there may be cause for concern.⁸³

Sorai noted as well that the relatively low *kan'i* of bakufu officials posed a problem in diplomatic relations. For instance, the head of the embassy sent by the Korean king traditionally held the 3rd rank. To treat him with due respect, the hosts at the state banquet provided by the shogun also had to be of the 3rd rank. Since no bakufu official possessed that high a *kan'i*, the custom had developed of calling upon the *sanke* to serve as hosts. But, Sorai argued, because the relationship of the *sanke* to the shogun was much closer than that of the Korean ambassador to the Korean king, this arrangement was improper. He pointed out that, on the occasion of the 1711 embassy, Hakuseki, recognizing the inappropriateness of the *sanke* serving as hosts, had stopped this practice, but, because of the precedent that the hosts should be of the 3rd rank, the Koreans had objected, resulting in an awkward atmosphere.

As a solution to these problems, Sorai proposed the establishment of a system of merit ranks (*kun'i*) for *bushi* distinct from the existing *kan'i*.

system. If bakufu officials like the *rōjū* were awarded the 3rd rank within such a system, they could assume the responsibility of acting as hosts on the occasion of the banquet for the Korean embassy, and the Koreans "would find it most appropriate." Had such a system been in effect at the time of the 1711 embassy, Sorai asserted, the contretemps created by the absence of the *sanke* could have been avoided, "but Arai, being an ignoramus, did not think of such a thing."⁸⁴

Actually, whether or not Sorai was aware of it, early in Ienobu's reign, as one means to correct the deficiencies of the *kan'i* system, Hakuseki had proposed, albeit unsuccessfully, a *kun'i* system quite similar to that advocated by Sorai. Hakuseki's approach to definition of the symbols of shogunal authority pointed implicitly towards replacement of the existing *kan'i* system with one that would manifest more clearly the shogun's role as a national monarch. The *kan'i* system was, however, too embedded in Japanese political tradition for him to call for its outright dismantling. Instead, he recommended adjustments that would reduce both the implications of *buke* subordination to the court and the part played by the *kan'i* system in the *kakaku* order. Simultaneously, to balance the court-centered connotations of the *kan'i* system, he proposed the creation of an additional symbolic structure, a *kun'i* system, focused around the shogun.

As adjustments to the existing system, Hakuseki suggested terminating award of the post of *jijū* to bakufu retainers, in particular to the *rōjū*, and utilization of a wider range of court ranks for *bushi*. By origin, the *jijū* were secretaries to the major officials of the *nakatsukasa-shō*, the central secretariat of the *ritsuryō* governmental structure responsible for conveying policy proposals to the *tenno* and for promulgating edicts on his behalf. The post of *jijū* thus implied both a close association with the central government and direct subordination to the high-ranking nobles who headed the *nakatsukasa-shō*. To end grants of this particular post to the *rōjū*, Hakuseki asserted, would do away with some of the "unfortunate" contradictions which clouded Ieyasu's far-sighted recognition of the need to distinguish the *kan'i* awarded *buke* from those granted to court nobles.⁸⁵ At the same time, we may note, change in the established practice of awarding this symbolic status to those appointed as *rōjū*, together with use of a wider range of court ranks, would break the fixed

association between certain types of *kan'i* and certain levels of feudal status, thereby loosening one area of the *kakaku* structure. As *kan'i* positions appropriate for the *rōjū*, Hakuseki suggested head of one of the four court guard units or head of the office in charge of the administration of the city of Kyoto—in other words posts where the symbolism corresponded closely to the actual national function of the *rōjū*.⁸⁶

Parallel to these adjustments, Hakuseki, like Sorai some fifteen years later, recommended installation of a system of twelve merit ranks. Reserved for bakufu vassals, the merit ranks would be geared to the actual functions of the recipients and would operate independently of the existing *kan'i* system.

Tokugawa retainers from the *rōjū* down could be awarded *kun'i* ranks ranging from the 1st to the 12th. Among the *kuge*, one's *kan'i* would express one's relative status, and among the *bukee*, one's merit rank and official function would express one's relative status. Under such an arrangement neither [status group] would infringe on the other, the function of the *buke* would be endowed with the appropriate loftiness, and the honor of Japan would be preserved vis-à-vis those from other countries.⁸⁷

Thus, as Hakuseki presented it, a *kun'i* system would balance the *kan'i* system by creating a symbolic order focused around the shogun; at the same time, it would endow the shogunal government with the appurtenances of rank necessary to manifest its true national role. Had such a system been instituted, it would have indeed helped to establish the shogun as a ruler with comprehensive authority, the source of rites and music as well as military expeditions. Hakuseki's proposal, however, was never realized, a fact that hints at the various obstacles he faced in his efforts to transform the shogun into a king.

NINE

Answering Critics

Hakuseki's endeavors to manifest the all-encompassing nature of the shogun's monarchal authority through redefinition of the symbols of shogunal rule encountered substantial opposition. Those who objected to his innovations raised two primary arguments against them: that they deviated from the norms of bakufu rule established by previous shogun, and that they infringed on the prerogatives of the imperial court. Such arguments were not baseless. Hakuseki quite clearly did seek to change the norms of bakufu rule, and his adherence to Chinese Confucian prescriptions about the relationship between the ruler and *rei ran* counter to the assumptions about that relationship that had become rooted in the Japanese political environment. In this regard, Tokutomi Sohō's acerbic evaluation of Hakuseki's program is quite to the point:

However much Edo changed under the impact of influences emanating from Kyoto, as long as shogunal rule continued, Edo had to be Edo and Kyoto Kyoto. The ultimate implications of a thoroughgoing transformation of Edo into a Kyoto could be only the abolition of shogunal rule on the one hand or the total absorption of Kyoto into Edo on the other. . . . [Had Hakuseki] succeeded in implementing his program to the full, the bakufu institutions in effect since the time of Ieyasu probably would have been shattered. Had he been able to dispose of all affairs with the same uncompromising approach shown on the occasion of the Korean embassy, who can say where the line would have been drawn?²¹

As an engaged politician, Hakuseki could not admit unequivocally such criticisms. He had to defend his program within the framework of the political givens of the day. At the same time, he did not necessarily view unfavorably the implications Tokutomi was to read into his program. In fact, while on one level he tried to answer his critics within the premises of their own arguments—to insist that his measures were true to the ways of the founders of the bakufu and that they in no way infringed on the prerogatives of the court—on another he essentially accepted such charges and attempted to demonstrate that he was fully justified in “seeking to turn Edo into something like the imperial court.”

This position entailed undeniable contradictions. These should not be decried as indications of a weakness in logic. Nor should one, assuming the inconsistencies to be only apparent, attempt to force a reconciliation of the points at conflict. Hakuseki was not an academic theorist, working out an abstract vision in his study. Utilizing the means available to him he strove actively to change the political environment around him. The contradictions in his approach reflect both the complexity of his aims and an irresolvable tension between his environment and his conceptual tools. For this reason, they are highly informative; in particular, they throw into relief the clash between the premises of Chinese Confucianism and the quite different dynamics of the Japanese political tradition.

In actuality, the various strands of the arguments Hakuseki formulated to answer his critics and promote his view of what the bakufu should be were closely intertwined. However, to illuminate the underlying implications of those arguments it will be useful to disentangle the strands and separate them into two polar approaches. To this end, in this chapter we shall focus on his attempt to present his endeavors as according with the parameters of Tokugawa rule, while in the following chapters we shall concentrate on his concurrent efforts to legitimize a radical reordering of those parameters.

THE NATURE OF THE OPPOSITION

Opposition to Hakuseki’s innovations came from various directions. The *rōjū* and other representatives of *fudai* interests were, of course, at

the forefront of the resistance, but the innovations also encountered fierce objections from non-bakufu elements, such as representatives of the domain of Tsushima. To advance his program, Hakuseki had to rebut the objections raised by these various groups. Likewise, in formulating his recommendations he had to anticipate and, if possible, forestall the criticisms they were likely to make. During the reign of Ienobu, when he had the backing of an adult shogun, Hakuseki was relatively successful at this task. The death of Ienobu made it more difficult to override the opposition to his efforts to reshape the symbols of shogunal rule; the accession of Yoshimune spelled his defeat. The course of Hakuseki's struggle with Hayashi Nobuatsu, the hereditary Confucian scholar to the bakufu, illustrates this evolution in the confrontation between Hakuseki and his opponents.

THE CONTEST WITH HAYASHI NOBUATSU. As the main architects of the symbolic structures which had evolved together with the patterns of Tokugawa rule, the Hayashi were accustomed, by the reign of Ienobu, to take charge of matters like promulgation of the *Buke shohatto* and the protocol for reception of the embassy from the king of Korea. Naturally Nobuatsu resisted Hakuseki's innovations in these areas. In challenging Hakuseki's encroachment upon his territory, so to speak, Nobuatsu could count on the backing of the *rōjū*. As a Confucian scholar, Nobuatsu was not a member of the *fudai* establishment in the sense that the *rōjū* and other leading *fudai* daimyo and *hatamoto* were. Nevertheless, the interests of the *fudai* were also bound up with the symbolic structures that Nobuatsu's father and grandfather had helped fashion. In seeking to defend those structures from Hakuseki's attempt to revamp them, the *rōjū* and Nobuatsu spoke as one. This factor added to the intensity of the contest between Hakuseki and Nobuatsu.

We have already noted the clash between Nobuatsu and Hakuseki over handling of the Korean embassy. That conflict was preceded by one over the form of the inscription on Tsunayoshi's sarcophagus—a conflict in which Hakuseki succeeded in supplanting Nobuatsu as the composer of the inscription—and another over the *Buke shohatto*. In the latter instance, much as in the case of the plans for the Korean embassy, "in accordance with the precedents of the previous reign," Nobuatsu was

assigned formal responsibility for drafting the version of the *Buke shohatto* to be issued by Ienobu. The draft he submitted, however, was found wanting, and Ienobu thereupon handed the assignment to Hakuseki, whose advocacy of revision of the code dated to the very first days of Ienobu's reign.² The *rōjū* and Nobuatsu criticized the version produced by Hakuseki in turn as incomprehensible and inappropriate. Hakuseki responded by preparing a commentary explicating his draft. This was given to Nobuatsu, who remained responsible for writing out the copy of the *Buke shohatto* officially promulgated, "for distribution to those who find it difficult to understand the new code."³

While Hakuseki thus succeeded in checking Nobuatsu during the reign of Ienobu, upon Ienobu's death, Nobuatsu moved quickly, in the words of Muro Kyūsō, "to take advantage of the change in reigns and regain his position as a Hanlin advisor."⁴ In the first days of Ietsugu's reign, he went to the *rōjū* and, citing the views of a number of Ming scholars, argued that it was inauspicious to use the character *shō* (correct) in a *nengō*, that its appearance in the *nengō* Shōtoku ("correct virtue"), adopted in 1711, had likely been a contributing factor to Ienobu's early death, and that, consequently, it would be wise to change to a new *nengō*.⁵ Theoretically, the promulgation of *nengō* was the prerogative of the *tenno*, but actually the *tenno* only acted upon the advice of the *bakufu*. Certainly the term *shōtoku*, which referred to the monarch's mission of rectifying society, was symbolically congruent with Hakuseki's vision of the shogun as king, and, in criticizing adoption of it as a *nengō*, Nobuatsu clearly sought to focus blame for the choice on Hakuseki. Kyūsō noted that Nobuatsu asserted that "he had been concerned about this issue since the time the *nengō* had been chosen, but had not spoken of it then because his late lordship [unlike previous shogun] did not consult him about such matters."⁶

Hakuseki's task in countering this *démarche* was relatively simple—to defend the status quo—and he accomplished it without much difficulty, arguing that Nobuatsu was appealing to superstition rather than reason and that the characters of a *nengō* had no impact upon the length of a ruler's life. Moreover, he pointed out, the character *shō* appeared in the *nengō* Shōhō, used between the years 1644 and 1648, when Nobuatsu's father and grandfather had been the central shogunal advisors on such

matters. If it were to be counted an error on Hakuseki's part not to have taken account of the Ming arguments against use of the character *shō*, it also would have to be accounted an error on the part of the earlier Hayashi.⁷ Whether or not as a result of Hakuseki's argument, the issue was dropped.

Nobuatsu, however, followed this opening maneuver with a second, more successful one, revolving around the question of the type of mourning for Ienobu to be observed by Letsugu. According to Hakuseki's autobiography and contemporary reports by Kyūsō, a few weeks after Ienobu's death, Hakuseki discovered that plans were being made to send envoys bearing the normal felicitous offerings to the imperial shrines at Ise and the Tōshōgū at Nikkō as soon as the 50 days of funeral observances were over.⁸ Surprised, Hakuseki asked Akifusa why the bakufu was not adhering to the year's avoidance of such activities usually observed on the occasion of the death of a shogun. Akifusa indicated Nobuatsu as the one behind this decision:

Hayashi Nobuatsu said that, in the mourning code that Lord Tsunayoshi had ordered him to undertake during the Genroku period and that had been settled upon after full deliberation, it stipulates that in the case of a child of less than 7 years neither [parent nor child] is to observe mourning for the other. Thus, as his present lordship will not be observing a period of mourning, there is no need to avoid [felicitous] activities.⁹

A number of implications were involved in this matter. The mourning code adopted in 1693, the work not only of Nobuatsu but also the master of Hakuseki and Kyūsō, Kinoshita Jun'an, did indeed state that a child of less than 7 years was to observe only a minimal period of 50 days' "restraint" (*enryo*) for his parents.¹⁰ The position of the Genroku code reflected the more liberal attitude regarding the length and strictness of mourning taken historically by the Japanese compared to the Chinese, from whom the basic principles of mourning were derived. Nobuatsu's call for application of this principle to Letsugu, however, also entailed a challenge to Hakuseki's efforts to enhance the weight of the shogunal role. Rapid resumption of the ordinary round of ceremonial activities served to reduce the significance of the loss of the figure whom Hakuseki had sought to present as the ruler of the realm. As Hakuseki put it:

While his late lordship had many children, his present lordship is the only one who has survived to continue the great line of the realm. Now it is said that, because of his youth, there should be no observance of mourning; again, while as ruler of the realm his late lordship maintained large numbers of retainers, [because the Genroku code also has no provision for the observance of extended mourning by vassals], it is asserted that they should not observe mourning for him. On what basis then may his death be referred to as "the great loss of the nation"?¹¹

Hakuseki tried to convince Akifusa to reject the position taken by Nobuatsu and seconded by the *rōjū*. His autobiography suggests that he argued that Ienobu had planned to revise the code. "His late lordship must have had some plan in mind, for at the beginning of his reign he queried me in detail about the ancient and recent mourning codes of China and Japan. I wrote out points and submitted sketches, but he died without any formal action having been taken."¹² Hakuseki had to recognize, however, that, without the explicit backing of the shogun, a direct disavowal of the Genroku code was impossible. Thus, his ultimate strategy was to try to skirt the issue of open contravention of the Genroku code by arguing that, in accordance with Japanese custom, the shogun could observe a period of private, unofficial "mourning in the heart" (*shinsō*), and that on this basis the sending of the felicitory envoys could be postponed.¹³

According to Hakuseki and Kyūsō, after some struggle, this argument won acceptance. As Kyūsō described what happened:

Lord Manabe put Arai's memorial in his pocket and first casually sounded out the feelings of the *rōjū* about it. However, their minds were already made up; it appeared that it would be very difficult to change them and that, even if he were to bring the memorandum out [as a formal proposal], the *rōjū* were unlikely to agree to it. Thus, Arai's memorial might lead to a rift with the *rōjū*. At the same time, Arai having spoken so strongly, if the course advocated by Hayashi were followed, it would be very uncomfortable for him. Pondering this, Lord Manabe felt that there must be some other way to resolve the matter, and thus he decided to say nothing more about it to the *rōjū*. Instead, he submitted the memorandum to Lady Ten'eiin and explained to her in detail Arai's thoughts on this matter. Thereafter he went back to the *rōjū* and transmitted the command that both Lady Ten'eiin and his lordship's mother felt that, whatever the provisions of the mourning code, to say so quickly that

there was no longer any need to abstain from felicitory acts was to risk divine retribution and that they wished to follow the custom of mourning in the heart. "Quite, quite," was the response, and the envoys to Nikkō and such were halted.¹⁴

Bakufu records make clear, however, that, while the *rōjū* may have agreed to "mourning in the heart," they did not regard it, as Hakuseki had intended, as a basis for abstaining from activities that would be avoided during a period of formal mourning. Rather, as accorded better with its usual meaning, they interpreted it as an expression of the shogun's personal grief, even as he proceeded with the normal activities incumbent upon his official position. Thus, despite the assertions of Hakuseki and Kyūsō to the contrary, the felicitory envoys were sent. The *Tokugawa jikki* records that on 1712/12/6,

the forty-nine days of funeral observances having come to an end, envoys on behalf of the shogun were despatched to various shrines. . . . Matsudaira Masa-kata was sent as envoy to the shrine [to Ieyasu] at Nikkō. . . . Aoyama Tadashige was sent as envoy to the mausoleum of Lord Iemitsu at the same mountain. The *kōke* (protocol officer) Nagasawa Sukechika was commanded to serve as envoy to Ise.

A month later, on the 7th day of the 1st month of the new year, the *Jikki* again records the sending of "the usual emissaries" to Ise and Kyoto.¹⁵

VICTORY OF THE OPPOSITION. The denouement of this episode was a portent of the eventual full triumph of Nobuatsu and his backers following the succession of Yoshimune. Upon his accession, Yoshimune, as noted in Chapter 1, made a point of demonstrating his respect for the traditional patterns of Tokugawa rule. To this end, he summoned leading representatives of the *fudai* for consultation; included among those honored in this manner was Hayashi Nobuatsu.¹⁶ Yoshimune evidenced support for the views of these people concerning bakufu *rei* by declaring immediately after his accession that he would be doing things "differently from his previous lordship and in a manner that might on occasion appear somewhat austere"; people should be forewarned that, "regarding the standards (*kakushiki*) established since the days of Lord Ieyasu, there will be no restriction whatsoever, but in other areas there should be

great care not to engage in needless extravagance.”¹⁷ Within two months, the *nengō* Shōtoku had been changed to Kyōhō (“preservation of the inheritance”), an appropriate manifestation of Yoshimune’s stated aims.

In line with these indications of the direction he intended to pursue, Yoshimune rapidly eliminated Hakuseki’s innovations. Hayashi Nobuatsu was assigned to compose the inscription for Ietsugu’s sarcophagus. Declaring that, on the occasion of the funeral of Ienobu, the funeral furnishings had been “excessively splendidous,” Yoshimune explicitly ordered that those for Ietsugu be more modest. Reduction of expenses was not the object. When the *rōjū* noted that, the furnishings already having been constructed according to the previous pattern, it would be more economical to keep them as they were, Yoshimune replied that saving money was not as important as restoration of the old forms.¹⁸ He abandoned Hakuseki’s innovations in bakufu court dress, to which Sakai Tadataka, representative of the *fudai* old guard par excellence, had specifically objected. He had the roofed and pillared *yotsuashi* gate built at Hakuseki’s urging within the grounds of Edo Castle torn down.¹⁹ In promulgating the *Buke shohatto* early in 1717, Yoshimune restored the 1683 version composed by Nobuatsu. Shortly thereafter, at the recommendation of Nobuatsu, he proclaimed his intention to abandon use of the title of *kokūō* and revert to the established protocol for reception of the Korean embassy.²⁰

Politically these moves were adroit; the conspicuous reversal of policies that had been designed to enhance the authority of the shogun at the expense of the traditional role of the *fudai* establishment contributed to a reconciliation with the *rōjū* that paved the way for the substantial reforms of the Kyōhō era. For Hakuseki, however, the dismantling of the monarchal *rei* he had struggled to install was a bitter blow. In a letter to a friend, he described Yoshimune as one who, like the followers of Mozi in ancient China, “would make do with miso in earthen dishes for a great state banquet.”²¹ In another letter to the same friend, in which he likened Yoshimune to the spartan-minded leaders of Qin, Hakuseki added:

What keeps heaven above and earth below is *rei*. . . . If the Son of Heaven, regional lords, high and low officials, *shi* [samurai], and populace are all alike to strive only for frugality without attention to preservation of the proper levels of *rei*, how will it differ from that time of barbarity before the establishment of civilized modes of life?²²

In the same vein, he made the loss of his official residence near Edo Castle and the granting to him of residence land in the remote Naitō Shinjuku the setting of a poem in which he referred to himself as "like one who has escaped from Qin."²³

Hakuseki's bitterness spurred him to continue to defend, after his retirement, what he had attempted to do in his years as advisor to Ienobu and Akifusa. One step in this direction was the autobiography he wrote shortly after his departure from the bakufu. In the final sentence of that work, he noted that, in the weeks after Letsugu's death, "people who call themselves hereditary retainers of this house" had expressed criticism of the conduct of affairs during the reigns of Ienobu and Letsugu and relief that, with the accession of Yoshimune, the Tokugawa house at last was in good hands. However, Hakuseki declared, "a hundred years hence, when public opinion shall pass impartial judgment," such an attitude would be seen to cast shame on those who currently prided themselves on it.²⁴ To encourage such an eventual "impartial judgment," in the various historical works to which he devoted much of his energy in the last decade of his life he sought to justify, in theoretical and historical terms, the measures he had advocated. In a letter to a friend, he avowed that to embark on such a project was like "a spider spinning its web in the face of a storm; however, as is said, it is better to gamble than to give up."²⁵ In later chapters, we shall examine the web he spun in these works. First, however, let us consider his immediate rejoinder to his opponents.

THE ARGUMENT AGAINST HAKUSEKI'S INNOVATIONS

His critics leveled two types of charge against Hakuseki's innovations. One was that they departed from the established norms of *buke* rule in general and those of the Tokugawa bakufu in particular. The other was that they infringed on the prerogatives proper to the court. Often, as happened regarding construction of a *yotsuashi*-style gate within the precincts of Edo Castle, a measure met with both criticisms. In that case, some objected to the gate on the grounds that no shogunal house had ever constructed a roofed gate in such a location.²⁶ Others, saying that Hakuseki intended it to be the equivalent of the Gate of Immortality (Furōmon) within the Imperial Palace, objected to such usurpation of

the perquisites of the *tenno*.²⁷ The two criticisms focused on different points. Nevertheless, both rested on a common premise about the relationship between *rei* and the ruler, which differed fundamentally from that which motivated Hakuseki's efforts to reshape the symbols of shogunal rule.

Hakuseki drew upon the standard Chinese Confucian assumption that the *rei* proper to the ruler were attached to the status of rulership rather than to the person of the individual ruler or to a particular dynastic line. In the orthodox Chinese Confucian view, a legitimate monarch derived his authority from heaven, which had singled him out as "the one man" capable of acting as its steward in governing "all under heaven." In granting the ruler its mandate (*tianming*; J.: *tenmei*), heaven also endowed him with the privilege of manifesting his authority through adoption of the *rei* appropriate to his position. If the recipient of the mandate proved unworthy of heaven's trust, however, heaven would withdraw its mandate and transfer it (*geming*; J.: *kakumei*) to another individual, or, as the theory came to be applied, to another ruling line. This new recipient thereby also inherited the prerogative to manifest the patents of authority of "the one man" charged with the responsibility of governing "all under heaven."

In line with this view, while Chinese Confucians regarded usurpation of the *rei* of the recognized ruler as an instance of lèse majesty, they took it for granted that a new recipient of the mandate could legitimately fall heir to the *rei* of the previous holder. The symbolic significance of Han Gaozu's summoning of scholars from Lu, the state believed to have preserved best the authentic rites of the Zhou, was just such a transmission of the *rei* of kingship to a new dynasty. Likewise, it was basically premises of this sort that sent Hakuseki to Kyoto in quest of the *rei* appropriate to the shogun's substantial status as national monarch.

The ideas about *rei* that had evolved in the Japanese context, however, were quite different. Japanese rulers of the sixth to eighth centuries adopted the Chinese premise that the ruler should manifest his authority through a distinctive set of symbolic attributes. In formulating *rei* appropriate to themselves they also emulated those characteristic of Chinese rulers. But they grafted the Chinese concept of kingship on to a native assumption that the ruler had to be of a particular bloodline to

fulfill his intrinsic function of serving as a channel of communication between the human world and that of the gods. Under the influence of these native ideas, the ideologists of the Nara state discarded the central Chinese presumption that heaven's mandate was conditional upon the ruler's carrying out the responsibility with which heaven had charged him. Asserting that the Sun Goddess, the analogue of heaven, had permanently vested in her descendants her mandate to rule Japan, they also rejected the proposition that the *rei* of kingship were legitimately transferrable from one ruling line to another.

The premise that the *rei* adopted by the Nara court were the distinctive and permanent attributes of the imperial court persisted even as the court steadily lost temporal authority to the succession of *buke* rulers who arose from the mid-twelfth century on. For various reason, these *buke* leaders found it more convenient to claim to rule under the aegis of imperial sanction than to overthrow the *tenno* and govern in the name of a direct mandate of their own. Consequently, instead of taking for themselves the attributes of kingly authority which the Chinese regarded as the rightful perquisites of the effective ruler, they upheld the notion that these were particular to the court. Simultaneously, the idea took root that there was a different tradition of ceremony and customs proper to the *buke*.

To be sure, as the evolution in court dress shows, the two styles, noble and *buke*, were not totally insulated from each other. In particular, Yoshimitsu, the third Ashikaga shogun, sought to elevate his stature as national ruler by adopting a ceremonial life style modeled after that of the retired *tenno* and by fostering a fusion of court and *buke* tradition. Nevertheless, the idea that the two traditions were distinct survived to become an operating premise of the Tokugawa mode of rule.

The fact that the center of Tokugawa power was in the east, the traditional heartland of *bushi* society, together with the complexity of Tokugawa relations with the Toyotomi, who had affiliated themselves closely with the court, led Ieyasu to present himself as the direct successor to the tradition of an eastern *buke* government founded by Yoritomo. Thus, while in actuality the Tokugawa derived many of their ceremonial practices from the Ashikaga, symbolically Ieyasu linked himself to the Kamakura tradition of shogunal rule as something distinct from the

style of the court rather than to the Ashikaga fusion of the two. As one aspect of this stance, the Tokugawa sought to separate themselves from Ashikaga “presumption” vis-à-vis the court. Notably, in choosing to present himself as belonging to the Minamoto lineage and thus properly qualified to assume the post of shogun, Ieyasu did not trace his descent from the Ashikaga. Implicitly emphasizing that the latter’s origins as shogun were clouded by their betrayal of the reigning tenno, Godaigo, Ieyasu claimed instead as his ancestor Nitta Yoshisada, the contemporary of Ashikaga Takauji who, unlike Takauji, had remained loyal to Godaigo to the end.

It was to the assumption that the Japanese polity encompassed two mutually exclusive political traditions that Hakuseki had to answer. One strategy was to challenge this assumption, anomalous from the perspective of Chinese Confucian political thought, in the name of the Confucian premises on which he was acting. In many ways, this was the logically most coherent approach and, as we shall see, Hakuseki pursued it boldly and vigorously. But, as a practical device for meeting the criticisms of his opponents and winning acceptance of his proposals, such a strategy did not promise success. In the Tokugawa context, the ways of the founders carried far greater weight than Confucian theory. Consequently, parallel to his endeavors to use the tenets of Confucianism to justify Tokugawa absorption of the *rei* of the court, Hakuseki attempted to answer his critics on their own terms, that is, to show that the measures he proposed neither deviated from the tradition of *buke* rule nor infringed on perquisites proper to the court. By nature, this was an endeavor that required Hakuseki to exercise fully his polemical skills, a circumstance that means we need to pay as much attention to the kind of tactics he employed as to the content of his argument.

*HAKUSEKI'S DEFENSE OF HIS PROGRAM
AS TRUE TO BUKE TRADITION*

To defend his proposals against charges that they were contrary to *buke* tradition, Hakuseki used essentially two strategies. First, he attempted to define the nature of *buke* tradition in such a way as to make room within it for what he sought to do. To this end, he stressed that *buke* rule was

not static and fixed. For instance, in his memorial on merit ranks he sought to forestall the predictable objection that there was no appropriate precedent with the declaration that "neither the appearance of *buke* rule itself during the Kamakura period nor the formulation of *buke* ceremonial (*gishiki*) during the reign of Ashikaga Yoshimitsu were matters for which there was any precedent."²⁸

As another step to foster compatibility between what was defined as "*buke* tradition" and his own program, Hakuseki, as the above quotation suggests, emphasized the actual importance of Ashikaga Yoshimitsu as a source of *buke* ceremonial. For Hakuseki to present his program as true to the pattern of divided rule established by Yoritomo was difficult. By contrast, Yoshimitsu, of all the shogun, offered the closest actual precedent for Hakuseki's attempt to transform the shogun into a national monarch who claimed as his own various symbolic elements traditionally associated with the court. The same memorial provides a good example of the way in which Hakuseki endeavored to utilize this precedent:

Yoshimitsu is generally said to have been presumptuous and arrogant. In martial valor, however, he was superior to his father and grandfather, and his abilities would seem to have been such that they overflowed the boundaries of our country. Even if they were not sufficient in the realm of military matters to end unrest within the four seas, or in the realm of civil affairs to bring ease to the lives of the multitude, he skillfully handled the matter of the northern court, he himself rose to the highest rank among subjects, and at his death he was awarded the title of retired tenno. The Chinese emperor enfeoffed him as king of our country and granted him the posthumous name of King Kyōken. And it was from Yoshimitsu's reign that it became customary to refer to the shogun as *kubō* [a term previously used of the tenno], that the shogun adopted the ceremonial style of the court of the retired tenno, and that the eternal practices of the *buke* were established. Consequently one should not be overly harsh in one's assessment of him.²⁹

If one strategy used by Hakuseki to defend his program as true to *buke* tradition was to single out for emphasis those elements in the history of *buke* rule that accorded most closely with his own aims, another was to seek to throw his opponents on the defensive by challenging the authenticity of what they claimed to be *buke* tradition. His efforts to

justify the construction of a *yotsuashi* gate inside the main entrance to Edo Castle provide a good example of how he combined this strategy with the first to defend a measure criticized for deviating from the norms of *buke* rule.

When Hakuseki's plan to construct the gate inside Edo Castle became known, someone evidently queried the bakufu carpenters about traditional Tokugawa practice in such matters. The carpenters reported that the shogunal houses had never constructed a roofed gate in front of their great audience hall (*ōhiroma*). Declaring that, "in regard to the style of dwellings, the shogunal houses have long taken the diagram of Lord Yoritomo's residence in Kamakura as establishing the standards appropriate for the *buke*," they submitted a copy of the diagram to show that those standards did not include a roofed gate. As additional evidence, they pointed out that, in accordance with traditional *buke* practice, the daimyo built only unroofed gates in front of their audience halls. And, to account for this *buke* custom, they noted that a roof would impede the passage of palanquins and elongated implements.³⁰

Hakuseki responded to these points by challenging the authenticity of the carpenters' evidence. To say that shogunal houses since the time of Yoritomo had not constructed roofed gates in front of their *ōhiroma* involved an anachronism, he asserted, because, as an architectural feature of *buke* dwellings, the *ōhiroma* was of more recent provenance. The same was true of the supposition that Yoritomo had avoided building a roofed gate because it would impede the passage of elongated implements. The hypothesis was faulty because the salient example of a long-handled military implement, the spear (*yari*), dated from after Yoritomo's time. Hakuseki further questioned the authenticity of the diagram of Yoritomo's residence supplied by the carpenters. Noting the presence of various anachronisms in it, he asserted that it was not a diagram of Yoritomo's residence at all. Rather, it dated from the late Muromachi period and depicted the residence of the Kanto *kanrei*. And, he added, in that the whole point of differentiating gate styles was to distinguish different social statuses, to adduce the practices of the daimyo as evidence about the gate proper to the shogun was to "display an ignorance of traditional customs. Is this not the height of impropriety?"³¹

Concentrating on the problematic aspects of the evidence presented

by his opponents, Hakuseki adroitly avoided answering the main thrust of their argument: that *yotsuashi* gates were not part of the tradition of *buke* architecture deriving from Yoritomo. He asserted in passing that previous shogunal houses must have had *yotsuashi* gates, because "otherwise they would not have been able to conduct affairs in accordance with *rei*." However, he supplied no concrete evidence to support this contention. To justify construction of the gate, he relied, instead, on the argument that the *buke* tradition was not immutable and that, by implication, Yoritomo did not offer the only appropriate precedent. Along this line, as in the memorial on *buke kan'i*, he declared that, from the time of Yoshimitsu, "*buke* ceremonial has followed in all regards the style of the retired tenno's palace. . . . For this reason, the style of the shogun's palace, too, came to differ in various points from the principles followed in the Kamakura period." He closed by asking if the carpenters had not heard of the gate erected within Nijō Castle, the shogun's headquarters in Kyoto.³²

At one point, a *yotsuashi* gate had existed in Nijō Castle; it had been used to receive Gomizunoo Tenno on the occasion of his procession to Nijō Castle in 1626 to call on Hidetada and Iemitsu.³³ As Hakuseki acknowledged elsewhere, however, that gate later had been moved to the grounds of the retired tenno's palace.³⁴ Perhaps for that reason, while he devoted considerable energy to challenging the authenticity of the information provided by the carpenters, he did not elaborate on the implications of the Nijō Castle gate.

THE ISSUE OF IMPERIAL PREROGATIVES:
DEFENSE OF THE TITLE OF KOKUŌ

Hakuseki used similar tactics to defend his efforts to reshape the symbols of shogunal authority from the charge that they infringed on prerogatives proper to the imperial court. Of all his innovations, it was adoption of the title of *kokuō* for the shogun that most invited this criticism. Those who opposed this innovation stated the problem succinctly: In terming himself king of Japan, the shogun presented himself as the national ruler in place of the tenno. To defend shogunal use of the title of *kokuō* against this charge, Hakuseki utilized various strategies. These

strategies were not necessarily consistent with each other and a number involved strained reasoning. It would be unwise, however, to conclude that the inconsistencies and forced logic reveal intellectual carelessness. To the contrary they testify, on the one hand, to the difficulty of the challenge Hakuseki faced in defending shogunal adoption of the title of *kokuō* and, on the other, to the ingenuity with which he endeavored to meet this challenge.

The argument that shogunal use of the title of *Nihon kokuō* infringed on the perquisites of the *tenno* was voiced most cogently by Amemori Hōshū, a Tsushima *jusha*, who, like Hakuseki, was a disciple of Kinoshita Jun'an, and to whom fell eventually the task of convincing the Koreans to accept the various changes in protocol made on the occasion of the 1711 embassy. When Hōshū learned of Hakuseki's plan to change the title of the shogun from *taikun* to *kokuō*, he responded with a series of highly critical letters.³⁵ Noting in one the steady absorption by the *buke* of the powers and authority of the court, he declared that Yoritomo's acquisition of the prerogative to appoint *jitō* nationwide had marked the first stage of the decline of the court. Use by the Ashikaga in relations with China of the forms of diplomatic intercourse appropriate to a national ruler had marked the second stage. And, "if now, following your recommendation, a new precedent is set of his lordship referring to himself as king of Japan in the reply to Korea, it will mark the third stage of the decline of the court."³⁶ In another letter, Hōshū declared that, with the decline of the court,

those who hereditarily hold military authority, although in name only ministers [of the *tenno*], in fact have acted as rulers of the nation (*kokushū*). The power to grant and confiscate rank and income has lain solely in their hands. In the end, their power has been such that the people of the realm have forgotten the existence of the sacred lineage which embodies heaven and is equal to the sun. . . . The only thing that can be seen as preserving the fidelity of a subject [to the *tenno*] is that the shogun has not dared to refer to himself publicly as a king in relations with Korea. . . . If now you abandon the special term established as precedent through generations of use and formulate a totally inappropriate standard, regarding the ruler, it will fail to uphold the obligation of fidelity, and regarding [the Tokugawa house], it will abrogate the institutions of the founders.³⁷

Given the history of Tokugawa-Tsushima-Korea relations up to 1636, there was a certain irony in a representative of Tsushima condemning so righteously the shogun's use of *kokuō* as a self-appellation. That very point, however, demonstrates how firmly established *taikun* had become as the title appropriate to the shogun and how problematic the shogun's claim to the title of *kokuō* appeared to his feudal subordinates.

Against the argument that shogunal use of the title of *kokuō* "failed to uphold the obligation of fidelity" to the tenno Hakuseki developed several counterplots. One was to assert that the problems with *taikun*, a title used in Korea to refer to a figure subordinate to the king, were far greater. Amenomori Höshū rejoined that, while address of the shogun as *taikun* may have carried negative implications for him, those same implications reflected favorably on the tenno and on Japan as a whole. In his letter to Hakuseki, Höshū emphasized that, whatever theoretical objections might be made to *taikun* as a title that the Koreans applied to a prince who was of lesser status than their king, the forms of correspondence used between the bakufu and Korea were those appropriate to a national ruler. Thus it was clear that the Korean king dealt with the shogun as his equal. To be concerned about the title *taikun* because of its implication of subordination to another,

is to have in view only his lordship himself and to forget the country of Japan. If the Korean king regards his lordship as of subordinate status within Japan and yet conducts relations with him on a basis of parity, Japan is established as the land of the tenno and the Korean king is established as of the same status as one subordinate within Japan; nothing could redound more to the glory of the country of Japan.³⁸

To forestall counterarguments of this sort, in a subsequent reference to the negative features of *taikun* as an appellation for the shogun, Hakuseki emphasized that these did not injure the shogun alone. To the contrary, they also diminished the prestige of the tenno. Hakuseki developed this argument particularly in communicating with members of the court nobility, on whom he relied extensively in his investigation of "authentic" *rei* and who could be expected to be especially sensitive to the implications shogunal use of the title of *kokuō* carried for the tenno. For instance, he expanded on the injury dealt the tenno by address of

the shogun as *taikun* in a letter of 1711/7/16 to Konoe Iehiro, reporting that the Koreans had changed the title of address for the shogun to *kokuō* in the diplomatic missive they were bringing to Japan. In the letter to Iehiro, Hakuseki declared that the insistence of people like Hayashi Razan that *kokuō* was improper as a title for the shogun because it was a title used of the tenno had, in effect,

reduced the title of the tenno to *kokuō*. And, since, within Korea, this title [of *taikun*] is clearly that of a subject of the king, for the shogun to accept address of himself as such and reduce disrespectfully the title of the tenno to *kokuō* is to make the tenno as of the same status as the chieftain of a tribe of eastern barbarians [that is, the Korean king]. Is this right?³⁹

Having asserted that address of the shogun as *taikun* had been in fact pejorative towards the tenno, Hakuseki proceeded to claim that the change to *kokuō* would not only establish the appropriate parity between the shogun and the Korean king, but would also manifest abroad the glory of the imperial house:

Although there were no orders to such effect from the government, I, with my own arm alone, pushed the foreign country and readily got them to use the old title for the shogun. The title of *kokuō* having been restored to the shogun, the authority of the title of the tenno has as a result been restored as well. Might not one say that the light of the sun of the country of the rising sun, while temporarily eclipsed, today sends forth its light with increased brilliance?⁴⁰

A second strategy employed by Hakuseki was to play down the connotations of national rulership carried by the title *kokuō*. Hōshū had pointed these out bluntly in castigating the combination of the title *ō* with the name of the country of Japan. Were the shogun to refer to himself as “king of [the province of] Musashi of the country of Japan (*Nihonkoku Musashi ō*)” or “king of the Kanto region of the country of Japan,” Hōshū declared, he might be considered as conforming to the post-Han usage of *ō* for the ruler of a principality. “But to give simply the name of the country before the word king indicates the title of the supreme ruler of the nation.”⁴¹ Consequently, Hakuseki’s adoption for Ienobu of the signature *Nihon kokuō* was tantamount to suggesting that there had been “a change in ruling house.”⁴²

In fact, as Hōshū perceived, this was a central, and not unintended, implication of Hakuseki's call for the shogun to adopt the title of *kokuō*. Hakuseki meant the title to establish the shogun as king of Japan, not king of one region of Japan. Nevertheless, as a defensive measure he gathered whatever evidence he could to deny that description of the shogun as king of Japan was tantamount to an act of lese majesty vis-à-vis the tenno. Ignoring the distinction made by Hōshū, he declared that Chinese usage made clear the difference in level between *ō* and tenno. While *ō* had been the title of Chinese emperors prior to the Qin, "from the Han on, *ō* has been used simply as the standard term for a ruler (*kunchō*)."⁴³ Regarding the specific case of Japan, both Chinese and Korean records showed that they recognized that "*ō* is not the title of the tenno of the heavenly court (*tenchō tenshi*)."⁴⁴

On another occasion, to justify the propriety of the shogun's referring to himself not just as *ō*, but *Nihon kokuō*, Hakuseki asserted that Chinese usage provided examples of two contemporary political personages with different titles each using the name of their common country before their title, such as the case of the kings of Zhou, Wu and Cheng, and the Duke of Zhou, Dan. Since there was a fundamental distinction in level between the titles of rulership *kō* (Ch.: *huang*) and *ō*, "if in addition *ten* (heaven) is added to *kō* to make tenno, and *koku* (country) is added to *ō* to make *kokuō*, the proper hierarchical distinction between superior and inferior is as firm as the irreversible positions of heaven and earth."⁴⁵

To be sure, he was hard put to find additional Chinese evidence to corroborate this argument. He had to admit that the other instance to come to mind, that of "King" Xiang of Chu (Xiang Yu) and "Emperor" Yi of Chu at the end of the Qin, was hardly auspicious,⁴⁶ Xiang Yu being a member of the old Chu aristocracy and Yi a descendant of the Chu kings whom Xiang Yu first championed as a puppet, elevating him to the status of "emperor," only to arrange his assassination the following year.

In a somewhat similar vein, Hakuseki also asserted that Japanese usage of the title of *ō* showed that it did not endow its holder with a notably exalted status in the context of the court hierarchy centered around the tenno. In an early memorial advocating the change to *kokuō*

which was passed on to the Konoe, Hakuseki used such an argument to help secure approval of the change:

In our country, is it not true that even an imperial prince [*kōshin shinnō*; that is, a member of the imperial family awarded the title of “imperial prince”] does not take precedence over a court minister (*daijin*) in active service? All the more must such be the case with ordinary princes (*shōō*). Thus, in our country, titles like *ō* do not appear to indicate a particularly noble status. However, as in China, both in antiquity and now, this title has been regarded as noble, it must be said that to use the title of king in communications with other countries is precisely to the point.⁴⁶

As yet another strategy to justify shogunal use of the title *kokūō*, Hakuseki insisted that, contrary to appearances, for the shogun to adopt the title of *kokūō* in relations with Korea would conform to traditional *buke* practice, including that of the Tokugawa. To this end, Hakuseki consistently referred to adoption of the title of king as a “restoration of the traditional title (*fukugō*).” In so doing, he dismissed two patent difficulties. One was that not even the Ashikaga had termed themselves *kokūō* in relations with Korea. Hakuseki dealt with this problem by arguing that references in Korean works to differences in the titles used domestically and externally by the Japanese “*kokūō*” were proof that the Ashikaga had in fact termed themselves *kokūō* vis-à-vis Korea. “If such were not the case,” he declared, “why should the Korean ruler and his ministers complain that the failure of our letter [of 1607] to refer to the shogun as king went against the standard form?” Hakuseki went on to assert that the monk Zuikei (1392–1473), in his *Zenrin kokuhō ki*, the major source for early Ashikaga diplomatic usage, must have “removed the character *ō* from the missives sent Korea during the previous [that is, Ashikaga] era so as to show his disapproval [of this usage]. What he records is not the original form.”⁴⁷

The second problem Hakuseki had to confront in claiming adoption of the title of *kokūō* vis-à-vis Korea to be a “restoration” was that the only “Tokugawa” usage of the title had been in the Tsushima forgeries of the early seventeenth century. To resolve this problem, Hakuseki tried to present those forgeries in as favorable a light as possible. The initial Tsushima forgeries of 1606 and 1607 had not become an issue in the 1635 exposure of the 1617 and 1624 forgeries,⁴⁸ a circumstance that allowed

Hakuseki to imply that the recognized forgeries had been preceded by letters in which Ieyasu had referred to himself as king. Thus, he depicted as authentic the initial Tsushima forgery, the 1606 “letter from Ieyasu” requesting the reopening of relations with Korea. Japanese records did not contain this letter, he admitted; nevertheless, Korean and Chinese works mentioned it, showing that it had existed. Saying that the failure of Japanese records to refer to this letter “is strange,” he glossed over the question of whether it had in fact been initiated by Ieyasu.⁴⁹

Hakuseki could not deal in such a cavalier fashion with the 1617 and 1624 forgeries, which had been exposed definitively as false. Instead he concentrated his efforts on vindicating them. Since the various daimyo participating in the Korean invasions had all termed themselves “generalissimos” (*taishōgun*), the Koreans, he asserted, naturally did not wish to resume diplomatic relations with someone called “shogun”:

They declared that they could discuss the resumption of friendly relations only with one who, as in past eras, was the hereditary ruler of the nation, the *kokuō*. . . . However, at that time his lordship [Hidetada] had already, following the precedent of previous *buke* houses, received the title of shogun from the *tenno*. [The Tsushima *karō* Yanagawa Shigeoki thus decided that] it would be improper to say to him that this was a title not regarded highly in other countries. But, at the same time, if the letter were sent on as it was, the accord [between Japan and Korea] that was finally on the verge of fulfillment was sure to fall apart again. The most important thing, he said, was to ensure peace between the two nations, and thus, on his own initiative, he rewrote the letter so that it was signed *Nihon kokuō*.⁵⁰

Hakuseki further argued that the relatively light punishment dealt the principals behind the forgeries testified to an appreciation of their intentions. Falsification of diplomatic correspondence from the shogun, he pointed out, would normally be treated as a crime of high treason and punished by death. Nevertheless, Yanagawa Shigeoki and others involved in the Tsushima forgeries were sentenced only to exile “because in undertaking [these forgeries] he had only our country’s well-being at heart.”⁵¹

That to present adoption of the title of *kokuō* as a “restoration” Hakuseki had to distort the circumstances surrounding the Tsushima forgeries points up the difficulties he faced in trying to answer his critics on their terms. Likewise, insofar as Hakuseki remained on the defensive, it was

virtually impossible for him to formulate a cohesive rationale for what, in fact, he was trying to do. As the above discussion shows, he could do little more than tailor his discussion according to the occasion and audience. Inevitably, the result was an incomplete and often contradictory picture of what his innovations could be expected to accomplish. However, simultaneously with his efforts to answer the objections of others, Hakuseki also engaged in a far bolder attempt to justify his program on its own terms. In that attempt, he did not work within the framework of the premises held by his opponents. Instead, challenging that framework head on, he sought to replace it with a new structure of propositions that not only vindicated his program but also spelled out its full implications. It is this new structure that we will consider in the following two chapters.

Arguing from History: Reappraisal of the Eternal Sovereignty of the Imperial Line

The controversy aroused by Hakuseki's program grew out of divergent views of the proper nature of the Japanese polity and of the relationship between *rei* and the ruler. As we saw in the previous chapters, in Japan the assumption had taken root that the polity contained two distinct political traditions, one innate in the imperial court and the other particular to the *buke*. Observed objectively, the former was rich in symbols of national authority but essentially hollow when it came to substance. The latter, on the other hand, was the repository of tangible power but lacked a full range of the patents of autonomous kingship. Hakuseki's program challenged this bifurcation. Convinced both that the authentic king should exercise a comprehensive authority and that, in the contemporary situation, the shogun was the proper figure to assume the role of the authentic king, Hakuseki attempted to bring about a coalescence of the two dimensions of the Japanese polity.

The inspiration for this effort derived from the fundamental premises of Chinese Confucian political thought. Consequently, when he set out to compose a full-scale, coherent justification of his program, Hakuseki quite naturally turned to those same premises. Bringing them to bear on the accepted data of Japanese history, Hakuseki demolished step by step the conceptual framework underlying the tradition of bifurcated authority. Simultaneously he erected a new interpretative structure supportive of his aims. This enterprise, carried out in the series of historical works that he wrote or rewrote in the decade between 1716 and his death in

1725, offers the fullest rationale for what Hakuseki sought to do during his years of political activity. At the same time, as perhaps the most thoroughgoing application of Chinese Confucian political norms to Japanese political reality of the Tokugawa period, if not the entirety of Japanese history, it occupies a significant place in the history of Tokugawa thought.

Hakuseki's reinterpretation of the data of Japanese history according to the premises of Chinese political historiography entailed two major components. One was an attempt to incorporate the imperial court fully within the scope of Confucian propositions about the accountability of the ruler to heaven and the mutability of heaven's mandate. By applying these propositions to the history of the imperial lineage from its origins to the fourteenth-century reign of Godaigo, Hakuseki sought to demonstrate that the imperial line, while once holding the mandate to rule Japan, had forfeited it and thus, by extension, the patents of sovereignty proper to the king. Among the reasons for this forfeiture was the imperial line's failure to preserve the comprehensive authority characteristic of the true king. The second component of Hakuseki's historical enterprise followed logically upon the first. In it he tried to show that, the imperial line having lost heaven's trust, it was incumbent upon the shogun to fulfill the expectations of heaven and assume the mantle of authentic kingship. We shall examine the first component of Hakuseki's analysis of the course of Japanese history in this chapter and the second in the chapter that follows.

THE TRADITION OF ETERNAL IMPERIAL RULE

In seeking to bring the imperial line fully under the sway of Chinese Confucian theories about the ruler and the mandate of heaven, Hakuseki had to confront a deviation from those theories dating to the beginning of recorded Japanese history. As noted in the previous chapter, the ideologists of the Nara state had grafted the Chinese notion of a comprehensive temporal authority sanctioned by heaven on to a quite different native concept of the nature of kingship. The theory of the mandate of heaven assumed that the recipient was a human being, one of remarkable qualities, but a human being nevertheless. Equally important, the personal virtue and competence as a ruler that won heaven's trust were

considered to be peculiar to the recipient as an individual. The aura of his virtues might extend beyond his lifetime to influence positively the fortunes of his descendants. But, whether or not the descendants retained heaven's trust depended ultimately on their own actions.

By contrast, the early Japanese concept of kingship, reflecting the religious role of the Japanese rulers of the day, rested on the assumption that the ruler was the descendant of deities. For that reason, he was able to act as a channel of communication between the world of the deities and the human realm; his fulfillment of the function of the ruler depended not on his individual attributes but on those innate to his lineage.

The Chinese concept added an important element to the existing, quite primitive, idea of sovereignty. At the same time, the weight of the native idea worked to modify significantly the implications of the imported theory of the mandate of heaven. The *Kojiki* and the *Nihon shoki*, the central works through which the Nara ideologists sought to legitimize the sovereignty of the Yamato line over the nation as a whole, testify to both developments. In its account of the reigns of the human tenno from Jinmu on, the *Nihon shoki*, in particular, utilized the Chinese ideas about the social and political function of the ruler to justify an enlarged role for the Yamato rulers as heads of a unified, centralized state. The compilers of the *Nihon shoki* also used the Chinese assumption that the mandate typically was won by the virtuous founder of a dynasty and lost by his immoral descendants to account for what, to the modern observer, appear to have been shifts of power from one ruling line to another. Thus, the annals of the reign of Nintoku, an early member of what is presumed to be the second of three successive dynasties, attribute to him the virtues characteristic of the founder of a dynasty, while the annals of the reign of Buretsu, the putative predecessor of the founder of the third dynasty, ascribe to him the stock failings of one responsible for losing heaven's trust.¹

But the compilers of the *Nihon shoki* inserted these Chinese elements into a narrative structure that emphasized that the ruler's qualifications derived above all from his descent from a particular lineage of deities. An account of the activities of the deities from whom the Nara tenno claimed descent preceded the annals of the human tenno. Likewise, to reinforce the importance of the ruler's blood links to these deities, the

compilers, even as they used Chinese mandate theory to justify the replacement of one dynasty by another, simultaneously wove the rulers of the three historic dynasties into one single lineage stretching back from those reigning at the time of compilation to the age of the gods (*kamiyo*).

Later political theorists and commentators elaborated on this mixture of Confucian and native elements in the Japanese concept of sovereignty without resolving its inherent contradictions. If anything, as the substantive powers of the court waned, scholars associated with the court or with the shrines at Ise added to the complexity of the mixture through an allegorical reinterpretation of the *kamiyo* accounts that associated the *kamiyo* legends with Buddhist and Chinese philosophical and cosmological traditions. Thus, for instance, the Muromachi court noble and scholar Ichijō Kanera (1402–1481) in his commentary on the *Nihon shoki*, *Nihon shoki sanso*, equated Takamagahara with the Buddhist *ten-shū*, the highest of the six realms of existence; Amenominakanushi no mikoto, one of the earliest deities to appear at the time of the formation of heaven and earth, with Daibonten (Mahabrahma); and the eight islands of Japan (Ōyashima) with the eight trigrams of the *Book of Changes*.² In a similar fashion, the southern court loyalist Kitabatake Chikafusa somewhat earlier had linked the regalia, supposedly given by Amaterasu to her grandson Ninigi no mikoto at the time of his descent from Takamagahara to Japan and passed on from tenno to tenno as the symbols of sovereign authority, to virtues of Confucian and Buddhist provenance. Equating each with a particular virtue—the mirror with sincerity, the jewel with compassion, and the sword with wisdom—Chikafusa concluded that the transmission of the regalia rooted the qualities of kingship in the imperial line. Because Amaterasu had bequeathed sincerity, compassion, and wisdom to her descendants together with the regalia, “the single imperial line has continued properly to reign as the divine spirit (*shinrei*) of this country.”³

While scholars like Kanera and Chikafusa, who were associated closely with the court, sought through such embellishments of the *kamiyo* myths to reaffirm the claim of the imperial line to an “eternal prerogative” to rule Japan, early *buke* ideologues, such as Hayashi Razan, took a somewhat different perspective. Razan’s interpretation of the *kamiyo*

myths, which by his time had become inextricably interwoven with Japanese assumptions about sovereignty, was true to the ambiguities of the Tokugawa polity. On the one hand, congruent with Tokugawa utilization of the legitimizing capacity of the imperial line for their own purposes, Razan tried to preserve the mystique of the *kamiyo* mythology. At the same time, however, just as the Tokugawa also sought more autonomous sanctions for their rule, Razan attempted to universalize that mystique, thereby reducing the particularism of its association with the imperial line and by implication bringing within its aureole those who historically had shared actual power with the imperial line.

The effort to universalize the implications of the *kamiyo* mythology is clearly apparent in *Shintō denju*, wherein Razan set out to demonstrate that Shinto (the way of the *kami*) was identical to *ōdō* (the way of the Confucian king). Razan began *Shintō denju* with the declaration that “*kami* is the spiritual essence (*rei*) of heaven and earth. . . . If one’s body is likened to a house, the heart is like the master of that house, and *kami* is the soul of the master.”⁴ By *kami* Razan explicitly meant the deities of the *Nihon shoki* and *Kojiki*. Thus, he recast Kuninotokotachi no mikoto, whom the *Nihon shoki* presents as the first deity to appear at the time of the formation of heaven and earth, into a transcendent, mystic force, the source of all *kami* and all phenomena, present in all human beings, the reason why “they are able to penetrate the myriad phenomena.”⁵ Similarly, he transformed Takamagahara, the setting of the *kamiyo* myths, from a divine region existing at a particular point in time into something located within the timeless realm of the individual human soul. He concluded *Shintō denju* by commenting on the statement that the *kami* reside in Takamagahara:

Takamagahara is heaven, is principle (*li*; J.: *ri*), is the great vacuity. In the realm of the formless, *kami* naturally exist. In the realm of *li* resides the light of *kami*. In the *Nihon shoki* it states that the *kami* residing in Takamagahara is Amenominakanushi. This *kami*, too, does not exist outside the heart.⁶

This approach to the world of Takamagahara weakened the premise maintained by medieval theorists that the *tenno*, as descendants of a particular lineage of deities, were innately different from other political figures and thus uniquely endowed with the prerogative to rule Japan.

Razan challenged that premise further in his interpretation of the sections of the *kamiyo* accounts that directly pertained to the linkage of the imperial line to the deities of Takamagahara. Thus, he interpreted in spiritual terms of universal portent the creation of a sacred space (*himorogi*) to shelter Amaterasu's grandson, Ninigi, at the time of his descent from Takamagahara to Japan. The description of the *himorogi* traditionally was taken to give mythic sanction to the role of the court nobility in assisting the tenno to rule. According to Razan, however, "Wherever *kami* reside is a *himorogi*. For instance, if one's body is likened to a house and one's heart to its master, is not the light of *kami* in one's heart a *himorogi*?"⁷

The connection Razan drew between Kuninotokotachi no mikoto, the source of all *kami* and all phenomena, and Ninigi likewise denied the singularity of Ninigi's descent. Equating the ten generations between Kuninotokotachi no mikoto and Ninigi in the *kamiyo* accounts to the ten months of human gestation, he transformed Ninigi's descent into an allegorical expression of the mystery of birth.⁸ Razan worked a comparable transformation with the concept of a Shinto bloodline (*shintō kechimyaku*). Pointing out that the genealogy of the tenno went back to Jinmu, the first human tenno (rather than to Amaterasu), he carefully distinguished the Shinto bloodline from that particular lineage; the Shinto bloodline was, rather, something that connected each individual to Kuninotokotachi no mikoto "in an eternal circle, without beginning and without end."⁹

In effect, Razan attempted to preserve intact the magical aura of the world of Takamagahara while interrupting the chronological continuum between *kamiyo* and the realm of human history which traditionally linked the imperial line and its immediate associates, and them alone, to that aura. The effort to establish a chronological break between the world of human rulers and the *kami* of Takamagahara is also evident in Razan's historical works, wherein he consistently emphasized the place of Jinmu, rather than that of the gods of Takamagahara, as the original ancestor of the imperial line. For instance, *Honchō tsugan*, a bakufu-sponsored history of Japan from its origins to the founding of the Tokugawa, begun by Razan and completed by his son, Gahō, began its central narrative with Jinmu and made the events of *kamiyo* an appendix to

that main account. A private, and thus less circumspect, account of the origins of the imperial line in which Razan proposed that Jinmu was probably an immigrant from the continent, a descendant of the virtuous scion of Zhou, Wu Taibo, made even more explicit Razan's intention to detach the imperial line from the world of the gods.¹⁰

This intention was undermined, however, by Razan's desire to preserve the mystique of *kamiyo* itself and by his concern not to impair the efficacy of the veil of legitimacy provided by imperial sanction of Tokugawa rule. These considerations made it difficult for him fully to distinguish the capacity of the tenno to legitimize the rule of others from the "eternal prerogative" to rule Japan traditionally imputed to the imperial line. The blurring of the two is readily visible in his efforts to equate his version of Shinto with the kingly way; the resultant dual way he grounded in the actions of Amaterasu and the line of human tenno alike:

The purity and brightness of the heart is the light of *kami*. Correct behavior is the form of *kami*. The enactment of government is by the virtue of *kami*, the ordering of the nation is by the power of *kami*. This has been transmitted from Amaterasu ōmikami. It is what has been practiced by the tenno since the time of Jinmu. . . .¹¹

Similarly, Razan presented an interpretation of the significance of the regalia much in line with that of Chikafusa, identifying them with the three virtues set forth in the *Doctrine of the Mean*, wisdom, benevolence, and commitment:

Preserved in the heart, they are wisdom, benevolence, and commitment. Manifested as implements, they are the jewel, the sword, and the mirror. It is with these that the nation is governed and protected. . . . The three sacred regalia joined, the kingly way is complete. The principle of the kingly way and Shinto is the same.¹²

Thus, despite the divergence between Razan's aims concerning *kamiyo* and those of medieval ideologues like Ichijō Kanera and Kitabatake Chikafusa, the ultimate consequence of his interpretation of the *kamiyo* mythology was not so different from theirs. It added yet another element to the Japanese theory of sovereignty without sorting out its inherent contradictions. By contrast, Hakuseki's challenge to the bifurcated Japanese political tradition necessarily led him to take issue as well

with the theory of sovereignty in which the ambiguities of the relationship between the Tokugawa shogun and the imperial court were embedded.

HAKUSEKI'S INTERPRETATION OF KAMIYO

To justify rejection of the tradition of bifurcated political authority, Hakuseki attempted to carry out a transformation of *kamiyo* far more radical than Razan's. Guided by the precepts of Chinese Confucianism, he sought to make *kamiyo* into a world of human rulers accountable to the will of heaven. To accomplish this end, Hakuseki set out to demonstrate that the "deities" of *kamiyo* were neither divine entities operating outside the scope of the will of heaven nor cosmological or metaphysical elements belonging to the realm of heaven itself. The former notion—that of the original *Kojiki* and *Nihon shoki* accounts—he termed the product of the imaginings of the "naive and credulous" people of antiquity, who, in transmitting the events of the past, had turned history into a "tale told in a dream."¹³ The latter view—characteristic of the medieval and early Tokugawa tradition of exegesis of the *kamiyo* myths—he castigated as based, often for dubious ends, on forced analogies, "which if they do not derive from Taoism have their source in Buddhism."¹⁴

To counter such misconstructions, Hakuseki pursued a methodological tactic diametrically opposite to Razan's. Razan had attempted to draw a line between *kamiyo*, which he defined as the realm of metaphysics, and history. Hakuseki, by contrast, endeavored to return *kamiyo* totally to the realm of history. In essence, he aimed to reshape the *kamiyo* mythology into something comparable to the account of the beginnings of Chinese rulership found in the classical *Book of History*. To do so, in his major works on the myths, *Koshitsū* and *Koshitsū wakumon*, written in 1716, he submitted the *kamiyo* accounts to innovative procedures designed to remove the accretion of "dream-like imaginings" and "forced analogies" and to reveal their "true character" as a record of the history of several generations of human rulers. The consequent transformation of the character of *kamiyo* served two purposes. It enabled Hakuseki to deny, in a far less equivocal fashion than Razan, that the imperial line possessed a permanent prerogative to rule Japan rooted in

its divine origins. It also allowed him to discover in the *kamiyo* accounts evidence of the transferral of the mandate from one ruling line to another in accordance with the will of heaven. Through such revision of the traditional concept of imperial sovereignty, Hakuseki established the theoretical ground for the ultimate transferral of the comprehensive authority of the true king from the imperial line to the shogun.

PROCEDURAL OPERATIONS. To reclaim *kamiyo* for the realm of history, Hakuseki advanced two propositions. The first concerned the nature of language and the relationship between the original Japanese vocabulary and the Chinese characters adopted in antiquity to transcribe it. Hakuseki argued that language was in a continuous process of evolution; the meaning of words did not remain constant. Consequently, "to comprehend the words of our country, whether ancient or modern, one must consider them in the context of the age that produced them."¹⁵ Moreover, when Japanese words first had been written down, they had been transcribed by Chinese characters which already had a specific meaning derived from Chinese usage. As a result, the original meaning of the Japanese word soon became overlaid with the Chinese connotations of the character used to transcribe it. To make things worse, those who compiled the *kamiyo* accounts did not follow one principle alone when choosing characters to transcribe Japanese terms. Characters were sometimes chosen for their phonetic value and sometimes for their meaning. In the latter instance, sometimes the choice was apt and sometimes not. "If there was an error or ambiguity in the choice of the character used for transcription, the original meaning became distorted."¹⁶ The problem was compounded by later commentators who had built their fanciful interpretations of the *kamiyo* accounts solely on the meaning of the characters, ignoring the original Japanese terms those characters had been intended to transcribe. Thus, to understand correctly the terms found in the ancient texts the reader had to exercise caution. Not only was it necessary to consider the terms in the context of the age that produced them; it was essential "to reconstruct the meaning of the original [Japanese] words and not be misled by the meaning of the characters used to transcribe those words."¹⁷

Hakuseki's second proposition concerned the nature and relationship

to each other of the various works that recorded the events of *kamiyo*. The work regarded by later generations as the central account, the *Nihon shoki*, itself contained multiple alternate versions of particular incidents apart from the one selected by the compilers as the main text. And antedating the *Nihon shoki* were two other sources, the *Kojiki* and the *Kujiki* (or *Kuji hongi*), which likewise differed in various respects from the *Nihon shoki* accounts. The *Kujiki* is today regarded as of later provenance, but its preface claimed it to be the work of Shōtoku Taishi and Soga no Umako, a claim Hakuseki upheld.

The existence of these multiple versions of the events of *kamiyo* testified, Hakuseki argued, to the variety of problems, linguistic and otherwise, involved in recording the history of *kamiyo*:

The *Kujiki* is full of nebulous things that seem like accounts of a dream told by someone who has just awakened. This characteristic would seem to be the result of its intention to record the passed-down accounts with their discrepancies and mixture of fact and fiction intact, and thereby to transmit what was dubious as dubious. One may say that the *Nihon shoki* followed this same principle. It recorded the various accounts indiscriminately with the intention of leaving selection among these accounts to the worthies of later ages (*kōsei no kunshi*).¹⁸

Consequently, Hakuseki asserted, none of the records of *kamiyo* should be regarded as definitive. Nor should what seemed to resist rational understanding simply be attributed, as some held, to “the unfathomable way of the gods,” and left at that. Rather, following the example of Confucius, one should draw selectively (*bissaku*) from the various accounts, recognizing them as flawed but nevertheless usable tools for reconstructing the historical record. By adopting such a procedure and paying attention to the original meaning of the language of the *kamiyo* accounts, one could properly eliminate the distortions introduced in the course of the process of transcription and compounded by later generations of commentators.¹⁹

In some respects these propositions of Hakuseki’s bear a striking resemblance to the premises followed by modern researchers in their interpretation of the *kamiyo* mythology. The manner in which Hakuseki proceeded to reconstruct the “original version” of the *kamiyo* accounts, however, shows his object to be quite different from a disinterested,

scientific study of the myths. The assertion that one should distinguish the meaning of the phonetic word from that of the character used to transcribe it and that one should utilize the total range of *kamiyo* accounts justified more than the removal of past misinterpretations. It also facilitated the creation of a new version of that mythology, one far more compatible with Hakuseki's own political aims.

Applying the principle of differentiating the original Japanese word from the character used to transcribe it, Hakuseki developed what has been described as the most thoroughgoingly euhemerist interpretation of the *kamiyo* myths formulated prior to the Meiji period.²⁰ Arguing that the conception of the *kami* of *kamiyo* as "deities" was solely the result of linguistic misinterpretation, Hakuseki opened his major discussion of the myths, *Koshitsū*, with the declaration that "the 'gods' (*kami*) were people. Both in antiquity and today the people of our country have called those to whom they pay honor '*kami*.' The meaning of this word appears to be 'honored' or 'revered.'" When characters were adopted *kami* was transcribed sometimes with the character for "god" and sometimes with the character for "upper." The latter transcription did not distort the original meaning so greatly, but the former laid the ground for the ultimate apotheosis of what had been people honored as people into deities.²¹

Hakuseki dealt in a similar way with Takamagahara, the High Plain of Heaven, equated by Ichijō Kanera with the Buddhist *tenshu* and by Razan with the Confucian metaphysical heaven. Hakuseki argued instead that *taka*, written with the character for "high," was a place name. *Hara*, written with the character for "plain," actually meant "on" or "above." *Ama* (-*ma*), written with the character for "heaven," originally referred to the sea; however, an interchange of sounds common in ancient Japanese had led to usage of the same characters to transcribe phonetically the word *ama* meaning "sea" and the word *ame* meaning "heavens" or "sky." When the compilers of the *kamiyo* accounts had changed from phonetic to ideographic use of characters, they mistakenly had adopted for this name the character for heaven rather than the one for sea. As a consequence, what originally had been a place name meaning "Taka on the Sea" had become transformed into the mythological "High Plain of Heaven." And the connotations of this latter term had

led, in turn, to the description of the inhabitants of “Taka on the Sea” as deities and the ascription to them of various kinds of supernatural acts.²²

Acting on this assumption, Hakuseki proposed a major recasting of the nature of the first generations of *kami*, those such as Amenominakanushi no mikoto and Kuninotokotachi no mikoto, who in the original texts do little more than appear and disappear and who had been the objects of much cosmological and metaphysical elaboration at the hands of later commentators, like Ichijō Kanera and Hayashi Razan. Analyzing the etymology of the names of these *kami*, Hakuseki declared them to be local rulers in the region of “Taka on the Sea,” which he posited to lie on the eastern seaboard of Honshu northeast of Edo. Thus, he linked Kuninotokotachi no mikoto, Kuninosatsuchi no mikoto, and Toyokumunu no mikoto, the three *kami* given by the main *Nihon shoki* text as the first to appear at the time of the formation of heaven and earth, with the provinces of Hitachi, Kazusa-Shimōsa, and Kōzuke-Shimotsuke respectively. Amenominakanushi no kami, Takamimusubi no kami, Kamimusubi no kami, the three *kami* listed by the *Kojiki* as the first to appear, he connected to the districts of Naka and Taka in Hitachi and the village of Kami in Taka.²³ The status of these *kami* as rulers he established by redefinition of the terms *hitorinasu* (*dokka*) and *horigami* applied to them by the *Nihon shoki*, *Kojiki*, and *Kujiki*. These terms did not, he asserted, mean “appearing alone” or “appearing solely through the agency of yang” as the *Nihon shoki* infers. “These terms are like references in later ages to ‘the single one above’ (*kami ichinin*); the one who was ruler of the main lineage (*daiittō no kimi*) was referred to as *horigami*.²⁴

Hakuseki’s linguistic manipulation of terms like *kami* and Takamagahara in effect did away with the notion that the imperial line, being of divine origin, enjoyed a unique prerogative to rule Japan. If the imperial ancestors, the *kami* of *kamiyo*, were human beings, the ground no longer existed for viewing the *tenno* as innately different from other claimants to the title of ruler. Hakuseki did not, however, rely solely on redefinition of the terminology of the *kamiyo* accounts to make this point. He also deployed the redefined terms in such a way as to make them convey a quite different political message from that traditionally ascribed to them. Far from documenting the claim that a single line had been

destined to rule Japan since the age of the gods, the *kamiyo* accounts, according to Hakuseki, in fact depicted the transfer of kingly authority, in obedience to the will of heaven, from one ruling line to another. Hakuseki set forth this new version of the meaning of *kamiyo* through reinterpretation of three elements of the *kamiyo* myths with particular bearing on the nature of imperial sovereignty: the account of the creation of the islands of Japan by Izanagi and Izanami; the account of Ninigi's descent from Takamagahara to rule Japan; and the account of Jinmu's founding of the tradition of imperial rule.

THE CREATION MYTH. According to the creation myth found in the *Kojiki* and *Nihon shoki*, Izanagi and Izanami, having agreed to produce together the land, circle a pillar and proceed to have intercourse. The first child they produce, the leech-child, is a failure, but, after ascertaining the reasons for this mishap, they go on to procreate successfully the islands of Japan and various deities. In the original accounts, the creation myth thus served to establish the world of the *kami* as something transcending the realm of human history. Moreover, in that these accounts present Amaterasu, the putative ancestor of the imperial line, as the child of Izanagi and Izanami, or alternatively as the child of Izanagi alone, the creation myth contributed to the concept of the imperial line as something which, "coeval with heaven and earth," stood outside the passage of ordinary human history.

Hakuseki set out to challenge such implications by extending to the creation myth his euhemerist strategy for converting deities into human rulers. Undaunted by the much greater specificity of the creation myth compared to the accounts of the first generations of *kami*, he redefined the meaning of the language of the myth in much the same way that he redefined terms like *hitorinasu*. The so-called "floating bridge of heaven" (*ame no ukihashi*), on which Izanagi and Izanami stand, was in fact, he declared, a line of warships on the sea. The establishment of a pillar upon the island of Onogorojima was the posting of a symbol of sovereignty. Izanagi and Izanami's decision to produce together the land was an agreement to pacify (*hirakibiraku [kaitaku]*) as yet unsettled territory. The act of intercourse (*maguwai*) they engage in to this end was a pledge to join their two armies in a sea battle.²⁵

Having defined his terms in this way, Hakuseki went on to present his own version of what Izanagi and Izanami undertook and accomplished:

The *kami* of the eastern seaboard having commanded the *kami* Izanagi and Izanami to undertake a campaign of pacification of the region of Ashihara [central Honshu], the two *kami* led their forces in boats out to sea and headed westward. The *kami* of the island they reached first resisted them but ultimately submitted of their own accord. Thus, Izanagi and Izanami erected there as a symbol of their sovereignty over this territory the spear they had been given by the *kami* of the eastern seaboard. The two *kami* halted on the island to plan their strategy for extending the campaign to the southern and northern regions. The male *kami* said that he would lead the army of the left, while the female *kami* should lead the army of the right; it was agreed that they should encircle the island, join their forces and proceed. However, the army of the right failed to keep the appointed pace and went ahead on its own, leaving the army of the left to catch up later. When their forces joined, the two *kami* were happy. But the armies were not well meshed in their emplacement and the battle did not go well, the two *kami* managing only to take some coastal inhabitants captive and to secure one small island. Consequently, they set free those they had taken captive, abandoned the island they had captured, and retreated with their forces to Takamagahara. [This last is Hakuseki's version of the birth and setting adrift of the leech child.] . . .

The *kami* of the eastern seaboard engaged in divination and admonished the male and female *kami* that victory in the campaign depended upon the coordination of their forces. The two *kami* again led their forces out. Basing themselves on Awashima, the region they had taken previously, they extended their campaign of pacification to the countries of the west, south, and north. Thereupon the people of those countries came and submitted to them as if they were submitting to their own parents. Consequently, the two *kami* entrusted these countries to the *kami* of these areas as before, establishing them as deputies under their suzerainty (*sono hajime o aratametamaishi*).²⁶

Viewed objectively, Hakuseki's interpretation of the Izanagi and Izanami creation myth is as forced as the cosmological commentaries he decried for manipulating the connotations of the Chinese characters without regard for the meaning of the original Japanese word. To illustrate the problematic features of his "reconstruction" of that meaning, we need only consider his assertion that the term *mito no maguwai* did not mean that Izanagi and Izanami engaged in sexual intercourse with the intent of procreating the land, but rather that "the two *kami* pledged

together to join at their destination" the forces each was leading separately. Hakuseki criticized the *Nihon shoki* and *Kujiki* for selecting characters meaning sexual intercourse or "to become man and wife" to transcribe this term. But his own contention as to its significance hardly rested on linguistic evidence of an alternative meaning. Instead, to support his argument Hakuseki referred to an "analogous" instance of a ruler and his consort leading separate expeditionary forces to a common destination, that of Chūai and Jingū.²⁷

But, while Hakuseki's interpretation of the Izanagi and Izanami myth entailed methodological problems as grave as those underlying the cosmological and metaphysical interpretations of earlier commentators, it served a specific political end. It made it possible for Hakuseki not only to transform Izanagi and Izanami from deities into human beings, but also to convert them into political entities who extended "civilized rule" over the region of Ashihara in more or less the same way that Yao, Shun, and Yu, according to the *Book of History*, brought the regions of China under the sway of their kingly authority. Hakuseki thereby laid the ground for a major recasting of the political implications of the central element in the theory of an eternal imperial sovereignty, the account of the descent of Ninigi from Takamagahara to rule Japan.

THE DESCENT OF NINIGI. In dealing with the Ninigi myth, Hakuseki confronted one of the major underpinnings of the notion that the imperial line, being of divine descent, was destined to rule Japan eternally. In the original *kamiyo* accounts, Ninigi, the immediate ancestor of the imperial line, descends from heaven to earth armed with the key historical symbols of imperial sovereignty, the regalia granted him by Amaterasu. In some versions, Amaterasu also endows Ninigi with the explicit charge that his dynasty should endure forever. Hakuseki, carrying further his euhemerist interpretation of the *kamiyo* myths, sought to diminish Ninigi's role as a link between the line of human emperors and their divine ancestors. He also tried to neutralize the potency that association with Ninigi and Amaterasu had given the regalia as paramount indicators of imperial sovereignty.

Ninigi, held Hakuseki, was a representative of the rulers of "Taka on the Sea", entrusted by them with continuing the task of pacifying the

realm initially undertaken by Izanagi and Izanami. Applying the same kind of linguistic reinterpretation to the key terms of the Ninigi myth as he had to the Izanagi and Izanami myth, Hakuseki argued that the description of Ninigi's descent from heaven in the *kamiyo* accounts in fact referred to his setting out to sea from the eastern coastal region much as had Izanagi and Izanami. "The myriad layers of the heavens' trailing clouds" through which the *kamiyo* accounts have Ninigi push was a rhetorical flourish used to describe the clouds hanging over the sea. The so-called "awesome pushing" (*itsu no chiwaki chiwakite*) referred to Ninigi readying his boats and embarking from Izu, "where from antiquity the large boats of our country were usually made."²⁸

Hakuseki also used judicious excision to reduce some implications of the traditional account of Ninigi's descent. He passed over in silence the existence of those grandiloquent versions of the descent myth which declare that the lineage of Amaterasu should rule eternally, coeval with heaven and earth. And, in sharp contrast to other commentators, he paid minimal attention to the regalia received by Ninigi at the time of his descent. Ignoring the various cosmological interpretations made of the significance of the bequest of the regalia, he instead pointed out that, according to the *Kogoshūi* and other early works, the jewel was not originally part of the regalia. He further diminished the significance of the regalia by noting that, while Amaterasu had commanded that her descendants keep the mirror always at their side, from the reign of the tenth tenno, Sujin, the mirror was enshrined apart from the ruler.²⁹

In these ways, Hakuseki deemphasized those elements of the Ninigi myth that had contributed to the notion of a sovereign authority innate and exercisable only in the imperial line. But Hakuseki did not stop with simply trying to neutralize those aspects of the Ninigi myth that were incompatible with his own concept of political sovereignty. He attempted as well to transform that myth into something that positively supported his concept. This he did by reshaping the story of Ninigi's descent from Takamagahara to Japan into an account of the transfer of the mandate from one ruling line to another, a transfer comparable to that which occurred, according to Chinese Confucian mythology, when Yao chose Shun as his successor and Shun chose Yu.

Hakuseki accomplished this transformation through an ingenious

analysis of the multiple versions of the generations of *kami* up to Izanagi and Izanami. Each of the major accounts of *kamiyo*, including the *Nihon shoki* variants, listed these *kami* as appearing in a different order. The *Nihon shoki* and the *Kujiki* made some effort at consolidation by identifying some of the *kami* as having more than one name, but they did not agree on what alternative names should be attached to what *kami*. The result was substantial confusion as to just who was who and who preceded whom. The approach of most commentators to this confusion had been to continue the attempt at consolidation by treating the generations of *kami* as different manifestations of the same cosmological entity. For instance, Hayashi Razan, following medieval Shinto interpretations, asserted that the so-called five and seven generations of *kami* that appeared at the time of the formation of heaven and earth were all different names of Kuninotokotachi no mikoto, an indication of that spiritual entity's magnitude and universality.³⁰

Here again, Hakuseki took the opposite approach. Instead of consolidating the multiplicity of *kami* into a few, he made the most of the multiplicity. He argued, on the one hand, that what were presented as alternative names were in fact the names of descendants of the *kami* in question. On the other hand, he asserted that the recurrence of the same name in different contexts indicated not the reappearance of the same *kami* but the presence of another possessing the same family name. This approach enabled Hakuseki to substitute the delineation of genealogical relations for analysis of events in presenting a historical interpretation of the first stages of *kamiyo*. He thus was able to sidestep the problems posed by the paucity of information of a historical sort about such *kami* as Amenominakanushi and Kuninotokotachi. More important, Hakuseki's method for dealing with the multiplicity of first generations of *kami* made it possible for him to distinguish a number of different lineages among them, which, through his etymological analysis of the names of the first *kami*, he linked to different geographic regions. The combination of these two procedures established the ground for recasting Ninigi's descent into an account of the transferral of the mandate to rule Japan from one line to another.

Hakuseki argued that the major *kami* of the first stages of *kamiyo* could be sorted into two ruling lines. One, which he referred to as the

“Ame line” (*Tentō*), began with Amenominakanushi no mikoto, listed as the first *kami* to appear by the *Kojiki*, one *Nihon shoki* variant, and, Hakuseki asserted, the *Kujiki*. This line continued with Takamimusubi no kami and Amenotokotachi no kami, and culminated at the time of Amaterasu with a second Takamimusubi no kami. The second lineage, which Hakuseki identified as the “Kuni line” (*Kokutō*), began with Umashiashikabihikoji no kami. Of this second line and its chronological relationship to the *Tentō*, Hakuseki wrote:

According to the *Kojiki*, at the time of Amenominakanushi, when things were still in a primeval state (*tenzō sōmai no sai*), there was a sage (*shinsei*) who came up from the coastal area and settled that region; he was called Ashikabihikoji. . . . The one who continued the line of Ashikabihikoji was called Kuninotokotachi, and after several generations this line culminated in Izanagi no kami.³¹

This picture of *kamiyo* genealogy set the stage for Hakuseki to give new importance to the role played by Takamimusubi no kami at the time of the descent of Ninigi, Izanagi’s great-grandson. In the various accounts of that event, Takamimusubi no kami, described as the maternal grandfather of Ninigi, plays an active part in making the arrangements for Ninigi’s descent. In some versions, he plays a more dominant role than Amaterasu herself. Hakuseki’s genealogical analysis revealed, he claimed, the true significance of this role. What was actually taking place was a transfer of the mandate from the Ame line, represented by Takamimusubi, to the heir of the Kuni line, to which belonged Izanagi, Amaterasu, and Ninigi.

It was to acclaim this transfer, Hakuseki argued, that the *Kujiki* headed its genealogy of *kamiyo* with a mysterious entity, not found in any of the other accounts, identified as Ameyuzuruhi amenosagiri kuniyuzurutsuki kuninosagiri no mikoto. This term indicated the ultimate yielding (*yuzuri*) of the mandate by the Ame line to the Kuni line and the union of both lineages in the person of Ninigi, grandson to Amaterasu and Takamimusubi no kami alike. By contrast, he asserted, the *Nihon shoki* misguidedly had blurred the issue by establishing Kuninotokotachi rather than Amenominakanushi as the first *kami* of *kamiyo*. It thus was responsible for the failure of later generations to comprehend the significance of what had occurred:

The *Nihon shoki* makes Kuninotokotachi no mikoto the *kami* at the time of the opening of heaven and earth and does not speak of Amenominakanushi no kami, barely touching upon his existence in one of the alternative versions it appends as notes. Later commentators have praised this as an indication of respect for the legitimate line. However, this presentation does not accord with reality. Since heaven had already awarded its mandate and the line of Kuninotokotachi no kami had already been established as the rulers of Ōyashima, what virtue is to be found in distorting the situation or leaving things out as if there were something to be ashamed of or better not mentioned? I personally cannot but follow the *Kujiki*.³²

In asserting that Ninigi's descent in fact constituted a transfer of the mandate from one lineage of rulers to another, Hakuseki challenged the premise that one ruling line was endowed with an eternal prerogative to rule Japan. He also established the possibility for a further transfer of the mandate, at some point in the future, from the imperial line to a different lineage of rulers. His handling of the Jinmu myth reinforced both dimensions of his elaboration of the "true significance" of the account of Ninigi's descent.

JINMU'S ESTABLISHMENT OF THE TRADITION OF IMPERIAL RULE. According to the *kamiyo* accounts, Jinmu, the great-grandson of Ninigi, moved from the land of Hyūga, where Ninigi had descended from Takamagahara, to Yamato. There, after subduing various opponents, he established a palace from which to rule the entire realm. Among the events that signaled Jinmu's successful pacification of the realm, and thus the inauguration of the "historical" tradition of imperial rule, was the submission to him of a figure known as Nigihayahi no mikoto. In the *Kojiki* and *Nihon shoki*, Nigihayahi plays a dual role; these works identify him as a child of the heavenly deities but also link him to the local chiefs of the Yamato area. Thus, his submission to Jinmu represents acknowledgment by those chiefs of Jinmu as the proper ruler of all under heaven.

Hakuseki made Nigihayahi's submission the central feature of his discussion of the Jinmu myth, but, once again following the *Kujiki* rather than the *Nihon shoki* (and, in this case, the *Kojiki*), he gave that submission an additional dimension: He transformed it into another instance of one legitimate line of rulers yielding the mandate to another. The

Kujiki elaborated considerably on Nigihayahi's background, asserting that he was in fact the elder brother of Ninigi and that, prior to Ninigi's descent, Nigihayahi had come down from Takamagahara in a "rock-boat." Building on the *Kujiki* account, Hakuseki argued that Nigihayahi had gone first to Kawachi and then had moved to Yamato, where he married the daughter of a local chief. Shortly thereafter, Nigihayahi had died, but a child born to him posthumously survived. The local chiefs remained loyal to this child, but, because of the latter's youth, the rulers of Takamagahara sent down Ninigi to assist him in ruling the western regions. It was for this reason, Hakuseki held, that Ninigi went to Hyūga rather than the central Yamato region.³³

According to Hakuseki's interpretation, the descendants of Nigihayahi thus represented the main line of the Kokutō, and Ninigi's descendants the junior line. Consequently, the submission of another Nigihayahi to Jinmu represented more than just the pledge of fealty of a local magnate; it constituted acknowledgment by the Nigihayahi line, which previously had held the mandate to rule Toyoashihara, of the transfer of that mandate to the line of Ninigi. (To account for the reappearance at the time of Jinmu of Nigihayahi, supposedly dead before Ninigi's descent, Hakuseki utilized the argument that the recurrence of the same name in different contexts indicated its use as a family name.)

According to Hakuseki, Jinmu and the second Nigihayahi belonged to two branches of the same lineage. In this sense, compared to his interpretation of the Ninigi myth, his treatment of Nigihayahi's submission to Jinmu did not represent quite as bold an affirmation of the universal validity of the Chinese premise that the mandate could properly pass to another line (*yixing geming*; J.: *ekisei kakumei*). Nevertheless, Hakuseki clearly intended his discussion of Nigihayahi's submission to buttress his assertion of the applicability of that premise to Japan, an assertion fundamental to his effort to deny the legitimacy of the Japanese tradition of a bifurcated political authority. Thus, much as he condemned the *Nihon shoki* for establishing Kuninotokotachi rather than Amenominakanushi as the first *kami* of *kamiyo*, he attacked as short-sighted Ichijō Kanera's assertion in the *Nihon shoki sanso* that the *Kojiki* and *Nihon shoki* did not elaborate upon the relationship between Nigihayahi and Ninigi out of respect for the main line. The author of the *Gengenshū*,

another medieval commentary on the *kamiyo* accounts, was correct, Hakuseki declared, in criticizing the *Nihon shoki* and *Kojiki* for failing to elucidate the relationship between Nigihayahi and Ninigi. Recognition of that relationship was essential to grasping the true import of the second Nigihayahi's submission to Jinmu.³⁴

Demonstration that the history of imperial rule began with two instances of transferral of the mandate also set the stage for Hakuseki's discussion of the subsequent development of Japanese history. For the main point of the latter discussion was that, just as in China the descendants first of Yu and then of Tang, the founder of the second dynasty, had lost heaven's trust, so had the tenno who followed Jinmu.

THE LATER STAGES OF IMPERIAL RULE

In his interpretation of *kamiyo*, Hakuseki sought to establish that the tenno neither were endowed with an eternal prerogative to rule Japan nor were exempt from accountability to heaven. Within the context of his discussion of the *kamiyo* myths, he developed the theme of accountability in a way that reflected favorably on the imperial ancestors. The voluntary yielding of the Tentō to the Kokutō and of Nigihayahi to Jinmu in accordance with the will of heaven testified to the virtue of both parties, as had Yao's selection of Shun as his heir and Shun's selection of Yu. Hakuseki's aim, however, was not simply to document the operation of heaven's mandate; he wished to validate the eventual transfer from the imperial house to the *buke* of the mandate and the comprehensive authority it conferred. To this end, in his account of post-*kamiyo* history he illuminated the tenno in an increasingly negative light. The major works in which he developed this perspective are *Tokushi yoron*, originally composed in 1712 and revised in the last decade of his life, and *Shigi*, a work of his last years. *Shigi* today exists only in fragments, but it appears to have dealt at some length with the period between *kamiyo* and the Heian era.³⁵

In *Tokushi yoron*, Hakuseki set forth the proposition that "in our country after nine epochal changes [beginning in the early Heian] the government of the realm was assumed by the *buke*."³⁶ In *Shigi*, he appears to have distinguished further at least three eras between the time

of Jinmu and the early Heian: (1) the era of Jinmu and his immediate successors; (2) the span of reigns from Sujin to the Taika reforms in the mid-seventh century; and (3) the era inaugurated by those reforms. The major theme of his account of post-Jinmu Japanese history in both works was that the imperial line, which once enjoyed heaven's mandate and thus reigned as true kings, eventually lost heaven's trust because the tenno proved themselves unworthy. The definitive loss of the mandate by the imperial line took place, he held, in the mid-fourteenth century, during the reign of Godaigo; the events testifying to this loss constituted the ninth "epochal change."

In delineating the process of loss of the mandate by the imperial line Hakuseki employed the criteria used by generations of Chinese Confucian historians to account for such an event. Thus, like his Chinese models, he gave a central place to the decline in the tenno's personal rectitude. At the same time, reflecting his desire to justify shogunal exercise of the comprehensive authority of the true king, he also stressed that the tenno had failed of themselves to maintain various central elements of such an authority. Their neglect of that aspect of kingly responsibility led to a downward spiral in social order and showed that they were not worthy of heaven's trust. In Hakuseki's view, lack of personal rectitude and failure to preserve the authority proper to the king were not two different shortcomings but two dimensions of the same defect. For purposes of analysis, however, we may consider each separately.

THE DECLINE IN IMPERIAL VIRTUE. While the personal rectitude of the ruler entailed many qualities, Chinese historians frequently referred to a ruler's lack of sexual circumspection to sum up a general moral insufficiency.³⁷ In his depiction of the steady decline in imperial virtue, Hakuseki followed the same practice. In one of the *Shigi* fragments, taking note of the amorous activities attributed to Nintoku (traditionally held to have reigned AD 310–399), as well as the size of his tomb, Hakuseki explicitly questioned Nintoku's vaunted reputation as a benevolent ruler.³⁸ In *Tōkushi yoron*, he emphasized the negative consequences of the continued predilection of the tenno for giving free rein to their sexual impulses. He pointed out the serious moral irregularity of Murakami Tenno's (r. 946–967) adulterous relationship with and later

marriage to his consort's younger sister, who previously had been married to the tenno's own elder brother. Likewise, he described the sexual misadventures of Kazan Tenno (r. 984–985) as an unmistakable sign of “the sovereign’s immorality.”³⁹ As Hakuseki presented the situation, sexual laxity, occurring generation after generation, spawned an atmosphere of intrigue and decadence in which the tenno, like the moral renegades of the latter years of Chinese dynasties, readily fell prey to the wiles of evil women. According to him, such a denouement occurred at the time of Toba Tenno (r. 1107–1122, exercised authority as *in*, 1129–1156). Hakuseki attributed the upheavals that followed Toba’s death as due in large measure to the unchecked machinations of the tenno’s favorite, Bifukumon’in. And those upheavals in turn, he pointed out, hastened a key epochal change leading to imperial loss of the mandate—the division of authority over the realm with the *buke*.⁴⁰

Another key indicator of a lack of personal rectitude on the part of the ruler emphasized by Hakuseki was a tendency to regard the realm as a private possession and source of personal profit rather than as a weighty charge. Such an attitude resulted, on the one hand, in contests over the succession and, on the other, in the tenno’s not giving due care to the critical matter of designating an heir. According to *Tokushi yoron*, the first contest over the succession took place in 672, when the future Tenmu Tenno raised an army against his deceased brother Tenji’s legitimate heir, Prince Ōtomo (referred to by Hakuseki as Ōtomo Tenno). As Hakuseki described the situation, despite Tenmu’s apparent triumph, the fate of his descendants clearly reflected heaven’s disapproval of his usurpation:

While Tenmu succeeded for the moment in defeating the imperial forces and claiming the realm, only seven reigns and a hundred some years later, his line terminated with his great-great-grandchild, the female ruler Shōtoku [r. 749–758, 764–770]. The grandchild of Tenji, Kōnin [r. 770–781], succeeded to the throne, and his line has continued to the present. One must say that it is clear that heaven joins with those who uphold the Way. This was the beginning of the rivalry for the throne between two rulers that marked later ages; clearly, kingly virtue had already slackened and social customs begun their decline.⁴¹

As he traced the course of Japanese history from the eighth century to the fourteenth, Hakuseki repeatedly focused on manipulation of the

succession as an indication of the continued decline in kingly virtue. As noted in Chapter 8, he began *Tokushi yoron* with Montoku Tenno's unprecedented passing over of three elder sons to make the infant Seiwa, born to a daughter of Fujiwara no Yoshifusa, crown prince. Montoku's death in 858 thus left a child on the throne, and Yoshifusa was able to take advantage of this situation to become the first non-imperial regent. In Hakuseki's interpretation, whether the immediate cause of this development was Fujiwara pressure or imperial weakness, it could not have occurred had the tenno preserved the virtue incumbent upon the king. That fact was confirmed by what happened when the faltering of Fujiwara fortunes led to retired tenno taking the initiative in court affairs. "Showing an extraordinary lack of concern for the importance of the position of the sovereign," they followed the Fujiwara example and continued to manipulate the succession according to their own personal interests and inclinations.⁴² The ultimate consequence of such manipulation was the overt division within the court at the time of Godaigo.

ABANDONMENT OF THE COMPREHENSIVE AUTHORITY OF THE KING. In his challenge to the tradition of bifurcated sovereignty, what Hakuseki had to justify was shogunal assumption of the "civil" authority historically associated with the imperial court. However, to make his case for that innovation, Hakuseki approached the issue from the opposite direction. Starting from the premise that maintenance of an all-encompassing authority was an intrinsic responsibility of the king, he argued that, after the first several reigns subsequent to Jinmu, the tenno had ceased to uphold that responsibility. Having abandoned of their own will the comprehensive sovereignty of the true king, the tenno no longer could properly claim an exclusive monopoly of one aspect of it.

Hakuseki developed various dimensions of the argument that the tenno had betrayed the kingly authority they once possessed. One revolved around the traditional Confucian valuation of a "feudal" as opposed to "centralized" mode of rule. While Confucianism had flowered and taken root in Chinese society within the context of the post-Han centralized imperial state, Chinese Confucian thinkers continued to idealize the "feudal institutions" of the three dynasties of Xia, Shang, and Zhou and to decry as encouraging despotism the centralized commandery and

prefecture (*junxian*) system adopted from the Qin and Han on.

Objectively speaking, Hakuseki's efforts to make the shogun a more monarchal figure and to dissolve the hegemonic character of the *bakuban* structure of rule owed more to the imperial style of the post-Han dynasties than to the idealized but shadowy picture of the feudal customs of the Three Dynasties. Nevertheless, in setting the stage for presentation of the shogun as the proper heir to the kingly authority forfeited by the tenno, Hakuseki found it convenient to play the positive aspects of a "feudal" system off against the negative qualities of the centralized government structure associated with imperial rule from the Taika period on.⁴³ Thus, he asserted that the tenno once had governed through a feudal system comparable to that of the Three Dynasties (and, implicitly, the *bakuban* state), but from the time of Sujin on, with the aim of maximizing their personal power, they had abandoned it for a centralized structure.

In the *Shigi* fragments, Hakuseki explicitly linked Jinmu to a feudal mode of rule comparable to that of the Three Dynasties of ancient China:

When Jinmu first pacified the realm, he enfeoffed those with meritorious accomplishments, making eight people *kuni no miyatsuko* and three people *agata nushi* [two categories of local chief]. At this time, the king's personal holdings (*ōki*) were solely within the central region; the *kuni no miyatsuko* and *agata nushi* generally were enfeoffed within that area. As for the remaining territory, Jinmu simply rectified and confirmed the credentials of those who held it.⁴⁴

As a result, the realm was at peace and the populace responsive to the transforming effect of the ruler's virtue.⁴⁵

Jinmu's successors, however, Hakuseki argued, steadily deviated from the example he had set of the appropriate exercise of the authority of the king. In *Shigi*, Hakuseki declared that, in place of the Three Dynasty-like feudal order of Jinmu's era, the tenth tenno, Sujin (traditionally held to have reigned 97–29 BC, and the next tenno after Jinmu for whom the *Kojiki* and *Nihon shoki* provide much concrete information) and Sujin's immediate successors adopted a mixed centralized-feudal system comparable to that of the early Han.⁴⁶ This development paved the way for a definitive break with feudal institutions under Kōtoku Tenno (r. 645–655).

In his analysis of the Taika reforms promulgated by Kōtoku, Hakuseki utilized his polemical skills to the full. Discreetly ignoring the fact that many of the monarchal *rei* he sought to introduce into the bakufu traced their origins to the *ritsuryō* system adopted from Taika on, he likened the issuing of the Taika edicts to the Qin institution of centralized bureaucratic rule. Indeed, he declared the Taika edicts to be more reprehensible than that development, traditionally held by Confucian thinkers to have destroyed the remaining remnants of the archaic system of kingly rule:

In the past, the Qin laid claim to the realm and divided it up into prefectures and commanderies. Kōtoku Tenno also laid claim to the realm and divided it up into prefectures and commanderies. The act in each case was the same, yet its implications differed greatly. The Qin destroyed six states, but the lords ruling those states were its enemies. It abolished the institution of the Three Dynasties, but the rulers of those dynasties were of a different surname. What Kōtoku Tenno destroyed were the ancestral shrines and hereditary vassals of his own house; what he abolished were the institutions of his ancestors. As for what the Qin created, the entire realm knows its evil; as for the changes in laws made by the tenno, the entire realm calls it good. How could such changes help preserve the nation, serve to limit expenditures? The profit deriving from them he made his own. Consequently, their evil effect has been carried to the myriad generations. How sad it is that no one in the realm recognizes this!⁴⁷

According to Hakuseki, the tendency, characteristic of a centralized system of rule, to treat the realm as the ruler's private possession grew worse under Tenmu (r. 672–686). Tenmu, held Hakuseki, selected people for office on the basis of name rather than ability and rewarded his favorites through the creation of eight hereditary *kabane* ranks. This development, Hakuseki argued, by making government service dependent on *kakaku*-like criteria, enabled a few houses to monopolize officeholding and access to the wealth of the nation. The consequent displacement of other houses also led to the disappearance of the vast majority of the ancient lineages and the termination of their ancestral rites. These developments “extinguished *rei* and knowledge of the Way, introduced social customs like those of the barbarians of the west and north, and led to abandonment of the benevolent ways of the east.”⁴⁸

Not only did the populace suffer from such developments; the failure of the tenno to preserve the stance proper to the ruler made him vulnerable to manipulation by others equally greedy for power. The rise first of the Fujiwara and then of the retired tenno pointed precisely to such a denouement. Regarding the institutional implications of these developments, Hakuseki quoted Kitabatake Chikafusa's evaluation in the *Jinnō shōtōki*:

When government ministers dominated affairs, they at least used imperial edicts and ministry orders to administer the realm. But from [the late Heian] weight was put instead on edicts from the *in* and directives from his headquarters, and the role of the regnant ruler became purely decorative. Truly this was a development appropriate to a degenerate age!⁴⁹

Hakuseki's delineation of the evils resulting from adoption of a centralized system of rule put the onus on the imperial line for losing heaven's trust. Simultaneously, it implicitly established the ground for affirmation of the assumption of sovereign authority over the realm by a regime which "reverted" to the feudal system of antiquity. Hakuseki pursued a similar polemical strategy in his dissection of another dimension of abandonment of kingly authority by the imperial line: forfeiture of responsibility for overseeing military affairs.

While Confucian thinkers favored the use of suasion instead of force, they by no means denied the importance of military power. To the contrary, they regarded the sage-kings of antiquity as having combined in their persons civil and military (*bunbu*) authority. The Confucian insistence on the ruler's maintaining a comprehensive sovereignty rested on the premise of just such a combination. Pursuing the same premise, Hakuseki argued that in antiquity the tenno, following the way of the true king, had paid close attention to military affairs. Their neglect of such matters in later centuries testified to the increasing irresponsibility on the part of the tenno, which eventually caused heaven to withdraw its mandate from the imperial line.

Hakuseki laid the foundation for his emphasis on the martial component of kingly authority in his depiction of Izanagi and Izanami and Ninigi as leaders of military expeditions to pacify the realm. His analysis of the post-Jinmu era made that emphasis explicit. Referring to *Analects*

10:2 (“When the Way prevails in the realm, ritual and music and punitive military expeditions proceed from the Son of Heaven”), he entitled the first section of his account in *Tokushi yoron* of the rise of the *buke*, “In antiquity punitive military expeditions proceeded from the Son of Heaven.”⁵⁰ Up through the reign of Saimei (r. 655–661), Hakuseki argued, the tenno continued to conduct military campaigns themselves or, when they did not, delegated imperial scions to do so. “Punitive campaigns being an important national matter, it appears that in antiquity rulers regarded them as of grave import and took great care with them. They did not, as became the custom in later ages, simply go on about their own affairs and appoint a general to put down a rebel.”⁵¹

With the general decline in imperial rule, however, the tenno came to delegate campaigns of pacification to others. Their attitude towards those they appointed to carry out military campaigns further showed their lack of due regard for this aspect of the ruler’s responsibility. Instead of reintegrating meritorious generals into the civil officialdom upon completion of the campaign, the tenno treated them as specialized military officials and distinguished them from civil officeholders. This tendency brought about the rise of the *buke* class and with it the movement towards a bifurcation of civil and military authority inimical to the way of the true king:

As kingly virtue slackened and favorite ministers came to monopolize power, little importance was placed on the appointment of generals. No military figures obtained high civil office, and both civil and military posts became hereditary in nature. As a consequence, the authority of the court declined daily, meritorious vassals [that is, *bushi*] came to oversee military prerogatives, the tide of the times underwent a fundamental change, and things became such as to make impossible a return to the ways of antiquity.⁵²

IMPERIAL LOSS OF THE MANDATE. The inevitable consequence of the decline in the personal rectitude of the tenno on the one hand and their abandonment of fundamental elements of the true tradition of kingly rule on the other was the loss of heaven’s trust. In *Tokushi yoron*, Hakuseki traced the evidence of the inexorable movement from the early Heian on towards this denouement. He noted that the frequent revolts

in the east recorded during the reign of Kanmu (r. 782–806) indicated that “the transforming influence of the kingly virtue of the ruler no longer extended far.” Similarly, the fact that there were twelve instances of warfare in the 245 years between the revolts of Taira no Masakado and Fujiwara no Sumitomo in 939 and the destruction of the Taira in 1185, while there had been only fourteen instances in the 1,564 years from the accession of Jinmu to the revolts of Masakado and Sumitomo, showed that, “when heaven decides to move, it does not tarry.”⁵³ Warning of the imminent loss of the mandate came with the establishment of the Kamakura bakufu in 1192 and the subsequent division of the powers of the realm between the court and *buke*. Definitive loss of the mandate by the imperial line came a century and a half later, with the failure of Go-dai go’s attempt to restore imperial rule in 1333–1336.

Hakuseki’s evaluation of Godaigo’s abortive restoration was, in essence, a summation of the errors of one destined to forfeit the mandate. Simultaneously, Hakuseki emphasized the bankruptcy of what remained of the imperial tradition of rule:

Even in the best of times, is not restoration a more difficult enterprise than founding? Founding is like building a house anew. Even if the accomplishment in construction is not that great, once accomplished, the house will stand for hundreds of years. But to try to restore to its former state a great mansion that has started to collapse is a major task. . . . That, after the Fujiwara regents began to use their power as they pleased and the *rei* of the court declined, Go-sanjo Tenno [r. 1068–1072] was able readily to restore things to what they had been in the past was because the degree of decline was not yet that great. It was like a house repaired when the damage to it is yet small.

After Yoritomo had divided the powers of the realm and Hōjō rule had continued for nine generations, the *bushi* of the sixty-some provinces had grown used to exerting power and having their way. How could they be expected now to bow and plead before those without any merit? To attempt to restore things to what they had been in the days before the court’s decline, as if such a task required no particular effort, was like propping up the walls and adding embellishments to a building whose foundation is crumbling. Certain collapse was only a matter of days. And, when the people had not yet been relieved of the burden on their shoulders, to seek to build a palace, to award grants of land first to palace attendants [Hakuseki uses the term “eunuch”, *kangan*], female servants, actors, and priests, allotting nothing to those with military merit, or else soon retracting what rewards were given—this was to invite revolt.

Again, at a time like this, it is essential to handle rewards and punishments equitably. Unless one deals properly with such matters one can evoke neither feelings of gratitude nor awe. But in dealing with those of great merit, let alone those whose accomplishments were slight, the tenno failed completely to make rewards appropriate to the accomplishments of those concerned.⁵⁴

Because Godaigo came at the end of the long decline in imperial rule and because he himself was deficient in virtue, the populace turned from him and supported Ashikaga Takauji (1304–1358), despite the fact that, in betraying Godaigo's cause, Takauji had earned the name of traitor.

Takauji was able to become leader of the *buke* (*buke no tōryō*) because both *buishi* and the populace knew that government under the court was far inferior to what had existed during the period of *buke* rule [under the Kamakura bakufu]. Thus, everyone, no matter who, throughout the realm longed to take as ruler whoever could revive the age of *buke* rule. Takauji opportunely having become an enemy of the court, [they followed him], for, although they disliked the name [of traitor], they longed for the substance of what Takauji represented.⁵⁵

As a consequence, from the time of Takauji, “the court existed only as a facade propped up by others, and the realm was completely under *buke* rule.”⁵⁶ Given that situation, Hakuseki paid little attention to the activities of the tenno from the Muromachi period on. Instead, as he pursued his argument for shogunal assumption of the comprehensive authority of the recipient of the mandate, he concentrated on evaluation of the patterns of *buke* rule.

Redefinition of the Parameters of Buke Rule

Through his delineation of the imperial line's loss of heaven's trust, Hakuseki set the stage for presenting the shogun as the appropriate heir to the mandate. However, to clarify fully the propriety of the shogun's assuming the comprehensive monarchal authority of the true king, one further step was necessary: Hakuseki had to address the implications of the history of *buke* rule in which the Tokugawa bakufu was grounded. In particular, he had to challenge the traditional acceptance by *buke* rulers, including the Tokugawa, of the pattern of bifurcated sovereignty. To this end, parallel to his reappraisal of the basis of the ongoing authority of the court, Hakuseki engaged in a multi-faceted critique of the succession of *buke* rulers from Yoritomo on. As in the case of his evaluation of the evolution of imperial rule, that critique rested on a thoroughgoing application of the premises of Chinese Confucian political thought to the course of Japanese history.

Hakuseki was far from the only Tokugawa thinker to employ Confucian notions to evaluate the significance of the role of the *buke* in Japanese political life. The obvious link between the decline in the effectiveness of court rule and the steady absorption of the functions and powers of the court by the *buke* focused the attention of both political actors and thinkers on the issue of competence as a prerequisite of political authority, an issue regarding which the tradition of Confucian political thought had much of pertinence to say. Likewise, since the Tokugawa *bakuhan* system represented the culmination of the long rise of the *buke*, those

who were concerned either to justify or to criticize the manner of Tokugawa rule necessarily had to review the prehistory of the bakufu.

But, while Hakuseki was not alone in bringing Confucian premises to bear on the tradition of *buke* rule, the conclusions he reached were as distinctive as those he advanced on the nature of imperial sovereignty. By and large, others of this period who wrote on the evolution of *buke* rule from a Confucian perspective sought to affirm, for one reason or another, the innate ambiguities of the structure of Tokugawa rule. Thus, they stretched the Confucian conceptual framework to make it accommodate many of the major sources of those ambiguities, including the readiness of successive *buke* leaders to work within the pattern of bifurcated sovereignty. By contrast, Hakuseki's concern to strengthen the monarchal authority of the shogun led him to challenge, in the name of Confucian political values, the actions of the major bearers of the *buke* tradition. In short, his demonstration of the disqualification of the *tenno* as rulers did not translate directly into affirming the approach to governance of the *buke* leaders who assumed power from the Kamakura on. Albeit for different reasons, the latter, too, in Hakuseki's interpretation, did not meet the requirements of the true heir to the mandate.

Hakuseki's challenge of the pre-Tokugawa *buke* tradition served as the foundation for a critique of continued adherence to various elements of that tradition under the Tokugawa. However, to carry the critique of *buke* rule forward into the context of his own "dynasty" posed several strategic problems. There was, for instance, the question of how to deal with the founder of the "dynasty," Ieyasu. Objectively speaking, Ieyasu stood firmly in the tradition of *buke* rule that Hakuseki sought to deny. But, from the perspective of both political practicality and Confucian propriety, Hakuseki could hardly make Ieyasu an object of criticism. To resolve this dilemma, Hakuseki maneuvered adroitly if tendentiously. On the one hand, he praised Ieyasu as acting, unlike his *buke* predecessors, as a true heir to the mandate. Simultaneously, however, he tried to separate Ieyasu from the patterns of Tokugawa rule as they had evolved under his successors, most notably Iemitsu.

PERSPECTIVES ON THE HISTORICAL ROLE OF THE BUKE

As discussed in Chapter 8, the founders of the Tokugawa bakufu combined two quite different strategies to establish their authority over the daimyo. One was to associate themselves with the legitimizing capacity of the court. The other was to assert an autonomous authority as rulers in their own right. These two strategies were in turn sustained by divergent sets of intellectual premises. The former drew from the mystique of eternal sovereignty surrounding the court; the latter emerged out of the claim, widely advanced by the Sengoku competitors for power, that the ruler's authority derived from his personal competence. The growing emphasis on competence as the basis of governmental authority endowed with a new relevance the Confucian premise that heaven would lend its support to one who proved himself able to bring order to the realm.¹ This conjunction between the immediate concerns of the late Sengoku and early Tokugawa rulers and elements of Confucian thought contributed to the rise of interest in Confucianism characteristic of the period. Likewise those thinkers who took it upon themselves to provide a theoretical justification of Tokugawa rule, coming largely from a Confucian background, tended to develop their argument within a basically Confucian framework. Consequently, even as they endeavored to uphold the capacity of the court to shelter the bakufu within its legitimizing aura, they also set forth the proposition that the Tokugawa exercised power as national rulers with the sanction of heaven.

To provide a comparative context against which to examine Haku-seki's analysis of the *buke* tradition, we may consider here some of the ways in which other Tokugawa political thinkers juggled these innately contradictory intellectual elements. We shall focus on two influential perspectives of the seventeenth and early eighteenth century. One, that of the Hayashi, constituted the mainstream bakufu view of the nature of *buke* rule. The other was formulated by the scholars employed by the Mito domain to compile a definitive history of Japan, the *Dai Nihonshi*. As representatives of one of the major collateral domains, the Mito scholars, like the Hayashi, were firmly committed to Tokugawa rule. However, they, and their lord, Tokugawa Mitsukuni, also wished to restrain the tendency towards shogunal autocracy characteristic of the

last decades of the seventeenth century and first years of the eighteenth. To this end they, more than the Hayashi, stressed the constraints on shogunal authority implicit in the relationship between the shogun and the tenno.² In combination, the two perspectives offer an instructive background against which to consider Hakuseki's interpretation of the *buke* tradition and shogunal role.

CONSEQUENCES OF THE INCORPORATION OF MANDATE THOUGHT. The acceptance by Tokugawa political thinkers of the premise that heaven had sanctioned Tokugawa rule brought in its wake an important corollary: The *buke* had emerged as effective rulers of the nation because the court, headed by the tenno, had lost heaven's trust. In line with this assumption, both the Hayashi and the Mito scholars, like Hakuseki, saw the mid-fourteenth century reign of Godaigo as the pivotal point in the shift of heaven's support from the court to the *buke*. For instance, Hayashi Gahō (1618–1680), Razan's son and successor as official bakufu scholar, in his history of Japan, *Ōdai ichiran*, clearly depicted Godaigo as the loser of the mandate. Like Hakuseki, Gahō described Godaigo as shortsighted in his governmental decisions, arbitrary in meting out punishments and rewards, receptive to the suggestions of a scheming consort, but resistant to the remonstrances and advice of loyal associates. Consequently, Gahō declared, the "realm viewed *buke* rule as preferable."³ Building on the implications of this assertion, Gahō ended *Ōdai ichiran* by presenting Ieyasu in the classic guise of the newly anointed recipient of the mandate. With the battle of Sekigahara in 1600, Gahō declared, "Evildoers and bandits were vanquished, and the entire realm submitted to Lord Ieyasu, praising the establishment of peace and extolling his martial virtue. That this glorious era that he founded may continue for ten thousands upon ten thousands of generations, coeval with heaven and earth!"⁴

The *Dai Nihonshi* likewise utilized the structure of mandate thought in portraying the fate of the southern court founded by Godaigo and its implications for the subsequent period of *buke* rule. Following the model of the official dynastic histories of China, the *Dai Nihonshi* included a section of biographies as well as the basic annals. To each segment of the annals and to the biographies the compilers further appended

critical evaluations (*ronsan*) summing up the moral to be drawn from each. In these *ronsan*, their author, Asaka Tanpaku (1656–1737), specified that Godaigo's lack of rectitude was responsible for the ultimate failure of the southern line to perpetuate itself. The arbitrary and inconsistent treatment of the *bushi* class by Godaigo's government had created disorder and unrest throughout the realm. Ashikaga Takauji's action in taking advantage of this unrest and overthrowing Godaigo was treasonous “beyond calculation, but it was also the consequence of the court itself breaching the bonds of morality.”⁵ The last tenno of Godaigo's line, Gokameyama (r. 1383–1392), weighed down by the “legacy of the faults” of Godaigo and his son, Gomurakami, yielded the regalia to the northern court in 1392 “because he knew that heaven had already withdrawn its mandate.”⁶

The *Dai Nihonshi* terminated its coverage of Japanese history in the early fifteenth century with the end of the period of division between the northern and southern courts; thus it did not discuss directly the establishment of Tokugawa rule. Nevertheless, by alluding to the retribution ultimately meted out to the Ashikaga, the immediate victors in the wars of the period of division and to the eventual recognition of the merit of the apparent loser, Nitta Yoshisada, the putative ancestor of the Tokugawa, the compilers clearly set the stage, as did the Hayashi, for acclamation of Ieyasu as the ultimate recipient of heaven's mandate.⁷

Even as they delineated in this manner the transfer of the mandate from the court to the *buke*, however, the basic commitment of the Hayashi and the Mito scholars to the tradition of bifurcated authority motivated them also to affirm the ongoing sovereignty of the imperial line. That aim inevitably led them to hedge in various ways their depiction of imperial loss of the mandate and thus to blur the autonomy the shogun theoretically should have possessed as its recipient. Two aspects of their historical approach reveal their vacillation with particular vividness—the manner in which they dealt with the symbolic indicators of sovereignty characteristic of Chinese Confucian historiography and the way in which they presented the office of shogun.

INDICATORS OF SOVEREIGNTY. Following the established practice of Chinese Confucian historians, the Hayashi and Mito scholars manipulated a

number of symbolic elements to indicate who was the legitimate ruler at a given point in time and to define the relationship to each other of various political actors. Central among these was the chronological-annals format which, by recording events reign by reign, emphasized the position of the ruling tenno as the legitimate sovereign. Both the Hayashi and the Mito scholars adopted this format. Moreover, by using it for the post- as well as pre-Godaigo eras, both also conveyed that the imperial line retained ultimate sovereignty, even after the debacle of Godaigo's failure to reconsolidate authority in the hands of the tenno.

In the case of the Hayashi, both *Ōdai ichiran* and *Honchō tsugan*, a bakufu-sponsored history of Japan up to the beginning of Tokugawa rule, begun by Razan and completed by Gahō, presented the northern line of tenno as continuing the imperial succession without a break after the reign of Godaigo. Consequently, the annals of the subsequent reigns of the northern tenno served as the framework in which the Hayashi delineated the events of the era of Ashikaga rule. Moreover, in *Honchō tsugan*, Gahō explicitly made this framework applicable to the Tokugawa period as well by extending the coverage of the work through the reign of Goyōzei (r. 1586–1611). The extension of the imperial annals to 1611 allowed for the incorporation in them of the imperial award of the title of *seii tai shōgun* to Ieyasu in 1603 and to Hidetada in 1605. Thereby it softened the suggestion that the establishment of Tokugawa rule constituted the founding of an autonomous dynasty and implied that the reigns of subsequent shogun should also be viewed within the larger context of the reigns of the tenno who followed Goyōzei.

In their handling of the annals format, the Hayashi passed gingerly over the complexities inherent in the relationship between the southern line of tenno deriving from Godaigo and the northern line which, set up by Takauji, had continued to hold the post of tenno thenceforth. The Mito scholars, by comparison, took a more nuanced approach to this knotty issue. Upholding the criteria stressed by Confucian scholars such as Zhu Xi, the Mito scholars sought to establish that, despite the faults of the last southern tenno, legitimacy rested with the southern line. To emphasize this point, they originally intended to terminate the *Dai Nihonshi* with the rejoicing of the courts in 1392, indicating that, with the end of the southern line, the legitimate dynasty likewise had ended.

Similarly, they planned to exclude from the imperial annals the five northern tenno who had occupied the throne in Kyoto during the existence of the southern court and to discuss them in the general-biographies section as pretenders.⁸

Eventually, however, this arrangement, which called into question the legitimacy of the Tokugawa tenno (as descendants of the northern line), was discarded as too radical. Describing his reaction to the original plan to put the five northern tenno in the biography section as pretenders, Asaka Tanpaku wrote:

If the situation were one of dynastic change as in China, and one were compiling the history of the preceding dynasty, such a format might be acceptable. But here the imperial house has continued as one lineage, and, while there were the so-called northern and southern lines, both were alike the descendants of the heavenly founder. Moreover, the so-called "five rulers" (*goshu*) of the northern court are in fact the direct ancestors of the present tenno. How could they properly be relegated to the biographies section?⁹

In accordance with this conclusion, the *Dai Nihonshi* eventually was extended beyond the reign of Gokameyama to include the reign of the contemporary northern tenno, Gokomatsu (r. 1382–1413), which encompassed the reunification of the northern and southern courts. In addition, the five northern tenno were taken out of the general-biographies section and allotted a kind of semi-legitimacy through the appending of an account of the events concerning them to the annals of the reign of Gokomatsu.¹⁰ By thus regularizing the status of the northern tenno and extending the coverage of the main annals to include the reign of Gokomatsu, the Mito scholars reduced the clarity of the loss of the mandate by the imperial line. Simultaneously, they indicated that the northern line of tenno should continue to be upheld as the locus of national sovereignty.

The instrument used by the Mito scholars to reconcile the conflicting claims to legitimacy of the southern and northern tenno also served to reinforce the notion that a residual, eternal sovereignty was vested in the imperial line. That instrument was a renewed emphasis on the significance of the regalia as the indicator of imperial legitimacy. The yielding of the regalia to the northern line in 1392 by Gokameyama, who as the

legitimate ruler had held them up to then, indicated that henceforth it was the northern line that should be regarded as legitimate.

Seeking to maintain the assumption that the legitimate ruler should be demonstrably worthy of heaven's trust, the early Mito scholars endeavored to distinguish between the premise that possession of the regalia was evidence of legitimacy founded on worthiness and the conclusion that possession of the regalia was sufficient to confer legitimacy. In the *ronsan* on Gokomatsu, Asaka Tanpaku declared, "The weight of the regalia depends on winning the hearts of the people. If the people cleave to the ruler, the regalia carry weight; if their hearts are distant from him, then the regalia do not carry weight." Nevertheless, he also imputed to the regalia a kind of magical power that ensured they automatically would go to the appropriate recipient. He concluded the same section by remarking, "The regalia as spiritual entities (*reibutsu*) of themselves have that to which they cleave."¹¹

Thus, in Tanpaku's interpretation, possession of the regalia, associated exclusively with the imperial line since the days of *kamiyo*, displaced the traditional criteria of Chinese Confucian historiography, such as the extent of the putative ruler's authority or manner of succession to the throne, as the central evidence of heaven's will. As Matsumoto Sannosuke points out, the ultimate consequence of such restructuring of the concept of heaven's will was to remove the imperial line as a whole from the purview of mandate thought, even while using the concept of the mandate as a criterion for judging the conduct of individual *tenno*.¹²

The motives of the Hayashi and the Mito scholars in thus blurring the application of the mandate of heaven to the imperial line were not identical. In essence, in their analysis of the history of court-buke relations, the Hayashi sought to affirm both dimensions of the pragmatic strategy utilized by the Tokugawa to consolidate their rule. They wished to acclaim the Tokugawa as the recipients of heaven's sanction who were thus theoretically justified in ruling in their own right. At the same time, they wished to uphold the part traditionally played by the *tenno* as the granters of legitimacy to the effective exercisers of power. The Mito scholars, on the other hand, as representatives of a leading domain rather than the bakufu itself, wanted to preserve the balance in the relationship between the *daimyo* and the shogun by emphasizing the transcendent

authority of the tenno as the ultimate locus of national sovereignty. Despite these differences in orientation, the approach of the Hayashi and the Mito scholars had a common effect: It confirmed the tradition of bifurcated authority as a fundamental premise of *buke* rule. Their treatment of the post most centrally associated with *buke* rule, that of shogun, had similar consequences.

APPROACHES TO THE OFFICE OF SHOGUN

The question of how to handle the role of the shogun posed a number of problems for those who sought to present Japanese history in a Confucian mold. From the time of Yoritomo, the office of shogun had epitomized the authority of the leader of the *buke*. However, as we noted in discussing the history of the appellations used by the shogun in relations with other countries, the import of the office within the categories of rulership deriving from the Chinese political tradition did not match its domestic connotations. In the Chinese context, the title of shogun (literally “general”) hardly identified its holder as a legitimate ruler of significant stature. Confronting this contradiction, the Hayashi and the Mito scholars alike opted for affirmation of the significance of the shogunal office and sought ways of overcoming its lack of authenticity from a Confucian perspective. The methods they devised cast a heightened aura of authority around the position. At the same time, true to the fundamental ambiguities of the premises of shogunal rule, they located the office firmly within the tradition of bifurcated sovereignty.

One way in which the Hayashi and the Mito scholars sought to reinforce the significance of the shogunal office was by tracing its origin to the earliest stage of Japanese history. For instance, in *Ōdai ichiran*, Gahō wrote that the appointment of shogun to pacify the realm dated to the designation of four “generals” (*shōgun*) as leaders of punitive expeditions during the reign of the tenth tenno, Sujin.¹³ Gahō’s stress on the archaic antecedents of the post did not resolve its irregularity, from the Confucian point of view, as the title of the ruler. It did, however, provide the office with an alternative source of legitimization.

Hayashi adherence to a pure chronological-annals (*bennen*) style in their history made this form of legitimization of the shogunal role suf-

ficient for their purposes. For the Mito scholars, however, the situation was more complicated. The decision to write the *Dai Nihonshi* in the combined dynastic-annals and biographies (*kiden*) format inaugurated by Sima Qian and used for the official dynastic histories of China, rather than in the pure chronological-annals style used by the Hayashi, necessitated a more explicit definition of the office of shogun. The *kiden* style emphasized the difference in status between the ruler, the focal point of the annals section, and the ruler's ministers, the subject of the biographies. Mito adoption of this format thus raised the acute question of whether the shogun should be treated historically as a ruler—as befitting his substantive role—or as a minister, because of his appointment by the tenno.

The Mito scholars concluded that neither alternative was fully appropriate. As Miyake Kanran (1674–1718), a key figure in the development of the format of the *Dai Nihonshi* (and, like Hakuseki, a disciple of Kinoshita Jun'an), pointed out, the traditional Chinese categories of ruler and minister could not readily accommodate the historical reality of the shogunal role. The shogun occupied a position intermediate between the tenno on the one hand and the nobility and populace on the other. While he was appointed by the tenno and ranked as a subject, the shogun in fact

holds the powers of financial administration over the lands of the realm; the prerogatives to appoint governors and government officials, to mount punitive expeditions, to cause to live or to die, to eradicate or create, all devolve upon him. From the Zhou and Han to the Song and Yuan, among the records of [Chinese] rulers and subjects, there has been no comparable situation.¹⁴

The Mito scholars ultimately solved the problem of the shogun's status by creating a new historiographical category, the *shōgun den*, in nature somewhere between the annals established for the ruler and the biographies set aside for subjects, wherein events pertaining to the shogun and their vassals were covered. Of this arrangement Asaka Tanpaku wrote, "While in name [the *shōgun den*] belongs to the category of biography (*retsuden*) [indicating that the shogun was not the ruler], in substance it is like the main annals (*hongi*) [which cover events concerning the ruler]."¹⁵

The definition of the shogunal role developed by the Mito scholars inevitably obscured the distinction between ruler and minister. Its implementation thus required the compilers of the *Dai Nihonshi* to stretch one of the most basic Confucian historiographical principles. At the same time, however, the innovation of the *shōgun den* was true to the intersecting concerns of the Mito scholars. It affirmed that the political role and authority of the shogun were greater than those of any ordinary subject. But, as an adjunct to the main annals, it also established that the shogun's function, for all its importance, did not make him a national monarch. Like the tracing of the office of shogun to an archaic imperial appointment, the device of the *shōgun den* thus ultimately reconfirmed that the authority of the shogun existed within, not outside, the framework of imperial sovereignty.

THE VIEWS OF HAKUSEKI

Unlike the Hayashi and the Mito scholars, in his treatment of the history of *buke* rule, Hakuseki sought explicitly to deny the tradition of bifurcated authority. Whether in his handling of the post-Godaigo era, his appraisal of the office of shogun, or the chronological format he pursued in his own history of Japan, he adhered unequivocally to the standard premises of Chinese Confucian historiography. Thereby he tried to demonstrate that imperial loss of the mandate was irrevocable and that consequently it was incumbent upon the shogun to assume the mantle of authority of an autonomous monarch.

APPROACH TO THE POST-GODAIGO ERA. Hayashi and Mito treatment of the relationship between the southern and northern lines served to play down the implications of Godaigo's failure to restore imperial rule to a firm footing. By contrast, through his handling of the relationship between the two rival lines, Hakuseki pointed up those implications.

Like the Mito scholars, Hakuseki held that those who established the southern court represented the legitimate line of *tenno*. As a consequence, he declared, "Those court nobles who knew the meaning of loyalty and rectitude largely went to the southern court. . . . The same was true

among the *buke*. . . .”¹⁶ It followed that the northern tenno were no more than puppets of the Ashikaga.

As for the northern court, its existence came about simply because Lord Ashikaga, even he, within his heart was afraid of what he had done in rebelling against his ruler and in competing with him as a subject for the realm. Having repeatedly failed to gain victory in battle, he took the suggestion of someone and eventually put up Lord Kōmyō as ruler and tried to make [his rebellion] look like a quarrel between northern and southern tenno. Thus, those with consciences found it shameful to serve the northern court. Accounts like that of the *Taiheiki*, too, note that people mocked the northern court, saying how fortunate Lord Kōmyō was to have been awarded the post of tenno by the shogun. The northern court thus was no more than something established by Lord Ashikaga for his own purposes; it could not be considered the legitimate imperial line, and the people of the day spoke of it as the pretender or the court of the pretender.¹⁷

Given that, by origin, the southern tenno represented the legitimate line and the northern tenno pretenders, the southern court’s failure to perpetuate itself conveyed an unmistakable message: The southern court was unable to retain heaven’s support because of the legacy of imperial misrule that culminated in the malefactions of Godaigo. “That nevertheless [the southern line] ultimately was unable to carry forward its succession was due entirely to the circumstance that heaven did not join with it because of the lack of virtue of its founder.”¹⁸ The extinction of the legitimate line of tenno had two further implications. It indicated that heaven’s withdrawal of its mandate from the imperial house was irreversible. And that circumstance removed the possibility of the southern line’s somehow granting its lost legitimacy to the erstwhile line of northern pretenders. To underline this last point, Hakuseki treated the transfer of the regalia from the southern to the northern line as being of virtually no importance. While he touched on the transfer in the course of discussing the events of the shogunal reign of Yoshimitsu, he eschewed comment on its implications, remarking only in a brief parenthetical note, “After fifty-six years south and north were reunited.”¹⁹

Dismissing the significance of the regalia’s transfer was congruent with the minimal attention Hakuseki, in contrast to writers like Kitabatake Chikafusa and Hayashi Razan, accorded the regalia in his discussion

of *kamiyo*. Hakuseki dealt with the regalia in much the same manner Chinese historians adopted towards similar objects in the context of Chinese history.²⁰ He recognized possession of the regalia as one of the marks of a legitimate tenno. Thus, Godaigo's possession of the regalia, together with the fact that he "had occupied the awesome position of sovereign," was one of the reasons why "those court nobles who knew the meaning of loyalty and rectitude largely went to the southern court."²¹ But Hakuseki clearly sought to deny the notion that the regalia were endowed with magical spiritual properties. They were symbols, not the source of imperial legitimacy and thus, in Hakuseki's interpretation, could by no means convey legitimacy to one who otherwise lacked the essential qualifications of a ruler.

In these ways, Hakuseki's handling of the post-Godaigo era differed sharply from the Hayashi and the Mito scholars. Far from reinforcing the status of the tenno as the eternal sovereigns of Japan, his emphasis on the legitimacy of the southern line threw into heightened relief the conclusion that the end of that line spelled imperial loss of heaven's mandate to rule Japan. And, by thus rejecting the claim that the imperial line continued to function as a repository of sovereignty even after Godaigo, Hakuseki also challenged the notion that *buke* leaders could legitimize their rule by linking themselves to the tenno. What they sought to uphold as a repository of sovereignty was, in fact, in Hakuseki's interpretation, nothing more than a line of pretenders.

APPRAISAL OF THE OFFICE OF SHOGUN. Hakuseki's insistence on imperial loss of heaven's trust at the time of Godaigo clearly set the stage for presenting a *buke* ruler as heir to the mandate. Yet, Hakuseki, who sought to challenge the tradition of bifurcated sovereignty, had no wish to affirm the validity of the historical forms of *buke* rule. He took the position that, because of the actual role of the *buke* as effective rulers, the candidate to receive heaven's trust in place of the discredited tenno inevitably would emerge out of the *buke* class. None of the *buke* rulers up to the Tokugawa, however, showed themselves worthy of that trust. Their failure to demonstrate the qualities incumbent in a true monarch made the span of time between Godaigo and the establishment of the Tokugawa bakufu an era like the late Zhou in China. One legitimate

dynasty had come effectively to an end but, as evidenced by the continuation of political disorder and social chaos, a new legitimate ruler had not yet appeared.

This view of the historical nature of the post-Godaigo era was directly connected with Hakuseki's appraisal of the meaning of the office of shogun. The Hayashi and the Mito scholars, operating within the tradition of bifurcated authority, sought to endow the office of shogun with greater authenticity. Hakuseki, by contrast, treated the post of shogun as the product of the particular circumstances associated with the decline in imperial rule and the political instability which followed imperial loss of the mandate. Thereby he explicitly called into question its appropriateness as the office of the true national ruler.

Hakuseki's criticism of the attempt by Gahō and the Mito scholars to trace the office of shogun to the reign of Sujin illustrates the difference between his approach and their effort to enhance the pedigree of the shogun's title. Noting that the *Kojiki* does not refer to the term "shogun" in its account of the event in question, he declared that "during that age there was no such title as 'shogun.' The words recorded in the *Nihon shoki* appear to be embellishments added at the time of later compilation."²² Similarly, in using Confucian historiographical categories of analysis to explicate the activities of the *buke* leaders from Yoritomo on, Hakuseki took an approach diametrically opposite to that of the Mito scholars. While the Mito scholars attempted to devise a new category of "Confucian" rulership which would fit the realities of the shogunal role, Hakuseki held that there was no need to go outside the classic Chinese categories to find a "name" for the pre-Tokugawa *buke* leaders. A perfectly appropriate (if not positive) "name" for what they represented already existed: that of *ba* (J.: *ha*), or hegemon.

The term *ba* referred historically to the succession of feudal lords of the late Zhou who had sought to establish themselves as supreme over their peers by championing the cause of the increasingly powerless Zhou king and by carrying out, with the king's nominal sanction, certain of his functions as ruler. In Hakuseki's succinct definition, "Since *ba* means 'chief,' it refers to one who, becoming chief of the feudal lords, raises up the Son of Heaven and issues orders [in his name]."²³ In a disturbed political atmosphere, some of the earlier *ba* succeeded in restoring a measure

of political and social stability. Nevertheless, in the Confucian view they made power rather than righteousness their cause. As Hakuseki, echoing Mencius, remarked of Guan Zhong, who assisted Duke Huan of Qi to become the first *ba*, "What is accorded his merit by and large appears to entail trickery and force and the feigning of benevolence and righteousness."²⁴

The position of the *ba* also entailed a highly problematic relationship with the theoretically legitimate ruler. The *ba* did not seek to replace the ruler; nominally they showed the rulers they championed the respect owed the sovereign by subjects. Nevertheless, by effectively absorbing what remained of the substance of the ruler's authority, the *ba* in fact made kingly ritual into an empty shell. Thereby they both contributed to the further decline of kingly government and made themselves liable to the charge of usurpation.

In Hakuseki's view, these characteristics of the *ba*'s approach to governance, with all their negative implications, described exactly the position of the *buke* leaders from Yoritomo to Hideyoshi. He allowed that the institutional circumstances of the late Zhou and of Japan between the Heian and the Sengoku periods were not identical; thus, in dealing with their peers, the *buke* leaders active in that span of time had not necessarily adopted the same strategies as the *ba* of pre-Han China. However, he held, their intentions, and particularly their efforts to legitimate their power by linking themselves to a nominal sovereign, were precisely those of the *ba*.

YORITOMO AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE TRADITION OF BUKE RULE.

Hakuseki made clear in the introduction to *Tokushi yoron* his aim to explicate the *ba*-like character of *buke* rule. There he identified the sixth of the nine epochs of court rule as when "the lord of Kamakura assumed military authority over the realm."²⁵ Official assignment of the sovereign's military authority to the bakufu was nothing other than the recognition of a *ba*. In his summation of Yoritomo's career, Hakuseki expanded on the qualities that made the name *ba* applicable to him. He began by likening Kitabatake Chikafusa's praise of Yoritomo for having maintained order and stability in an age of chaos to "Confucius's allowance that Guan Zhong might be termed benevolent."²⁶ However, Hakuseki

demurred, such an evaluation should be seen as relative. Yoritomo, like Guan Zhong, had demonstrated a political competence which brought about a temporary amelioration of the conditions of the day. But, seen in a total context, his actions were far from praiseworthy.

Regarding Yoritomo's aspirations, that crucial criterion for evaluating the worth of a political figure, Hakuseki noted that his "ambitions centered on solidifying the situation of his own house."²⁷ As a result he had no fundamental commitment to the task of the true king:

When Yoritomo first raised an army, he did not do so out of a desire to uphold the ruler and succor the people. Coming at a time when the evils brought about by the Taira were rampant and when the powerful houses of the realm were quarreling among themselves, one talented and fleet got his deer.²⁸

Not only did Yoritomo have at heart his own interests rather than those of his sovereign and the people; in seeking to advance his own power, he necessarily infringed on the prerogatives of the tenno:

In the years from the time he first raised his forces until the campaign against Yoshinaka, there is no evidence of his having taken a single warrior west to chastise evildoers and uphold the ruler. Moreover, under broad heaven, to the far reaches of the nation, who is not the subject of the ruler? Where is the land that is not the ruler's? The people that Yoritomo destroyed, the land that he claimed for his own, whose subjects were these? Whose land?

In the manner of the *ba*, Yoritomo asserted that he was serving the imperial cause (referred to throughout this passage as *ōke* [kingly house], to make explicit the parallel with the late Zhou). His success in destroying his enemies may have seemed to corroborate his claim to be on the side of righteousness. "His army may have appeared righteous and it may have seemed that it was for that reason that he readily accomplished his task." In reality, however, his success was due to luck and to the fact that heaven did not yet intend to extinguish the imperial house. Had that not been the case, since Yoritomo personally was not worthy of heaven's support, he would have been unable to cast the veil of legitimacy over his actions.

Had the Taira succeeded, as they plotted, in taking the retired tenno Goshirakawa with them when they fled the capital, or had Yoshinaka succeeded, as he plotted, in taking the retired tenno with him to the western regions when

fighting broke out between him and Yoritomo, then under what name would Yoritomo's army have attacked Yoshinaka, under what pretext would he have put down the Taira? That Goshirakawa managed to stay in the capital and that the Taira left the fourth prince [the later Gotoba] in the capital was none other than the doing of heaven, an indication that the imperial lineage was not to be extinguished. However, claiming [the destruction of Yoshinaka and the Taira] as his own merit, Yoritomo used these acts as an excuse for pressuring and controlling the court. Should it not be said that in truth he was stealing the accomplishments of heaven?

To be sure, Yoritomo did not seek deliberately to undermine the authority of the *tenno*, and some of the actions he took served to slow temporarily the descent into chaos that had resulted in large measure from misrule by the court.

At the time he received the prerogative [to appoint *shugo* and *jitō*], the realm had just been pacified, and remnants of the Taira were to be found throughout the nation; in addition, there were the matters of Yoshitsune and Yukie. Had not the posts of *shugo* and *jitō* been created at that time, the realm would soon have returned to turmoil. In seeking the authority to make these appointments, Yoritomo did not intend to weaken the authority of the ruler or to establish his own power as paramount. At the beginning of the *Jōei shikimoku*, there are several articles enjoining the *shugo* and *jitō* of the day from infringing upon the prerogatives of the provincial governors and noble *shōen* proprietors. To judge from this, the steady decline in the authority of the court and growing power of the *buke* were evils later brought about by those institutions; they were not Yoritomo's original intent.

Nevertheless, the end result was the further erosion of the political order Yoritomo claimed to uphold and on which he depended for sanction of his power. That erosion, together with the consequences of his machinations, spelled the doom of his own house, which survived for only two generations and three reigns. "It may be said that heaven never errs in its retribution, but this is something that Yoritomo brought about himself."²⁹

ADMINISTRATION OF THE REALM BY REAR VASSALS. Yoritomo's machinations also laid the foundation for the rise to power of the Hōjō, who, taking advantage of their position as vassals and in-laws to Yoritomo, dominated bakufu affairs after his death. Hakuseki presented Hōjō rule

as a degenerate variation of that of the *ba*. The Hōjō were not themselves *ba*; they exercised power as vassals of the *ba*. Thus their regime represented the further decay in relations between superiors and inferiors that was an inevitable consequence of the disintegration of the comprehensive authority of the sovereign. To emphasize this point, in the introduction to *Tokushi yoron* Hakuseki identified the era of Hōjō rule as one in which “rear vassals controlled the affairs of state.”³⁰ The description was a quotation from the passage in the *Analects* where Confucius delineated the spiraling decline brought about by the drainage of the comprehensive powers of government from the hands of the legitimate ruler.³¹

In line with this generalization, Hakuseki painted the individual Hōjō regents almost universally in dark colors. He did quote, with little comment, Kitabatake Chikafusa’s positive appraisal of the third Hōjō regent, Yasutoki.³² The other regents he criticized as power-hungry and traitorous, both towards their nominal lords, the shogun, and towards the court which in theory granted the shogun the powers the Hōjō proceeded to usurp. For instance, Hakuseki characterized Hōjō Yoshitoki, the major architect of bakufu policy at the time of the Shōkyū War, as “the most unprincipled political figure in the history of this country.” The unscrupulous way in which Yoshitoki utilized his relationship with the Minamoto to build up his own power was comparable to the behavior of Wang Mang, who took advantage of his position as prime minister and maternal relative of the Han emperors to establish his own dynasty in place of the Han, and worse than that of Soga no Umako, who manipulated the imperial succession and assassinated Sushun Tenno.³³ The fifth regent, Tokiyori, stood similarly liable to the charge of acting traitorously towards his lord. Not only had he deposed in succession the two Fujiwara shogun that the Hōjō had set up as heads of the bakufu and thus as their own lords; he may well have been involved in the deaths of the two ex-shogun.³⁴ The control of the affairs of state by such people inevitably hastened the further disintegration of the shell of court rule and opened the door to the dislocation and disorder characteristic of the Ashikaga era.

ASHIKAGA RULE AND THE BANKRUPTCY OF THE STRATEGY OF THE BA. Hakuseki’s critique of the *ba*-like stance of the Kamakura rulers rested on the

premise that the tenno, despite their faults, still retained legitimacy. Consequently, even if partially necessitated by the incompetence of the court, the bakufu's absorption of powers that properly should have been exercised by the sovereign was a usurpation of the sovereign's authority. By contrast, the relationship of the Ashikaga to the court entailed more complex nuances. On the one hand, Hakuseki held, the Ashikaga were culpable of contributing to the ultimate collapse of imperial rule:

Takauji established his house by casting aside the ties of his family [to the bakufu] of many generations' standing and going over to the side of the tenno (*kōke*). Shortly thereafter he turned against the tenno and brought the realm to turmoil. The tenno had rewarded his small merit far beyond its due. However, having raised his army with his own interests rather than those of the tenno in mind, Takauji no doubt always had planned to turn against the tenno in the end. . . . From the time he first raised his forces in battle, for twenty-six years there was not a day without fighting. In the end, he was unable to pacify the realm, and the fighting between lord and vassal [or ruler and subject], father and son, brother and brother, was without parallel, past and present. It all resulted from the fact that lacking rectitude himself, he was unable to rectify others.³⁵

These aspects of the Ashikaga regime represented an enlargement of the flaws inherent in seeking to govern as shogun already visible under the Kamakura bakufu. But, according to Hakuseki, the Ashikaga stance as *ba* also introduced a further problem into the tradition of shogunal rule. That is, the Ashikaga sought to act as *ba* at a time when the tenno no longer retained legitimacy as the recipient of heaven's mandate, a time when "the court existed only as a facade propped up by others."³⁶

Theoretically, imperial loss of the mandate made the situation ripe for the emergence of a figure of virtue who would be able to establish his rule on a firm basis as the new legitimate monarch. That the Ashikaga failed to rise to the occasion indicated their innate lack of worthiness as rulers. Likewise, their attempt to play *ba* to a crumbling structure propped up by others was nothing other than a patent effort to disguise their own disqualification as candidates to receive heaven's trust.

These premises underlay Hakuseki's evaluation of Ashikaga Yoshimitsu in *Tokushi yoron*. As noted in Chapter 9, in seeking to defend his program as true to the principles of *buke* rule, Hakuseki stressed the

precedents provided by Yoshimitsu. In particular, he emphasized the positive dimensions of Yoshimitsu's acquisition of various prerogatives previously associated with the imperial line. For instance, in his memorial calling for Ienobu to adopt a more kingly mode of dress and for revisions in the *kan'i* structure, Hakuseki appraised positively Yoshimitsu's adoption of the ceremonial style of the court of the retired tenno and of such imperial prerogatives as use of the epithet *kubō*. Addressing, in that memorial, the controversial issue of whether Yoshimitsu had been awarded the posthumous title of *daijō tennō* ("imperial parent"), Hakuseki argued that the use of epithets like *kubō* for Yoshimitsu during his lifetime suggested that grant of the title of *daijō tennō* antedated his death. It was distortion of the historical record by jealous members of the court nobility that had kept this fact from being generally recognized. And, Hakuseki went on to say, given the award to Yoshimitsu of the status of *jusangū* ("status equivalent to that of the three consorts," i.e., the tenno's grandmother, mother, and consort), there was nothing particularly out of line about the grant to him of the title of *daijō tennō*.³⁷

Leaving aside, as Hakuseki largely did in this particular memorial, the question of whether Yoshimitsu personally was worthy of recognition as a national monarch, Hakuseki regarded the acquisition of monarchal *rei* as befitting the *buke* leader's ultimate destiny as an autonomous sovereign. But, while developments such as these associated with Yoshimitsu had contributed to the enhancement of the prestige of the *buke* leader as a figure of authority in his own right, Yoshimitsu also had continued to show an ambivalent attitude towards the court; this ambivalence, in Hakuseki's view, had negative consequences for the course of *buke* rule. On the one hand, he sought high court rank and office for himself; on the other, he dealt with members of the court nobility as if they were his own retainers. Thus, in Hakuseki's estimation, fundamentally he had remained within the mistaken course of the *ba*. It was this latter dimension of Yoshimitsu's place in the history of shogunal rule that Hakuseki emphasized in *Tokushi yoron*.

Discussing Yoshimitsu's obtaining the title of *daijō daijin*, the foremost office in the imperial bureaucracy, Hakuseki wrote:

In antiquity Confucius said, "If names be not correct, language is not in accordance with the truth of things. If language be not in accordance with the truth of things, affairs cannot be carried on to success. . . ." Now, the term *minister* refers to a subject who serves the ruler in an official capacity. When one holds an office, there necessarily are functions specific to it. . . . Since the court had already fallen into decline and the *buke*, governing the realm, had set up the *tenno* as the ruler (*yo no kyōshū*), although [Yoshimitsu] called himself by the name of subject, what he was in substance differed from that name. If, receiving the office of minister to the king, one does not undertake to carry out the affairs of the king, how can he expect true submission from those whom he in turn commands to carry out his affairs?

Further, the office [Yoshimitsu] held was that of minister to the king; the offices his vassals held were also those of minister to the king. When both lord and vassal hold the post of minister to the king, in substance they may be lord and vassal, but in name they are both ministers of the king. In such a situation, how can the vassal in fact revere his lord? The unending succession of rebellious vassals during Yoshimitsu's reign may be attributed to his lack of virtue, but it also had its source in the lack of true reverence for the lord. Moreover, while assuming the status of a subject, Yoshimitsu summoned ministers of the court to serve him, calling them attendants or retainers of his house; how could he escape the condemnation of the ages for such an act of overt usurpation? Since the age had already changed, he should have established the *rei* for his reign in accordance with those changes. This is the principle of according with change. . . .³⁸

By the Ashikaga period, the possibility no longer existed for a *buke* ruler to establish a semblance of social order by adopting the methods of a *ba*. Nevertheless, by preserving the forms of bifurcated sovereignty at a time when all substance of imperial authority had disintegrated, shogun like Yoshimitsu had kept alive the remnants of the tradition of the *ba*. In the subsequent stage of *buke* rule, these remnants were in turn utilized by Nobunaga and Hideyoshi as they tried without success to consolidate their power on a lasting basis. Hakuseki's evaluation of Hideyoshi's efforts in this direction emphasized with heavy irony the bankruptcy of their endeavor:

As for one who had the intention to become a true *ba* and who succeeded in the work of a *ba*—may Hideyoshi be counted as such? This person followed the policies of Nobunaga in everything he did, but perhaps because he was impatient to achieve his aim, unlike Nobunaga he did not bother to exterminate

the established daimyo and lesser lords. Instead he awarded their existing lands to those who submitted to his military power. The only house he destroyed was the Hōjō of Sagami. Thus he soon was able to show evidence of the achievement of his aim. The missives he sent to the Shimazu and the Hōjō all purported to express the will of the tenno. This was indeed an instance of raising up the Son of Heaven and issuing edicts in his name. However, at that time who knew anything of respect for an edict from the Son of Heaven? Thus neither the Shimazu nor the Hōjō responded to those purported commands. It was like putting on the mask of a demon to frighten a child. When one thinks about it today it was most ridiculous.³⁹

THE MESSAGE OF FORMAT. In his review of the four stages of *buke* rule preceding the establishment of the Tokugawa bakufu, Hakuseki thus emphasized and reemphasized the *ba*-like nature of the office of shogun and the evils attendant on the tradition of bifurcated sovereignty. The chronological framework he developed in *Tokushi yoron* reiterated this point in another form. In *Tokushi yoron*, Hakuseki divided the course of Japanese history into two major eras. As he put it in the introduction, "In our country, after nine epochal changes, the government of the realm was assumed by the *buke*; in the age of *buke* rule, there were five further epochal changes leading to the rule of the present house."⁴⁰ These two eras did not constitute two chronologically distinct blocks of time. As the age of court rule ended with Godaigo and that of *buke* rule began with Yoritomo, the final three epochs of court rule and the first two of *buke* rule overlapped. This format manifested Hakuseki's overarching conceptualization of the course of Japanese history from the early Heian to the founding of the Tokugawa bakufu. Through it he sought to show that, up to the establishment of the Kamakura bakufu, the court retained a formally unified sovereign authority; between the establishment of the Kamakura bakufu and the establishment of Ashikaga rule, the *buke*, acting as *ba* vis-à-vis a weakening court, steadily absorbed the powers of the court; after the failure of Godaigo's attempt to restore imperial authority, the *buke* exercised the degree of control over the affairs of the realm that circumstances allowed; however, since they had not yet proved themselves worthy of heaven's trust as successors to the discredited imperial line, no authentic locus of sovereignty existed.

To clarify further these implications of *Tokushi yoron*'s overlapping

chronological format, Hakuseki utilized the classic techniques of Chinese Confucian historiography to indicate the presence or absence of legitimacy. For the first section, the era of court rule, when the tenno could claim to be the legitimate rulers, Hakuseki adopted more or less the style of the imperial annals found in the dynastic histories. Thus, he delineated events reign by reign, and he began his account of each reign by identifying the parentage of the tenno in question, the date of his designation as crown prince, and the date of his accession.

In the second section, where he examined the growing power of the *buke* leaders active during the period when the court retained sovereign authority, he looked more closely at the rise of the *buke*, in effect reconsidering from another angle events he already had touched upon in the first section. This section, although not explicitly identified as such, was thus analogous to the biographies section of the dynastic-histories format. In the third section, Hakuseki presented events in such a way as to demonstrate both the passage of political initiative from the court to the *buke* and the absence of a legitimate sovereign. He centered the discussion around the succession of *buke* leaders from the Ashikaga to Hideyoshi and referred only in passing to one tenno or another. By way of comparison, while in *Ōdai ichiran* Hayashi Gahō discussed the last reigns of the Ashikaga shogun and the rule of Oda Nobunaga and Toyotomi Hideyoshi within the context of the reign of Ōgimachi Tenno (r. 1557–1586), in the third section of *Tokushi yoron* Hakuseki barely touched upon the accession of Ōgimachi in the course of discussing the events of the era of shogunal rule of Ashikaga Yoshiteru (r. 1556–1565), and, in his summation of the course of “the realm under Hideyoshi,” he did not even allude to Ōgimachi’s abdication or the accession of his successor.⁴¹

By not according the tenno, from Godaigo on, the historical treatment due a legitimate monarch, Hakuseki indicated their loss of legitimacy. At the same time, he did not list for the Ashikaga shogun all the details of birth and parentage that he listed for the tenno in section 1. Thereby he also cast doubt on the legitimacy of the Ashikaga and their immediate successors and manifested the view that no authentic ruler, no locus of sovereign authority existed during the epochs of *buke* rule under them.

APPROACHES TO THE TOKUGAWA BAKUFU

Considered from one perspective, Hakuseki's analysis of the stages of court and *buke* rule prior to the Tokugawa period set the stage for presenting the Tokugawa as recipients of heaven's mandate. Such a conclusion was implicit, for instance, in Hakuseki's division of Japanese history between the early Heian and the Tokugawa period into two eras consisting respectively of nine and five epochs. As Ulrich (Kemper) Goch has shown, that division was based as much on the association in the *Book of Changes* between the combination of the numbers 9 and 5 and the appearance of a virtuous ruler as it was on the logical dividing points of Japanese history. By fitting the events of Japanese history into the framework of a combination of nine and five epochs, Hakuseki pointed to the following era as one when a ruler qualified to receive the mandate would appear.⁴²

In line with this underlying implication of the 9-5 format, Hakuseki, after pointing out the fallacy of Hideyoshi's efforts to act as a *ba*, concluded by distinguishing Ieyasu's accomplishments from those of his *buke* predecessors: "How could such deeds compare to the achievement of the founder of this house in bringing the realm to submit through the agency of his martial virtue (*shinbu*)?"⁴³ In referring to Ieyasu in such terms, Hakuseki clearly sought to establish him as the founder of a dynasty, comparable to King Wu of the Zhou, who was able "by one display of his anger to give repose to all the people of the kingdom."⁴⁴ Hakuseki further laid the ground in *Tokushi yoron* for conceptualization of Ieyasu as the ultimate recipient of the mandate by referring in passing to the virtue of those who defended the cause of the southern court against Takuaji and his puppet northern emperor (see, for instance, above, p. 275-276). Among those defenders was Nitta Yoshisada, from whom the Tokugawa (and Hakuseki) claimed descent. Presented in a Confucian perspective, Yoshisada fit the image of the minister who, knowing the way of righteousness, remained loyal to a less-than-worthy ruler. Thereby, like King Wen, the father of King Wu, who similarly had remained loyal to a tyrannical ruler, Yoshisada had exhibited the qualities for which heaven looked in seeking a recipient for its charge. That heaven should have turned eventually to Ieyasu testified not only to his

own personal worthiness as a ruler; it also could be understood as appropriate recognition of Yoshisada's hitherto unrequited virtue.

But, in presenting Ieyasu as the recipient of heaven's mandate, Hakuseki hardly intended to affirm the legitimacy of the actual Tokugawa system of rule, which, as we have seen, remained firmly within the tradition of the bifurcated sovereignty Hakuseki sought to challenge. His acclaim of Ieyasu as the recipient of the mandate was, in fact, carefully formulated so as to be consistent with that challenge. In essence, Hakuseki pursued the argument that, in sanctioning Tokugawa rule, heaven had responded favorably to Ieyasu's potential to act as a true king. The actual evolution of the bakufu, however, had accorded with neither the aspirations of Ieyasu nor the anticipation of heaven. Consequently, to bring to fruition what Ieyasu had sought to do and to cause heaven to renew its support of the Tokugawa, it was imperative to rectify past errors and proceed on the course of the true king.

Hakuseki developed this argument in various forms. Within the context of his historical works, he employed the method utilized by generations of Chinese Confucian historians to criticize their own dynasties: delineation of the past as a mirror for the present. That is, while presenting the rise and fall of previous "dynasties" in such a manner as to justify the existence of his own, through his explication of the shortcomings of past regimes he also sought to point out those of the current system of rule and to illuminate the way to correct them. When it came to justifying individual innovations or reforms Hakuseki made particular use of the assertion that they coincided with the "intent," since betrayed, of Ieyasu. And, to underwrite that somewhat tendentious strategy, Hakuseki tried in various ways to separate Ieyasu from the course of subsequent Tokugawa rule.

THE PAST AS A MIRROR FOR THE PRESENT. The 9-5 epochal format of *Tokushi yoron* provides a good example of how, while acclaiming the destiny of the Tokugawa as recipients of the mandate, Hakuseki simultaneously made clear that the Tokugawa had yet to fulfill that destiny. As Goch has pointed out, in the *Book of Changes* the 9-5 combination represents the potential for attainment of the highest political good, not its achievement. Achievement remains contingent on consultation with a

“great man,” in other words, one cognizant of the way of the true king.⁴⁵ The implication was obvious: The end heaven had anticipated in vesting its mandate in Ieyasu (and preservation of the Tokugawa house) could be attained only by adherence to the program set forth by Hakuseki.

This connotation of the 9-5 format indicates that Hakuseki fully intended his condemnation of the *ba*-like character of the pre-Tokugawa tradition of *buke* rule to apply as well to Tokugawa maintenance of that tradition. Similarly, his dissection of the shortcomings of previous regimes contained various allusions to what he regarded as current evils. For instance, his repeated strictures about the negative consequences of establishing hereditary offices or *kakaku*-like criteria for officeholding reflected his convictions about the deleterious effects of the power of the *fudai* within the structure of Tokugawa rule. Whether his overt object of criticism was the hereditary privileges of the Fujiwara, the Hōjō, or the big *shugo* houses favored by the Ashikaga, Hakuseki reiterated the same point. To sanction such privileges rather than establish appropriate kingly institutions was “to encourage vassals to usurp the prerogatives of their lord.”⁴⁶ Hakuseki’s castigation of the usurping nature of Hōjō rule, in particular, seems to have been based on his perception of the analogy between the relationship of the Hōjō to the Minamoto and that of the major *fudai* to the Tokugawa. On occasion, Hakuseki also pointed directly to the connection between Tokugawa practices and past errors. For instance, following his critique of Hideyoshi’s efforts “to utilize awe of the imperial house to control the realm,”⁴⁷ Hakuseki explicitly listed several “harmful customs” inaugurated by Hideyoshi which “continue to have a deleterious effect today.” Among these was the award to *buke* of high court rank and office.⁴⁸

While thus using the past to elucidate contemporary evils, Hakuseki also drew from his account of history justification for his efforts to rectify those evils. For instance, in discussing the factors behind the rise of the *bushi* in the late Heian, Hakuseki criticized as superficial and futile the attempt of Toba Tenno (r. 1107–1123, exercised power as *in*, 1129–1156) to restrain the growing power of the major *buke* houses by forbidding the *bushi* of the realm to affiliate themselves with the Taira and Minamoto. Such linkages had their source, Hakuseki declared, in the decline of imperial authority and usurpation of the powers of the

throne by hereditary ministers, the Fujiwara. Those circumstances inevitably encouraged the growth of disruptive hereditary affiliations throughout society. Given the nature of the problem, to correct it one had to go to the root of the matter. Had Toba genuinely wished to reverse the course of events, he should have followed the example of Chinese emperors like Guangwu of the Later Han, who, by emphasizing the importance of civil office and putting weapons into storage, had countered the power of the military figures who had backed his assumption of the throne; and Taizu of the Song, who likewise had sought to limit the power of the generals from whose ranks he himself had risen.⁴⁹ It was the failure of the Japanese tenno of the Heian and Kamakura periods to take comparable measures that led inexorably to a world "completely under the sway of the *buke*."

At the end of *Tokushi yoron*, Hakuseki reintroduced the example of the two Chinese emperors in the context of a further discussion of the problem of how to deal with overly powerful military houses. Contrasting the largess of Nobunaga and Hideyoshi in awarding grants of lands to those who recognized them as overlords to Ieyasu's caution in such matters, Hakuseki declared that Ieyasu's "deep plans and far-sighted intent had much in common with those of Guangwu of the Later Han and far surpassed those of Taizu of the Song."⁵⁰ The implicit contrast with the actions of Toba underlying the explicit differentiation of Ieyasu's efforts to limit the power of his vassals from the lax attitude of Nobunaga and Hideyoshi served two purposes. It pointed up the qualification of the Tokugawa to assume the mantle of kingship long since abandoned by the tenno. At the same time, by linking Ieyasu's "intent" to the strategies of the two Chinese monarchs, it established the premise for Hakuseki to present his own efforts to enhance the sovereign authority of the shogun as the fulfillment of the founder's aims.

RESTORATION OF THE WAYS OF THE FOUNDER. Hakuseki's historical evaluation of the nature of *buke* rule and his attribution to Ieyasu of the aspiration to act as a true king provided a theoretical justification for his own efforts to dissolve the tradition of bifurcated sovereignty and transform the shogun into a more monarchal figure. However, to make a theoretical argument was one thing but to transplant it into the arena

of daily politics was another. In the political arena, as suggested in Chapter 9, Hakuseki could not, as a practical matter, pursue the attack on the bankruptcy of *buke* rule that he set forth so boldly in his historical works. He had, rather, to defend his innovations as true to the *buke* tradition that he was actually attempting to overturn. That necessity inevitably resulted in the introduction of contradictions into his argument. Nevertheless, within these constraints he developed as consistently as he could the proposition that Ieyasu had sought to adhere to the way of the true king (defined within the context of everyday politics as being equivalent to “the ancient ways of the *buke*”) and that what he, Hakuseki, endeavored to do was nothing other than to fulfill the intent of Ieyasu.

In some cases, Hakuseki claimed directly that measures he proposed were a restoration of policies of Ieyasu abolished by later shogun. For instance, when, ten days after Ienobu’s succession, Hakuseki first submitted his recommendation for revision of the *Buke shohatto*, he couched it in the form of a “commentary on the intent of the founder’s code (*shinsōhō ikai*).”⁵¹ Hakuseki’s version of the *Buke shohatto* in fact had little in common with that issued in 1615 during Ieyasu’s lifetime. But his attempt to present his own version as true to the “intent” of the 1615 code shows how he sought to invoke the name of Ieyasu to justify his own endeavors to enhance the monarchal authority of the shogun. In the same way, as we saw in Chapter 9, Hakuseki defended shogunal adoption of the title of *kokūō* as a “restoration” of the title used by Ieyasu, despite the fact that such a claim was only supportable if one accepted the Tsushima forgeries as genuine.

Where he could not draw even such tenuous connections between his own measures and the policies of Ieyasu, Hakuseki adopted another strategy. He suggested that Ieyasu, and the latter’s immediate successor, Hidetada, had recognized that their times were not appropriate for establishing the definitive practices of the Tokugawa house; consequently, they deliberately had left that task for later generations. Hakuseki developed such an argument, for example, in his memorial recommending the adoption by the bakufu of a more monarchal court dress and revision of the *kan’i* system:

When the founder of this house came to rule the realm, he wished to revive the ancient ways of the shogunal houses; however, of the elders among the *buke*, only Hosokawa Fujitaka was still alive. The founder seems to have consulted with him about various matters . . . but, although Hosokawa far surpassed others of the day in his accomplishments in civil and military affairs, he had been born at a time when the realm had been in total disorder for two hundred years and when the ancient ways of the *buke* had all been lost. It does not seem that he knew completely even what had been transmitted about the practices of the previous shogunal house.

In this way, after the completion of the Osaka campaign, at New Year's in the spring of 1616, the vassals of this house were assembled in formal attire. . . . Had the founder lived longer, doubtlessly he would have had the *rei* appropriate for this house discussed and settled upon. However, in the 4th month of that year, he passed away. . . . During Lord Hidetada's reign, there was at length a declaration that the ancient ways of the military houses should be revived. I wonder if the founder did not leave posthumous instructions to this effect. Among the elders entrusted with the handling of government affairs at that time, however, there was one who objected, and so in the end this matter was not carried out.

Relating at this point the story quoted in Chapter 8 concerning Han Gaozu's discovery of the positive effects of ritual, Hakuseki went on to suggest that the objections of the elder had not been without merit:

When Shusun Tong summoned the scholars of ritual, there were two Confucians from Lu who did not respond. "Peace has just been established in the realm," they said. "The dead have not yet been buried, the wounded are not yet healed. And yet you wish to establish the rites. To establish the rites requires the accumulation of a hundred years of virtuous rule. What your lord seeks to do does not accord with ancient practice. We will not go." Thus, the attempt during Lord Hidetada's reign to revive the ancient ceremonial of the *buke* was the same in spirit as the wish of Gaozu to establish the rites of the Han dynasty, and the objection of the elder was the same as those of the two scholars from Lu.

By imputing the reasoning of the Lu scholars to the founders of the bakufu, Hakuseki sought to answer two potential objections to his efforts to change existing ceremonial practices. Such reasoning, he asserted, not only made clear why the founders had not established "authentic" *rei*, but also why the present moment was the appropriate time to do so:

Now, in those remarks of the two scholars, it says that the rites are to be established after the accumulation of a hundred years of virtuous rule. Thus the time for the present house, taking account of the ancient ceremonial (*kyūgi*) of the *buke*, to settle the *rei* appropriate for ten thousand generations to come is precisely today, a hundred years since the founding of this house!⁵²

SEPARATION OF IEYASU FROM THE SUBSEQUENT COURSE OF TOKUGAWA RULE.

In these ways, Hakuseki endeavored to present his program as something true to the aims of Ieyasu. To buttress this attempt, he further pursued two other strategies. The first, a necessary adjunct to the claim that his revisions of established policy in fact adhered to the vision of Ieyasu, was to separate Ieyasu from the manner of Tokugawa rule as it actually had evolved. In particular, this strategy entailed an effort to loosen the association between Ieyasu and Iemitsu, during whose reign the structure of the bakufu had taken definitive shape. The second strategy was to endow Ienobu with the aura of a ruler who might be expected “to cause heaven to renew its mandate.”⁵³

Hakuseki’s efforts to loosen the association between Ieyasu and Iemitsu so assiduously cultivated by Iemitsu took several forms. For instance, playing on the well-known coolness between Iemitsu and his father, Hidetada, Hakuseki sought to emphasize the link between Ieyasu and Hidetada. In the memorial on court dress and the *kan’i* system cited above, for example, Hakuseki went out of his way to praise Hidetada for “continuing unswervingly the enterprise of the founder. . . . One should say that not only the founder but also Lord Hidetada stands as a rare example among the rulers of Japan and China.”⁵⁴ By contrast, in the same memorial, he charged Iemitsu with being responsible for “ill-considered and unprecedented” changes in the system of *buke kan’i* ranks. Among other things, he pointedly dated the break with Ieyasu’s policy of keeping the rank and income of the *rōjū* low to the promotion of two of the *rōjū* to the *kan’i* of *jushii ge jijū* on the occasion of Iemitsu’s visit to Kyoto in the fall of 1632.⁵⁵ Likewise, in his early memorial attacking Ienobu’s predilection for the No and the taking on of actors as bakufu vassals, Hakuseki accused Iemitsu of having failed to keep open the channels of employment for *rōnin* “established by Lord Ieyasu and Lord

Hidetada as a means of long preserving the peace of the realm." That failure, Hakuseki implied, was one of the reasons for Yui Shōsetsu's abortive rebellion at the time of Iemitsu's death.⁵⁶

Hakuseki also tried to establish a distance between Ieyasu and Iemitsu by challenging various aspects of the form of the cult of Ieyasu which had taken definitive shape during the third shogun's reign. For instance, in *Saishikō*, a memorial on rites to spirits, Hakuseki objected to the way in which Iemitsu had attempted to link himself to that cult. Noting that, to be enshrined as a deity upon one's death, it was necessary to have accomplished deeds of great benefit to the populace during one's lifetime, Hakuseki went on to state bluntly:

It was because the founder of the present house had such meritorious accomplishments that he is revered and enshrined as a great deity. It is said that Lord Iemitsu fervently hoped that he, too, would be revered as a deity a hundred years after his death, but, since he did not have accomplishments of comparable merit, his hopes were in vain.⁵⁷

Nor did Hakuseki aim simply at distancing Iemitsu from the religious aura surrounding Ieyasu. He sought also to transform that aura from the form it had taken under Iemitsu into something more compatible with his own vision of the role of Ieyasu as the founder of a new kingly dynasty. *Saishikō* and a companion work, *Kishinron*, offered a Confucian explanation of the nature of spirits that stood as a clear alternative to the Shinto-Buddhist concept of spirits underlying the deification of Ieyasu as an avatar. In line with this disavowal of Shinto-Buddhist syncretism and advocacy of a Confucian view of spirits, Hakuseki took exception to the practice of referring to Ieyasu as "Gongen-sama," an appellation deriving from the first shogun's religious status as Tōshō dai-gongen, the title secured from the court by Tenkai. Instead, Hakuseki sought to convey an image of Ieyasu as the founder of an independent dynasty by referring to him as Shinso ("Divine Ancestor"), an epithet reminiscent of the posthumous names of Chinese emperors and connoting a fully autonomous religious status rather than one dependent on the sanction of the court. To give wider currency to the image of Ieyasu as Shinso, Hakuseki also urged Ienobu to establish a new Confucian-

style ancestral shrine to him.⁵⁸ The plan never came to fruition, but, if realized, it would have served as another means to separate the aspirations of Ieyasu from the actions of Iemitsu.

Parallel to his effort to dissolve the connection between Ieyasu and Iemitsu, Hakuseki attempted to link Ienobu to the founder by casting him in the role of one destined to cause heaven to renew the mandate granted to Ieyasu. The model he undoubtedly had in mind was one well established in Chinese historiography, that of a ruler who restores the fortunes of a dynasty otherwise embarked on a course of decline. As Muro Kyūsō remarked shortly after Ienobu's death, the very name Ienobu, adopted by the lord of Kōfu upon his designation as Tsunayoshi's heir, conveyed such an association. While the first character of that name derived from the first of Ieyasu's, the second, *nobu*, or *xuan* in Chinese, was to be found in the names of several Chinese rulers noted for carrying out a mid-dynasty "restoration": Xuan Wang of the Zhou (reigned 827–781 BC), Xuan Di of the Han (reigned 73–48 BC), and Xuanzong of the Tang (reigned AD 847–860).⁵⁹

On a more concrete level, many of the measures Hakuseki proposed, particularly in the initial days of Ienobu's reign, served, apart from their specified purpose, to associate the shogun with the image of one who could regain heaven's waning confidence in the kingly qualities of the Tokugawa house. Hakuseki's recommendation for a general amnesty immediately upon Ienobu's succession was one such instance. The amnesty, declared by Hakuseki to be necessary so as to "restore a sense of life and hope to the people," might also be expected to bring about a revival of popular trust in the ruler that would establish Ienobu as one qualified to carry on the task of the founder.

In these ways, Hakuseki sought, in the actual political arena, as well as the realm of history, to rearrange the parameters of Tokugawa rule in such a way as to delineate his own program as the authentic fulfillment of the aims of Ieyasu. Whether or not he succeeded in this endeavor is another question. Objectively, it was hardly plausible for Hakuseki to claim his innovations as the restoration of policies inaugurated by Ieyasu. Similarly, he could not counter in any truly compelling manner the weight of Iemitsu as the effective "second founder" of the bakufu. Ironically, Hakuseki's most substantial achievement in diminishing the place

of Iemitsu in the history of the bakufu and associating Ienobu and Letsugu with the restoration of abandoned practices came in the form of the mortuary arrangements for Ienobu and Letsugu.

By the 1710s, the shogunal house had two mortuary sites in Edo. The oldest was Zōjōji, the Jōdo temple where, in accordance with the Tokugawa family's hereditary affiliation to the Jōdo sect, Ieyasu's funeral had been held and Hidetada had been buried. The second was Kan'eiji, constructed by Iemitsu in conjunction with the elaboration of the Ieyasu cult and affiliated with the religious complex at Nikkō where Ieyasu and Iemitsu were buried. Reflecting those connections and adding to the prestige of Kan'eiji relative to Zōjōji, Iemitsu's sons, Ietsuna and Tsunayoshi, both were buried at Kan'eiji. When Ienobu died, however, this pattern was reversed. Ienobu's last testament, drafted by Hakuseki, noted that, if continued, the lopsided favoring of Kan'eiji in such matters would result in neglect of filial obligations to the spirit of Hidetada. To forestall such a consequence, it continued, Ienobu should be buried at Zōjōji.⁶⁰ Four years later Letsugu also was buried there.

Hakuseki's efforts to use even the occasion of Ienobu's death to challenge the authenticity of precedents consolidated by Iemitsu illustrates the fervency of his determination to reshape the contours of shogunal rule. At the same time, the Zōjōji location of the tombs of Ienobu and Letsugu was the only one of Hakuseki's symbolic innovations to outlast his period of influence—evidence of how problematic the task he set himself was. So far, we have considered the difficulties of that task in the context of the clash between the nature of the Japanese political tradition and the Chinese Confucian premises that Hakuseki employed to change it. However, Hakuseki's endeavors entailed other equally fundamental problems. Most crucially, for all their potency in some respects, the Confucian weapons Hakuseki wielded were innately flawed in others. Those flaws entangled him in contradictions which made it impossible for him to achieve the very end that he conceived, in considerable measure, under the influence of the premises of Confucian political thought. To complete this survey of the interaction between Confucianism and the Japanese political environment fundamental to Hakuseki's enterprise, we need to examine these contradictions and their implications.

Contradictions

For Hakuseki, the potency of Confucianism as a political weapon depended on its consistency as a system of thought. It was unwavering adherence to the ideal of unity of name and substance that would establish the ground for the shogun to act as a national monarch and thus to absorb the kingly *rei* associated with Kyoto. It was thoroughgoing acceptance of Confucian premises about the nature and sources of political legitimacy that would justify rejection of the tradition of bifurcated authority and with it the historical patterns of *buke* rule. But Hakuseki's insistence on cleaving to the original premises of Chinese Confucianism also brought him into confrontation with a number of insoluble contradictions. Indeed, the very intensity of his attempts to bring the dynamics of Chinese Confucianism to bear on the Japanese environment cast those contradictions into heightened relief. In the end, Hakuseki's experiences did not simply point up the gap between the propositions of Confucian political thought and the patterns of Tokugawa political life; they also demonstrated that even a commitment to Confucian authenticity so bold as to border on obsession was insufficient to bridge that gap.

Within the context of his efforts to transform the shogun into a legitimate monarch, Hakuseki became entangled in two particularly knotty sets of contradictions. The first was endemic to Confucianism in the Chinese as well as the Japanese setting. It derived from a fundamental tension in Confucian thought concerning the transfer of legitimacy

from one dynasty to another. Chinese Confucians, regarding such a transfer as based on the removal and reassignment of heaven's mandate, accepted as normal the loss of legitimacy by one regime and its acquisition by another. At the same time, Confucian thinkers held that inferiors should show reverence for superiors, even if the latter were innately undeserving of such respect. This requirement extended, of course, to the subjects of a declining dynasty. The consequence of the conjunction of these two assumptions in Confucian theorizing about the relationship between ruler and subject was to make the founder of a new dynasty necessarily a betrayer of the old. In practice, only the cessation of all claims to authority by the former dynasty, most usually as a result of its destruction, could remove this ambiguity in the founder's reputation. Conversely, any indication that the former dynasty still clung to life tended to cast the legitimacy of a new regime into question.

This tension in Confucian conceptualization about shifts of power was the source of a major crack in Hakuseki's argument about the relationship between the Tokugawa bakufu and the court. Through his analysis of the pre-Tokugawa history of court-*buke* relations, Hakuseki had demonstrated that the court, having lost heaven's mandate at the time of Godaigo, had survived only as a "facade propped up" by successive *buke* rulers. Nevertheless, for all his efforts to show that the court no longer possessed any genuine sovereign authority, the court continued to exist in Kyoto and, by general agreement, to retain the capacity to sanction the political power exercised by others. This circumstance was a major impediment to the justification of the shogun's assuming a more comprehensive kingly role. To reconcile an increase in the monarchal authority of the shogun with the ongoing existence of the court it was insufficient simply to delineate the historical emptiness of the authority attributed to the court. Rather, a resolution of the anomalies in the relationship between the court and bakufu had to take place on the level of actual policy. In effect, Hakuseki had to recreate within the context of contemporary politics the basis for the definitive transfer of legitimacy from the court to the bakufu that, according to his historical argument, should have occurred, at the latest, on the occasion of the founding of the Tokugawa bakufu.

But it was precisely at this critical juncture that Hakuseki's conceptual

tools failed him. The end result of his efforts to foster a transfer of sovereignty from the “former” dynasty, the court, to the “present” one, the bakufu, was to reconfirm the reality that the Confucian theory of legitimacy could account for shifts of power that had occurred in the past, but could not cope adequately with the problems presented by former dynasties that lingered on into the present.

The second set of contradictions awaiting Hakuseki was rooted in the clash of two different perspectives on Japan’s place in the world at large, each of which derived in some sense from the body of Confucian assumptions about the nature of the state. On the one hand, Hakuseki’s conception of the shogun as a national monarch led him to stress the autonomy of Japan, the state ruled by the shogun, as a political entity. On the other hand, his identification of the shogun as a king brought him up against the common post-Zhou Chinese usage of that title for the rulers of states which stood, or, in Chinese eyes should stand, in a tributary relation to China.

Hakuseki’s emphasis on the importance of political autonomy made acceptance of the implications of a tributary, or even inferior, relationship to China intolerable. At the same time, insofar as he sought to uphold the premises of Chinese Confucianism as “authentic,” he could not reject out of hand the assumption, embedded alike in those premises and in the traditional China-centered tributary system, that properly “all under heaven” should be incorporated in one universal hierarchical order.

A PRACTICAL SOLUTION AND ITS PROBLEMS

Considered from a non-Confucian perspective, the most “practical” way to consolidate the *political* authority of the shogun within the context of the concurrent existence of two evident monarchs (tenno and shogun) would have been to demarcate more clearly the authority of each. Arguably it would have been possible to grant the tenno a kind of cultural or religious role while removing him from the sphere of political authority reserved for the shogun as king. Such a solution would have accorded quite well with the objective situation in late-seventeenth and early-eighteenth-century Japan as recorded, for instance, by the German observer Engelbert Kaempfer.¹

Almost a century ago, Yamaji Aizan pointed out that in some ways Hakuseki moved in the direction of such a solution.² For example, as we shall discuss more fully below, in his struggle with the issue of Japan's national status relative to that of China, Hakuseki occasionally argued that the continued existence of the imperial dynasty had made possible the preservation of ancient *rei* and music that otherwise might have been lost.³ Hakuseki's recommendation in *Tōkushi yoron* as to what Yoshimitsu should have done to clarify the nature of his authority as national ruler also hints at a comparable resolution of the relationship between the shogun and tenno. After cataloguing Yoshimitsu's errors in assuming the stance of a minister of the court even as he asserted his dominance over it, Hakuseki continued:

Since the age had already changed, Yoshimitsu should have established the *rei* for his era in accordance with those changes. This is the principle of according with change. Had he not been unlearned and unlettered, at that time he could have investigated the practices of the Minamoto house and of our country, old and new, and established his title (*myōgō*), making it one rank below the tenno and clarifying that, apart from the ministers of various ranks serving the court, the entire populace of the 60 some provinces were his subjects. Had he done so, his efforts would be of use even in this age today.⁴

As Bitō Masahide has pointed out in his analysis of this passage, the establishment of *rei* and the extension of authority over the entire populace were prerogatives specific to the king. Thus, in asserting that Yoshimitsu should have established the *rei* for his era and made clear that the entire populace were his subjects, Hakuseki argued here that Yoshimitsu should have consolidated his sovereign authority by assuming a title that reflected his substantive status as a national monarch.⁵ Seen in this context, the delineation of a status for the tenno one rank above the national monarch in effect reserved for the tenno a supra-political role. Given the primary function of the court nobility as preservers of aristocratic culture, the specification that the tenno should retain authority over the nobility likewise suggested that his role would be largely cultural.

Hakuseki's basic commitment to Confucian premises about the nature of kingly authority, however, made it impossible for him to develop more than tentatively this division between religio-cultural and political spheres. To have used that division as an explicit solution to the

relationship between tenno and shogun, thereby allowing the tenno a superior authority in the religio-cultural sphere, would have undermined the core of Hakuseki's argument as to why it was essential to transform the style of shogunal rule. For, as we have seen, that argument rested on the Confucian proposition that the ruler should exercise a comprehensive authority that encompassed not only "punitive military expeditions" but also "ritual and music."

The problems Hakuseki faced in trying to demarcate "political" and "religious" spheres of authority are well illustrated by a passage from *Koshitsū* wherein he sought to reserve a "religious" role for the tenno without compromising his basic assertion that the kingly *rei* were not attached permanently to the imperial line. "Shinto," Hakuseki allowed, was the special province of the imperial court:

In our country, superior to all the myriad nations, the great line of the *kami* rulers (*shinnō*) exists coeval with heaven and earth. The *kami* lineages (*shin'in*) whom the founder *kami* (*kōsoshin*) commanded should perform the religious ceremonies at the ancestral shrines to them and to the other myriad *kami* all have continued to the present without interruption. Thus, regarding the matter of ceremonies of purification, prayers, and supplications, who other than these people should go beyond the offertory table and perform them?²⁶

On the surface, this passage acclaimed the permanent religious authority of the imperial court. However, Hakuseki prefaced it with a qualification which made clear that the religious authority exercised by the court as its innate prerogative should be seen as intrinsically different from the "true" spiritual authority encompassed within the Way of the Sages:

In the *Rites* it says, "In the realm of darkness, there are spirits and gods (*kishin*); in the realm of light, there are rites and music." People may refer to our country as the country of gods (*shinkoku*), but matters such as religious ceremonies, prayers, and supplications (*saishi kijō*) do not belong to the realm of the rites and music and teaching of the Way (*reigaku seikyō*). . . . When [ancient sources] refer to [the founding of] the way of the *kami* (*shintō*) as the establishment of "teaching," it does not seem that they mean the usual Way (*tsune no michi*) or the teaching [of the sages]. It is for this reason that they distinguish it as the "way of the *kami*."²⁷

Hakuseki's motive for trying to distinguish between "religious ceremonies, prayers, and supplications" and "rites and music and teaching of the Way" is obvious. The latter, according to his fundamental argument was properly the province of the shogun as the recipient of heaven's mandate. However, to sustain such a distinction required contravention of the very premises of Confucian thought that he sought to uphold. Only by a forced interpretation of the phrase he cited from the *Book of Rites*, could he demarcate the "religious ceremonies, prayers, and supplications" belonging to the realm of darkness (that of the tenno) from the "rites and music and teaching of the Way" belonging to the realm of light (that of the shogun acting as national monarch). In the original, as Hakuseki unquestionably must have realized, the realm of darkness and the realm of light are presented as two dimensions of the same thing, not as separate spheres. The concept of the ultimate unity of the two realms constituted yet another underpinning of the premise that the ruler, in presiding over "all under heaven," should exercise a comprehensive sacerdotal and secular authority. Thus Hakuseki could not pursue arguments of this sort very far without undermining his own call for adherence to the full implications of the authentic Confucian view of sovereignty. For this reason, his attempt to set aside a special religio-cultural role for the tenno necessarily remained tentative and problematic, a minor undercurrent in the total context of his efforts to resolve the anomalies in the relationship between tenno and shogun. The main thrust of those efforts had to be grounded in the Confucian theory of sovereignty.

VOLUNTARY YIELDING

The Confucian tradition affirmed two legitimate mechanisms for the transfer of sovereignty from one dynasty to the other. One was that of the "just punishment" (*fangfa*; J.: *hōbatsu*) of a corrupt dynasty by the new recipient of the mandate. The other was that of the "voluntary yielding" (*shannrang*; J.: *zenjō*) of the throne to the figure most qualified to occupy it. The establishment of the Shang dynasty by King Tang and the Zhou dynasty by King Wu represented the classic instances of the former mechanism, while the latter approach was held to have been adopted by Yao, who chose Shun rather than his own son as his successor,

and by Shun, who in turn chose Yu. In the case of voluntary yielding, the initiative for the transfer of sovereignty lay with the yielder rather than the receiver. Moreover, the yielder's quest for the figure most worthy of occupying the throne and choice of him rather than someone of his own lineage pointed up his own virtue as well as that of the new ruler. Thus, of the two mechanisms for the transfer of legitimacy, voluntary yielding offered the optimal resolution of the tension between the assumption that heaven's mandate should go to the one most worthy of it and the premise that inferiors should defer to superiors.

Few historical rulers, however, contemplated, let alone carried out, such an act of self-abnegation. Consequently, those who founded new dynasties generally used the premise of just punishment to legitimize their acquisition of power and relied on the completeness of their military victory to allay any lingering doubts about the propriety of their relationship with their erstwhile lord. Reference instead to the ideal of voluntary yielding became the resort of rulers who lacked definitive evidence, in the form of a lasting military triumph, of the shift of heaven's trust in their favor. And, as demonstrated by the most famous effort to stage a voluntary yielding, the attempt of Wang Mang to establish a new dynasty in place of the faltering Han, such efforts almost invariably left their instigator tarred with the name of usurper.

In his account of the establishment of the Tokugawa bakufu, Hakuseki employed the image of Ieyasu pacifying the realm by means of a just punishment of his corrupt predecessors. However, when it came to resolving on the level of actual policy the problem of the ongoing existence of the court, Hakuseki could hardly call for a new "just punishment" of the tenno. Instead, insofar as he sought to remain within the parameters of Confucian authenticity, he had little choice but to try to utilize the ideal of voluntary yielding. Consequently, to justify, in the context of contemporary policy, shogunal assumption of a more kingly role, Hakuseki attempted to present the court as conveying the prerogatives of the king to the shogun in the same manner as Yao had passed sovereign authority to Shun. At the same time, in pursuing such a course, Hakuseki necessarily encountered the pitfalls inherent in any effort to translate the ideal of voluntary yielding into historical reality.

THE PART OF SHUN. According to the script for the transfer of legitimacy through voluntary yielding, the prospective recipient should demonstrate his kingly potential in various ways. One was through the conduct of government affairs and the effort to ensure the welfare of the people. But equally crucial, and particularly relevant to the relationship between the court and the bakufu, he should continue to show the deference owed by an inferior to a superior until the initiative of the latter brought about a shift in their respective roles. In line with this script, Hakuseki's endeavors to get the court to play the role of Yao rested on the premise that first the bakufu should demonstrate its readiness to assume the respectful stance of Shun vis-à-vis Yao.

Undoubtedly, the most notable demonstration of Shun-like concern for the welfare of the court urged by Hakuseki was the establishment of a new cadet branch (the fourth) of the imperial house and the granting of funds to enable the marriage of an imperial princess. By custom and according to the regulations set up for the court by the Tokugawa, imperial progeny other than the crown prince were severely restricted in the opportunity to marry and procreate children. Princesses might marry within the branches of the imperial family or into the five leading noble houses, the *sekke*, and princes might be adopted into one of the three cadet houses of the imperial line. Most imperial offspring, however, did not marry; instead they became members of the Buddhist clergy.⁸

In a memorial submitted in the first days of Ienobu's reign, Hakuseki called upon him to rectify this "unnatural" state of affairs by providing financial support for the establishment of a new cadet house of the imperial line and for the marriages of imperial daughters. "Even the lowliest of couples," he wrote,

having given birth to a child, wish to see him marry. This is the natural sentiment of people throughout the universe, past and present. Today, even those of the peasant, artisan, and mercantile classes divide their wealth among their sons and seek husbands for their daughters. Among the *bushi* class there are none who do not do so.

The court, having grown accustomed to the situation in which most imperial offspring were forced to take Buddhist orders, might not seek

directly to have it changed. However, that very circumstance presented the opportunity for a spontaneous demonstration of shogunal virtue vis-à-vis the court:

The custom [of imperial progeny taking Buddhist orders] being long established, the court is not likely at this point to complain about it or ask to have it remedied. However, even if the court says nothing about this matter, unless something is done about it, it cannot be said that [the shogun] has exerted himself fully on behalf of the tenno. At the present time [the bakufu] grants the court nobility house lands. Were an imperial son to be established as an imperial prince [that is, granted the source of income necessary to maintain him as such], how much land would it require? Were an imperial daughter to marry, how much of the national resources would have to be expended?⁹

Hakuseki's memorial led to concrete action. The following year, 1710, a cadet house, later known as the Kan'in house, was established for one of the sons of Higashiyama Tenno with sustenance lands of 1,000 *koku*; likewise, a marital allowance of 300 *koku* was provided for one of the daughters of Higashiyama to support her marriage into the Fushimi house.¹⁰

If such action on the part of the bakufu could be taken to manifest a Shun-like concern for the welfare of the court, the script for the voluntary yielding of authority suggested that it should be followed by comparably selfless action on the part of the court: namely, a quest for the figure most qualified to rule the realm and the granting of sovereignty to him. At the end of his account in *Oritaku shiba no ki* of his memorial on the marriage of imperial offspring and its consequences, Hakuseki alluded to such an expectation. Referring to the fact that he had submitted the memorial in the first days of Ienobu's reign, he noted, "I submitted this memorial at this time because it had bearing on the [imperial] investiture of the shogun (*shōgun senge*)."¹¹ Nor did Hakuseki wait passively for the fulfillment of this premise. Throughout his years of activity in the bakufu, he endeavored to obtain evidence in one form or another of the court's "voluntary" recognition of shogunal assumption of a more kingly role.

EFFORTS TO BRING ABOUT THE TRANSFER OF AUTHORITY. One way Hakuseki sought to obtain the court's sanction of the shogun's acting as king

was through cultivation of the shogun's father-in-law, Konoe Motohiro, who had served as *kanpaku* from 1690 to 1703, and brother-in-law, Konoe Iehiro, who served first as *kanpaku* and then as *sesshō* from 1707 to 1712.¹² The first two years of Ienobu's reign saw several developments designed to cause these leading figures within the court to look favorably upon the shogun. Six months after Ienobu's accession, his consort, Motohiro's daughter, was granted the high court rank of *jusanmi*, unprecedented for the consort of a reigning shogun.¹³ A few months later, Motohiro was appointed to the post of *daijō daijin*, the largely honorary post that constituted the pinnacle of the traditional court bureaucracy. The following year, Iehiro was appointed in turn to the post. Although together they held the office for less than a year, it was the first time in 125 years that a court noble had been honored with appointment as *daijō daijin*.¹⁴ Furthermore, at the beginning of 1710, the shogun invited Motohiro to come to Edo for a visit, and, during the court noble's sojourn in Edo, which eventually was extended to two years, he entertained and consulted with him frequently.¹⁵

From Hakuseki's perspective, the cultivation of the Konoe had several implications. On the one hand, it facilitated his investigation of authentic kingly *rei*. Not only were the Konoe themselves valuable sources of information about courtly practices, the connection with them helped make it possible for Hakuseki to observe directly various important court ceremonies and artifacts. In late 1710, during Motohiro's stay in Edo, it was arranged for Hakuseki to travel to Kyoto to observe the accession ceremonies of Nakamikado Tenno on 1710/11/11, and, through the offices of Iehiro, his stay in Kyoto was extended to allow him to view as well the ceremonies for Nakamikado's *genpuku* (coming-of-age ritual), which took place on the first of the next year. The Konoe also assisted Hakuseki in meeting and consulting with various noble experts on the *rei* of the court during his stay in Kyoto. One of his informants, Nonomiya Sadamoto, recorded in his diary that, to answer Hakuseki's queries, for five days he "left aside all other affairs, refused all guests, closeted [himself], and scribbled furiously."¹⁶

Apart from serving as a source of information about *rei*, the Konoe, particularly Motohiro, were maneuvered into playing a symbolic role as witnesses of the shogun's kingly qualities. Motohiro's diary shows that,

during his stay in Edo, he was provided with copies of edicts that particularly illustrated the shogun's concern for the welfare of the populace, such as the directive to the Yase villagers written in simplified language and the edict issued by the shogun after receiving the reports from the circuit inspectors in which he reproached the daimyo and bakufu officials for the absence of "conspicuous evidence of good government."¹⁷

Moreover, bakufu extension of Motohiro's stay in Edo until the 4th month of 1712, despite his expressed wish to return to Kyoto in the winter of 1710 for the accession of Nakamikado,¹⁸ ensured that he would observe the arrival and reception in Edo of the Korean embassy, come to offer its respects to the "king of Japan." Motohiro's diary records that Akifusa reported to him various actions and statements by the Koreans which expressed their admiration for the kingly rule of the shogun. In a written conversation in Chinese with Hakuseki, the Koreans, according to Akifusa, had commented on the flourishing condition of the populace, stating that "it is apparent that Lord Minamoto is a virtuous ruler." Akifusa also told Motohiro that the envoys "commonly refer to the present era as the Minamoto dynasty (Genchō)," and that, on the occasion of their meeting with the shogun, "to show their respect for the king (*kokudō*)," the envoys had, "for the first time" in the history of the embassies, worn the type of court dress used for major ceremonial occasions in Korea.¹⁹

The effort to impress upon Motohiro the shogun's virtues and to indicate to him that other people recognized the shogun as a king was, at the same time, an attempt to cast the noble in the role of a sanctioning agent. Considered in this context, the success of the bakufu in keeping Motohiro in Edo during the period when the new bakufu *rei* were adopted took on a further meaning. Leaving aside the question of Motohiro's own intentions, the apparent willingness of the Konoe to cooperate in the process of Edo's absorption of the *rei* of Kyoto could be taken as a tacit signal of the court's readiness to "yield" its authority to the shogun.

Hakuseki did not stop with utilizing Ienobu's relationship with the Konoe in his efforts to justify the shogun's assumption of a more monarchal role. He also worked to consolidate specific connections between the court and the shogun which, interpreted in light of the Yao-Shun

model, might be taken to convey a transfer of authority from the tenno to the shogun. Ironically, the most notable opportunity for establishing such connections came with the death of Ienobu and succession of the young Ietsugu. One occasion for forging a link of this sort with the court was Ietsugu's *genpuku*, held in the 3rd month of 1713, shortly before the ceremony of shogunal investiture. The name taken by a Tokugawa shogunal heir at his *genpuku* customarily was awarded by his father. However, Ienobu's death made an alternative plan necessary, and, at Hakuseki's suggestion, it was arranged for the retired tenno, Reigen, to grant Ietsugu his adult name. Following procedures reserved for the highest-ranking nobility and unprecedented for the Tokugawa, Reigen also presented Ietsugu with his cap of adulthood.²⁰

The establishment of a symbolic parent-child relationship between Reigen and Ietsugu implied that the latter might act as the tenno's "heir" in other ways as well. This implication was expanded further two and a half years later when Ietsugu was betrothed to Reigen's infant daughter, Yaso no miya. The betrothal represented the first instance in Japanese history of a marital alliance between the daughter of a tenno and a *buke* ruler. *Buke* rulers had previously married their daughters to tenno and the children of such unions had succeeded to the throne. Likewise daughters of high-ranking nobles such as Konoe Motohiro had been married to *buke* husbands, and the fourth Tokugawa shogun, Ietsuna, had taken his consort from the Fushimi cadet house of the imperial line. Never before, however, had the daughter of a tenno "married down" into the *buke*.

The unprecedented betrothal of an imperial princess to a *buke* ruler might be seen as a quite concrete "return" on Ienobu's virtuous efforts to enlarge the opportunity for imperial progeny to marry. From Hakuseki's perspective, it evoked other connotations as well. It reenacted one of the stages of the process whereby Yao selected Shun as his successor. According to legend, having settled upon Shun as the optimal candidate to rule the realm, Yao put him to one final test: He married his own daughters to Shun.²¹ Thus, the transfer of legitimacy from Yao to Shun also took the form of the passage of sovereign authority from father-in-law to son-in-law. We have seen that in *Koshitsū*, in his account of the relationship between the "Ten dynasty" descended from Amenominakanushi

no mikoto and the "Koku dynasty" descended from Kuninotokotachi no mikoto, Hakuseki developed a similar interpretation. Takamimusubi no kami, representing the reigning Ten dynasty, married his daughter to the son of Amaterasu ōmikami, representing the emergent Koku dynasty, and transferred his sovereign authority to the children of the Koku dynasty, Nighayahashi and Ninigi. Interpreted against this theoretical background, the betrothal of Yaso no miya to Ietsugu could be taken as visible evidence of the court's willingness to yield its authority to the figure who had shown himself most worthy of exercising it.

Whether the other key figures involved interpreted the betrothal of Yaso no miya and Ietsugu in this manner is another question. It is likely that the *rōjū* saw its significance as lying in a quite different direction. Presumably they regarded it primarily as a means of borrowing the prestige of the court to shore up bakufu authority during the reign of a minor. However, that Hakuseki hoped to endow the betrothal with the connotations of a Yao-like yielding of sovereignty is clear from the fact that he submitted *Koshitsū* to the bakufu shortly thereafter. Not only did the timing of the submission suggest a desire to point out the parallel between his own, highly original interpretation of the events of *kamiyo* and the impending marriage between Yaso no miya and Ietsugu; the very terminology he employed to identify the two archaic dynasties conveyed the same message. The *Ten* dynasty's yielding of authority to the *Koku* dynasty foreshadowed nothing other than the envisioned contemporary yielding of authority by the *tenno* to the *kokuō*.²²

OBSTACLES

Hakuseki's endeavor to invoke the idea of a voluntary yielding of sovereign authority from the court to the bakufu to justify shogunal assumption of a more monarchal role was both bold and ingenious. Inevitably, however, it foundered in the face of various insurmountable obstacles. On the one hand, his own concern to enhance shogunal autonomy undermined the consistency of his effort to present the shogun as deferring Shun-like to the court. Similarly, his fundamentally negative view of the history of court rule introduced ambiguous overtones into his attempt to cast the *tenno* and the Konoe in the role of Yao. On the other

hand, the unwillingness of the court to cooperate in any fundamental way with his strategy doomed his efforts to obtain some tangible indication of the court's voluntary transfer of sovereign authority to the bakufu.

THE CONFLICT BETWEEN DEFERENCE TO THE COURT AND THE ASSERTION OF SHOGUNAL SOVEREIGNTY. Hakuseki succinctly delineated the tension between the call for shogunal reverence towards the court and the drive to establish shogunal sovereignty in his comments on a poem in which his disciple, Dohi Motonari, used explicitly imperial terminology to describe the bakufu:

You openly refer to the Kanto as the Han court. To clarify the moral proprieties (*meibun*) is the function of the *jusha*, and to use such terms without care will not do. Although I have long utilized such terms, I always have employed them allusively or in an indirect fashion (*biyu mata wa uwasa no yō ni*). To use them blatantly is not at all proper.²³

In a poem it might have been possible to manifest, in an allusive fashion, the shogun's status as a monarch recognized by heaven while simultaneously avoiding the appearance of a presumptuous encroachment on the prerogatives retained by the court. In the realm of politics, however, it was virtually impossible to reconcile these two ends. Inevitably, Hakuseki's dominant concern to enlarge the autonomous authority of the shogun reduced the effectiveness of his concurrent efforts to show the shogun as respectful of the court.

For one thing, to sustain the momentum of his attack on the validity of the tradition of bifurcated authority, he had to take care not to let signs of respect for the court turn into affirmation of its residual sovereignty. That danger militated against pursuit of what otherwise would have been logical opportunities for demonstration of shogunal reverence towards the court. For instance, Tsunayoshi had sponsored the revival of the *daijōsai* on the occasion of the accession of Higashiyama in 1687 and shogun from Yoshimune on were to continue that practice. On the occasion of the accession of Nakamikado in 1710, however, no *daijōsai* was held.

Similarly, in 1716, shortly after the betrothal of Ietsugu to the daughter

of the former tenno, Reigen, Hakuseki advised against granting Reigen's request to send out a nationwide decree (*inzen*) calling for subscriptions to complete the rebuilding of Tōdaiji, an enterprise begun during the reign of Tsunayoshi. The issuance of a nationwide *inzen* by the former tenno would have been a clear expression of imperial sovereignty. Obviously seeking to forestall such a consequence, Hakuseki put together various arguments to counter those submitted by the court in support of Reigen's request.

The court had argued that precedents for the former tenno's plan existed in the *inzen* calling for subscriptions to rebuild Tōdaiji issued by the retired Goshirakawa Tenno in 1181 and in similar edicts (*rinji*) issued by Ōgimachi Tenno in 1568 and 1570. Hakuseki, passing over in silence the *rinji* issued by Ōgimachi, a reigning rather than retired tenno, argued that there was no precedent for a retired tenno to issue directly an edict of this nature. Distorting the circumstances of the call for subscriptions in 1181, when Kamakura had hardly established a nationwide political competence, Hakuseki asserted that Goshirakawa had not issued on his own authority an *inzen* calling for contributions; rather, he argued, the retired tenno had directed Kamakura to promulgate orders to that effect.²⁴ Moreover, he pointed out, the call for contributions made during Tsunayoshi's reign had been sponsored by the bakufu, not the court. Adding that financial exigency had made it difficult for many daimyo to respond to this most recent campaign, Hakuseki suggested that the retired tenno should be informed privately of these considerations and his attention drawn to the danger that, should "an *inzen* now be issued [for further contributions] to complete the work on the corridor and such, and should there be provinces that do not respond, it might appear that imperial orders are being ignored." In the face of this counter-pressure Reigen withdrew his request.²⁵ Clearly, in this instance Hakuseki saw the need to consolidate and sustain the monarchal authority of the shogun as taking precedence over a show of respect for the very figure who was being asked to play the role of Yao.

The concern to maintain shogunal sovereignty not only checked possibilities for showing shogunal reverence for the tenno; it also colored what otherwise might be seen as signs of deference towards the court. For instance, in 1711 the bakufu "rectified" the names used for the lands

set aside for support of the tenno and retired tenno. In place of the terms “imperial domain” (*kinri goryō*) and “domain of the retired tenno” (*sento goryō*) it adopted the more indirect geographic designation “Yamashina fields” (*Yamashina goryō*) and “Toba fields” (*Toba goryō*).²⁶ The following year, the bakufu changed the title of the response of the shogun to a message from the tenno from “imperial reply” (*chokutō*) to simply “reply” (*gohentō*).

Kurita Mototsugu characterized these changes as indicative of respect for the court. The first, he pointed out, reduced the implication that the tenno held a fief from the shogun in the same manner as a Tokugawa vassal, while the second did away with a possible infringement on a term proper to the tenno, as *chokutō* could mean “reply by the tenno” as well as “reply to the tenno.”²⁷ At the same time, however, the changes deleted words that imputed a residual sovereignty to the court. By affirming explicitly neither the sovereign authority of the court nor the subordinate position of the shogun, the new terms neutralized that relationship, so to speak. In this sense, they were faithful to the nuances of Hakuseki’s advice to Dohi Motonari, which allowed that it was appropriate to refer to the bakufu in imperial terms, as long as one did so in an allusive or indirect fashion. They also were of a piece with the omission of the *daijōsai* on the occasion of Nakamikado’s accession and the forestalling of Reigen’s issuance of a nationwide *inzen*.

The concern to assert shogunal sovereignty also resounded as a counterpoint to the call for a demonstration of respect for the court in Hakuseki’s recommendation that the shogun enlarge the opportunity for imperial offspring to marry. Viewed from one perspective, the major consequence of Hakuseki’s recommendation—the establishment of a new imperial cadet house—constituted an act of deference towards the court. Seen from another, however, it was fully consistent with his underlying view of the court as a former dynasty no longer endowed with sovereign authority, a view that he alluded to in this memorial by identifying the court as an extension of the northern line, “which, having been established for the benefit of the *buke*, has shared the same fortunes and misfortunes as the *buke* rulers.”²⁸

The primary argument Hakuseki developed to justify the creation of a new cadet house was, in fact, geared to his view of the shogun as

properly the heir to the authority of the tenno. Heaven's approval of Ieyasu's enterprise had been reflected, Hakuseki declared, in the abundance of his progeny. In the following generations, however, such evidence of heaven's favor had declined steadily, until, by Ienobu's reign, one hundred years after Ieyasu, the natural succession from father to son had been interrupted twice in a row. This worrisome circumstance, he suggested, was connected to the unnatural restriction on the potential of the imperial house to perpetuate itself. "If the descendants of the Heavenly Ancestor (Tenso) of this country are in such straits, how can one hope for the eternal prosperity of the descendants of the Divine Ancestor (Shinso) of this house?" To ensure the continuation of the shogunal line it was essential to secure as well the possibility for the imperial line to continue itself. "At this time what is most essential to cause heaven to regret these misfortunes and to renew its mandate is to carry on the virtuous enterprise of the founder," who "in coming to rule the realm [had] supplied the neglected needs of the court and revived what had been abandoned."²⁹

In making this argument, Hakuseki implicitly referred to the ancient Chinese belief that heaven would punish one who, by exterminating another lineage, prevented the continuation of that lineage's ancestral rites. To forestall such an eventuality, the founders of the Shang and the Zhou dynasties had enfeoffed descendants of the previous ruling line, thereby ensuring the preservation of their predecessors' lineages and the continuation of their rites. Considered against this background, Hakuseki's call for the establishment of a new imperial cadet house carried similar implications. It connoted an act of virtue towards the "former" dynasty by the present recipient of the mandate.³⁰ That connotation was reinforced by the fact that the new cadet house was established for the brother of Nakamikado, the tenno for whom the *daijōsai* was not held, and by the circumstance that, at the bakufu's insistence, Higashiyama Tenno, the father of both Nakamikado and the founder of the new cadet house, had postponed his abdication until after the investiture of Ienobu as shogun.³¹ Embedded in that sequence of events was yet another scenario for the termination of the imperial line as the legitimate dynasty and the transfer of sovereign authority to the bakufu.

In this scenario, Higashiyama represented the last legitimate monarch

of the imperial line, the “lord” of Ienobu at the time of the latter’s succession. Higashiyama’s investiture of Ienobu and abdication shortly thereafter manifested his recognition of Ienobu as the figure sanctioned by heaven to rule the realm, while the omission of the *daijōsai* for his son and successor, Nakamikado, confirmed that Higashiyama’s line no longer should exercise sovereign authority. However, evidencing the virtue that made him worthy of heaven’s trust, Ienobu, in the same manner as King Tang of the Shang and King Wu of the Zhou, enfeoffed a junior member of that line so as to ensure the continuation of its ancestral rites.³²

MUTUAL ANTAGONISMS. The innate contradictions between Hakuseki’s strategies for challenging the tradition of bifurcated sovereignty and his efforts to demonstrate shogunal reverence for the court posed one critical stumbling block in his attempt to use the idea of a voluntary yielding of authority by the court to justify shogunal assumption of a more monarchal role. Equally fatal were the mutual antagonisms that underlay the appearance of his cooperation with representatives of the court. On one side, Hakuseki’s efforts to cultivate the Konoe were shadowed by his fundamentally negative view of the history of court rule. As he put it starkly in *Tokushi yoron*:

From the middle ages on, those who, knowing the meaning of virtue and righteousness, in times of disorder have striven to serve [the ruler] unto death have all been warriors. By contrast, there are those who, when things have quieted down a little, have lived in comfort with high rank and fat stipends and have regarded warriors as if they were slaves or rabble, but who, when the world has fallen into turmoil, have held their heads and scurried around like rats trying to hide, showing no concern at all to exert themselves on behalf of the ruler. They have all been *kuge* or clergy. Truly, it is these people who should be termed the pestilence of the realm. However, since it is the principle of the way of heaven that it will turn to those who act meritoriously on heaven’s behalf, one may conclude that there is good reason why, in later ages, the *buke* came to rule the realm.³³

Hakuseki made clear that the Konoe were not to be exempted from such a sorry heritage. Discussing the behavior of the nobility at the time of the division of the northern and southern courts, he noted that there were a few who, “knowing the meaning of loyalty and righteousness,”

refused to serve the northern court and went south to Yoshino. Among these, he singled out for special attention the *kanpaku* Konoe Tsunetada. To do so, he had to draw from limited and somewhat problematic source material, and it appears that his main motive was not so much to acclaim Tsunetada as it was to set up a contrast unfavorable to Tsunetada's cousin, Konoe Mototsugu, whom the northern court designated as *kanpaku* and who, Hakuseki noted pointedly, was "the ancestor of the present Lord Konoe."³⁴ This underlying perspective on the court nobility could not but inject tension and a calculating note into his efforts to establish a cooperative relationship with the Konoe.

The attitude of the Konoe towards Hakuseki and his plans was equally complex. While Motohiro described Hakuseki as "regrettably sharp-edged" for a Confucian, he also acknowledged Hakuseki's intellectual and literary ability and the fact that the demonstration of this ability in dealings with the Korean embassy had kept "the barbarian guests" from "ridiculing" Japan.³⁵ Similarly, the Konoe could find various reasons for cooperating to some extent with Hakuseki's plans to turn Edo into the court of a king. From their perspective as nobles, bakufu adoption of the *rei* of Kyoto constituted a desirable recognition of the superior value of court culture. On a more practical level, as Kurita Mototsugu pointed out, the link with the shogun was of personal advantage to the Konoe in the context of Kyoto court politics.³⁶ However, at bottom, as Tsuji Tatsuya has argued, the Konoe view of the relationship between the court and the bakufu remained the same as that expressed by Motohiro in 1679 on the occasion of his daughter's betrothal to Ienobu, at that time lord of Kōfu.³⁷

In 1679, ironically describing his "delight" at the "good fortune" of his house, Motohiro noted in his diary that once before the bakufu had requested that he give his daughter in marriage to a Tokugawa scion. At that time, true to an ancestral testament warning against marital alliances with the *buke*, he had put aside the reality that the physical survival of the nobility depended on economic support from the bakufu and had held firm against the request. This time, he had thought to do the same, but the *buke* "pressed their demand so importunately that there was no help for it but to accept the situation and express my great joy over this arrangement that I did not desire at all."³⁸

Between 1709 and 1716, Motohiro similarly, if somewhat less openly, recorded opposition to many of the developments Hakuseki hoped would convey a voluntary yielding of authority by the court to the bakufu. Thus, Motohiro described as “most regrettable” his failure to persuade the bakufu to reconsider its demand that Higashiyama Tenno postpone his abdication until after Ienobu’s investiture. Likewise he decried the betrothal of Yaso no miya to Ietsugu as an indication that “the day for decline of the court has come.”³⁹ In both these cases, the bakufu had its way, regardless of noble objections. Motohiro did hold out successfully, however, against a proposition by Hakuseki that, had it been realized, would have constituted a clear recognition by the court of the shogun’s monarchal authority—the formal grant of the title of king to the shogun by the tenno.

When, in the 4th month of 1710, Hakuseki submitted a memorial recommending that the shogun adopt the title of *kokūō* on the occasion of the forthcoming Korean embassy, he suggested that it would be desirable to have the tenno officially approve shogunal use of that title:

As [the bakufu during the reign of Iemitsu] changed the established style of communication between the two countries because it was said that use of the title of king infringed on the prerogatives of the court, it may not be easy for the shogun now to use on his own initiative that title as was done during the reigns of the Muromachi shogun and at the time of Hideyoshi. Should that be the case, perhaps it would be best to explain these matters in detail to the court and, whether, as was the standard practice in generations past, the shogun uses the title king in relations with foreign countries, or whether he is granted a special new title, seek the sanction of the tenno.⁴⁰

To be sure, Hakuseki admitted, people might object that there was no precedent for the tenno to grant the title of *ō* to someone not of the imperial lineage. Enlisting his polemical skills, Hakuseki advanced two arguments to counter that problem. One was that sometimes it was necessary to create a new precedent. The other was that, in antiquity, following the reign of Jingū, the tenno had, in fact, granted the rulers of the Korean states their titles as king:

Among the rulers of the kingdoms of the Korean peninsula, there was not one who did not receive his title as king (*hōshaku*) from this court. People may argue that this instance involved principalities across the seas and, thus, that it

cannot serve as a precedent for the granting of the title of king within this country. However, it is commonly held that there are no outer limits to the king's jurisdiction. Consequently, regarding the extent of the king's authority, no differentiation should be made as to the nearness or farness of the territory of the recipient or as to whether it is within or beyond the seas. "Where is the land that is not the king's land, subjects who are not the king's subjects?" To quibble over whether the territory involved is within or beyond the seas and hold that these instances cannot readily serve as precedents for [the tenno appointing the shogun as king of] Japan—such objections cannot be termed convincing. Moreover, is it not difficult to say that in all instances in the past ancient precedent alone was observed? There are not a few instances when, in accordance with the time and the situation, a new precedent was established.⁴¹

Hakuseki provided a copy of this proposal to the Konoe, and he also discussed it with Motohiro at the end of the 5th month. Had he been able to persuade Motohiro of its validity and had Motohiro in turn convinced the court to adopt Hakuseki's idea, it would have accomplished more than simply smoothing shogunal adoption of the title of king in relations with Korea. As explicit evidence of the tenno's "yielding" of his authority to the shogun, it also would have contributed to resolving the tensions in the relationship between the two brought to the fore by Hakuseki's efforts to enhance the shogun's sovereignty.

Motohiro, however, as his diary testifies, was not prepared to cooperate with this particular plan. Describing Hakuseki's call on him on 1710/5/28, he wrote, "Arai Kageyu [Hakuseki] came and talked from 10:00 AM to 2:00 PM. He . . . discussed matters pertaining to the court and *buke*; also he brought copies of the official missives [exchanged with] Korea and held forth about them endlessly. How tiresome (*taikutsu tai-kutsu!*)!"⁴² In the end, the issue was dropped, and Ienobu used the title of king of Japan without the court's sanctioning that act. Reflecting that denouement, some years later, in seeking to justify shogunal use of the title of king on the occasion of the embassy, Hakuseki argued precisely the reverse of what he had in his 1710 memorial. Declaring that there was no problem with the shogun's "referring to himself as king without formal award of that title by the tenno," Hakuseki turned around his earlier assertion about the tenno's having granted the Korean rulers of antiquity their titles as kings:

In antiquity, when the states of the Korean peninsula were in a tributary relationship (*shinzoku*) to our court, all the rulers of those states, no matter how small, referred to themselves as kings. However, there is no evidence that these kings adopted their titles as such only after receiving them from this court.⁴³

In reversing his argument, Hakuseki tacitly acknowledged the failure of his idea for a “voluntary yielding” by the tenno. That failure likewise meant that ultimately there was no way out of the contradictions posed by Hakuseki’s attempt to apply the Confucian theory of kingship to the Japanese situation. On the one hand, Confucian insistence on the all-encompassing nature of the authority of the king prevented Hakuseki from pursuing the most “practical” solution to the relationship between the tenno and the shogun—a division of spheres of authority. On the other, in the absence of definitive evidence of a transfer of sovereignty from the tenno to the shogun, the notion of “voluntary yielding” could not justify effectively the consolidation of kingly authority in the person of the shogun. To the contrary, the contradiction between the need to demonstrate shogunal reverence for the tenno so as to prepare the ground for a voluntary yielding of sovereignty and the attempt to transform the shogun into a more monarchal figure inevitably cast a cloud over the propriety of the latter enterprise.

CONFRONTATION WITH THE CENTER

If the innate delicacy of the king’s relations with the preceding dynasty posed a major obstacle to successful resolution of the relationship between the shogun and the tenno, the dual connotations of the title of king further complicated that task. As noted in Chapter 8, the title of king (*wang*, 王) carried two quite different implications in the East Asian political tradition. Originally, during the Shang and Zhou dynasties, it was the title used by the monarch. In that context, it conveyed the image of an autonomous sovereign ruling over the feudal lords and subordinate only to heaven.

From the late Zhou on, however, when various contenders for power began to claim simultaneously the title of king, other associations came to overlay its original meaning. The devaluation of the title of king led

the founders of the Qin and Han dynasties to adopt a new, more grandiose title, that of *huangdi* (J.: *kōtei*; emperor). Having reserved the title of *huangdi* for themselves, the rulers of the post-Qin dynasties proceeded to use that of *wang* for princes of the blood whom they enfeoffed within China and for rulers of states on the periphery of China. As "kings," domestic princes explicitly assumed a relationship of vassalage to the emperor. Foreign kings, likewise, insofar as they entered into official relations with China, were expected to acknowledge the superior status of the Chinese emperor and, ideally, to offer tribute to him as a vassal. Thus, contrary to earlier usage, the title of king came to signify not an autonomous ruler but one whose authority over his own territory was underwritten by his incorporation into a single, universal hierarchy centering around the Chinese *huangdi*.

Hakuseki's underlying purpose, as we have stressed, was to do away with the tradition of bifurcated sovereignty and to make the shogun a national monarch exercising a comprehensive, autonomous authority. Nevertheless, however strong his commitment to the vision of the shogun as a monarch, he could not claim that the shogun should assume the title of *tenno*, the Japanese equivalent of the Chinese *huangdi*. The prevalence of the assumption that only members of the imperial line could become *tenno* and the necessity to avoid overt usurpation of prerogatives proper to the *tenno* house made such a move unfeasible. Instead, Hakuseki turned to the title of king, the title sanctioned by the classics, as the most authentic indicator of monarchical status. In calling upon the shogun to assume this title he clearly had in mind its original rather than post-Zhou meaning. The sense in which he wished to use the term was well illustrated by his citation of the statement from the classics concerning the limitless extent of the king's authority. Regardless of Hakuseki's intentions, however, the post-Zhou implications of subordination to the Chinese *huangdi* clung stubbornly to the title of *kokūō*. The major precedent for the shogun's terming himself a king was the example of Ashikaga Yoshimitsu, who had done so in the context of formal acceptance of a tributary relationship with the Ming dynasty. The immediate justification for "restoration" of the title, that it was necessary so as to establish parity between the shogun and the Korean king, also implied that shogunal adoption of the title of king might

entail acceptance of a position of subordination to China, since one defining attribute of the Korean ruler's status as king was that he traditionally pledged fealty to the Chinese *huangdi*.

The combination of these factors, together with the fact that acceptance of subordination to China, even in an abstract sense, was incompatible with his effort to enhance the shogun's authority as an autonomous monarch, strongly motivated Hakuseki to eliminate the post-Zhou connotations clinging to the title of *kokūō*. In attempting to do so, he necessarily had to confront as well some of the underlying premises of Chinese Confucian political theory. Most particularly, he had to come to terms with the assumption, basic to the standard notion of the *huangdi-wang* relationship, of a single universal hierarchy focused around China as the homeland of the sages and the source of civilization. Hakuseki attempted in various ways to counter this assumption. Internal contradictions in his efforts in this direction kept him from developing a fully articulated critique of the Sinocentric elements in Confucian political theory. Nevertheless, to delineate the nature of the problems encountered by Hakuseki in his endeavor to transform the shogun into a king, it will be useful to probe two of the strategies he used to neutralize the Sinocentric dimensions of the Confucian concept of rulership. One strategy was to deny that there could be only one overarching hierarchy in the universe. The other was to affirm the idea of a single hierarchy, while simultaneously asserting that, judged according to Confucian values, Japan could better claim to constitute the center of that hierarchy than could contemporary China.

Each approach offered a means of challenging the Sinocentric shadow falling on the title of king. However, each also had a fundamental defect. Neither could be pursued to any extent without compromising Hakuseki's underlying purpose, the establishment of the shogun as an autonomous monarch exercising a comprehensive authority over the realm. Carried too far, the denial of a sole Sinocentric hierarchy would undermine the major support for Hakuseki's effort to transform the shogun into a king—insistence on the universal validity of the Chinese Confucian premises of kingship. On the other hand, insofar as he held to the notion that the shogun as king was the national ruler of Japan, Hakuseki could not plausibly develop the argument that Japan rather than

China should be regarded as the contemporary center of one universal order. To counter the place of the Chinese *huangdi* as head of a transnational political hierarchy composed of kings, it was necessary to introduce a figure of comparable stature, the *tenno*. That action, however, inevitably complicated yet further the attempt to resolve the relationship between the *tenno* and the shogun within the domestic political context.

Considered objectively, these contradictions were irreconcilable. Pursuit of one end necessarily thwarted achievement of another. As a consequence, the attempt to transform the shogun into a king while simultaneously denying Japan's subordination to China took on the character of an effort to find a way out of a maze with no exit. That circumstance had obvious implications for the fate of Hakuseki's enterprise. At the same time, it also raised significant questions about the fate of Confucianism as a coherent, integrated system of ideas in the Tokugawa context.

APPEAL TO PLURALISM. Insofar as Hakuseki wished the shogun's adoption of the title of king to manifest his status as an autonomous national monarch, he had to do away with the common notion of the "king" as occupying a specific, subordinate niche in a political hierarchy centering on China. One way to accomplish this end was to counter the premise of a Sinocentric political hierarchy with an alternative image of a pluralistic world order composed of multiple, autonomous states. Hakuseki tried in various ways to develop such an image. On the most fundamental level, he argued against the proposition, closely bound up with the idea of a Sinocentric political order, that China, as the sole homeland of the sages and source of civilization, was superior to all other countries. In *Koshitsū*, for instance, before setting forth his analysis of the *kamiyo* myths, Hakuseki took explicit issue with that proposition. Paraphrasing a remark attributed to the sage-ruler Tang in the *Book of History*, he declared, "For great heaven endows all its people with its essence," and continued: "Where is the place that a sage cannot be born? How could it be that it was only in the so-called 'flowery kingdom' that sages were born?"⁴⁴ His subsequent depiction of the *kami* appearing in the *Kujiki*, *Kojiki*, and *Nihon shoki* as sages comparable to the early rulers of China rested on the assumption that sages had been born in Japan as well.

The existence of sages in Japan meant that there was no basis for regarding China as superior; the two countries constituted, in effect, equally sovereign entities. Consequently, Hakuseki argued, there was no reason for Japanese to adopt the Chinese custom of referring to China by terms such as “flowery” (*hua*; J.: *ka* [i.e., “civilized”]) or “central” (*zhong*; J.: *chū*), which implied that China stood above other countries. “Everywhere,” he wrote,

people, as private individuals, regard their own country as the noblest among nations. There is nothing wrong with manifesting such a view to others as one's own perspective. There is nothing wrong with the people of China from the Three Dynasties down through the Han and Tang referring to their own country as “flowery” and others as barbaric. Likewise, as the mirror image of this practice, people of our country from antiquity have termed our country as heaven and other countries as barbaric. Such, too, may be justified as a manifestation to others of one's own perspective. However, for us to adopt the viewpoint of those who regard us as barbarians and themselves as civilized is to turn against the Way of the Sages of antiquity.⁴⁵

In line with such reasoning, Hakuseki almost never referred to China as Chūgoku (Ch.: Zhongguo; “the central kingdom”). Instead he used a dynasty name or a neutral term such as “the foreign court” (*ichō*) or “the other country” (*kano kuni*). Where he found use of a Sinocentric term more or less unavoidable, he took care to make clear that the term reflected a Chinese rather than universal perspective. For instance, in *Ryūkyūkoku jiryaku*, a brief history of the Ryukyu Islands, where he paraphrased the accounts of Chinese relations with the Ryukyus contained in the Chinese dynastic histories, he referred to China as Chūgoku; but, at the first appearance of the term, he also noted parenthetically, “What the [Chinese] records call ‘Chūgoku’ refers to ‘Shina.’”⁴⁶

The assertion that Japan and China were equal in their sovereign status also made it possible to declare that the shogun, the “king,” as the ruler of Japan, should stand properly in an autonomous position relative to the ruler of China. Just as he drew support from the words of Tang for a pluralistic view of sagehood, Hakuseki attempted to justify such a conclusion by the polemic strategy of attributing it to the Chinese themselves. Thus, he argued that the Chinese did not apply the term *wang* only to those rulers who offered fealty to the Chinese emperor. They

also used it as a generic title “for the heads (*kunchō*) of foreign countries. . . . Because *wang* has the meaning of ruler (*jun*; J.: *kun*), the one who acts as ruler of a country is referred to [by the Chinese] as *wang*.⁴⁷

Through such arguments, Hakuseki sought to break down the connotations of a subordinate relationship to China associated with the title of king. Inevitably, however, this effort brought him into confrontation with a number of problems. On the immediate level, there was the difficulty that Chinese tradition hardly offered support for the view of the king that Hakuseki attempted to derive from it. While the Chinese might identify as kings rulers of states who did not explicitly accept enfeoffment by the Chinese *huangdi*, they took it for granted that such rulers could only establish their monarchal authority on an authentic basis by entering into a relationship of fealty with the *huangdi*. A ruler who termed himself a king might be assumed, by extension, to be seeking the recognition of his status provided most authentically by a tributary relationship with China.

The difficulty Hakuseki faced in doing away with this assumption is readily visible in his attempt to rebut the criticism expressed by Zuikei (the Muromachi priestly chronicler of Japan's relations with other countries) of Yoshimitsu's adoption of the title of king. Zuikei had allowed that for the Chinese “to address the leader (*shōsō*) of our country as king is an indication of respect and not necessarily to be reviled.” However, he asserted, for that leader to term himself a king indicated a readiness to accept enfeoffment by China.⁴⁸ Unable to counter this point, which was consistent with the attitude towards the title of king taken by Hideyoshi and the first Tokugawa shogun, Hakuseki could only try to finesse it. Thus, in his discussion of Zuikei's objection to Yoshimitsu's use of the title of king, Hakuseki attempted to blur the priest's careful distinction between terming oneself and accepting address of oneself as king; Zuikei, he declared “had not substantiated his statement that to be called *kokūō* (*kokūō* to *shōseraruru koto*) is to accept enfeoffment by [China].”⁴⁹ The rhetorical dissimulation was, in effect, an admission that he could not find a convincing answer to the priest's argument.

The paucity of supporting evidence was not the only, or even the most significant, problem with using a pluralistic argument to counter the Sinocentric implications surrounding the title of king. Embedded

within such an argument were presumptions that, if made explicit, would subvert the foundations of the effort to transform the shogun into a king. That effort rested, as we have seen, on the call for unswerving adherence to the Confucian principles of kingship. Hakuseki endeavored to find in Japanese history evidence of patterns that would affirm the validity of those principles and thus his attempt to apply them to the contemporary political situation. But, for all the ingenuity of his polemic efforts, Hakuseki could hardly recast Japanese history into the desired mold without referring to the example of Chinese legend and history. He acknowledged as much in his somewhat rueful appraisal in *Koshitsū* of the character of Amaterasu. “The people of our eastern region,” he noted,

have revered the *kami* of the sun together with heaven and the solar orb with undiminished fervor for hundreds of generations. However, perhaps because her virtue was so great as to be unnameable, from antiquity little has been transmitted about what actions led to her being revered in this way.

The only thing to give a glimpse of Amaterasu’s virtue was the statement in the *Kojiki* that, upon discovering the various polluting acts committed by Susanoo, she sought to make excuses for him. “If, based on her words, one speculates about her heart, it might be termed comparable” to the loving attitude shown by Shun towards his arrogant younger brother.⁵⁰

In effect, Hakuseki recognized, it was only by extrapolating from the example of Shun that it became possible to perceive the qualities befitting Amaterasu’s assigned role as a sage native to Japan.⁵¹ The corollary was that, without such extrapolation, the evidence of Japanese history would yield a quite different set of lessons about the contemporary course proper to the shogun. Given these circumstances, to sustain his insistence on the necessity of adhering to the Confucian principles of kingship, Hakuseki could not pursue too far a pluralistic view of the relationship between China and Japan. In the end, the task of transforming the shogun into a king required acceptance not only of the premise of a universal order but also of the proposition that Chinese patterns of monarchal rule manifested most fully the imperatives of that order.

EVALUATION ACCORDING TO UNIVERSAL PRINCIPLES. Parallel to his pluralistic challenge of the Sinocentrism in the Confucian theory of kingship Hakuseki also tried to counter it by drawing from the universalistic dimensions of the Confucian world view. That is, building from the premise of one universal order, he attempted to show that, evaluated according to the intrinsic standards of the Way, Japan rather than China should be recognized as the contemporary center of that order. To develop this assertion, Hakuseki took issue with two assumptions commonly held to support China's claim to supremacy among nations. One was the geographic idea of China as the physical center of the world. The other was the cultural notion of China as the exemplar of civilization, a society that adhered to the rites. To the former, Hakuseki opposed the cosmological premise that Japan was located closer than any other nation to the point where the phenomena of the universe originated. Against the latter he raised the objection that Japan in many respects had preserved better than China the authentic *rei* of antiquity.

As an argument against Sinocentrism, the universalistic assertion that Japan was more qualified than China to act as the focal point of the contemporary international order had certain advantages over the pluralistic approach. Since it upheld more vigorously the universal validity of the structure of the Confucian world view, it was potentially a more effective weapon in circumstances, such as negotiations with the Koreans, where Confucian notions of the relationship between peoples were taken for granted. Likewise, considered from one angle at least, it fit better with Hakuseki's call for realization of the Confucian vision of the king within the context of contemporary politics. From another perspective, however, the universalistic argument simultaneously made it more difficult for Hakuseki to accomplish his fundamental purpose: establishment of the shogun as the uncontested claimant to the title of national monarch. Given the longstanding East Asian premise of a hierarchy of rulers in which the Chinese *huangdi*, as a universal ruler, stood a level above those national rulers who adopted the title of king, the shogun—the *kokujō*—was not a plausible candidate to succeed to the symbolic position hitherto occupied by the *huangdi*. Insofar as Hakuseki sought to develop in the international arena the assertion that Japan should replace China as the focus of the contemporary world order, he

necessarily had to introduce the figure of the tenno as a counterpart to the *huangdi*. But this argument, necessitated by the exigencies of the international arena, could not but undermine his concurrent effort to resolve the anomalies of the domestic tradition of bifurcated sovereignty in favor of the shogun.

As with other of his efforts to counter the premises of Sinocentrism, Hakuseki sought evidence from within the body of Confucian writings for his cosmological challenge of China's place as the center of the world. Thus, for instance, to enhance the position of Japan relative to China, he made the most of the positive association in Chinese cosmology between the east, the rising sun, and the beginnings of things. Hakuseki noted that Japan's location as the "easternmost country of the east" put it at the point "where yin and yang and day and night divide . . . making it first among the myriad nations." To substantiate the latter claim he quoted the commentary on the first character of the first hexagram in the *Book of Changes* to the effect that all things are in the highest state of good in their beginnings.⁵² In the same vein, he noted that the *Book of History* described Yao as "commanding the second brother Xi to reside at Yuyi, in what was called the bright valley, and there respectfully to receive as a guest the rising sun." This passage, he argued, indicated that Yao and Shun, in insuring that proper respect be awarded to the geographic points of the compass, had been aware of Japan's existence and had associated it with the rising sun.⁵³

Hakuseki further reinforced this argument by seeking support for it from outside the East Asian tradition. For instance, he noted that he had confirmed Japan's easternmost position on a map of the world shown him by the Dutch on the occasion of their annual visit to Edo.⁵⁴ Similarly, he quoted the Italian priest Sidotti as expressing a view of the relationship between nations that greatly resembled his own. "Our country is isolated far to the east and is very small. . . . I cannot fathom your purpose in coming here," Hakuseki recorded himself as having said to Sidotti. To which, he asserted, the priest replied:

"You should not say that this country is isolated in the east or that it is small. The worth of a country should not be seen as depending on its size or whether its location is near or far. Among the myriad nations, none is so large in size as Tartary or Turkey. However, the inhabitants of those countries are not to

be valued even as highly as beasts. If the people of the countries of Europe were not transformed by our teachings, they, too, would be no different from the populace of Tartary and Turkey. The area of our Rome is no more than eighteen *ri*. However, since it is the place where our teachings are established, there is none among the nations of the west and south that does not revere it. One may liken this situation to the head, although small, being at the top of the four extremities.”

Sidotti’s description of the position of Rome relative to “the nations of the west and south” could be extrapolated to the relationship between Japan and the nations to *her* west and south envisioned by Hakuseki. The continuation of Hakuseki’s version of Sidotti’s remarks suggests that such a coincidence was not accidental:

“Moreover, if one observes various things, there is none which is not in the highest state of good in its beginning. The *ki* of heaven and earth, the movement of the years and days, the production of the ten thousand things—there is none of these which does not start from the east. Among the various nations, not a single one lies farther east than this one. Thus, to show that this land is superior to all others, I need not elaborate at length.”

According to his account of their discussion, Hakuseki, by playing the devil’s advocate, further confirmed Sidotti’s dismissal of the value of “centrality” as opposed to “easternness.” “Our country is not the only one in the east,” he recorded himself as having demurred. ““Chiina” also lies in the east, and the literature and imperial proclamations of that country have from antiquity termed it “the central land.” What about that country?” To this, he wrote, Sidotti answered:

“The people of this country give the impression of something round, the people of ‘Chiina’ give the impression of something square. The people of this land are warm and gentle like this”—and he took his robe in his hand. Then, rubbing his chair, he went on, “The rigidity and sharpness of the Chinese is like this. One should not look down upon what is close and revere what is far.”⁵⁵

While countering the value of “centrality” with that of “easternness,” Hakuseki further sought to establish Japan’s credentials as the focal point of the hierarchy among nations by marshaling evidence to show

that, despite China's claim to exemplify civilization, many of the authentic rites of antiquity had been preserved better in Japan than in China. Even in antiquity, he asserted, people in China had recognized Japan for maintaining rites that had become lost in the decadent later days of the Zhou. For instance, he noted, the *Book of Rites*, the editing of which was attributed to Confucius, praised the admirable qualities of the mourning rites performed by two scions of the eastern barbarians. Given such praise, he continued, it was possible that Confucius had considered leaving China for Japan. "I have had occasion to wonder if Confucius did not indeed have our country in mind in saying [as quoted in the *Analects*] that he wanted to dwell among the nine barbarians or that he wanted to get on a raft and float out to sea."⁵⁶

Similarly, on a number of occasions, he cited the early Tang scholar Lu Deming (556–627) as having noted Japan's maintenance of a ritual practice that had disappeared in China. In his commentary on the *Zhouli*, Lu had remarked that the custom of the Japanese of clapping their hands while bowing corresponded to the interpretation given by the Later Han commentator Zheng Xuan (127–200) of one of the types of bow listed in the *Zhouli*, and "probably preserves the ancient practice." On the occasion of Ienobu's visit in 1710 to the shrine of Confucius at Yushima, Hakuseki instructed the shogun how to bow in the manner described by Lu. On the same occasion, asserting that the Japanese *eboshi* retained the style of cap found in the Zhou period and that the court dress of the ancient kings had been square-collared, the round-collared style of later centuries reflecting barbarian influence, Hakuseki also directed that Ienobu should wear *eboshi* and the square-collared *hitatare* instead of *kanmuri* and the round-collared *sokutai*.⁵⁷

Hakuseki did not stress Japan's preservation of civil *rei* only. Reflecting his basic position that the true Way of the Sages entailed a combination of civil and martial virtues, he also emphasized the maintenance in Japan of archaic martial *rei*. For instance, as he noted in a work on Japanese armor, in China knowledge of the authentic forms of weapons and armor had been lost following the destruction of the Zhou feudal order by the Qin. By contrast, various archaic martial artifacts had survived in Japan.⁵⁸

Considered in the light of the Chinese defeat at the hands of the "barbarians of the north," the Manchus, and the shogun's adoption, at Hakuseki's urging, of kingly *rei*, Japan's preservation of the ancient martial forms took on an added significance. It showed that, among East Asian rulers, only the ruler of Japan—the *kokūō*—exemplified the comprehensive civil and military authority characteristic of the Way of the Sages; ergo only Japan could serve properly as the focus of the universal hierarchy founded on the Way. In effect, Hakuseki developed the same argument in the international as in the domestic context: The erstwhile "central" authority having forfeited heaven's trust by its abandonment of the qualities, including martial competence, proper to the ruler, it was incumbent upon those hitherto regarded as "eastern barbarians" to assume the mantle of comprehensive kingship.

DEMONSTRATION OF JAPAN'S ACHIEVEMENTS IN THE WAY. The major opportunity for Hakuseki to counter the Sinocentrism of the East Asian world order through a display of Japanese achievements in the Way was the Korean embassy of 1711. The Koreans, he observed, "humiliated by not being able to match us in military matters, have sought to show themselves superior to us in the civil arts."⁵⁹ Moreover, the Tsushima representatives who dealt directly with the Koreans on behalf of the bakufu tended to talk only about Japan's martial qualities, thereby confirming the Koreans in their appraisal of Japan as backward in the area of the civil arts.⁶⁰ Thus, while his underlying aim was to demonstrate Japan's maintenance of the comprehensive Way of the ancient kings, both in preparing for the embassy and the actual reception of the Koreans in Edo, Hakuseki gave particular attention to the task of demonstrating Japanese mastery of the civil dimensions of kingship. This concern figured in all the preparatory tasks in which Hakuseki involved himself, from the selection of the dishes to be used at the banquet for the envoys to the choice of music to entertain them and of the gift to be sent to the Korean king. For instance, regarding the first, Hakuseki directed that, instead of seeking to impress the Koreans with dishes decorated lavishly in gold, on the occasion of the banquet utensils of unadorned wood and earthenware should be used.

The wooden and earthen vessels used in our country . . . retain the ancient style found in the age of the sages. It is only in our country that such things have been preserved. This is one of the ways in which our country is superior to all others. The Koreans say that theirs is the country of rites, but nothing of such an ancient style remains there today.⁶¹

Likewise, as entertainment for the envoys, he substituted for the customary performance of No one of *gagaku*. While No, in his eyes, represented nothing other than the licentious vulgar music condemned by Confucius and Mencius, *gagaku*, if not a remnant of the music of the sages, preserved a far more ancient mode than anything to be found on the continent. To make the *gagaku* performance possible, Hakuseki imported from Kyoto not only instructors to train the bakufu musicians but also forty court musicians and dancers together with the necessary costumes and props.⁶²

The present prepared for the Korean king, a multi-paneled screen, each panel depicting some outstanding aspect of Japanese history, customs, or scenery, was intended explicitly to portray Japanese accomplishments in the Way. The first panels, illustrative of "sagely virtue," pictured heavenly auguries of the virtue of the sovereign: a white pheasant said to have appeared during the reign of Kōtoku Tenno, and auspiciously patterned clouds that appeared during the reign of Monmu. In his memorandum on the rationale for the choice of pictures, Hakuseki noted that the two tenno combined the civil and martial virtues characteristic of the sage.⁶³ Given his harsh assessment of Kōtoku in *Shigi* as being worse than Qin Shihuangdi, one can only conclude that Hakuseki's concern to show Japanese rulers as impressive by Chinese standards led him to propagate for foreign consumption the standard version of Japanese history that he challenged in the domestic context.

The other panels were designed similarly to demonstrate the achievements of Japanese relative to those of the Chinese. To illustrate "loyalty and filial piety," Hakuseki chose the scene of Taira no Shigemori remonstrating with his father and Kusunoki Masashige instructing his son. Each scene, he noted, illustrated two virtues at once, loyalty and filial piety in the case of Shigemori, and loyalty and compassion in the case of Masashige, "something rare in China as well." Other panels designed to make a favorable contrast with China portrayed Ōe no Masafusa's

composition of a 400-verse poem at Anrakuji ("such a massive work is an achievement unparalleled in China") and Murasaki Shikibu and Sei Shōnagon ("the two were outstanding . . . not only in the way of *waka* but also in their knowledge of Chinese"). And, of three panels illustrating ceremonial and music, Hakuseki remarked, "These pictures of *rei-gaku* are foremost among the things one hopes will be shown to China."⁶⁴

Having gone to such lengths in his preparations for the embassy to impress upon the Koreans Japan's achievements in the civil as well as martial dimensions of the Way, Hakuseki did not neglect to reemphasize that issue during the Koreans' stay in Edo. For their part, the Koreans evidently intended to hold to the practice, criticized by Hakuseki, of emphasizing Japanese martial prowess. Thus, during a written conversation in Chinese conducted with Hakuseki at the banquet given for the envoys at Edo Castle, the Koreans turned the conversation to martial matters. On that initial occasion, Hakuseki replied with an expansive description of the ability of practitioners of the art of the rapid draw (*iai*) to remove the sword so rapidly from its scabbard that "lightening flashes . . . and blood sprays the instant the hand touches the hilt."⁶⁵ But, when the Koreans again brought the discussion around to the subject of Japanese martial skills during a second written conversation a few days later, Hakuseki responded that such repeated references to martial matters made it appear that the Koreans regarded the Japanese as a people who honored only military technique. To the contrary, he continued, what they revered was the combination of martial and civil virtue characteristic of the sages of old.⁶⁶

To emphasize the latter point, the banquet also provided the setting for the performance of *gagaku*. Sitting near the envoys, Hakuseki indicated the provenance of each piece. When one identified as an ancient Korean work was played, he obtained from the envoys the admission that it no longer existed in Korea.⁶⁷ Hakuseki followed up on this discovery in the second conversation where he remarked that he was disappointed to have discovered that the Koreans, despite their claim of descent from the Shang rulers, did not preserve the Shang style of court dress, using instead that of the Ming. By contrast, he declared, various Chinese sources acclaimed Japan's preservation of ancient rites. Mentioning the reference in the *Book of Rites* to the mourning rites of the descendants

of the eastern barbarians and the remarks of Lu Deming, he asserted to the Koreans that, to judge from such evidence, “the five rites of our country are largely the same as the institutions of the Three Dynasties [of ancient China: that is, the Xia, the Shang, and the Zhou].”⁶⁸

CREATION OF A JAPAN-CENTERED HIERARCHY. Hakuseki looked upon the Korean embassy not only as an opportunity to demonstrate Japan’s preservation of authentic *rei*, but also as an occasion to develop the image of a Japan-centered hierarchy of nations. To be sure, Hakuseki’s efforts in this direction were not limited to the Korean embassy. The tally system he proposed as a feature of the 1715 Nagasaki trade regulations was another. The Ming had used tallies to regulate foreign access to Chinese markets in the context of a tributary system. Given that historical background, Hakuseki’s recommendation that a tally system be adopted to control Chinese participation in the Nagasaki trade suggested a parallel attempt to incorporate China in a Japan-centered hierarchical order. His insistence that Japanese—as opposed to Chinese—paper be used for the tallies reinforced the Japanocentric overtones of his recommendations. Hakuseki’s approach to the bakufu’s relations with the Ryukyu Islands carried similar connotations. The Ryukyus engaged simultaneously in tributary relations with China, the bakufu, and the domain of Satsuma. In this circumstance, Hakuseki, building on the cultural and linguistic links between Japan and the Ryukyus, sought to emphasize the Japanocentric dimensions of the relationship between the two. Thus, when, on the occasion of the 1710 embassy which came to congratulate Ienobu on his succession, the Ryukyuans brought a letter from the king in Chinese, Hakuseki urged that they be informed that henceforth “it would be more appropriate to the honor” of Japan if they brought a letter written in Japanese.⁶⁹

But, while Hakuseki sought to develop the image of a Japan-centered international order in contexts such as these, his main efforts in this area were directed towards Korea. As a major tributary of China which, unlike the Ryukyus, had sought consistently to avoid taking a stance of subordination vis-à-vis Japan, Korea could be held to represent the Sino-centric diplomatic order in its fullest form. At the same time, following the Qing conquest of the Ming, the Koreans had endeavored to keep as

much distance as they could from the new rulers of China.⁷⁰ If, building on that trend, Korea could be located symbolically within the framework of a Japanocentric order, it would be prime evidence that Japan had replaced China as the center of the universal constellation of nations.

Reflecting these considerations, in his arrangements for the Korean embassy Hakuseki persistently attempted to maneuver the envoys into playing the role of tributaries to Japan. While he asserted that the aim of his revisions in the protocol for receiving the envoys was to establish parity between the government of the Korean king and that of the shogun, in fact those revisions served to reduce the status of the Korean king and his envoys relative to the shogun and his vassals. The envoys were told to greet and send off the shogun's emissaries at the entrance to the building where they stayed rather than inside it, and, as his emissary to call on the envoys at their quarters in Edo, the shogun sent one of the *kōke* instead of one of the *rōjū*. Whereas, previously, the secretary to the embassy had presented the letter from the king, on this occasion it was stipulated that the ambassador should do so. The seating position of the envoys relative to the shogun on the occasion of their audience with him was reduced from a place comparable to that of the *sanke* to one comparable to that of the *kōke*. And, at the banquet in honor of the embassy, the envoys were seated on the west instead of the more prestigious east, while bakufu officials assumed the role of host in place of the *sanke*.⁷¹

Moreover, in line with his assertion that, in antiquity, "the Korean states (Sankan) were tributaries (*gaihan*) of this court for four hundred some years,"⁷² in his conversations with the Koreans Hakuseki explicitly suggested that, in the contemporary situation, Korea relied upon the presence of Japan to preserve a degree of autonomy in its relations to the Qing. Following up on a discussion of how both the Ryukyuans and the Koreans continued to wear Ming court dress despite the Qing conquest, Hakuseki asserted that it probably was their relationship with Japan that enabled them to resist adopting the emblematic customs of the Qing.

At present, the Qing have established a new dynasty and changed [previous] dynastic practices. Based on their own national customs, they have imposed new regulations on the realm. Your country and the Ryukyus have already assumed a posture of fealty and declared yourselves tributaries of the Qing. Yet the two of you have escaped having to dress your hair in the queue and

fasten your collars on the left. Is this because the Qing, in fact, following the way of the Zhou, rely on the influence of virtue rather than force? Might it not be rather because your two countries borrow courage from our eastern region?⁷³

In a letter to Asaka Tanpaku written some years later, Hakuseki elaborated on the point he had tried to make to the Koreans. According to a Korean story, he explained, the Kangxi Emperor once had proposed to a Korean envoy that the Qing formally incorporate Korea as a satellite state by placing one of Kangxi's sons on the throne as king. After some debate among themselves as to how to respond to this threatening proposal, the Koreans had replied that, since Korea had pledged to Japan that the Yi dynasty would rule Korea eternally, they feared Japan's reaction to such a change. Thereupon, noted Hakuseki, Kangxi immediately backed down. Hakuseki added: "This matter is kept secret even in Korea. The reason for this is that they do not want it known here that they are relying on Japan in this way. Having heard about this incident on good authority, I alluded to it in my written conversation with the Koreans some years ago, but they did not say a word in reply."⁷⁴

DEFEAT. As Hakuseki's last remark suggests, his efforts to depict the Korean embassy as a tributary mission from a respectful vassal were less than successful. No more willing than the court nobility to play the role Hakuseki envisioned for them, the Koreans held throughout the embassy to the principle that the relationship between Japan and Korea was between peers. As Ronald Toby has shown, they accepted the bakufu's request that they address the shogun as *kokūō* in considerable measure because they saw Japanese adoption of the latter title as affirming the parity between the Korean king and the shogun.⁷⁵ Similarly, they fiercely protested Hakuseki's revisions of protocol as derogatory to Korea's status as a peer of Japan. In Osaka, on the way to Edo, to convince the envoys to meet the shogun's emissaries at the entrance to the hall instead of inside it, the Tsushima representative, according to Hakuseki, had to threaten to drag them to the door.⁷⁶ In Edo, they objected to the absence of the *sanke* at the banquet up to the time when it was scheduled to start. Konoe Motohiro recorded in his diary that the Koreans yielded on this point only when Hakuseki declared that the banquet would be canceled

if they did not.⁷⁷ They further manifested their unwillingness to play the role of a subordinate to Japan by demanding that the bakufu rewrite the shogun's return letter to the king. They found the letter unacceptable because it used a character which, as the personal name of one of the Yi kings, they held to be taboo, and because they regarded the abbreviated address on the outside as disparaging to the king. The dispute over the return letter resulted in the delay of the departure of the embassy from Edo; it was resolved finally by a complicated compromise worked out by the Tsushima representatives and the *rōjū* Tsuchiya Masanao which entailed rewriting both the letter from the king and the shogun's return letter.⁷⁸

Assuming the stance of representatives of the "flowery civilization," the Koreans also refused to acknowledge more than equivocally the significance of Hakuseki's display of *rei*. Thus, at the conclusion of the performance of *gagaku*, the Korean ambassador praised Japan's preservation of the music of the past, but added the demurral that it "was not the music of the Three Dynasties."⁷⁹ Hakuseki himself admitted elsewhere the same point.⁸⁰ However, in the context of his efforts to impress upon the Koreans the authenticity of Japanese *rei*, he did not let such an objection go unchallenged. His remarks in his second written conversation with the Koreans about the Koreans' not using Shang court dress and Japanese rites being largely the same as those of the Three Dynasties was one rejoinder to the reservations expressed by the ambassador. On the spot, however, Hakuseki relied on another counterploy: introduction of the figure of the *tenno*. "The heavenly court began with heaven; the heavenly lineage continues as does heaven," he wrote. "The *tenno* is a true Son of Heaven. He is not like the rulers of the successive dynasties of the western land, where mortals have succeeded to heaven and bearers of different surnames have established successive dynasties in turn." As this circumstance had made it possible to preserve unchanged the rites and music of antiquity, it also meant that one could find "ample evidence" of the rites and music of the Three Dynasties in Japan.⁸¹

The emphasis on the connection between the unbroken line of *tenno* and maintenance of the rites of antiquity was in line with Hakuseki's tentative moves towards delineating a cultural role for the *tenno*. The acclamation of the heavenly origins of the *tenno*, so much at variance

with Hakuseki's general approach to the tenno house, may also be attributed (like the two sides of his evaluation of Kōtoku Tenno) to a strategic distinction between arguments intended for a foreign audience and those appropriate to the domestic situation. Nevertheless, it also suggests that, in a situation where the foreign audience presumed a relationship of parity between the Japanese *kokūō* and their own ruler, pursuit of the image of a Japanocentric order required reference to a figure of higher status than the *kokūō*. Only by relying on the tenno, who historically had claimed to be equal in stature to the Chinese *huangdi*, the focal point of the Sinocentric order upheld by Korea, could Hakuseki attempt to present Japan as the new apex in the hierarchy of nations.

Such a strategy necessarily compromised Hakuseki's primary endeavor to consolidate the authority of the shogun as an autonomous national monarch. Equally troublesome, not even introduction of the tenno sufficed to overcome the Sinocentric dimensions of the East Asian diplomatic order. To be sure, in a letter to the Konoe written two days after the embassy had finally departed from Edo, Hakuseki described its consequences in positive terms. Passing over the compromises made on the Japanese side, which had, in fact, shifted the symbolism of the exchanges between the Korean king and the shogun back in the direction of parity, Hakuseki declared that the Koreans had agreed that henceforth they would avoid use of characters from the names of the Tokugawa shogun in their letters and that they would "change the style of their letter to conform to that of Japan." Describing his assertion to the Koreans about the implications of the existence in Japan of an "unbroken heavenly line," Hakuseki added that the Koreans had "thereupon shown themselves most respectful," and, indicative of their acknowledgment of the superior position of Japan, had referred to Kyoto, the seat of the tenno, as "the imperial capital (*kōkyō*)."³²

In fact, however, the transcript of the written conversations between Hakuseki and the Koreans indicates that the Koreans countered Hakuseki's introduction of the unbroken heavenly line by a double-handed compliment which expressed their refusal to admit any fundamental challenge to the position of China as the proper center of the universal order. "To have rites like this, to have music like this," the ambassador wrote, "does this not fit the saying 'one step further and you will reach the

level of the flowery civilization?"⁸³ The Koreans repeated the same point in the second written conversation when Hakuseki raised the issue of why they maintained the Ming style of court dress. Declaring that Korea alone, as "the country of rites and righteousness," stood as "Eastern Zhou" in the face of China's inundation by barbarians, one of the Koreans noted that Japan's current endeavors to develop the civil arts suggested that the Japanese, too, might be aspiring to emulate the "flowery civilization."⁸⁴

Thus, in the end, the Korean embassy had two quite different implications within the context of Hakuseki's program as a whole. On the one hand, it served as the major pretext for accomplishment of one of Hakuseki's main objects: shogunal adoption of the kingly *rei* associated with Kyoto. Theoretically the shogun's assumption of monarchal *rei* should have clarified his status as a national sovereign and, at the same time, manifested Japan's qualification to supersede China as the center of the universal order of nations. But the exigencies of overcoming the Sino-centric connotations of the title of *kokūō* in the face of Korean insistence on maintaining parity between the Korean king and the shogun brought about another consequence as well—the introduction of the *tenno* as a figure equal to the Chinese *huangdi*, whom the Koreans did acknowledge as occupying a status superior to their king. As a result, the embassy also became the occasion for a blurring of the sovereign authority of the shogun in the name of an effort, ultimately unsuccessful, to establish the image of a Japan-centered hierarchical order.

This irresolvable dilemma perhaps figured in Hakuseki's eventual condemnation of the Korean embassies as being more disadvantageous than beneficial to Japan. In 1715, when an embassy to congratulate Ietsugu upon his succession was probably being considered, Hakuseki wrote bitterly that the Koreans looked upon their embassies to Japan simply as intelligence-gathering missions. Moreover, he declared, while they might respectfully refer to the shogun as *kokūō* in Japan, at home they denigrated him as "chief of the Wa barbarians."⁸⁵ Consequently, he held, in the future it would be better to limit diplomatic communications with the Koreans to the exchange of missives at the border, namely, Tsushima. It was an ironic denouement to the enterprise on which he had expended so much effort and imagination.

Conclusion

Having surveyed what Hakuseki attempted to do and the obstacles and contradictions he encountered, we may close this study with some observations about his place in Tokugawa political and intellectual history. With respect to institutional developments, Hakuseki contributed in two quite different ways to the evolution of the bakufu. One contribution was of a direct nature. The foreign trade and currency measures associated with him, although less a single-handed creation than sometimes has been thought, had a lasting impact on bakufu policy in these areas. The new strategies of local administration formulated under Yoshimune, while considerably more far-reaching than anything Hakuseki recommended, likewise built on trends already set in motion during Hakuseki's period of influence. A comparable relationship underlies developments in the internal mechanics of bakufu rule during the Shōtoku and Kyōhō eras. As we have seen, Hakuseki did not work explicitly for rationalization of the bakufu bureaucracy. Indeed, the combination of Confucian assumptions about what made for a good official and his own situation led him to resist the contemporary trend toward bureaucratization. Nevertheless, considered from a broad perspective, the questions Hakuseki raised about the functioning of the *kanjō bugyō* and the handling of judicial cases by the *hyōjōsho* served as a precondition for the development under Yoshimune of a more finely articulated bureaucratic structure and of more systematic procedures for carrying out the business of government.

More significant, however, than Hakuseki's direct contribution to the evolution of Tokugawa rule was what may be called his dialectical contribution. In pursuing his own vision of shogunal rule, Hakuseki paved the way for developments quite different from those he sought to bring about. Hakuseki's efforts to make the shogun a more king-like figure raised to a new level both the trend towards enlargement of the shogun's personal authority characteristic of bakufu politics since the reign of Tsunayoshi and the polarization between the shogun and his leading vassals which attended that trend. Two further developments in this state of affairs theoretically were possible. One, the movement towards transformation of the shogun into a king inaugurated by Tsunayoshi and pushed forward by Hakuseki could be carried through to its logical conclusion, a development which, as Tokutomi Sohō argued, eventually would have fractured the institutions established by Ieyasu and brought about the dissolution of the *bakuhan* state. Alternatively, a compromise could be effected which would reduce the erosive polarization in the relationship between the shogun and his vassals. Yoshimune opted for the second alternative. Thus, while seeking a solution to the fiscal and administrative problems of the day through the establishment of more efficient bureaucratic procedures and the adoption of policies intended to restore the financial health of the bakufu, Yoshimune also strove to accommodate those elements of the traditional order who saw their interests jeopardized by the trend towards a more monarchical style of shogunal rule.

Ironically, in endeavoring to meet this dual challenge, Yoshimune was able to turn to advantage those very measures of Hakuseki's that had brought the tensions in bakufu politics to the fore. By reversing Hakuseki's much-criticized efforts to reshape the symbols of shogunal authority, Yoshimune was able to offer tangible evidence of his regard for the traditional position of the *fudai* within the structure of bakufu governance. The psychological reconciliation with the major *fudai* that was thus facilitated in turn established the foundation for Yoshimune to assert his leadership over the formulation of bakufu policy. In effect, Hakuseki's failed attempt to make the shogun into a king provided Yoshimune with a lightning rod to deflect opposition from his own efforts to resolve the pending fiscal and administrative crisis through a

readjustment, if not a fundamental reshaping, of the patterns of Tokugawa rule.

Within the context of the day, the course followed by Yoshimune undoubtedly was the safer, surer choice. At the same time, viewed from a larger perspective, it narrowed the ground for response to the problems of the future. In essence, Yoshimune reconfirmed the principle that the role proper to the shogun was that of a hegemon working in coordination with his vassals rather than that of a king administering affairs through his ministers. This approach to bakufu politics, conjoined with his symbolic reaffirmation of the importance of the function of the *rōjū*, set the stage for the *rōjū* to assume an ever more central part in determining policy. From the 1770s on, it was holders of the office of *rōjū* or *tairō* who shaped the course of bakufu history.¹ Quite naturally, such figures tended to be responsive to the concerns of the *fudai*, a circumstance that meant that the pull between the interests of the *fudai* as individual daimyo on the one hand and as participants in a national government on the other remained fundamental to the structure of the bakufu. This situation greatly enlarged the difficulty of developing an effective response to the domestic and international crises confronting the nation in the last decades of the Tokugawa period. Instead, as the Tokugawa leaders struggled with increasingly intractable and urgent problems, the centrifugal tendencies intrinsic to the bakufu pulled it apart from within even as its traditional hegemonic role was challenged from without.² Given this denouement, the failure of Hakuseki's attempt to transform the bakufu into a monarchy centered around the shogun had two quite different implications. It may have helped prolong the life of the political structures he had sought to change, but it also foreshadowed the eventual demise of Tokugawa rule.

The same may be said of Hakuseki's efforts to resolve the ambiguities inherent in the relationship between the court and the bakufu, an issue that bears directly on his place in Tokugawa intellectual history. Here, too, what Hakuseki tried to accomplish failed to gain acceptance. Instead, his challenge to the tradition of bifurcated sovereignty helped set in motion a dialectical process that led eventually to an outcome markedly different from what he had sought to bring about. The initial stage of this process took the form of an attempt to justify the division of

sovereignty between the tenno and the shogun by defining the powers of the shogun as resting on a delegation (*inin*) of authority from the tenno. Among those responsible for the articulation of this concept was Matsudaira Sadanobu (1758–1829), a grandson of Yoshimune who, adopted as successor to the daimyo of the Shirakawa domain, served as dean of the *rōjū* and shogunal regent (*bosa*) between 1787 and 1793.³ In this capacity, Sadanobu contributed significantly to the consolidation of the *rōjū*- and *fudai*-centered patterns of bakufu politics characteristic of the last several decades of Tokugawa rule. The concept of *inin* formulated by Sadanobu and various scholars associated with him thus did not represent solely an attempt to reestablish the tradition of bifurcated sovereignty on a more solid theoretical basis; it also entailed an effort to define the shogunal role in a manner compatible with the collegial patterns of bakufu politics pursued by Sadanobu and his peers.

Hakuseki's attack on the tradition of bifurcated sovereignty started from the fundamental Confucian premise that the ruler should combine in himself the name and substance of authority. By contrast, the concept of *inin*, as Bitō Masahide has shown, presumed the separation of those elements: the tenno was held to have retained ultimate sovereignty despite his delegation of the substance of authority to the shogun.⁴ To establish the basis for such an argument, highly questionable from a Confucian point of view, the formulators of the notion of *inin* necessarily had to reverse Hakuseki's theoretically orthodox analysis of the course of the historical relationship between the name and substance of rulership in Japan. Thus, for instance, in *Seimeiron*, a brief but seminal work written in 1791 at the request of Sadanobu, the young Mito scholar Fujita Yūkoku (1774–1826) recast the political evolution occurring between the Heian and Tokugawa eras in such a way as to reach the opposite conclusion from Hakuseki's in *Tokushi yoron*. The Fujiwara and the successive *buke* leaders, held Yūkoku, may have come to exercise the substance of imperial authority. Nevertheless, they had not usurped the name of king. Ieyasu had “upheld the calendar of the tenno and received his office and title from the tenno.” Therein lay the special virtue of the Japanese polity. Had the shogun assumed the name of king as well as the substance of kingly authority, he would have contravened the moral order (*meibun*) fundamental to the relationship between ruler and

subject, for “Just as there are not two suns in heaven, there cannot be two kings on earth.” By reverently serving the tenno instead of presenting himself as directly accountable to heaven in the manner of the successive dynastic rulers of China, the shogun set a standard for the relationship between lord and vassal that all throughout the realm could emulate.⁵

Three decades later, in the *Nihon gaishi*, another work presented to Sadanobu, Rai San'yō (1780–1832) took even more explicit issue with Hakuseki’s views. Challenging Hakuseki’s assertion that Ashikaga Yōshimitsu should have adopted a title that would have clarified his authority as ruler of the populace of the entire nation, San'yō declared that Hakuseki’s argument was that of a “traitor” which, if implemented, would have reduced the realm to chaos. Like Yūkoku, San'yō granted that the imperial line had lost the substance of authority. Nevertheless, it had fortunately retained the name of ruler, and only by continuing to acknowledge the sovereign prerogatives of the tenno could those who exercised the substance of authority effectively carry out their task of governing the people. “The name [of tenno], transmitted hereditarily for thousands of years, is established in the ears and eyes of the populace. What [newly created title] could have its power to bring the populace to submit voluntarily?”⁶

Neither Sadanobu nor San'yō nor Yūkoku intended to weaken the position of the shogun by affirming the unchallengeable place of the tenno as the font of legitimate political authority. To the contrary, as may be seen from the passages cited above, they held that the positive example set by the shogun in his relationship with the tenno would reverberate throughout the social hierarchy, thereby enhancing the stability of Tokugawa rule. Moreover, they interpreted the act of *inin* to mean that the tenno, having entrusted the administration of the country to the shogun, should leave governmental matters entirely to the shogun.⁷ In this sense, Sadanobu and the scholars associated with him, while rejecting Hakuseki’s premises about the tenno-shogun relationship, did not simply affirm the ambiguities of the structure of bifurcated sovereignty characteristic of the pre-Shōtoku era. Rather, through the concept of *inin* and its attendant separation of the name of kingship from its substance, they sought to rationalize the Tokugawa structure of sovereignty

by distinguishing between two qualitatively different levels of legitimate authority.

Within the context of an intellectual world shaped by Confucian notions, however, this rationalization was inherently unstable. To interpret positively the separation of name and substance was contrary to the entire weight of the Confucian tradition. Figures like Yūkoku and San'yō might counter successfully Hakuseki's contention that it was the shogun who should combine in his person the name and substance of kingly authority, but they could not so easily lay to rest his decisive enunciation of the orthodox Confucian premise that name and substance should be united. Instead, the ongoing echo of that assertion necessarily eroded the foundations of the argument that the eternal holder of the name of ruler had delegated the substance of his authority to the shogun. Consequently, when, in the 1850s and 1860s, the shogun came to be perceived as not fulfilling the governmental responsibilities entrusted to him, the resolution of the dialectic set in motion by Hakuseki rapidly entered a new stage; that is, the notion of *in in* yielded to the cry for a new unification of the name and substance of political authority, this time in the person of the tenno. Thus Hakuseki's uncompromising effort to apply the propositions of Confucian political theory to the Tokugawa polity not only pointed up what was, in fact, an unbridgeable gap between those propositions and the premises of the Tokugawa political order; it also contributed to an intellectual process that helped pave the way for the collapse of Tokugawa rule.

How, finally, might we evaluate Hakuseki as an individual historical figure? Various answers have been offered to this question in the course of the last two and a half centuries. Muro Kyūsō has provided us with both his own comment and the succinct appraisal of Yoshimune. One day in 1723, eight years after his accession as shogun, Yoshimune, wrote Kyūsō, suddenly asked him about the nature of Hakuseki's scholarship. "Arai," Kyūsō replied, "is a man of wide knowledge, conversant with past and present. There are many knowledgeable people in the world, but in most cases their knowledge is limited to Chinese matters. Arai, on the other hand, is very knowledgeable about things Japanese as well, and is able to elucidate matters of China and Japan in conjunction with

each other." After a while the shogun responded. "Arai is overly concerned with ornament," he said.⁸

Others were harsher. Matsuura Seizan (1760–1841), the late Tokugawa reform-minded daimyo and essayist, quoted Hayashi Jussai (1768–1841), the figure Matsudaira Sadanobu called upon to restore the scholarly caliber of the Hayashi house, as declaring that Hakuseki "is said to have had the signs of a traitor in his face." Matsuura commented, "Not having studied the art of physiognomy, it is difficult for me to say whether or not this is true. His portrait, however, indeed shows a dubious kind of face, one that can hardly be regarded as the face of a gentleman."⁹ Yanada Seigan (1672–1757), who studied Chinese poetry with Hakuseki, reportedly likened him to Chao Cuo, a Han scholar of obscure origins who became an influential advisor to Emperor Jing. Arguing that the extensive fiefs granted the feudal lords by the early Han emperors posed a threat to the longevity of the dynasty, Chao Cuo urged the emperor to reduce them. His recommendations and unyielding manner antagonized the Han aristocracy and helped bring about the revolt of the seven feudatories in 154 bc. Thereupon the emperor, shaken by the revolt, had Chao Cuo, still wearing his court dress, executed in the eastern market.¹⁰ Another poetic companion and fellow disciple of Kinoshita Jun'an, Gion Nankai (1677?–1751), is said to have compared Hakuseki's approach to governance of the realm to that of Wang Anshi, the Song prime minister whose radical reform program, supported by his own unorthodox reinterpretation of the classics, aroused fierce opposition from aristocratic factions within the government and made him a figure of opprobrium in later Confucian tradition.¹¹


Whatever questions may be raised about the appropriateness of these evaluations, they sum up several salient aspects of Hakuseki's endeavors. Hakuseki's personality and political aims had much in common with those of Chao Cuo, even if he escaped the latter's fate. In content, his program, including what Yoshimune noted as a tendency to overemphasize ornament, may have differed from that of Wang Anshi's. But his bold readiness to challenge the status quo and recast the ideological tradition underlying it displayed inclinations quite comparable to those of the Song statesman. Considered from the perspective of Hayashi Jussai,

such inclinations might well be described as potentially traitorous.


Almost a hundred years ago, Yamaji Aizan, the Meiji historian and journalist, author of one of the first modern biographies of Hakuseki, added another image to the above melange. Comparing Hakuseki to his contemporary Ogyū Sorai, Aizan pointed out that both had challenged the existing order. But, while Sorai fought like a Moses marshaling his followers around him as he set forth the principles of a new intellectual outlook, Hakuseki fought like a Goliath charging single-handedly the armies of Israel. His uncompromising attitude and his refusal to recognize anyone else as his equal left him isolated and ultimately doomed him to defeat. At the same time, those qualities enabled him to remain his own master, regardless of the circumstances he confronted.¹² Aizan's simile may be hyperbolic, but its very extravagance captures an essential element of Hakuseki's place in Japanese history.

Appendixes
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APPENDIX A The Tokugawa Shogunal Line and Related Houses up to the Mid-EIGHTEENTH Century



APPENDIX B Bakufu Offices Figuring in the Text



#The number of the appointees for each post varied to some extent; the figures given are those current in 1713 (see *Kaitei datubukan*, pp. 464-492).

Notes

PREFACE

1. In this category one may include Tsuji Tatsuya's otherwise excellent study of the evolution of the structure of bakufu politics between the 1680s and the 1740s, *Kyōhō kaikaku no kenkyū* (hereafter cited as Tsuji Tatsuya, *Kyōhō*). While I differ with Tsuji on this point, I have been influenced greatly by his interpretations in my overall view of the major developments of this period.
2. Despite their significant other merits, the two major modern studies of Hakuseki, Kurita Mototsugu's *Arai Hakuseki no bunchi seiji* and Miyazaki Michio's *Arai Hakuseki no kenkyū*, share this tendency. It should be said, however, that Kurita's work, which incorporates summaries of a number of important source materials not readily available elsewhere, remains the most comprehensive study to date of Hakuseki's political program. Professor Miyazaki likewise has contributed significantly to the contemporary understanding of Hakuseki. Apart from *Arai Hakuseki no kenkyū* and several other works on Hakuseki, he has written a valuable commentary on Hakuseki's autobiography, *Oritaku shiba no ki* (*Tēi-hon oritaku shiba no ki shakugi*).
3. The ideologically controversial aspects of such a position in post-Tokugawa Japan have inspired a quite heated debate over the propriety of Hakuseki's approach to the role of the shogun and the latter's relations with the imperial court. Unfortunately, the major consequence of this debate has been to obscure rather than to clarify what Hakuseki endeavored to accomplish in this area. Ironically, if understandably, the efforts of his champions, such as Kurita and Miyazaki, have been especially problematic. By contrast, some of those who have been most critical of Hakuseki have shown sharp insight into what he sought to do. A case in point is Tokutomi Sohō, who considers Hakuseki's political endeavors in Vol. XX of his *Kinsei Nihon kokumin shi*. Among the most balanced as well as perceptive treatments of Hakuseki's approach to this issue is the early biography by Yamaji Aizan (*Arai Hakuseki*).
4. Hani Gorō, *Hakuseki Yukichi*, pp. 223–224.

5. Two major editions of *Oritaku shiba no ki* are available: Miyazaki's *Teibon oritaku shiba no ki shakugi* and the version edited by Matsumura Akira included in Vol. LXXXV (*Taionki, Oritaku shiba no ki, Rantō kotohajime*) of the Nihon koten bungaku taikei. Because of the wide availability of the latter series, except where otherwise specified, all references to *Oritaku shiba no ki* in this study are to the Nihon koten bungaku taikei text. *Oritaku shiba no ki* (hereafter referred to as *Oritaku*) has been translated into English by Joyce Ackroyd as *Told Round a Brushwood Fire*.
6. *Oritaku*, p. 426.
7. A 2-volume annotated edition of Hakuseki's diary has been published in the Dai Nihon kokiroku series as *Arai Hakuseki nikki*. Kyūsō's letters were preserved by their recipients, Aochi Kenzan and Reitaku; they have been published as *Kenzan hisaku* in Vol. VI of the *Nihon keizai taiten* series.
8. In this regard I differ with Joyce Ackroyd, who sees the historical value of the diary as lying in its confirmation of the essential accuracy of *Oritaku shiba no ki*. See her introduction to *Told Round a Brushwood Fire*, pp. 24–25.
9. For most of these, the standard published edition continues to be that included in the 6-volume edition of Hakuseki's collected works, *Arai Hakuseki zenshū* (hereafter referred to as *AHZ*). Where a more reliable edition is available, references are given to the latter.

ONE: CONTOURS OF BAKUFU POLITICS

1. Tokugawa vassals fell into several different categories. The largest vassals, the daimyo, were enfeoffed by the shogun with domains with a putative yield (*kokudaka*) calculated to be equivalent to a minimum of 10,000 *koku* of rice (one *koku* equals approximately five bushels). There were three major subdivisions of daimyo: the *fudai*, whose ancestors had served the Tokugawa prior to the latter's decisive victory at Sekigahara in 1600 or who had been promoted to the level of daimyo by the Tokugawa; the *shinpan* (related houses), who were offshoots or more distant relatives of the main shogunal line; and the *tozama* (outside) daimyo, whose ancestors already had acquired the status of daimyo prior to 1600 and who had recognized the Tokugawa as overlords only after that date. The Tokugawa maintained as well two categories of direct vassal of lesser size and status than the daimyo: the *hatamoto* (bannermen) and the *gokenin* (housemen). *Hatamoto*, constituting approximately 5,000 houses, received feudal incomes from the Tokugawa ranging from 9,500 *koku* down to less than 100 *koku*. Three-fifths of the *hatamoto* fell in the 100- to 500-*koku* range; only 240 received more than 3,000 *koku*. Below the *hatamoto* were the *gokenin*, usually calculated to number about 17,000 men. Appointees to the major posts within the bakufu government structure were drawn from the ranks of the *fudai* daimyo and the upper ranges of the

- hatamoto*. Lesser staff positions went to lower-ranking *hatamoto* and *gokenin*. For a fuller discussion of these matters see John W. Hall, *Government and Local Power in Japan, 500–1700*, pp. 330–374, and Conrad Totman, *Politics in the Tokugawa Bakufu*, pp. 110–178.
2. The general evolution of bakufu politics is discussed by Conrad Totman, *Politics in the Tokugawa Bakufu*, and Harold Bolitho, *Treasures Among Men, The Fudai Daimyo in Tokugawa Japan*. The latter, in particular, stresses, as I do in this work, the tension between the centripetal and centrifugal characteristics of bakufu rule. While Bolitho, however, sees the bakufu as asserting its authority over the daimyo in the early decades of the Tokugawa period and then becoming increasingly passive in this regard, I see ambivalence about the division of authority between shogun and daimyo as characteristic of Tokugawa rule from the beginning.
 3. Kitahara Akio, “Iemitsu seiken no kakuritsu o megutte,” pp. 116–130.
 4. Kitajima Masamoto, *Edo bakufu no kenryoku kōzō*, pp. 446–487; Fujino Tamotsu, *Shintei bakuban taiseishi no kenkyū*, pp. 307–323.
 5. Koji ruien, kan’i bu III, 173–177, 186, 189; Matsudaira Tarō, *Kōtei Edo jidai seido no kenkyū*, pp. 366–373.
 6. Asao Naohiro, “Shōgun seiji no kenryoku kōzō,” pp. 35–36.
 7. For a discussion of the creation, composition, and incorporation into the bakufu of the Tatebayashi retinue, see Fukai Masaumi, “Tsunayoshi seiken no shutai seiryoku—Kandakan kashindan no seiritsu to bakushinka.” When Tsunayoshi became shogun, a considerable portion of the Tatebayashi retinue was assigned to his young son, Tokumatsu, who continued as domain lord even after moving into the shogunal heir’s quarters in the Western Enceinte. The definitive absorption into the bakufu of Tatebayashi land and retainers took place only after Tokumatsu’s death in 1683. *Ibid.*, pp. 333–335.
 8. In this regard, the Tatebayashi domain and the similar Kōfu domain created for Ienobu’s father (see below) were more like the later *sankyō* houses than the *sanke* domains. For the relationship of these houses to the shogunal line see Appendix A.
 9. Tsunayoshi’s outlook and policies are discussed in Donald Shively, “Tokugawa Tsunayoshi, the Genroku Shogun.”
 10. *Shintei Kansei chōshū shokufu*, II, 8 (hereafter cited as *Kanseifu*); *Tokugawa jikki*, V, 402, 418 (hereafter cited as *Jikki*).
 11. Tsuji Tatsuya, *Kyōhō*, pp. 43–45, 51–52; Bolitho, pp. 172, 186.
 12. Tsuji Tatsuya, *Kyōhō*, pp. 46–50.
 13. Kurita Mototsugu, *Edo jidai, jō*, pp. 473–474 (hereafter cited as Kurita, *Edo jidai*); Tsuji Tatsuya, “Bakusei no shindankai,” p. 16. A diagram of the bakufu offices figuring in this study may be found in Appendix B.
 14. Tsuji Tatsuya, *Kyōhō*, pp. 57–58; *Kanseifu*, XI, 1–2.
 15. Kitahara Akio points out that Iemitsu used his attendants for a variety of political purposes without institutionalizing their role. Kitahara, pp. 122–125.

16. *Koji ruien*, kan'i bu III, 268; Matsudaira, pp. 155–157.
17. The *karō* played a role within domain administration comparable to that of the *rōjū* within the bakufu.
18. *Koji ruien*, kan'i bu III, 261–263; Tsuji Tatsuya, *Kyōhō*, pp. 56–57.
19. Ono Kiyoshi, *Shiryō Tokugawa bakufu no seido*, p. 231; Totman, *Politics in the Tokugawa Bakufu*, p. 101.
20. *Kanseifu*, III, 251–254.
21. The assumption found in later periods that the origins of the *sobayōnin* lay in the role of the earlier *shuttōnin* derives from Hakuseki's account in *Oritaku shiba no ki*. There, Hakuseki, seeking to justify the role played by the shogun's personal attendants vis-à-vis the *rōjū*, described the function performed for Iemitsu by Hotta Masamori as the direct antecedent of the reliance on personal attendants as it developed during Tsunayoshi's reign (*Oritaku*, p. 424). See also Tsuji Tatsuya, *Kyōhō*, pp. 60–61.
22. Tsuji Tatsuya, "Bakusei no shindankai," p. 18.
23. Tsuji Tatsuya, *Kyōhō*, p. 63.
24. Fukai, "Tsunayoshi seiken no shutai seiryoku," pp. 336, 340.
25. Ibid., pp. 340, 342–343, 346.
26. Tsuji Tatsuya, *Kyōhō*, pp. 63–64.
27. Ibid.
28. For a detailed analysis, see Fukai Masaumi, "Sakuradakan kashindan no bakushinka—Ienobu, Ietsugu seiken no shutai seiryoku."
29. Ibid., pp. 247, 252.
30. *Jikki*, VII, 1–2.
31. Ibid.
32. *Jikki*, V, 297–298; Fukai, "Sakuradakan kashindan no bakushinka," pp. 240–241.
33. Kurita, *Edo jidai*, p. 464; *Kanseifu*, XXII, 63–64.
34. *Kanseifu*, XXII, 63–64.
35. *Jikki*, IX, 200–201.
36. Ibid., VII, 102–103.
37. *Oritaku*, p. 425.
38. *Kanseifu*, XI, 221–223.
39. *Kenzan hisaku*, p. 253.
40. Ibid., p. 330.
41. Ibid., pp. 251–252. Cf. *Oritaku*, pp. 311–313.
42. *Jikki*, VII, 248–249.
43. Ibid., p. 284.
44. *Kenzan hisaku*, p. 254.
45. Ibid., pp. 312–314.
46. See, for instance, *ibid.*, pp. 320–323.
47. Tōbu Yashi Jin'yōshi [Dazai Shundai?], *Sannō gaiki*, p. 10a.
48. *Kenzan hisaku*, pp. 352–357. The particular theater involved was razed and not

allowed to be rebuilt; the other theaters were closed by bakufu order for several months. Donald Shively, "Bakufu Versus Kabuki," pp. 253–255.

49. *Sannō gaiki*, p. 13b.
50. *Kenzan hisaku*, pp. 389–390. Various considerations entered into the choice of Yoshimune over the contemporary head of the house of Owari, usually regarded as the premier *sanke* house. Tokugawa Yoshimichi, the previous lord of Owari, considered as a candidate for shogun at the time of Ienobu's death, had since died himself. The current lord, having succeeded after Ienobu's death, had not, unlike Yoshimune, personally pledged fealty to Ienobu. In addition, he was one generation farther removed than Yoshimune from Ieyasu.
51. For details on these appointments, see Fukai Masaumi, "Kishū hanshi no bakushinka to Kyōhō kaikaku."
52. *Ibid.*, pp. 405, 414–416.
53. *Jikkō*, VIII, 7.
54. *Ibid.*, IX, 183–188, 201.
55. See Fukai, "Kishū hanshi no bakushinka to Kyōhō kaikaku," and Ōishi Shinzaburō, "Ōoka Echizen no kami Tadasuke nikki to sono shiryō kachi ni tsuite no jakkan no kōsatsu."

TWO: JUSHA AND YORIAI

1. *Arai kakei*, AHZ, III, 198.
2. *Ibid.*, pp. 198–199.
3. *Oritaku*, pp. 154–155.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 182.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 195.
6. *Buke shohatto* (Kan'ei 12 [1635] version), in *Tokugawa kinreikō*, zenshū I, 64 (hereafter *Kinreikō*).
7. *Kanseifu*, II, 185–186.
8. Masatoshi's domain tripled in size between 1680 and 1682. To match the enlargement of his domain Masatoshi also expanded his entourage, taking on 1,056 new retainers, 180 of high (*shibun*) rank and 876 of low rank. *Kanseifu*, XI, 1–2; Kimura Motoi, *Kakyū bushi ron*, pp. 55–56.
9. *Oritaku*, pp. 199–200; Letter to Sakuma Dōgan, AHZ, V, 549.
10. *Oritaku*, pp. 199–201.
11. See, for instance, Bitō Masahide, *Nihon hōken shisōshi kenkyū*; Hori Isao, *Hayashi Razan*; Wajima Yoshio, "Hoshina seiiken to Rinke no gakumon"; Watanabe Hiroshi, *Kinsei Nihon shakai to sōgaku*; Herman Ooms, "Neo-Confucianism and the Formation of Early Tokugawa Ideology: Contours of a Problem."
12. Herman Ooms, *Charismatic Bureaucrat, A Political Biography of Matsudaira Sadanobu*, pp. 123–125.

13. Watanabe Hiroshi, p. 16; Bitō Masahide, *Genroku jidai*, pp. 122–124.
14. *Honsaroku kō*, AHZ, VI, 550. This is actually a letter dated fall, 1723, replying to an inquiry from Maeda Tsunanori, daimyo of Kaga, with whom Hakuseki conducted an extensive correspondence in the last decade of his life, largely through the mediation of Oze Fukuan, a doctor in Tsunanori's service. Hakuseki presumably is referring here to accusations circulated about Kumazawa Banzan and Yamaga Sokō at the time of Yui Shōsetsu's abortive revolt in 1651.
15. *Oritaku*, p. 184.
16. Ibid., pp. 187–188.
17. Wajima, p. 84.
18. Kurita, *Edo jidai*, p. 431; Shively, "Tokugawa Tsunayoshi," pp. 115–116.
19. Kurita, *Edo jidai*, pp. 565–566; Shively, "Tokugawa Tsunayoshi," p. 115.
20. *Nikki*, I, 2.
21. *Honsaroku kō*, p. 550.
22. *Jikki*, VI, 95–96.
23. *Kanseifu*, XII, 396–397. In addition, from 1691, the Hayashi received 1,000 *koku* in support for the shrine to Confucius at Yushima.
24. Ibid., XX, 284.
25. Hara Nensai, *Sentetsu sōdan*, kan VI, 24a–25b; Bitō Masahide, "Dazai Shundai no hito to shisō," pp. 493–494.
26. Iwashashi Junsei, *Sorai kenkyū*, pp. 124–125. Stipends were awarded in three fundamental forms. The most prestigious was a *chigyō*, or fief, calculated in *koku* of rice. *Chigyō* figures were based on the total putative yield (*kokudaka*) of an area of land, estimated in terms of rice, and the holder drew only a certain percentage of this yield, the rest going to the peasants who worked the land. In bakufu territory, it generally was calculated that the holder would take 40%. Thus, a *chigyō* with a putative yield of 200 *koku* would bring the holder an actual income of 80 *koku* annually. The next most prestigious form of stipend was a "storehouse allotment" (*kuramai* or *kirimai*) awarded in bales (*hyō*) of rice. *Hyō* varied in size, but, for purposes of calculating *kuramai* stipends, were considered to hold 0.4 *koku*. Hence 200 *hyō* also equaled 80 *koku* in actual income. Third on the scale of prestige were "commissary rations" (*fuchi*), allotted by "man-units," e.g., a "40-man-unit ration" (*yonjūninbuchi*). An adult male was considered to eat 0.005 *koku* of rice a day, or 1.8 *koku* a year. Thus, a "40-man-unit ration" equaled roughly 72 *koku* in actual income, making it equivalent in amount to a stipend of 200 *koku* or 200 *hyō*. Technically, there is no such term as *ninbuchi*; it is, rather, *fuchi*. However, the standard conjunction of *fuchi* with "man-units," plus the fact that "man-units" were conceived of abstractly rather than literally, has led me to adopt the neologism *ninbuchi*. Apart from the above differences, the three forms of stipend were allotted differently, with the less prestigious forms being collected in smaller portions at more frequent intervals.

27. *Nikki*, I, 1–3; *Oritaku*, pp. 203–204. The account of these negotiations in Haku-seki's diary shows him to be a considerably harder bargainer than does the *Oritaku shiba no ki* version. Tsuji Tatsuya has analyzed the differences between the two accounts in "Arai Hakuseki no shūshoku."
28. *Nikki*, I, 4–5.
29. Ibid., I, 23. The memorial referred to in this entry is presumably *Seizōkō*, AHZ, VI, 489–492.
30. *Nikki*, passim; "Keien shinkō."
31. *Oritaku*, pp. 209–210.
32. Ibid., p. 270.
33. *Nikki*, I, 240.
34. *Kenzan hisaku*, pp. 263–264.
35. Letter to Sakuma Dōgan, AHZ, V, 529–530.
36. *Nikki*, I, 115.
37. *Oritaku*, p. 220.
38. *Nikki*, I, 224–225, 234.
39. Ibid., I, 234.
40. Ibid., I, 225–226, 235–237.
41. Ibid., II, 79–82; *Oritaku*, pp. 225–231.
42. *Nikki*, II, 88–89; *Oritaku*, pp. 242–243.
43. Letter to Asaka Tanpaku, AHZ, V, 353.
44. *Nikki*, II, 90, 115.
45. Ibid., II, 150.
46. *Kenzan hisaku*, p. 237.
47. *Oritaku*, pp. 260–261.
48. Ibid., pp. 242–243.
49. *Kanseifu*, XX, 271; XX, 284–285; XXI, 17; XXII, 270; XXII, 323.
50. *Oritaku*, p. 220.
51. *Kenzan hisaku*, pp. 270–271.

THREE: ASSOCIATES AND RIVALS

1. *Oritaku*, pp. 240–241.
2. *Kenzan hisaku*, p. 239.
3. Anon., *Bunbyō gaiki*, pp. 351–352.
4. *Sannō gaiki*, pp. 11b–12a.
5. Ibid., p. 12b.
6. *Kenzan hisaku*, p. 335.
7. Ibid., pp. 263–264.
8. *Oritaku*, p. 296.
9. Ibid.

10. Tokutomi Sohō makes similar observations regarding Ienobu's character. *Tokutomi*, pp. 39–43.
11. For instance, the percentage of former Kōfu retainers in Ienobu's immediate entourage was greater than that of former Tatebayashi retainers in Tsunayoshi's. Fukai, "Sakuradakan kashindan no bakushinka," p. 247.
12. In this regard, Hakuseki's inauguration of the *Odes* project early in his service of Ienobu may be seen as a skillful device to capture the latter's attention.
13. *Kenzan hisaku*, p. 315.
14. *Oritaku*, p. 426.
15. *Nikki*, I, 90.
16. *Tokushi yoron*, p. 403. *Tokushi yoron* has been translated by Joyce Ackroyd as *Lessons from History: Arai Hakuseki's Tokushi Yoron*.
17. *Tokushi yoron*, pp. 400–401.
18. Ibid., p. 397.
19. On one level, Hakuseki's comparison of Yoshimasa and Yoshihisa can be read as an allegorical contrast of Ienobu's reign to that of Tsunayoshi, but the dig at Akifusa is also evident.
20. *Nikki*, I, 93–115.
21. Ibid., I, 112.
22. *Shintei no an*, AHZ, VI, 263–271.
23. *Haiyūkō*, AHZ, VI, 524–535.
24. *Kenzan hisaku*, p. 271.
25. *Shintei no an*, pp. 269–271. The reference to the frowns and headaches of the people is from *Mencius*, 2A:1 (James Legge, *The Chinese Classics*, II, 151).
26. *Shintei no an*, pp. 268–269.
27. *Kenzan hisaku*, p. 271.
28. *Nikki*, II, 3, 11–13.
29. Ibid., II, 26–27. Akifusa's description of Hakuseki as "in straitened circumstances" was to the point. At that time, Hakuseki drew a stipend equivalent to 300 *kokku* and, as a consequence, technically should have maintained a retinue of 5 men and a horse. Later, as *hatamoto* of 1,000-*kokku* status, he theoretically should have maintained a retinue of between 15 and 20 men, of which 4 or 5 should have been of *shibun* status, 4 horses, and 5 or 6 maids (see Sasama Yoshihiko, *Edo bakufu yakushoku shūsei*, pp. 30–36, 50–52). In actuality, he made do with much less. On different occasions through the years, his diary indicates his using two people with surnames—indicating at least nominal samurai status—in a capacity as retainers to handle the drawing and conversion of his stipend and other errands. On important occasions, however, such as taking possession of his official residence or receiving title to the villages making up his fief, he did not make use of these retainers. Rather, he called instead on his wife's younger brother, who does not seem to have been in service, or borrowed the retainer of someone

else. We know that in 1705 he had 4 servants—2 male and 2 female—because, in a diary entry estimating his debts, he recorded what he still owed them (*Nikki*, I, 257). The years 1705 and 1709, when Ienobu became shogunal heir and shogun respectively, found Hakuseki particularly hard-pressed financially. He borrowed from Ienobu's other Confucian tutors, from a merchant friend, from his rice broker, from book dealers, and from various Buddhist temples, which commonly served as pawnshops. His debts in 1705 equaled close to a third of his regular income for the year (*ibid.*, I, 233–269). For an analysis of the evidence concerning the financial situation of the *hatamoto* provided by Hakuseki's diary, see Nomura Kentarō, "Nikki o tsūjite mitaru Arai Hakuseki no kakei."

30. *Nikki*, II, 11.
31. See, for instance, *ibid.*, II, 13, 41.
32. *Kanseifu*, X, 141–143; Tsuji Tatsuya, *Kyōhō*, p. 64.
33. *Oritaku*, pp. 232–234.
34. *Ibid.*, pp. 234–235.
35. *Ibid.*, pp. 236–237.
36. *Ibid.*, p. 238.
37. Taya Hirokichi, *Kinsei ginza no kenkyū*, pp. 213–215.
38. *Ibid.*, p. 188.
39. *Kenzan hisaku*, p. 310. In the *Nibon keizai taiten* edition of *Kenzan hisaku*, Ogiwara is consistently written as Hagiwara.
40. *Kanseifu*, X, 143; *Oritaku*, p. 305.
41. One of the problematic aspects of the *Oritaku* account of these developments is a discrepancy in Hakuseki's dating of the third debasement (the so-called *yotsutakaragin*). As noted above, this debasement took place in 1711/8, a full year before Shigehide's ouster and Ienobu's death (Taya, pp. 186–189). However, in *Oritaku shiba no ki*, Hakuseki presented this debasement as having occurred a year later. According to his account, at the end of the 7th month of 1712, Ienobu, spurred on by continuing rumors of the 1710 debasements, queried Shigehide about the true situation. Shigehide, Hakuseki stated, thereupon confessed to having ordered a debasement of the currency on his own authority. Hakuseki went on to link this development to the issue of the *yotsutakaragin*. "While his lordship, dumbfounded, was agonizing over what decision he should take regarding this matter, Shigehide, thinking that there was no further need for hesitation, he having already said all that there was to say, at the beginning of the 8th month sent out an internal directive for a further debasement of silver in which he stated that he had secret orders for such from the shogun" (*Oritaku*, pp. 308–309). Since Hakuseki succeeded in ousting Shigehide from office in the 9th month of 1712, his dating in *Oritaku shiba no ki* of this sequence of events to the 7th and 8th months of 1712 makes it appear that, once Ienobu was fully aware of the debasements, he acted to redress the situation. However, the fact that the *yotsutakaragin*

- actually had been issued a year earlier, in the 8th month of 1711, casts a rather different light on these developments. If the conversation between Shigehide and Ienobu in fact took place as described, a full year elapsed between Shigehide's "confession" and issuing of the *yotsutakaragin* on "secret orders" from the shogun on the one hand and the termination of Shigehide's appointment as *kanjō bugyō* on the other. This circumstance suggests that Shigehide had the tacit understanding of the shogun if not his "secret orders" for the issuance of the *yotsutakaragin*.
42. *Ogiwara Shigehide dangaisho*, in Kate W. Nakai and Nakai Yoshiyuki, "Shiryō shōkai: Arai Hakuseki jihitsu *Ogiwara Shigehide dangaisho sōkō*," p. 44.
43. *Oritaku*, p. 307.
44. Ibid., pp. 298–299.
45. Tsuji Tatsuya, *Kyōhō*, p. 90.
46. *Jikkō*, VII, 46, 115. While the practice of sending an attendant to sit in on the deliberations of the *hyōjōsho* goes back at least to Iemitsu (Kitahara, p. 123) the *Jikkō* is in error in stating (p. 46) that Ienobu revived a practice abandoned during the previous reign. See below, Chapter 7.
47. *Oritaku*, p. 241.
48. *Jikkō*, VII, 232–233.
49. Ibid., pp. 243–244; *Kinreikō*, kōshū I, 35–37.
50. *Ogiwara Shigehide dangaisho*, p. 42.
51. Ibid., pp. 43–48.
52. *Oritaku*, p. 308. Shigehide died the following year (according to Kyūsō he deliberately starved himself to death), and the fief inherited by his son was reduced from 3,700 *koku* to 700 *koku* on grounds of Shigehide's insubordination and unheeding pursuit of his own interests (*Kenzan hisaku*, p. 342; *Kanseifu*, X, 143).
53. *Oritaku*, p. 313.
54. Ibid., p. 314. Murakami Masanao was an attendant (*koshō*) whom Hakuseki consistently depicted unsympathetically in *Oritaku*.
55. *Kenzan hisaku*, p. 254.
56. Letter to Takebe Masanoki, *AHZ*, V, 569–570.
57. *Kenzan hisaku*, p. 270.
58. Ibid., p. 339.
59. Ibid., pp. 278–279.
60. Ibid., pp. 281–282.
61. Ibid., pp. 285–286.
62. Ibid., pp. 324–325.
63. Ibid., p. 349.
64. Ibid., p. 336.
65. *Oritaku*, pp. 369–373.
66. *Nikki*, II, 176–177.
67. The currency and foreign trade reforms adopted in this period may appear to

be evidence to the contrary. But, as discussed in Chapter 5 below, although Hakuseki acted as a catalyst in bringing about those measures, we should not overestimate them as his single-handed accomplishment.

68. *Jikki*, VIII, 7.
69. *Nikki*, II, 192–200.
70. Ibid., II, 200–203; letter to Muro Kyūsō, *AHZ*, V, 393.

FOUR: INTELLECTUAL INFLUENCES, PSYCHOLOGICAL DISPOSITION

1. *Kenzan hisaku*, p. 340. Wm. Theodore de Bary notes that many Neo-Confucians found the metaphysical content of the first chapter of the *Jinsilu* forbidding and that even Zhu Xi described it as “difficult to read” (“Neo-Confucian Cultivation and the Seventeenth-Century ‘Enlightenment’,” pp. 154–155). Even so, Hakuseki’s dismissal of its value is indicative of a general coolness towards the metaphysical elements that unquestionably were a major aspect of the Zhu Xi philosophical outlook. The description of “On the Substance of the Way” and the translations of the titles of the other chapters cited here are taken from Wing-tsit Chan, tr., *Reflections on Things at Hand*.
2. *Oritaku*, pp. 205–206.
3. Letter to Asaka Tānpaku, *AHZ*, V, 328.
4. Letter to Sakuma Dōgan, *AHZ*, V, 443. Hakuseki does not refer here to Sorai by name, but it is clear that he is speaking of him.
5. *Sonbu heibō taku fukugen*, *AHZ*, VI, 112.
6. Ibid., p. 111.
7. Letter to Sakuma Dōgan, *AHZ*, V, 435.
8. Ibid., pp. 434–437. The letter cited in this and the preceding note is identical to *Hakuseki sensei gakkun*, *AHZ*, VI, 628–631.
9. Letter to Dohi Motonari, *AHZ*, V, 155.
10. *Oritaku*, pp. 186–187.
11. Ibid., pp. 211–213.
12. *Kenzan hisaku*, pp. 280, 412.
13. *Nikki*, I, 254.
14. Hara Nensai, kan V, 15a.
15. *Seijō kibun*, p. 16.
16. Letter to Sakuma Dōgan, *AHZ*, V, 527.
17. *Mencius*, 6:A:16 (Legge, II, 418–419; translation modified).
18. Ibid., II, 193–194 (2:A:2), 360–364 (5:A:7).
19. See, for instance, *Shintei no an*, pp. 263, 268–269, and the dialogue with Amemori Hōshū quoted Chapter 3, p. 52.
20. Ulrich Goch, “Tokushi yoron ni okeru jidai kubun no bunseki,” pp. 192–193; Ulrich Kemper, *Arai Hakuseki und seine Geschichtsauffassung*, pp. 87–89.

21. *Nikki*, I, 225.
22. *Ibid.*, p. 235.
23. *Ogiwara Shigehide dangaisho*, p. 44. Hakuseki's insistence in this memorial on preserving his own personal integrity as an upholder of the Way becomes even more apparent when the memorial is compared to a summation of it made by Muro Kyūsō. Kyūsō wrote that, when he read the memorial "I felt tears come to my eyes. I see before me a rare thing in these days," I said. "I would like to rewrite it in Chinese so that it may be transmitted to the hundred generations to come, an example to later ages of the attitude of a loyal vassal." However, in summarizing this particular passage, Kyūsō also reduced its force somewhat, for, in place of Hakuseki's statement that he did not wish to die a dog's death in taking on an unworthy opponent, Kyūsō described him as saying that his study of the classics had taught him that for "a vassal to kill an evil person at the side of his lord without the latter's order is equivalent to treason, and he could not commit an act condemned as wrong by the sages." *Kenzan hisaku*, pp. 309–311.
24. *Ogiwara Shigehide dangaisho*, p. 49.
25. "Tōjō shishū," p. 17a.
26. *Oritaku*, p. 188.
27. *Kenzan hisaku*, p. 283.
28. *Ibid.*; cf. Mencius, 3:A:4 (Legge, II, 255). Kyūsō gives Hakuseki's *haigō*, Tōin, and two *hokku* by him. On this basis, Shida Yoshihide has located *hokku* by Hakuseki in a contemporary collection, *Edo benkei*, published in 1680. Shida notes that, in style, Hakuseki's *haikai* belongs to the witty Teimon mode (*Haibungaku no kōsatsu*, pp. 208–212).
29. Letter to Sakuma Dōgan, *AHZ*, V, 430.
30. *Ibid.*, p. 540.

FIVE: ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF BAKUFU RULE

1. Ienobu's reign began in the 6th year of the Hōei era (1709); the era name was changed to Shōtoku in 1711. For purposes of simplicity, however, Shōtoku may be used to refer to the entire span of the reigns of Ienobu and Ietsugu. The era name was changed from Shōtoku to Kyōhō in 1716, the first year of Yoshimune's reign, and that name continued to be used until 1735. The majority of the reforms associated with Yoshimune's reign took place during those 20 years; thus Kyōhō will be used here to denote Yoshimune's reign as a whole.
2. See, for instance, Ōishi Shinzaburō, *Genroku jidai*, pp. 180, 183.
3. *Ibid.*, pp. 72–78; Taya, pp. 145–167.
4. Taya, pp. 186–189.
5. *Jikki*, VII, 273–274.
6. *Ibid.*, VII, 273.

7. Itō Tasaburō, “Edo bakufu Shōtoku no kahei kaichū,” pp. 12–25; Tsuji Tatsuya, *Kyōhō*, pp. 187–226.
8. *Jikki*, VII, 272–274; *Osuregaki Kanpō shūsei*, ed. Takayanagi Shinzō, et al., pp. 903–905; hereafter cited as *Kanpō shūsei*.
9. *Oritaku*, pp. 313–314, 319–320.
10. *Kenzan hisaku*, p. 260.
11. *Oritaku*, p. 320.
12. *Hakuseki kengi* (Nos. 4, 5, 7, and 8), *AHZ*, Vol. VI. A summary of and selected excerpts from Nos. 4, 5, and 8 may be found in Neil Skene Smith, “An Introduction to Some Japanese Economic Writings of the Eighteenth Century,” pp. 42–67, 99–104.
13. *Hakuseki kengi* (No. 4), *AHZ*, VI, 191–193.
14. *Hakuseki kengi* (No. 5), *AHZ*, VI, 208–209.
15. Taya, pp. 273–274; Itō Tasaburō, “Edo bakufu Shōtoku no kahei kaichū,” pp. 14–15, 22.
16. Presumably the *rōjū* are the “authorities” (*shikarubeki hitobito*) whose objections Hakuseki sought to answer in *Kengi* 4. See pp. 199–200.
17. Itō Tasaburō, “Edo bakufu Shōtoku no kahei kaichū,” pp. 6–7.
18. *Hakuseki kengi* (No. 4), p. 201.
19. Tsuji Tatsuya, *Kyōhō*, p. 196.
20. Taya, pp. 273–274; Itō Tasaburō, “Edo bakufu Shōtoku no kahei kaichū,” pp. 14–15.
21. *Oritaku*, p. 357. For Hakuseki’s proposal, see *Kengi* 5.
22. *Kanseifu*, VIII, 80–81; *Jikki*, VII, 233, 357.
23. *Oritaku*, p. 357.
24. *Nikki*, I, 7, 256; Nomura, p. 17.
25. Ōishi, *Genroku jidai*, pp. 170–173; Takao Kazuhiko, “Keizai kōzō no henka to Kyōhō kaikaku,” pp. 15–16.
26. *Nikki*, I, 136.
27. See note 29, Chapter 3.
28. *Kanseifu*, VIII, 80–81. As discussed in the following section, currency policy had a direct bearing on the trade conducted through Nagasaki. Thus, Hagiwara’s appointment as *Nagasaki bugyō* in 1736 indicates a close association with the new monetary policy adopted that year.
29. A brief note to his disciple, Dohi Motonari, shows Hakuseki trying to master, not with total success, the principles of long division: “According to the text, 5376 divided by 72 gives 74 with 40 left over. You say that it should be 74 with 66 left over. This seems too much to me. Is there any way to make the remainder come out to 40? Would you please work it through again for me?” (*AHZ*, V, 152). Unless the *AHZ* version of this letter incorporates a mistake in transcription, both the “text” and Motonari were wrong (the correct answer is 74 with a remainder of

- 48). The episode demonstrates Hakuseki's initiative in delving into a subject considered more appropriate to merchants than to *bushi* and Confucians, but it also suggests the difficulties he must have confronted in dealing with fiscal subjects.
30. For a concise discussion of the overall patterns and evolution of Tokugawa foreign trade, see Numata Jirō, "Edo jidai no bōeki to taigai kankei," pp. 41–76, and Tashiro Kazui, "Foreign Relations During the Edo Period: *Sakoku* Reexamined."
 31. Numata, pp. 46–55.
 32. Ibid.; Yamawaki Teijirō notes that, in 1685, the number of Chinese boats coming to trade was almost four times that of the previous year, 85 compared to 24 (Yamawaki Teijirō, *Nagasaki no Tōjin bōeki*, p. 50).
 33. Numata, pp. 56–58; Yamawaki, pp. 72, 86–93. The transcription of *shiromonogae* is Yamawaki's; Kurita (*Bunchi seiji*, p. 379) reads the same term as *daimotsugae*.
 34. Yamawaki, p. 57.
 35. Asao Naohiro notes that, in 1701–1702, these fees amounted to 10% of bakufu income ("Shōgun seiji no kenryoku kōzō," p. 48).
 36. Numata, pp. 55–59.
 37. Kurita, *Bunchi seiji*, pp. 381–384; Yamawaki, pp. 101–104.
 38. *Jikki*, VII, 381–382.
 39. Ibid., VII, 413–417; *Tsūkō ichiran*, IV, 369–383; Numata, pp. 60–61; Yamawaki, pp. 140–145. One *kin* equals approximately 600 grams.
 40. *Tsūkō ichiran*, IV, 68–69, 369–383.
 41. Yamawaki, pp. 153–155.
 42. Ōishi, *Genroku jidai*, p. 183.
 43. *Honchō hōka tsūyō jiryaku*, AHZ, III, 673–674; *Hakuseki kengi* (No. 6), AHZ, VI, 242; *Oritaku*, p. 316.
 44. *Hakuseki kengi* (No. 6), p. 245; *Honchō hōka tsūyō jiryaku*, p. 674.
 45. To some extent, this was already recognized as necessary. Numata notes that limitations on the import of raw silk were established in 1698 (p. 59).
 46. *Jikki*, VII, 331; *Oritaku*, p. 317; Kurita, *Bunchi seiji*, pp. 442–443.
 47. Holograph letter in the possession of Yōmei Bunko, Kyoto (document 37181); Kurita quotes this letter in *Bunchi seiji*, pp. 444–445.
 48. *Kanseifu*, II, 103.
 49. See the letters exchanged between Ōoka and Hakuseki quoted by Kurita, *Bunchi seiji*, pp. 381–399. Ōoka's letters were preserved because Hakuseki later used their reverse side to write a draft of *Nantōshi*, a study of the geography of the Ryukyu Islands.
 50. Kurita, *Bunchi seiji*, pp. 436–438.
 51. *Nikki*, II, 199.
 52. *Kenzan hisaku*, pp. 412–414.
 53. *Tsūkō ichiran*, IV, 363.
 54. Tashiro, "Foreign Relations," pp. 296–298; Tashiro Kazui, *Kinsei Nitchō tsūkō*

- bōekishi no kenkyū*. In the latter work, see especially, pp. 269–271.
55. Tashiro, *Nitchō bōeki*, pp. 305–313, 335. What is referred to here as “coined” silver actually was lumps of irregular size (*chōgin*). Given a specified silver content, the value of a particular *chōgin* depended on its weight.
56. Tashiro, “Foreign Relations,” pp. 300, 305 (emphasis in the original); *Nitchō bōeki*, p. 338.
57. *Hakuseki kengi* (No. 5), p. 213; Tashiro, *Nitchō bōeki*, p. 336.
58. Tashiro, *Nitchō bōeki*, pp. 334–341.
59. The following discussion of local administration under Tsunayoshi and Yoshi-mune is based largely on Tsuji Tatsuya, *Kyōhō*, pp. 62–75, 146–170, and Kitajima, pp. 327–356. Kitajima (pp. 331, 353) notes that, until the *Kyōhō* period, there often were a substantially larger number of *daikan* at any one time.
60. Ibid., p. 35; *Kanpō shūsei*, p. 688.
61. Fukai, “Tsunayoshi seiken no shutai seiryoku,” p. 240.
62. *Oritaku*, p. 299.
63. Tsuji Tatsuya, *Kyōhō*, p. 173.
64. *Jikki*, VII, 240–241; *Kanpō shūsei*, pp. 679–680.
65. *Kanpō shūsei*, p. 681.
66. Ibid., pp. 688–693, 707–710.
67. Ibid., p. 690.
68. Ibid., p. 709.
69. Tsuji Tatsuya, *Kyōhō*, pp. 146–147; *Kinreikō zenshū* IV, 139.
70. Watanabe Nobuo, “Kaidō to suiun,” pp. 302, 305.
71. Maruyama Yasunari, “Kinsei no kötsū to kanri,” pp. 122–124; Maruyama, *Kinsei shukueki no kisoteki kenkyū*, I, 143–145.
72. Watanabe Nobuo, pp. 309–313, 326–327.
73. *Kanpō shūsei*, pp. 650–651; *Dainihon teikoku ekitei shikō kōshō*, p. 211.
74. Maruyama, *Kinsei shukueki no kisoteki kenkyū*, I, 145–147; *Ekikanroku*, II, 100–105; *Dainihon teikoku ekitei shikō kōshō*, pp. 219, 227–229.
75. *Oritaku*, pp. 290–291.
76. Ibid., pp. 293–294.
77. To be sure, despite the favorable views of the *dōchū bugyō*, there evidently were problems with the system of *yoriki* and *dōshin*, for it was abolished a few years later in 1724. Thereafter the bakufu seems to have reverted to relying on the *daikan* to supervise the operation of the post-station system. Perhaps the bakufu leaders looked to the closer overall regulation of the *daikan* achieved in this period to resolve some of the problems noted earlier in *daikan* supervision of the post-station system. To regulate the activities of the long-distance porters, the bakufu relied increasingly on the self-regulating structure of the transport associations (*bikyakudoiya*), a policy that fit in with the general effort of this period to regulate economic activities through mercantile associations to which the bakufu

granted official recognition. See *Dainihon teikoku ekitei shikō kōshō*, pp. 238–296 *passim*; Maruyama, *Kinsei shukueki no kisoteki kenkyū*, I, 147–148; Watanabe Nobuo, pp. 326–327.

SIX: ROLE OF THE RULER IN THE BAKUHAN STATE

1. Mizubayashi Takeshi, “Kinsei no hō to kokusei kenkyū josetsu (2),” pp. 213–214; Nagahara Keiji, *Nihon chūsei no shakai to kokka*, p. 198. For a discussion of *kōgi*, see the articles by Sasaki Junnosuke, Asao Naohiro, and Katsumata Shizuo in *Japan Before Tokugawa*, ed. J. W. Hall, et al.
2. On the *kōsatsu*, see Harafuji Hiroshi, *Bakufubō to hanpō*, pp. 543–594; *Kanpō shūsei*, pp. 38–66.
3. Harafuji, p. 565.
4. Asao Naohiro argues that the Keian *ofuregaki* was an “unusual instance” of the bakufu’s issuing an edict directly to the populace of the entire nation and sees it as a symbol of the completion of the bakufu *kōgi* structure (“Shōgun seiji no kenryoku kōzō,” p. 33). However, Hiramatsu Yoshirō points out that the Keian *ofuregaki* was addressed originally just to the population of the *tenryō* (“Kinsei hō,” pp. 338, 346–347). Harafuji makes the same point (p. 32). As Harold Bolitho points out, the daimyo might be expected to share the perspective of the bakufu regarding exhortations of this sort to the populace (p. 27).
5. Hiramatsu, “Kinsei hō,” p. 365. For an evaluation of the various nuances in the relationship between bakufu and *han* law, see Harafuji, pp. 17–78.
6. *Kinreikō*, zenshū V, 149–150.
7. Kimura Motoi, “Chōsan to uttae,” pp. 217, 228–230. See also Sone Hiromi, “Kyō-hōki no soshō saibanken to uttae,” p. 281.
8. Harafuji, pp. 566–567; *Jikkō*, V, 449.
9. Kurita, *Edo jidai*, p. 572; Tsukamoto Manabu, “Tsunayoshi seiken no rekishiteki ichi o megutte,” p. 46.
10. Hiramatsu, “Kinsei hō,” pp. 336–337.
11. Beatrice Bodart-Bailey discusses the *shōrui awaremi no rei* in “The Laws of Compassion.”
12. On these points, see Tsukamoto Manabu, “Bakuhan kankei kara mita shōrui awaremi seisaku” and “Tsunayoshi seiken no rekishiteki ichi o megutte,” pp. 38–45.
13. Tsukamoto, “Tsunayoshi seiken no rekishiteki ichi o megutte,” p. 45.
14. *Jikkō*, V, 430.
15. Ibid., V, 437; VI, 732.
16. Hiramatsu, “Kinsei hō,” pp. 356–357; Hiramatsu, *Kinsei keiji soshōbō no kenkyū*, p. 3.
17. *Kanpō shūsei*, p. 1172; Hiramatsu, *Kinsei keiji soshōbō*, pp. 9–13.

18. Hiramatsu, *Kinsei keiji soshōhō*, pp. 4–9; Tsukamoto, “Bakuhan kankei kara mita shōrui awaremi seisaku,” pp. 237–238.
19. *Kanpō shūsei*, p. 679.
20. *Mencius*, 1:B:11 (Legge, II, 171).
21. *Oritaku*, p. 239; for the amnesty see *Jikki*, VII, 11–14. A further amnesty was held a few months later on the occasion of the ceremonies of shogunal accession (*ibid.*, VII, 45).
22. Tsukamoto, “Bakuhan kankei kara mita shōrui awaremi seisaku,” pp. 227–228.
23. *Tokushi yoron*, p. 430.
24. *Jikki*, VII, 250.
25. *Oritaku*, pp. 403–405.
26. *Ibid.*, pp. 405–407.
27. *Ibid.*, pp. 320–322.
28. *Ibid.*, pp. 238–239. Previously, in 1707, when Ienobu was still shogunal heir, Hakuseki had recommended the extension of an amnesty to the inhabitants of daimyo domains on the occasion of the birth of Ienobu’s eldest son (*Nikki*, II, 31). His suggestion was not adopted.
29. *Oritaku*, p. 241.
30. Tsukamoto, “Bakuhan kankei kara mita shōrui awaremi seisaku,” pp. 239–240; *Nikki*, II, 81.
31. *Oritaku*, pp. 280–284.
32. *Ibid.*, p. 282.
33. *Ibid.*, pp. 284–286.
34. *Ibid.*, pp. 283–284.
35. *Ogiwara Shigehide dangasho*, p. 42.
36. The Asano case was that of Asano Naganori, who, in 1701, wounded another Tokugawa vassal within Edo Castle and was consequently ordered to commit suicide. Contrary to the established practice of punishing both parties to a quarrel, no bakufu action was taken against his opponent. It was this point that aroused the ire of the “samurai of the realm,” who regarded the bakufu handling of the case as arbitrary and partial. Bakufu punishment of the 46 former Asano vassals who hunted down the opponent their lord had failed to kill was another controversial issue. See Bitō, *Genroku jidai*, pp. 297–323 and Tahara Tsuguo, *Akō shijūrokushi ron*.
37. *Jikki*, IX, 245–246.
38. Sone, pp. 279–285.
39. *Kanpō shūsei*, pp. 1205–1206; *Jikki*, IX, 58; Tsuji Tatsuya, *Kyōbō*, pp. 119–122.
40. For instance, the *jibun shioiki rei* was addressed explicitly to the daimyo, not the daimyo and *hatamoto* (Hiramatsu, *Kinsei keiji soshōhō*, pp. 13–14). For a detailed discussion of the judicial competence of the *hatamoto* compared to that of the daimyo, see *ibid.*, pp. 245–299.

41. Sone points out that, while the *bugyō* did not hear first appeals from *tenryō* inhabitants, they customarily did hear first appeals from the inhabitants of *hata-moto* domains. The same order of the *rōjū* commanded the *bugyō* to stop the latter practice, thus reaffirming the jurisdictional hierarchy (Sone, pp. 279–282).
42. Ibid., pp. 286–294.
43. Tsuji Tatsuya, *Kyōhō*, p. 27.

SEVEN: BAKUFU ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE

1. Hiramatsu, “Kinsei hō,” p. 335.
2. *Kinreikō*, kōshū I, 2–10; Matsudaira, pp. 676–680.
3. Ōishi Shinzaburō, “Ōoka Echizen no kami Tadasuke nikki,” pp. 2–3.
4. *Kinreikō*, kōshū I, 2–12; Matsudaira, pp. 676–680.
5. Kitahara, p. 123.
6. Fukai Masaumi, “Tsunayoshi seiken no shōbatsu genmei saku ni tsuite,” pp. 386–388.
7. Ibid., pp. 386–387; Kitajima, pp. 420–424.
8. Fukai, “Tsunayoshi seiken no shōbatsu genmei saku,” pp. 391–398.
9. *Kōji ruien*, kan’i bu III, 617; *Jikki*, V, 376; VI, 214. As noted in Chapter 3 (note 46), there is a certain amount of confusion about the practice of sending attendants to observe *hyōjōsho* meetings. References in the *Tokugawa jikki* to Ienobu’s actions in this regard state that he revived a custom abandoned in the previous reign. However, the *Jikki* entries cited here demonstrate that Tsunayoshi made similar use of his attendants. The editors of *Kōji ruien* take Tsunayoshi’s action in this regard as inaugurating the custom of *sobayōnin* observing the meetings of the *hyōjōsho*. Fukai Masaumi recently has suggested that the discrepancy in the *Jikki* accounts may refer to Tsunayoshi’s shift to sending a *sobayōnin* instead of a *sobashū* to the *hyōjōsho* meetings (“Edo bakufu shoki no sobashū ni tsuite,” pp. 197–205).
10. Hiramatsu, “Kinsei hō,” pp. 339–340; Naitō Chisō, “Tokugawa-shi shisei no taiii,” pp. 1220–1221. For developments in Tokugawa judicial practice, see Dan F. Henderson, *Conciliation and Japanese Law*, I, 63–97.
11. Hiramatsu, “Kinsei hō,” pp. 339–340.
12. Matsudaira, pp. 695–696.
13. Hiramatsu, “Kinsei hō,” p. 362.
14. *Jikki*, VIII, 226; IX, 157.
15. Izui Asako, “Tashidaka-sei ni kansuru ichi kōsatsu,” pp. 307–312.
16. Ibid., pp. 312–317; Tsuji Tatsuya, *Kyōhō*, pp. 131–134.
17. *Kenzan hisaku*, p. 377; Tsuji Tatsuya, *Kyōhō*, pp. 102–103.
18. *Kinreikō*, zenshū II, 147; Tsuji Tatsuya, *Kyōhō*, pp. 102–103.
19. Ōishi, “Ōoka Echizen no kami Tadasuke nikki,” pp. 8–16; Ōishi, “Hōryaku-

- Tenmei ki no bakusei,” pp. 152–154. See also Fukai, “Kishū hanshi no baku-shinka to Kyōhō kaikaku.”
20. Tsuji Tatsuya, *Tokugawa Yoshimune*, pp. 47–50; *Jikki*, IX, 159.
 21. Tsuji Tatsuya, *Kyōhō*, pp. 119–120.
 22. *Kenzan hisaku*, pp. 309, 306–307, 288–289; *Oritaku*, pp. 349–352.
 23. *Shintei no an*, pp. 269–270.
 24. *Hakuseki kengi* (No. 1 [“Shosei kengi”]), *AHZ*, VI, 162.
 25. Ibid., pp. 162–167; *Hakuseki kengi* (No. 2), *AHZ*, VI, 174–180.
 26. Izui, p. 316.
 27. Ibid., p. 314; Muro Kyūsō, *Kenkaroku*, pp. 167–173.
 28. *Kenzan hisaku*, pp. 327–328.
 29. For a discussion of the relationship between the legend of Ōoka Tadasuke (*Echizen no kami*) and the historical figure, see Tsuji Tatsuya, *Ōoka Echizen no kami, meibugyō no kyozō to jitsuzō*.
 30. *Nihon rekishi chimei taikei*, XXVII, 92–93; Ikeda Akira, “Sonraku ni okeru ken’i shinkō,” pp. 249–250. I am indebted to Umezawa Fumiko for drawing my attention to the latter source.
 31. *Oritaku*, pp. 256–257.
 32. Ibid. The actual decree is cited in “Yase ki,” a manuscript account of this incident, which is cited in turn in Ikeda, p. 251.
 33. “Yase ki,” cited in Ikeda, pp. 253–254.
 34. *Oritaku*, pp. 256–257.
 35. Ibid., p. 257.
 36. “Yase ki,” cited in Ikeda, pp. 253–254.
 37. Ikeda, pp. 255–261; cf. *Kanseifu*, XV, 192.
 38. *Kanpō shūsei*, pp. 20–21.
 39. Ibid., pp. 23–24.
 40. *Oritaku*, p. 407.
 41. Hiramatsu, “Kinsei hō,” p. 368.
 42. Tsuji Tatsuya, *Kyōhō*, pp. 121–122; *Kenzan hisaku*, pp. 621–622.
 43. *Oritaku*, p. 400.
 44. Ibid., pp. 400–401.
 45. *Kanpō shūsei*, p. 21.
 46. *Kenzan hisaku*, pp. 260–261.
 47. Ibid., p. 326.
 48. *Oritaku*, pp. 423–424.

EIGHT: RESHAPING THE SYMBOLS OF SHOGUNAL AUTHORITY

1. Yuasa Jōzan, *Bunkai zakki*, p. 653.
2. Tsuji Tatsuya, *Kyōhō*, p. 87.

3. Asao Naohiro, “Bakuhansei to tennō,” pp. 210–221.
4. Ibid., pp. 212–220; Asao, “Shogun seiji no kenryoku kōzō,” pp. 5–7; Tsuji Zennosuke, *Nihon bunkashi*, V, 142–151; *Kinreikō*, zenshū I, 2; *Kugyō bunin*, III, 552–554.
5. Ronald Toby, *State and Diplomacy in Early Modern Japan*, pp. 34–35, 72–73.
6. Ibid., pp. 64–69.
7. Ishin Süden, *Honkō kokushi nikki*, III, 160; *Nikkōshishi*, II, 81–82.
8. *Jikki*, II, 95.
9. *Honkō kokushi nikki*, III, 183–184, 188–189; *Jikki*, II, 98; *Nikkōshishi*, II, 83–84.
- Ieyasu had been initiated into the Yoshida Shinto tradition; despite Tenkai’s assertions, which were adopted by the *Jikki* account, he had no connection with the by then largely moribund Sannō Shinto tradition. Süden and other priests associated with the bakufu opposed Tenkai’s plan to deify Ieyasu as a *gongen*. Instead they favored deification in the better established Yoshida Shinto tradition as a *myōjin*. By contrast, Tenkai evidently looked to this occasion as an opportunity to restore the fortunes of the Sannō school of Shinto, and he is regarded as the essential founder of the resultant Sannō Ichijitsu tradition. Tsuji Tatsuya, *Edo kaifu*, pp. 292–295; Asao Naohiro, *Sakoku*, pp. 271–273.
10. *Honkō kokushi nikki*, III, 231–232; 293–294; *Jikki*, II, 101, 106, 120–125; *Nikkōshishi*, II, 85–96.
11. Asao, “Bakuhansei to tennō,” p. 221; *Jikki*, II, 638, 648, 658–660; Tsuji Tatsuya, *Edo kaifu*, pp. 390–391.
12. Toby, *State and Diplomacy*, pp. 76–97.
13. Tenkai’s efforts to elaborate the Ieyasu cult are discussed briefly by Asao, *Sakoku*, pp. 273–274, and more fully by Herman Ooms, *Tokugawa Ideology*, pp. 175–183.
14. *Nikkōshishi*, II, 151–158; Asao, *Sakoku*, pp. 276–279; *Koji ruien*, jingi bu I, 345–347; IV, 778, 827; *Jikki*, III, 420, 436.
15. Toby, *State and Diplomacy*, pp. 97–103, 203–204.
16. Tsuji Zennosuke, *Nihon bunkashi*, V, 148.
17. Asaka Tanpaku, *Tōgen iji*, p. 329.
18. Asao, *Sakoku*, p. 276.
19. *Koji ruien*, saiji bu, 630–631.
20. Herman Ooms acknowledges that envoys were sent by the bakufu to Ise as well as by the court to Nikkō and points out that the bakufu evidently persuaded the court to dispatch the envoys by agreeing to the restoration of the annual sending of imperial envoys to Ise, a practice that had ceased during the Sengoku period. He concludes, however, that this “bakufu . . . concession . . . did not [alter] the asymmetry of the situation.” *Tokugawa Ideology*, p. 184. In my opinion, it is more plausible to see the reciprocal dispatch of court and bakufu envoys alike to Ise and Nikkō as reflecting a symmetrical rather than asymmetrical arrangement.
21. Tsuji Tatsuya, *Edo kaifu*, pp. 303–304.

22. Bitō Masahide, “Kinseishi josetsu,” p. 19.
23. Asao argues that a major reason for Ieyasu’s ultimate decision to eliminate the Toyotomi may have been the grant of *kan’i* to 14 of Hideyori’s retainers without the recommendation of the Tokugawa (“Bakuhansei to tennō,” pp. 215–216).
24. *Koji ruien*, *jingi bu* IV, 852–853; *Nikkōshishi*, II, 431–434. The sepulchre dating from the reconstruction during the reign of Iemitsu had been damaged in an earthquake in 1683.
25. Tsuji Zennosuke, *Bunkashi*, V, 232–233. The rest remained unlocatable.
26. Ibid., V, 234; *Koji ruien*, *teiō bu*: 1303, *jingi bu* I, 943–948.
27. *Analects* 16:2:1; modified from Legge, I, 310.
28. Sima Guang, *Zizhi tongjian*, I, 2185–2186.
29. Ibid., I, 2–6; Rai Tsutomu, “Kaisetsu,” pp. 496–498.
30. *Tokushi yoron*, p. 186. Masuda Takashi, the editor of the annotated edition of *Tokushi yoron* contained in the Nihon shisō taikei volume on Hakuseki, argues that Hakuseki in fact viewed the designation of Seiwa, despite his youth, as the appropriate choice because the mothers of Montoku’s other sons were of inferior social status (“Kaidai,” pp. 605–612). However, the whole thrust of Hakuseki’s argument clearly indicates otherwise.
31. *Tokushi yoron*, p. 428.
32. Ibid., p. 369.
33. Ibid., p. 277.
34. Hakuseki’s view of Christianity also illustrates the importance he put on sustaining the undivided authority of the ruler. In his initial recommendations about what to do about Sidotti, the Italian priest who attempted to enter Japan, he noted that “the emergence of rebellious vassals and sons will follow inevitably” upon the spread of Christianity and suggested that the rise of Christianity in China was a major factor in the fall of the Ming (*Tenshukyō taii*, pp. 191–200). In *Seiyō kibun*, he spells out the reasons why this should be so. According to the Way of the Sages, only the ruler was to serve heaven directly; to prevent disruption of the hierarchical order, all others should honor heaven indirectly; a vassal should serve heaven by being loyal to his lord, and a son should serve heaven by being filial to his father. In contrast to this assumption, the Christians held that Deus was the father of all and the lord of the universe. What, then, became of one’s relationship to one’s own father and lord? Hakuseki asked. “If beyond one’s lord there is a greater lord one should serve and beyond one’s father there is a greater father one should serve, and if the authority of this great lord and father is regarded as superior to that of one’s own lord and father, there will be two authorities within the family and two lords within the nation.” Should conflict arise between the two, commitment to the Christian god might well lead “one to assassinate one’s lord, murder one’s father without hesitation” (*Seiyō kibun*, p. 79).
35. *Saishikō*, AHZ, VI, 484–487.

36. *Shintei no an*, p. 266.
37. *Oritaku*, p. 239. In accordance with Hakuseki's recommendation, a special nationwide amnesty was announced on the occasion of Ienobu's investiture as shogun (*Jikki*, VII, 45).
38. *Shintei no an*, p. 265. The reference is to *Analects* 3:1 (Legge, I, 154).
39. *Buke kan'i shōzoku kō*, AHZ, VI, 478. Hakuseki's account of this episode follows that in the *Shiji* almost word for word. See Burton Watson, tr., *Records of the Grand Historian of China*, I, 293–295.
40. Letter to Sakuma Dōgan, AHZ, V, 437.
41. *Buke kan'i shōzoku kō*, p. 481.
42. Ibid., pp. 480–481.
43. Kurita, *Bunchi seiji*, pp. 246–249; *Jikki*, VII, 227. Regarding court dress, see *Koji ruien*, *fukushoku bu*, 295, 527–528, and *Shin'ya mondō*, the detailed questionnaire on such matters that Hakuseki submitted to the court noble Nonomiya Sadamoto on the occasion of his visit to Kyoto in 1710 (AHZ, VI, 566–616).
44. Kurita, *Bunchi seiji*, pp. 246–249; *Koji ruien*, *kyokyo bu*, 828–829.
45. Itō Tasaburō, "Shōgun Nihon kokuō to shōso—sono shiteki igi," pp. 4–5; Nakamura Hidetaka, *Nissen kankeishi no kenkyū*, II, 24–27.
46. Nakamura, II, 197–212.
47. Ibid., III, 264–267. Tashiro Kazui provides a vivid account of the circumstances surrounding this and subsequent Tsushima forgeries in *Kakikaerareta kokusho*.
48. Nakamura, III, 282–283.
49. Itō Tasaburō, "Shugō mondai to shōgun no ken'i," p. 5; *Shugō jiryaku*, AHZ, III, 632–633; Tashiro, *Kakikaerareta kokusho*, pp. 39–41.
50. There is some controversy over whether on the occasion of the 1624 embassy Süden held firm on the use of no title whatsoever by the shogun or agreed to the shogun's signing himself as *kokushu*, which was then changed in Tsushima to *kokuō*. Itō Tasaburō argues for the former ("Shugō mondai to shōgun no ken'i," pp. 5–7). Cf. Nakamura, III, 290. For the background of the title *taikun* and the process of settling upon it, see Nakamura, III, 482, and Itō, "Shugō mondai," p. 6. Ronald Toby raises questions about the traditional attribution of the choice of the title *taikun* to Razan, but the evidence he cites does not seem strong enough to overturn it (*State and Diplomacy*, pp. 85–87).
51. Toby, *State and Diplomacy*, pp. 178–189.
52. Ibid., p. 180.
53. *Chōsenkoku shinsho no shiki no koto*, AHZ, IV, 671 (based on the holograph ms in Naikaku Bunko). The Yōmei Bunko collection of correspondence between Hakuseki and Konoe Motohiro and Ichiro contains a holograph ms of the same title corresponding, with minor differences, to the first half of the AHZ text, another holograph ms entitled "Honchō buke shōgōkō," corresponding to the second half, and a third related piece, "Honchō shōgun no shōko," not included

in the *AHZ* text (documents 89980, 89982, and 89981 respectively). This tripart work fits the notation in Hakuseki's diary of having submitted on 1710/4/20 "three pieces on [the title] *kokuō*" (*kokuō kō santsū*). *Nikki*, II, 114. As discussed in Chapters 9 and 12, Hakuseki conferred extensively with the Konoe concerning preparations for the embassy.

54. Letter from the Sō Edoyashiki *rusuiyaku* Sugimura Saburōzaemon to Tsushima, 1711/2/13, reporting on a meeting with Hakuseki and a subsequent letter from him. The text is given in Takeda Katsuzō, "Sōke shiryō ni yoru fukugō ikken," p. 42.
55. Ibid.
56. *Kokusho fukugō kiji*, *AHZ*, IV, 705–706; Kurita, *Bunchi seiji*, pp. 476–477.
57. See the holograph letter to the Konoe of 1711/7/16 (Yōmei Bunko document 90005) and "Chōsen shinshi taigū kaikaku an," the holograph draft of a memorandum on protocol for the embassy formerly owned by Mr. Shimizu Yoshitada and now in the possession of Keiō University Library.
58. "Chōsen shinshi taigū an."
59. See the description of the food, furnishings, and gifts supplied by various daimyo in Kurita, *Bunchi seiji*, pp. 504–511.
60. I have focused here primarily on the domestic implications of these changes; as Chapter 12 will show, they also had bearing on the posture of Japan vis-à-vis the outside world.
61. *Nikki*, II, 92–105.
62. *Oritaku*, p. 272.
63. For the communications between Hakuseki and Tsushima, see Takeda, pp. 39–53.
64. In a letter to the Konoe written the summer preceding the embassy, Hakuseki noted that it was to be expected that the Koreans would object to many of the changes in protocol, and that, while the Tsushima officials were to be entrusted with the handling of any disputes that arose on the road, he planned to call personally on the envoys in Edo "to discuss *rei*." In that situation, he continued, it would be "improper for the honor of Japan for me to have [only] the status of *hoi*," the style of dress allowed bakufu officials not prominent enough to be awarded court rank and office, a status that Hakuseki had, in fact, obtained only the month before. The reason for the impropriety was that, while the bakufu *jusha* "will all be meeting with the scholars (*gakushi*) [attached to the embassy] as holders of the status of *hoi*," those with whom Hakuseki would be dealing were the leaders of the embassy, all of whom held high court rank. This letter is cited in Naitō Konan, "Hakuseki no ichi ibun ni tsuite," pp. 20–21. Unfortunately, this letter and several of the others transcribed or paraphrased in Naitō's article are no longer to be found in the Yōmei Bunko collection of materials pertaining to the relationship between Hakuseki and the Konoe.

65. *Oritaku*, p. 263.
66. For the Korean response to Hakuseki's modifications of protocol and change in the shogunal title, see Ronald Toby, "Korean-Japanese Diplomacy in 1711: Suk-chong's Court and the Shogun's Title."
67. *Mei o hōjite Chōsen shikaku ni kyōyu su*, AHZ, IV, 661; cf. *Liji xunzuan*, juan I, 2a.
68. *Oritaku*, pp. 267–268; Konoe Motohiro, "Motohiro kō ki," kan LXVIII, entry for 1711/11/4. A transcription of this entry is contained in Tokutomi, p. 221.
69. See *Chōsen shinshi shinken gichū*, *Chōsen shinshi shikyō gichū*, *Chōsen shinshi jiken gichū*, AHZ, IV, 545–660.
70. Takagi Shōsaku, "Edo bakufu no seiritsu," pp. 144–147.
71. *Kinreikō*, zenshū I, 61–62.
72. Hiramatsu, "Kinsei hō," p. 335.
73. *Kinreikō*, zenshū I, 63–65.
74. Ibid., zenshū I, 61–75.
75. Asao, "Shogun seiji no kenryoku kōzō," p. 46.
76. *Kinreikō*, zenshū I, 66–67.
77. Hakuseki's version of the *Buke shohatto* may be found in ibid., pp. 67–70. See also his commentary on his version of the *Buke shohatto*, *Shinrei kukai*, in *Nihon keizai taiten*, IV, 265–274.
78. *Shinrei kukai*, pp. 265–268.
79. *Tōkushi yoron*, p. 369.
80. *Buke kan'i shōzoku kō*, 471. Much the same point is made by Fujii Jōji, "Bakuhan kanryōsei ron," 348–349.
81. *Buke kan'i shōzoku kō*, p. 471.
82. Ibid., p. 473.
83. Ogyū Sorai, *Seidan*, p. 348; Tahara Tsuguo, "Kinsei chūki no seiji shisō to kokka ishiki," p. 324.
84. Ogyū Sorai, pp. 349–350.
85. *Buke kan'i shōzoku kō*, pp. 469–470.
86. Ibid., p. 472.
87. Ibid., pp. 472–473.

NINE: ANSWERING CRITICS

1. Tokutomi, pp. 5, 46.
2. *Oritaku*, pp. 227–228, 247; *Nikki*, II, 79–80.
3. *Oritaku*, p. 247.
4. *Kenzan hisaku*, p. 263.
5. Ibid., pp. 262–263; *Oritaku*, pp. 330–336.
6. *Kenzan hisaku*, p. 262.
7. *Oritaku*, pp. 330–336; *Shōtoku nengō ben*, AHZ, VI, 148–151.

8. It is not clear precisely what felicitory envoys Hakuseki and Kyūsō referred to. One logical assumption is that they were the envoys responsible for announcing the succession of Ietsugu. However, the time of year of Ienobu's death makes it possible that they were the envoys sent by the bakufu with offerings to Ise and Nikkō every year on the 9th day of the 1st month. Alternatively, it may have been both. Bakufu records of the eventual sending of both categories make it clear that the envoys in question were not, as Miyazaki suggests (*Teihon oritaku shiba no ki shakugi*, p. 415), imperial envoys. For the bakufu records, see below, note 15.
9. *Kenzan hisaku*, pp. 266–267.
10. *Kanpō shūsei*, pp. 497–513; *Koji ruien*, reishiki bu II, 601.
11. *Oritaku*, pp. 325–326.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 325.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 326.
14. *Kenzan hisaku*, pp. 268–269. Cf. *Oritaku*, p. 327.
15. *Jikki*, VII, 283, 295. For the custom of “mourning in the heart” (*shinsō*), see *Koji ruien*, reishiki bu II, 686–687.
16. *Jikki*, IX, 183.
17. *Kenzan hisaku*, p. 383.
18. *Jikki*, VIII, 7; IX, 143.
19. *Ibid.*, VIII, 13–16; IX, 145, 185.
20. *Ibid.*, VIII, 61–62, 78; IX, 154.
21. Letter to Sakuma Dōgan, *AHZ*, V, 482.
22. *Ibid.*, pp. 436–437. Hakuseki here used the social categories of ancient China to delineate the contemporary categories of Japan.
23. *Hakuseki sensei ibun shū*, *AHZ*, V, 74; letter to Muro Kyūsō, *AHZ*, V, 392.
24. *Oritaku*, p. 426.
25. Letter to Sakuma Dōgan, *AHZ*, V, 452.
26. *Oritaku*, pp. 275–276; “Tōryō domo kōjōgaki fushin jōjō.”
27. “Meikun Kyōhō roku” (Nanki Bunko bon), p. 35b. This version of “Meikun Kyōhō roku” contains various details, including that cited here, which are not found in the published version contained in *Okina gusa*, XII, 325–326.
28. *Buke kan'i shōzoku kō*, p. 473.
29. *Ibid.*, p. 466.
30. “Tōryō domo kōjōgaki fushin jōjō.”
31. *Ibid.* The Kanto *kanrei* was a bakufu official stationed in Kamakura who exercised administrative jurisdiction over the eastern half of the country.
32. *Ibid.*
33. Asao, *Sakoku*, p. 137.
34. *Oritaku*, p. 276.
35. The texts of Amenomori Hōshū's letters to Hakuseki about this issue are included as an appendix entitled “Kokuō shōgō ron” in Yoshida Shōin's *Gaiban tsūryaku*.

36. Ibid., p. 245.
37. Ibid., p. 248.
38. Ibid., p. 246.
39. Yōmei Bunko document 90005.
40. Ibid. Hakuseki used on other occasions as well the argument that, far from infringing on the prerogatives of the court, his reforms would remove the usurpations of previous generations. Thus, for instance, in advocating the creation of a merit-rank system exclusively for vassals of the shogun, a step that might be seen as infringing upon one of the central remaining prerogatives of the court, he held up as a warning example of usurpatory behavior the competition among *bushi* for high court rank and office during the time of Hideyoshi. Asserting that infringement upon the perquisites of the court lay in such blurring of the distinctions between the court nobility and *bushi*, he went on to declare that the court should welcome the limitation of the *kan'i* offices held by *buke* and the creation of a new merit rank system for *bushi* (*Buke kan'i shōzoku kō*, pp. 469, 472–473). Similarly, he sought on other occasions to turn the tables on his opponents by asserting that some proposal of theirs overstepped the boundaries between court and *buke* jurisdiction. For instance, when Hayashi Nobuatsu called for change of the *nengō* Shōtoku, Hakuseki countered that, whatever apparent evidence to the contrary, *nengō*, as something under the jurisdiction of the tenno, had never been changed as a result of the death of a shogun; to call for a change because of the death of Ienobu would be to infringe on the prerogatives of the tenno (*Oritaku*, pp. 334–335; *Shōtoku nengō ben*, p. 150).
41. Amenomori Hōshū, “Kokuō shōgō ron,” p. 248.
42. Ibid., p. 242.
43. *Kokusho fukugō kiji*, p. 700.
44. *Shugō jiryaku*, p. 636.
45. Ibid., p. 638.
46. *Chōsenkoku shinsho no shiki no koto*, p. 672.
47. *Kokusho fukugō kiji*, p. 698. Hakuseki's reference to the Korean complaints took at face value the argument Tsushima used to try to convince the Tokugawa to adopt the title of *kokuō* in 1617. Itō Tasaburō points out that there was one instance of an Ashikaga shogun's referring to himself as *kokū* vis-à-vis Korea—Yoshizumi in the early sixteenth century (“Shōgun Nihon kokuō to shōsu,” p. 6).
48. Toby, *State and Diplomacy*, p. 79.
49. Hakuseki's discussion of the 1606 letter may be found in *Shugō jiryaku*, p. 631. He was attacked on this point by the Tsushima *jusha* Matsuura Kashō, who wrote a critique of *Shugō jiryaku*. Matsuura's comments on this point are given in *Tsūkō ichiran*, III, 86–87.
50. “Honchō shōgun no shōko,” Yōmei Bunko document 89981.
51. *Shugō jiryaku*, p. 633.

TEN: REAPPRAISAL OF IMPERIAL SOVEREIGNTY

1. *Nihon shoki*, ed. Sakamoto Tarō, et al., I, 382–417; II, 8–17; *Nibongi*, tr. W. G. Aston, I, 272–300, 399–407. For a concise analysis of the evidence concerning the existence of three dynasties, see Cornelius Kiley, “State and Dynasty in Archaic Yamato.”
2. Ichijō Kanera, *Nihon shoki sanso*, pp. 13, 30, 42.
3. Kitabatake Chikafusa, *Jinnō shōtōki*, ed. Iwasa Tadashi, et al., pp. 60–61; see also Paul Varley, tr., *A Chronicle of Gods and Sovereigns*, pp. 76–77.
4. Hayashi Razan, *Shintō denju*, p. 12.
5. Ibid., p. 13.
6. Ibid., p. 57.
7. Ibid., p. 29.
8. Ibid., pp. 24–25.
9. Ibid., pp. 35–36.
10. Hayashi Razan, *Jinmu tennō ron*, pp. 280–281.
11. Hayashi Razan, *Shintō denju*, p. 19.
12. Ibid., pp. 12–13.
13. *Koshitsū*, AHZ, III, 212.
14. Ibid., p. 216.
15. *Tōga*, AHZ, IV, 6.
16. *Koshitsū*, p. 211.
17. Ibid., p. 210. Regarding the impact of *kanji* on archaic Japanese, Hakuseki wrote in *Tōga* as follows: “The obscuring and loss of the meaning of the ancient vocabulary of our country appears in most cases to have been caused by the increasing use of *kanji* [for their own meaning] and the abandonment of the old literature [written in *kanji* used for their phonetic value]. If one examines this matter closely, the relationship between our words and their characters should necessarily be that of ‘master’ and ‘guest’. The words of our country transmitted from generation to generation since the beginning of time are the masters. The words introduced from abroad are guests. With the increasing use of *kanji*, the meaning of the two was joined and the guests became dominant. The guest became the master and the master became the guest. That anything remains of the meaning of the ancient words is simply due to good fortune” (*Tōga*, pp. 15–16).
18. *Koshitsū*, p. 212.
19. Ibid., pp. 212–216.
20. Matsumura Takeo, *Nihon shinwa no kenkyū*, I, 25–26.
21. *Koshitsū*, p. 219; see also *Tōga*, pp. 75–77.
22. *Koshitsū*, p. 225.
23. Ibid., pp. 219–220, 225–226.
24. *Koshitsū wakumon*, AHZ, III, 334; cf. *Nihon shoki*, I, 76–77; *Kojiki*, ed. Kurano

- Kenji, et al., pp. 50–51; *Sendai kuji hongi* [Kujiki], p. 3.
25. *Koshitsū*, pp. 227–228.
26. Ibid., pp. 229–230, 232.
27. Ibid., p. 228; cf. *Nihon shoki*, I, 80–81, 322–323.
28. *Koshitsū*, pp. 292–293. Cf. Kurano, ed., *Kojiki*, pp. 128–129; Donald Philippi, tr., *Kojiki*, p. 141.
29. *Koshitsū*, pp. 291–292. Hakuseki's view of the regalia is one area where his interpretation of *kamiyo* is seconded by modern scholarship. See the supplementary note on the regalia in *Nihon shoki*, I, 571.
30. *Shintō denju*, p. 26.
31. *Koshitsū wakumon*, p. 332. Cf. the *Kojiki*: “Next, when the land was young resembling floating oil and drifting like a jelly fish, there sprouted forth something like reed shoots. From these came into existence the deity Umashiashikabihi-kōji.” Philippi, p. 47; Kurano, ed., *Kojiki*, pp. 50–51.
32. *Koshitsū wakumon*, pp. 333–335. The AHZ text gives the name of the entity heading the *Kujiki* *kamiyo* genealogy as Ameyuzuruhi amenosagiri kuniyuzuruhi kuninosagiri.
33. *Koshitsū*, pp. 282–283; *Koshitsū wakumon*, pp. 376–377; cf. *Kujiki*, pp. 25–30. For the *Kojiki* and *Nihon shoki* accounts, see Philippi, p. 177; Aston, tr., *Nihongi*, I, 127–128. Hakuseki admitted that his version of these events differed considerably from that of the *Kujiki*, which joins a number of different stories. He declared that, in consolidating these stories into one consistent version, his intent was “to correct the errors and confusion [that have been introduced into the text] and restore it to its original form” (*Koshitsū wakumon*, p. 377). Nigihayahi was claimed as ancestor by the Mononobe, and the *Kujiki* evidently was compiled by someone with Mononobe connections. Matsumura Takeo notes that these factors presumably were behind the *Kujiki*'s elaboration of the connection between Amaterasu and Nigihayahi (Matsumura, I, 352–353).
34. *Koshitsū*, pp. 284–285; Ichigō Kanera, *Nihon shoki sanso*, p. 137; *Gengenshū*, ed. Hirata Toshiharu, p. 150. There is some question whether the *Gengenshū*, attributed to Kitabatake Chikafusa, is in fact by him. It may be noted, however, that, in *Jinnō shōtōki*, Chikafusa put Nigihayahi ahead of Ninigi in the line of descent from Amaterasu (*Jinnō shōtōki*, p. 58). In a letter to Sakuma Dōgan, Hakuseki pursued yet another method of historicizing the *kamiyo*, thereby making it into something of relative rather than absolute value. The unearthing of *dōtaku*, not known to have been made in the post-*kamiyo* era or mentioned in the *kamiyo* accounts, but clearly made by human hands, indicated, he suggested, that another historic age had preceded *kamiyo*. This age had disappeared from recorded history because the compilers of the *kamiyo* accounts, to magnify the position of the imperial line, had erased from the historical record the events preceding the emergence of the imperial line. Similarly, and for the same purpose, they had sought to make

- kamiyo* seem more ancient than it actually was (AHZ, V, 562).
35. For the extant fragments of *Shigi*, see *Hakuseki sensei ibun*, AHZ, V, 7–28.
36. *Tōkushi yoron*, p. 184.
37. See Arthur Wright, “Sui Yang-Ti: Personality and Stereotype,” pp. 61–65.
38. *Hakuseki sensei ibun*, pp. 11–12.
39. *Tōkushi yoron*, pp. 194, 198.
40. Ibid., pp. 215–222.
41. Ibid., pp. 279–280.
42. Ibid., p. 261.
43. Hakuseki's equation of his own vision of shogunal monarchy with the ancient Chinese feudal order is visible in *Hankanpu*, the history of the daimyo houses that he compiled in 1702 when Ienobu was still lord of Kōfu (AHZ, I). Watanabe Hiroshi points out that use of the term *han*, meaning a fief granted by the king, to denominate the daimyo domains implies a conceptualization of the shogun as a monarch (*Kinsei Nihon shakai to sōgaku*, p. 35, 40). *Hankanpu* carried another implication as well with respect to Hakuseki's political enterprise. As Fujino Tamotsu suggests, its compilation provided Hakuseki with unparalleled information about the genealogical details and the ancestral exploits and honors of the various daimyo houses. These were precisely the elements that constituted the foundation of the *kakaku* order (*Shintei bakuhān taiseishi no kenkyū*, p. 558).
44. *Hakuseki sensei ibun*, p. 20; *Nihon shoki*, I, 214–215.
45. *Tōkushi yoron*, p. 278.
46. *Hakuseki sensei ibun*, p. 20. In the introduction to “Densei kō,” one of the extant fragments of *Keibō tenrei*, his now lost history of monarchical institutions in Japan, Hakuseki suggested that the system of taxation employed up to the reign of Sujin was comparable to the tributary system of the Xia, while that used after Sujin was like the levies utilized by the Zhou (*Hakuseki sensei ibun shūi*, AHZ, V, 45).
47. *Hakuseki sensei ibun*, p. 22. The description of Kōtoku as destroying his ancestral shrines referred in part to the imperial patronage of Buddhism characteristic of this period.
48. Ibid., p. 24.
49. *Tōkushi yoron*, pp. 210–211; Kitabatake Chikafusa, pp. 142–143.
50. *Tōkushi yoron*, p. 278.
51. Ibid., p. 279.
52. Ibid., p. 281.
53. Ibid., pp. 280–281, 290. Actually, the number of years between Jinmu's accession and the 939 revolts should be 1,599.
54. Ibid., pp. 337–338.
55. Ibid., p. 356.
56. Ibid., p. 186.

ELEVEN: PARAMETERS OF BUKE RULE

1. Katsumata Shizuo, “The Development of Sengoku Law,” pp. 119–124.
2. I discuss a number of the issues raised in this chapter in “Tokugawa Confucian Historiography: The Hayashi, the Early Mito School, and Arai Hakuseki.”
3. Hayashi Gahō, *Ōdai ichiran*, kan VI, 10a–b.
4. *Ibid.*, kan VII, 60b–61a.
5. *Dai Nihonshi sansō*, pp. 177–178.
6. *Ibid.*, pp. 66–69, 164–165.
7. Bitō Masahide, “Rekishi shisō ni okeru Nihon to Chūgoku,” p. 196; Bitō, *Genroku jidai*, pp. 209–212; *Dai Nihonshi sansō*, pp. 164–165.
8. Matsumoto Sannosuke, “Kinsei ni okeru rekishi jojutsu to sono shisō,” pp. 580–581; Ogura Yoshihiko, “Kaidai,” pp. 552–553.
9. Cited in Matsumoto, p. 580. See also Fujita Yūkoku, *Shūshi shimatsu*, p. 69.
10. Matsumoto, pp. 580–581; Ogura, pp. 552–553.
11. *Dai Nihonshi sansō*, pp. 69–70.
12. Matsumoto, p. 591.
13. Hayashi Gahō, *Ōdai ichiran*, kan I, 4b.
14. Miyake Kanran, “Shōgun den shigi,” p. 432; Matsumoto, p. 582.
15. Asaka Tanpaku, “Chōshū kiden girei no ato ni shosu,” p. 305; Matsumoto, p. 582.
16. *Tokushi yoron*, pp. 275–276.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 276.
18. *Ibid.*
19. *Ibid.*, p. 264.
20. For the Chinese approach, see Morohashi Tetsuji, “Shina no jingi oyobi seitōron,” pp. 320–327.
21. *Tokushi yoron*, pp. 275–276.
22. *Ibid.*, p. 278. Cf. *Nihon shoki*, I, 242–243; Kurano, ed., *Kojiki*, pp. 182–183.
23. *Tokushi yoron*, p. 427.
24. *Ibid.* Cf. *Mencius* 1:B;3 (Legge, II, 196).
25. *Tokushi yoron*, p. 185.
26. *Ibid.*, p. 294. Cf. *Jinnō shōtōki*, pp. 163–164.
27. *Tokushi yoron*, pp. 242–243.
28. *Ibid.*, p. 294.
29. *Ibid.*, pp. 294–295.
30. *Ibid.*, p. 185.
31. See Chapter 8, note 27.
32. *Tokushi yoron*, p. 331.
33. *Ibid.*, p. 318.
34. *Ibid.*, p. 326.
35. *Ibid.*, pp. 355–356.

36. Ibid., p. 186.
37. *Buke kan'i shōzoku kō*, pp. 466, 470.
38. *Tokushi yoron*, pp. 368–369; *Analects*, 13:3 (Legge, I, 263–264).
39. *Tokushi yoron*, p. 428.
40. Ibid., p. 184.
41. In *Ōdai ichiran*, the years of Hideyoshi's rule after the abdication of Ōgimachi in 1586 are covered in an appendix to the reign of Ōgimachi. *Honchō tsugan* goes up through the reign of Ōgimachi's successor, Goyōzei (r. 1486–1610). Hayashi Gahō, *Honchō tsugan*.
42. Goch, pp. 192–194; Kemper, pp. 86–90; see also Katō Shūichi, "Arai Hakuseki no sekai," pp. 533–535.
43. *Tokushi yoron*, p. 428.
44. *Mencius* 1:B:3 (Legge, II, 156–157).
45. Kemper, pp. 86–90; Goch, pp. 192–194; Hellmut Wilhelm, *Change: Eight Lectures on the I Ching*, pp. 56–57.
46. *Tokushi yoron*, p. 369.
47. Ibid., p. 277.
48. Ibid., pp. 430–431.
49. Ibid., pp. 288–289.
50. Ibid., p. 427.
51. *Nikki*, II, 80.
52. *Buke kan'i shōzoku kō*, pp. 477–478. Cf. Watson, I, 293–294. Some of the distinction Hakuseki sought implicitly to maintain between the ancient ways of the *buke* and true *rei* may be seen in the fact that in this passage he consistently referred to the former not as *rei*, but *kyūgi* or *gishiki*.
53. *Oritaku*, p. 229.
54. *Buke kan'i shōzoku kō*, pp. 477–478.
55. Ibid., p. 471.
56. *Shintei no an*, p. 270.
57. *Saishikō*, p. 482.
58. *Kenzan hisaku*, p. 254.
59. Ibid., p. 243.
60. *Jikki*, VII, 249–250.

TWELVE: CONTRADICTIONS

1. Kaempfer referred to the shogun as emperor. Where he sought to distinguish the shogun from the tenno, he referred to the shogun as secular monarch (*weltlichen Kaiser*, *weltlichen Monarch*) and the tenno as ecclesiastical hereditary emperor (*geistlichen Erbkaiser*) (Engelbert Kaempfer, *The History of Japan*, tr. J. G. Scheuchzer; *Geschichte und Beschreibung von Japan*.)

2. Yamaji, pp. 86–87.
3. *Zakan hitsugo*, AHZ, IV, 722–724.
4. *Tokushi yoron*, p. 369.
5. Some have taken these remarks as a call for greater deference to the tenno as the sovereign authority (Kurita, *Bunchi seiji*, p. 575). However, as Bitō Masahide points out, Hakuseki, in fact, was calling here for the clarification of the shogun's authority as the national monarch ("Arai Hakuseki no rekishi shisō," pp. 563–565).
6. *Koshitsū wakumon*, p. 325.
7. Ibid.; cf. *Liji xunzuan*, juan XIX, 5b–6a.
8. See the numbers cited by Kurita, *Bunchi seiji*, p. 587.
9. *Oritaku*, pp. 229–230.
10. Kurita, *Bunchi seiji*, pp. 589–590.
11. *Oritaku*, p. 231.
12. *Kanpaku* and *sesshō* were two types of imperial regent; the *sesshō* served as regent during the reign of a minor, while the *kanpaku* acted as regent for an adult tenno. Appointment to the two posts became established in the Heian period as a hereditary prerogative of the leading branches of the Fujiwara family, of which the Konoe was one.
13. "Motohiro kō ki," kan LXIV, entry for 1709/6/26; *Jikki*, VII, 43–44.
14. "Motohiro kō ki," kan LXIV, entries for 1709/9/28, 9/29, 10/20, 10/25, 10/26, 11/5, 12/9. Hakuseki presumably had something to do with this development; his diary records that, two months prior to Motohiro's appointment, he submitted a memorial to Ienobu on the post of *daijō daijin* (*Nikki*, II, 98).
15. "Motohiro kō ki," kan LXV, entry for 1710/2/9; kan LXV–LXIX passim.
16. Cited in Kurita, *Bunchi seiji*, p. 245. Hakuseki's questions and Nonomiya Sadamoto's replies are contained in *Shin'ya mondō*, AHZ, VI, 554–617.
17. "Motohiro kō ki," kan LXV, entries for 1710/6/23, 7/4, 7/12; kan LXVIII, entry for 1711/8/16. Motohiro was also consulted on the simplified wording for the Yase edict and told about the Echigo Murakami case and the shogun's handling of it (kan LXVIII, entries for 1711/8/25, 8/27, 12/1). In the first days of Ienobu's reign, copies of the edict abolishing the *awaremi no rei* also were sent to him (kan LXIII, entries for 1709/1/23, 2/1).
18. Ibid., kan LXVI, entries for 1710/9/13, 10/1.
19. Ibid., kan LXVIII, entries for 1711/10/28, 11/1. These entries are quoted extensively in Tokutomi, pp. 215–216, 219.
20. *Oritaku*, p. 343. "Motohiro kō ki," kan LXIX, entry for 1712/12/11; *Jikki*, VII, 305–306. Naitō Chisō notes that the procedures followed were based on those used for the *genpuku* of the crown prince (*Tōkugawa jūgodaishi*, III, 1598). Kurita says the procedures were based on the *tenjō genpuku* used for the *sekke* (*Bunchi seiji*, p. 596).
21. *Shang shu*, 1:3 (Legge, III, 26–27).

22. *Koshitsū* prepared the ground for such a development in another way as well: The establishment of the region around Hitachi as the original homeland of the rulers of Japan provided a justification for the return of sovereign authority to the ruler based in that area. Similarly, it reversed the usual assumption as to the relationship between the source and recipient of civilizing influences. While, in the standard view, the east had only come to know civilized life as it came under the sway of the capital region, according to Hakuseki's interpretation it was the capital region that owed its "opening" to emissaries sent out by rulers based in the east. That Hakuseki had some such motive in making Hitachi the site of Takamagahara is indicated by the lengths he went to to sustain that identification. To do so, he had to go against the methodological principle set forth so uncompromisingly in the introduction to *Koshitsū*—that the etymological analysis of *kamiyo* terms should be based on their phonetic value rather than on the characters used to transcribe them. His identification of Hitachi as Takamagahara rested ultimately not on a phonetic link but on the common occurrence of the character *jō* in the province name Hitachi and in the names of Kuninotokotachi no mikoto and Amenotokotachi no kami, where it is read *toko*. And, if the original identification necessitated contravention of his methodological principles, it was sustainable only through selectivity if not distortion in the use of sources; for instance, in Hakuseki's commentary on the attendant groups which, according to the *Kujiki*, accompanied the 32 *kami* sent down with Nigihayahi. The *Kujiki* identifies these *kami* as the ancestors of various prominent local families throughout the country, and a number of the attendant groups bear names that are clearly of western provenance, such as Sanuki Mino no Mononobe, Tsukushi Kiki no Mononobe, and Harima Mononobe. Hakuseki, however, either identified the names of these groups with local place-names in the east, noting, for example, that there is a village called Sanuki in Kazusa and villages called Harima in Shimōsa and Hitachi, or declared them as unidentifiable, as he did with the Tsukushi group. *Koshitsū*, pp. 219–220, 277–282; *Kujiki*, pp. 25–29.
23. Letter to Dohi Motonari, *AHZ*, V, 143.
24. In 1181, Antoku Tenno ordered the priest Chōgen to take charge of raising subscriptions for the rebuilding of Tōdaiji. Riding in a wheelbarrow he had constructed for this purpose, Chōgen traveled throughout the nation soliciting contributions. In 1185, he approached Yoritomo, who applauded him for not waiting upon the command of the tenno in making such a request and who pledged a substantial contribution to the reconstruction project. Yoritomo supported the reconstruction project in various other ways in the next several years. However, it is clear from the above that the nature of his support differed from what Hakuseki implied. Tsuji Zennosuke, *Nihon bukkyōshi*, II, 16–27; Minoru Shinoda, *The Founding of the Kamakura Bakufu*, 1180–1185, p. 296.
25. *Oritaku*, pp. 407–408.

26. Kurita, *Bunchi seiji*, p. 594. The character used for *ryō* was also changed from one meaning “domain” to one meaning “sustenance.”
27. Ibid.
28. *Oritaku*, p. 229.
29. Ibid., pp. 229–230.
30. In this regard, the establishment of the Kan'in house fit in with Hakuseki's effort in *Koshitsū*, discussed above, to reserve a ritual role for the imperial house. Hakuseki further developed a Chinese-style view of the relationship between ancestral spirits and their descendants in *Kishinron* (AHZ, VI, 1–23) and *Saishikō*. Among other things, in the latter he called for the performance of rites to pacify the “hungry ghosts” created by the execution of large numbers of Christians earlier in the Tokugawa period (*Saishikō*, p. 487).
31. “Motohiro kō ki,” kan LXIII, entry for 1709/2/20, quoting letter from Manabe Akifusa; kan LXIV, entry for 1709/6/19.
32. This sequence helps explain Hakuseki's somewhat cryptic remarks about the dating of the memorial and its link to the *shōgun senge* (see above, note 11). Hakuseki's argument had yet another dimension. The contrast between the abundance of progeny produced by Ieyasu and the inability of later shogun to secure heirs of their own immediate bloodline suggested that it was the departure of the later shogun from the path set forth by Ieyasu that had caused heaven to send such signs of disapproval. In this way, Hakuseki linked his call for the shogun to treat the descendants of the imperial dynasty in a more kingly fashion to his larger effort to detach Ieyasu from the actual patterns of Tokugawa rule and to present Ienobu as continuing the task assumed by Ieyasu as the recipient of the mandate.
33. *Tokushi yoron*, p. 377.
34. Ibid., pp. 377–378, 275–276.
35. “Motohiro kō ki,” kan LXVIII, entries for 1711/8/21, 11/23; the latter is cited by Tokutomi, p. 225.
36. Kurita, *Bunchi seiji*, pp. 591–593.
37. Tsuji Tatsuya, *Kyōhō*, pp. 23–24.
38. “Motohiro kō ki,” kan VIII, entry for 1679/6/26.
39. Ibid., kan LXIV, entry for 1709/6/19; kan LXXIV, entry for 1715/10/12. Similarly, the assistance Nonomiya Sadamoto offered Hakuseki in his investigation of *rei* undoubtedly was tempered by the view of the *buke* expressed by Nonomiya in his diary in 1696 when he was chosen to serve as imperial envoy to Edo at the time of the memorial services held on the 17th anniversary of the death of Ietsuna. Writing sarcastically of the “honor” of “prostrating oneself before the chieftain of the barbarians of the east,” Nonomiya declared that, from the day he embarked on his journey to the east, he would not record anything in his diary. “As the barbarians of the east and north know nothing of *reigi*, it will be pointless to keep a record” (cited in Tsuji Zennosuke, *Bunkashi*, V, 235–236).

40. *Chōsenkoku shinsho no shiki no koto*, pp. 672–673; Yōmei Bunko document 89980. For the background and dating of this document, see Chapter 8, note 53.
41. *Ibid.*, p. 673.
42. “Motohiro kō ki,” kan LXV, entry for 1710/5/28.
43. *Shugō jiryaku*, p. 637.
44. *Koshitsū*, p. 215; *Shang shu*, 4:3:2 (Legge, III, 185).
45. Letter to Karakaneya Baisho, pp. 105–106.
46. *Ryūkyūkoku jiryaku*, AHZ, III, 658. Hakuseki here uses the transcription for China said to have originated among Indian Buddhist monks. For another instance of Hakuseki’s adoption of alternative terms for Chūgoku, see his transcription of Sidotti’s pronunciation of China as “China,” cited below, note 54.
47. *Shugō jiryaku*, p. 637.
48. Zuikei Shūhō, *Zenrin kokubō ki*, p. 100.
49. *Shugō jiryaku*, pp. 626–627. Cf. *Zenrin kokubō ki* (p. 100): “Mizukara ō o shōsuru toki wa sunawachi kore kano kuni no hō o mochiyu nari.”
50. *Koshitsū wakumon*, p. 359.
51. The relative absence of sage-like behavior in the Chinese mold was not the only troublesome dimension of the figures of *kamiyo*. Even more problematic, the *Kojiki* and *Nihon shoki* often described them as engaging in behavior that, in Confucian terms, was decidedly unusage-like, such as Izanagi’s and Izanami’s setting adrift the leech child (captives taken in battle, according to Hakuseki’s interpretation), or the marriage of Jinmu’s father, Ugayafukiaezu no mikoto, to an aunt, Tamayorihime, who, according to the *Kujiki*, was also his stepmother. This problem Hakuseki could surmount only by arguing that the present *kamiyo* accounts reflected a garbling of the original story by later generations. Acting on that premise, he engaged in a radical “judicious excision,” deleting certain elements and rearranging others on grounds that things could not have happened as described. For example, to get around the problem of Ugayafukiaezu’s marrying his stepmother, Hakuseki argued that there must have been two different Tamayorihime, one Ugayafukiaezu’s aunt and stepmother and the other, who became Ugayafukiaezu’s spouse, the first one’s niece (*Koshitsū*, pp. 312–313).
52. *Hakuseki sensei ibun*, p. 34; letter to Sakuma Dōgan, AHZ, V, 475–476.
53. *Koshitsū wakumon*, pp. 390–392. Cf. *Shang shu*, 1:1:2 (Legge, III, 18).
54. Letter to Sakuma Dōgan, AHZ, V, 475–476.
55. *Seiyō kibun*, pp. 77–80.
56. *Koshitsū wakumon*, p. 391; *Gakutai*, AHZ, V, 143. Cf. *Liji xunzuan*, juan XXII, 3a; *Analects*, 5:6 and 9:13 (Legge, I, 174, 221).
57. *Oritaku*, p. 260; *Koshitsū wakumon*, p. 392. Lu Deming, *Zhouli yinyi, shang*, p. 33b. Cf. the Zheng Xuan commentary, *Zhouli Zheng zhu*, juan III, 22b–23a.
58. *Honchō gunkikō shūkozusetsu*, AHZ, VI, 416.

59. *Chōsen heishi kōgi*, AHZ, IV, 680.
60. *Tsūkō ichiran*, III, 159.
61. “Odaidokorokata ukagai no gi ni tsuki oboe.” This section is quoted by Kurita, *Bunchi seiji*, p. 249.
62. See the orders appended to Hakuseki’s detailed scenario for the reception of the envoys at Edo Castle, *Chōsen shinshi shikyō gichū*, pp. 635–639. The musicians and dancers were instructed that, “as foreigners would be viewing” the performance, they should take particular care to preserve decorum both on stage and in the green room. For Hakuseki’s views on music, see *Gakutai*, pp. 142–147.
63. *Chōsen heireiji*, AHZ, IV, 533.
64. Ibid., pp. 533–534; the explanations of the scenes portrayed on the screen may be found in *Hakuchichō*, AHZ, IV, 735–739.
65. *Zakan hitsugo*, AHZ, IV, 723.
66. *Kōkan hitsudan*, AHZ, IV, 728.
67. *Zakan hitsugo*, p. 722.
68. *Kōkan hitsudan*, pp. 727, 729–730.
69. *Oritaku*, p. 375.
70. Toby, *State and Diplomacy*, p. 95. Toby notes that Korea, which previously had used Chinese era names in its communications with Japan, dropped them in 1645 and never resumed their use.
71. *Kokusho fukugō kiji*, pp. 704–712; *Chōsen shinshi shikyō gichū*, pp. 617–623; *Chōsen heireiji*, pp. 507–517; Kurita, *Bunchi seiji*, pp. 459–527. The *kōke* were high-ranking *hatamoto* with particular responsibility for ceremonial matters.
72. Letter to Sakuma Dōgan, AHZ, V, 518.
73. *Kōkan hitsudan*, p. 727. For a discussion of the actual events to which Hakuseki alluded in making this claim, see Naitō Konan, pp. 6–10.
74. Letter to Asaka Tanpaku, AHZ, V, 310–311.
75. Toby, “Korean-Japanese Diplomacy in 1711,” pp. 10, 12.
76. *Chōsen heishi kōgi*, AHZ, IV, 680.
77. “Motohiro kō ki,” kan LXVIII, entry for 1711/11/4; quoted in Tokutomi, p. 221.
78. *Chōsen heishi kōgi*, p. 681; *Oritaku*, pp. 268–269. Kurita has a detailed discussion of the dispute based on Tsushima records which amplifies Hakuseki’s rather one-sided discussion and which makes clear that the ultimate solution represented a defeat for Hakuseki (*Bunchi seiji*, pp. 528–538). The dispute involved counter claims about whether the Korean king, seven reigns back, came within the range of taboos that should be observed and whether it was necessary to observe a taboo for one character of a double-character name. The Koreans raised the latter issue, pointing out that the Japanese themselves did not appear to observe it, in their second written conversation with Hakuseki (*Kōkan hitsudan*, p. 729).
79. *Zakan hitsugo*, p. 724.
80. *Gakutai*, pp. 142–143.

81. *Zakan hitsugo*, p. 724.
82. Letter dated 1711/11/21, Yōmei Bunko document 89995.
83. *Zakan hitsugo*, p. 724.
84. *Kōkan hitsudan*, p. 727. The Korean ambassador incorporated a similar slap in the preface he wrote at Hakuseki's request to a collection of Hakuseki's poetry in Chinese, which Hakuseki quite clearly had compiled for the express purpose of impressing upon the Koreans his own mastery of the poetic style of the high Tang. In his preface, the ambassador noted that among nations Japan was the most remote and isolated, its people had no contact with China and spoke a different language. To seek, in such circumstances, for "the civilization of flowery Xia" required great talent and unremitting effort (*Hakuseki shisō*, AHZ, V, 77). Naitō Konan relates that, having arranged for the publication of the collection, Hakuseki sent it to Amenomori Hōshū in Tsushima to be shown to the envoys upon their arrival there. Undoubtedly, he intended that the envoys, yet to discover the role Hakuseki was to play in the reception of the embassy, should already be aware of him as a formidable poetic talent (Naitō Konan, pp. 12–13). Utilizing a line of connections running through the Ryukyu Islands, Hakuseki further succeeded in having the collection of poetry published in preparation for the embassy sent to Beijing, where a Hanlin academician wrote a preface for it, praising Hakuseki's poetry as living up to the standards set by the great poets of the Chinese tradition. Yoshikawa Kōjirō, who detects a patronizing note in the Hanlin scholar's praise, has given an account of the latter's background and of the process whereby the preface was obtained in *Hōchō fushi, rongo zakki*, *Arai Hakuseki itsuji*, pp. 147–245.
85. *Chōsen heishi kōgi*, p. 684.

CONCLUSION

1. Notably, even those who got their start as personal favorites, like Tanuma Oki-tsugu, sought to exercise authority from the position of *rōjū*. This fact suggests the need to consider further the evolution of the relationship between *kakaku* and office in the post-Yoshimune era, but it also points up the centrality of the formal political structure, which basically was associated foremost with the interests of the *fudai*.
2. For a discussion of these developments, see Bolitho, pp. 198–222, 230–255; and Conrad Totman, *The Collapse of the Tokugawa Bakufu*.
3. For a discussion of the career and political program of Matsudaira Sadanobu, see Herman Ooms, *Charismatic Bureaucrat* and Bolitho, pp. 198–205.
4. Bitō Masahide, "Sonnō jōi shisō," pp. 77–79; Bitō, "Mitogaku no tokushitsu," pp. 571–574.
5. Fujita Yukoku, *Seimeiron*, pp. 10–14; the reference to Ieyasu's upholding the

calendar of the tenno is taken from the “Tokugawa bon” version cited by the editors in the 4th note on p. 14.

6. Rai San'yō, *Nihon gaishi*, I, 424–426; Bitō, “Sonnō jōi shisō,” p. 79. Another scholar associated with Sadanobu who criticized Hakuseki’s approach to the relationship between the court and bakufu was Nakai Chikuzan, who contended that the construction of the monarchal four-pillared gate advocated by Hakuseki, “being disruptive as to both ‘name’ and ‘substance,’ made it look as if there were two suns in the heaven.” Chikuzan added that he had it on good authority that one of the purposes of Hakuseki’s trip to Kyoto was to extract from the unwilling court a set of imperial robes for the shogun to wear in receiving the Korean embassy. Nakai Chikuzan, *Chikuzan kokujitoku*, pp. 22a, 23ab.
7. Thus, while Sadanobu stressed the shogun’s duty to show reverence for the tenno and, in a period of fiscal retrenchment, allocated substantial sums of money to restore the Imperial Palace to its authentic ancient form, he also did not hesitate to deal sternly with the court when it persisted in demands that he regarded as inappropriate. For example, he not only rejected the request of Kōkaku Tenno, who succeeded to the throne from a branch line, to award his father the title of *daijō tennō*; he also took the unprecedented step of punishing without the authorization of the tenno the court officials responsible for pressing Kōkaku’s request (Bitō, “Sonnō jōi shisō,” p. 77). Ironically, Kōkaku came from the Kan’in no miya house, envisioned by Hakuseki as a mechanism for preserving the rites of the no-longer-reignant tenno line.
8. *Kenzan hisaku*, pp. 640–641.
9. Matsuura Seizan, *Kasshi yawa*, III, 253.
10. Asano Baidō, *Kankei sōtetsu*, I, 33. Seigan also, alluding to the scholarly advisor to Goshirakawa who lost his life in the Heiji War, described Hakuseki as comparable to a Fujiwara no Shinzei with gold trim. Ibid. For Chao Cuo, see Watson, I, 527–532.
11. Yoshida Tōgo, *Tokugawa seikyō kō*, I, 166.
12. Yamaji, pp. 25–27.

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Abbreviation: AHZ *Arai Hakuseki zenshū*

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Glossary

The names of authors and books included in the bibliography are not duplicated here. In principle *kanji* have been given in their standard contemporary forms; however, the original *kana* orthography and peculiarities of usage have been followed for terms cited from a specific text. Chinese pronunciation has been used for terms from the Confucian political tradition that are relevant primarily to the Chinese context; Japanese pronunciation has been used for terms basic to the Japanese as well as Chinese tradition.

PROPER NAMES

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Amenominakanushi no kami (mikoto) 天御中主神(尊)	Arai Masanari 新井正濟
Amenotokotachi no kami 天常 立神	Asano Naganori 浅野長矩
Ameyuzuruhi amenosagiri kuni- yuzurutsuki (-hi) kuninosa- giri no mikoto 天譲日天狹霧國 譲月(-日)国狹霧尊	Ashihara 葦原
Anrakuji 安楽寺	Ashikabihikoji no kami. <i>See</i> Umashiashikabihikoji no kami (mikoto)
Antoku Tenno (Tennō) 安徳天皇	Ashikaga Takuaji 足利尊氏
Aochi Kenzan 青地兼山	Ashikaga Yoshihisa 足利義尚
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Aoyama Tadashige 青山忠重	Ashikaga Yoshimitsu 足利義満
Arai Hakuseki 新井白石	Ashikaga Yoshiteru 足利義輝
	Ashikaga Yoshizumi 足利義澄
	Awashima 淡洲

- Bifukumon'in 美福門院
Buke shohatto 武家諸法度
 Buretsu Tennō 武烈天皇
- Chao Cuo 晁錯
 Chen She 陳涉
 Cheng, i.e. Zhou Cheng Wang 周成王
 Chiina チイナ
Chikugo no kami 筑後守
 Chōgen 重源
Chōsokabe 長曾我部
 Chu Xiang Wang 楚項王
 Chu Yi Di 楚義帝
 Chūai Tennō 仲哀天皇
Chūgoku (*Zhongguo*) 中国
Chun qiu 春秋
- Dai Nihonshi* 大日本史
 Daibonten 大梵天
 Dan, i.e. Zhou Gong Dan 周公旦
 Dazai Shundai 太宰春臺
Densei kō 田制考
 Dohi Motonari 土肥元成
- Echigo 越後
Echizen no kami 越前守
Edo benkei 江戸弁慶
 Ejima 江島
 Enryakuji 延暦寺
- Fujiwara no Shinzei 藤原信西
 Fujiwara no Yoshifusa 藤原良房
- Fujiwara no Sumitomo 藤原純友
 Fukushima Masanori 福島正則
 Funabashi Marekata 船橋希賢
 Furōmon 不老門
Fushimi no miya 伏見宮
- Gekkōin 月光院
 Genchō 源朝
Gion Nankai 祇園南海
 Godaigo Tennō 後醍醐天皇
 Gohanazono Tennō 後花園天皇
 Gohōjō 後北条
 Gokameyama Tennō 後龜山天皇
 Gokomatsu Tennō 後小松天皇
 Gomizunoo Tennō 後水尾天皇
 Gomurakami Tennō 後村上天皇
 Gongen sama 権現様
 Gosanjō Tennō 後三条天皇
 Goshirakawa Tennō 後白河天皇
 Gotoba Tennō 後鳥羽天皇
 Goyōzei Tennō 後陽成天皇
 Gozan 五山
 Guan Zhong 管仲
- Hachiman 八幡
 Hagiwara 萩原
 Hagiwara Yoshimasa 萩原美雅
 Han Guangwu Di 漢光武帝
 Han Gaozu 漢高祖
 Han Xuan Di 漢宣帝
 Hanlin, i.e. Hanlin yuan 翰林院
 Harima 幡麻

Harima Mononobe 播磨物部	Kaga 加賀
Hayashi Dōshun 林道春	Kami 賀美
Hayashi Jussai 林述斎	Kamimusubi no kami 神皇產靈神
Hayashi Nobuatsu 林信篤	Kanda 神田
Hieizan 比叡山	Kanei 寛永
Higashiyama Tennō 東山天皇	Kan'eiji 寛永寺
Hitachi 常陸	Kan'in no miya 閑院宮
Hitotsubashi Munetada 一橋宗尹	Kangxi 康熙
Honda Tadayoshi 本多忠良	Kanō Yōboku 狩野養朴
Honda Tadakatsu 本多忠勝	Kawachi 河内
Hosokawa Fujitaka 細川藤孝	Kawasaki 川崎
Hotta Masamori 堀田正盛	Kazan Tennō 花山天皇
Hotta Masatoshi 堀田正俊	Kazusa 上総
Hōei 宝永	<i>Keian no ofuregaki</i> 慶安御触書
Hōjō Tokiyori 北条時頼	<i>Keibō tenrei</i> 経邦典例
Hōjō Yasutoki 北条泰時	<i>Kenmu shikimoku</i> 建武式目
Hōjō Yoshitoki 北条義時	Kii 紀伊
Huan, i.e. Qi Huan Gong 齐桓公	<i>Kinchū narabi ni kuge shohatto</i> 禁中并公家諸法度
Hyūga 日向	Kinoshita Jun'an 木下順庵
Ii Naomori 井伊直該	Kita 喜多
Ikushima Shingorō 生島新五郎	Kōben, i.e. Kōben Hosshinnō 公弁法親王
Itakura Shigenori 板倉重矩	Kōfu 甲府
Izu 伊豆	<i>Kogoshūi</i> 古語拾遺
Jie, i.e. Xia Jie Wang 夏桀王	Koishikawa 小石川
Jing, i.e. Han Jing Di 漢景帝	Kōkaku Tennō 光格天皇
Jingū Kōgō 神功皇后	Kokutō 国統
Jinmu Tennō 神武天皇	Kōmyō Tennō 光明天皇
Jinsilu 近思錄	Kōnin Tennō 光仁天皇
Jōei shikimoku 貞永式目	Konoe Iehiro 近衛家熙

Konoe Mototsugu 近衛基嗣
 Konoe Tsunetada 近衛経忠
 Kōtoku Tennō 孝徳天皇
 Kōzuke 上野
 Kumazawa Banzan 熊沢蕃山
 Kuninotokotachi no mikoto 国常立尊
 Kuninosatsuchi no mikoto 国狹槌尊
 Kunōzan 久能山
 Kusunoki Masashige 楠木正成
 Kuze Shigeyuki 久世重之
 Kyōhō 享保
 Kyōken 恭獻

 Maeda Tsunanori 前田綱紀
 Makino Narisada 牧野成貞
 Manabe Akifusa 間部詮房
 Matsudaira Nobutsuna 松平信綱
 Matsudaira Sadanobu 松平定信
 Matsudaira Masakata 松平正容
 Matsuura Kashō 松浦霞沼
 Meireki 明暦
 Mikawa 三河
 Ming Taizu 明太祖
 Mito 水戸
 Monmu Tennō 文武天皇
 Mononobe 物部
 Montoku Tennō 文徳天皇
 Mozi 墨子
 Murakami 村上

Murakami Masanao 村上正直
 Murakami Tennō 村上天皇

 Nagasawa Sukechika 長沢資親
 Naitō Shinjuku 内藤新宿
 Naka 那珂
 Nakae Tōju 中江藤樹
 Nakamikado Tennō 中御門天皇
 Nantōshi 南島志
 Nigihayahi no mikoto 饒速日命
 Nihonkoku Musashi ō 日本国武藏王
 Nihonmatsu 二本松
 Nijō 二条
 Ninigi no mikoto 琼瓈杵尊
 Nintoku Tennō 仁徳天皇
 Nitta 新田
 Nitta Yoshisada 新田義貞
 Niwa Tadashige 丹羽尹重
 Nonomiya Sadamoto 野々宮定基

 Ōe no Masafusa 大江匡房
 Ogasawara Nagashige 小笠原長重
 Ogawa-chō 小川町
 Ōgimachi Tennō 正親町天皇
 Ogiwara Shigehide 萩原重秀
 Okina mondō 翁問答
 Ōkubo Tadamusu 大久保忠増
 Ōnin 応仁
 Onogorōjima 渚能碁呂島

Ōoka Kiyosuke 大岡清相	<i>Shi jing</i> 詩経
Ōoka Tadasuke 大岡忠相	<i>Shigi</i> 史疑
Ōtomo Tennō 大友天皇	Shimizu Shigeyoshi 清水重好
Owari 尾張	Shimōsa 下総
Ōyashima 大八洲	Shimotsuke 下野
Oze Fukuan 小瀬復庵	Shina 支那
 	Shinagawa 品川
Qi 齋	Shinmi Masanobu 新見正信
Qin Shihuangdi 秦始皇帝	Shinso 神祖
 	Shirakawa Tennō 白河天皇
Reigen Tennō 靈元天皇	Shō. See <i>Yūshōin</i>
Rinnōji 輪王寺	Shōheizaka 昌平坂
 	Shōhō 正保
Sagami 相模	Shōtoku 正徳
Saimei Tennō 齋明天皇	Shōtoku Tennō 称徳天皇
Sakai 堀	Shun 舜
Sakai Tadataka 酒井忠拳	Shusun Tong 叔孫通
Sakai Tadakiyo 酒井忠清	Sima Qian 司馬遷
Sakai-chō 堀町	Song Taizu 宋太祖
Sakurada 櫻田	Sō Edoyashiki <i>rusuiyaku</i> Sugi-mura Saburōzaemon 宗江戸屋敷留守居役杉村三郎左衛門
Sankan 三韓	Sujin Tennō 崇神天皇
Sannō Ichijitsu Shintō 山王一実 神道	Sun. See <i>Sunzi</i>
Sanuki 讃岐	Sunpu 駿府
Sanuki Mino no Mononobe 讃岐三野物部	Sunzi (<i>Sunzi</i>) 孫子
Seiwa Genji 清和源氏	Suruga 駿河
Seiwa Tennō 清和天皇	Susanoo no mikoto 須佐之男命, 素戔鳴尊
Sekigahara 関ヶ原	Sushun Tennō 崇峻天皇
Shang shu 尚書	
Shen 申	

Tagaya 多賀谷	Tōin 桐陰
Taigong Wang 太公望	Tokugawa Hidetada 德川秀忠
Taiheiki 太平記	Tokugawa Ieharu 德川家治
Taira no Masakado 平将門	Tokugawa Iemitsu 德川家光
Taira no Shigemori 平重盛	Tokugawa Ienobu 德川家宣
Taka 多珂	Tokugawa Ieshige 德川家重
Takamagahara 高天原	Tokugawa Ietsugu 德川家繼
Takamimusubi no kami 高皇產靈 神, 高御產巢日神, 高御產日神	Tokugawa Ietsuna 德川家綱
Takasaki 高崎	Tokugawa Ieyasu 德川家康
Tamayorihime 玉依姫	Tokugawa Mitsukuni 德川光圀
Tang, i.e. Yin (Shang) Tang Wang 殷(商)湯王	Tokugawa Tadanaga 德川忠長
Tang Shunzong 唐順宗	Tokugawa Tokumatsu 德川徳松
Tang Taizong 唐太宗	Tokugawa Tsunanori 德川綱教
Tang Xuanzong 唐玄宗	Tokugawa Tsunashige 德川綱重
Tang Xuanzong 唐宣宗	Tokugawa Tsunayoshi 德川綱吉
Tani Yasutaka 谷安殷	Tokugawa Yorifusa 德川頼房
Tanuma Okitsugu 田沼意次	Tokugawa Yorinobu 德川頼宣
Tatebayashi 館林	Tokugawa Yoshimichi 德川吉通
Tayasu Munetake 田安宗武	Tokugawa Yoshinao 德川義直
Ten'eiin 天英院	Tokugawa Yoshimune 德川吉宗
Tenji Tennō 天智天皇	Toyoashihara 豊葦原
Tenkai 天海	Tōshōgū 東照宮
Tenmu Tennō 天武天皇	Tōshō daigongen 東照大權現
Tenshakudo 天爵堂	Toyokumunu no mikoto (kami) 豊斟渟尊(神)
Tenso 天祖	Toyotomi 豊臣
Tentō 天統	Tsuchiya Masanao 土屋政直
Toba Tennō 鳥羽天皇	Tsuchiya Toshinao 土屋利直
Toba goryō 鳥羽御料	Tsuchiya Yorinao 土屋頼直
Tōdaiji 東大寺	Tsukushi Kiki no Mononobe 筑紫聞物部

Ugayafukiaezu no mikoto 鶉葦草葦不合命	Yase 八瀨
Umashiashikabihikoji no kami (mikoto) 宇摩志阿斯訶備比古 遲神，可美葦牙彥舅尊	<i>Yase ki</i> 八瀨記
Wa 倭	Yaso no miya 八十宮
Wang Anshi 王安石	Yi Yin 伊尹
Wang Mang 王莽	Yin 殷
Wang Shuwen 王叔文	Yoshida Shintō 吉田神道
Wei Zheng 魏徵	Yoshinaka, i.e. Minamoto no Yoshinaka 源義仲
Wen, i.e. Zhou Wen Wang 周文王	Yoshiwara 吉原
Wu, i.e. Wuzi 吳子	Yu 禹
Wu, i.e. Zhou Wu Wang 周武王	Yui Shōsetsu 由井正雪
Wu Taibo 吳太伯	Yukiie, i.e. Minamoto no Yukiie 源行家
Xi 羲	Yushima 湯島
Xiang Yu 項羽	Yuyi 嶴夷
Xianyang 咸陽	Yūshōin 有章院
Yamaga Sokō 山鹿素行	Zhenguan 貞觀
Yamashina goryō 山科御料	Zhou Xuan Wang 周宣王
Yanada Seigan 梁田蛻巖	Zhu Xi 朱熹
Yanagawa Shigenobu 柳川調信	Zhuangzong, i.e. Houtang Zhuangzong 後唐莊宗
Yanagawa Shigeoki 柳川調興	Zizhi tongjian gangmu 資治通鑑綱目
Yanagisawa Yoshiyasu 柳沢吉保	Zōjōji 増上寺
Yao 堯	Zuo zhuan 左伝

TERMS

<i>agata nushi</i> 県主	<i>fangfa (hōbatsu)</i> 放伐
<i>ame no ukibashi</i> 天の浮橋	<i>fuchi</i> 扶持
<i>ba (ha)</i> 羅	<i>fudai</i> 譜代, 譜第
<i>bakuban</i> 幕藩	<i>fukugō</i> 復号
<i>bakumatsu</i> 幕末	<i>fusō</i> 傳相
<i>bangashira</i> 番頭	<i>gagaku</i> 雅樂
<i>bu</i> 分	<i>gaihan</i> 外藩
<i>bugyō</i> 奉行	<i>gaku (yue)</i> 樂
<i>buke no tōryō</i> 武家の棟梁	<i>gakushi</i> 学士
<i>bukki ryō</i> 服忌令	<i>geming (kakumei)</i> 革命
<i>bunbu</i> 文武	<i>genpuku</i> 元服
<i>chigyō</i> 知行	<i>gishiki</i> 儀式
<i>chokutō</i> 勅答	<i>gohentō</i> 御返答
<i>chōgin</i> 丁銀, 檻銀	<i>gohōkō muki</i> 御奉公むき
<i>daigaku no kami</i> 大学頭	<i>gohōkō no mono</i> 御奉公のもの
<i>daiittō no kimi</i> 大一統の君	<i>gohōkō okumuki</i> 御奉公奥むき
<i>daijin</i> 大臣	<i>gokenin</i> 御家人
<i>daijō daijin</i> 太政大臣	<i>gongen</i> 権現
<i>daijō tennō</i> 太政天皇	<i>goshu</i> 五主
<i>daijōsai</i> 大嘗祭	<i>goyō toritsugi</i> 御用取次
<i>dōchū bugyō</i> 道中奉行	<i>haigō</i> 俳号
<i>dōri</i> 道理	<i>haikai</i> 俳諧
<i>dōshin</i> 同心	<i>hakkyō</i> 発狂
<i>dōtaku</i> 銅鐸	<i>ban</i> 藩
<i>eboshi</i> 烏帽子	<i>hatamoto</i> 旗本
<i>enryo</i> 遠慮	<i>hennen</i> 編年
	<i>bikyakudoiya</i> 飛脚問屋
	<i>himorogi</i> 神籬

<i>birakibiraku</i> 開拓	<i>jisha bugyō</i> 寺社奉行
<i>bissaku</i> 筆削	<i>jitō</i> 地頭
<i>bitatare</i> 直垂	<i>jō (toko)</i> 常
<i>hitorigami</i> 独神	<i>jōmen</i> 定免
<i>hitorinasu</i> 独化	<i>jun (kun)</i> 君
<i>hiyu mata wa uwasa no yō ni</i> 豐喩又はうわさのやうに	<i>junkenshi</i> 巡檢使
<i>hoi</i> 布衣	<i>junxian (gunken)</i> 郡県
<i>hōin</i> 法印	<i>junzi (kunshi)</i> 君子
<i>hokku</i> 発句	<i>jusangū</i> 淮三宮
<i>hongi</i> 本紀	<i>jusanmi</i> 徒三位
<i>hosa</i> 補佐	<i>jusha</i> 儒者
<i>hōshaku</i> 封爵	<i>jushii ge jijū</i> 徒四位下侍從
<i>hōsho renpan shū</i> 奉書連判衆	<i>kabane</i> 姓
<i>hua (ka)</i> 華	<i>kaisho</i> 会所
<i>huangdi (kōtei)</i> 皇帝	<i>kakaku</i> 家格
<i>hyō</i> 傀	<i>kakushiki</i> 格式
<i>hyōjō</i> 評定	<i>kami</i> 神
<i>hyōjōsho</i> 評定所	<i>kami</i> 上
<i>iai</i> 居合	<i>kami ichinin</i> 上一人
<i>ichō</i> 異朝	<i>kamiyo</i> 神世
<i>in</i> 院	<i>kan'i</i> 官位
<i>inin</i> 委任	<i>kangan</i> 宦官
<i>inzen</i> 院宣	<i>kanjō bugyō</i> 勘定奉行
<i>ito wappu</i> 糸割符	<i>kanjō gashira</i> 勘定頭
<i>itsu no chiwaki chiwakite</i> 伊都能 知和岐知和岐邑	<i>kanjō ginmiyaku</i> 勘定吟味役
	<i>kanjō kumigashira</i> 勘定組頭
	<i>kanmuri</i> 冠
	<i>kano kuni</i> 彼国
<i>jibun shioki rei</i> 自分仕置令	<i>kanpaku</i> 関白
<i>jiī</i> ぢい	<i>kanrei</i> 管領
<i>jijū</i> 侍從	<i>kariginu</i> 狩衣

<i>karō</i> 家老	<i>kōsei no kunshi</i> 後世の君子
<i>kashin</i> 家臣	<i>kōshin shinnō</i> 皇親親王
<i>kashira</i> 頭	<i>koshō</i> 小姓, 小性、扈從
<i>keigaku</i> 経学	<i>koshōshū</i> 小姓衆, 小性衆, 払從衆
<i>kemi</i> 毛見, 檢見	<i>koshōgumi</i> 小姓組
<i>kengi</i> 建議	<i>kōsoshin</i> 皇祖神
<i>kenjin</i> 賢人	<i>kōtei.</i> See <i>huangdi</i>
<i>ki (qi)</i> 気	<i>kubō</i> 公方
<i>kiden</i> 紀伝	<i>kuge</i> 公家
<i>kiguse</i> 気くせ	<i>kuji no shokuyaku</i> 公事の職役
<i>kin</i> 斤	<i>kun'i</i> 納位
<i>kinju</i> 近習	<i>kunchō</i> 君長
<i>kinju shuttōnin</i> 近習出頭人	<i>kuni no miyatsuko</i> 国造
<i>kinri goryō</i> 禁裏御領	<i>kuramai</i> 藏米
<i>kirimai</i> 切米	<i>kyūgi</i> 旧儀
<i>kishin</i> 鬼神	<i>li.</i> See <i>rei</i>
<i>kō (huang)</i> 皇	<i>li (ri)</i> 理
<i>kobushin</i> 小普請	<i>machi bugyō</i> 町奉行
<i>kōgi</i> 公儀	<i>maguwai.</i> See <i>mito no maguwai</i>
<i>kōke</i> 公家	<i>meibun</i> 名分
<i>kōke</i> 高家	<i>meikun</i> 名君
<i>kokudaka</i> 石高	<i>metsuke</i> 目付
<i>kokuō</i> 国王	<i>meyasubako</i> 目安箱
<i>kokuō denka</i> 国王殿下	<i>mito no maguwai</i> 美斗能麻具波比
<i>kokuō kō santsū</i> 国王考三通	<i>miya (gū)</i> 宮
<i>kokuō to shōseraruru koto</i> 国王と 称せらるる事	<i>mizukara ō o shōsuru toki wa</i> <i>sunawachi kore kano kuni no</i> <i>hō o mochiyu nari</i> 自称王則此 用彼国之封也
<i>kokushu</i> 国主	
<i>kokyō</i> 皇京	
<i>konando</i> 小納戸	
<i>konandoshū</i> 小納戸衆	
<i>kōsatsu</i> 高札	

<i>myōgō</i> 名号	<i>reigaku seikyō</i> 礼樂政教
<i>myōjin</i> 明神	<i>reigi</i> 礼儀
<i>nagabakama</i> 長袴	<i>retsuden</i> 列伝
<i>naginata</i> 鑑刀	<i>ri. See li</i>
<i>nakatsukasa-shō</i> 中務省	<i>ri 里</i>
<i>nanushi</i> 名主	<i>rinji</i> 縱旨
<i>nengō</i> 年号	<i>ritsuryō</i> 律令
<i>ninbuchi</i> (... <i>ninbuchi</i>) 人扶持	<i>rittaiishi shiki</i> 立太子式
<i>nishinomaru okubangashira</i>	<i>rōjū</i> 老中
西の丸奥番頭	<i>rōnin</i> 浪人
<i>nōshi</i> 直衣	<i>ronsan</i> 論贊
<i>ō. See wang</i>	<i>rusui</i> 留守居
<i>ōban</i> 大番	<i>ryō</i> 両
<i>ōbangashira</i> 大番頭	<i>ryōgae</i> 両替
<i>ōdō</i> 王道	<i>saishi kijō</i> 祭祀祈禳
<i>ōhiroma</i> 大広間	<i>sanke</i> 三家
<i>ōjōya</i> 大庄屋	<i>sankin kōtai</i> 参勤交代
<i>ōke</i> 王家	<i>sankyō</i> 三卿
<i>ōki</i> 王畿	<i>sashinuki</i> 指貫
<i>ōkimi</i> 大君	<i>seii tai shōgun</i> 征夷大將軍
<i>ōmetsuke</i> 大目付	<i>sekke</i> 摂家
<i>omotemuki tsutomekata no koto</i>	<i>sentō goryō</i> 仙洞御領
表むき懃方の事	<i>sesshō</i> 摂政
<i>oni</i> 鬼	<i>sha</i> 社
<i>ōoku</i> 大奥	<i>shanrang (zenjō)</i> 禅讓
<i>ōrai mono</i> 往來物	<i>shibun</i> 士分
<i>rakusho</i> 落書	<i>shihai</i> 支配
<i>rei (li)</i> 礼	<i>shihō baibai</i> 市法壳買
<i>rei</i> 靈	<i>shikarubeki hitobito</i> しかるべき人々
<i>reibutsu</i> 靈物	<i>shikken</i> 執權
	<i>shikunshi (shijunzi)</i> 士君子

<i>shinbu</i> 神武	<i>sōshitsu</i> 宗室
<i>shin'in</i> 神胤	<i>sukegō</i> 助郷
<i>shinkoku</i> 神国	
<i>shinnō</i> 神皇	<i>taiki</i> 大器
<i>shinpan</i> 親藩	<i>taikun</i> 大君
<i>shinrei</i> 神靈	<i>taikutsu taikutsu</i> 退屈退屈
<i>shinsei</i> 神聖	<i>tairō</i> 大老
<i>shinsō</i> 心喪	<i>taishōgun</i> 大將軍
<i>shinsohō ikai</i> 神祖法意解	<i>tashidaka</i> 足高
<i>shintō</i> 神道	<i>tawaramono</i> 傕物
<i>shintō kechimyaku</i> 神道血脉	<i>tedai</i> 手代
<i>shinzō</i> 神像	<i>tenchō tenshi</i> 天朝天子
<i>shinzoku</i> 臣属	<i>tenjō genpuku</i> 殿上元服
<i>shirononogae</i> 代物替	<i>tennō</i> 天皇
<i>shō</i> 正	<i>tenryō</i> 天領
<i>shōen</i> 莊園	<i>tenshu</i> 天衆
<i>shōgun den</i> 將軍伝	<i>tenzō sōmai no sai</i> 天造草昧之際
<i>shōgun senge</i> 將軍宣下	<i>tianming (tenmei)</i> 天命
<i>shōō</i> 諸王	<i>tōbun no onagusami</i> 当分の御慰
<i>shōrui awaremi no rei</i> 生類憐み の令	<i>tomeyaku</i> 留役
<i>shōsō</i> 将相	<i>tomeyakunin</i> 留役人
<i>shōya</i> 庄屋	<i>tozama</i> 外様
<i>shugo</i> 守護	<i>tozamashū no nami</i> 外様衆のなみ
<i>shukun</i> 主君	<i>tsune no michi</i> 常の道
<i>sobayōnin</i> 側用人	
<i>sobashū</i> 側衆	<i>unjō</i> 運上
<i>sokutai</i> 束帶	
<i>sono hajime o aratame tamaishi</i> 其初を更たまひし	<i>wagakuni shissei no daijin</i> 我国 執政ノ大臣
<i>sō orusu yaku</i> 総御留守役	<i>wakadoshiyori</i> 若年寄

wang (ō) 王	yo no kyōshū 世の共主
wataribōkō わたり奉公	yorai 寄合
	yoriki 与力
yakuryō 役料	yotsuashimon 四足門
yari 鐛	yotsutakaragin 四宝銀
yejo 札曹	yuzuri 譲
yixing geming (<i>ekisei kakumei</i>)	
易姓革命	zasu 座主
yōnin 用人	zhong (chū) 中



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
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