

# Intro to Security HW 1

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## 1 Problem 1

An affine cipher is a type of simple substitution where each letter is encrypted according to the following rule  $c = (ap + b) \bmod 26$ . Here,  $p$ ,  $c$ ,  $a$ , and  $b$  are each numbers in the range of 0 to 25, where  $p$  represents the plaintext letter,  $c$  the ciphertext letter, and  $a$  and  $b$  are constants. For the plaintext and ciphertext, 0 corresponds to "a," 1 corresponds to "b," and so on. Consider the ciphertext QJKES REOGH GXXRE OXEO, which was generated using an affine cipher. Determine the constants  $a$  and  $b$  and decipher the message. Hint: Plaintext "t" encrypts to ciphertext "H" and plaintext "o" encrypts to ciphertext "E."

### 1.1 Answer

Given that "t" encrypts to "H", and "o" encrypts to "E".

$$7 = 19a + b \bmod 26$$

$$4 = 14a + b \bmod 26$$

Subtracting them gives us

$$\begin{aligned}3 &= 5a \pmod{26} \\ 5^{-1} &= 21 \pmod{26} \\ a &= 21 * 3 \pmod{26} \\ a &= 11 \\ \\ 7 &= (11)(19) + b \pmod{26} \\ 7 &= 209 + b \pmod{26} \\ b &= -202 \pmod{26} \\ b &= 6\end{aligned}$$

So with a little python script we can decipher the text.

```
def encrypt_letter(p, a, b):
    pp = ord(p) - ord('a')
    c = (pp*a + b) % 26
    return chr(c + ord('A'))

A = 11
B = 6
CIPHERTEXT = "QJKESREOGHGXXREOXEO"
ALPHABET = "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz"

# Create a mapping from ciphertext letters to plaintext letters
decrypt_letter = {encrypt_letter(p, A, B): p for p in ALPHABET}

# Lookup every ciphertext's letter and join the whole result
return "".join(decrypt_letter[c] for c in CIPHERTEXT)
```

Which yields us  $P = ifyoubowatallbowlow$ , or with appropriate spacing and punctuation: "If you bow at all, bow low."

## 2 Problem 2

Consider a Feistel cipher with four rounds. Then the plaintext is denoted as  $P = (L0, R0)$  and the corresponding ciphertext is  $C = (L4, R4)$ . What is the ciphertext  $C$ , in terms of  $L0$ ,  $R0$ , and the subkey, for each of the following round functions? (You should get the most concise solution.)

- $F(R_{i-1}, K_i) = 0$
- $F(R_{i-1}, K_i) = R_{i-1}$
- $F(R_{i-1}, K_i) = K_i$
- $F(R_{i-1}, K_i) = R_{i-1} \oplus K_i$

(Note that for each of cases A – D, the cipher uses four rounds.)

## 2.1 Answer

### 2.1.1 $F(R_{i-1}, K_i) = 0$

$$\begin{aligned}
 L_1 &= R_0 \\
 R_1 &= R_0 \oplus 0 = L_2 \\
 R_2 &= R_1 \oplus 0 = L_3 = R_0 \oplus 0 \\
 R_3 &= R_2 \oplus 0 = L_4 = R_0 \oplus 0 \\
 R_4 &= R_3 \oplus 0 = R_0 \oplus 0
 \end{aligned}$$

### 2.1.2 $F(R_{i-1}, K_i) = R_{i-1}$

$$\begin{aligned}
 L_1 &= R_0 \\
 R_1 &= R_0 \oplus R_0 = L_2 = 0 \\
 R_2 &= R_1 \oplus R_1 = L_3 = 0 \\
 R_3 &= R_2 \oplus R_2 = L_4 = 0 \\
 R_4 &= R_3 \oplus R_3 = 0
 \end{aligned}$$

### 2.1.3 $F(R_{i-1}, K_i) = K_i$

$$\begin{aligned}
 L_1 &= R_0 \\
 R_1 &= R_0 \oplus K_1 = L_2 \\
 R_2 &= R_1 \oplus K_2 = L_3 = R_0 \oplus K_1 \oplus K_2 \\
 R_3 &= R_2 \oplus K_3 = L_4 = R_0 \oplus K_1 \oplus K_2 \oplus K_3 \\
 R_4 &= R_3 \oplus K_4 = R_0 \oplus K_1 \oplus K_2 \oplus K_3 \oplus K_4
 \end{aligned}$$

#### 2.1.4 $F(R_{i-1}, K_i) = R_{i-1} \oplus K_i$

$$\begin{aligned} L_1 &= R_0 \\ R_1 &= R_0 \oplus R_0 \oplus K_1 = L_2 \\ R_2 &= R_1 \oplus R_1 \oplus K_2 = L_3 = K_2 \\ R_3 &= R_2 \oplus R_2 \oplus K_3 = L_4 = K_3 \\ R_4 &= R_3 \oplus R_3 \oplus K_4 = K_4 \end{aligned}$$

### 3 Problem 3

Suppose that we use a block cipher to encrypt according to the rule:

$$\begin{aligned} C_0 &= IV \oplus E(P_0, K), \\ C_1 &= C_0 \oplus E(P_1, K), \\ C_2 &= C_1 \oplus E(P_2, K), \\ &\dots \end{aligned}$$

#### 3.1 Answer

##### 3.1.1 What is the corresponding decryption rule?

$$\begin{aligned} P_0 &= D(IV \oplus C_0, K) \\ P_i &= D(C_{i-1} \oplus C_i, K) \quad i > 0 \end{aligned}$$

##### 3.1.2 Give two security disadvantages of this mode as compared to CBC mode.

Say  $P = P_0P_1P_2P_3$  and in particular  $P_1 = P_2$ . Then,

$$\begin{aligned} C_0 &= IV \oplus E(P_0, K) \\ C_2 &= IV \oplus E(P_0, K) \oplus E(P_1, K) \oplus E(P_2, K) = IV \oplus E(P_0, K) \end{aligned}$$

This is a compromise of confidentiality, because the same plaintext blocks can yield the same ciphertext blocks, similar to the issues with ECB. At the same time, say Trudy switches  $C_0$  and  $C_2$ . Then Bob, who receives the message, will get  $P_{trudy} = P_1P_2P_1P_3$ . This is a compromise of integrity, as the message can be rearranged and altered given certain matching plaintexts.