71; Leys 1965). But most who study corruption now argue that it is a symptom as well as a cause of dysfunctions within democracies (de Leon 1993; della Porta and Vannucci 1999; Elster 1989, 26372; RoseAckerman 1999; Thompson 1995). Corruption, it is increasingly noted, breaks the link between collective decision making and peoples powers to influence collective decisions through speaking and voting, the very link that defines democracy. Corruption reduces the effective domain of public action, and thus the reach of democracy, by reducing public agencies of collective action to instruments of private benefit. Corruption creates inefficiencies in deliveries of public services, not only in the form of a tax on public expenditures, but by shifting public activities toward those sectors in which it is possible for those engaged in corrupt exchanges to benefit. And when public officials put prices on routine government transactions, then the rights and protections citizens should be able to enjoy become favors, to be repaid in kind. Moreover, corruption undermines the culture of democracy. When people lose confidence that public decisions are taken for reasons that are publicly available and justifiable, they often become cynical about public speech and deliberation. People come to expect duplicity in public speech, and the expectation tarnishes all public officials, whether or not they are corrupt. And when people are mistrustful of

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government, they are also cynical about their own capacities to act on public goods and purposes and will prefer to attend to narrow domains of selfinterest they can control. Corruption in this way diminishes the horizons of collective actions and in so doing shrinks the domain of democracy. Finally, corruption undermines democratic capacities of association within civil society by generalizing suspicion and eroding trust and reciprocity.

That corruption has not become the topic it should in democratic theory has to do not with the lack of normative issues. The problem, I shall argue, is that our received conception of political corruption the abuse of public office for private gain has been outgrown by contemporary democracies. The received conception is not irrelevant: abuse of public office for private gain remains a central issue, but does little to identify and clarify common intuitions into the corruption of democratic institutions and practices, or so I shall argue.

From the perspective of conceptual history, this is not surprising: our received conception did not develop from democratic norms and expectations at all, but rather from early modern liberal ones. It developed in response to liberal concerns with defining, rationalizing, and limiting public duties and responsibilities against the background of what had come to be seen as pervasive corruption within absolutist regimes, especially in England and France (Arendt 1965, 10002). As I shall note, the early liberal project had to do with securing the dividing lines between state and society, public and private. The concept we have inherited, still bearing the marks of these origins, has been molded, ex post and with a certain clumsiness, to democratic politics and institutions. I next suggest that the robust conceptual link between democratic theory and corruption can be found in the fact that corruption is always a form of duplicitous and harmful exclusion of those who have a claim to inclusion in collective decisions and actions. Corruption involves a specific kind of unjustifiable disempowerment. This normative link between democracy and corruption can be mapped onto democratic institutions and practices if we recognize that todays democracies have evolved into ecologies of complementary and competing institutions and associations. It follows, I then argue, that corruption in democracies has become differentiated by domain in such a way that its logic of exclusion will assume forms and meanings in specific to each. Finally, I develop these forms and meanings as they appear within the state, public spheres, civil society, and markets, while relating each back to the encompassing democratic theory of corruption as duplicitous exclusion. I conclude by noting a number of broader implications of a democratic conception of corruption.

# The Modern Conception of Corruption

Prior to the early modern period, there was no widely accepted and politically practicable concept of political corruption. Concerns about the misuse of public office did exist among the Greeks (Philp 2002, 48). Classical distinctions between, say, monarchy and tyranny turned on the contrast between the public responsibility of kings and their private gains. Still, it would be an anachronism to define for example, the sale of public offices in early modern absolutist monarchies as corruption; this was simply the way these regimes did their business and they did not pretend to do otherwise (Scott 1972, chapter 3). It was not, of course, that the concept of corruption did not exist, but rather that the most recognizable lineages, handed down from Plato, treated corruption in ways that were broadly cosmological, and so served less as guides for institutional reform than as moral indictments of individuals, peoples, and cultures. These tendencies persisted within early modern republicanism: Machiavelli (1950, 16670, 25255), the periods most perceptive student of corruption, understood it primarily as a moral condition, measured by the distance between a peoples collective character and moral standards of everyday conduct as defined by their Christian context. For Rousseau (1985), corruption was the centerpiece of a philosophical anthropology that tracked the corrosion of a natural moral empathy among humans and the emergence of a bourgeois egoism.

As often noted, these moral conceptions of corruption were both too broad and too focused on individual character to serve the institutional engineering that accompanied the liberal revolutions. Limiting *political* corruption required standards of conduct specific enough to indict specific behaviors. The development of a politically practical conception of corruption was facilitated by two developments associated with the liberal revolutions. First, as Friedrich has observed, the notion of a deviation from office required the development of rationalized bureaucracies, that is, institutions with explicit, written, and publicly available codes that define offices. As bureaucracies rationalized, corruption came to be conceived as a particular form of political pathology rather than global degeneration. As such, it could be defined in behavioral terms, and the activities objected to [could] be outlawed (1989, 21).

Second, as Euben (1989) has pointed out, the modern conception of political corruption depended upon the notion that an institution can be better than the individuals who constitute it. Madison, the first thoroughgoing

modernist in this regard, understood that public roles could be circumscribed by broadly distributing powers of decision making, providing officials and citizens alike with the motives and capacities to flush out conspiracies against the public interest. Under this emerging conception, then, it was not necessary to define corruption in moral terms at all. Indeed, it is best to assume that individuals naturally pursue their own interests, even against the public interest (Hamilton, Jay, and Madison 2000, no. 51). A good political system follows from power distributions that motivate selfinterested individuals to check the abuses of other individuals, thus giving each a stake in defining norms of public office. The modernist approach thus penetrates character just enough to solidify the definition of corruption in terms of a conflict between private and public regarding motivations. As Friedrich argues, corruption is not simply a kind of behavior which deviates from the norm actually prevalent or believed to prevail in a given context, such as the political. It is deviant behavior associated with a particular motivation, namely that of private gain at public expense (1989, 15). Most contemporary conceptions what I shall summarize, loosely and not entirely accurately, as the modern conception of corruption follow this logic, conceiving political corruption as individual departures from rules and norms of public office for reasons of private gain (Huntington 1968, 69; Nye 1967; Transparency Interna

tional 2000, 1).

The advantages of this nowentrenched conception of corruption are many, not the least of which is widespread agreement among professionals that this defines political corruption. By measuring individual behavior against norms operationalized into laws, offices, and rules, the modern conception lays out markers for how to design institutions to resist corruption. Assuming, with Madison, that officials are likely to be selfinterested, institutions should be designed to ensure that no official has monopoly control over resources; the power they do have should be linked to mechanisms of accountability; and the rules under which they operate should be relatively clear and minimize room for discretionary judgment (Gardiner and Lyman 1978; RoseAckerman 1999; Transparency International 2001). In Klitgaards concise formulation, institutions can be designed to resist corruption if we

Without diminishing these important advances, however, we need to ask what features of politics in a democracy and thus potentials for political corruption fall outside the modern conception. Its democracyexcluding attributes are as follows: