

# Digital Forensic

## Report-s5348038- Muhammad Hamza Aslam

### Evidence A.

Evidence A contains **11 disk** image files that were combined into a single dd image as shown in Figure 1. The hash of the file was taken before investigating the files to ensure integrity of data throughout the process.

```
sansforensics@sfifworkstation: ~/Downloads/evidenceA
$ ls
EvidenceA.001 EvidenceA.002 EvidenceA.003 EvidenceA.004 EvidenceA.005 EvidenceA.006 EvidenceA.007 EvidenceA.008 EvidenceA.009 EvidenceA.010 EvidenceA.011
sansforensics@sfifworkstation: ~/Downloads/evidenceA
$ cat EvidenceA.001 EvidenceA.002 EvidenceA.003 EvidenceA.004 EvidenceA.005 EvidenceA.006 EvidenceA.007 EvidenceA.008 EvidenceA.009 EvidenceA.010 EvidenceA.011 > EvidenceA.dd
sansforensics@sfifworkstation: ~/Downloads/evidenceA
$ md5sum EvidenceA.dd
e2163d35fb453047af7534d12de89055 EvidenceA.dd
```

Figure 1: Combining Files and Matching Hash

I used the **img\_stat** to extract information **EvidenceA.dd**. It shows that the image is type **raw** with sector size of **512 bytes**. These details are crucial for further investigation.

```
$ img_stat EvidenceA.dd
IMAGE FILE INFORMATION
-----
Image Type: raw
Size in bytes: 21474836480
Sector size: 512
```

Figure 2 : Result of Img\_stat

I use **mmls** command to display partition structure of EvidenceA.dd. This enable me to look at the partitions having more data, and of interest partition **006**, then I calculated the offset of partition by **512 X 673792**, resulting an offset of **344293376** bytes. This step was important for targeting further analysis. After this I used the **fsstat** command to gather additional file system details. The output confirmed that the file system on partition 006 is **exfat/NTFS** having windows format, with a cluster size of 4096 bytes. As shown in the following figures

```
$ mmls EvidenceA.dd
GUID Partition Table (EFI)
Offset Sector: 0
Units are in 512-byte sectors

      Slot      Start        End      Length      Description
000: Meta 00000000000 00000000000 00000000001 Safety Table
001: ----- 00000000000 0000002047 0000002048 Unallocated
002: Meta 00000000001 00000000001 00000000001 GPT Header
003: Meta 00000000002 00000000033 00000000032 Partition Table
004: 000 0000002048 0000411647 0000409600 EFI system partition
005: 001 0000411648 0000673791 0000262144 Microsoft reserved partition
006: 002 0000673792 0041940991 0041267200 Basic data partition
007: ----- 0041940992 0041943039 0000002048 Unallocated
```

Figure 3 : Partition Layout

```
$ fsstat -o 673792 EvidenceA.dd
FILE SYSTEM INFORMATION
-----
File System Type: NTFS
Volume Serial Number: 90B06F6AB06F562E
OEM Name: NTFS
Version: Windows XP

METADATA INFORMATION
-----
First Cluster of MFT: 786432
First Cluster of MFT Mirror: 2
Size of MFT Entries: 1024 bytes
Size of Index Records: 4096 bytes
Range: 0 - 113152
Root Directory: 5

CONTENT INFORMATION
-----
Sector Size: 512
Cluster Size: 4096
Total Cluster Range: 0 - 5158398
Total Sector Range: 0 - 41267198
```

Figure 4 :File System Information

After that, I mounted the partition using the command in Fig 5 with the calculated offset **344981504**. For integrity of the evidence, the specified partition was mounted in read-only mode to avoid modification of the info. The partition was mounted to **/mnt/windows\_mount**

```
sansforensics@sfifworkstation: ~/Downloads/EvidenceA
$ sudo mount -o ro,loop,offset=344981504 EvidenceA.dd /mnt/windows_mount
sansforensics@sfifworkstation: ~/Downloads/EvidenceA
$
```

Figure 5 : Mounting the Partition

### Question 1: Who is the owner of the computer?

To determine the owner, I used **RegRipper** to extract data from registry hive files. By using **grep** command and accessing hives like **SAM** and **Software** to find active user in Figure 6.

```
$ rip.pl -r /mnt/windows_mount/Windows/System32/config/SOFTWARE -p profilelist
Launching profilelist v.20200518
profilelist v.20200518
(Software) Get content of ProfileList key
Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\ProfileList
Path      : %systemroot%\system32\config\systemprofile
SID       : S-1-5-18
LastWrite : 2019-12-07 09:16:08Z
Path      : %systemroot%\ServiceProfiles\LocalService
SID       : S-1-5-19
LastWrite : 2019-12-07 09:16:08Z
Path      : %systemroot%\ServiceProfiles\NetworkService
SID       : S-1-5-20
LastWrite : 2019-12-07 09:16:08Z
Path      : C:\Users\Alex Marshall
SID       : S-1-5-21-212117580-4225460857-3930097821-1000
LastWrite : 2024-08-27 13:19:41Z
Domain Accounts
```

```
$ rip.pl -r /mnt/windows_mount/Windows/System32/config/SAM -p samparse | grep Username
Launching samparse v.20200825
Username   : Administrator [500]
Username   : Guest [501]
Username   : DefaultAccount [503]
Username   : WDAGUtilityAccount [504]
Username   : Alex Marshall [1000]
```

Figure 6 : Extracting Usernames from

```
sansforensics@siftworkstation: /mnt/windows_mount/Users
$ ls
[Alex Marshall]  'All Users'  Default  'Default User'  desktop.ini  Public
```

Figure 8 : User Directory Listing

Figure 7 : User Directory Listing

To further confirm evidence, I use plugin **profilelist** (Fig 7) to get info about the current active or previous active accounts on the machine and also User directory shows the **Alex** is **primary User with ID 1000** (Fig 8)

### Question 2. What programs have been installed on the computer? What recent programs have been run?

To detect which programs were installed , I used the **RegRipper** tool with that has **uninstall** plugin, which loops through Keys in registry tracking all installed software in Control system. Following programs I found are **Microsoft Edge**, **Mozilla Firefox** , **7zip** and **VLC Media** and many more in Fig 9

```
$ rip.pl -r /mnt/windows_mount/Windows/System32/config/SOFTWARE -p uninstall
Launching uninstall v.20200525
uninstall v.20200525
(Software, NTUSER.DAT) Gets contents of Uninstall keys from Software, NTUSER.DAT hives
Uninstall
Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall
2024-08-27 13:12:17Z
7-Zip 24.08 (x64) v.24.08

2024-08-27 13:07:52Z
Mozilla Maintenance Service v.129.0.2

2024-08-27 13:05:12Z
VMware Tools v.11.1.5.16724464

2024-08-27 13:04:44Z
Microsoft Visual C++ 2019 X64 Additional Runtime - 14.24.28127 v.14.24.28127

2024-08-27 13:04:43Z
Microsoft Visual C++ 2019 X64 Minimum Runtime - 14.24.28127 v.14.24.28127

2019-12-07 09:51:08Z
WIC

2019-12-07 09:16:09Z
AddressBook
Connection Manager
DirectDrawEx
FontCore
IE40
IE4Data
IESBAKE
IEData
MobileOptionPack
SchedulingAgent
```

```
Now6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall
2024-08-28 06:01:08Z
Microsoft Edge V.92.0.902.67

2024-08-27 13:16:25Z
VLC media player v.3.0.21

2024-08-27 13:07:35Z
Mozilla Firefox (x86 en-US) v.129.0.2

2024-08-27 13:04:44Z
Microsoft Visual C++ 2015-2019 Redistributable (x64) - 14.24.28127 v.14.24.28127.4

2024-08-27 13:04:41Z
Microsoft Visual C++ 2019 X86 Minimum Runtime - 14.24.28127 v.14.24.28127
Microsoft Visual C++ 2015-2019 Redistributable (x86) - 14.24.28127 v.14.24.28127.4
Microsoft Visual C++ 2019 X86 Additional Runtime - 14.24.28127 v.14.24.28127

2023-05-05 12:32:49Z
Microsoft Edge Update v.1.3.147.37

2019-12-07 09:51:08Z
WIC

2019-12-07 09:16:08Z
AddressBook
Connection Manager
DirectDrawEx
FontCore
IE40
IE4Data
IESBAKE
IEData
MobileOptionPack
SchedulingAgent
```

Figure 9 : List of all Installed Programs

For recent programs, I used RunMRU plugin to extract data as shown in Figure below. In figure 10, ‘cmd, calc ‘notepad,’ and ‘mspaint’ were the most recently run programs.

```
$ rip.pl -r /mnt/windows_mount/Users/Alex\ Marshall/NTUSER.DAT -p runmru
Launching runmru v.20200525
runmru v.20200525
(NTUSER.DAT) Gets contents of user's RunMRU key

RunMRU
Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\RunMRU
LastWrite Time 2024-08-27 13:13:05Z
MRULIST = edcba
a cmd\1
b calc\1
c notepad\1
d mspaint\1
e firefox\1
```

### Question 3. Recover the content of any files in the recycle bin.

To recover the files, I navigated to **Recycle.Bin** and see following **5 files**. It has two deleted items, one is text file and other is zip file as shown in Figure 11

```
sansforensics@siftworkstation: ~/mnt/windows_mount/$Recycle.Bin/S-1-5-21-212117580-4225460857-3930897821-1000
$ ls
'$IAU06YK.txt'  '$ILY0J7N.zip'  '$RAU06YK.txt'  '$RLY0J7N.zip'  'desktop.ini'
```

Figure 11: Files in RecycleBin

To recover **\$RAU06YK.txt**, I use **file** command to shows its **archive** file, I unzip the file and got **notes.jpg** as shown in Figure 12 . I use built in tool **Libreoffice** to view the file. It was **Alex Testimonial** in Figure 13.

```
sansforensics@siftworkstation: ~/Downloads/EvidenceA
$ file '\$RAU06YK.txt'
$RAU06YK.txt: POSIX tar archive
sansforensics@siftworkstation: ~/Downloads/EvidenceA
$ unzip '\$RAU06YK.txt'
Archive: \$RAU06YK.txt
Warning [\$RAU06YK.txt]: 1536 extra bytes at beginning or within zipfile
 (attempting to process anyway)
 inflating: notes.jpg
sansforensics@siftworkstation: ~/Downloads/EvidenceA
$ file notes.jpg
notes.jpg: Microsoft Word 2007
```

This is my last will and testament.  
If you're reading this, it means something has gone terribly wrong. I'm sorry for everything that's happened, for the pain I've caused. I want my parents to know that I love them, even though we didn't always see eye to eye. I wish I could have been a better son.  
To Lily, I'm sorry for all the hurt I caused. You deserve so much better. I hope you can find it someday.  
To Sophia... I don't know what to say. I never meant for things to end this way. I just wanted to find a way to be happy, but I made too many mistakes. I hope you can find peace.  
All my belongings should go to my family, to help them with anything they need. I don't have much, but it's all I can offer.  
Goodbye, everyone.  
Alex Marshall

Figure 12,13: Recovering Files & Results

The zip file '**\$RLY0J&N.zip**' was password protected. I use **Fcrackzip** with **rockyou** dictionary to **crack** the password. The password found was "**football**", I use the password to unzip the file as shown in Figure 14, The file name was **UniversityWarning\_letter.pdf**

```
sansforensics@siftworkstation: ~/Downloads/EvidenceA
$ unzip 'SRLY0J7N.zip'
Archive: SRLY0J7N.zip
[SRLY0J7N.zip] UniversityWarning_Letter.pdf password:
 skipping: UniversityWarning_Letter.pdf incorrect password
sansforensics@siftworkstation: ~/Downloads/EvidenceA
$ fcrackzip -u -v -D -p rockyou.txt 'SRLY0J7N.zip'
Found file 'UniversityWarning_Letter.pdf', (size cp/uc 63178/ 66769, flags 9, chk 7688)

PASSWORD FOUND!!!!: pw == football
sansforensics@siftworkstation: ~/Downloads/EvidenceA
$ unzip 'SRLY0J7N.zip'
Archive: SRLY0J7N.zip
[SRLY0J7N.zip] UniversityWarning_Letter.pdf password:
 inflating: UniversityWarning_Letter.pdf
```

Figure 14: Cracking zip File

PENNBRIDGE UNIVERSITY  
March 15, 2024  
To: Alex Marshall  
Student ID: 734545  
Department of Computer Science  
Dear Mr. Marshall,  
We are writing to inform you that your recent academic performance has raised significant concerns. Our records indicate that you have failed two courses in the previous semester and have missed several key assignments and exams in the current semester.  
Please be advised that you are now on academic probation. If you do not demonstrate substantial improvement in your academic performance by the end of this term, you may face suspension from the university, and your scholarship may be revoked.  
Additionally, we are aware of an incident last semester where you were suspected of unauthorized access to university systems. Although this case was closed due to insufficient evidence, any further infractions will be met with severe disciplinary action.  
We strongly encourage you to seek academic counseling and make use of the resources available to help you succeed.  
Sincerely,  
Dr. Karen Thompson  
Dean of Students  
Pennbrook University

Figure 15 : Uni Warning letter

### Question 4. Is there evidence that gives an indication of the state of mind of the owner of the computer?

During my investigation, I found multiple documents related to the owner , which helps me to deduce the state of mind of owner. Following are the documents given as

1. **Alex Dad** email, in which his dad was angry at him for doing poor in courses (Fig16) and ask him to get his life sorted out or otherwise its final warning from his side.

2. **Debit\_Tracker** shows that alex was in debt with alot of money of **\$7450** and there is big amount of \$5000 dollar from **unknown** source causing stress to him (Fig 17)
3. **Uni Warning\_letter** shows that Alex **failed** in two courses and giving a warning to go on probation and no continual of scholarship. It is also mention he is involved in suspicious activity but case close due to less evidence (Figure 15)
4. In **Journal1**, Alex mentions he is in big debt and under stress due to studies. He also feeling guilty due to selling exam answers and feeling scared if get caught. (Fig 18)
5. In **Journal2**, Alex mentions that his credit **card maxed out** and owe money to people, he is **unwilling** to share problem and situation with parents (Fig 20)
6. **Mum\_Email** provides insights that alex isn't contact with her mom and she is worried about him and ask him to share his problem (Figure 19)
7. **InternshipOffer** letter shows that alex received internship but it needs good academic results to join, highlighting that it put more stress on Alex (Figure 21)
8. **Alex Testament**, the biggest clue, in which alex mention he's lifes is messed up due to poor decisions and saying sorry to his **parents, lily, sophia** and further mention that his belongings handed to his parents and overall goodbye to everyone (Fig 13)

From: Oliver Marshall <oliver\_marshall@email.com>  
To: Alex Marshall <alex\_marshall@university.edu>  
Date: March 10, 2024  
Subject: Your Future

Alex,

I've just received your latest report card, and I'm deeply disappointed. This is not the level of performance I expect from my son. You have all the potential in the world, but you're throwing it away by not applying yourself.

I've warned you before that you're running out of chances. If you don't get your act together, I will have no choice but to cut off your financial support. You need to understand that the Marshall family has a reputation to uphold, and you're not living up to it.

You need to focus on your studies and start making decisions that reflect the kind of man you want to become. I didn't work my entire life for you to squander these opportunities.

Consider this your final warning.

Dad

A	B	C	D	E
Creditor	Amount	Owed	Due Date	Notes
Credit Card 1	1200	2024-04-15	Maxed out	
Credit Card 2	800	2024-04-20	Maxed out	
Lily Parker	300	2024-04-10	Personal loan, urgent	
Private Loan	5000	2024-04-30	From unknown source, urgent	
Friends	150	2024-04-25	Various small loans	
Total	7450			

journal1.txt

1 February 28, 2024  
2  
3 Money's been tighter than I expected this semester. Between rent, utilities, and trying to keep up appearances, I'm running out of cash faster than I thought. I've been looking for a job, but with the course load and everything else, I just don't have the time.  
4  
5 I started selling exam answers a few weeks ago—just a couple of assignments here and there. I know it's wrong, but I need the money. Every time I think about stopping, I remember how empty my bank account is. It's a risk, but what choice do I have?  
6  
7 The guilt is starting to get to me, though. I'm always looking over my shoulder, waiting for someone to figure it out. What if I get caught? What if I lose everything? But I can't back out now. I'm in too deep.

Figure 16: Dad\_Email\_March.pdf

April 5, 2024

Dear Alex,

I hope you're doing well. I've been thinking about you a lot lately and wanted to write you a quick note to check in.

I know things have been tough with school, and your father can be hard on you. He just wants what's best for you, but I understand it can be overwhelming. I want you to know that I'm here for you, no matter what.

If you ever feel like you need someone to talk to, please don't hesitate to reach out. I'm worried about you, and I hope you're taking care of yourself. Life can be challenging, but you're strong, and I know you'll find your way.

Remember that we love you very much, and we're always here for you.

Love,  
Mum

Figure 19: Mum\_Email.jpg

Figure 17,18: Debit\_Tracker,Journal1.txt

journal2.txt

1 April 5, 2024  
2  
3 I'm drowning in debt. The credit cards are maxed out, and I still owe Lily for that loan she gave me last month. I hate asking for help, especially from her, but I didn't have a choice. I don't know how I'm going to pay her back.  
4  
5 Dad's been on my case again, telling me I need to get my life together. Easy for him to say—he's not the one trying to balance classes, relationships, and this mess of a life. He doesn't understand the pressure I'm under, and I can't tell him about the money problems. He'd lose it.  
6  
7 I've thought about dropping out, but where would I go? What would I do? I can't let everyone down, but I don't know how much longer I can keep this up.

Figure 20: Journal2.txt

Dear Alex,

I am pleased to offer you an internship position with TechVision, a leading company in the field of artificial intelligence and cybersecurity. This opportunity is extended to you based on your demonstrated skills and potential in computer science.

The internship is a highly competitive program that could be a pivotal step in your career. However, I must stress the importance of staying focused and avoiding any distractions that may impede your progress.

This internship will require full commitment and excellence in both your academic and professional pursuits. I trust you will take this opportunity seriously and make the most of it.

Please confirm your acceptance of this offer by April 10, 2024.

Best regards,  
Professor Mark Reynolds  
Department of Computer Science  
Pennbrook University

*Figure 21: Internship\_letter*


## **Evidence B.**

EvidenceB was provided in the zip file, after extracting I got .pcap file. I use Wireshark tool to monitor the network traffic and do the following questions

**Question 5. Who are the people communicating in the transmission? When does the first transmission begin and the last transmission finish?**

To get data, I follow the tcp stream by clicking on packet selecting option follow > TCP stream as shown in the Figure 22

I get the following data from tcp streams **0, 3, 272, 371** as shown below in the following images below



*Figure 22 :Following Tcp stream*

The people who were communicating in the transmission are **AlexM21**, **PartyDude**, **DormKing**, **BookWorm**, **LilyLaw** and **ArtLover99** as shown in Figure 23, 24 and 25.

To get the starting and ending time of Transmission I check the first and last packet so it begins at **Sep 1, 2024 07:28:33 UTC** and ended at **Sep 1, 2024 08:51:43 UTC**

And conversation started at time 07:57:11 and ended at 08:46:20

*Figure 23 : Stream 272, output*

[[],],..,42]"msg": {"chan": "2", "msg": [{"from": "["mode"]", "nick": "AlexM21"}, {"type": "message", "time": "2024-09-01T08:23:34.621Z", "text": "What's that supposed to mean?"}, {"msg": [{"highlight": "false", "users": "[]"}]}],..,3, "x", 3, "x", ..,0, ..,0, ..,0}],..,42]"msg": {"chan": "2", "msg": [{"from": "["mode"]", "nick": "LilyLaw"}, {"type": "message", "time": "2024-09-01T08:22:09.352Z", "text": "I'm not exactly what I mean. Are you seeing someone else?"}, {"msg": [{"highlight": "false", "users": "[]"}]}],..,3, "x", 3, "x", ..,0, ..,0, ..,0}],..,42]"msg": {"chan": "2", "msg": [{"from": "["mode"]", "nick": "AlexM21"}, {"type": "message", "time": "2024-09-01T08:22:31.052Z", "text": "Lily, come on. You're over thinking this whole thing."}, {"msg": [{"highlight": "false", "users": "[]"}]}]]

*Figure 24: stream 371 output*

"mode":"@","nick":"ArtLover99","type":"message","time":"2024-09-01T08:09:28.019Z","text":"Alex, we need to talk."}, {"self":true,"highlight":false,"users":[],"id":21,"previews":[]}]}, {"...\$...3...42["msg","chan":3,"msg":{"from":{"mode":"","nick":"AlexM21"},"type":"message","time":"2024-09-01T08:09:44.743Z","text":"About what? I'm busy."}, {"self":false,"highlight":false,"users":[],"id":22,"previews":[]}]}..zJ..hx...3..z..X\$...41..B...K...{..21..C.....,\$H..y|..T..w...~...42["msg","chan":3,"msg":{"from":{"mode":"","nick":"ArtLover99"},"type":"message","time":"2024-09-01T08:10:02.912Z","text":"About us. I can't keep doing this if your not serious."}, {"self":true,"highlight":false,"users":[],"id":23,"previews":[]}]}, {"...z9..x9...3...42["msg","chan":3,"msg":{"from":{"mode":"","nick":"AlexM21"},"type":"message","time":"2024-09-01T08:10:31.914Z","text":"Sophia, I told you. I need time. It's complicated with Lily."}, {"self":false,"highlight":false,"users":[],"id":24,"previews":[]}]}...2..2..3..1....Rowt...s...5..#N.

*Figure 25: stream 0 output*

- Frame 1: 75 bytes on wire (600 bits), 75 bytes captured (600 bits)  
Encapsulation type: Ethernet (1)  
Arrival Time: Sep 1, 2024 07:28:33.832421000 UTC

*Figure 26: Starting of Transmission*

- Frame 69871: 66 bytes on wire (528 bits), 66 bytes captured (528 bits)  
Encapsulation type: Ethernet (1)  
Arrival Time: Sep 1, 2024 08:51:43.613666000 UTC

*Figure 27: Ending of Transmission*

**6. What browsers, operating systems, and IP addresses are used by the communication endpoints?**

To find the IP addresses, I use the tool **Network Miner** to extract the IP address and get more info about the operating system as shown in figures below. By following TCP stream, I found **User-Agent** header in stream 4 which shows **Mozilla/5.0**. I further confirm from **user-agents.net** and get the following data about **browser** and **operating system** in Figure 28 which is Firefox/129.0 and Ubuntu

```
GET /canonical.html HTTP/1.1
Host: detectportal.firefox.com
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Ubuntu; Linux x86_64; rv:129.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/129.0
Accept: */*
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Cache-Control: no-cache
Pragma: no-cache
Connection: keep-alive

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: Apache/2.4.29 (Ubuntu)
Content-Length: 90
Vary: 1.1, google
Date: Sun, 01 Sep 2024 01:43:33 GMT
Age: 100
Content-Type: text/html
Cache-Control: public,must-revalidate,max-age=0,s-maxage=3600
<meta http-equiv="refresh" content="0;url=https://support.mozilla.org/kb/captive-portal"><GET /canonical.html HTTP/1.1
Host: detectportal.firefox.com
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Ubuntu; Linux x86_64; rv:129.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/129.0
Accept: */*
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Cache-Control: no-cache
Pragma: no-cache
Connection: keep-alive
2 client pkts, 2 server pkts, 3 turns
Entire conversation (1,198 bytes)
Show and save data as ASCII
Find:
```

Figure 28: User Agent Found in Stream 4




Figure 29 : Confirming User agent from Source

Following IP address found through network miner are given in Table 1 below

10.10.10.1(Firefox/129.0)	10.10.10.22(Firefox/129.0)
10.10.10.33(Firefox/129.0)	10.10.10.44(Firefox/15.0.1)
10.10.10.56(Firefox/129.0)	10.10.10.254

Table 1 : IP Address

For confirmation IP's addressed displayed in the miner tool is given as




Figure 30: NetworkMiner Showing IP's

### Question 7. What files were transmitted on the local network?

I filter packets using ftp and found out that sslkey file is shared by FTP in Fig 31. I used ftp-data filter to get SSL Key and recovered it in raw form. Then I choose option Edit > preferences and add the raw key to TLS protocol. This decrypt the TLS conversations and as result I was able to get the hhtp2 protocol and I was able to extract more valuable data as shown below.

52123 2024-09-01 08:42:41.807132 10.10.10.254	10.10.10.22	FTP	86 Response: 220 (vsFTPD 3.0.5)
52432 2024-09-01 08:42:47.574969 10.10.10.22	10.10.10.254	FTP	82 Request: USER anonymous
52434 2024-09-01 08:42:47.774815 10.10.10.254	10.10.10.22	FTP	89 Response: 230 Login successful.

Figure 31 : FTP Data Transfer Found

```
220 (vsFTPD 3.0.5)
USER anonymous
230 Login successful.
215 UNIX Type: L8
TYPE I
200 Switching to Binary mode.
PORT 10,10,10,22,211,95
200 PORT command successful. Consider using PASV.
STOR sslkeyfile
553 Could not create file.
TYPE A
200 Switching to ASCII mode.
PORT 10,10,10,22,137,9
200 PORT command successful. Consider using PASV.
LIST
150 Here comes the directory listing.
226 Directory send OK.
CWD pub
250 Directory successfully changed.
200 PORT command successful.

Entire conversation (814 bytes)
Show and save data as ASCII
Stream 694
```

Figure 32 : Sign of SSLKeyFile Transfer in stream 694

```
# SSL/TLS secrets log file, generated by NSS
CLIENT_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET 7eb7aa304379b7e109738e0400b548856f1efaf0d24596fb4dd24f8d9d7d42 10b7a548166d4d0030ef819588fe4e7d85efbc1b307670bbdefe28d8aea790
SERVER_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET 7eb7aa304379b7e109738e0400b548856f1efaf0d24596fb4dd24f8d9d7d42 2b4c0ec1d27e54df3c81590342d13a7650caf2864bc209e1e79c81d9348d4
CLIENT_TRAFFIC_SECRET_0 7eb7aa304379b7e109738e0400b548856f1efaf0d24596fb4dd24f8d9d7d42 56d9e20b5d9d51c2d512d51f13707674f1c4e8cc342b4b4885530e8cad1307ad5d4
SERVER_TRAFFIC_SECRET_0 7eb7aa304379b7e109738e0400b548856f1efaf0d24596fb4dd24f8d9d7d42 5292a58dfe7f74317fd0d56d64f286d1593bf39986321ecff844f47f3d14ce
EXPORTER_SECRET 7eb7aa304379b7e109738e0400b548856f1efaf0d24596fb4dd24f8d9d7d42 552cfd619a3dd621374f8329c65b90fcfee98155c5687f7a2c9195e2c31c7c
CLIENT_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET db75f172d0879ab8d42c7efae0e3b4099156ef7fbe596622ab448eac447978508 81f2273e0c5bfcfb2f167c4b0ffff8b52cf3d43666cc17c2d53ccba5c2c97e
SERVER_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET db75f172d0879ab8d42c7efae0e3b4099156ef7fbe596622ab448eac447978509 80a8110cdee8f702a8b8eaat732a7e35cc6916a018ebfffee11f824294ccbc2db
CLIENT_TRAFFIC_SECRET db75f172d0879ab8d42c7efae0e3b4099156ef7fbe596622ab448eac447978509 823923398b872af7bcfe4099d297fb6bb82e106cfb69452417715bf56fa84
SERVER_TRAFFIC_SECRET_0 db75f172d0879ab8d42c7efae0e3b4099156ef7fbe596622ab448eac447978509 cf4acc43bf6248e6508a12eb6eff22b643d4eac6d6f79742d889f72c1582bb
EXPORTER_SECRET db75f172d0879ab8d42c7efae0e3b4099156ef7fbe596622ab448eac447978509 3983d3505e8346a105118e094b455d61f92c6e60ef77009a46d0694df7b7a037
CLIENT_RANDOM 38016b94a0e8264124f45f2a7e0d26697f1a839ed56fb4334e9534bfccff 281ccdb82c2b83a8ca3e80d3055d20b68c24b8e44e1a9d2929b6088fb6fb7e74cd93cc749cf10da5
CLIENT_RANDOM_72d3bab8bca2edac7cd4b842b1d3d8419a0e36428c7823e59080e3c9e74764a f8e324701a8f89ee65104ed422c7e87505624b8e12b857846e44e1a9d2929b6088fb6fb7e74cd93cc749cf10da5
CLIENT_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET 87bd31f6fcab93618ad60938ae29462e02f35613624745ca0a3e1fc65fd789 594413ca10cef125613a13df4b99f36300f497fde0789b79f784d9104b359e995
CLIENT_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET_bebbf13481fa86e2c7842648a0cf05f3ff257eac15125d2c944b4bee17a6870 12c6ef79f206c8a7ef3e08aa0e0c0042af324b81dda60c4998e0d4bb3321
CLIENT_TRAFFIC_SECRET_0 87bd31f6fcab93618ad60938ae29462e02f35613624745ca0a3e1fc65fd789 117fa0e5c14fd43867ead620b251bdc14c52692d178656f8e1ce260e965
SERVER_TRAFFIC_SECRET_0 87bd31f6fcab93618ad60938ae29462e02f35613624745ca0a3e1fc65fd789 f128e5299eaa294df91109de7902a8e83dcb652a5be10d61dacb86214bd5
EXPORTER_SECRET 87bd31f6fcab93618ad60938ae29462e02f35613624745ca0a3e1fc65fd789 fea2139978e111b44272f7ea7d4206672c3038e591bd2fa7570fc52375fe7
```

Figure 33 : SSL/TLS log file in Stream 701

After gaining access to http2 protocol, I gained new insights as shown in figure 34

50124 2024-09-01 08:40:56.155812 10.10.10.254	10.10.10.22	HTTP2	430 HEADERS[23]: 200 OK, DATA[23]
50197 2024-09-01 08:41:01.596414 10.10.10.22	10.10.10.254	HTTP2	154 HEADERS[25]: GET /data/ExamSample.png, WINDOW_UPDATE[25]
50203 2024-09-01 08:41:01.596909 10.10.10.254	10.10.10.22	HTTP2	10282 HEADERS[25]: 200 OK, DATA[25] [TCP segment of a reassembled P..

Figure 34: Access to HTTP2 protocol

Further checking the packets details and bytes I found that following files has been shared on this stream which include **ExamSample.png**, **bazaar.zip** and **secret.key** as shown in the figure. Which shows these files can be extracted out .

<h1>Index of /data/</h1><hr><pre><a href="#">..</a>\r\n<a href="ExamSample.png">ExamSample.png</a>	01-Sep-2024 07:19	120094\r\n
<a href="bazaar.zip">bazaar.zip</a>	01-Sep-2024 07:19	304581\r\n
<a href="secret.key">secret.key</a>	01-Sep-2024 07:19	106\r\n

Figure 35 : Packet bytes shows Sharing of files

After that I looked ExamSample.png by searching png in field and got the following PNG stream. I investigated further by checking fragments bytes and found the Exam image

↑ 50222 2024-09-01 08:41:01.597862 10.10.10.254	10.10.10.22	HTTP2	5528 DATA[25], DATA[25] (PNG)
[Pad Length: 0]			
- [15 Body fragments (120094 bytes): #50203(8192), #50205(8192), #50205(8192), #50205(8192), #50209(8192), #50210(8192), #50210(8192), #50212(8192), #50212(8192)]			
[Frame: 50203, payload: 0-8191 (8192 bytes)]			
[Frame: 50205, payload: 8192-16383 (8192 bytes)]			
[Frame: 50205, payload: 16384-24575 (8192 bytes)]			

Figure 36 :ExamSample.png Fragments Found

I use the option show packet bytes and it display Bio101 exam image as shown below. I also further extracted Secret key which hints there is **aes encrypted file**




Figure 37: Secret Key

Figure 38 : BIO101 Exam

I further investigate more and follow tcp streams, in which stream **699** display few files that were present in the directory. These files were shared previously in **2021** present in **pub directory** highlighting alex shared academic documents before with these guys. Files names are **test.txt** and **upload.txt**

-rw-rw-r--	1	ftp	ftp	5 Aug 31 2021	test.txt
-rw-r--r--	1	ftp	ftp	5 Aug 31 2021	upload.txt

Figure 39 : Files present in Public Directory

All above results shows that the files I have recovered and shared on local network are **ExamSample.png** and **secret.key**

#### Question 8. What is the relationship of the people communicating in the network capture? How are they related to the victim?

According to above Data, 6 people were found in the communicating(Fig 23,24,25). Data shows that these people were friends with victim(Alex) and shared same university studies

Following are the people involved in transmission.

**DormKing(Figure 23):** He is involved in group **Dorm** to get the exam answer and was not willing to pay \$200 to victim. Also instructed PartyDude to get the sessionkey file from victim system.

**PartyDude(Figure 23):** He is also involved in **Dorm** in getting exam answers and heavily dependent on victim awnsers insights. He tried to steal the session key from victim room, so he couldn't pay for the Bioexam insights.

**BookWorm(Figure 23) :** He is also part of the group Dorm and warned others about the integrity theft of the exam and mention he would not be a part of it as he was scared but observe the situation as spectator.

**LilyLaw(Figure 24):** Lily is girlfriend of victim and she is quite angry on situation and suspecting that victim is seeing someone else and warned him to sort this out.

**ArtLover(Figure 25):** Artlover is Sophia, who is in a romantic relationship with the victim and asking him to leave Lily and choose between one of them as soon as possible.

All of the above data highlights how the conversation and scenario play out the friends involved.

---

#### Evidence C.

The Evidence C was provided in **.vmem** format, to examine **RAM** memory dump I use **Volatility** tool, which is used in forensic to extract important info from these memory dump. To start the process I use **imageinfo** plugin to identify the windows profiles which is **Win7SP1x64** and it also shows timestamps in Figure 40.

```
sansforensics@siftworkstation: ~/Downloads/Evidence C
$ vol.py -f EvidenceC.vmem imagedinfo
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6.1
INFO : volatility.debug : Determining profile based on KDBG search...
Suggested Profile(s) : Win7SP1x64, Win7SP0x64, Win2008R2SP1x64, Win2008R2SP1x64_24000, Win2008R2SP1x64_23418, Win2008R2SP1x64, Win7SP1x64_24000, Win7SP1x64_23418
          AS Layer1 : WindowsAMD64PagedMemory (Kernel AS)
          AS Layer2 : FileAddressSpace (/home/sansforensics/Downloads/Evidence C/EvidenceC.vmem)
          PAE type : No PAE
          DTB : 0x187000L
          KDBG : 0xf800029f40a0L
Number of Processors : 1
Image Type (Service Pack) : 1
          KPCR for CPU 0 : 0xfffffb000029f5d00L
          KUSER_SHARED_DATA : 0xfffffb780000000000L
Image date and time : 2024-09-08 12:26:34 UTC+0000
Image local date and time : 2024-09-08 22:26:34 +1000
```

*Figure 40 : Memory Dump of Profile*

**Question 9. What applications are running on the memory dump computer?**

To know which applications are running I use **plugin pstree** which shows the hierarchical and parent-child view of the process as shown in Figure 41. It lists all the User Applications which are **Windows Explorer**, **Mozilla Firefox**, **Thunderbird**, **Notepad++** and other applications and services can be seen in the figure below.

Name	Pid	PPid	Thds	Hnds	Time	.....
0xfffffff0a0324e1060:wininit.exe	384	316	3	77	2024-09-08 07:08:12 UTC+0000	
0xfffffff0a03254740d:lmss.exe	496	384	9	146	2024-09-08 07:08:14 UTC+0000	
0xfffffff0a03252b00:services.exe	480	384	6	215	2024-09-08 07:08:13 UTC+0000	
0xfffffff0a03252b00:svchost.exe	784	480	23	208	2024-09-08 07:08:09 UTC+0000	
0xfffffff0a03257060:spoolsv.exe	1036	480	13	277	2024-09-08 07:08:25 UTC+0000	
0xfffffff0a032599a0:taskhost.exe	5056	480	6	219	2024-09-08 08:03:37 UTC+0000	
0xfffffff0a0326cbb0:wpnnetv3.exe	2444	480	13	397	2024-09-08 07:08:43 UTC+0000	
0xfffffff0a032692b0:svchost.exe	840	480	29	917	2024-09-08 07:08:22 UTC+0000	
0xfffffff0a032693b0:msdc.exe	872	480	12	144	2024-09-08 07:08:34 UTC+0000	
0xfffffff0a0326a3b0:searchindexer.	2356	480	14	662	2024-09-08 07:08:42 UTC+0000	
0xfffffff0a0327975b0:svchost.exe	1064	480	17	298	2024-09-08 07:08:25 UTC+0000	
0xfffffff0a0327975b0:svchost.exe	688	480	7	334	2024-09-08 07:08:25 UTC+0000	
0xfffffff0a0327975b0:svchost.exe	648	480	3	204	2024-09-08 07:08:31 UTC+0000	
0xfffffff0a0327d000:spovsc.exe	2868	480	4	151	2024-09-08 07:10:41 UTC+0000	
0xfffffff0a03268470:svchost.exe	816	480	23	469	2024-09-08 07:08:22 UTC+0000	
0xfffffff0a03267e120:dwm.exe	1464	816	5	126	2024-09-08 07:08:28 UTC+0000	
0xfffffff0a03267e00:svchost.exe	992	816	18	773	2024-09-08 07:08:23 UTC+0000	
0xfffffff0a03267e30:svchost.exe	328	480	19	495	2024-09-08 07:08:24 UTC+0000	
0xfffffff0a03268000:svchost.exe	508	480	10	269	2024-09-08 07:08:37 UTC+0000	
0xfffffff0a03268000:wmprflw.exe	2196	480	10	269	2024-09-08 07:08:37 UTC+0000	
0xfffffff0a032b7800:dlhost.exe	4332	588	8	249	2024-09-08 12:16:17 UTC+0000	
0xfffffff0a03252680:dlhost.exe	1976	480	13	193	2024-09-08 07:08:34 UTC+0000	
0xfffffff0a03252680:vtntools.exe	1584	480	11	272	2024-09-08 07:08:30 UTC+0000	
0xfffffff0a032876910:VGAuthService.	1240	480	3	84	2024-09-08 07:08:27 UTC+0000	
0xfffffff0a03317a600:svchost.exe	1712	480	13	328	2024-09-08 07:10:42 UTC+0000	
0xfffffff0a032d4200:svchost.exe	2780	480	9	364	2024-09-08 07:08:45 UTC+0000	
0xfffffff0a03317a600:svchost.exe	1388	480	9	364	2024-09-08 07:08:45 UTC+0000	
0xfffffff0a03317b30:svchost.exe	2556	480	21	333	2024-09-08 07:08:44 UTC+0000	
0xfffffff0a032544480:lsass.exe	488	384	7	764	2024-09-08 07:08:14 UTC+0000	
0xfffffff0a03251060:cssrs.exe	324	316	9	512	2024-09-08 07:08:11 UTC+0000	
0xfffffff0a031872510:thunderbird.exe	1892	4672	63	906	2024-09-08 12:02:41 UTC+0000	
0xfffffff0a032023c0:thunderbird.exe	4476	1892	7	163	2024-09-08 12:02:46 UTC+0000	
0xfffffff0a031f7408:thunderbird.exe	3268	1892	7	155	2024-09-08 12:10:21 UTC+0000	
0xfffffff0a031f6600:thunderbird.exe	798	1892	17	228	2024-09-08 12:10:21 UTC+0000	
0xfffffff0a031f6600:thunderbird.exe	854	1892	10	224	2024-09-08 12:11:01 UTC+0000	
0xfffffff0a031b3f70:thunderbird.exe	4988	1892	13	232	2024-09-08 12:02:58 UTC+0000	
0xfffffff0a031b3e00:thunderbird.exe	3412	1892	21	261	2024-09-08 12:02:42 UTC+0000	
0xfffffff0a031b3f70:thunderbird.exe	3504	1892	21	261	2024-09-08 12:02:42 UTC+0000	
0xfffffff0a031c3b00:firefox.exe	3512	1892	81	1838	2024-09-08 08:00:31 UTC+0000	
0xfffffff0a032b2b30:firefox.exe	3024	3512	17	235	2024-09-08 12:25:58 UTC+0000	
0xfffffff0a031f58b0:firefox.exe	3436	3512	20	250	2024-09-08 12:25:42 UTC+0000	
0xfffffff0a03200600:firefox.exe	4216	3512	20	247	2024-09-08 12:25:47 UTC+0000	
0xfffffff0a031c3b30:firefox.exe	4176	3512	17	235	2024-09-08 12:26:01 UTC+0000	
0xfffffff0a03145b00:firefox.exe	3800	3512	6	148	2024-09-08 08:00:31 UTC+0000	
0xfffffff0a03145b00:firefox.exe	2712	3512	20	245	2024-09-08 12:25:02 UTC+0000	
0xfffffff0a03b2d060:firefox.exe	4420	3512	20	245	2024-09-08 08:01:47 UTC+0000	
0xfffffff0a031b3ab0:firefox.exe	2432	3512	20	243	2024-09-08 12:24:57 UTC+0000	
0xfffffff0a031b3ab0:firefox.exe	4086	3512	17	231	2024-09-08 08:00:33 UTC+0000	
0xfffffff0a03269500:firefox.exe	4264	3512	17	235	2024-09-08 12:26:01 UTC+0000	
0xfffffff0a031c1fb0:firefox.exe	3168	3512	8	174	2024-09-08 08:00:33 UTC+0000	
0xfffffff0a031f58b0:firefox.exe	3512	3512	20	245	2024-09-08 12:25:00 UTC+0000	
0xfffffff0a03290000:firefox.exe	1752	3512	20	247	2024-09-08 12:25:35 UTC+0000	
0xfffffff0a032d7060:firefox.exe	1724	3512	22	251	2024-09-08 12:25:31 UTC+0000	
0xfffffff0a031f13b0:firefox.exe	4256	3512	22	255	2024-09-08 12:25:15 UTC+0000	
0xfffffff0a032b4060:firefox.exe	4576	3512	8	164	2024-09-08 08:01:48 UTC+0000	
0xfffffff0a031c07b30:firefox.exe	3748	3512	26	364	2024-09-08 08:00:31 UTC+0000	
0xfffffff0a031e03b730:firefox.exe	3088	3512	18	239	2024-09-08 08:00:35 UTC+0000	
0xfffffff0a032b089d0:firefox.exe	4108	3512	20	244	2024-09-08 12:25:31 UTC+0000	
0xfffffff0a032b2d060:firefox.exe	4040	3512	21	251	2024-09-08 12:24:41 UTC+0000	
0xfffffff0a031f2060:firefox.exe	2516	3512	22	257	2024-09-08 12:24:44 UTC+0000	
0xfffffff0a030b2e090:system	4	0	89	577	2024-09-08 07:08:05 UTC+0000	
0xfffffff0a0317de0:smss.exe	240	4	2	29	2024-09-08 07:08:05 UTC+0000	
0xfffffff0a03025000:winlogon.exe	420	368	3	111	2024-09-08 07:08:12 UTC+0000	
0xfffffff0a03060000:csrss.exe	376	368	11	891	2024-09-08 07:08:12 UTC+0000	
0xfffffff0a030291b30:explorer.exe	1504	1456	21	902	2024-09-08 07:08:29 UTC+0000	
0xfffffff0a032b2a60:vtntools.exe	2866	1504	7	214	2024-09-08 07:08:36 UTC+0000	
0xfffffff0a032b28000:dsrservice.exe	1532	1504	2	53	2024-09-08 07:08:36 UTC+0000	
0xfffffff0a031f19e0:ynepadplus.exe	4366	1504	5	247	2024-09-08 12:15:06 UTC+0000	

*Figure 41: List of Running Applications & Services*

**10. What web pages has the memory dump computer visited recently?**

To check which web pages were visited, I started my investigation by using the plugin **firefoxhistory** and **chromehistory** to check recently visited pages. I didn't get any data from it as shown in Fig 42. Then I used the plugin **iehistory**, which extracted the data but it was unfiltered and not useful for investigation as shown in Fig 43.

```
sansforensics@siftworkstation: ~/Downloads/Evidence.C
$ vol.py -f EvidenceC.vmem --profile=Win7SP1x64 iehistory
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6.1
*****
Process: 1504 explorer.exe
Cache type "URL" at 0x2a36400
Record length: 0x280
Location: https://www.google.com.au/favicon.ico
Last modified: 2019-10-22 18:30:00 UTC+0000
Last accessed: 2024-09-08 07:47:44 UTC+0000
File Offset: 0x280, Data Offset: 0x90, Data Length: 0xa0
File: favicon[1].ico
Data: HTTP/1.1 200 OK
```

*Figure 42 : Result of firefoxhistory & chromehistory*

*Figure 43 : Result of iehistory*

To investigate further I do memory dump of **firefox.exe** files by grabbing the PId **3512** and using the following command as shown in Fig 44

```
sansforensics@sfworkstation: ~/Downloads/Evidence_C
$ vol.py -f Evidence.vmem --profile=Win7SP1x64 dumpfiles -n -p 3512 -D FirefoxData/
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6.1
DataSectionObject 0xfffffaa031c50a20 3512 \Device\HarddiskVolume1\Windows\Registration\R000000000006.cib
DataSectionObject 0xfffffaa031b03b70 3512 \Device\HarddiskVolume1\Users\Sophia Bennett\AppData\Roaming\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\v2333frx.default-esr\storage\default
ps%2CQuora.com%29\ls\data.sqlite
DataSectionObject 0xfffffaa032e5ae0 3512 \Device\HarddiskVolume1\Windows\System32\en-US\MMDevAPI.dll.hui
DataSectionObject 0xfffffaa031c257a0 3512 \Device\HarddiskVolume1\Users\Sophia Bennett\AppData\Roaming\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\v2333frx.default-esr\storage.sqlite
DataSectionObject 0xfffffaa031c8d30 3512 \Device\HarddiskVolume1\Users\Sophia Bennett\AppData\Roaming\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\v2333frx.default-esr\cert9.db
DataSectionObject 0xfffffaa031c95d60 3512 \Device\HarddiskVolume1\Users\Sophia Bennett\AppData\Roaming\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\v2333frx.default-esr\key4.db
```

*Figure 44 : Firefox memory Dump*

Further, I found a file name file **formhistory.sqlite.dat**, opened through **sqlite** database software and found the result in **formhistory** database which shows search **keywords**

id	fieldname	value	timesUsed	firstUsed	lastUsed	guid
Filter	Filter	Filter	Filter	Filter	Filter	Filter
1	searchbar-history	download thunderbird 115	1	172578246...	172578246...	NorhaZ4LRoGMGdBB
2	searchbar-history	How to stop someone from leaving you	1	172579828...	172579828...	8xMxmGvJ54inUXsN
3	searchbar-history	Signs someone is cheating	1	172579829...	172579829...	8JjrLyERRQ69WUMn
4	searchbar-history	How to get away with self-defense	1	172579829...	172579829...	uk5P0Vm7NSE2LX5
5	searchbar-history	Emergency therapy services	1	172579831...	172579831...	CmT5RtqRTHG1w2gY

*Figure 45: Search History Found in Database*

After this I found **places.sqlite.dat** file, which is valuable as it holds data about the website visited plus bookmarks. After running the command **Strings filename | grep https** give me the following result in Fig 46. The web pages searches data from file confirm and matches with formhistory database which shows the recently visited pages

*Figure 46: WebPage Searches From places.sqlite.dat*

By all the above evidence these are webpages url and keyword history give in Fig 45.46

1. <https://www.quora.com/How-can-I-stop-people-leaving-me>
  2. <https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-e&q=Emergency+therapy+services>
  3. <https://download-installer.cdn.mozilla.net/pub/thunderbird/releases/115.15.0/win64/en-US/Thunderbird%20Setup%20115.15.0.exe>
  4. <https://www.verywellmind.com/warning-signs-your-spouse-is-cheating-2300652>
  5. <https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-e&q=How+to+get+away+with+self-defense>

**Question 11. What is email address of the owner of the memory dump computer and how are they connected to the case?**

To get email address, I use Volatility plugin **dumpregistry** to dump registries and hivelist by command in Figure 47. Further it was analysed by **RegRipper** to extract important data. I saw a file name **registry.0xfffff8a000b98010.SOFTWARE.reg** and use plugin **lastloggedon** to extract owner name, which is **Sophia Bennett** as shown in Figure 48

```
sansforensics@siftworkstation: ~/Downloads/Evidence C
$ vol.py -f EvidenceC.vmem --profile=Win7SP1x64 dumpregistry -D SystemReg/
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6.1
*****
Writing out registry: registry.0xfffff8a000b80410.BCD.reg
*****
Writing out registry: registry.0xfffff8a000024010.SYSTEM.reg
*****
Writing out registry: registry.0xfffff8a00001010.HARDWARE.reg
*****
Writing out registry: registry.0xfffff8a000dd7010.SECURITY.reg
```

Figure 47 : Registry Dump

```
sansforensics@siftworkstation: ~/Downloads/Evidence C/SystemReg
$ rtp.pl -r registry.0xfffff8a000b98010.SOFTWARE.reg -p lastloggedon
Launching lastloggedon v.20200517
lastloggedon v.20200517
(Software) Gets LastLoggedOn* values from LogonUI key
LastLoggedOn
Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Authentication\LogonUI
LastWrite: 2024-09-08 07:08:26Z
LastLoggedOnUser = .\Sophia Bennett
LastLoggedOnSAMUser = WIN-H3NARMQ1QIU\Sophia Bennett
```

Figure 48 : Extracting Owner Name

To further confirm the owner of the laptop I use the **Samparse** plugin on file **registry.0xfffff8a000e43010.SAM.reg**, which contains account & security information. I use grep Username to extract the owner name as shown in Figure 49

```
sansforensics@siftworkstation: ~/Downloads/Evidence C/SystemReg
$ rtp.pl -r registry.0xfffff8a000e43010.SAM.reg -p samparse | grep Username
Launching samparse v.20200825
Username : Administrator [500]
Username : Guest [501]
Username : Sophia Bennett [1000]
Username : HomeGroupUser$ [1002]
```

Figure 49: Extracting Username From Sam registry

To confirm the email address of the owner I the following Strings commands in figure 50,52 to extract the data about the emails and how its related to victim.

```
sansforensics@siftworkstation: ~/Downloads/Evidence C
$ strings EvidenceC.vmem | grep "gmail.com"
```

Figure 50 : Grabbing All Mails

```
To: sr8640171@gmail.com
From: Sophia Bennett <vb9945311@gmail.com>
Subject: Missed You Today
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8; format=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
Hey Alex,
```

Figure 51: Owner Email Extracted

By using grep, I found owner email address which is [vb9945311@gmail.com](mailto:vb9945311@gmail.com) (Figure 51) Further running grep Alex command show me Alex email which is [sr8640171@gmail.com](mailto:sr8640171@gmail.com) (Fig 52) and It also shows more data which is conversation between Sophia and Alex.

```
vb9945311@gmail.com
sr8640171@gmail.com
To: sr8640171@gmail.com
From: Sophia Bennett <vb9945311@gmail.com>
1@gmail.com;
```

Figure 52 :Alex Email Detected

```
Subject: You and Me
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8; format=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
Hi Alex,
It felt so good to see you the other day. I could tell you
're feeling
torn, and I get it
I really do. But you know you don
```

Figure 53: Subject You and Me

```
Subject: Missed You Today
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8; format=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
Hey Alex,
I missed you in class today. I kept looking over at your usual spot,
hoping you
d walk in with that goofy smile of yours. It
s strange how
^C
```

Figure 54: Subject Missed You Today

```
Subject: Feeling overwhelmed
To: vb9945311@gmail.com
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="000000000000f7b5bd06219aa924
--000000000000f7b5bd06219aa924
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Hey Soph,
Thanks for checking in. I=E2=80=99ve been feeling a bit overwhelmed with
```

Figure 55: Subject Feeling Overwhelmed

Following emails with subject **You and Me, Missed You Today and Feeling Overwhelmed** shows that **owner(Sophia)** connected with case chatting with Alex and Alex chatting about his situation with owner. From emails it is deduced that owner loves Alex and want to help him as they are good friends in Figure 53, 54, 55.

### Question 12. What is password of the memory dump computer?

To get the password of dump system, I use volatility plugin **lsadump** as it can extract info about **security logs** including passwords and authentications. Result is shown in Fig 56.

Password Extracted is '**Alexisbeautiful**'. I get the same result by using **hashdump** (Fig 57)

```
sansforensics@siftworkstation: ~/Downloads/Evidence_C
$ vol.py -f Evidence.vmem --profile=Win7SP1x64 lsadump
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6.1
DefaultPassword
0x00000000 1e 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 .....
0x00000010 41 00 6c 00 65 00 78 00 69 00 73 00 62 00 65 00 A.l.e.x.i.s.b.e.
0x00000020 61 00 75 00 74 00 69 00 66 00 75 00 6c 00 00 00 a.u.t.i.f.u.l.....
DPAPI_SYSTEM
0x00000000 2c 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 .....
0x00000010 01 00 00 00 f1 df 54 0f a8 3d 4d df e1 68 87 7b .....T..=M..h.(
0x00000020 98 00 1b ee b0 ae b1 29 f9 b3 8b 25 49 e3 f9 .....a)...MI
0x00000030 bd 9c 00 ec df c0 bc e0 c0 30 9c Be 00 00 00 00 .....
```

Figure 56: Password Extracted By lsadump

```
sansforensics@siftworkstation: ~/Downloads/Evidence_C
$ vol.py -f Evidence.vmem --profile=Win7SP1x64 hashdump
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6.1
Administrator:500:aad3b435b51404eeaaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
Guest:1000:aad3b435b51404eeaaad3b435b51404ee:fcb8264a1c97a4d07495fd5998eb251e:::
Sophia Bennett:1000:aad3b435b51404eeaaad3b435b51404ee:ed9a644efe3a408b18243aeb8e3f6ffb:::
HomeGroupUser$:1002:aad3b435b51404eeaaad3b435b51404ee:ed9a644efe3a408b18243aeb8e3f6ffb:::
```

✓ Found:  
f6c8264a1c97a4d07495fd5998eb251e:Alexisbeautiful

Figure 57: Password Extracted By hashdump

And when I decode the hash to get the same password

### Evidence D.

When I extracted EvidenceD I get 10 disk files. By using **ls -la** I get info about disk size and started my investigation from largest file which were **dm-1** and **vdc**. As shown in Figure 58. Further I run **File & mmls** command to check the details about the image. Dm-1 is linux file with no partitions and vdc is data file with no partitions in figure 59

```
sansforensics@siftworkstation: ~/Downloads/Evidence_D/EvidenceD
$ ls -la
total 21199420
drwxr-xr-x 2 sansforensics sansforensics 4096 Oct 12 00:55 .
drwxr-xr-x 4 sansforensics sansforensics 4096 Oct 12 00:56 ..
-rw-r--r-- 1 sansforensics sansforensics 2641915904 Sep 14 13:13 dm-0
-rw-r--r-- 1 sansforensics sansforensics 6442450944 Sep 14 13:16 dm-1
-rw-r--r-- 1 sansforensics sansforensics 2886451712 Sep 14 13:04 vda
-rw-r--r-- 1 sansforensics sansforensics 2684354560 Sep 14 13:07 vda1
-rw-r--r-- 1 sansforensics sansforensics 69206016 Sep 14 13:07 vdb
-rw-r--r-- 1 sansforensics sansforensics 6442450944 Sep 14 13:10 vdc
-rw-r--r-- 1 sansforensics sansforensics 1048576 Sep 14 13:12 vdd
-rw-r--r-- 1 sansforensics sansforensics 102760448 Sep 14 13:12 vde
-rw-r--r-- 1 sansforensics sansforensics 1006633296 Sep 14 13:12 vde1
-rw-r--r-- 1 sansforensics sansforensics 536870912 Sep 14 13:12 vdf
```

```
sansforensics@siftworkstation: ~/Downloads/Evidence_D/EvidenceD
$ file dm-1
dm-1: Linux rev 1.0 ext4 filesystem data, UUID=57f8f4bc-abfa-655f-bf67-946fc0f9f25b (needs journal recovery) (extents) (large files)
sansforensics@siftworkstation: ~/Downloads/Evidence_D/EvidenceD
$ mmls dm-0
Cannot determine partition type

sansforensics@siftworkstation: ~/Downloads/Evidence_D/EvidenceD
$ file vdc
vdc: data
sansforensics@siftworkstation: ~/Downloads/Evidence_D/EvidenceD
$ mmls vdc
Cannot determine partition type
```

Figure 59: Details about Disk & Partitions

Figure 58 : List of Disks & Size

From above detail it can be deduce that **vdc** is corrupted version of **dm-1** as they have the same size to the **bits** which is **rare**, Now applying this info , I mounted the dm-1 without **offset** and **readonly** settings to avoid data tampering by following command (Figure 60)

```
sansforensics@siftworkstation: ~/Downloads/Evidence_D/EvidenceD
$ sudo mount -o loop dm-1 /mnt/windows_mount
```

Figure 60 : Mounting dm-1

### Question 13. What are the non-stock applications installed on the phone?

I found the non-stock applications in app directory and found 5 apps as shown(Figure 61)

```
sansforensics@siftworkstation: /mnt/windows_mount/app
$ ls
'bubbleshooter.orig_mcDR6VD-5BnTEEaLv6ryg=='  'com.rovio.angrybirds-MuGoLXF0b1XC8SKBw-2s6g=='  'com.twitter.android-vqbt0lxCiAWV-LTxYVYCaQ==' 
'com.facebook.katana-J3ntMgKbUCsvp4s1mDESQ=='  'com.tencent.mm-rdSDo2acXtitLTQ8yKrMg=='
```

Figure 61: List of non-stock Applications

I identify the app as in android phones apps name start with .com. The non stock-apps are **facebook**, **bubbleshooter**, **angrybirds** , **twitter** , **tencent** as **Wechat**.

### Question 14. Who is in the contacts list? What messages and calls have been sent and received by the phone?

To get contact list, I search for all logs and databases by using the command Find. After getting the list I found important databases named **calllogs.db**, **contact.db**, **contact2.db** and **mmssms.db**. To examine these files, I gain **root** access(Android) to copy these files and to other folder and then change **ownership(sansforensic)** to open these files by **sqlite software** as shown in figure 62 and resetting ownership using **chown** in Figure 63

```
$ sudo su
root@siftworkstation:/mnt/windows_mount#
root@siftworkstation:/mnt/windows_mount# cp /mnt/windows_mount/data/com.android.providers.contacts/databases/contacts2.db /home/sansforensics/Downloads/Evidence0
root@siftworkstation:/mnt/windows_mount# cp /mnt/windows_mount/data/com.android.providers.contacts/databases/calllog.db /home/sansforensics/Downloads/Evidence0
root@siftworkstation:/mnt/windows_mount# cp /mnt/windows_mount/data/com.android.providers.telephony/databases/mmssms.db /home/sansforensics/Downloads/Evidence0
```

Figure 62: Copying Database Files as Root User

```
sansforensics@siftworkstation: ~/Downloads/Data
$ sudo chown sansforensics:sansforensics contacts2.db
sansforensics@siftworkstation: ~/Downloads/Data
$ sudo chown sansforensics:sansforensics calllog.db
sansforensics@siftworkstation: ~/Downloads/Data
$ sudo chown sansforensics:sansforensics mmssms.db
```

Figure 63: Setting privileges

In callogs.db and in table **calls**, I found that alex received **5 calls** in which **4 declined** calls from **Lily** and one **70 seconds** call from **Sophie** as showin in Figure 64.

Table: calls															New Record	Delete Record				
_id	number	ent	post_dial_digits	num	date	duration	t_us	type	at	com	subscription_id	x	cou	ub_i	new	name	number	type	label	cou
1 1	+61449857236	1		...	0		5		0	c...	890141032...	...	0	-1	1	Lily Parker	2	NULL	US	
2 2	+61449857236	1		...	0		5		0	c...	890141032...	...	0	-1	1	Lily Parker	2	NULL	US	
3 3	+61449857236	1		...	0		5		0	c...	890141032...	...	0	-1	1	Lily Parker	2	NULL	US	
4 4	+61449857236	1		...	0		5		0	c...	890141032...	...	0	-1	1	Lily Parker	2	NULL	US	
5 5	+61417692485	1		...	70		2		0	c...	890141032...	...	0	-1	1	Sophie ...	2	NULL	US	

Figure 64 : Calls Received & Declined in callogs.db database.

Further, in contacts2.db I found 4 contacts(Fig 65) with following names and phone numbers

1 Lily Parker +61 449 857 236

2 Sophia Bennett +61 417 692 485

3 Mum +61 438 179 564

4 Dad +61 467 315 782

Table: data															New Record	Delete Record
id	kag	mimetype_id	raw_contact_id	is_read_only	rim:rp	data_version	data1	data2	data3	data4	data5	data6				
1 16	...	11	4	...	0	0	1	1		NULL	NULL	NULL	...			
2 18	...	5	4	...	0	0	1	+61 449 857 236	2	NULL	+61449857...	NULL	...			
3 19	...	7	4	...	0	1	2	Lily Parker	Lily Parker	NULL	NULL	NULL	...			
4 20	...	3	4	x...	0	0	0	NULL	1	NULL	NULL	NULL	...			
5 21	...	12	4	...	0	0	0	NULL	NULL	NULL	NULL	NULL	...			
6 22	...	11	5	...	0	0	1	1	NULL	NULL	NULL	NULL	...			
7 24	...	5	5	...	0	0	1	+61 417 692 485	2	NULL	+61417692...	NULL	...			
8 25	...	7	5	...	0	1	2	Sophie Bennett	Sophie Bennett	NULL	NULL	NULL	...			
9 26	...	11	6	...	0	0	1	1	NULL	NULL	NULL	NULL	...			
10 28	...	5	6	...	0	0	1	+61 438 179 564	2	NULL	+61438179...	NULL	...			
11 29	...	7	6	z...	0	1	2	Mum	Mum	NULL	NULL	NULL	...			
12 30	...	3	5	x...	0	0	0	NULL	1	NULL	NULL	NULL	...			
13 31	...	12	5	...	0	0	0	NULL	NULL	NULL	NULL	NULL	...			
14 32	...	3	6	x...	0	0	0	NULL	1	NULL	NULL	NULL	...			
15 33	...	12	6	...	0	0	0	NULL	NULL	NULL	NULL	NULL	...			
16 34	...	11	7	...	0	0	1	1	NULL	NULL	NULL	NULL	...			
17 36	...	5	7	...	0	0	1	+61 467 315 782	2	NULL	+61467315...	NULL	...			
18 37	...	7	7	...	0	1	2	Dad	Dad	NULL	NULL	NULL	...			
19 38	...	3	7	x...	0	0	0	NULL	1	NULL	NULL	NULL	...			
20 39	...	12	7	...	0	0	0	NULL	NULL	NULL	NULL	NULL	...			

Figure 65 : Contact list in Contact2.db

Continuing my investigation, I examine **mmssms.db** and found the following conversation

<u>id</u>	<u>ead</u>	<u>address</u>	<u>ersc</u>	<u>date</u>	<u>date_sent</u>	<u>otoc</u>	<u>reactatu</u>	<u>ypesth_ibje</u>	<u>body</u>
1	3	+61449857236	4	1726318296...	1726318296000	0	1	-1 1 0	Hey, can we talk tonight? We really need to sort this out.
2	3	+61449857236	...	1726318315...	0	...	1	-1 2	Not tonight, Lily. I'm dealing with a lot right now.
3	3	+61449857236	4	1726318328...	1726318329000	0	1	-1 1 0	Alex, this is important. I can't keep going on like this, wondering where we stand.
4	3	+61449857236	...	1726318345...	0	...	1	-1 2	I know, I know. But I just can't tonight. Tomorrow?
5	3	+61449857236	4	1726318358...	1726318358000	0	1	-1 1 0	Tomorrow might be too late. Alex, if you don't end this with her, I will.
6	3	+61449857236	...	1726318370...	0	...	1	-1 2	Lily, please don't do anything rash. I'll figure it out, I promise.
7	3	+61449857236	4	1726318383...	1726318384000	0	1	-1 1 0	You better. I'm done waiting.

Figure 66 : Conversation Between Lily and Alex

4	+61417692485	5	1726318414...	1726318414000	0	1	-1 1 0	Alex, I'm outside your dorm. Can we talk?	NULL
4	+61417692485	...	1726318436...	0	...	1	-1 2	Sophia, now's not a good time. I'm swamped.	NULL
4	+61417692485	5	1726318448...	1726318448000	0	1	-1 1 0	It'll only take a minute. Please, I really need to see you.	NULL
4	+61417692485	...	1726318462...	0	...	1	-1 2	Fine, come up. But I don't have long.	NULL
4	+61417692485	5	1726318476...	1726318476000	0	1	-1 1 0	Thank you. I just... I need to know where we stand. I can't keep feeling like this.	NULL
4	+61417692485	...	1726318495...	0	...	1	-1 2	We'll talk when you get here.	NULL
4	+61417692485	5	1726318507...	1726318507000	0	1	-1 1 0	Okay, I'm on my way.	NULL
4	+61417692485	5	1726318688...	1726318689000	0	1	-1 1 0	I'm just outside. I can't take this anymore, Alex. You promised you'd choose me.	NULL
4	+61417692485	...	1726318705...	0	...	1	-1 2	Sophia, please, I need time. We'll talk, but not like this.	NULL
4	+61417692485	5	1726318716...	1726318716000	0	1	-1 1 0	No, I need to know now. It's either me or her.	NULL
4	+61417692485	...	1726318729...	0	...	1	-1 2	Come up, we'll talk. But you need to calm down.	NULL
4	+61417692485	5	1726318740...	1726318740000	0	1	-1 1 0	I'm calm, but I don't think you understand what this means for me. You can't just toss me aside.	NULL
4	+61417692485	...	1726318761...	0	...	1	-1 2	I'm not tossing you aside. Let's talk when you get here.	NULL

Figure 67: Conversation Between Sophie and Alex

5	+61458230941	...	1726318530...	1726318531000	0	1	-1 1 0	You're overdue on the payment. We agreed you'd have it by tonight.	NULL
5	+61458230941	...	1726318551...	0	...	1	-1 2	I'm working on it. I just need a bit more time.	NULL
5	+61458230941	...	1726318563...	1726318564000	0	1	-1 1 0	Time's up, Alex. You don't want to see what happens if you keep stalling.	NULL
5	+61458230941	...	1726318574...	0	...	1	-1 2	I'll have it by tomorrow. Please, just one more day.	NULL
5	+61458230941	...	1726318588...	1726318588000	0	1	-1 1 0	Fine. One day. But after that, we're done talking.	NULL
5	+61458230941	...	1726318602...	0	...	1	-1 2	Thank you. I won't let you down.	NULL

Figure 68 : Conversation Between Alex and Unknown Number (+61458230941)

As by above data, Alex was having conversation with 3 people which included **Sophia** , **Lily** and **Unkown person(+61458230941)**. Deleted\_contacts db was also found.

### Question 15. What Internet searches has the owner of the phone made?

To find web searches of the owner, I run the command **Find** to get valuable logs and database. I searched keyword history and get the following results.

```
root@siftworkstation:/mnt/windows_mount# find /mnt/windows_mount -iname "history"
/mnt/windows_mount/data/com.android.chrome/app_chrome/Default/History
root@siftworkstation:/mnt/windows_mount# find /mnt/windows_mount -iname "*history*"
/mnt/windows_mount/data/com.android.chrome/app_chrome/Default/History
/mnt/windows_mount/data/com.android.chrome/app_chrome/Default/History-journal
/mnt/windows_mount/data/com.google.android.gms/databases/google_account_history.db
root@siftworkstation:/mnt/windows_mount#
```

Figure 67 : Checking Histroy Files

I copied all the files and reset the ownership as previously. Then I examined all the files by sqlite and found all websearches in the **History** file in table **urls**(Figure 68)

urls				New Record	Delete Record
id	url	title		visit_count	
Filter	Filter	Filter		Filter	
1	https://www.google.com/search?...	cheap burner phones near me - Google Search		1	
2	https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.walmart.com/browse/cell-phones/prepaid-...	Prepaid Phones in Phones With Plans - Walmart.com		1	
3	https://www.walmart.com/browse/cell-phones/prepaid-phones/...	Prepaid Phones in Phones With Plans - Walmart.com		2	
4	https://www.google.com/search?...	emergency loan options for students - Google Search		1	
5	https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.elfi.com/emergency-student-loans-and-how...	403 Forbidden		1	
6	https://www.elfi.com/emergency-student-loans-and-how-to-get-them/	403 Forbidden		1	
7	https://www.google.com/search?...	how to block calls from a specific number - Google Search		1	
8	https://www.google.com/url?q=https://support.google.com/phoneapp/answer/...	Block or unlock a phone number - Phone app Help		1	
9	https://support.google.com/phoneapp/answer/6325463?hl=en	Block or unlock a phone number - Phone app Help		1	
10	https://www.google.com/search?...	how to delete messages permanently on Android - Google Search		1	
11	https://www.google.com/url?q=https://support.google.com/voice/answer/...	Archive or delete messages, calls, or voicemails - Android - Google Voice Help		1	
12	https://support.google.com/voice/answer/143935?hl=en&co=GENIE.Platform%3DAndroid	Archive or delete messages, calls, or voicemails - Android - Google Voice Help		1	
13	https://www.google.com/search?...	nearest campus security office - Google Search		1	
14	https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.cccco.edu/About-Us/Chancellors-Office/...	Clery Act Policy   California Community Colleges Chancellor's Office		1	
15	https://www.cccco.edu/About-Us/Chancellors-Office/Divisions/General-Counsel/Guideline...	Clery Act Policy   California Community Colleges Chancellor's Office		1	
16	https://www.google.com/search?q=google&oq=google&aqs=chrome....	google - Google Search		1	

Figure 68 : Internet Searches Data

Owner made the following Searches which include

- 1 . Nearest campus security office
2. How to delete messages permanently on Android
- 3.Block or unblock a phone number - Phone app Help
4. Cheap burner phones near me
- 5 Emergency loan options for students

And some other random searches can be seen in above Figure 68

#### Question 16. Is there other evidence on the phone that might indicate the role of the owner in Alex's death?

There are many other evidence which I found in dm-1 . After finding a table

**deleted\_contacts** in **contacts2.db** I noticed 3 numbers that have been deleted within 1 minute as shown in Figure 69.

After investigating more, I found a database name **pluscontacts.db** and in one of the table name **ac\_container** I found 3 rare Names **Gus Fring**, **Mike** and **Lalo Salamanca** (Figure 70). After this I use strings command to extract the information related to Gus Fring person. I use command strings and grep as shown in Figure 71 and it extracted out valuable information highlighting there Mike and lalo salamanca including there phone numbers (Figure 71).

Table: deleted_contacts	
contact_id	act_deleted_time
1	1726311395990
2	1726311407746
3	1726311402338

container...	profile_ty...	gaia_id	contact_id	compre...	has_avatar	in_circle	in_viewer...	display_name	formatte...	given_na...	family_na...
1	-1	3d449f508c78cf1		0	0	0					
1	-1	57b4bed18d95bbde		0	0	0					
1	-1	3159db238d31485e		0	0	0		Gus Fring		Gus	Fring
1	-1	790569dc8e6d1d45		0	0	0		Mike		Mike	
1	-1	2709d0de0a8f2ba2		0	0	0					
1	-1	1607b7590e26fa7f		0	0	0		Lalo Salamanca		Lalo	Salamanca
1	-1	1010dc48eb08eb0		0	0	0					

Figure 69 Deleted Contacts

Figure 70: New names shown in plusdatabase

```
sansforensics@slifworkstation: /Downloads/Evidence_B/Evidence
$ strings dm-1 | grep -A5 "Gus Fring"
emails_data_id_seqno_table_appdatasearch
contacts_contact_id_seqno_table_appdatasearch
a@ks^31
24371607b7590e26fa7fLalo SalamancaLalo(046) 473-4229<
24371790569dc8e6d1d45Mlkemike(049) 845-3251?
243713159db238d31485eGus FringGus(044) 675-7823
a@ks^31
phones_data_id_seqno_table_appdatasearch
contacts_contact_id_seqno_table_appdatasearch
phones
postals_data_id_seqno_table_appdatasearch
790569dc8e6d1d45
MikeMike(041)MikeM
MikeM
MikeM
```

Figure 7 1: Run Strings Command

I also find a strange file in **/media/0/Download**, which is **recording.aes**. This file is encrypted with aes algorithm and holds valuable data in figure 72

```
root@siftworkstation:/mnt/windows_mount/media/0# cd Download/
root@siftworkstation:/mnt/windows_mount/media/0/Download# ls
AlexAndSophia.png  MumDad.png  recording.aes  Sophia.png
root@siftworkstation:/mnt/windows_mount/media/0/Download#
```

Figure 72 : recording.aes File

### Question 17. Conduct a timeline analysis of the pieces of evidence.

For **evidence A** timeline analysis, I use **fis** tool from sleuth kit to list all the metadata of Evidence A from starting flag. By this command I received the output evidencetimefile.txt which include **Modified**, **Accessed**, **Changed** and **Created** timestamps in figure 73. After this I use **mactime** tool, which organize the data chronologically and shows files created or modified. File formate set to **csv** for easy analyzation as shown in Figure 74

```
sansforensics@siftworkstation: ~/Downloads/EvidenceA
$ sudo fis -r -p -o 673792 -m "C:" EvidenceA.dd > /home/sansforensics/Downloads/TimeAnalysis/evidencetimefile.txt
sansforensics@siftworkstation: ~/Downloads/TimeAnalysis
$ mactime -b evidencetimefile.txt > evidenceAtimeline.csv
```

Figure 73 :Running FIS & mactime For Time Analysis

165795	Mon Aug 12 2024 11:00:00	7079 m...	r/rwrxrwxrwx	0	0	108949-128-3 C:/Program Files/7-Zip/History.txt
165796	Sat Aug 17 2024 02:31:32	769 m...	r/rwrxrwxrwx	0	0	109132-128-3 C:/Users/Alex Marshall/Documents/journal1.txt
165797	Sat Aug 17 2024 02:36:22	717 m...	r/rwrxrwxrwx	0	0	109133-128-3 C:/Users/Alex Marshall/Documents/journal2.txt
165798	Sat Aug 17 2024 02:38:52	303 m...	r/rwrxrwxrwx	0	0	109130-128-1 C:/Users/Alex Marshall/Documents/Expenses_March.csv
165799	Sat Aug 17 2024 02:39:30	294 m...	r/rwrxrwxrwx	0	0	109129-128-1 C:/Users/Alex Marshall/Documents/Debt_Tracker.csv
165800	Sat Aug 17 2024 11:54:02	671677 m...	r/rwrxrwxrwx	0	0	109134-128-1 C:/Users/Alex Marshall/Documents/Mum_Email_April.jpg
165801	Sun Aug 18 2024 03:48:38	14915 m...	r/rwrxrwxrwx	0	0	101961-128-1 C:/Users/Alex Marshall/Documents/Dad_Email_March.pdf
165802	Sun Aug 18 2024 04:48:56	65155 m...	r/rwrxrwxrwx	0	0	109131-128-1 C:/Users/Alex Marshall/Documents/InternshipOffer_Reynolds.pdf
165803	Sun Aug 18 2024 06:43:32	63400 m...	r/rwrxrwxrwx	0	0	109136-128-1 C:/\$/Recycle.Bin/S-1-5-21-212117580-4225460857-3930097821-1000/\$RLY0J7N.zip
165804		90 m...	r/rwrxrwxrwx	0	0	109136-48-3 C:/\$/Recycle.Bin/S-1-5-21-212117580-4225460857-3930097821-1000/\$RLY0J7N.zip (\$FILE NAME)

Figure 74 :Running FIS & mactime For Time Analysis

For **evidence B** timeline analysis, I capture timestamps of the network capture through tool wireshark. As **wireshark** highlight the timestamp and endingtime and separating different protocols making it easier to do analysis. I also capture valuable info timestamps manually as shown in Figure 23, 24 and 25.

For **evidence C** timeline analysis, I use **volatility** and mactime tools to extract metadata. Firstly I use the plugin **timeliner**, which gather **timestamps** data of creation, access, modifying and give output in .body file. After getting output I use **mft parser** plugin to extract the meta data of activity and getting the output in .body format again in Figure 75

```
sansforensics@siftworkstation: ~/Downloads/Evidence C
$ vol.py -f EvidenceC.vmem --profile=Win7SP1x64 timeliner --output=body > TimeAnlaysisC/timeliner.body
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6.1

sansforensics@siftworkstation: ~/Downloads/Evidence C
$ vol.py -f EvidenceC.vmem --profile=Win7SP1x64 mftparser --output=body > TimeAnlaysisC/mftparser.body
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6.1
```

Figure 75 : Running Plugin Timeliner & Mftparser

After this I concatenate the data of both files to create detailed data by using **cat** (Figure 75) command and get the final output as shown in the figure . After this I use mactime tool again to give ascending order to the metadata of whole file and check sequence(Figure 76)

```
mftparser.body  timeliner.body
sansforensics@siftworkstation: ~/Downloads/Evidence C/TimeAnlaysisC
$ cat mftparser.body >> EvidenceC_time
sansforensics@siftworkstation: ~/Downloads/Evidence C/TimeAnlaysisC
$ cat timeliner.body >> EvidenceC_time
sansforensics@siftworkstation: ~/Downloads/Evidence C/TimeAnlaysisC
```

Figure 76: Concatenating Data

27259	Sun Aug 25 2024 07:18:20	0.machb	---a----->	0	0	511[MET FILE_NAME] Users\SOPHIA-1\AppData\Roaming\MICROS-1\INTERN-1\QUICKL-1\Shows Desktop.lnk (Offset: 0x7ee53c00)
27260	Sun Aug 25 2024 07:18:20	0.a.b	---a----->	0	0	511[MET STD_INFO] Users\SOPHIA-1\AppData\Roaming\MICROS-1\INTERN-1\QUICKL-1\SHOWSD-1.LNK (Offset: 0x7ee53c00)
27261	Sun Aug 25 2024 07:18:20	0.machb	hsa----->	0	0	512[MET FILE_NAME] Users\SOPHIA-1\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Accessories\System Tools\Desktop.lnk
27262	Sun Aug 25 2024 07:18:20	0.a.b	hs----->	0	0	512[MET STD_INFO] Users\SOPHIA-1\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Accessories\System Tools\Desktop.lnk
27263	Sun Aug 25 2024 07:18:20	0.machb	---a----->	0	0	513[MET FILE_NAME] Users\SOPHIA-1\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Accessories\Accessibility\Narrator.lnk
27264	Sun Aug 25 2024 07:18:20	0.a.b	---a----->	0	0	513[MET STD_INFO] Users\SOPHIA-1\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Accessories\Accessibility\Narrator.lnk
27265	Sun Aug 25 2024 07:18:20	0.machb	hsa----->	0	0	514[MET FILE_NAME] Users\SOPHIA-1\NTUSER.DAT\016889bd-6c6f-11de-8d1d-001e0bde3ec1.TMCContainer\00000000000000000000000000000000

Figure 78 : Timeline of Evidence C output

For **Evidence D**, I used similar process as **Evidence A**. I used **fis** and **mactime** tools. Firstly I use **fis** command to extract the metadata of disk, here **-r** mean to list directories and subdirectories . The **-m** shows that root path is set as system and the output is save as **evD.txt** file. After this I run **mactime** to arrange the all the metadata in sequential format that is easy to analyse and save the output in csv file for easy visualisation in Figure 78. After this I combined all the important events in separate csv file to do proper time analysis and to recreate the narrative and detect activities of the people for accurate analyzation as shown in figure 79 & 80 and also link for file is given as [+ Sorted Data Of All Evidence](#) .

Date	Time	Action
8/12/2024	11:00	C:/Program Files/7-Zip/History.txt
8/17/2024	2:36	C:/Users/Alex Marshall/Documents/journal2.txt
8/17/2024	2:38	C:/Users/Alex Marshall/Documents/Expenses_March.csv
8/17/2024	2:39	C:/Users/Alex Marshall/Documents/Debt_Tracker.csv
8/17/2024	2:31	C:/Users/Alex Marshall/Documents/journal1.txt
8/17/2024	11:54	C:/Users/Alex Marshall/Documents/Mum_Email_April.jpg
8/18/2024	3:48	C:/Users/Alex Marshall/Documents/Dad_Email_March.pdf
8/18/2024	4:48	C:/Users/Alex Marshall/Documents/internshipOffer_Reynolds.pdf
8/18/2024	6:43	C:/Recycle Bin/S-1-5-21-212117580-4225460857-3930097821-1000/\$RLY0J7N.zip
8/25/2024	4:42	C:/Users/Alex Marshall/Pictures/DayOne.png
8/25/2024	12:38	C:/Recycle Bin/S-1-5-21-212117580-4225460857-3930097821-1000/\$RAUO6GYK.zip
8/25/2024	4:42	C:/Users/Alex Marshall/Pictures/DormC.png
8/25/2024	4:42	C:/Users/Alex Marshall/Pictures/CampusfromTower.png
8/25/2024	5:57	C:/Users/Alex Marshall/Pictures/Alex and Lily.png
8/25/2024	5:58	C:/Users/Alex Marshall/Pictures/Alexand Lily 2.png
8/25/2024	5:59	C:/Users/Alex Marshall/Pictures/lily.png
9/1/2024	8:41:01	Bio101 file found in network packets
9/1/2024	08:09:28	Chatting between Alex and Sophia
9/1/2024	07:57:11	Conversation between AlexM21,DormKing,PartDude,BookWarm
9/1/2024	07:57:11	Deal for Bio101 answers
9/1/2024	08:16:09	DormKing Manipulates PartyDude
9/1/2024	08:44:49	DormKing accuses PartDude
9/1/2024	8:43:17	SSL/TLS found in the network packets
9/1/2024	08:19:53	Conversation between LilyLily and Alex
9/8/2024	07:08:41	Thunderbird session
9/8/2024	08:00:31	Firefox session
9/8/2024	12:15:06	Notepad session
9/8/2024	8:01:02	download thunderbird 115 - Sophia web search
9/8/2024	12:23:22	How to stop someone from leaving you - Sophia web search
9/8/2024	12:24:52	Signs someone is cheating - Sophia web search
9/8/2024	12:24:59	How to get away with self-defense - Sophia web search
9/8/2024	12:25:13	Emergency therapy services - Sophia web search
9/14/2024	12:58:49	Come up, weâ€ll talk. But you need to calm down. (From: +61417692485)
9/14/2024	10:58:56	Call Log: Lily Parker (+61449857236)
9/14/2024	10:58:53	Call Log: Lily Parker (+61449857236)
9/14/2024	10:59:22	Call Log: Sophie Bennett (+61417692485)

9/8/2024	12:24:59	How to get away with self-defense - Sophia web search
9/8/2024	12:25:13	Emergency therapy services - Sophia web search
9/14/2024	12:58:49	Come up, weâ€ll talk. But you need to calm down. (From: +61417692485)
9/14/2024	10:58:56	Call Log: Lily Parker (+61449857236)
9/14/2024	10:58:53	Call Log: Lily Parker (+61449857236)
9/14/2024	10:59:22	Call Log: Sophie Bennett (+61417692485)
9/8/2024	12:25:24	Hey, can we talk tonight? We really need to sort this out. (From: +61449857236)
9/14/2024	12:52:25	I know, I know. But I just canâ€t tonight. Tomorrow? (From: +61449857236)
9/14/2024	12:52:38	Tomorrow might be too late, Alex. If you donâ€t end this with her, I will. (From: +61449857236)
9/14/2024	12:52:55	Lily, please donâ€t do anything rash. Iâ€ll figure it out, I promise. (From: +61449857236)
9/14/2024	12:53:03	You better, Iâ€ll be doing waiting. (From: +61449857236)
9/14/2024	12:53:34	Alex, Iâ€ll be outside your dorm. Can we talk? (From: +61417692485)
9/14/2024	12:54:01	Sophia, nowâ€t's not a good time. Iâ€m swamped. (From: +61417692485)
9/14/2024	12:54:08	Iâ€ll take a minute. Please, I really need to see you. (From: +61417692485)
9/14/2024	12:54:22	Fine, come up. But I donâ€t have long. (From: +61417692485)
9/14/2024	12:54:34	Thank you, I justâ€t let you down. (From: +61417692485)
9/14/2024	12:54:55	Weâ€ll talk when you get here. (From: +61417692485)
9/14/2024	12:55:07	Okay, Iâ€m on my way. (From: +61417692485)
9/14/2024	12:55:51	Iâ€m working on it. Just need a bit more time. (From: +61458230941)
9/14/2024	12:56:03	Timeâ€s up. Alex, You donâ€t want to see what happens if you keep stalling. (From: +61458230941)
9/14/2024	12:56:14	Iâ€ll have it by tomorrow. Please, just one more day. (From: +61458230941)
9/14/2024	12:56:28	Fine. One day. But after that, weâ€re done talking. (From: +61458230941)
9/14/2024	12:56:42	Thank you, I wonâ€t let you down. (From: +61458230941)
9/14/2024	12:58:08	Iâ€m just outside. I canâ€t take this anymore, Alex. You promised youâ€d choose me. (From: +61417692485)
9/14/2024	12:58:25	Sophia, please, I need time. Weâ€ll talk, but not like this. (From: +61417692485)
9/14/2024	12:58:36	No, I need to know now. Itâ€s either me or her. (From: +61417692485)
9/14/2024	10:58:59	Call Log: Lily Parker (+61449857236)
9/14/2024	12:59:00	Not tonight, Lily. Iâ€m dealing with a lot right now. (From: +61449857236)
9/14/2024	10:59:02	Call Log: Lily Parker (+61449857236)
	11:23:00	Not tonight, Lily. Iâ€m dealing with a lot right now. (From: +61449857236)
	11:57:02	Youâ€re overdue on the payment. We agreed youâ€d have it by tonight. (From: +61458230941)

Figure 79, 80 : Time analysis of all Evidence Part 1 and Part 2

### Question 18. Provide a brief final analysis of the evidence and your conclusions.

#### Evidence A:

The analysis of this part shows that Alex was facing intense pressure due to financial debt, academic stress and complex relationship with Sophia and Lily. His journal entries from Feb and April 2024 shows he was in guilt for **selling** exam papers and feared of getting caught. Another major factor was in file **debit\_tracker** in which he was under debit of **\$7450** in which there was a mysterious **\$5000** loan on April 30, 2024 from unknown source added more pressure in his situation. Furthermore, University letter on March 15 informed Alex failing two course which put his **academic** and **internship** offer in future received on April 1st. In March His **Father**, Oliver Marshall expressed disappointment in mail and asked Alex to work hard or otherwise he would cut off his credit card. In the end, He wrote a testament in which he expressed his regret and message for people he loved . The main highlight of this Evidence

A is the urgent loan of **\$5000** from an **unknown** source as this bit is mentioned in the future evidence and can be the reason for Alex **death**.

#### Evidence B:

The Analysis of evidence B shows that Alex was involved in selling the exam answers, which was likely to coverup the debit and other financial issues. This conversation took place on **September 1, 2024**, in the very first streams Alex was seen negotiating with Drom King and Party dude for **Bio101 exam** answers. They agree on the price of **200\$** and Alex did mention that these answers will get them a passing grade and that's how they wont get in trouble. The whole conversation shows Alex engaging in unethical behaviour. After the deal , **DromKing and Party Dude** chatted in separate channels and agreed not to pay Alex and instead plan to steal the **session files** from Alex's system when he's gonna go outside. Party Dude with little understanding uploaded the key to Dorm King and then failed to go in Alex 's room as he was talking with some girl. Furthermore, it mentions that the Bio101 exam is uploaded on **08:41:01** time.

Furthermore there are snippets of conversation in the network packets and some of the stream at time **08:19:53**, where **Lily** accused Alex of seeing someone and is very **suspicious** of his activities , whereas on the other hand **Sophia** is asking Alex to choose one of us and make a final decision.

This network packet **highlights** the pressure on Alex to payback the money he owned and to do this he is willing to **unethical** activities shows his desperation which ties with narrative of evidence A, where Alex was feared and overwhelmed by **debit** and **guilt** and I think it was the only way out of this situation.

#### Evidence C:

The analysis of evidence C consists of a **memory** dump of **Sophia's laptop in Vmem format**. The laptop was present in the **Alex** room . As from previous data, it can be deduced that there was possible a **romantic relationship** between alex and sophia . Further we found email and web searches on the system.

After using **volatility** tool kit to scan memory dump, and “**pslist**” plugin to check active services and programs, which include mozilla ,**thunderbird** that play a significant role in uncovering the communication between Alex and Sophia **overwhelmed** by his circumstances and was struggling to cope with several ongoing issues.

While inspecting the data, I found **4 emails** in total, in which two of them were sent by sophia to Alex, where she expressed her feelings to Alex and conveyed her desire to be with him. Furthermore, there was one **rare** email which was sent from Sophia email(vb9945311@gmail.com) but Name **Victor Ivona was used to Professor Kane** (Figure 81), where the email was set as **warning** and **advice** to him to be in his lane . Finally, there was an email sent by Alex to sophia where he mentioned that he is in a bad **situation** and overwhelmed by his situation and was struggling to process ongoing issues. The **main narrative** promote the Alex **mental health** and need for support during this time.

Moving Foward, I checked some content of **db files** named **places.sqlite.dat** (Fig 82) and found out the searches made by sophia in which she was searching , “**how to stop someone from leaving**”, “**Emergency therapy**” and “**self defence**”. These searches highlight that sophia was going through an abdomen period and she was **possessive** for Alex.

While scanning more I found some journals written by sophia, name **Journal 1.txt** and **Journal 2.txt** that couldn't be accessed through memory forensic. In the last I did run plugin

**lsa** command to get hashdump and password was released of sophia which was **Alexisbeautiful**. Overall this evidence shows that Sophia was pretty possessive about alex and her mostly data was related to him, where as Alex was not in good mental health and mention his condition is getting worse.

```
-IvanovA Friendly WarningVictor Ivanov <vb994531@gmail.com> undefinedhs1615717@gmail.com undefined
iSHi Alex,
It felt so good to see you the other day. I could tell you
re feeling
torn, and I get it
I really do. But you know you don
t have to keep
pretending with her, Alex. I see how you look when you're with me, how
relaxed you seem. You deserve to be with someone who understands you,
who supports you without all the strings attached.
I keep thinking about what you said, about needing something different,
someone who gets it. I think we both know that
s me. I
n here for you,
```

Figure 81: Rare Email to Professor Kane

moz_formhistory						New Rec
id	fieldname	value	timesUsed	firstUsed	lastUsed	
Filter	Filter	Filter	Filter	Filter	Filter	
searchbar-history	download thunderbird 115	1	1725782462716000	1725782462716000		
searchbar-history	How to stop someone from leaving you	1	1725798280204000	1725798280204000		
searchbar-history	Signs someone is cheating	1	1725798292305000	1725798292305000		
searchbar-history	How to get away with self-defense	1	1725798299826000	1725798299826000		
searchbar-history	Emergency therapy services	1	1725798313777000	1725798313777000		

Figure 82:: Web Searches Made By Sophia

### Evidence D:

The analysis of **evidence D** provides more valuable information about the unknown sources. The evidence D has **10 disks** in which **dm-1** has the most data. After mounting the disk, It shows that the mobile belongs to Alex and has information about his **call logs**, **sms** and **contacts** numbers. Going through a database of call logs shows that **lily** tried to make multiple calls and for Alex **declined** all the calls, in the meantime there was a call with **Sophia** about **70** seconds in figure 64. Further moving to the contacts database , there were 4 contacts **Mum, Dad, Sophia** and **Lily** as mentioned in figure 65. Furthermore Alex sent sms to **3 different people**, one was lily in which lily asked him to end with sophia or otherwise she will take some strict action. Second with sophia in which sophia asked Alex if they can **meet** and she is outside his home, eventually Alex told her to come upstairs and it relates to the Evidence C and why sophia laptop was present in Alex's room. Third conversation was with Unknown source, as a person in the msg mentioned that if Alex doesn't pay then they are done talking and something bad will happen. The suspicious thing was found in Alex internet Search history in database **History** , in which he went through first checking for **security** near his home to search for an instant loan. After that he searches for buying a **burner phone** and how to block or **delete numbers** permanently.

After going through internet history, I checked for **deleted numbers** and I found deleted contact tables in database **contact2.db**. The timeframe of deleting those numbers was just 1 minute, which shows Alex removed these numbers in a hurry. Upon further investigation, I found a database which highlighted 3 **new people** in the case (Figure 69, 70 ,71). After checking more databases like places pluscontacts.db and icing-wal.db I found the names of these people. Which were **Gus, lalo salamanca** and **Mike**. This information changed the whole narrative and pointed the whole focus on these people. Further there was a recording.aes file in the download that I still couldn't decrypt . The **secret.key** was found in evidence B but still key IV has one value missing and making it difficult to crack.

To conclude the whole scene, I deduce the whole scenario revolving around **Alex murder** is that Alex was under **debt** from his activities and he took a big loan of **\$5000** from these **unknown sources** (3 guys). To overcome his debt he tried to sell the exam papers and do unethical things to get some money but couldn't succeed as the whole operation was sabotaged by **DormKing** and **Party Dude**. Relating to evidence C , it is hinted multiple times that Alex mentions he is in big trouble and it's hard for him to go back to normal. As mentioned in the Task detail, there was no **force of entry** to open the door but the whole room was in a **mess**, which shows whether Alex knew the **killer** or the door was kept open. There are multiple **searches** in alex phone about trying to **run away** from these guys , he specifically **deleted 3 numbers** and was planning to buy **Burner phone** or looking for a security office to hide and save his life, furthermore he encrypted **recording.aes** file to hide the very important information from some people. The way I the picture this scene according to the time analysis done previously, before murder took place Sophia and Alex met in the room, due to this the room door kept open and these guys (**Gus, Mike and Lalo**) enters the Alex house, there was no force entry as he knows these guys but due to **payment issue** these guys made mess in the room by use of force and killed Alex . In my deduction, all the evidence we have found narrows down the investigation to these killers: Gus, Lalo and Mike.

**Question 19. Provide advice to your forensics team about the identification and collection methods for each specific evidence item.**

**Evidence A : Alex System Identification and Collection Method**

First step is to Identify the **version** of the system for example which **operating system**, **hardware specifications** and the time system was **last active**. Furthermore, next step is to locate the **critical** files, go through **registry** hives for instance **SAM, SYSTEM, SOFTWARE** log files and check all the event logs along with the active process.

Prepare detail documentation of the running services, scheduled tasks and open network ports of the system.

For **collection of data** from Alex system , it is advice to use **write blocking tools** to prevent modification of disk. Secondly, while doing disk imaging it is recommended to use tools like **FTK Imager** and **DD (Sahin, 2023)** to copy the data in detailed (bit streaming) from storage drive (HDD) and its quite necessary to match the **hashes** (Md5sum, SHA-1) before and after making the image of the specific disks. For live forensic, it is recommended to use tools like Belkasoft Capture (Cloud Tips, 2023) before powering off the system and document all the steps in detailed to maintain authority.

**Evidence B: PCAP File of Network Transmission**

For identification of network transmission, it is mostly recommended to identify the **source** and **destination** IP communication **protocols** first for example (TCP,HTTP, FTP). After this step, analyst should look for patterns of different streams and detect suspicious behaviour, files exchange , traffic spikes and hidden protocols. Analyst can also use **ARP spoofing**, **DNS tunnelling** or do port scanning to detect **malicious** things in the network. Lastly traffic, such as **TCP, UDP, HTTP, DNS**, and **SSL/TLS** must be reviewed for deeper inspection.

For **collection of network traffic**, it is recommended to use **Wireshark** or **tcpdump** to capture the timestamps for accurate data filtering. We can use another powerful tool like **NetworkMiner** to extract files, emails and hidden data from the PCAP file. Also It is quite

important to capture this type of data directly from **router** or **IDS/IPS** and **firewall** systems which ensures that no packets are dropped during the process of collecting the data from network.

### **Evidence C : Memory Dump of Sophia Laptop**

When doing memory analysis, it is highly recommended to start identifying the **running process** first as it gives clear idea which **applications**, programs and process were active (browser, email, notepad). After analysing the programs, investigator should examine all the **network sockets** to trace communication with external and internal environment.

Furthermore, analyst should check for **credentials** and **passwords** often include plain text and **decrypted** applications **sessions**. While identifying data, **memory areas** that are not active should be also examined thoroughly to collect data like **cache**, **history files** and **artefacts**.

To **collect** data from memory dump tools like **Volatility** and **Rekall** are used to capture the running process. Also it is quite important to check the state of the machine as well as if system is still running then tools like FTK imager is best to take the snapshot of the memory as it collect the data in detail form matching each bit. Also it is quite important to run a live memory forensic to document all open logs and process before powering down the system. According to traditional way turning off the pc is not recommended as it clears all the cache and close the logs, analyst should alway pull the pug out to freez the current state and then gather the data. Once everything is done and data is collected, analyst should hash the files using SHA-256 to maintain the integrity and document each individual who handle the evidence

### **Evidence D: Mobile Android Data**

In android device analyst need to narrow down there search to main data points which are listed below

Alex's mobile contain **call logs**, **SMS/MMS messages**, **emails**, and **location data**, which contains database and provide insights. Analyst should go through all the messaging app data (from apps like WhatsApp or Telegram), media files, and **browser history** that are critical for understanding person details

**For collection** mobile devices should be treated with care. First step is to create a **disk image** of the mobile device. Before power on the device or extracting data it should be connected to a **write blocking** device to prevent any data modification. Analyst can use tools like **Cellebrite UFED** or **MSAB XRY** to capture all available data, including deleted files, app data, and metadata. By following these steps they can maintain integrity of the data and prevent accidental overwriting or loss.

Identification and collection of evidence are essential for maintaining data integrity in forensic analysis. Alex's Windows system, the PCAP file of network communications, Sophia's laptop memory dump, and Alex's mobile phone image each hold critical information, such as logs, messages, and communication details. Proper collection ensures the evidence remains untampered, enabling a thorough investigation and legally sound conclusions.

## **TASK 2**

### **Introduction**

Capturing and analysing stored data in **Random Access Memory** (RAM) is known as Memory Forensics. It is one of the vital areas within digital forensics which mainly focuses on the analysis of **volatile** memory to uncover evidence of unethical and anomalous behaviour in our systems. The data stored in volatile memory doesn't last for a long time making it **ephemeral** when the system is powered off. Forensic analysts need to be quick to retrieve valuable data that may not be available in traditional storage devices which is quite essential for capturing and analyzing the memory of devices. This data can include **active processes**, network transmission connections, open **files** system, and **encryption** keys, all of which can provide valuable insights into the state of the system (Hamid & Rahman, 2024).

Memory Forensic provides valuable insights into **incident response** and **malware analysis**. In incident response it is quite stressful to detect **malicious** code and software in hard disks but memory forensics allows to capture of a real-time snapshot of the system's volatile data which highlights malware in the running process list. **Snapshot** is also known as a memory dump which extracts vital information such as which users logged in to the system, process details, browsing activity, recently opened files, and memory data applications which is stored in **mem** and **vmem** extensions (Li, Sun, & Xu, 2018).

Memory Forensics is useful in situations where **quick** output is required for example in certain scenarios where hard drive data is too big and the size of RAM is only up to **16GB** (Gaur & Chhikara, 2020). Taking a memory dump will be much faster to transfer the data to be analysed and create a timeline for indicators of compromise. Furthermore, memory forensics is often used in solving **cyber cases**, where it detects **hidden** evidence that helps to reconstruct an attacker's activities and identify ways to **decrypt** the system's defenses. Therefore, memory forensics is a critical tool for modern digital investigations, relating to the **Alex case**, the memory dump was done on Sophia's laptop which can aid analysts in the detection of malicious activities and setting up the timeline.

### **Evidence Acquisition**

Evidence acquisition in digital forensics requires a detailed process and systematic approach to maintain absolute authenticity and integrity. According to the international (UNODC, 2023) standard, the important phases for handling digital data include **identification**, **collection**, **acquisition**, and **preservation**. These guidelines and processes were applied in the case of Alex's murder as well to ensure that digital data was kept safe throughout the investigation.

Following the **protocols** of acquiring **digital artifacts** and evidence, **First responders** are the ones who arrive first and take **videos**, and **photos** and **create documentation** of the scene. Their role is to deal with all the digital artifacts including hard drives, computer systems, and laptops, and have to make sure these devices are in secure condition. According to **RFC** (IETF, 2020) guidelines in the process of collecting volatile data in **memory** acquisition, the first step is to **duplicate** or capture memory also known as making **Image of RAM** into different systems to ensure the safety of data. This process is vital to collect the state of current processes(registries) and running apps(logs & cache) as data is

volatile and will be removed or destroyed if the device is powered off. To ensure accuracy, we can use tools like **FTK Imager**, **Fmem**, **volatility**, and **DD**. Each tool has its own pros and cons, for instance, DD and fmem always import their modules to make an image of the RAM, which eventually alters the data. Whereas FTK imager uses the process of **bitstream**(bit by bit) to form a copy of original data and evidence isn't tampered with. Usually, Analysts before processing evidence collection from the system, identify the nature of the device, whether the drive is **encrypted** or **physical** as some evidence is not able to process memory dump, they often require other tools such as for physical use fmem is good and for encrypted we use writer block without interfering the data.

Another tool for **taking images** of drivers in bit-by-bit form is a **write blocker** as this tool is quick and used for preserving integrity and recommended to ensure data remain persistent when transferring data from nonvolatile sections of the system for analysis labs while making sure no **tampering** is made. Forensic analysts prepare USB before for writing dumps and they don't use the same USB for multiple devices as it can alter the data (Li, Sun, & Xu, 2018). Similarly, when extracting a memory dump it should be done on separate files instead of the targeted machine.

Maintaining the **chain of custody** is a core part of digital forensics, it makes sure that each step is documented, has proof of integrity, and ensures data admissibility in court. Detailed documentation is necessary as the **recording** of evidence **condition**, **metadata**, version **name**, **serial issue**, and **people** involved in handling evidence is to make sure no tampering is done. The use of the **hashing** (Rohit et al., 2019) process gives a unique identifier to the memory file. By using algorithms **md5sum**, **sha256**, and **sha512** to generate unique strings that act as **digital fingerprints** and ensure that evidence integrity and no data is changed. For instance, even a single **byte** change in evidence will generate a new hash value and investigators can easily **flag** (Rohit et al., 2019) the tampering as mentioned in Alex's case. Furthermore, in a live system, forensic analysts avoid **shutting down** the machines as it wipes the **cache** of the files, and data will be tampered with or removed. The traditional way to do this process is to pull out the power plug or freeze the system state, these steps won't change the data and the system will **freeze** the current state and data can be derived from this. After collecting all the data and the evidence is ready to be transferred, there is a certain process to follow for example it needs to be stored in **tamper-evident bags** and properly **labeled** with information so it can be used for tracking information which includes the details about the evidence transfer path, which include details about the people who handed the data and accounted for it. By following these **protocols**, **techniques**, and **proper tools**, investigators ensure data is preserved and can maintain the **chain of custody** which lab analysts can sign off the form to verify integrity at each step to sustain scrutiny in the court..

## Forensic Analysis

Memory forensic analysis provides in depth details of volatile data and it goes through **methodical analysis** of the content from **RAM** to separate out the critical information related to the case (Sahin, 2023). Similar to Alex case, analysis is done to **identify patterns** and check **malicious** activities like **DLL injection** or **API hooking** to reconstruct the scenario once the memory content is acquired. To analyse **memory images**, the **volatility** framework is used on **Kali Linux** and it goes through the following process which involves **memory**

**craving, analysis & detection, network artefact** access and **registry** examination (Sahin, 2023).

In memory **craving technique** we extract deleted or hidden files from tools like **Bulk extractor**. It **scan** all the memory dump files to look out for the **headers, undetected logs** and **corrupted data** as well. It helps investigators to **trace malware, timestamps, ID's** and valuable information (Cloud Tips, 2023).

Further, analysts do analysis and detection in which they **scan** all the running processes by using Volatility plugins “**pslist**”, “**psscan**” and “**pstree**”. These plugins display all the **rouge processes** that don't appear in regular listings. The same process is implemented in Sophia's laptop to collect insights of the running process (Cloud Tips, 2023). **Pstree plugin** is also useful in **constructing** the relation between primary process and secondary process in the form of tree, which makes it easier to analyse as it provides good **visualisation**.

For **network** connection artefact, **Rekall** is used to provide valuable insights of web searches connections in real-time. It displays all the details of active and close connection. The “**netscan**” command in volatility gathers network related data and is used to detect virtual and network **anomalies** in communication patterns. Similarly for the **Windows registry** and **logs registry** allow investigators to go through **hives** and extract deleted content including **encrypted keys** (Li, Sun, & Xu, 2018).

Despite being a resourceful tool it faces several **challenges** related to the data being **time sensitive**. Volatile data **loses** its content when its powered off and adds delay as it loses a certain amount of evidence making the data corrupt and unusable. Even in certain stages using **FTK imager** doesn't work as the system reset the memory and valuable metadata and **cache** is already removed.

Another major issue is that cybercriminal use **anti forensic** techniques such as **Obfuscation, AES encryption** and **rootkits** to hide their malicious activities. These methods make the data much **harder** to detect and crack files for example if some person uses the encrypted memory regions all across the system then it will delay the process and investigators have to go through manual inspection or required advance **decryption techniques** making the process **costly**.

With today's advancement, If RAM consists of **large amounts** of data it will be a challenging task for the analyst to process memoric forensic on it. As mentioned earlier inorder to process proper **filtering** of data, it needs to be collected bit by bit. There are some tool and plugins like Autopsy and Rekall that can help to narrow down the investigation or pointing towards relevant headers to process valuable data but it will require **more time** and output is usually **corrupted**.

Overall Memory forensic analyzation is important component of investigation, for better practices it is recommended that Analyst should try to prepare **early memory acquisition** using tool like **WinPMem** and **FTK** to create proper **snapshot** of system, analyst should do analysis under multiple tools like **Rekall** and **Bulk extractor** to do cross checking and ensure accuracy of content and use of **write blockers** is necessary to maintain **authenticity** and **integrity** of the system for legal purpose (Hamid & Rahman, 2024).

## **Forensic Tools**

There are multiple tools available for conducting memory forensics on the volatile memory. Analyst interpret the memory content to dig deeper in the investigation to acquire and separate out valuable content that can further analyse. For investigation we use some of the

memory analysis tools like **Volatility**, **Bulk Extractor**, **Rekall** and **ISO Helix** (Sahin, 2023). Relating to Alex case I used the following tools to acquire data.

**Volatility** : One of the most recommended memory analysis framework as its an combination of multiple libraries and uses third party access from other tools to collect information. This tool has multiple switches and plugins that makes job easier to sort through complex data and retrieve important information from each memory dumps. Some of the most used plugins are given as

**Hashdump** : Extract out the hash of each user, that can be decoded to access user password

**Hivedump**: It prints out all the hives present in the system, helpful in narrowing down the information.

**Pstree**: This plugin provide the visual display of the primary process in the tree form

**Clipboard**: By this command analyst can extract data from Windows clipboard programs

**Plist** : It will list all the running commands and display their IDs and how much memory they are accessing.

Investigator should use following commands to extract out valuable data

**vol.py -f memdump.mem – profile= WinSP7X12 pslist**

Use for analyzing the process running on the system and time of capture

**vol.py -f memdump.mem --profile=WinXPSP2x86 svcscan**

Shows the current status of the memory dump and help to detect malicious services

**vol.py -f memdump.mem --profile=WinXPSP2x86 filescan**

This command helps to detect the location of the files and use to track which files are accessed or modified. It can also do time analysis using plugins like timeliner and shellbags to provide output of all the processes in sorted order.

Issues related with volatility is that it is not for beginners as it totally operates on command line and has no **GUI** (Sahin, 2023). Furthermore there are a lot of plugins to understand to perform detailed analysis.

**Rekall**: It's a memory forensic tool, which is used to analyse the memory images, operating system and extract useful information of networks as well

**Cross Platform Support** : Can be integrated into different OS environments

**Process analysis** : Display all the running services in sequential way

**Modular**: contain a library of plugins that can be used to analyse different memory dumps

**Rekal -f memdump.img pslist**

Lists processes running during memory dump.

**Rekal -f memdump.img netstat**

Lists all sockets and IPs of network connections.

Issues related to Rekall's interface as it is for less experienced analysts due to its command-line structure, and although it's versatile, it lacks a dedicated GUI, making it slightly less user-friendly than some alternatives like WinDbg.

**Magnet RAM Capture**: Its a popular forensic tool that captures memory of a system. It helps investigators analyse live memory for detecting malware, network connections, and running processes (Sahin, 2023).

**Cross-Platform**: Compatible with Windows and Linux systems for live memory acquisition.

**Process & Memory Analysis**: Help to identify running processes, network activity, and

volatile data. Overall it has Simple interface good for beginner and advanced users.as it allows a single-click events, making it accessible for less-experienced analysts.

Issues with **MRC** that is not as flexible for deep-dive analysis as Volatility or Rekall, which offer more customizable commands and plugins for memory examination.Other tools for memory forensics such as **Redline**, **PTK Forensics** etc. Each tools have their own pros and cons and analyst should choose tools based on the case complexity

## Conclusion

Analysis of memory forensics was instrumental in the **Alex case**, where volatile memory data from Sophia's laptop was captured and analyzed. Using tools like **Volatility**, **Rekall**, and **Magnet RAM Capture**, forensic analysts retrieved critical information such as active processes, network connections, and system logs. This provided a comprehensive view of the laptop's state during key moments of the investigation. The memory forensics **techniques** uncovered vital evidence, including **malware** traces and user activities, allowing investigators to build a timeline of events and identify malicious behaviors like **DLL injection** and unauthorized process execution (UNODC, 2023) . Furthermore, by leveraging the capabilities of plugins like “**pslist**” and **netscan** (Li, Sun, & Xu, 2018), investigators were able to detect and map suspicious processes and network activities, reinforcing the hypothesis of external tampering. Despite the inherent challenges of working with volatile data, such as its susceptibility to loss and manipulation upon shutdown, the tools used in this case provided sufficient reliability and precision. The acquisition and preservation methods followed strict protocols to ensure evidence integrity, with hashing algorithms confirming data authenticity. Moving forward, the field of memory forensics will need to evolve to manage larger memory sets and combat advanced **anti-forensic** techniques (Sahin, 2023) like obfuscation and encryption. As cyber threats grow more complex, advancements in tool efficiency and analyst training will be crucial in maintaining the accuracy and effectiveness of memory forensics in future digital investigations.

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