

# Detection of Amplifiers using Active Measurements

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
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- Introduction
- Framework
- Measurements
- Dashboards
- Conclusion

- **Distributed Reflective Denial-of-Service Attack (DRDoS)**



- Figure: DRDoS attack using a botnet.

- **Bandwidth Amplification Factor (BAF):**

$$BAF = \frac{\text{len}(\text{Response payload})}{\text{len}(\text{Request payload})}$$

- **Amplifier:**

- Publicly available
- Lacks authentication
- Connection-less
- $BAF > 1$

- **Terabit Attack Era**
  - GitHub reported 1.35 Tbps
  - Arbor Networks reported 1.7 Tbps
- **Abuse of IoT devices**
  - Mirai malware
- **Solution**
  - No IP address spoofing, no DRDoS attacks
  - Reduce the number of amplifiers
- **Our Contribution**
  - Framework to detect amplifiers using active network measurements

- How to orchestrate network scans in a large network?
- How to conduct network scans ethically?
- Do amplifiers exhibit any characteristics?
- Does the bandwidth amplification factor (BAF) changes over time?
- Does the number of active amplifiers change over time?

- **REST API**

- Developed using Django REST Framework (DRF)

API Endpoint	Request Method	Description
<i>/api/v1/scan</i>	POST	create new scan
<i>/api/v1/scan</i>	GET	list scan names
<i>/api/v1/scan/{name}</i>	GET	get scan details
<i>/api/v1/scan/{name}</i>	PUT	update scan
<i>/api/v1/scan/{name}</i>	DELETE	remove scan
<i>/api/v1/scan/{name}/result</i>	GET	get latest scan result
<i>/api/v1/scan/running</i>	GET	list task-ids of running scanning jobs
<i>/api/v1/scan/revoke/{task_id}</i>	GET	revoke running job with the specified task_id

TABLE : REST API endpoints

- **CLI Client**

- Increases usability

- **Scan Scheduling**

- Periodically execute network scans
- Celery Task Queue used

- **E-mail notifications**
  - Notify about amplifiers and error messages
- **Network Scanner (Zmap)**
  - Horizontal scanner (one scan per protocol)
  - Fast network scanner *“/0 scans in under 45 minutes”*
  - Stateless
  - Randomized probes
  - IPv6 address space scanning
- **Visualization Dashboards**
  - Developed using *Grafana*
  - Home Dashboard: stats from all scans
  - Scan Dashboard: stats for a specific scan
  - Amplifier Dashboard: stats for a specific amplifier

- **Address ranges:** TUM's public IPv4 addresses
- **Scanning frequency:** Twice a day
- **Scanning duration:** Two weeks (23.02.2019 – 06.03.2019)
- **No. of scanned addresses:** 130k
- **Scan execution time:** approx. 17 minutes

Protocol	Attack Vector
Chargen	get random ASCII characters
CLDAP	get list of users registered in a directory
DNS	DNS ANY query for google.com
Memcached	<i>stat items</i> command
NetBIOS	get NetBIOS name table
NTP	<i>monlist</i> command
QOTD	get random quote
RIPv1	get routing table
SNMP	get system description field using community string public
SSDP	discover packet for UPnP devices

TABLE: Overview of attack vectors used for detection of amplifiers.



- Validate probe packet
  - Don't cause harm to the devices
  - Use Wireshark to validate packet structure
  - Optimally, deploy services and capture request packets
- Host a web page to express scanning intentions

🔒 <https://www.net.in.tum.de/projects/gino/index.html#internet-wide-scans>

Contact

Information for Students

### Internet-wide scans

We conduct various regular and ad-hoc Internet-wide scans for protocols such as HTTPS, DNS, and BACnet. These are purely scientific and we never attempt to intrude into any system. We follow best practices laid out by the scientific community such as by Dittrich et al. <sup>1</sup>, and Partridge and Allman <sup>2</sup>.

If you are affected by these, e.g., because of IDS alerts, please [contact us](#) and we will be happy to blacklist you immediately. The involved machines are:

Host	IPv6 address	IPv4 address
planetlabX.net.in.tum.de	2001:4ca0:108:42::X	138.246.253.X
dallas	2600:3c00::f03c:91ff:fe3b:d2d	45.33.5.55
singapore	2400:8901::f03c:91ff:fe3b:d08	139.162.29.117

For a brief time in February 2018, the rDNS pointer for planetlab19.net.in.tum.de. points to researchscan19.netintum.umbrellastudy.com.


- Maintain a blacklist
- Avoid saturating networks
  - Low packet rate (128 pps)
  - ZMap's randomized probing
- Restricted access to scan results

# Measurements: Results

- Amplifiers detected for 5 protocols
- NetBIOS, SNMP have the highest no. of amplifiers
- Amplifiers decrease during the weekend
- Amplifiers increase during the day

Protocol	Min	Max	Avg
NetBIOS	73	215	122
SNMP	23	27	25
SSDP	1	3	2
Chargen	2	2	2
DNS	1	1	1

Table: Min, Max and Avg. number of amplifiers



# Measurements: NetBIOS Amplifiers

- Windows based protocol to allow applications to communicate on LAN
- Probe NetBIOS *nametable*
- Linux/Unix based machines found running NetBIOS
  - SAMBA suite
- Amplifiers belong to three subnets
- Subnet-1:
  - End user devices
- Subnet-2 & subnet-3:
  - Printers
  - Mail servers
  - LDAP servers




Figure: Number of active NetBIOS amplifiers in three subnets

- Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)
- Manage and monitor network devices
- Probe *system description* property

```
Samsung Samsung M262x 282x Series; V3.00.01.04 JAN-18-2012;  
Engine V1.00.02 01-17-2013;NIC V6.01.01;S/N ZD2JB8GD2B00LSR
```

Figure: System description string received from a Samsung printer

- SNMP *GetRequest* vs. *GetBulkRequest*
- Majority of SNMP amplifiers are printers

Vendor	Device Type	Count
HP	Printer	11
Brother	Printer	4
Kyocera	Printer	3
Samsung	Printer	2
Lexmark	Printer	1
Epson	External print server	1
nTop	nBox Netflow hardware appliance	1
APC	Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS)	1

TABLE: SNMP amplifier device types and vendors.

# Measurements: SSDP Amplifiers

- Simple Service Discovery Protocol (SSDP)
- Discovery and advertisement of plug-and-play devices
- Probe SSDP discover request
- Two Samsung printers found

## DNS Amplifiers

- Probe DNS ANY query for google.com
- One DNS open resolver found
- DNS resolver caches results
- BAF drops during weekend due to less records in resolver's cache




Figure: Change in BAF of amplifiers

- Legacy character generator protocol
- Testing and network debugging
- Highest BAF (74X)
- Two amplifiers
- Nmap scan reveals amplifiers are running:
  - Legacy protocols *Echo*, *Discard*
  - Outdated Sun Solaris 8 OS
- Sun Solaris 8 enables Chargen on system startup
- Sun management console found




Figure: Sun Management Console

- Bandwidth Amplification Factor of amplifiers:

Protocol	Amplifiers	BAF		
		all	50%	10%
NetBIOS	145	3.24	4.06	4.91
SNMP	24	3.02	4.15	6.47
SSDP	2	14.86	19.7	19.7
Chargen	2	74	74	74
DNS	1	12.56	12.56	12.56

Table: BAF per protocol recorded from the last scanning iteration, all shows the average BAF of all amplifiers, 50% and 10% shows the average BAF of 50% and 10% of the worst amplifiers, respectively.


- 9 devices found with multiple amplification vulnerabilities


Pos.	Protocol Combination	Count
1	NetBIOS, SNMP	7
2	NetBIOS, SSDP	1
3	NetBIOS, SSDP, SNMP	1


Table: Combination of vulnerable protocols detected in amplifiers

## **Visualization Dashboards Demo**









- Extensible framework for amplifier detection using active measurements
- Evaluation by executing scans ethically in Munich Scientific Network
- Number of amplifiers and BAF varies with time
- Misconfigurations exposes devices
- Internet wide scans in future could be a source of interesting insights

## Backup Slides

- **REST architecture style**
  - Client-server “*separation of concerns*”
  - Uniform Interface
- **Django REST Framework (DRF)**
  - Python based
  - Opensource
  - Pluggable components
  - Field validations (IP address format, port range)
- **CLI Client**
  - Constructs and sends request
  - Increases usability




Figure: Framework architecture

- **Scan Scheduling**
  - Periodically execute network scans
- **Celery**
  - Task Queue
  - Asynchronous execution of long running tasks
  - Publisher-Subscriber model
- **Celery beat scheduler**
  - Keeps track of scans
  - Triggers task execution
- **Celery worker**
  - Executes tasks
  - Stores results in database




Figure: Framework architecture

- **Network Scanner**
  - Horizontal vs. vertical scanning technique
- **ZMap**
  - Fast network scanner *“/0 scans in under 45 minutes”*
  - Stateless
  - Decouples sending probes and receiving responses
  - Bypasses the TCP/IP stack
  - Randomized probes
  - IPv6 address space scanning
  - Blacklist feature
- **One scan per protocol**





Figure: Framework architecture



- **Grafana – Data visualization framework**
  - Opensource
  - Support for several databases
  - Tables, graphs, heat-maps etc. to visualize data
- **Home Dashboard:** stats from all scans
- **Scan Dashboard:** stats for a specific scan
- **Amplifier Dashboard:** stats for a specific amplifier



- **E-mail notifications**

- Sent when the scan completes or fails
- Helps in tackling operational challenges of the framework




Figure: Amplifiers found notification




Figure: Error notification

# Measurements

- TUM's public IPv4 address ranges scanned
- 10 UDP-based protocols assessed for amplification abuse
- PlanetLab static IP addresses used for scanning nodes
- Scans executed twice a day




Figure: Scanning setup

- Prevent IP address spoofing
- Prevent public access to devices
  - SNMP, SSDP, NetBIOS are strictly designed for usage in LAN
  - Protect DNS resolvers
- Use latest operating systems and protocol versions
  - Sun Solaris 8's support was discontinued in March 2012
  - SNMPv3 provides username, password based authentication
  - UDP interface is disabled in latest memcached versions
  - NTP's monlist command is disabled in latest releases
- Secure service configuration
  - SNMP "*public*" passphrase on printers should be changed
- Protocol hardening
  - DNS: switch to TCP if the response size exceeds a threshold

- Amplification Hell: Revisiting Network Protocols for DDoS Abuse [1]
  - Scanned the internet for amplifiers, we scanned a university network
  - Described a passive approach for amplifier detection (BAF=5 and traffic=10MB)
  - Response size from the Chargen amplifiers is 74 bytes
  - Scanned only SNMPv2, we scanned SNMPv1 and v2 devices
  - DNS average BAF 28.7, we observed 12.56
  - SSDP average BAF 30.7, we observed 14.86
- Hell of a Handshake: Abusing TCP for Reflective Amplification DDoS Attacks [2]
  - TCP stacks re-transmit the SYN-ACK packet to victim
  - No amplification attack reported based on the TCP amplifiers
- *OpenResolverProject.org* and *OpenNTPProject.org*
  - Scan internet for DNS and NTP amplifiers
  - Limited to two protocols and IPv4 addresses

[1] Christian Rossow. "Amplification Hell: Revisiting Network Protocols for DDoS Abuse". In: In Proceedings of the 2014 Network and Distributed System Security Symposium, NDSS. 2014.

[2] Marc Kuhrer and Thomas Hupperich and Christian Rossow and Thorsten Holz, "Hell of a Handshake: Abusing TCP for Reflective Amplification DDoS Attacks", In Proceedings of the 2014 USENIX Workshop on Offensive Technologies WOOT' 14