An RBC model with heterogeneous firms and irreversible investments

Each firm with an individual state (k, z) solves the following problem:

$$\begin{split} J(k,z;X) &= \max_{k'} \pi(k,z;X) + (1-\delta)k - k' + \mathbb{E}_{z,X} M(X,X') J(k',z';X') \\ \text{s.t. } k' &\geq \phi I_{ss} + (1-\delta)k \\ \pi(k,z;X) &= \max_{k,n} Ak^{\alpha} n^{\gamma} - w(X)n \end{split}$$

where k is individual capital stock; z is the idiosyncratic productivity; n is the labor demand; I_{ss} is the steady-state aggregate investment level.

The household-side problem is as follows:

$$V(a; X) = \max_{c, a', N} log(c) - \eta N + \beta \mathbb{E}V(a'; X')$$

s.t. $c + \int a'(X')q(X, X')d\Gamma_{X'} = a + w(X)N$

where q is the stochastic discount factor; a' is the future equity portfolio.

The stochastic discount factor M(X, X') and wage w(X) is determined at the competitive market:

$$[M]: \quad a(X) = J(k(X); X)$$
$$[w]: \quad N(X) = \int n(k, z; X) d\Phi(k, z)$$

The first-order condition of firm's problem is as follows:

$$1 = \mathbb{E}_{z,X} M(X,X') J_1(k',z';X') + \lambda(k,z;X)$$

where λ is the Lagrange multiplier. The envelope condition of firm's problem is as follows:

$$J_1(k,z;X) = \pi_1(k,z;X) + (1-\delta) - \lambda(k,z;X)(1-\delta)$$
$$= \pi_1(k,z;X) + (1-\delta)(1-\lambda(k,z;X))$$

Combining the two conditions above, we have

$$1 = \mathbb{E}_{z,X} M(X, X') (\pi_1(k', z'; X') + (1 - \delta)(1 - \lambda(k', z'; X'))) + \lambda(k, z; X),$$

which pins down the optimal future capital stock k'(k, z, ; X).