Taking Play Seriously

RICHARD J. BURKE

At least since the Renaissance, our culture has been dominated by the idea of work. This idea takes various forms. One is the Puritan vocation or calling, generalized from the clergy of the Middle Ages; another is the capitalist pursuit of profit; still another is the industrial imperative to maximize efficiency and productivity. These can be combined, as they were throughout most of American history in "the Protestant ethic." But each can also exist without the others. In the medieval monastery there was vocation without capitalism or industrial productivity (although the beginnings of both have been traced there[1]); in the Italian nobility of the Renaissance there was capitalism without piety or industrialism; and in the Soviet Union today there is industrialism without piety or capitalism. These activities are quite different; but they are all pursued as means to an end, hence they involve some postponement of gratification even though they have also become ends in themselves for many.

We assume that man has always had to work almost constantly in order to survive, and pride ourselves on having lowered the average work week to about forty hours. It is a shock, therefore, when anthropologists tell us that on average, the adults in surviving hunting and gathering societies work only 3-5 hours per day![2] Still, we tend to answer questions about our identity by giving our occupation, and work is always taken seriously. Marx thought that human nature itself had been shaped through the changing forms of work.[3] Freud could even identify the work attitude in general with what he called the "reality principle," and with psychological maturity.[4]

Play, on the other hand, is thought of as childish and trivial activity, almost by definition. My *Encyclopedia Britannica* (1970) has no article on "Play" in general, but only one of "Play in Animals," in which the author explains that this behavior is characteristic of immature animals. (How about the animals closest to man—chimpanzees, dolphins, otters—which seem to spend most of their adult lives playing?) In contrast to Herbert Spencer's discredited theory that play is getting rid of "surplus energy," this author says, we now understand that it serves an important biological function: it develops the animal's sensory and motor skills so it can perform adult activities—feeding, fighting, mating—more effectively.[5] Jean Piaget's excellent analyses of types and levels of play are limited to showing how children's play prepares us for serious adult life.[6] A huge recent anthology of articles by psychologists about play, edited by Jerome Bruner and others, is entirely confined to this theme.[7]

But anyone who *looks* will see that adults in all cultures spend a lot of time playing, and watching others play, even in the narrowest sense of the word: games, sports, and leisure pastimes of all kinds. Is this just a holdover from childhood, or to keep our sensori-motor skills in fighting trim? Hardly. Anyone watching the Olympics, or even a weekend golfer lining up a putt, knows that this cannot be the whole story. We take these activities too seriously, devote too much time and energy to

Reprinted from *Listening*, 16, (Winter, 1981), pp. 56-67.

them and derive too much satisfaction from them, for this sort of explanation to be plausible.

Play Is Serious

I want to briefly sketch the opposite theory, that the psychological structure of play is characteristic of the fullest development of human nature, so that it *cannot* be taken too seriously. This is an ancient idea, developed cogently by Friedrich Schiller in the 18th century,[8] but given classic formulation by Johan Huizinga in 1938 in his brilliant book *Homo Ludens.* He showed, at the very least, that there is an important "play element" in all the "serious" cultural activities of man: art, religion, science, politics, business, even warfare.

> The great archetypal activities of human society are all permeated with play from the start. Take language, for instance—. . . Behind every abstract expression there lies the boldest of metaphors, and every metaphor is a play upon words. Thus in giving expression to life man creates a second, poetic world alongside the world of nature.
>
> Or take myth. . . . In myth, primitive man seeks to account for the world of phenomena by grounding it in the Divine. . . . Or finally, let us take ritual. Primitive society performs its sacred rites, its sacrifices, consecrations and mysteries, all of which serve to guarantee the well-being of the world, in a spirit of pure play truly understood.
>
> Now in myth and ritual the great instinctive forces of civilized life have their origin: law and order, commerce and profit, craft and art, poetry, wisdom and science. All are rooted in the primaeval soil of play.[9]

Huizinga's argument has not received the attention it deserves from philosophers. In fact, there is no article on "Play" in the Collier-Macmillan *Encyclopedia of Philosophy,* and not a single listing in the Index. Huizinga is mentioned only once in the *Encyclopedia,* in connection with a different topic. I will make use of some of Huizinga's ideas; but one need not agree with him that cultural activities are *essentially* forms of play in order to grant that the structural parallels are striking. Another thinker with a similar theory, also neglected by philosophers, is the French sociologist Roger Caillois, who distinguishes four basic types of play and correlates them with four types of culture.[10] Still another author, Jacques Ehrmann, criticizes both Huizinga and Caillois for not going far enough. After noting that they both define play in contrast to "ordinary life" or "reality," he continues:

> It is legitimate to wonder by what right "reality" may be said to be *first,* existing prior to its components—play in this case . . .—and serving as their standard. How could "reality" serve as a *norm* and thereby guarantee *normality* even before having been tested and evaluated in and through its manifestations? For . . . there is no "reality" (ordinary or extraordinary!) outside of or prior to the manifestations of the culture that expresses it. (Italics in original.)[11]

Later in the same essay, Ehrmann makes his own position explicit:

> Each text contains in itself its own reality . . . Play, reality, culture, are synonymous and interchangeable. Nature does not exist prior to culture.[12]

A complete response to Ehrmann would take me too far into the arguments against idealism in epistemology and metaphysics, along the lines of G.E. Moore's "A Defense of Common Sense" (1923). I will simply assume in this essay that nature *does* exist prior to culture, although *ideas* about nature are of course elements of culture; and that play can be defined over against "reality" in some philosophically adequate sense of that term. In the same way, one may explore the world of Shakespeare without raising the issue of whether Shakespeare's world is *the* world. Prima facie, at least, play is a form of "make-believe," even when the player is utterly absorbed in it.[13] I will develop

this concept, then offer a common-sense argument that play is therefore not as fully serious as several other human activities, including work. I will make use of a distinction by Kurt Riezler between a playful *attitude* and the *object* with which this attitude is concerned.[14] Unlike Riezler, however, I will argue that since the object is not fully real but a symbolic creation, the attitude should not be fully serious.

First of all, every game, from football to chess and from hide-and-seek to poker, has rules. These rules not only define which moves are permitted and which are not, and which win and which lose, but what is to count as a move in the game. They thus define a subset of all the infinite possible things people can do as constituting a system, a "little world" or microcosm, in which each move has a meaning in relation to all the others. These rules are freely adopted by anyone who wants to play, and have been invented and refined by generations of players to make the resulting microcosm as interesting as possible.[15] I think this analysis applies even to solitary pastimes like bouncing a ball or "doodling" on the edge of a piece of paper. The rules of a game like football can be very complex, but the world they create is still far simpler than the real world, with its infinity of possible categories of behavior. Each game or sport picks out a few of these, stylizes them, and creates a relatively simple model of reality defined solely in these terms. This relative simplicity, with its corollary of unambiguous meanings and definite outcomes, may well be the basic reason for the appeal of all sorts of games.

Games are simpler than reality also by being limited in space and time. Often they are played on a field or court, with the line between microcosm and the rest of the world neatly drawn on the ground or marked on the board. The beginning and end of the game are clearly defined, creating a finite stretch of game time. Less organized forms of play have vaguer boundaries, but are still spatio-temporally limited in a way that life as a whole is not.[16]

Finally, the participation of players in a game is also necessarily limited, in that we do not play with our whole self, but only with that aspect of us which is relevant to the game-world as defined by the rules. A college football player puts plenty of energy into the game, but his grades in school, his love life, and a hundred other things about him are irrelevant when he steps onto the field. He may be totally committed to playing as well as he can, but objectively the player is a limited aspect of the person, a role.[17] It is this feature of play which makes it questionable whether a gambler who risks more than he can afford to lose is still "playing."

Now the arts and sciences share many of these same features. Here too we create symbolic worlds, simpler than the real one by virtue of selecting a certain problem, then responding to it in terms of a network of conventionally defined concepts and methods.[18] Is this only a superficial parallel, or does it reveal a deep spiritual or intellectual relationship?

The easiest case is the arts. Many people have pointed out that one "plays" music,[19] that dramatists write "plays" in which actors "play" roles, etc. If "play" is defined as free participation in a simplified microcosm modeled on a few selected features of life, and created for its intrinsic interest rather than for any utilitarian purpose, the arts are either forms of play or very much like play. Suzanne Langer's analysis of the "world" created by each artistic genre, and ultimately by each individual work within the genre, helps to make this comparison plausible.[20] In fact, the only real question here is why we use the word "work," as I just did, to refer to the products of artistic creation but not to those of playful activities. The answer lies in realizing that the terms "work" and "play," while often contrasted, are not really opposites. They refer to different *aspects* of an activity—"work" to its instrumental relation to other activities, and "play" to the free spirit in which it is carried on—so that the same activity can be both "work" and "play" from different points of view; and *parts* of play can be work, like practicing to be a better athlete or musician, and perfecting "teamwork."

There is a characteristic attitude associated with playful activities, and a different ("serious") at-

titude associated with work. Since one cannot have both attitudes at once, we generally assume that one cannot work and play at the same time. But since it is possible, even common, to be serious about play, and to be playful about one's work, the attitude characteristic of each must be only *part* of its nature. A professional athlete, actor or musician is "working" in the sense that he gets paid. His attitude may, however, still be the same as it was before he "turned pro," when he loved "playing" so much he got good enough to make a living at it. Certainly, the activity itself is still essentially the same. And the activity of amateurs may involve long hours of drudgery to perfect one's technique, and may require careful coordination of parts in a whole, both features of many kinds of work. Rather than struggling to decide whether a serious athlete, actor or musician is working *or* playing, it seems better to admit that these activities (and many others) are *both* working and playing in themselves, whatever the participant's attitude on a particular occasion (or at a particular moment!) may be.[21] If this argument is sound, the International Olympic Committee should stop making a distinction where there is characteristically no difference, and permit professional athletes to compete in the games.

It is a bit harder to see what the sciences have in common with play. While the arts involve imagination, and thus are free (like play) to transcend ordinary reality, it seems that science is tied to the explanation of whatever exists. Granted, a scientist can be creative in inventing hypotheses; but does he not differ from the philosopher and the poet in just this, that unlike them he must bear the burden of proof, must show that his hypotheses conform to the facts? There is certainly a kernel of truth in this assumption; but such commonsense realism about science has been problematic at least since Hume and Kant, and was dealt a serious blow by T.S. Kuhn's *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.*[22] Kuhn showed that at any given time each branch of science is guided in its theorizing and research by a "paradigm" or basic model, and that changes from one paradigm to another are brought about more by persuasion than by proof, so that science cannot be sharply distinguished from rhetoric. While Kuhn's position is still controversial, most philosophers today seem to agree that science is an activity of creative model-building in which the model can never be compared to nature directly, and is known to be a simplification which at best approximates to it.[23] Just as the rules of football, although complex, are simple compared to real life, so the equations of a scientific theory are always simpler than the process they attempt to portray. Can the scientist's state of mind be compared to that of the player or the artist? While they may sometimes be thinking of practical uses to which their discoveries may be put—in medicine, for example—it is typical for a scientist to be captivated by the intrinsic beauty and interest of the ideas themselves. Jacob Bronowski, in his BBC-TV series "The Ascent of Man," has beautifully captured this aesthetic character of science, and the lack of any fundamental distinction between science and art in this respect.[24]

If the psychological structure of adult play is similar to that of the arts and sciences, "education for leisure" becomes far less paradoxical than is commonly supposed. The creation of, and joyful participation in, simplified versions of life defined by a freely adopted set of rules begins to look less like a temporary respite from serious activity, and more like the characteristic human response to the world. The fact that some people play games or sports better than others, just as some are better artists or scientists than others, also becomes more significant. Playing is *not* something we all do by "instinct," but a form of behavior that must be learned, that is learned better by some than by others, and that presumably could be learned better by everyone if it were better taught. Play and games should be used in school not only as "simulations" of reality, so that students will be better prepared for their jobs in the "real world," but as valuable activities in their own right. The equa-

tion of the world of work with reality, and the "worlds" of play with childish fantasy, is philosophically naive.[25]

But Not Fully Serious

While the argument I have just summarized undoubtedly has merit, the conclusion that play can be as serious as any other human activity seems too strong. An adult who devotes himself primarily to playing games, or to being "number one" at some particular game, does seem to lack something. But the same can be said, for the reasons outlined above, of the arts and sciences. To take any of these for life itself attributes too much importance to the enjoyment of our own symbolic creations, and not enough to coping with reality in its intractable fullness. Granting that life can be made "meaningful" by interpreting it in terms of symbols—the world can be imagined as a "kingdom" (with "God" as the "king"), history as a "drama," a "contest," etc.—we must never forget that symbols are deliberate simplifications. Drawing on the same analysis of play as the enjoyment of a symbolic microcosm, I suggest that play should therefore *not* be taken with full seriousness. My argument will be analogous to the critique of "idolatry" by the ancient Hebrew prophets, and to the "seriousness and labor of the negative" in Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*.

When a friend says, "Don't play games with me," what exactly does he mean?[26] He wants to be taken seriously. He wants to be reacted to in his own terms, not just as part of someone else's scenario, however clever and creative. Each of us constructs an interpretation of each of our acquaintances, and of humanity in general. We interact with people in terms of these interpretations, and usually this works fine. But when we know someone well, he expects our interpretation of him to be not only more accurate, but also *open* to his reality. We are not free to relate to him as we please in the face of resistance. We have a moral obligation—perhaps this is even our most fundamental obligation—to be *responsive* to other people as they are in themselves, as opposed to our own mental reconstructions of them. Kant was making this point, I think, when he argued that morality concerns persons in themselves, while theoretical understanding is only of "phenomena" or "objects." Likewise, existentialists from Kierkegaard to Sartre have emphasized the need to respect the "otherness" of other people.

This idea may be generalized to include other animals and plants, in fact the whole of nature. The ecology movement has combined with increasing awareness of non-Western cultural attitudes to "raise our consciousness" about the narrowness of the Western exploitative relationship to nature. "Nature is like a great machine," said Descartes. His successors omitted the "like," and proceeded to find as many ways as possible to put that machine to work for us. Just as we should be open and responsive to the full reality of other people, so we should ideally be equally open and responsive to all of nature. From this perspective the medieval bestiaries, with their moral homilies on each species of animal—"the elephant and his wife represent Adam and Eve," "the ibex symbolizes learned men,"[27]—illustrate the same Western tendency to see in nature only what we ourselves have put there for our own purposes. Perhaps, as historian Lynn White, Jr. has argued, this tendency goes back to the Book of Genesis;[28] perhaps it is even universal. Still we must recognize it as a weakness, and struggle to overcome it.

If play, art, and science all involve the creation of simplified microcosms which at best approximate to reality, these reflections suggest that none of them should be taken with full seriousness. This idea is bound to seem strange: if the works of Michelangelo or Shakespeare or Einstein are not fully serious, what is? Surely not the pathetic attempts of the ordinary person to eke out a modest living. The paradox becomes more tolerable if we

think of Michelangelo and Shakespeare and Einstein not as typical artists and scientists, but as rare exceptions. I suggest that their work is of great seriousness not quâ artists or scientists, but because each of them was responsive to the fullness of reality. This is what made them great. They *transcended* the activity of model-building, of "playing" with ideas even in Huizinga's extended sense, and let in some of the icy wind from the great world—the "macrocosm"—outside.

One may try to define "art" and "science" normatively, of course, so that "true art" always involves such transcendence and "true science" is always revolutionary.[29] But then most "artists" and "scientists" should really be called by other names. When Plato (or Socrates) first defined "true" being normatively, so that "true" humanity is an ideal that might never be exemplified, it was itself a great achievement of philosophical "transcendence"; but today it is only a rhetorical gambit, and of dubious value. We might as well admit that most practicing artists and scientists remain securely within the symbolic worlds that they and their colleagues have created, delighting in the discovery of ever new implications of their own ideas. This is the "play element" in the arts and sciences, and I do not mean to denigrate it. On the contrary, it *is* a characteristically human response to the world, and one which can call forth seemingly inexhaustible talent and ingenuity.

Riezler says that whenever the attitude of artists toward their work has been "merely playful," this indicates decay, a second-rate work, the end of a style. He says that a "real artist" recognizes an "unconditional obligation" to strive for a "mysterious something" in his work, to follow a "supreme lead" which is "not man-made" and which renders art "as earnest as religion to the religious man."[30] Such romanticism about art is not unfamiliar; but the weakness of the *argument* involved is that the same phrases *could* be used about playing sports, or indeed any other activity. (Also, some of the greatest art seems "merely playful": Bach's *Art of Fugue,* Sterne's *Tristram Shandy,* Joyce's *Finnegans Wake* come to mind.) Granted that one's *attitude* toward art or science may well be "deadly serious," the question is whether this attitude is any more warranted by the nature of the activity than in the case of play. I am arguing that it is not.

How about other human activities? Is work, for example, intrinsically more serious than play? Yes and no. The *forms* of work vary widely from one culture to another, and are often as laden with symbolic significance as any art form. In this sense work too is a human creation, and gives rise to a "microcosm" of limited importance. But insofar as it is necessary for survival, it involves coping with the very real limitations and exigencies of the human condition. This is epitomized in the revealing phrase "making a living." It is what led Freud to associate work with the "reality principle." Perhaps human life would be less meaningful without some form of creative symbolism; but it would not exist at all without work. This simple tautology is often overlooked in our preoccupation with "the search for meaning." In this sense, and *only* in this sense, there is a residual seriousness about work that is found neither in play, nor in the arts and sciences. One can make a living as an artist or a scientist, of course, just as he can as a football or bridge player; but this is an accident of our culture, irrelevant to the intrinsic structure of the activities.

The same sort of distinction should be made with regard to other human activities, such as sex and war, which are often embedded in a rich web of symbolic significance, but which are at bottom matters of brute survival. Huizinga has a chapter on the "play element" in warfare, by which he means the element of ritual, of limiting conventions and stylized heroism, by which almost every culture (at least prior to the 20th century) has sought to distinguish the conflicts between men from the ruthless struggles of animals.[31] We need not enter the controversy among anthropologists about the nature of warfare, and whether it is really any different from those animal struggles. The

point here is that man has always *thought* it was, and tried to make it as "cultural" as possible, including concocting ideological justifications for it. But to lose oneself entirely in the game or ritual aspect of war, as some outstanding military strategists have done (Genghis Khan? Napoleon?), is to lack due respect for the human misery involved. In that sense, it is to "play" at war; to not take life seriously enough.

There was no need for a chapter on "the play element in love" in Huizinga's book, since the poets have long made this theme familiar to everyone. What is perhaps more likely to be forgotten in this age of "the pill" is the absolute necessity of sex for the survival of the species, and the respect for the connection between love and procreation that this implies. Without love, sex is less "meaningful"; but without procreation we would not be here. There is thus a "residual seriousness" in sexuality that is not present in sentimental or romantic love.

Finally, what about religion? Man's playfulness has shown itself profusely in thousands of myths and rituals, in religious art and architecture, etc. Some religious traditions have encouraged this impulse more than others: Hinduism more than Theravada Buddhism, ancient Greek cults more than Roman, Catholicism more than Protestantism. Recently several American theologians have tried to revive the sense of devout playfulness in our Protestant, work-oriented culture.[32] But even the most austere Calvinist believes that human life is given meaning by the "drama" of sin and redemption in the Bible, from the Fall of Adam through the Death and Resurrection of Christ to the Last Judgment. From the perspective of this essay, this story is another of man's attempts to give form and structure to his life by interpreting it in familiar categories, inevitably simplifying and obscuring other insights—for example, those of Buddhism—in the process. Obviously this is highly controversial territory; but to commit oneself entirely to any one set of theological categories would seem to be "idolatry" in the Biblical sense: taking a manmade symbol to be reality itself. In religion, where the concern is with whatever is ultimately or fundamentally real, it is especially important to keep our symbols distinct from what can never be exhaustively symbolized, but must be responded to. The great theologians have all emphasized this "transcendence";[33] but it tends to be forgotten by zealots and sectarians. If play is like art and science in creating and enjoying a symbolic microcosm, this applies to much of religion too. But central to religion is the insistence that reality always transcends our interpretations of it, and the demand that we respect that transcendence. It is this, and only this, that merits our total commitment. While there is an important "play element" in religion, it would be highly misleading to treat religion (as Huizinga seems to do) as a form of play, or even to regard play as essential to it. Some forms of mysticism (the so-called "via negativa") seem to be attempts to eliminate all vestiges of play from religion, including the play of ideas; and what remains may well be the most precious gift of religion to mankind.

A full discussion of the relation of play to art, science, work, love, and religion would obviously require a book, even many books. Some of these books have already been written, and among these Huizinga's *Homo Ludens* is a masterpiece. In combating our tendency to regard play as trivial and childish, however, he seems to have gone too far toward the opposite extreme; and Ehrmann goes even further. My purpose here has been to sketch the outlines of a more balanced treatment, based on reflective common sense. Play is *not* just letting off surplus energy, nor is it just preparation for mature functioning. It can be a fully adult activity, similar in psychological structure to art and science, and deserving of the same respect. It is one of the ways in which we "humanize" our lives and render them "meaningful." But it also lacks the ultimate seriousness of morality, work, war, and religion, each of which brings us up against the limits of our formidable symbolic powers, and forces us to deal as whole persons with reality.

Notes

1. L. Mumford, *The Myth of the Machine* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1967), pp. 263–72.
2. M. Sahlins, *Stone Age Economics* (New York: Aldine-Atherton, 1972), chap. I.
3. See especially "Private Property and Communism," in *Karl Marx: Early Writings*, trans. and ed., T.B. Bottomore (McGraw-Hill, 1963), pp. 152–67.
4. See D. Riesman, "The Themes of Work and Play in the Structure of Freud's Thought (1950)," reprinted in *Individualism Reconsidered* (Free Press of Glencoe, 1954), pp. 310–33.
5. *Encyclopedia Britannica*, Vol. 18, pp. 39–41.
6. *Play, Dreams, and Imitation in Childhood* (New York: Norton, 1951), Part 2.
7. J. Bruner, A. Jolly, K. Sylva, eds., *Play, Its Role in Development and Evolution* (New York: Basic Books, 1976).
8. *On the Aesthetic Education of Man*, trans. R. Shell (Yale University Press, 1954).
9. *Homo Ludens* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1950), pp. 4–5.
10. *Man, Play, and Games*, trans. M. Barash (New York: Free Press, 1961).
11. J. Ehrmann, "Homo Ludens Revisited," in *Game, Play, Literature* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968), p. 33.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 56.
13. Huizinga, *op. cit.*, p. 13.
14. "Play and Seriousness," *Journal of Philosophy*, XXXVIII (Sept. 1941), p. 209.
15. On the evolution of flexible attitudes towards the rules of games, see J. Piaget, *The Moral Judgment of the Child*, trans. M. Gabain (New York: Free Press, 1965), Part I.
16. The last two paragraphs are based loosely on Huizinga, *op. cit.*, especially chap. I; the next paragraph, however, has a different emphasis from his. For more on the symbolic nature of play, see R. Grathoff, *The Structure of Social Inconsistencies* (The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1970), chaps. 6–7.
17. I assume here that a person is more than any set of roles that he plays. This may seem questionable, especially in certain pathological cases: "multiple personality," etc. But even G.H. Mead, one of the founders of "role theory," showed in *Mind, Self and Society* (University of Chicago Press, 1934), pp. 173–78, that we must postulate an active agent—the "I"—interacting with and constituting all its systematic relationships with "significant others." I think some such analysis applies to all forms of human pathology as well, and has important implications for moral and legal issues in psychiatry; see T. Szasz, *The Myth of Mental Illness* (Dell Publishing Company, 1961), pp. 223–40.
18. My approach in the next few paragraphs derives broadly from Ernst Cassirer's "philosophy of symbolic forms."
19. In many languages, not just English; see Huizinga, *op. cit.*, chap. 2.
20. *Feeling and Form* (New York: Scribner's, 1953).
21. I have developed this argument more fully in " 'Work' and 'Play,' " *Ethics*, Vol. 81, no. 1 (October 1971), pp. 33–47.
22. University of Chicago Press, 1962. Compare also C. Turbayne, *The Myth of Metaphor* (University of South Carolina Press, 1962), published in the same year. But most of the credit should go to Hegel.
23. M. Polanyi, *Personal Knowledge* (University of Chicago Press, 1958); K. Popper, *Conjectures and Refutations* (New York: Basic Books, 1962); P. Feyerabend, *Against Method (Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science IV*, 1970), etc.
24. J. Bronowski, *The Ascent of Man* (Little, Brown, and Company, 1973).
25. The classical ideal of "education for

leisure" has been revived recently, on somewhat different philosophical grounds from the ones outlined here, by Thomas Green in *Work, Leisure and the American Schools* (New York: Random House, 1968).

26. I owe this example to Edgar Z. Friedenburg.
27. *The Bestiary,* trans. T.H. White (New York: Capricorn Books, 1954), pp. 27, 30.
28. "The Historical Roots of Our Ecologic Crisis," *Science,* Vol. 155 (March 10, 1967), pp. 1203–07.
29. This is precisely Riezler's position, *op. cit.,* pp. 211–13.
30. *Ibid.,* p. 211.
31. *Op. cit.,* pp. 89–104.
32. E.g., Harvey Cox, *Feast of Fools* (Harvard University Press, 1969); Robert Neale, *In Praise of Play* (New York: Harper & Row, 1969); Sam Keen, *To a Dancing God* (New York: Harper and Row, 1970).
33. See Thomas Aquinas, Maimonides, Al-Ghazali, etc. Wilfred Cantwell-Smith has shown with scholarship and eloquence that therefore no one religious tradition can claim a monopoly of spiritual insight, in *The Meaning and End of Religion* (New York: Harper Torchbook, 1978).