



Augustus F. Lindley

# TI-PING TIEN-KWOH

(Vol. 1&2)

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# **Ti-Ping Tien-Kwoh (Vol. 1&2)**

## **The History of the Ti-Ping Revolution**

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# PREFACE.

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This work has been written in accordance with instructions received from the leaders of the great Ti-ping Revolution in China.

Besides an account of my own personal adventures and practical experience during four years' military service and social intercourse with the Ti-pings, the following pages contain:—

A complete history of the Revolution: its Christian, political, military, and social organization; an accurate description of its extraordinary leader, Hung-sui-tshuen, and his principal chiefs; the rise, progress, and present circumstances of the movement, together with its bearing and influence as well upon the welfare of the 360 million inhabitants of China, as on the general interests of Great Britain; with a thorough review of the policy of the British Government towards China; including the intervention with and hostilities against the Ti-ping patriots, who, by accepting Christianity and abandoning idolatry, revolted against the Manchoo-Tartar Government.

In writing this work I have been prompted by feelings of sympathy for a worthy, oppressed, and cruelly-wronged people; as well as by a desire to protest against the evil foreign policy which England, during the last few years, has pursued towards *weak Powers*, especially in Asia.

As a talented writer has just proved,<sup>1</sup> "It is not once, nor yet twice, that the policy of the British Government has been ruinous to the best interests of the world. It is not once, nor yet twice, that British deeds have aroused the indignation and horror of 'highly civilized and half-civilized races.' Disregard of international law and of treaty law in Europe—deeds of piracy and spoliation in Asia—one vast system of wrong and violence have everywhere for years marked the dealings of the British Government with the weaker nations of the globe."

Entertaining similar opinions to these, I have endeavoured to produce a complete history of the wonderful revolution in China, and an accurate narrative of the forcible intervention of the British Government against it. As this subject has never been properly placed before the people of England; as it forms one of the last acts of interference with the internal affairs of another State which was undertaken by Lord Palmerston's Administration; and as I have had peculiar opportunities of becoming acquainted as well with the Ti-pings as with the terrible effects of British intervention in this instance—I feel it my duty to afford the fullest information to my countrymen, so as to assist them in forming a correct opinion on a question of such vast magnitude.

Deploring, as I do, the apathy with which the great majority of Englishmen regard the foreign policy of their rulers, and lull themselves into a self-satisfied and indolent state of mind, because of the *present* internal prosperity of their country, it is with hope of some good result that I offer my testimony against an hitherto uncondemned national crime; and, by illustrating the iniquity of our last hostilities in China, join the small array of those who strive to arouse their countrymen from what may prove a fatal lethargy.

During the last thirty years, all the great nations of Europe have acted in a way more or less antagonistic to the only principle which insures the peace of the world, viz., that "No State has a right *forcibly* to interfere in the internal concerns of another State, unless there exists a *casus belli* against it." Consequently it is apparent that the existence of international and treaty law must be in a very precarious position.

When we consider British armed intervention in the internal affairs of the Netherlands, Spain, Portugal, Turkey, Afghanistan, &c.; the three wars with China; the wars with Burmah, Persia, and Japan; together with the forcible demonstrations against Ashantee, Greece, Siam, and Brazil; it cannot fail to be seen that England has not been the most backward in

violating the above true principle of international law, nor the least guilty in following up unjustifiable impositions upon unoffending belligerents by actual *force*.

It is not, however, with the cases here mentioned, but with the late unproclaimed war against the Ti-pings, and with the general effect of the policy in question, that this work is concerned.

With regard to the first subject, it is shown that British interference has caused a tremendous destruction of human life; that it has been carried on with fire and sword against the first Christian movement in modern Asia; that it has been directed against a mighty national religio-political revolution which in no way concerned England; and that every incident of this forceable intervention, from beginning to end, was totally unjustifiable and iniquitous.

With regard to the second subject, if the explanation of the first be considered together with the general effect upon the world which has been produced by England's policy towards some of the States mentioned as those with whom she has interfered during the last thirty years, it is probable that further light may be thrown upon "two remarkable phenomena which now puzzle this nation," described at p. 270, part iv., of the admirable work entitled "Intervention and Non-intervention," as follows:—

"(1) That the reign of force, without any real moral antagonism, is now established throughout all the four quarters of the globe.

"(2) That Great Britain is no longer honoured and trusted as she was, her statesmen having lost that moral influence which, quite as much as physical fear, serves to restrain unscrupulous governments in a career of wrong-doing."

He will indeed be a bold casuist who can dispute the truth of the above propositions, or the fact that they are the natural consequence of such acts as the intervention against the Ti-pings, &c., which have been perpetrated for the sole object of forwarding our own interests and "commercial transactions," without the slightest regard for the principles of right, justice, and international law.

The history of the world proves that every great nation which has been founded by aggression and the sword has ultimately fallen, notwithstanding its power and grandeur, through the exercise of the same illegal violence against itself. Now those who utterly condemn any political action having for its basis expediency, temporary interest, commercial extension, placeholding, or any other mercenary or selfish motives, at the sacrifice of rigid equity and honour, believe that under Providence England will never fall from her exalted position while adhering unchangeably to the eternal principles of right and justice. If the future and the ultimate fate of a nation be not preordained, but are really dependent upon itself, let us believe that its destiny will be determined by an immutable law which only rewards or punishes according to deserts. Then will all who love their country be jealous of its honour, whilst those who are rather intent upon immediate and personal aggrandizement will imitate the acts of the robber, who cares not for the crime so long as he can enrich himself.

Mingled with the more serious parts of this work, the reader will find much information regarding the vast Chinese empire; the character, customs, and position of its interesting people, especially so far as the Ti-pings are concerned. As these are subjects which have come largely under my personal observation, I have connected them with my own travels and adventures in the form of a narrative, so that each alternate chapter should treat exclusively of the history of the Ti-ping Revolution until both could be combined together.

At present civil war is raging in every part of China, and if the natives—as represented by the Ti-ping, Nien-fie, or other insurrectionists—should succeed in overthrowing their Manchoo oppressors, a vast field will be thrown open to European enterprise, and the opportunity that will exist for civilizing and Christianizing the largest country in the world cannot be exaggerated.

A. F. L.

*London, 3rd February, 1866.*

#### ERRATA.

P. 546, *For* the word "whom" *read* "with."

P. 689, *read* last paragraph, commencing at the twenty-seventh line, as follows:—"Yet, on the other hand, there are people who have the obstinacy to review this and similar affairs, and observe that in other parts of the world a very different policy has been enacted, where it could be done with impunity, which affords sufficient evidence that the pretended adoption of a non-interfering policy is neither more nor less than an unprincipled truckling to strong powers, and an aggressive bullying of the weak."

#### FOOTNOTE:

1. "Intervention and Non-intervention," by A. G. Stapleton.

# CHAPTER I.

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Arrival in Victoria.—The Happy Valley.—Hong-Kong.—Tanka Boat Girls.—Chinese Boatmen: their evil propensities.—Captain Mellen's Adventure.—Canton Girls.—Amusements in China.—Cafés Chantant.—The Exhibition.—Temple of Lanterns.—Chinese Character.—Piracy in China.—The "North Star."—Fate of the Crew.—Tartar Cruelty.—Adventure with Pirates.—Sporting.—Duck-shooting.—Chinese Hospitality.—Mandarin Barbarity.—Whampoa.—Marie the Portuguese.—Marie's History: her Escape.—Description of Marie: her Excitability: her Jealousy.

In the summer of 1859, I arrived before the town of Victoria, on board the good ship *Emeu*, and cast anchor in the blue waters of its shaded harbour. Victoria is the only town in the island of Hong-Kong, and, viewed from the bay, presents a very imposing appearance, in many respects resembling Gibraltar.

Like the city of the "Sentinel of the Straits," it is built from the very edge of the sea to some considerable distance up the mountains which constitute the principal portion of the island, and is almost entirely hemmed in by towering masses of time-worn granite, that constitute a grand and effective background to its princely buildings. Many of these noble edifices—the dwellings of European merchants and officials, and the British Government works—in the higher parts of the town are well ornamented by gardens; which, with several verdant little valleys in the hollows of the mountains, some low hills covered with a feathery semi-tropical foliage—Green Island, with its dense bushes on one hand, and Jardine's, crowned with a noble mansion of that firm, on the other—together with the multitude of junks and European shipping at anchor, and those under weigh crossing and enlivening the scene, afford a charming and picturesque tone to what would otherwise be the unrelieved massiveness and sterility of the place.

There is one particularly beautiful spot in the "Island of Sweet Waters," as it is poetically termed by the Chinese, that well repays the trouble of a visit. It is situated some five or six miles from the town, and is named Happy Valley. It is surrounded with luxuriant Asiatic foliage, from the midst of which occasional farm-houses peep out. A fine grassy level forms the centre of the valley, around which is constructed the Hong-Kong racecourse, and this is bounded by a broad carriage-road completely encircling the whole plain; while on the edges of the distant rising ground the burial-place of those Europeans who never return to their home rears above the surrounding evergreens its monumental sculpture.

Happy Valley is surrounded by mountains whose sloping sides are thickly clothed with vegetation; the trees, although of a stunted species, are thickly interlaced with undergrowth and an innumerable variety of evergreen bushes, through which murmur many mountain springs, that become in the rainy months swollen into torrents. Although a favourite resort of European residents, I hardly consider Happy Valley a good sanatorium; for, when visiting it at early sunrise, I invariably found thick, damp vapours shrouding it, slow to be dispelled by the morning sun, and strongly significant of fever, and "Hong-Kong fever" in particular.

The colony of Hong-Kong represents most perfectly the success of British enterprise in commercial matters; and, what is far more important, points to the true mode by which Christian and civilized nations may communicate with the Pagan and semi-civilized ones of Asia.

The less said about the cession of the island to England the better; for, although in the year 1841 the Imperial Commissioner, Keshen, coerced by the presence of British troops, agreed to cede it, his Government repudiated this unauthorized agreement, and yet the British made that a *casus belli*, and afterwards compelled them to sanction and endorse the concession. Many people will, doubtless, say that England was compelled to make war upon the Chinese at that time, in order to defend her subjects and protect their trade and property; but it does not appear that either trade or property had

ever been threatened, except through the nefarious opium traffic. The Chinese Government took the best measures to prevent the introduction of this injurious drug into their empire, but the British Government laid themselves open to the charge of wishing to protect the smugglers and forward the lawless trade.

The colony of Hong-Kong is in many respects to be admired, and it is to be regretted that the ministers of the present day do not appreciate its many advantages. In former days England possessed more statesmen and fewer politicians than now. Of all the blunders which have recently marked her foreign policy, the late intervention in China is the worst; there we find neither the courage nor intellect which, in former ages, by talent, energy, and success redeemed even acts of aggression; neither do we perceive any desire to forego that system of unjustifiable interference which is so much calculated to render this great nation contemptible.

Hong-Kong is a free port, and in that lies the secret of how to establish relations with the Chinese, Japanese, or any other exclusive Asiatic people. As the late Mr. Cobden very correctly stated, during the debate upon China in the House of Commons (May 30, 1864), "We have only to establish free ports on the coast of China, withdraw ourselves altogether from political contact with the people, and we shall have a trade with them quite as much, if not more, than if we penetrate into the country and assist in destroying their civilization in a vain attempt to plant our own, for which they are not yet fitted." There is no necessity whatever to *force* trade, and when such policy is persisted in, the results are always calamitous. To apply the idea personally: How would any of us like a stranger (foreign to us in every respect) to come and thrust himself into our house, determined to *compel* us to trade with him, openly professing his intentions to alter our religion, ancient institutions, &c., with his goods in one hand (principally a poisonous drug) and a sword in the other? But let the stranger establish himself close to our house, without aggression or loud-mouthed professions of interference with our domestic and public policy, and then, whenever we become aware

of the benefit to be derived from him, is it not certain that we should flock to him willingly, and take him amongst us as a friend?

I caught the first glimpse of real Chinese life directly the anchor fell from the *Emeu*'s starboard cathead; for although at Singapore and Penang there are many "Celestials," yet their peculiar manners and customs do not forcibly obtrude themselves upon the notice of a "bird of passage." They seem, at both places, to be leading a subdued, unnatural, very un-Celestial sort of existence; and, besides, very few Celestial ladies are to be seen about. The *Emeu* was scarcely moored when I was startled by the appearance of those amphibious creatures, the Chinese boat and laundry women. The Tanka (boat) girls lead an almost entirely aquatic life, and are actually born, live, and die, on board their floating homes. Their time seems fully occupied in rowing, or sculling with a large oar over the stern of the boat; and this incessant labour makes them strong and well-figured. Until married, it cannot be said they are either paragons of virtue or modesty; but when married, or betrothed—that is to say, bought by a long-tailed Benedict—they, at all events, seem far less amiable towards the exiled "Fan-Kwei" (foreign devil), as, in common with most Chinese, they politely designate all foreigners.

The personal charms of these first seen of the Chinese fair sex are by no means so contemptible as Europeans generally imagine. Their long and intensely black hair, brilliant and merry though oblique black eyes, light-yellowish brown and often beautifully clear complexion, and lithe robust figures, constitute a charming and singular variety of feminine attraction. They are a gay thoughtless set these boat-girls; unfortunately, to mar what would otherwise often be a very handsome face, many of them have the flattish nose typical of South China, though the high and more European formed one is by no means uncommon. Through constant exposure to the sun, they are mostly tanned to a regular olivaster gipsy hue, and wicked little gipsies they often are, especially when making a young greenhorn, fresh from his mamma in England, pay six times the proper fare.

The Tanka girls are free in all things unconnected with their work; but, as many are purchased by aged individuals, owners of boats, they are slaves in so far as their occupation is concerned. Very different is it with their unfortunate sisters, the slaves of the washerwomen, who are bought when quite young, and trained to an evil life.

It is a usual thing to see, the moment a ship has anchored, several old laundry hags, each with an attendant retinue of fascinating nymphs, "taking charge" and establishing themselves in possession of all quarters of the vessel, from the skipper's cabin to the black cook's galley. Of course, these little witches make sad havoc of the sailors' hearts, and generally of their clothes.

It is a singular fact, but no less singular than true, that invariably upon pay-day the number and affection of these pretty damsels seem to increase and multiply in a surprising manner; and by the very perceptible metallic chinking when they take their departure by the gangway, it would appear that their sweetness of disposition had not been exerted unsuccessfully.

The boat and laundry women are peculiar to the South of China, being only met with at Macao, Canton, Whampoa, and Hong-Kong. They seem to have become a distinct part of the population of China since the arrival of Europeans to its shores, as employment by the latter affords their principal means of livelihood. Throughout the year they constantly amuse themselves in the water, swimming and disporting themselves about the above-mentioned harbours, like so many young porpoises in a gale of wind.

Besides the Tanka boats, there are others at Hong-Kong manned by Chinamen; but until quite lately, and until the establishment of a water-police, they formed a very dangerous mode of travelling at night, the crews having frequently robbed and murdered their passengers.

A friend of mine was once very nearly killed by a boat's crew when being taken to his vessel by them; and although, as it will appear, upon that occasion he managed to escape, he was afterwards brutally murdered by the Chinese. But that terrible affair I will relate at its proper place; for I found

his mangled corpse, together with those of his wife and child, some years afterwards, in another part of China.



HONG-KONG BOAT GIRLS.

London, Published March 15th 1866 by Day & Son, Limited Lithogrs Gate Str, Lincoln's  
Inn Fields.

Day & Son, Limited, Lith.

My friend Mellen was captain of a vessel belonging to himself, and, just after the last Canton war, was at anchor in Hong-Kong harbour. Returning on board late one night, the boatmen—seven in number, six pulling and one

in the stern-sheets steering—soon after leaving the shore, instead of steering directly towards his ship, seemed to be keeping away from her. He, of course, endeavoured to make them steer in the right direction; but with that half-complying, half-defying shuffling of your true Chinaman, they managed to persist on the wrong course until reaching some little distance outside all the shipping. At this moment, and while still a considerable way from his own vessel, which happened to be lying outside all the others in port, he was suddenly struck with some heavy weapon by the man behind him, who was steering. Through a forward movement which he made, the blow luckily missed his head and struck him on the shoulder. Mellen very fortunately had a small revolver with him, and at the moment when the rest of the boatmen started from their seats and rushed to attack him, he turned and shot his first assailant, had just time to face them, firing again and wounding the foremost, when they were upon him, armed with formidable knives and the heavy thole pins used to fasten the oars. In an instant he received several wounds, though providentially his assailants were too much in each other's way to use their murderous weapons effectively; but his revolver being self-acting, without a pause, he was enabled to shoot dead another, and severely wound a fourth. At this, seeing four of their number *hors de combat* almost within five seconds, two of the remaining robbers lost heart, and jumped overboard to swim for it; the last, a large powerful fellow, closed with Mellen in a fierce and deadly struggle. My friend's revolver was empty; so, abandoning the weapon that had already rendered such good service, he grappled with his adversary, endeavouring to wrest away the knife with which he was armed.

In the meanwhile, the reports of the pistol and the noise of the struggle had reached the wakeful ears of my friend's wife, who was by good chance on deck, waiting and watching for her husband's return. Piercing the darkness of the night with eager eyes, she faintly discerned a boat in the distance, outside all the other ships, and naturally concluded it must be bound for their vessel. In agony for her husband's safety, she aroused the

crew, seized a pistol from the cabin, and set off in the gig to overhaul the boat which had attracted her attention. The gig's crew pulling fast, arrived at the scene of conflict not an instant too soon; for Mellen being in weak health, was succumbing to the superior strength of his antagonist, who, with one hand grasping him by the throat, was making fierce efforts to release the other, and plunge the dagger it held into my friend's breast.

Just at this critical moment, Mrs. Mellen and her boat's crew arrived alongside, and, seeing all the danger, she presented the pistol at the Chinaman and fired; the ball passed directly through his head and laid him lifeless at her husband's feet. This gallant act was but one of many instances in which that courageous woman had saved her husband's life, and in defending which she eventually lost her own—a fruitless though noble sacrifice.

After landing and reporting myself at head-quarters, I finished my first day in China by seeing as much of Celestial life as my uninitiated state permitted. A sedan chair, the usual and aristocratic style of travelling in China, was hired, which for upwards of three hours transported me all over the town. The Chinese—their country—in fact, all about them—will afford an observant stranger an inexhaustible fund of study and amusement; yet, as a rule, Europeans are singularly neglectful of the country and most interesting traits of the peculiar people they sojourn amongst. They go to China with the sole idea of making a fortune, and too often in its blind pursuit all other principle is sacrificed. Their whole existence seems a feverish dream to obtain dollars enough to return home wealthy; and very seldom, if ever, are any found sufficiently disinterested or philanthropic to study the welfare and future of the immense Chinese empire.

At first, as foreigners generally are, I was considerably disgusted by the unnatural appearance of the men my lot was cast with, consequent upon the shaved head and monkey appendage. This frightful custom in no slight degree adds to the naturally cruel expression of their oblique eyes and

altogether peculiar features; in fact, hair is absolutely required to tone down the harsh and irregular contour of their faces.

While wandering through the town, I was much struck by the appearance of many Chinese girls wearing European shoes on naturally formed feet, and head-dresses of brilliant Manchester pattern, in the form of handkerchiefs, folded diagonally and once knotted under the chin, the ends projecting on either side by a particular and almost mathematical adjustment. I soon became convinced that the European proclivities of the Canton girls went much further than this. These young ladies, before marriage or obtaining a "massa," wear their front hair cut short and hanging over the forehead, which gives them an expression between that of a London street-preacher and a person just dragged through a haystack; their back hair is gathered together and plaited into a long tail, which, when loose, strangely resembles the tail of a black Shetland pony. To the best of my knowledge, the Chinese women never cut their hair, and their system might be beneficially imitated by foreigners, for their tresses are certainly much longer and more luxuriant than those of the women of Europe.

I arrived during the Chinese New Year holidays, which, throughout China, are celebrated with extensive merry-making. At Hong-Kong the new year is welcomed with much festivity, and during many days the cracking of fire-crackers, the roar of petards, and the clanging of gongs is incessant; which, being continued all night, renders sleep difficult.

I visited numberless sing-songs, or theatres, in all of which I found the most persevering of instrumental and vocal performers. Some exclusively confined themselves to musical (Chinese) entertainment, while others were devotees of the Chinese Thespis, and, of the two, I think the latter preferable; for, although their principal hits consist of a tremendous crash of gongs, drums, horns, &c. (which invariably places the audience in ecstasies of delight), there is not so much of the shrieking falsetto of the singers, or the scraping of that excruciating tympanum-piercing instrument of torture—the Chinese fiddle. The nation has certainly obtained its knowledge of musical

concord from the vicinity of Pandemonium, its idea of discord must come from somewhere considerably beyond that place.

Some of the sing-songs combined creature comforts with those more intellectual; but these were permanent institutions, and not simply for the occasion. These establishments are open free of charge, but care is taken to have a select audience. The female performers considerably outnumber the male, and have the cramped small feet. After shrieking themselves hoarse, in a higher pitch of voice than I ever heard before, they approach the visitors to receive largess. Now, their manner of doing this I denounce as the most revolting specimen of self-distortion and pedestrianism imaginable. I can think of no juster simile than a frog trying to walk upright with half its hind legs amputated and stilts fastened to the stumps. Why the deformed feet should ever have been termed "small" I am at a loss to imagine, all that I have seen being quite the reverse. The bottom of the foot, it is true, is bandaged, and compressed into a hoof-like smallness, with the toes all forced into the sole, and on this the shoe is fitted; but look at the ankle, instep, and heel, and you will see nothing but an immense shapeless mass, closely resembling the foot of an elephant.

Whenever the Celestial vocalists have hobbled up to you and taken a seat—perhaps on your knees if they should happen to take a fancy to you—the polite thing is to order supper for the company *ad libitum*, and by this means the proprietors and musical talent of the establishment recompense themselves; for although there is no entrance-charge, by George! they *do* make you pay for supper.

It is a pity some of the members of teetotalism do not undertake a proselytizing expedition to China, for in these intellectual entertainments of the people they would find a fair field for their labour. The etiquette of the sing-song is that a man must never refuse the wine-cup from the hand of one of the attendant sirens, and I am quite sure the sirens use the strongest persuasion and their most fascinating arts to ply it. It sometimes unfortunately happens that a victimized Chinaman becomes unduly elated,

and attempts to steal a kiss; and when this happens, as the ladies are thickly beflooured and daubed with paint, the poor fellow quickly assumes a floury appearance, while the lady's countenance becomes variegated with irregular lines of commingled colour.

The Chinese have another polite mode of making beasts of themselves, consisting of a sort of forfeit game, in which one holds up his fingers and the other, before seeing them, quickly guesses the number held up, the loser's penalty being to swallow a cupful of wine or *samshoo*, and then, to show his superior breeding and capacity, to hold it aloft, bottom up, after each draught.

The professional ladies are always open to an engagement, and are usually invited to attend evening parties, to enliven the guests by their melody and flirtation. Upon these occasions each siren carries a fan, upon which is inscribed her list of songs, and this is handed round the company to select from. The wives and daughters of the host are never present at these *soirées musicales*, for they, poor creatures, being only upon a par with the goods and chattels, are considered unworthy to mix with their lords in public. In all affairs but the most private domestic ones they are entirely ignored, and it would be the greatest breach of good manners for one Chinaman to ask another after his wife's health, and would be vulgar to talk of female relatives at all. Of course, where woman occupies such an inferior position, her rights are frequently usurped; and it is no uncommon thing for one of the singing ladies to monopolize a man with several wives.

While at Hong-Kong I had the satisfaction of visiting a grand New Year exhibition that only takes place once every ten years. It consisted of an immense building of bamboo and matting, after the general style of Chinese theatres. The people excel in this style of building, and will finish one of these temporary structures in a few days, and without using a single nail in the work. The walls and roof are simply bamboo, lashed together with rope, then thatched with rushes, and covered with matting; the whole completely watertight, and strong enough to resist the wind and weather. That which I

visited was designated the Temple of some long-named Chinese divinity, and was of vast extent, covering several acres of land. The interior contained a little of every production of China, a fair sprinkling of European articles, and an endless variety of shows and amusements. Some parts were devoted to stalls of raw produce, while others contained every kind of manufactured article. One of the most attractive scenes for the Chinamen was a show of models of a great variety of wild animals, comprising almost everything, from a mouse to a camelopard. Although this dummy menagerie gave the greatest satisfaction and elicited numberless "Hi-ya's!" from the astonished Celestials, I am pretty certain that many of the supposed representations could never have found an original, and I am quite sure that had a tiger seen the tremendous monster intended for himself, it would have certainly frightened him. Theatres, sing-songs, lecturers, quack-doctors, mountebanks, tumblers, jugglers, fortune-tellers, all were to be enjoyed for the sum of two dollars paid at the door.

The Temple was said to contain 1,000,000 lanterns, and was altogether remarkably well got up. I met the Chinese jugglers for the first time at this place, and I must say they are remarkably dexterous. One of the best tricks I saw them execute is this—the performer, after showing the audience that he has nothing concealed about him and going through a series of gymnastics to convince them, will suddenly stop, stoop down, and from under his ordinary Chinese robe produce an immense bowl filled to the brim with water; so full, indeed, that the slightest movement would spill some, yet the trick is executed without a drop falling to the ground.

While lounging through the "palace of 1,000,000 lanterns," I found the first opportunity to study that absurd jargon, "pidgeon English." I was watching one of the most expert jugglers, when a fine, portly, evidently well-to-do Chinaman came up, and addressed me with—

"Hi-ya! this piecee man belong numbah one. Can do so fashon? ga la!"

More by good luck than comprehension, I happened to hit upon his meaning that the man was very clever, and his inquiry as to whether I

approved of the trick. After a few more general and equally ambiguous remarks, in which some of my interlocutor's friends joined and made a worse confusion, he thought we had had enough of the wizard, and invited me to partake of some Chinese good cheer in these words:—

"S'pose you no wantche look see, mi wantche you come along mi catchee samshoo."

Having nothing better to do, and thinking it a good opportunity to ascertain a little of Chinese character, I accepted his proposal, and we adjourned to a restaurant department close by, where I spent a short time very pleasantly—telling the Chinamen about railways, balloons, submarine telegraph, &c., and receiving in return copious information upon *pidgeon* (business) and the Chinese politics of Hong-Kong. My friends were loud and unanimous in praise of the colony, and declared it, and all pertaining to it, "numbah one;" while they quite as heartily expressed their dissatisfaction with the state of their country and its Manchoo Government. At last, I was obliged to leave them in a hurry, having a confounded middle watch to keep, and we parted with mutual protestations of good will, amidst which might have been prominently distinguished, "Engleman numbah one," "Chinaman numbah one," "Chin-chin, ga la!" &c.

Hong-Kong is highly appreciated by the Chinese, who, to escape from the tyranny and rapacity of their Manchoo rulers, stifle their national pride, and flock to it in great numbers. Those who have preferred British jurisdiction to the unendurable state of their own country are mostly respectable men; but, of course, there is another and a disreputable party. Hong-Kong, besides affording shelter and advantages to the honest and worthy, has been quite as useful to bad characters and criminals from the mainland; and as these latter have not been slow to avail themselves of its protection, the result is that gangs of robbers and pirates have become located amongst the large native population. Until quite lately, a walk at evening, outside the precincts of the town, was likely to terminate unpleasantly, as these fly-by-night gentlemen were often hanging about with

an eye to business. Many Europeans have returned from a late walk considerably edified upon this point; some have never returned, for the Chinese marauders are particularly unscrupulous. A couple of philanthropists one night thought to relieve me of the burden of my purse while I was taking a moonlight stroll barely beyond the houses of Victoria; but the arguments of a Penang lawyer proved so effectual—thanks to Sergeant-Major Winterbottom and its own toughness—that they were glad to forego their unwelcome attentions and decamp, leaving a memento of the meeting in the shape of an ugly-looking rusty knife.

This sort of thing, however, is becoming less frequent, in consequence of the increased police force; but there is another and a much greater evil, almost as bad as ever—that is, piracy. The whole coast, for several hundred miles north and south, is infested with pirates, and the peculiar formation of the land about Hong-Kong, (with its many bays, creeks, inlets, and rivers of every description,) affords them a rendezvous with the most perfect means of concealment. Many piratical craft carry on their depredations quite within sight of the colony; some vessels have even been plundered, and their crews massacred, upon its waters, with a large fleet of British gunboats lying uselessly almost within gunshot-range. Some of the wealthiest Chinese in Hong-Kong have been discovered to be in connection with the pirates, and even Europeans have been implicated.

About five years ago a large English brig was captured, and many of her crew murdered, in full sight of the signal-station at Victoria Peak. This case happened to come under my own observation.

The *North Star* sailed from Hong-Kong early one morning, bound for Japan, in ballast, but carrying some 12,000 dollars in specie. Her crew consisted of seventeen persons all told, including two passengers, to whom the treasure belonged. The wind being very light, the vessel made but little progress, and towards evening became nearly becalmed about seven miles from the anchorage. About this time the Chinese pilot left, and was observed to communicate with a native junk which had followed in the wake of the

brig all day, unfortunately without exciting the apprehension of those on board.

Soon after the pilot's departure, the Chinese steward brought the captain his revolver, and asked him if he wished it to be cleaned; unsuspectingly he discharged all the barrels and returned it to the steward. At this moment the junk—which had gradually been edging down, the light airs sensibly affecting her broad lateen sails, though the brig was almost stationary—having approached within fifty yards, suddenly became alive with men, although only two or three had previously been visible. Putting out large sweeps they commenced pulling rapidly towards the brig.

The captain of the *North Star* perceived the danger too late, and rushed to the cabin for a musket (four of which comprised the whole armament), calling upon the crew to arm themselves as best they could, and get the watch below on deck. The pirates crashed alongside, and instantly cast a shower of stink-pots on the deck of their prey, killing the man at the wheel, and severely burning two others of the crew. Fore and aft the pirates boarded in overwhelming numbers. The captain ran on deck with a musket, and with him, similarly armed, the two passengers and the second mate. At the same time the mate, in the fore part of the vessel, had snatched up a deck handspike, the carpenter an axe, and the rest of the crew whatever they could lay their hands on. The captain and his supporters levelled their pieces, and with care and coolness pulled the trigger, the caps snapped—but that was all. The steward, after so cunningly inducing the captain to empty his revolver, had filled the nipples of each musket; he was, of course, the accomplice of the pirates, and jumped on board their junk directly she touched the sides of the vessel he had betrayed.

In a moment the captain, second mate, and one of the passengers were cut down, shockingly wounded by the swords and spears with which the pirates were armed, while the remaining passenger jumped overboard. Meanwhile, overpowered by numbers, and without arms to defend themselves, the remainder of the crew, with the exception of two or three

who escaped, had been massacred. The mate, after desperately defending himself with his heavy handspike, and breaking the skulls of several assailants, received a fearful gash across the face, destroying both eyes. The carpenter buried his axe in the brain of one pirate, but, before he could recover himself, was cut down by another. In a similar way all the crew, except two men and a boy, were stretched dead or dying on the deck. The three who escaped and afterwards gave evidence, saved themselves by climbing up the forestay and hiding in the top. They were part of the watch below, and directly they emerged from the hatchway saw one of their shipmates lying half under the fore trysail (the halyards of which had been let go by the pirates while seeking ropes to make their junk fast alongside) weltering in his blood; this, and the horrid noise of the slaughter taking place abaft, warned them to seek safety aloft, while the trysail screened them from observation.

After getting the treasure on deck, and placing it on board their junk, the pirates plundered the *North Star* of everything of value, and then left her, sweeping themselves rapidly to seaward. When the junk was a long way off, the three survivors descended from their place of concealment, did all they could to alleviate the sufferings of the few yet alive on deck, and steered in for the harbour with a light breeze that had sprung up. After midnight the wind fell again; and, lowering a small boat, two of the three got into her, and pulled for the shipping. They reached my ship first; and, sending them on to the next vessel (H.M.S. *Impérieuse*) for a surgeon, we manned a cutter, and set off for the *North Star*. We soon reached the unfortunate bark, and then gazed upon a fearful scene of butchery. The mate and three of the crew were still living, but appeared too horribly mangled for any chance of recovery; the rest were all dead, some being literally hacked to pieces. The boats from the *Impérieuse* soon arrived, and we took the brig in tow. The surgeon pronounced every case but one hopeless. Out of the sixteen Europeans on board at starting, only five escaped; the four sailors, and the passenger who jumped overboard. The escape of the latter was something marvellous; while

in the water, the pirates threw three bamboo spears at him, which did not strike him, but even furnished a means of support. They then paid no further attention to him; so, swimming close under the stern of the brig, he remained there perfectly hidden for some time. Being a capital swimmer, he at length determined to push off and attempt to reach the shore, although fully seven or eight miles distant. He did so; and, after being in the water for nine hours, reached land, and was carried to Hong-Kong by fishermen.

During some months I made voyages on the north-east coast of China, from Hong-Kong to Swatow, Amoy, Foo-chow, and Shanghae. I mixed as much as possible with the natives at each place, and found all alike heartily disgusted with their present rulers. Much of the cruelty and duplicity generally attributed to the natural character of the Chinese is the consequence of the evil government of the Manchoo dynasty.

From infancy the people have become habituated to scenes of blood and torture, similar to those inflicted upon their ancestors during the last two centuries by the Tartar conquerors. Made callous and degraded by the ceaseless persecution of their authorities; unnaturally branded with the shaven-headed badge of slavery; their spirit broken and debased by a system of grinding tyranny; their lives and property at the mercy of the most merciless officials in existence, and of judges solely influenced by bribery; "cut into a thousand pieces," according to law, or otherwise cruelly tortured to death for any rebellion against their foreign Emperor's unrighteous sway; frequently decapitated upon bare suspicion, but always if related to a rebel—how can it be a matter of surprise if the Chinese seem imbued with cunning and deceit, the usual resource of the weak and sorely oppressed?

Since the colony of Hong-Kong was founded, the natives, through intercourse with foreigners, have become acquainted with the superior laws, governments, &c., of those they have been taught to consider "outer barbarians." This has tended to make them more dissatisfied with their own national constitution; can we, then, feel astonished at the exclusive policy of the Manchoo government? Why, seclusion is their salvation; too surely they

know that their power consists in the weakness, ignorance, superstition, and degradation of their Chinese slaves. The great Ti-ping revolution proves their fears are well founded, from the fact of its originating entirely from the contact of Christian civilization with China.

As for fishermen, pirates, and wreckers, the whole coast of China is as thick with them as the fabulous Straits of Bafflemen is with monkeys—where they say a ship's yards cannot be squared on account of them. Upon one occasion, while anchored in foggy weather off the island of Namoa, close to Swatow, I had a capital opportunity of noticing the remarkable keenness with which those light-fingered gentry are ever on the alert for plunder. Early in the morning, before daylight, while in charge of the deck, I suddenly heard a distant and wide-spread splashing of the water. At first I naturally supposed it to be a shoal of porpoises; but as the noise became more distinct, I fancied I could distinguish the regular sound of oars. Directly I became convinced of this, I made the gunner load a couple of guns, and turned all hands out. In a few minutes the fog cleared a little with the dawn of day, and I was able to discern an innumerable fleet of boats pulling and sailing rapidly towards the ship. I had scarcely discovered them when they suddenly ceased rowing, and rested on their oars, having, I fancy, perceived the smoke issuing from our funnel. Seeing their hesitation, we gave them a blank cartridge, and this, with the noise of our men at the capstan weighing anchor, frightened them off; for they immediately "topped their booms," and soon disappeared in the surrounding mist.

In the neighbourhood of Swatow the people are much excited against their government, and at one place—within twenty miles of that city—they have been in open rebellion for many years. The Viceroy of the province having several times had his troops defeated by them, found it much easier to make an arrangement by which they were to govern themselves, while nominally under the Manchoo *régime*; therefore, at the present day, the Goo-swah men, who inhabit a mountainous part of the sea-coast, live, to a certain extent, independent of the Manchoo rule.

While thinking of the north-east coast, I must not forget the capital shooting I have had at Foo-chow. Wild water-fowl are found at this port in vast quantity, in fact, in numbers such as I have never seen equalled in any part of Europe, Asia, Africa, or America, that I have visited. The whole river and surrounding country literally swarm with an infinite variety of wild swan, geese, duck, curlew, and water-fowl of every description. During six months of the year, sometimes more, this game is found in plenty, generally appearing about the commencement of October, and departing by the end of March. The best shooting-ground about Foo-chow was the false mouth of the river and the adjacent country. This became my favourite haunt, and comprised a broad sheet of shallow water full of mud and sand-banks; low land on each side, marshy and intersected by creeks and canals, with many bamboo or reed swamps, and here and there a few hills. I generally started from the ship, at the anchorage, about midnight, in a covered native boat, with two or three Chinamen to work her, my Chinese boy, and a Malay, as body-guard and general assistant in the work of slaughter upon the feathery tribe. Reaching my destination generally before daylight, I had ample time to make all preparations, amidst the quacking of ducks and the constant rushing sound of innumerable wings. At the earliest peep of dawn, or a little before, I got ashore upon the sand-bank to which the boat might be fastened, and almost always found myself within shot of immense flocks of wild fowl.

Sometimes I had the misfortune to land upon a bank of treacherous consistency, and upon such occasions became stuck fast in the mud; and Chinese mud is of a wonderful stickiness and tenacity, as those who have had experience of it can well testify. There is often considerable danger in such a fix, for every effort to extricate oneself simply tends to make a deeper immersion. The only sure plan is to use a plank on the surface of the mud; so that I always carried several with me for emergencies of such a muddy nature. For the first shot I usually had a long musket, loaded with grape cartridge, and a wire one; the effect of this amongst a closely packed flock, often within sixty yards, may be easily imagined. I frequently bagged five or

six brace of duck, or several geese, as a commencement. The swans and geese were generally off, after the first alarm; but I often had several shots, with the double-barrel which my Malay carried after me, amongst the ducks or teal. As for snipe and curlew, I have many a time seated myself in the centre of a sand-bank, and, with the Malay loading my guns as fast as he could, kept up an incessant fire upon them in flocks eddying round and round the shoal, but unwilling to leave it, until the rising tide compelled their flight, or my guns exterminated them. After this I would return to the boat for "Chow-chow," and when it was despatched, cross over to the mainland, probably getting a few brace of widgeon on the way. Early morning, or about twilight, I always found the best time for sport; during the day the birds are very wild. I have tried all sorts of dodges to get close. I have dressed as a Chinese field-labourer—umbrella hat, rush waterproof, and everything; but although such a Chinaman can be seen working within thirty yards of the birds, I could never get so close by a long way. The abundance of game about Foo-Chow is almost incredible. I have sometimes shot curlew in the dark, guided by the noise they made, and finding them by the cries of a wounded bird. I have shot wild swans so large, that when a Chinaman carried one with the head over his shoulder, its feet draggled on the ground; and very seldom returned to my ship without a boat literally loaded with spoil.

During shooting excursions and my frequent intercourse with the Chinese country people, I have nearly always found them exhibiting traits of character we give them little credit for; but only when they are completely by themselves, and none of the Manchoo troops, officials, or *employés* of any description are in the vicinity, have I found them particularly friendly to foreigners—very inquisitive, although not so outwardly, by reason of their great politeness and calm behaviour; hospitable and obliging. To qualify this, yet to render still more interesting the *natural* disposition of the people, it is easily perceived they have a sort of undefined dread of, and dislike to us, caused by the lying teaching and bitterly hostile reports circulated by the

entire body of Manchoo officials concerning the "foreign devils," which, for my part, I have always done my best to expose wherever I have wandered amongst the deeply interesting natives. But few Europeans are aware of the entire misrepresentations the Manchoo Government circulate about foreigners, much less of the monstrous atrocities attributed to them; and I dare say, if propriety allowed me to mention some I have been told by the Chinese, most people would disbelieve them, especially since the British Government has entered into *alliance* with the Manchoos.

I was eye-witness to a fearful specimen of the so-called "paternal" Government's displeasure at Foo-chow some years since. It appears the Viceroy of Fu-keen issued an edict to prevent the Cantonese ascending the river to trade, for some fault they had committed. Before, however, this edict could have become generally known, three Canton lorchas sailed up the river laden with merchandise. They were fired upon by the batteries about the mouth of the river, yet, regardless of this (for the Cantonese are a brave, obstinate race), they passed up and arrived within a short distance of the European shipping. At this point, about sixty of the Mandarin gunboats (row-galleys), without any warning or communication whatever, opened fire upon and pulled for the lorchas. Apparently, the first two allowed them to board unresistingly; and this no sooner took place than a savage slaughter of their helpless crews commenced. Some were cut down and brutally mutilated upon the decks, their heads being chopped off and their bodies thrown overboard; others jumped into the river, only to be there killed by the soldiers in the gunboats, who followed them wherever they swam, spearing them, and thrusting them under water. The crew of the third lorcha, seeing the terrible fate of their comrades, endeavoured to prevent the government troops from boarding, and made a gallant resistance. Their defence, however, though desperate, was unavailing. The gunboats surrounded them, and poured in showers of grape and canister; the lorcha had but three guns of small calibre to reply with, and soon lost so many men that those remaining could no longer beat the enemy off. At last, being boarded, some of her

defenders jumped overboard, and the rest, fighting and disputing inch by inch, were quickly dispatched. Some of the European shipping sent boats to try and rescue the poor wretches from the water, and, fortunately, managed to save a few. Thus, for breaking a proclamation of which, very probably, they were ignorant, these unfortunate men were all massacred, and the ships, with their cargo, confiscated to the Mandarins.

After some voyages upon the coast, my vessel was ordered to Whampoa, to be dry-docked and her bottom overhauled. Before entering the dock, and while lying at anchor on the river, I was one evening surprised to see a sampan (literally three planks, *i.e.* a little boat) containing two Chinese girls, and a third, neither Chinese nor European, hanging about the ship; its occupants evidently desirous to communicate something, yet half fearful to venture. The lady of the unknown nationality seemed endeavouring to attract my attention. I was alone on the quarter-deck, with the exception of an old weather-beaten quartermaster. I beckoned her to come alongside, and descended the gangway ladder. As I was going over the side, the old quartermaster came up to me and exclaimed—

"Keep your weather eye lifting, sir; she's a pi-ar Portuguee."

"Well," I replied; "what if she is?"

"Well, d'ye see, sir, them Portugees is awful wild craft. I've got a remembrancer here," touching his ribs; "one of 'em gave me in Rio, just because she thought I was backing and filling with a chum of hers."

"If a Rio girl fell in love with you, and you made her jealous, you old sinner, what has that to do with a Whampoa girl? Besides, we shall have no time for falling in love here."

"Ay! ay! you don't know 'em, sir; the breed's the same all over; and, as for time, why, they'll be in love with you afore you can say 'vast heaving there.'"

"You're out of your reckoning for once, quartermaster; call Mr. ——, if I am not on board by eight bells;" and with this I disappeared over the side.

Directly I jumped into the boat, it was shoved off, and dropped astern with the tide.

My attention was, of course, directed to the lady designated a "pi-ar Portuguee" by the quartermaster; I at once discovered that she was a Macao Portuguese, very handsome; and, to all appearance, in great affliction. For some time she made no reply to my inquiries as to what was the matter, but commenced sobbing, and crying as if her heart would break. At last she ceased, and related the cause of her trouble to the following effect:—She was the daughter of a rich Macanese, who was principal owner of one of the Whampoa docks, and was also Portuguese consul at that port. Her mother was dead, and her father had determined to compel her to marry a wealthy Chilianian half-caste; in fact, everything was arranged for the marriage to take place in ten days' time. She hated the fellow, in spite of his dollars, which, it appeared, was her father's idol, and was resolved to suffer anything rather than submit. She came off to my ship to try and obtain a passage down to Hong-Kong, where she had friends who would take care of her. Here was the deuce to pay, and no pitch hot, as the sailors say. In a moment, almost, I was to become the champion and protector of this forlorn damsels. However selfishly I tried to reflect, I could not help being sensibly impressed with her extreme beauty and utter wretchedness. The *piquante* style of her pretty broken English, as she implored me to give her a passage to Hong-Kong and save her; the knowledge of the cruel fate which awaited her—the entire confidence which she was only too willing to repose in me—her unprotected position and passionate, ingenuous, ebullition of feeling—all conspired to interest me deeply in her favour.

The longer I listened the more interested and determined to help her I became. She was very young, and it seemed irresistible to sympathize with and pity her. At last, in the midst of a protestation of assistance on my part, and of fervent thanks on hers, we were interrupted by one of the China girls thrusting her head under the mat cover of the boat, and exclaiming—

"Hi ya! missee! more bettah go shore—belong shih tim cheong" (ten o'clock).

The poor girl seemed quite alarmed to find it so late, and told the boatwomen to pull ashore as fast as possible.

We soon reached the bank, but my interesting friend would not allow me to land with her, stating she lived close by; however, she promised to meet me at the spot we then occupied, the next evening. The China girls quickly pulled me off to my ship, and then I was alone to think over the singularity and probable issue of the adventure.

Poor Marie! would that I had never met her—that she had accepted the Chilianian, or some prophetic spirit had whispered a warning in time to save her from her sad fate. However, it was ordained otherwise, and all that is left me is her memory. True to her promise, she saw me the following evening; then the next; and so for several consecutive days. It happened that, fortunately for the fulfilment of our appointments, Marie's father never returned from the docks, at the opposite side of the river, till late in the evening. We were thus constantly thrown together, and who can wonder that we insensibly allowed ourselves to become deeply attached?

Upon the ninth day after our first meeting, my ship was undocked, and prepared to sail for Hong-Kong in the morning; the morning, too, that, as Marie told me with tears in her eyes, would usher in her bridal day. Although Marie and I had never till then spoken of love, we both knew that it was mutual, and at this moment of peril and uncertainty we threw off all disguise and expressed our true feelings for each other. She felt no regret at sacrificing all other ties for my sake—I was but too anxious to risk anything to save her. On the evening of this, the last day that was to separate us, Marie entered her cruel father's dwelling for the last time; and, having quickly made some slight preparations, rejoined me in the boat with which I awaited her.

This boat was the same in which I had first seen her, and the poor girls who worked it being slaves of one of the old Whampoa laundresses, I

determined to rescue them from their doubtful future, and prevent them making any disclosure as to Marie's escape, by carrying them down to Hong-Kong with her, and there giving them liberty.

I had already made every preparation on board, and had taken the gunner and carpenter into my confidence, as I had decided to stow them away in the sail-room; and to do this rendered it necessary for them to pass the berths of those officers. About midnight, sending the quartermaster of the watch off the deck upon an errand to get him out of the way, I smuggled the girls aboard and secreted them at the back of the sail-room well hidden by spare topsails, &c., piled up before them.

Early in the morning we lighted fires, and soon after daybreak, with steam up, commenced to get under weigh. Just then, as I fully expected, off came Marie's father and the old laundress—the one to look for a daughter who vanished on her bridal morn, the other for her poor slave girls—with warrants from the British consul for the delivery of the three girls if found on board. I was in charge of the deck, and took care to receive the bereaved parties at the gangway. After hearing their complaints, I reported the case to the captain, and received his orders to have the ship searched. This duty I took upon myself, rousing all hands out, and searching every part of the ship except the sail-room, which I took care to allow no one to approach. By the time the unsuccessful search was concluded, the anchor had been weighed, and we immediately commenced to drop down the river.


When we reached Hong-Kong, Marie landed and went to reside with her friends. She had become my betrothed, and seemed truly happy in the thought that nothing now could cause our separation. Little either of us thought at that happy time how ruthlessly all these bright prospects would be altered, and what sadness was yet in store for us. Alas! how little at that happy time either thought how soon the ruthless destroyer would annihilate a bond we had sworn should last for ever.

Marie was very lovely. Rather darker than the generality of Macao women; her complexion was a beautifully clear deep olive; the skin

delicately soft, with the rich blood mantling through upon the slightest emotion; her eyes large, jet-black, lustrous, and almond-shaped, as those of the Spanish creoles of South America—eyes which can form a language of their own, so deeply expressive, so ever changeful, and heart-speaking—were exquisitely fringed with long silken lashes and arching brows; her hair, dark as the raven's wing, waved in rich profusion round her finely tapered shoulders; the Grecian nose and delicately formed nostrils spoke of her high caste; while a short full upper lip, so richly coloured, adorned a mouth small but singularly expressive, and studded with teeth of pearly whiteness. This young creature, nurtured in a southern clime, could scarcely number sixteen summers, and yet her *petite* figure, lithe and graceful as it was, had attained its full development. She was, in truth, an unsophisticated child of nature—ardent, passionate—the very creature of impulse.

In a small secluded dwelling, shaded by evergreen foliage, in one of the prettiest parts of Hong-Kong, every moment I could spare from my ship was devoted to Marie. We were supremely happy. We had no thought or care for the morrow, we were too fully absorbed in the present. The old quartermaster's warning proved his experience, although, with one exception, it was unnecessary in my case, yet the exception was sufficient.

To many of those warm impassioned temperaments of the East love becomes as necessary as life itself. Marie was one of these. Natures like hers could be moulded by love to any form. The house of Marie's relatives was one of two built together; but for this it would have been in total seclusion, the bend of the hills it rested on hiding all other buildings in the distance, and entirely screening it from observation. The next door and only neighbours consisted of two Portuguese sisters and an Englishman, the husband of the eldest.



MARIE.

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Inn Fields.

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The Portuguese being natives of Macao, were slightly acquainted with Marie, and we gradually became intimate with them. The youngest of the sisters was very good-looking, and being of a very merry disposition, we often had great fun. Now, it so happened that Marie's love was so intense, so selfish, and so exacting, she could not bear me to pay the slightest attention to another. So at last, to realize the old adage, that "true love never did run

smooth," she took it into her passionate little head to become jealous. This jealousy may be a very mild affair amongst our colder Northern women, but with a fiery little piece of impetuosity like Marie it was more serious. With such temperaments, jealousy instantly generates an all-consuming passion for revenge.

For a little while I had noticed Marie's more than usual excitability, accompanied by occasional bursts of grief, without any apparent cause; but, knowing her extreme sensitiveness, I thought but little of it. At last the cause was revealed, and this history nearly terminated in its revelation.

The house had a verandah in front, connecting it with that adjoining, from which it was simply divided by a wooden partition. One evening I and Theresa, the unmarried Portuguese, were conversing from the respective balconies. I fancied Marie had received me rather crossly that day, and to vex her thought I would have a little fun with her pretty neighbour. This thoughtlessness very nearly resulted in a tragical termination. After laughing and chatting with Theresa for some time, I went close up to the partition between the verandahs; and, leaning round it, pretended to kiss her. Instantly I heard Marie, with an exclamation, rush towards me. As I withdrew, I fortunately caught the shadow of an uplifted hand on my own side of the partition; and, while turning, I rapidly threw up my arm, just in time to arrest the descending blow, aimed by Marie with a stiletto. I received but a slight scratch, and soon took the weapon from my fierce little love, who instantly, with characteristic revulsion of feeling, threw herself into my arms in a passionate burst of grief. We were soon reconciled; this was Marie's first and last jealousy.



SING-SONG GIRL—page 10.

## CHAPTER II.

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Hung-sui-tshuen.—Clanship in China.—Hung-sui-tshuen's Genealogy: his Education.—Extraordinary Visions: Description of them.—Description of Hung-sui-tshuen: his Early Days: his Visions Explained: his Conversion: how Effected.—Hung-sui-tshuen's Preaching: his Religious Essays.—The God-worshippers.—Destruction of Idols.—Progress of God-worshippers.—Numbers increase.—Hostilities commence.—God-worshippers Victorious.—"Imperialist" Cruelty.—Bishop of Victoria.—Chinese Dynasty proclaimed.

Hung-sui-tshuen is a name now familiar in most parts of Europe as that of the chief—or King, as his followers term him—of the great Ti-ping revolution in China. Unfortunately much misapprehension exists as to him and his cause. Such information as I may give my readers, that has not come under my personal observation, has been derived from the actors themselves, especially all relating to the origin of the Ti-pings, their progress until I met them, and the description of their great leader—in fact, my knowledge of Hung-sui-tshuen has been obtained principally from his Prime Minister and cousin (Hung-jin), his chamberlain, and many of his chiefs and own clan. Since my return to England, I have had the pleasure to peruse, for the first time, the admirable little work of the late Rev. Theodore Hamberg, missionary of the Basle Evangelical Society to China—"The Visions of Hung-sui-tshuen, and Origin of the Kwang-si Insurrection." This, and the pamphlet entitled "Recent Events in China," by the Bishop of Victoria (published some nine or ten years ago), coincide in most particulars with the information I have gathered from direct sources; and, as all my journals, notes, and memoranda fell into the hands of the Imperialists

during my service with the Ti-pings, I have found them very useful in recalling facts I might otherwise have forgotten.

Hung-sui-tshuen was born in the year 1813, at a small village in the Hwa district,<sup>2</sup> some little distance from the city of Canton. His ancestors, originally from the north-east boundary of the Kwang-tung province, soon after the complete subjugation of the Chinese by the Manchoo Tartars, A.D. 1685, with many other families loyal to the Ming, through the persecution and exactions of the invader, abandoned their homes and sought refuge in the southern parts of Kwang-tung and Kwang-se, the two most southerly provinces of China. Here, to the present day, their descendants are known by the name of Hakkas (settlers) by the Punti people (natives of the soil).

The genealogy of Hung-sui-tshuen's family is one of the most ancient in China. During ten centuries, until the era of the present dynasty, they trace members of their house occupying the most exalted stations in the empire. So far back as the Sung dynasty, A.D. 1000, many of the Hungs were prominent literati; from that time till the Manchoo invasion, numbers of them have been members of the Han-lin College—the highest literary rank in China. For many generations the dignity of Minister of State was attained, and this was particularly the case throughout the sovereignty of Sung. During the Ming dynasty (the last Chinese one) likewise, the Hungs invariably numbered men of renown and literary attainments among them. They became allied to the Imperial family by marriage; and it was one of the Hungs who, as generalissimo of the Chinese forces, fought the last battle in defence of Nankin and the Ming prince. The prince was treacherously killed by some of his own followers, while the general perished with the greater number of his troops, being totally defeated by the Tartars, who thus destroyed the last attempt to keep them north of the river Yang-tze-kiang.

Like most countries, China has had her feudal period, the earliest and last authentic records of which refer to the ninth and tenth centuries. In this,

as in many important events, the Chinese have been before western nations, their feudal system having terminated anterior to the meridian of that of Europe. A system of clanship, however, prevails in many parts of China; all persons of the same surname, though frequently numbering tens of thousands, being considered near kindred; and, singularly enough, not being allowed to marry amongst themselves. I am inclined to believe this is much lessened at the present day, for I have generally found that members of a clan or kindred do not reverence any one head of the entire name, but one much more nearly related to themselves, and who is seldom elder, or chief, of more than some hundreds. Previous to the incursion of the Manchoos, Hung-sui-tshuen's kindred formed a vast and powerful body; their stanch support of the last struggles for the Ming dynasty, and the sanguinary persecutions they, in common with other obnoxious families, suffered from the invader, greatly reduced their number. Upon the outbreak of the Ti-ping revolution, the Hung clan was supposed to number upwards of 20,000 persons; subsequent to that event the greater part were massacred by the Imperialists, simply because they were the connections of a rebel! Of Hung's immediate relatives, who, to the number of five or six hundred, peopled his native village under the authority of his father, not one remains; men, women, and children, all who were unable to join him, were mercilessly slaughtered by the ruthless Manchoo, and their very dwellings swept from the face of the earth.

Now, although the honourable and ancient lineage of Hung-sui-tshuen has never been disputed, some persons, with a mendacity truly astonishing, have amused themselves by designating him the "Coolie King." Not only was Hung of good family—a secondary consideration in China, where personal rank is everything<sup>3</sup>—but his own position, as a member of the literati, was one of the most honourable. These are qualifications, it is probable, the persons who styled him "Coolie King" do not possess.

For many generations Hung's progenitors had been the chiefs or elders of their clan. His father fulfilled this capacity, and governed the affairs of his own and many surrounding villages. In spite of Hung's line of ancestry and his father's eldership, they were far from being well supplied with the good things of this life; in fact, their freehold was barely sufficient to support them. The family mansion was by no means suitable to the former dignity of the name. An ordinary Chinese farmer's cottage, containing nothing but the simplest articles of use, was the birthplace of one of the greatest men the empire has ever produced. At the earliest age, Hung exhibited a remarkable aptitude for study, became an inmate of the village school at seven years of age, and in less than twice that time had become proficient in the usual course of Chinese education; besides which, he studied by himself the history of China, and the higher branches of Chinese literature. Even at this early period, he was universally distinguished for his extraordinary talents, which were so highly appreciated by his teachers and relatives, that they united in defraying the expense of his further education. At sixteen years of age the want of means put an end to his studies; within a year, however, a young fellow-student took him as a companion. After this, when eighteen years of age, he was appointed schoolmaster of his native village, by the unanimous wish of the people.

About this time Hung commenced to attend the public examinations at Canton. These examinations confer upon successful candidates one of four literary degrees, commencing with a district examination, leading to a departmental one, to a provincial one, and finally to a Pekin examination, from which members of the Han-lin college are selected.

Although Hung-sui-tshuen was always one of the most distinguished at the district examinations, through the corruption of the Manchoo officials, to whom bribery alone is a passport, he was unable to obtain his degree. At last, upon another visit to the public examinations, about the year 1836, an event took place that ultimately, in no slight manner, affected his future

career. This I cannot do better than give in the words of the Rev. T. Hamberg:—

"In the streets he found a man dressed according to the custom of the Ming dynasty, in a coat with wide sleeves, and his hair tied in a knot upon his head. The man was unacquainted with the Chinese vernacular tongue, and employed a native as interpreter. A number of people kept gathering round the stranger, who used to tell them the fulfilment of their wishes, even without waiting for a question from their side. Sui-tshuen approached the man, intending to ask if he should attain a literary degree, but the man prevented him by saying, 'You will attain the highest rank, but do not be grieved, for grief will make you sick. I congratulate your virtuous father.' On the following day he again met with two men in the Siung-tsang street. One of these men had in his possession a parcel of books consisting of nine small volumes, being a complete set of a work, entitled, 'Keuen-shi-leang-yen,' or 'Good Words for Exhorting the Age,' the whole of which he gave Hung-sui-tshuen, who, on his return from the examination, brought them home, and after a superficial glance at their contents, placed them in his bookcase, *without at the time considering them to be of any particular importance.*"

Once more, in the year 1837, Hung-sui-tshuen attended the examinations. Upon this occasion, after being placed high on the list, his rank was afterwards lowered. This, with the gross injustice and partiality of the examiners, so affected him, that he returned home very ill. His illness lasted for a considerable time, during which he underwent a marvellous series of visions or dreams.

In the account of Hung's visions and earlier life, it will be necessary to quote frequently from Mr. Hamberg's little work, he having received in detail many important facts I only had in substance from Hung-jin. I feel the more confident of the indulgence of my readers from the fact of the interesting nature of all I shall quote, and, moreover, the absolute necessity

of doing so in order to enable them to form a correct judgment of the noble character and almost superhuman career of the Tiping-wang.

It must be remembered that in a country like China, where literary distinction, until Manchoo corruption altered it, was the recognized path to honour and fame, everything tended to excite the hopes and ambition of Hung-sui-tshuen, who was more than usually intellectual, and whose failure to attain eminence, through the degenerated policy of the Manchoo dynasty, who no longer observe the rights of the literati in their selection of public officers, must have been accompanied with a degree of mortification and bitterness never experienced by Europeans, who have a variety of paths to distinction.

The visions of Hung-sui-tshuen, as related by Hung-jin, are thus published in Mr. Hamberg's account:—

"He first saw a great number of people, bidding him welcome to their number, and thought this dream was to signify that he should soon die, and go into the presence of Yen lo-wang, the Chinese king of Hades. He therefore called his parents and other relatives to assemble at his bedside, and addressed them in the following terms:—'My days are counted, and my life will soon be closed. O my parents! how badly have I returned the favour of your love to me! I shall never attain a name that may reflect its lustre upon you.' After this he lost all strength and command over his body, and all present thought him about to die—his outward senses were inactive, and his body appeared as dead, lying upon the bed; but his soul was acted upon by a peculiar energy, so that he not only experienced things of a very extraordinary nature, but afterwards also retained in memory what had occurred to him. At first, when his eyes were closed, he saw a dragon, a tiger, and a cock entering his room, and soon after, he observed a great number

of men, playing upon musical instruments, approaching with a beautiful sedan-chair, in which they invited him to be seated, and then carried him away. Sui-tshuen felt greatly astonished at the honour and distinction bestowed upon him, and knew not what to think thereof. They soon arrived at a beautiful and luminous place, where on both sides were assembled a multitude of fine men and women, who saluted him with expressions of joy. As he left the sedan, an old woman took him down to a river, and said, 'Thou dirty man, why hast thou kept company with yonder people and defiled thyself? I must now wash thee clean.' After the washing was performed, Sui-tshuen, in company with a great number of virtuous and venerable old men, among whom he remarked many of the ancient sages, entered a large building, where they opened his body with a knife, took out his heart and other parts, and put in their place others, new and of a red colour. Instantly when this was done, the wound closed, and he could see no trace of the incision which had been made.

"Upon the walls surrounding this place, Sui-tshuen remarked a number of tablets with inscriptions exhorting to virtue, which he one by one examined. Afterwards, they entered another large hall, the beauty and splendour of which was beyond description. A man, venerable in years, with golden beard, and dressed in a black robe, was sitting in an imposing attitude upon the highest place. As soon as he observed Sui-tshuen, he began to shed tears, and said, 'All human beings in the whole world are produced and sustained by me; they eat my food and wear my clothing, but not a single one among them has a heart to remember and venerate me; what is, however, still worse than that, they take of my gifts and therewith worship demons;

they purposely rebel against me, and arouse my anger. Do thou not imitate them.' Thereupon he gave Sui-tshuen a sword, commanding him to exterminate the demons, but to spare his brothers and sisters; a seal, by which he would overcome the evil spirits; and also a yellow fruit, to eat which Sui-tshuen found sweet to the taste. When he had received the ensigns of royalty from the hand of the old man, he instantly commenced to exhort those collected in the hall to return to their duties to the venerable old man upon the high seat. Some replied to him, saying, 'We have indeed forgotten our duties towards the venerable.' Others said, 'Why should we venerate him? let us only be merry, and drink together with our friends.' Sui-tshuen then, because of the hardness of their hearts, continued his admonitions with tears. The old man said to him, 'Take courage, and do the work; I will assist thee in every difficulty.' Shortly after this, he turned to the assemblage of the old and virtuous, saying, 'Sui-tshuen is competent to this charge.' And thereupon he led Sui-tshuen out, told him to look down from above, and said, 'Behold the people upon this earth! hundredfold is the perverseness of their hearts.' Sui-tshuen looked, and saw such a degree of depravity and vice, that his eyes could not endure the sight, nor his mouth express their deeds. He then awoke from his trance, but still being under its influence, he felt the very hairs of his head raise themselves, and suddenly seized by a violent anger, forgetting his feebleness, put on his clothes, left his bedroom, went into the presence of his father, and making a low bow, said, 'The venerable old man above has commanded that all men shall turn to me, and all treasures shall flow to me.' The sickness of Sui-tshuen continued about forty days, and in vision he often

met with a man of middle age, whom he called his elder brother, who instructed him how to act, accompanied him upon his wanderings to the uttermost regions in search of evil spirits, and assisted him in slaying and exterminating them. Sui-tshuen also heard the venerable old man with the black robe reprove Confucius for having omitted in his books clearly to expound the true doctrine. Confucius seemed much ashamed, and confessed his guilt.

"Sui-tshuen, while sick, as his mind was wandering, often used to run about his room, leaping and fighting like a soldier engaged in battle. His constant cry was, 'Tsan-jau, tsan-jau, tsan-ah, tsan-ah! Slay the demons, slay the demons!—slay, slay; there is one, and there is another. Many, many cannot withstand one single blow of my sword.'

"His father invited magicians, by their spells, to drive away the evil spirits he thought possessed his son; but Sui-tshuen said, 'How could these imps dare to oppose me? I must slay them, I must slay them! Many, many cannot resist me!' As in his imagination he pursued the demons, they seemed to undergo various changes and transformations, at one time flying as birds, at another time appearing as lions. Lest he should be unable to overcome them he held out his seal against them, at the sight of which they immediately fled away.

"During his exhortations he often burst into tears, saying, 'You have no hearts to venerate the old father, but you are on good terms with the impish fiends; indeed, indeed, you have no hearts—no conscience more.' He often said that he was duly appointed Emperor of China, and was highly gratified when

any one called him by that name; but if any one called him mad, he used to laugh at him, and to reply, 'You are, indeed, mad yourself; and do you call me mad?' When men of bad character came to see him, he often rebuked them and called them demons. All the day long he used to sing, weep, exhort, reprove by turns, and in full earnest."

The following is the description of Hung-sui-tshuen, given by his cousin Hung-jin, upon his return to health:—

"Sui-tshuen's whole person became gradually changed, both in character and appearance. He was careful in his conduct, friendly and open in his demeanour; his body increased in height and size; his pace became firm and imposing, his views enlarged and liberal. His friend describes him as being, at a later period, a rather tall man, with oval face and fair complexion, high nose, small round ears, his voice clear and sonorous. When he laughed, the whole house resounded; his hair was black, his beard long and sandy, his strength of body extraordinary, his power of understanding rare. Persons of vicious habits fled from his presence, but the honest sought his company.

"From his youth, Hung-sui-tshuen was generally liked by all, because of his open and straightforward character. He was gay and friendly, but not dissolute. Being superior in talent to most of his fellow-students, he often used to make sport of them, and cause them to feel his sharp wit; but still, his friends were fond of listening to his remarks, as they generally contained true and noble ideas, and acknowledged his superior intellect. After his sickness, his whole person became changed, his manners noble

and dignified. He sat erect upon the chair, his hands placed upon his knees, and both his feet resting a little apart, but never crossed upon the ground, without leaning backwards or to either side; and, though sitting for hours, he never appeared fatigued. He did not look aslant or backwards; his pace in walking was dignified, neither quick nor slow; he now spoke less and laughed seldom. After he had begun to worship, he was very strict in regard to his own conduct. In his words he was often severe, and easily offended others. He liked to sit down and talk with honest and sincere men, though they were ever so poor and of low estate; but he could not bear with the profligate, even if they were ever so rich and high in station."

The visions of Hung-sui-tshuen, marvellous as they were, and deeply significant upon many important points, could never have led to any earthly result but through the medium of some earthly key. This came at last, and the whole train of circumstances admit of no other interpretation than the will of a divine, inscrutable Providence. It is doubtful whether any one impressed with a sense of the awfully mysterious power of an Almighty Creator can dispute the cause of Hung-sui-tshuen's visions, conversion, and ultimate career; or that they rival many of the miracles of old which have been handed down to us, dimmed by the obscurity of time, and rendered difficult of comprehension by the subtleties of language as well as by the figurative style of the ancients.

For several years Hung-sui-tshuen continued his studies and acted as village schoolmaster. On one occasion, while engaged as teacher at a village some ten miles distant from his native place, a cousin, Le, while searching his bookcase, chanced to come across the small volumes, "Good Words for Exhorting the Age." Le inquired the nature of the works, but Sui-tshuen was unacquainted with the contents and lent them to him to read. It is stated by the Rev. T. Hamberg:—"These books contain a good number of whole

chapters of the Bible according to the translation of Dr. Morison, many essays upon important subjects from single texts, and sundry miscellaneous statements founded on Scripture."

Le read the books and returned them, stating their contents were very extraordinary, and differed entirely from Chinese books. Sui-tshuen then took the books and commenced reading them closely and carefully. He was greatly astonished to find in these books what he considered an explanation of his own visions of six years before, and that their contents corresponded in a singular manner with all he had experienced at that time. He now understood the venerable old one who sat upon the highest place, and whom all men ought to worship, to be God the Heavenly Father; and the man of middle age, who had instructed him and assisted him in exterminating the demons, to be Jesus the Saviour of the world. The demons were the idols, his brothers and sisters were the men in the world. Sui-tshuen felt as if awaking from a long dream. He rejoiced in reality to have found a way to heaven, and a sure hope of everlasting life and happiness. Learning from the books the necessity of being baptized, Sui-tshuen and Le now, according to the manner described in the books, and as far as they understood the rite, administered baptism to each other. They prayed to God, and promised not to worship evil spirits, not to practise evil things, but to keep the heavenly commands; then they poured water upon their heads, saying, "Purification from all former sins, putting off the old, and regeneration." When this was done they felt their hearts overflowing with joy, and Sui-tshuen composed the following ode upon repentance:—

"When our transgressions high as heaven rise,  
How well to trust in Jesus' full atonement;  
We follow not the demons, we obey  
The holy precepts, worshipping alone  
One God, and thus we cultivate our hearts.  
The heavenly glories open to our view,

And every being ought to seek thereafter.  
I much deplore the miseries of hell.  
O turn ye to the fruits of true repentance!  
Let not your hearts be led by worldly customs."

They thereupon cast away their idols and removed the tablet of Confucius, which is generally found in the schools, and worshipped by the teacher as well as the pupils.

In a little while Hung-sui-tshuen returned to his native village. He soon converted to the religion his cousin Hung-jin, and an intimate friend, Fung-yun-san, also a teacher.

While at home, Sui-tshuen and his friends attentively studied the books, which Sui-tshuen found to correspond in a striking manner with his former visions—a remarkable coincidence, which convinced him fully as to their truth, and that he was appointed by Divine authority to restore the world—that is, China—to the worship of the true God.

I must particularly recommend to the notice of my readers the sound reasoning and wisdom of Hung-sui-tshuen's own explanation, and the high and exalted determination his subsequent acts have so nobly fulfilled.

"These books," said he, "are certainly sent purposely by Heaven to me, to confirm the truth of my former experiences. If I had received the books without having gone through the sickness, I should not have dared to believe in them, or have ventured, on my own account, to oppose the customs of the whole world; if I had merely been sick, but had not also received the books, I should have had no further evidence as to the truth of my visions, which might also have been considered as merely productions of a diseased imagination."

Then he raised his voice and spoke in a bold manner:—

"I have received the immediate command from God in His presence: the will of Heaven rests with me. Although thereby I should meet with calamity, difficulties, and suffering, yet I am resolved to act. By disobeying

the heavenly command, I would only rouse the anger of God; and are not these books the foundation of all true doctrines contained in other books?"

Under this conviction, Sui-tshuen, when preaching the new doctrine to others, made use of his own visions and the books, as reciprocally evidencing the truth of each other. He revered the books highly, and if any one wished to read them, he urgently told them not to alter or mark them in any manner, because, said he, it is written therein, "Jehovah's word is correct" (Ps. xxxiii. 4).

The small volumes, "Good Words for Exhorting the Age," that have exercised such a wonderful effect upon a great proportion of the Chinese, through the individual acts of Hung-sui-tshuen, were the production of Liang Afah, one of Dr. Milne's Chinese converts. Consequently it may be argued that contact with Europeans has been instrumental in producing the great Ti-ping revolution, and that to Dr. Milne and his convert, Liang Afah, may be attributed the honour of being agents in converting Hung-sui-tshuen and in originating the first Christian movement in modern Asia.

Although, through the foreign idiom, want of commentaries, and use of pronouns (unintelligible through the absence of the relative), Hung-sui-tshuen, as well as his earlier converts, misunderstood some parts of Liang Afah's volumes, still it is indisputable that the grand truths of Christianity were fully and completely appreciated by them. As the Bishop of Victoria has written:—"Stung with a sense of injustice, and feeling the full weight of disappointment, he found his knowledge of Confucian lore no longer the road to office and distinction. It was at such a critical season of the future hero's career that the truths of the Holy Scriptures were presented to his notice, and the pure doctrines of Christianity arrested his mind."

Hung-sui-tshuen, after some time, again returned to his teachership in the other village, leaving Hung-jin to expound and study the new doctrine. Sui-tshuen's own relatives were soon converted from idolatry and received baptism.

With his few followers he now experienced the usual worldly effects of devout opposition to the sinful and idolatrous practices of neighbours. Hung and his friends lost their scholastic employment and became very poor. Unable longer to maintain themselves at home, they determined to visit other districts and preach the true doctrine, hoping to support themselves by the sale of a few articles they carried with them for the purpose.

Hung, Fung-yun-san, and two other friends left their native villages and started upon a proselytizing mission to the independent tribes of Miau-tze. Passing through the village of Hung's relatives, the Le family, they converted and baptized several of them. Afterwards Hung-jin was engaged as teacher at this place (Clear-far), and in course of time baptized upwards of fifty persons.

Sui-tshuen and his friends continued their journey, everywhere preaching the new doctrine, teaching men to worship the one God, Jehovah, who sent his Son to atone for the sins of the world; and in every place they found some willing to accept their words. Into the wild and mountainous regions of the Miau-tze, Hung and Fung-yun-san journeyed alone, their friends having left them. They were fortunate enough to meet with a teacher who kept a school for Chinese instruction to the aborigines. Being ignorant of the Miau-tze dialect, after converting the schoolmaster and leaving a few tracts with him, they continued their journey to a part of Kwang-si where Hung had relatives.

Hung at last reached the village of his cousin Wang, and at this place preached with such devout eloquence as not only to convert hundreds to Christianity, but to cause many to believe that he and Yun-san were descended from heaven to preach the true doctrine.

To relieve his cousin from the support of so many guests, two converts of the Hung family having likewise arrived, he ordered Yun-san and the others to return to Kwang-tung. Fung-yun-san, however, was moved to continue teaching the Gospel; therefore, although the two returned, he

remained preaching by the roadside. Meeting with some workmen he knew, he journeyed with them to a place named Thistle Mount, where, assisting them in their work, he at the same time taught them the way to immortal life.

Some of the workmen, convinced by Yun-san's preaching, went to their employer and informed him. The master engaged Yun-san as teacher of his school, and was himself soon baptized. Yun-san remained in the neighbourhood of Thistle Mount several years, and preached with great zeal and success; so that a large number of persons, whole families of various surnames and clans, were baptized. They formed congregations among themselves, gathering together for religious worship, and became soon extensively known under the name of "the congregation of the worshippers of God." In the meanwhile Hung-sui-tshuen returned home, and greatly displeased Fung-yun-san's relations by having returned without him. During 1845–46 Hung remained at home, employed as village teacher. He wrote many essays, discourses, and odes upon religious subjects, all of which were afterwards improved and printed in the "Imperial Declaration of Ti-ping," at Nankin.

Hung-sui-tshuen unceasingly continued his preaching of Christianity, baptizing many people who had learned to believe in God and our Saviour. He often met Hung-jin, still a teacher at the village Clear-far, once expressing his hatred of the tyrant Manchoo thus:—

"God has divided the kingdoms of the world, and made the ocean to be a boundary for them, just as a father divides his states among his sons; every one of whom ought to reverence the will of his father, and quietly manage his own property. Why should now these Manchoos forcibly enter China, and rob their brothers of their estate?"

Again, at a later period he said:—

"If God will help me to recover our estate, I ought to teach all nations to hold every one its own possessions, without injuring or robbing one

another; we will have intercourse in communicating true principles and wisdom to each other, and receive each other with propriety and politeness; we will serve together one common heavenly Father, and honour together the doctrines of one common heavenly Brother, the Saviour of the world; this has been the wish of my heart since the time when my soul was taken up to heaven."

It is a pity the monarchs of Europe and their statesmen possess not the sentiments of the "Coolie King."

In the latter part of the year 1846, a Chinaman named Moo arrived at Hung's village from Canton. He informed him missionaries were preaching the true doctrine in that city. Sui-tshuen and his cousin Hung-jin were unable to visit the city, being engaged by their schools. Moo, upon his return to Canton, mentioned to a Chinese assistant of Mr. Roberts (missionary) the existence of the God-worshippers. This assistant having written and invited Hung and his cousin to Canton, in 1847 they visited that city, and studied Christianity under Mr. Roberts and other missionaries. Upon the expiration of one month they returned to their village with two converts; they all preached here a short time, and then went back to Canton, Hung-jin remaining at home. For some time Hung-sui-tshuen continued his studies in Canton; but at last, through the intrigues of some of Mr. Roberts' assistants, who became jealous of his superior talent, he left that city, and started upon a tour to Kwang-si, in search of his friend Fung-yun-san.

After a journey of much suffering, by reason of his poverty, Sui-tshuen at last reached the abode of his cousin Wang. He soon heard of Yun-san's earnest and successful career at "Thistle Mount;" and, rejoicing, joined him, preaching the Gospel and teaching everywhere.

These primitive Christians soon numbered two thousand, and were increasing day by day. Rapidly the surrounding country came under the influence of the new doctrine. "Men of great influence, and graduates of the

first and second degrees, with great numbers of their clans, joined the congregation."

Hung-sui-tshuen, upon his arrival, immediately replaced their former books with copies of the Bible he had brought from Canton; reserving only such parts as were of the New Testament.

Ere long commenced the iconoclastic impulse that has since proved one of the greatest characteristics of the Ti-ping revolution. In the department of Siang, Kwang-se, an idol named "Kan-wang-ye" had long been celebrated, the natives far and near believing in its power. Hung-sui-tshuen becoming acquainted with their grossly superstitious and ignorant veneration for this idol, was greatly enraged, and with three friends, including Fung-yun-san, started for the temple. Reaching the place, they found the idol of a dreadful and imposing aspect; nothing daunted, Sui-tshuen with a stick dashed the idol to pieces, destroying its fine raiment and the vessels of spices and incense.

When the people became aware of this desecration of their idol, they set about apprehending the perpetrators. A young boy becoming, as they thought, possessed by the demon, told them not to molest the destroyers. The people therefore desisted, and this event greatly advanced the reputation of Hung-sui-tshuen, soon leading to an important addition to his followers.

The iconoclastic zeal thus introduced was quickly followed up by the destruction of many images. Upon this the officials, for the first time, came into contact with them, and Fung-yun-san and another were imprisoned, mainly through the malignancy of a rich graduate named Wang, who bribed the magistrate for that purpose. Eventually, the God-worshippers induced the same official to release their friends, but only Fung-yun-san was restored to them; the other had expired in prison, through the brutal treatment of his Manchoo jailers.

About this time—the latter part of 1848—Hung-sui-tshuen's father died, at the age of seventy-three. He had long given over the errors of idolatry, and had received Christian baptism. Upon his death-bed he admonished his children, saying:—"I am now ascending to heaven: after my decease, you must not call any Buddhist priests, or perform any heathen ceremonies, but merely worship God, and pray to him."

At the end of 1848, Hung-sui-tshuen and his friend Fung-yun-san left the congregation of God-worshippers at Thistle Mount, and returned to their homes.

About the middle of 1849 they again set out for their friends in Kwang-si. At the end of this year, during his absence, the first son of Hung-sui-tshuen was born; at the instant of his birth the following singular circumstance took place:—"Thousands of birds, as large as ravens and as small as magpies, made their appearance. They continued long hovering about in the air, and finally settled in the trees behind the dwelling of Sui-tshuen. These birds remained in the neighbourhood of the village about one month, to the astonishment of the people, who said that the crowd of birds came to do homage to the new-born king."

Upon their arrival, Hung-sui-tshuen and Yun-san were joyfully received by the God-worshippers. They now heard of singular occurrences having taken place among the brethren during their absence. It appeared that, often while engaged in prayer, one or other of them was seized by a sort of fit, and falling to the ground in a state of ecstasy, was moved by the spirit, and uttered extraordinary words of exhortation, reproof, or prophecy. The more remarkable of these rhapsodies were noted down, and reserved for the inspection of Hung-sui-tshuen. Those he principally pronounced as true were uttered by one Yang-sui-tshin, who afterwards became one of the principal Ti-ping chiefs. This same Yang was said to possess the power of healing sickness by intercession for the afflicted, many having been cured in a wonderful manner, after prayer to God.

Hung-sui-tshuen compelled his followers to observe strict order, and although Fung-yun-san was the original chief and founder of the congregation, they all, with one accord, acknowledged the superiority of the former; electing him as their leader, as well for his personal merit as his extraordinary ability to command and organize a strict discipline among so heterogeneous a multitude as themselves.

At this time, Hung prohibited the use of opium, and even tobacco, and all intoxicating drinks, and the Sabbath was religiously observed. About the same period he sent to Kwang-tung for his whole family, giving as his reason, that a pestilence would shortly visit the earth, and carry off the unbelievers. Singularly enough, some parts of Kwang-si were visited by a malignant distemper, whereby the number of his adherents was greatly increased, many believing they escaped disease merely by joining the God-worshippers.

About the end of the year 1850, a civil war broke out between the Punti men and the Hakkas. Although at first the Hakkas were victorious, being a more hardy and adventurous people than the Puntis, the superior numbers of the latter soon prevailed, who, not contented with defeating the enemy, followed up the victory by even destroying their habitations. In dire distress, the Hakkas sought a refuge among the God-worshippers, willingly adopting their religion.

So great a celebrity had the God-worshippers attained in Kwang-si, that not only the Hakkas came to them, but many outlaws, who refused allegiance to the Manchoo; and all persons in distress, or in any way afflicted, together with their families.

With a far-seeing discernment, Hung-sui-tshuen had long expected the course of events that at last resulted from the presence of so many various elements, for the most part obnoxious to the Government. His plans were arranged, his resolution fixed, and he only awaited a favourable opportunity

to act. The following ode, which he composed about this time, affords an index of his intentions:—

"When in the present time disturbances abound,  
And bands of robbers are like gathering vapours found,  
We know that heaven means to raise a valiant band  
To rescue the oppressed and save our native land.  
China was once subdued, but it shall no more fall.  
God ought to be adored, and ultimately shall.  
The founder of the Ming in song disclosed his mind,  
The Emperor of the Han drank to the furious wind.  
From olden times all deeds by energy were done,  
Dark vapours disappear on rising of the sun."

This ode is highly significant to the Chinese. Hung alludes to the many bands of robbers rising like the vapours on the mountain tops; he expresses his intention to allow them to fight and fatigue each other, when he would easily become their master—such being the plan expressed by the founder of the Ming dynasty in his song—comparing himself to the aster, a flower that only begins to blossom when others have passed away; and, after they have ceased to contend, remains undisputed master of the field.

The defeat of the Hakkas ere long realized Sui-tshuen's predictions. The God-worshippers gradually became involved in the quarrels of their new allies, and at last were not only accused of annoying the worship of others, and destroying their idols, but also of helping the outlaws and fostering rebellious intentions against the usurping dynasty. Sui-tshuen and Yun-san at this period left "Thistle Mount," and retired to the privacy of a friend's house situated in a mountainous recess. The Manchoo soldiers were sent against them here; but, afraid to enter the glen, contented themselves with blockading the pass, sure of the ultimate capture of the inmates. "At this critical moment it is reported that Yang-sui-tshin, in a state of ecstasy,

revealed to the brethren of Thistle Mount the impending danger of their beloved chiefs, and exhorted them to hasten to their rescue." A considerable body marched against the soldiers who watched the pass, routed them with ease, and Sui-tshuen and Yun-san were carried off in triumph.

Hung-sui-tshuen now concentrated all his followers, who had already converted their goods into money, and formed a common treasury. They were thus prepared, if necessary, for the emergency of flight. Fear for the safety of themselves and families quickly brought the entire congregation of the God-worshippers together. "Old and young, rich and poor, men of influence and education, graduates of the first and second degrees, with their families and adherents, all gathered round the chiefs. Wei-ching alone brought with him about one thousand individuals of his clan."

Previously to this, the God-worshippers had suffered much persecution from the local authorities, many being imprisoned and killed by want and ill-treatment. Soon the jealous fears of the Manchoo officials led them to send troops against a native movement which they knew full well they had good cause to dread by reason of their own tyrannical rule.

Hostilities having once commenced, a bold and energetic course became imperative. A strong body of soldiers being on the march for their present position, Hung-sui-tshuen prepared to receive them. Abandoning Thistle Mount, he took possession of the market-town Lieu-chu, close at hand. This small city was surrounded by a broad river, protecting it from sudden attack, which Sui-tshuen soon fortified so strongly that, when the soldiers arrived, it was impregnable. From this place Sui-tshuen sent messengers into Kwang-tung, calling upon the remaining relatives of the two clans, Hung and Fung, to join him in Kwang-si. Before they could do this, Sui-tshuen, from want of provisions, was compelled to move his camp. This he effected in a fine strategic manner. To deceive the Imperialists as to his real intentions, he placed a number of women and boys belonging to the town in a house close to the river, and in the direction of the besiegers' camp,

ordering them to beat the drums throughout the following day; while he, with his entire force, evacuated the place at night without giving the foe the slightest suspicion of his movement.

The Imperialists, as soon as they discovered the trick that had been played upon them, detached light troops in pursuit; but these, venturing too closely upon the rear of the retreating forces, were repulsed with severe loss. The Imperialists now, according to their usual habits, commenced to vent their cowardly rage upon the unoffending inhabitants by burning several thousand houses, and plundering indiscriminately.

They slaughtered numbers of the townspeople upon the slightest suspicion that they were God-worshippers, or even friendly disposed towards them.

"Many of these unhappy victims evinced great self-possession, and resignation to their fate. One named Tsen said to the soldiers, 'Why do you delay? If you are to kill me, then do so—I fear not to die.' He, with many others, refused to kneel down, and received the death-blow in an upright posture. These cruelties greatly incensed the populace; and many, who otherwise would have remained quietly at home, desirous to worship God without taking part in the insurrection, were thus forced to leave their abodes and join the army of Hung-sui-tshuen."

After evacuating the town of Lieu-chu, Hung took up his new position at a large village, Thai-tsун, and at this place received very considerable additions to his force. Two *female* rebel chiefs of great valour, named respectively Kew-urh and Szu-san, each bringing about two thousand followers, here joined him, submitting to his authority and adopting the religious opinions of his people. About this time eight chiefs of the San-hoh-hwui, or Triad Society—a confederation of many years' standing, sworn to expel the Manchoos and free China of their hateful presence—entered into negotiations with Hung-sui-tshuen to join his army, which he agreed to upon condition that they would conform to the worship of the true

God. He sent teachers to them, and when they were sufficiently instructed, permitted them to join him.

Unfortunately, it now happened that out of sixteen teachers, one of the number was found guilty of peculation, by having withheld from the public treasury his share of the presents they had received from the Triad chiefs for their instruction. Having often before been convicted of violating their regulations, this last offence was no sooner proved against him than Sui-tshuen and his own relatives condemned and punished him, according to the full rigour of their law, by decapitation. When the chiefs of the Triads found that one who had just been their teacher was capitally punished for so slight a transgression, they became uncomfortable, and said:—"Your laws seem to be rather too strict; we shall, perhaps, find it difficult to keep them; and upon any small transgression you would, perhaps, kill us also."

Upon which, seven of them departed with their men, and afterwards surrendering to the Imperialists, turned their arms against the God-worshippers. One chief—Lo-thai-kang—preferred remaining with the latter.

The varied elements of his followers—the simple God-worshipper, the discontented Hakka, with Triads, outlaws, and other known opponents to the Manchoo rule—were all destined, by Hung-sui-tshuen's comprehensive mind, soon to establish for themselves an important political existence. The Bishop of Victoria wrote:—

"The literary talent, the moral greatness, the administrative ability, the mental energy, the commanding superiority of the latter soon won for him the post of leader and director of the movement; and Hung-sui-tshuen became, by universal consent and the harmonious deference of Teen-tih (Fung-yun-san) himself, the chief of the insurgent body. He found in the tumultuous bands, who, inflamed by civil discontent, had been engaged in hostilities with the provincial rulers, the nucleus and the body around which the persecuted *Christians* gathered

as a place of refuge and safety. He transformed a rebellion of civil malcontents into a great rendezvous and rallying-point for his oppressed co-religionists. He rendered the insurrection a great religious movement—*he did not transmute a Christian fraternity into a political rebellion. The course of events, and the momentous interests of life and death—the dread realities of the rack and torture, imprisonment, and death—drove him to use in self-defence all the available means within reach, and to employ the resources of self-preservation.* He joined the rebel camp, preached the Gospel among them, won them over to his views, placed himself at their head, and made political power the means of religious propagandism.

"The adoption of the Imperial style, at so early a period as 1850, shows the grand projects and the vast designs which speedily unfolded themselves to the view of the new leader. Nothing but an expulsion of the hated Man-chow tyrants, the subversion of the idolatrous system, and the incorporation of the whole nation into one empire of 'universal peace,' as the servants of the one true God, and the believers in the one true Saviour Jesus Christ, with Taeping-wang himself, the political head and religious chief of the whole—could henceforth satisfy minds inflamed by enthusiasm and animated by past success."

Before the close of the year 1851 the standard of a national revolt was raised, and a Chinese dynasty proclaimed. Hung-sui-tshuen again moved his camp, marching upon and capturing the city of Yung-ngan. He was here elected Emperor by the enthusiastic acclamation of his followers. It is said Sui-tshuen offered the supreme dignity to each of the four chiefs, Fung-yun-san, Yang-sui-tshin, Siau-chau-kwui, and Wai-ching (the last, a powerful leader of some thousands of his own clan); and that, only after their refusal

and unanimous election of himself, he accepted power, appointing them princes of the four quarters; the position in which they afterwards became known to Europeans. From this period the style God-worshippers became relinquished in favour of the title of the new dynasty, Ti-ping-tien-kwoh.

## FOOTNOTES:

2. See Map of China.

3. The Chinese place little value upon hereditary rank; but, in lieu thereof, have the extraordinary custom of ennobling a meritorious or successful person's ancestry, though the honours are not inherited by his descendants.

## CHAPTER III.

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The Manchoo Party.—The Ti-ping Party.—The Ti-ping Character.—Conflict with Manchoos.—Chinese Gunboats.—First Ti-ping Position.—Its Appearance.—Ti-ping Hospitality.—Ti-ping Country described.—Effects of Intervention.—San-le-jow.—Ti-pings Superior to Imperialists.—Ti-pings and Chinamen.—Ti-ping Costume.—The Honan Ti-pings.—The "Chinese Paris."—Interview with Chung-wang: his Appearance: his Religious Feelings: his Penetration: his Policy.—Commission from Chung-wang.—San-li-jow.—A Ti-ping Army.—Its Friendly Bearing.—Arrival at Shanghae.

About the beginning of the year 1860 the rapid success of the Ti-ping revolution excited considerable attention. From the unfavourable impressions I entertained with regard to the Manchoo Imperialists, I felt very desirous to become acquainted with their adversaries, whose professed intention was not only to subvert the tyrannical foreign dynasty, but to overthrow national idolatry and establish Christianity throughout China. I therefore determined to relinquish my profession for a more unfettered life on shore, which would afford me an opportunity of seeing something of the Ti-pings—a resolution which gathered strength from the fact that Marie and her relatives were about to leave Hong-Kong and take up their abode at Shanghae.

I had long observed that although the majority of people condemned the revolution, they were infinitely less worthy of credence than those who supported it.

The anti-Ti-ping and pro-Manchoo party comprised:—All persons who were in any way connected with the iniquitous opium traffic; all British placemen and officials who represented Lord Elgin's politics or Chinese treaties; all foreign mercenaries, whether interested in the Chinese customs or army; all Roman Catholics, but especially Jesuits and French; all

missionaries who felt jealous of the Ti-ping Christianity, because they could not arrogate to themselves a *direct* credit for its propagation; and, lastly, all merchants and traders, who, trusting to make a fortune in a few years, and, being philosophers of the "After me the Deluge" school, cared not at all for the future of China, or the vast question of its regeneration and Christianity, because the execution of those glorious reforms might interfere with their traffic.

The friends of the Ti-pings comprised:—Many humble, devout missionaries, who rejoiced at the result of their *indirect* contact with the Chinese; many large-minded, large-hearted men, who admired the cause of a people and the welfare of an oppressed nation more than the favourable articles of the Elgin treaty; all persons who deprecated Europeans becoming the hired mercenaries of the most corrupt Asiatic despotism in existence; and all merchants not addicted to opium-smuggling, but satisfied with more honourable and righteous branches of commerce.

I thus found that interested persons were adverse to the revolution, while those who were favourable to it were disinterested. This is no psychological phenomenon. The explanation is very easy. It was simply a question of selfishness and dollars *versus* philanthropy and liberality. I must confess that, until I became personally acquainted with the Ti-pings, the reports of their maligners (preposterous and exaggerated as they were) made me very suspicious of the people they abused, although I had already begun to sympathize with them.

Before resigning my appointment, I obtained a berth as chief mate in a small steamer which was under the command of an old brother officer of mine, who had lately quitted the same service. I consequently embarked and proceeded with Marie and her friends to Shanghae. The little steamer I joined was employed upon the inland waters of the Shanghae district, trading to the Ti-ping territory for silk, so that my wishes for a meeting were soon to be gratified. The owners of the steamer were Chinese, though nominally

British, in order to obtain a register, and so we had things very much our own way on board.

The evening before we were to start for the interior, a boat-load of cargo came alongside—at least, what I imagined to be such. To my utter amazement, when I mentioned its arrival to the skipper, I found out that the cargo was no other than boxes of specie.

"What!" I exclaimed, "carry treasure amongst the rebels?"

"Why, of course we do; what in the world should prevent us?" said the skipper.

"Well," I replied, "it is singular for any one to send boxes of dollars right into the hands of people they term 'hordes of banditti,' 'bloodthirsty marauders,' 'desolators,' &c."

"My dear fellow, that's all bosh: don't you see if outsiders are made to believe the Ti-pings to be so bad, they will not trust themselves, or their money, amongst them; so those who know better are able to monopolize the silk trade."

"What! are all those reports about the Ti-pings false, then?" I asked.

"To be sure they are, or how do you suppose any silk could be obtained?"

This reply satisfied me completely. If the Ti-pings were "desolators," it was certain no silk could be left, or produced, while, if they were "marauders" and "brigands," it was equally certain no one dare carry large sums of money into their territory to trade. I was not a little pleased with this conclusion; before long I had ample proof of the total injustice and gross falsehood of nearly every charge brought against the revolutionists.

I received on board about 40,000 taels (over £13,000 sterling) during the evening, with a Chinaman to negotiate for the purchase of the silk when we should arrive in the silk country.

Early in the morning we got under weigh, and proceeded on our voyage, past Shanghae and up the Wong-poo river. We no sooner got clear of the shipping and crowd of junks anchored above the city, than I received orders to have all our armament put in order and ready for immediate use. For so

small a vessel she was very well armed with a 9 lb. pivot gun on each broadside, a swivel 4 lb. in the bow, and another right aft. Our crew consisted of eight European seamen, myself, captain, second mate, and engineer; besides four Chinese firemen, a Chinese engineer, a cook, and our European steward; we also carried a member of our European firm as supercargo.

The Wong-poo river for some fifty miles preserves an average breadth of about 250 yards, after which it rapidly decreases, and loses itself in a series of interminable lagoons. The whole country in this direction (due S.W. of Shanghae) is flat and alluvial, everywhere intersected by creeks and canals, and mostly in a high state of cultivation.

The tide being strong against us, we did not reach the last imperialist city, Soong-Kong, about twenty miles from Shanghae in a direct line, till mid-day. Soon after leaving port, the Manchoo troops commenced their annoyance. Every station we passed the gunboats would come off and attempt to stop us, their crews shouting and yelling like fiends, sometimes even firing blank cartridge to arrest our passage. One squadron, bolder than the rest, after we had passed Soong-Kong and were approaching the limits of Imperialism, thought fit to send us a dose of iron, and although we took the previous saluting very quietly, this was rather too striking an example of their favour to pass without return. I therefore brought one of our 9-pounders to bear, and gave them its warning message just over their heads, not wishing to hurt them unless compelled, especially as all their shot passed wide of us, excepting one that cut a funnel stay. Not satisfied with this, the whole squadron—some seven or eight—put off from the bank and pulled after us, each opening fire with its bow gun. Our captain called all hands to their stations, those not employed at the guns being armed with Sharp's rifles; and, suddenly changing our course, we put right about, gave a cheer, and steamed at the Mandarin boats full speed. Directly this was done, and the Imperialists saw so many Europeans, and heard our terrific yell, they thought no more of "loot," or seizing us; but round they went, turned tail,

and pulled off as desperately as they could, while those astern dashed to the bank and tumbled ashore one over the other in dire confusion and alarm, leaving their boats to take care of themselves or become the prize of the "foreign devils."

To give them a lesson, we contented ourselves by taking all their flags; and, setting the boats adrift on the stream, proceeded on our course.

These Chinese gunboats, when well manned, form very effective mosquito flotillas. They are about fifty feet long and seven broad, are manned by about twenty-five men, and pull from ten to twenty oars a-side. They are usually armed with a gun (from 4 to 24-pounder) mounted upon a platform in the bow, and another in the stern. They are very shallow, sit light upon the water, and pull very fast; they are also furnished with the usual bamboo sails, but only go well before the wind. These war-boats are almost innumerable, being found in large numbers all through the rivers and inland waters of China; and since the British arsenals have been thrown open to the Manchoo government, they have become formidable from the guns they have been supplied with, and the instruction their crews have received from English artillerists in using them.

When we came to the narrow part of the river, we were exposed to continual insult and annoyance from the Chinese on the banks, who, not content with assailing us with every opprobrious epithet in their vocabulary —the least being "Yang quitzo" (foreign devils), frequently pelted us with mud and stones. Soldiers, gun-boat *braves*, and villagers seemed striving to emulate each other in illustrating their hatred of the foreigners who, having allied themselves to the Manchoo government, had only just succeeded in driving the Ti-pings away and re-establishing the rule of the Tartars; placing our miserable assailants in possession of territory they could never have reconquered themselves—and this is how they displayed their *gratitude*!

The British and French had but lately made war upon the Ti-pings, having driven them from Shanghae and its neighbourhood, therefore the

least we might have expected was common civility from our allies; they, however, seemed to think otherwise, by treating us as enemies.

Towards dusk we approached the last Imperialist station, between which and the first Ti-ping outpost stretched a neutral ground of a few miles. As we could not reach the Ti-ping territory before dark, it was necessary to anchor for the night; but this we dare not attempt while in the Imperialist jurisdiction. Since the reinstatement of the Imperialists, piracy had become incessant, so much so, that a silk boat could scarcely ever make a trip without being attacked, many having been plundered and the Europeans in charge murdered. The whole country swarmed with robbers, and the river with pirates; the first being the Imperialist soldiery, and the latter mostly Imperialist gunboats. In consequence of this, we determined to reach the neutral ground, the commencement of which was a small and shallow lake, where we could lay comparatively safe from enemies, whereas, if we remained on the river, we should be at the mercy of any who might attack us from its banks, here scarcely sixty yards apart.

Amidst the curses and yells of the last outlying picket of Imperialists we shot into the lake, and anchored in its centre to wait for daylight. The night passed over without any particular excitement, though the watch on deck had frequently to warn off with a shot or two some boats hovering about. Getting under weigh in the morning, we soon came to the first Ti-ping position—a few houses with a palisade round them, and a gingall battery held by a small detachment of troops. I was much struck by the pleasant style in which they communicated with us. In place of making an offensive demonstration of force, and conducting their inquiries with the gross and insulting arrogance of the Imperialists, they simply put off a small boat, from which one officer boarded us, who behaved in a strikingly friendly and courteous manner while pursuing his investigations. When satisfied as to our intentions, he gave us a pass to proceed, and took his departure, leaving me with a very favourable impression of my first interview with a real, live Ti-ping.

After passing several small villages, in all of which the inhabitants were busily at work gathering in their crops, and apparently much better off than the Imperialist peasantry on the other side of the lake, we came to the extensive village of Loo-chee, some sixty miles from Shanghae by the river. At this place there seemed a large and varied trade. Silk boats, country boats, and Shanghae boats, were moored off the village in great numbers, all filled with merchandise, for which there seemed a good and ready market. The crowds of people about were all well dressed, the shops were fully stocked, and in every way the village seemed in a most flourishing condition. One singular circumstance which I noticed was the total absence of mendicants; though an ordinary Chinese market village of the same extent and prosperity would have swarmed with them, here not one was to be seen. Outside the village, the fields were alive with labourers gathering in the rich and heavy crops, it being harvest time; while far as the eye could reach stretched plains covered with the ripe grain, glistening and golden in the morning sun. In vain I gazed around for some trace of the "desolaters." If I looked to the village, I saw nothing but crowds of well-to-do, busy, complacent-looking Chinamen, and great piles of merchandise just landed from the boats; if I looked to the country, I perceived nothing but the richness and beauty of nature; yet this was a part of Ti-pingdom, and all the people I saw were Tipings or subject to them. At last, a little outside the village, I noticed a heap of bricks, such as the Chinese build their houses with; going up to it, I found the track of the "desolaters" after all; for this proved to be the remains of an immense joss-house they had destroyed—not a stone was left standing upon another; in their iconoclastic zeal they had literally crushed the Buddhist temple into the dust, for I could not find one whole brick amongst the *débris*, although it covered more than an acre of ground. Here and there, amongst the tall, rank grass, peeped out the mutilated remnants of the former divinities of the temple. I began to think this "desolating" and "murdering" à la Ti-ping not quite so bad as some parties had represented.

We remained at Loo-chee a few hours, while our supercargo and interpreter made inquiries about the silk. I observed but few Ti-ping soldiers in the village; the six or seven who rowed an officer off to us constituted quite half the garrison. They were all attached to the Loo-chee custom-house, and the officer who boarded us was *le chef de la douane*. While strolling through the village I was astonished by the very friendly and unrestrained manners of the people; I was seized upon and carried into many houses to partake of tea and Chinese wine, the Ti-pings actually struggling with each other to get me into their respective dwellings. The kindly behaviour of the soldiers was the more remarkable from the totally opposite conduct of the Imperialist *braves*, whose feeling towards us we had so lately experienced. Yet the Imperialists were our allies, and we were assisting them against the Ti-pings. It was even possible that friends or relatives of these Ti-ping soldiers had been killed by the British and French before Shanghae; still, anomalous and incredible as it must seem, our friends, the Imperialists, treated us as though we were enemies, and our enemies, the Ti-pings, treated us as friends.

At last, amid the hearty *adieux* of the natives, we steamed away from Loo-chee for another village, some twelve miles farther inland, where we expected to find silk.

Some three years later I visited Loo-chee again. A letter which I wrote upon the occasion appeared in the *Friend of China*, a Shanghae newspaper, and in the month of October, 1863, was reproduced, accompanied by the following observations:—

"At this juncture, when Gordon declares the Taepings to be incapable of government (he never had an opportunity of judging, or knowing anything about them, except how they could fight), it is not out of place to reproduce the writing of the only respectable foreigner we know in the Taiping fighting service—a service of which, in so far as intercourse with the Taiping goes, he has had several years' experience."

The letter referred to was as follows:—

"The general appearance of the country lately wrested from the Ti-pings by the British, and again given up to Imperial rule, cannot be passed without a feeling of pity for its sad alteration. Throughout the whole extent of this country, Europeans are now exposed to insult, the natives being as constrained and repulsive as is usual in Mandarin localities. Indeed, they are a vagabond and scanty lot, many large villages now exhibiting hardly one person to each house. The crops alone are in a flourishing condition—reared by Ti-pings for the Imperial commissariat—a rich harvest indeed.

"Custom-houses, or rather squeeze-houses, are springing up in every direction, and the poor Chinese trader is in a perfect whirlwind of mystification as to whom he ought to pay and whom not. The baneful effect of all this is very visible. There is an indescribable gloom and stagnation over the land, and everything on it. Even the birds appear less happy, for they do not chirp as of old. Of trade—there is none. The extensive village of Loo-chee, about sixty miles from Shanghae by water, is the last Imperialist station in this direction. When I was last here, some two and a half years ago, all was joyous as a marriage feast. It was a place of much trade and importance; now the only things to be remarked are a few piratical war-boats, with their usual villainous-looking crews, under the Imperial flag. Where formerly exuberant life and happiness were found, all now is wretchedness. Between Loo-chee and the nearest Ti-ping station comes a neutral ground of some ten miles in extent. This is almost a desert, and well it may be, when the Imperialists scour over it. At last we reached the first Ti-ping outpost. What a contrast! Now, indeed, all is smiling happiness. In place of insult we meet kind looks and salutations of welcome. Even the children run along the banks with cries of delight. Poor little things, they know not but that they may soon be homeless, bereft, perhaps, of parents, or even life itself."

When the above letter was written, the Imperialists, with the assistance of foreigners, had only lately succeeded in recapturing the village of Loo-chee; shortly afterwards I again passed the place, and the only change to be

observed was a new Buddhist temple in course of erection upon the ruins of the old. A striking example of the effect of British intervention: the Ti-pings destroy the heathen temples and establish the Holy Scriptures on their sites, but the Manchoos build them up again, and exterminate the worshippers of the True God.

So great a confidence had my friend, the Captain, in the Ti-pings, that directly we came to their territory he told me I might discharge and clean all our arms, and put them away until we re-entered the Imperialist lines.

Before arriving at our destination, we passed many villages, all thriving and apparently doing considerable trade; one especially attracted my attention—it was a very large walled village, named San-zar, and seemed to be the centre of an immense commerce. This place was fortified and well garrisoned. We stopped there and took in a supply of provisions, which were very cheap. I particularly remember San-zar, because I found in it the best sponge cake I ever tasted in China. The village was very extensive, containing upwards of five thousand houses; the shops were numerous, and at the time I first visited it every article of Chinese consumption was to be found in abundance. I passed through it lately—upon my return to England—and found everything sadly changed; the Imperialists were close at hand, and the inhabitants had fled away; the shops were closed, excepting here and there where some trader, more venturesome or avaricious than his fellows, seemed determined to drive his business till the last; the streets were silent and trafficless; in some parts the depopulation was so complete as to strongly remind me of Goldsmith's "Deserted Village."

Shortly after leaving San-zar, we arrived at San-le-jow, the termination of our voyage, a fortified position, three Chinese miles (one English) from the city of Pim-bong. San-le-jow is situated within the silk district, into which we should have proceeded further, but the creek was spanned by a bridge too small for our vessel to pass. We were therefore compelled to remain at anchor, and send boats in for the silk. All the specie was placed in them, comparatively unprotected, only the supercargo and two of our crew

going in charge of it; and yet it was taken into the very heart of Ti-pingdom in perfect safety.

We remained about three weeks at San-le-jow, while our supercargo was absent purchasing silk; and during this time I determined to see as much of Ti-pingdom and the Ti-pings as possible. I constantly visited the neighbouring villages to endeavour to ascertain what feeling the country people entertained for the Ti-ping rule. I was pleased to find them in every instance completely happy and contented; and was particularly struck by the gratified manner in which they would attract my notice to their long hair—the emblem of the Ti-ping and freedom, as opposed to the Manchoo and the shaven-headed, tail-wearing badge of slavery they inflict upon the Chinese. During my rambles I took my servant, A-ling, with me, and, as he was a capital interpreter, I was enabled to fully investigate all I cared for or found interesting.

As San-le-jow was only about twenty miles distant from the important provincial capital, Soo-chow, I engaged a boat, took A-ling with me, and, reaching the city, spent seven or eight days there very pleasantly.

I have visited many parts of Asia, but never in my life, not even amongst people of my own race, have I met with the kindness, hospitality, and earnest friendship I experienced from the Ti-pings. I shall never forget the deep impression I received at the moment I first met them: it was instantaneous, I required no further knowledge or explanation; I felt a mysterious sympathy in their favour, and, from that day to this, my frequent intercourse with them has only strengthened and cemented my first opinions.

The testimony of persons who have themselves seen the Ti-pings is unanimous as to their striking superiority over the Imperialists. Not only is their personal appearance infinitely more pleasing, but their entire character, physically and morally, exhibits the same wonderful superiority.

All Europe has for many years considered the Chinese the most absurd and unnatural people in the world; their shaven head, tail, oblique eyes, grotesque costume, and the deformed feet of their women, have long


furnished subjects for the most ludicrous attempts of caricaturists; while the atmosphere of seclusion, superstition, and arrogance, with which they delight to surround themselves, has always excited the ridicule and contempt of Europeans. Now, among the Ti-pings, these things, with the exception of the physiognomy, have all disappeared, and even their features seem improved—probably through their mental and bodily relief from thraldom.

One of the most remarkable contrasts between the Ti-pings and their enslaved countrymen, the Imperialists, and the first to attract the observation of foreigners, is their complete difference of appearance and costume. The Chinese are known as a comparatively stupid-looking, badly-dressed race; the disfigurement of the shaved head not a little causing this. One presents a type of the whole—a dull, apathetic countenance, without expression or intelligence, except what resembles the half-cunning, half-fearful manner of slaves; their energies seem bound, their hopes and spirits crushed by wrong and oppression. The Ti-pings, on the other hand, immediately impress an observer by their intelligence, continual inquisitiveness, and thirst for knowledge. It is, indeed, utterly impossible, judging from their different intellectual capacities, to come to the conclusion that they are both natives of the same country—a difference more marked cannot be conceived. The Ti-pings are a clever, candid, and martial people, rendered peculiarly attractive by the indescribable air of freedom which they possess. Where you would see the servile Tartar-subdued Chinamen continually cringing, the Ti-pings exhibit, even in the face of death, nothing but the erect, stately carriage of free men.

It is a singular fact that the handsomest men and women in China are to be seen in the Ti-ping array. This may possibly be partly the result of their difference of dress and of wearing the hair, but the main cause is undoubtedly the ennobling effect of their religion and freedom. The dress consists of very broad petticoat trousers, mostly of black silk, bound round the waist with a long sash, which also contains their sword and pistols; a short jacket, generally red, reaching just to the waist and fitting tight to the

body, forms their upper garment. But it is the style in which they wear their hair that forms their principal ornament: they allow it to grow without cutting, it is then plaited into a queue at the back of the head, into which is worked a tail of red silk cord, and it is always worn wound round the head in the form of a turban, the end, a large tassel, hanging down on the left shoulder. Their shoes are of varied colour, with flowers and embroidery worked all over them (the boots of Imperialists are quite different, being not only slightly of another shape, but always plain).

During my subsequent intercourse with the Ti-pings I found the above costume the summer one of the soldiers; the body-guards of the different chiefs wear their own particular colours, the edges of the jacket being always embroidered and braided with a different one, forming a regular uniform. In the cold weather they mostly wear fur-jackets, or other warm garments. The colours of their clothing vary much, in some cases the jacket being black silk and the trousers white, and in others blue, black, white, red, or yellow, according to their different corps. Yellow is the colour of only the highest chiefs, or of their king. The chiefs all wear long outside dresses, reaching to nearly the feet, of either blue, red, or yellow silk, according to their rank. On the head they wear a silk scarf, or hood, with a jewel fastened to the front as the badge of their position. In hot weather one and all wear large straw hats very prettily embroidered, the crown quite small, and the brim about a foot broad, which gives them a very gay and singular appearance. The great chiefs, who are titled Wang (generalissimos, or governors of districts), have a much more costly and elaborate dress. Upon all occasions of importance they wear their state robes and coronets, and the appearance they present when so arrayed is really magnificent. Being almost invariably men of a very energetic and expressive mien, when attired in their long robes, covered with ancient Chinese designs, fabulous animals, or fancy patterns, all worked in gold, silver, and jewels, with their jewelled coronets, and with their gold embroidered shoes, it would be utterly impossible to imagine a more splendid or effective costume.



A TI-PING ARMY GOING INTO ACTION.  
DAY & SON, LIMITED, LITH.

Many of the Ti-pings come from the province of Honan, and the Chinese say the natives of that part are the handsomest in China. The truth of this I fully believe, for having made it a particular point of inquiry to ascertain the native place of every Ti-ping I have met of more than ordinary appearance, I have invariably found the best-featured were either Honan men or came from the hilly parts of the Kiang-si province. Honan forms a central portion of China, and has long been remarkable for producing some of the best soldiers; but it is especially its *braves*, who man great numbers of the Mandarin gunboats which are used all through the inland waters, that are celebrated for their courage. The Honan people are easily distinguished by the lightness of their complexion; the shape of their nose, which is high and

well-formed like the European; the largeness, and little approximation to the oblique, of their eyes; and their superior stature. In a few cases I have met men not inferior to any race in the world for beauty, while it would be difficult to imagine a more picturesque bearing than they present with their dark massive hair wound around their heads by scarlet silken fillets, so as to form a shade for their expressive eyes and animated countenances. Some of these youthful Honan Ti-pings are as well featured and handsome as an Andalusian beauty, their black eyes and long lashes, olive complexion, and beardless faces rendering the resemblance more striking.

Upon my arrival at Soo-chow I received the kindest reception, and obtained an audience of several of the principal chiefs in the city. But little trace of the former magnificence of the "Chinese Paris" remained; its present possessors had only captured the city a few months, and the sad traces of civil war were everywhere around. The Imperialist troops had themselves burned and devastated the once rich suburbs, and the Ti-pings, in their usual manner upon the capture of a city, had destroyed all public and private buildings of the Manchoo construction, or any that tended to remind them of the hateful Tartar occupation. New suburbs, however, were springing up in every direction, and a considerable trade likewise, all commerce being carried on outside the walls. Within the city itself, the destruction had been extensive, and numberless workmen were employed erecting handsome new dwellings, those for the principal chiefs being of the best description. No trade was permitted within the walls, a very necessary precaution in China, for otherwise the place would be instantly filled by numbers of the enemy disguised as traders, &c. In this the Ti-pings have only acted as every other dynasty during its commencement, all (the present Manchoo included) having pursued the same policy. Many persons ignorant of this, after visiting Ti-ping cities, have reported that the inhabitants never return to them from fear of the new rulers; but we must remember the late war in America and the occupation of Atlanta by the Federal troops, who *compelled* the inhabitants to leave the city; it will then be seen that the military occupation

of fortified towns by the Ti-pings is much about the same as it is with people of our own race. Outside the ramparts a crowd of soldiers and labourers were hard at work throwing up fortifications, while, inside, others were converting the remaining streets into extensive barracks.

I found the chief in command was the Chung-wang, Le, who for the last few years had held the supreme position of Commander-in-Chief of all the Ti-ping forces. He very kindly granted me an audience, and made me live in his palace while I remained at Soo-chow, although he had only lately been driven from Shanghae, and hundreds of his men killed (rather say murdered, for they were slaughtered without the slightest justification) by the British.

I had long felt a desire to behold the celebrated leader of the Ti-ping forces, who, until the intervention of England, had been invincible, and now my wish was gratified. I no sooner found myself before the Chung-wang than I respected him—he appeared so unmistakably a master spirit, with the innate nobleness of presence of one born to command and govern.

For a chief of so exalted and powerful a position, and who, moreover, had received ample provocation to treat Englishmen as his deadliest enemies, Chung-wang received me with remarkable condescension and kindness. Whereas the meanest official understrapper of the Manchoo government would with the most insulting hauteur receive any foreigner (unless under coercion, as when the treaties have been arranged), and consider himself degraded by any contact, the Chung-wang, generalissimo of some four or five hundred thousand men, second personage in the Ti-ping government (being only inferior to the Tien-wang, the king), and Viceroy of the whole territory (at that period more than twice the size of England, and containing more than 70,000,000 inhabitants), advanced from his vice-regal chair, and shaking me by the hand in English style, made me be seated close to himself. He seemed about thirty-five years of age, though the trace of arduous mental and physical exertion gave him a rather worn and older appearance. His figure light, active, and wiry, was particularly well formed, though scarcely of the Chinese middle height; his bearing erect and

dignified, his walk rapid but stately. His features were very strongly marked, expressive, and good, though not handsome according to the Chinese idea, being slightly of a more European cast than they admire; the nose straighter than usual among Chinese; the mouth small, almost delicate, and with the general shape of the jaw and sharply chiselled lips, expressive of great courage and determination. His complexion dark; but it was his brow and eyes that at once told the observer he beheld a great and remarkable man. It was not alone his singularly high and expansive forehead, but the eyebrows and eyes, which, instead of being placed obliquely, as is the usual characteristic of the Chinese, were quite dissimilar: the eyes were nearly straight, the only Chinese part being the shape of the eyelids; and the brows, placed high above them, were almost even, the inner, in place of the outer, ends being slightly elevated. This peculiarity I have never seen so prominent in any other Chinaman; I have seen a few natives of Honan approach to it a little, but it gave the Chung-wang an un-Chinese look.

His large eyes flashed incessantly, while the lids were always twitching. From his very energetic features, and the ceaseless nervous movement of his body (some part being continually on the move and restless, either the legs crossing or uncrossing, the feet patting the ground, or the hands clasping, unclasping, or fidgeting about, and all by sudden starts), no one would imagine he could possess such perfect coolness in battle; yet I have often since observed him in action, when, in spite of his apparent excitability, his self-possession was imperturbable, and his voice—always low and soft, with a musical flow of language, slightly affected by a wound he received from a piece of a British shell before Shanghae, in the month of August, 1860—unchanged, save being more rapid and decisive in moments of the greatest danger. When I obtained my first interview with the Chung-wang, I found him rather plainly dressed. Instead of the long robes and large coronets, constituting the state dress of all the superior chiefs, he was simply attired in an ordinary scarlet quilted jacket. On his head he wore a scarlet hood, of the usual shape, surmounted by a kind of undress coronet peculiar to himself,

consisting of a large and valuable jewel in the front, with eight curious gold medallions, four in a row on each side.



CHUNG WANG'S HEAD-DRESS.

While in Soo-chow I became one of the congregation of Ti-pings during their performance of divine service on Sunday. The Sabbath is observed not upon the same day as in Europe, theirs being the Saturday of our reckoning. My interpreter was with me, and translated every part of their service. Their numbers, and apparent devotion, could not have been objected to by the most orthodox Christian.

I shall ever remember with feelings of the liveliest pleasure the first few days I spent with the Ti-pings at Soo-chow. I could not move through its

streets without experiencing the excessive friendliness of these warm-hearted converts to Christianity and civilization, thousands of whom were afterwards destroyed by a nation whose religion and civilized institutions they were earnestly striving to imitate.

Nor can I ever forget the eager manner with which, the moment I was seated in his house, my entertainer for the time being would give a copy of the Bible to my servant—waiting impatiently with the book in his hands till the etiquette of presenting me some tea had been observed—asking if it was the same as mine; and his satisfaction, when, after hearing parts of it translated, I assured him that it was.

The conversation I had with the Chung-wang naturally touched upon his late repulse from Shanghae by the British and French. He seemed to feel that event very deeply, and deplore the suicidal policy of those he had always striven to make his friends. The points of his communication were:—Why had the English and French broken faith with him? the English particularly, whose solemn written guarantees of neutrality the Ti-ping government held. The Ti-pings and the English worshipped the same God and the same Saviour, and were consequently of one religion and brotherhood, why, then, did they assist the common enemy, the Manchoo imps—the idol-worshippers and enemies of our Heavenly Father and Jesus the heavenly elder brother? By what right or law did the English soldiers take charge of the native city of Shanghae, preventing him, their friend, from capturing it, and defend it for the very Manchoos with whom at the time they were themselves at war?

Neither shall I ever forget the noble, enlightened, and patriotic designs, which absorbed them:—to propagate the Bible, to destroy idols, to expel the Tartars from China, and establish one complete and undivided native empire; to become brothers with the Christian nations of the West, and introduce European sciences and manufactures—seemed always their principal wish and determination.

He continually inquired: "Why are the English inimical to us? Have we ever done them the slightest harm? Have we not always acted with good faith and friendship?"

"Cannot your foreign nations see," he said, "that the imps of Hien-fung (the Manchoo Emperor of China), knowing you are of the same religion and family as ourselves, are plotting to establish a connection with you in order to produce trouble, misunderstanding, and separation between us? To do this they will tell many lies, pretend to be very friendly, and for the time let you do much trade to fool you."

This observation of the Chung-wang's is a good proof of his penetration and judgment; he only forgot to notice the fact that the Manchoo government had been compelled to pretend friendship, to allow increased trade, &c., by the British occupation of Pekin, in the first place; he was, however, undoubtedly right as to their after intrigue.

Another very important remark the Chung-wang made, was—"If you take Shanghae and a few *le* round it into your protection, how will you be able, in such a limited space, to dispose of your merchandise, or carry on any traffic with the interior, if I, in retaliation, choose to prevent you?"

When I told him any such policy on his part would probably lead to a war with the English, he replied:—

"Never! unless you reckon upon my forbearance; I have all the silk and many tea districts in my possession, and I can stop all your trade in a moment if I am so inclined. If I beat you, in event of hostilities, I shall then make you reasonable and cause you to mind your own affairs without interfering in our endeavours to expel the Manchoo; but if, on the other hand, you beat me, who can prevent my destroying all the silk and tea plantations, and so removing for ever the only thing you come to China for, and the only cause you would fight about? My soldiers are brave and innumerable, they cover the silk and the tea lands."

These arguments of the Chung-wang were perfectly just and unanswerable. What honest-minded man really acquainted with the facts of

the case can deny it?

With all his shrewdness and foresight, the Chung-wang was himself too enlightened and large-hearted to hit upon the true reason for British hostility. It did not occur to him that at the close of an expensive war which had resulted in the legalization of the opium trade, and had otherwise benefitted the English, it would not suit their policy—however beneficial it might prove to the Chinese—however imperatively it might be demanded by the sacred voice of humanity, to interfere with the advantages derivable from the Elgin treaties, the indemnity, and the traffic in opium—the use of which is prohibited upon pain of death by the Ti-pings.

The kindness I experienced was disinterested, genuine, and without a motive. Though some persons have considered their striking friendliness to foreigners has been the carrying out of a plan in order to secure the non-intervention of the European powers, all I saw of the Ti-pings, their earnest religious enthusiasm, patriotism, and generally noble sentiments, impressed me seriously. Before leaving Soo-chow I became warmly attached to their cause, than which—all my future intercourse has convinced me—a more righteous, or holy, never existed upon earth, and I therefore determined to aid and advocate it to the utmost of my power.

When upon the point of returning to my vessel, I informed the Chung-wang of my intention, and volunteered my services, at the same time requesting him to furnish me with some document or pass that would enable me to return, or travel, to any part of his dominions. The Chung-wang, after a short conversation with some of his chiefs, told my servant to inform me he would give me an honorary commission upon his staff, and then I should be able to act in whichever way I might find best, and to traverse every part of Ti-pingdom without let or hindrance.

At last my commission was made out, the Chung-wang affixed his seal, and amidst the congratulations of the surrounding chiefs I became an honorary Ti-ping officer. I afterwards learnt that in consideration of my being a foreigner, and the nature of the commission, the usual formalities of

investiture had been foregone; such as examination upon the Bible, swearing allegiance to the Ti-ping wang, and to expel the Manchoo.

After taking leave of my new friends and comrades, I discharged the boat I had arrived in, taking my departure on board a gun-vessel the Chung-wang had kindly placed at my disposal. While on my passage, I observed many people apparently returning to their homes in the neighbourhood of Soo-chow; I halted at some of the villages on my route, and found in all of them huge yellow placards, which my interpreter read as Ti-ping imperial proclamations calling upon the people to return to their homes without fear, to remain quiet, and lawfully to render a certain amount of tribute (a little over a third of the Manchoo taxation) to the Ti-ping general treasury. At the gateways of Soo-chow, and at several villages I passed, I saw heads hung up with notices attached, stating they were those of soldiers decapitated for plundering the country people, one for smoking opium, and another for carrying off a villager's daughter.

It was a singular fact that about every fourth village had been completely burned and destroyed. Sometimes I passed three villages, the two outside ones perfect and the central one entirely gutted. Upon inquiry, the country people said the Imperialists had been the destroyers; others said the inhabitants having run away and gone off with the "imps" (Imperialists), they had punished them by burning their habitations; while some said the destroyed villages had been fortified and defended by the Manchoo troops, and so, when captured by the Ti-pings, had been destroyed. This last I had reason to believe the correct account, for I noticed in all the ruined villages various traces of strife, and some seemed to have been surrounded with a wall or stockade and the houses loopholed; while, here and there, half hidden among the *débris* and tall rank weeds, lay some human skeletons.

When I reached the steamer, no silk having arrived, I had time to see more of the country. In one direction, some few miles from San-li-jow, I found a considerable tract of land perfectly desolated, not a dwelling nor

habitation of any sort standing, and the fields untended, with the rice or paddy growing wild.

It appeared this part had been severely contested by the Ti-ping and Imperialist troops, and between them it had become a solitude. I made several trips to this locality with my gun, and always returned well recompensed with golden plover and pheasants, which I generally flushed among the ruins of what had once been houses. The paddy-fields about here were impenetrable, being mostly a perfect jungle six or seven feet high, and full of ugly-looking green and yellow diamond-speckled snakes.

In the villages around San-li-jow I particularly noticed the exactitude with which the Ti-ping soldiers paid the country people for everything they required. I was told in one that a soldier dare not so much as take an egg without paying for it, and the villagers all stated it was "good trade" with the Ti-pings, because they gave a better price than the Imperialists.

In a few days after my return from Soo-chow the silk arrived, and while we were busily employed taking it on board, a large Ti-ping army came in sight. Some were marching along ashore, but by far the greater number were being transported by water; for miles, as far as the eye could reach, the sinuosities of the creek were covered with the sails of the vessels. I counted the number of boats passing within half an hour at one hundred, and the numbers in each at a fair average of twenty; therefore, the flotilla continuing to pass for seven hours, I estimated the approximate strength of the army at 30,000 men, including those ashore. Many of the leaders came alongside in their boats, and spent a few minutes on board with us; amongst them I found one or two I had met at Soo-chow, who informed me they were proceeding to attack the important provincial capital, Hang-chow. All who boarded us were very eager to purchase firearms, and I was sorry we could not muster half a dozen stand for them altogether. Many brought guns on board with the locks out of order, and by repairing these our engineers reaped a munificent reward. During the whole time the flotilla was passing we received many salutations and friendly remarks, and I did not hear a single insulting or

depreciating expression made use of towards us; whereas, amongst Imperialist troops it would be impossible to venture without being subjected to the grossest insult and contumely.

It has been the invariable habit to immensely exaggerate the strength of the Ti-ping armies, and this force upon the march for Hang-chow was supposed by Europeans to number several hundred thousand. It was commanded in chief by the Ting-wang, Prince of the Eastern Provinces.

When all our silk had arrived, we gave the chief of San-li-jow a farewell dinner on board, he having treated us with much hospitality and kindness during our stay; and after an exchange of presents (we gave him a few bottles of cherry brandy, some boxes of percussion-caps, a couple of muskets, and a few other things; and in return received a present of some pigs, fowls, ducks, and pieces of silk, a much more valuable one than ours) started for Shanghae.


We returned to the Wong-poo river, and Imperialist territory, by a different route to that by which we had left it, and in this direction, likewise, found one of the most prominent changes in the country—the total destruction of the idols and Buddhist temples. The desolating traces of civil war were also more visible.

We anchored for the night preceding our re-entry into the Imperialist lines, getting all our arms in readiness. Starting early in the morning, we fortunately caught the ebb tide, and so, after running the gauntlet past our *allies*, reached Shanghae safely the same afternoon.

Of course, my first moment was devoted to Marie. The relations she was living with—the poor relations of the family—acted with great kindness towards us; they were completely estranged from Marie's miserly father, and looked favourably upon our attachment. Fortunately my occupation was very much of a sinecure; so, often during the day I found time to fulfil our almost hourly assignations. Each night I returned to my ship with Marie's whisper "Till to-morrow" dwelling in my heart.

A short half-month of unmixed happiness soon passed away, and again came the hour of separation. We were to part—not with the whispered promise upon our lips, not with the anticipated pleasure of the morrow in our hearts; but for long weeks, perhaps even months: the very uncertainty was painful.

Mournfully sounded the last "adios" from the shore, but more mournfully still the echo that followed me over the waters from the little boat fast disappearing in the gloom of night, as we steamed out of the harbour—"adios!"



TI-PING versus IMPERIALIST.

## CHAPTER IV.

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Organization of the Ti-pings.—Hung-sui-tshuen's Manifesto.—Hung-sui-tshuen Emperor.—Proclamation of Rank.—Ti-ping Titles.—Siege of Yung-gnan.—Ti-ping Successes.—Their Moderation in Victory.—King Yang's Proclamation.—Tien-Wang's Proclamation.—Cruelty of Imperialists.—Cause of the Revolution.—Chinese History Reviewed.—Corrupt Government.—Tartar Ride.—Manchoo Barbarity.

The Ti-ping Revolution, even during its earlier stages, when emerging from the obscurity of mere local insurrection, was conducted in a very systematic and organized manner.

Just four months after the first outbreak, and four months previous to the capture of Yung-gnan, the Manchoo governor of the province (Kwang-si), whose letter is translated and quoted by Consul Meadows, wrote as follows:—

"Both Hung-sui-tshuen and Fung-yun-san are skilled in the use of troops. Hung-sui-tshuen is a man of dangerous character, who practises the ancient military arts. At first he conceals his strength, then he puts it forth a little, then in a greater degree, and lastly comes on in great force. He constantly has two victories for one defeat, for he practises the tactics of Sun-pin (an ancient Chinese warrior and celebrated tactician). The other day I obtained a rebel book, describing the organization of one army. It is the Sze-mar system of the Chow dynasty. A division has its general of division; a regiment has its colonel; an army consists of 13,270 men, being the strength of an ancient army, with the addition of upwards of a hundred men. \* \* \*

"The rebels increase more and more; our troops—the more they fight the more they fear. The rebels generally are powerful and fierce, *and they cannot by any means be likened to a disorderly crowd, their regulations and laws being rigorous and clear.*"

Thus it appears that even before the rebellion attained a political status, its organization was perfect, and that, too, within four months of its commencement. In spite of the mass of trustworthy evidence on this point, and the latterly improved constitution of the Ti-pings, some persons have foolishly declared the Ti-pings possess no organization whatever. The partisan spirit of such people carries them altogether beyond their mark; for any one, *not totally ignorant of Chinese character*, is perfectly well aware that for any body of Chinese to exist without organization is impossible. We have only to look towards Java, Australia, California, India, or wherever a body of Chinese may be found separate, to see they are invariably organized. The colonies formed in the above countries are all governed by chiefs of their own electing. At Batavia and various other parts of Java, Borneo, &c., these chiefs and their inferior officials, hold a recognized position in the Dutch administration. From their very cradles precepts of order and submission are so well engrafted and inculcated, that no nature is so amenable to control as a Chinaman's.<sup>4</sup>

Hung-sui-tshuen, previous to the capture of Yung-gnan, issued the following reply to the celebrated Commissioner Lin's summons to surrender:—

"The Manchoos who, for two centuries, have been in hereditary possession of the throne of China, are descended from an insignificant nation of foreigners. By means of an army of veteran soldiers well trained to warfare, they seized on our treasures, our lands, and the government of our country, thereby proving that the only thing requisite for usurping empire is the fact of being the strongest. There is, therefore, no difference between ourselves,

who lay contributions on the villages we take, and the agents sent from Pekin to collect taxes. Why, then, without any motive, are troops dispatched against us? Such a proceeding strikes us as a very unjust one. What! is it possible that the Manchoos, who are foreigners, have a right to receive the taxes of the captured provinces, and to name officers who oppress the people, while we Chinese are prohibited from taking a trifling amount at the public cost? Universal sovereignty does not belong to any one particular individual, to the exclusion of all the rest. And such a thing has never been known, as one dynasty being able to trace a line of a hundred generations of emperors. The right to govern consists in possession."

In this manifesto the insurgents claim the throne, from the fact that, being Chinese, to them by right it belonged.

This document, from which the above is an extract, proved such an effective and injurious one to poor Commissioner Lin, that he never rallied from the shock. Before dying, he memorialized his Emperor, informing him the rebels professed Christianity, and derived their origin from the hated "barbarians" (Europeans).

Hung-sui-tshuen effected the capture of the city of Yung-gnan by a very extraordinary stratagem:—

"The insurgents advanced quickly to the walls, which are not very high, and by throwing an immense quantity of lighted fire-crackers into the town, the continued explosion of which brought confusion among the soldiers within, and caused them to retreat, they easily succeeded in scaling the walls and entering the city."

Hung-sui-tshuen was no sooner proclaimed first emperor of the new dynasty of Ti-ping (Extreme Peace), with the title of Tien-teh-Ti-ping-Wang (Heavenly Virtue Extreme Peace King), than he immediately issued his manifestoes in imperial style.

During the first two months, the framing of new regulations, electing of officers, and bestowing rewards upon those who had previously

distinguished themselves, were attended to. Proclamations calling upon the soldiers to fight bravely, and promising them reward, were issued, in one of which the seventh commandment is rigorously enforced by the following passage:—

"There shall assuredly be no forgiveness, and we expressly enjoin upon the soldiers and officers not to show the least leniency, or screen the offenders, lest we bring down upon ourselves the indignation of the great God our Heavenly Father."

The following is the proclamation bestowing upon the five principal leaders their rank and title:—

"Our Heavenly Father, the great God and supreme Lord, is one true Spirit (God); besides our Heavenly Father, the great God and supreme Lord, there is no Spirit (God). The great God, our Heavenly Father and supreme Lord, is omniscient, omnipotent, and omnipresent—the supreme over all. There is not an individual who is not produced and nourished by him. He is Shang (Supreme). He is the Te (Ruler). Besides the great God, our Heavenly Father and supreme Lord, there is no one who can be called Shang, and no one who can be called Te.

"Therefore, from henceforth all you soldiers and officers may designate us as your lord, *and that is all*; you must not call me supreme, *lest you should encroach upon the designation of our Heavenly Father*. Our Heavenly Father is our Holy Father, and our Celestial *Elder Brother* is our Holy Lord, the Saviour of the world. Hence our Heavenly Father and Celestial *Elder Brother alone are holy*; and from henceforth all you soldiers and officers may designate us as your lord, *and that is all*; *but you must not call me holy, lest you encroach upon the designation of our Heavenly Father and Celestial Elder Brother*. The great

God, our Heavenly Father and supreme Lord, is our Spiritual Father, our Ghostly Father. Formerly we had ordered you to designate the first and second ministers of state, together with the generals-in-chief of the van and rear, royal fathers, which was a temporary indulgence in conformity with the corrupt customs of the present world; but, according to the true doctrine, *this was a slight encroachment on the prerogative of our Heavenly Father, for our Heavenly Father is alone entitled to the designation of Father.* We have now appointed the chief minister of state and general-in-chief to be designated the Eastern King, having charge of all the states in the Eastern region. We have also appointed the second minister of state and assistant general-in-chief to be designated the Western King, having charge of all the states in the Western region. We have further appointed the general of the advanced guard to be designated the Southern King, having charge of all the states in the Southern region. And we have likewise appointed the general of the rear guard to be designated the Northern King, having charge of all the states in the Northern region. We have furthermore appointed our brother Shih-tah-kae to be assistant-king, to aid in sustaining our Celestial court. All the kings above referred to are to be under the superintendence of the Eastern king. We have also issued a proclamation designating our Queen as the lady of all ladies (Empress), and our concubines as royal ladies. Respect this!"

The above document was translated by Dr. Medhurst. All words commencing with a capital letter are placed in the proclamation certain degrees higher than the rest. All words used to denote the Almighty being elevated *three* spaces, those denoting the chiefs *one* space.

By observing the passages in italics, it cannot fail to be understood that the appellation "Elder Brother" has not the blasphemous tendency some persons have imagined. Even had it, is that a reason why thousands of Christians in error should be slaughtered by a cruel intervention? Why, the very idea is monstrous! Yet some have been found who made the term "Elder Brother" an excuse for exterminating the Ti-pings, instead of doing their duty by teaching them better if necessary. There is another and more important reason why, had Hung-sui-tshuen, or rather the Tien-wang—as we shall for the future, in conformity with his title amongst his followers, term him—literally called himself the brother of our Saviour, Englishmen should be the last to throw stones at him; for have they not their Unitarians, *who deny his divinity altogether?* Why, then, do these war Christians go to China to defend the *name* of the Saviour, when here in England their zeal is more required. If people are to be massacred for making a wrong use of the attributes of our Saviour (when they do so through ignorance), then the slaughter should commence at home, with those who have every opportunity of acquiring a more correct knowledge. It would be as reasonable to suppose that Hung-sui-tshuen arrogates to himself the attributes of God by his title Tien-wang (Heavenly King), as that he considers himself the equal of Jesus, and one of the Trinity, by his style of "Younger Brother."

His titles, Tien-wang, Younger Brother, &c., are no more to be literally understood than any of the extravagant designations of the Manchoo Emperor (Celestial Ruler, Monarch of the Universe, Brother of the Sun, &c.), the Llama of Thibet, or any other Asiatic ruler; but is only the usual Chinese metaphorical style of naming their princes, and setting forth their dignity and high position. The Ti-pings are themselves the very last to entertain any other idea; and often when I have questioned them, they have ridiculed such an heathenish and absurd belief as that their chief was more than mortal. Their replies have always been essentially practical; such as

—"He is but a man like themselves, though a very great one." His prophecies, however, were believed to be inspired; his divine commission to earthly sovereignty and propagation of the Faith was likewise universally believed, though the blasphemies attributed to him, and circulated by interested European maligners, are without foundation. "Younger Brother" is the usual and touching Chinese figurative style of expressing an affectionate and dependent situation. The Tien-wang, when using it, simply expresses that relative position he wishes his people to believe he occupies, as our Saviour's faithful servant and disciple.

The Ti-pings, as we may now fairly call them, were allowed but short respite in the city of Yung-gnan. A large army of Imperialists, under the command of a celebrated Tartar general, Woo-lan-tae, invested the city upon every side, reducing the besieged to fearful extremities; till, at last, death by famine or the sword seemed their only fate. During November, 1851, all their outposts had been driven in with great loss, their spirits were damped, and the close of their existence seemed near at hand.

At length, after enduring incredible sufferings from famine and sickness, and a close siege of five months, during the night of the 7th of April, 1852, the Ti-pings sallied out from the city in three divisions, and after severe fighting, in which their losses were very heavy, succeeded in cutting their way through the besiegers and marching to the north-east, unfortunately leaving many of the sick and wounded prisoners, all of whom were barbarously tortured and put to death. Shortly after their escape from Yung-gnan, the Ti-pings laid siege to the provincial capital, Kwei-lin, but being unprovided with guns or sufficient powder to mine the walls, after a month spent before the city, they raised the siege, and marched into the adjoining province of Hoo-nan. At this time the total strength of the Ti-pings, men, women, and children included, numbered less than ten thousand persons. After capturing the city of Taou-chow, in the southern part of Hoo-nan, during the next three months they pressed steadily

northward, capturing many cities on the way, and overthrowing all opposition. Early in September they arrived before the capital city of the Hoo-nan province, Chang-sha, and intrenching themselves, commenced a regular siege, which lasted more than two months. Upon this important place all the Imperialist forces were immediately concentrated, and the plains before the city became the battle-ground of many severe actions, generally favourable to the Ti-pings. During the months of September, October, and November, the latter made several attempts to carry the city by assault, but were each time severely repulsed by the garrison, who held out with determined bravery. Upon the 29th of November, the last assault upon Chang-sha was repulsed with heavy loss to the besiegers, and upon the following day the siege was abandoned, and they moved off in a north-westerly direction.

The next movement of the Ti-pings was attended with better fortune, for, reaching the Tung-ting lake, they carried the city of Yoh-chow, which was situated at the junction of the lake with the river Yang-tze-kiang, by storm. Considerably enriched by the granaries and treasury of that city, they changed their line of march and proceeded in a north-easterly direction, down the course of the Yang-tze, conveyed by the large fleet of junks and war-boats they had captured on the lake. Upon the 23rd of December they reached the city of Han-yang, upon the north bank of the river. Capturing this place with but slight opposition, they crossed to the south side, and invested the vice-regal city Wu-chang-foo. After mining the walls and making a practicable breach, upon the 12th of January they assaulted and carried the city, the lieutenant-governor of Hoo-nan falling in its defence, together with a large number of his officers and troops. Collecting immense booty from these two cities and the adjoining unwalled emporium, Hankow, early in February, with a vast fleet loaded with men and stores, they proceeded down the river. On the 18th, the large and important city of Kew-kiang, situated close to the junction of the Poyang lake with the river, fell

before their arms. The city of Ngan-king, capital of the province of Ngan-Hwui, was captured on the 25th. On the 4th of March Wu-hoo was taken, and on the 8th the Ti-ping forces sat down before the walls of Nan-kin.

These successes of the insurgents were followed by the degradation of all Imperialist leaders who should have prevented them. The court of Pekin deprived the imperial commissioner Keshen of his rank of Lieutenant-General of Tartar bannermen; Sae-shang-ah, the general of the Imperialist troops in Hoo-nan, was sentenced to be decapitated; Sin, the Viceroy of the two Kwang, was deprived of his vice-royalty and two-eyed peacock's tail; while all their property was confiscated to the government. Meanwhile the Ti-pings, by their moderation and success, by their kindness, and protection of the country people who did not oppose them;—by controlling their troops and followers from committing the usual excesses and crimes—the scourges of war, even in civilized countries; had obtained for themselves the goodwill and confidence of the people in a very large degree. Reinforcements poured in from every side; all those in local revolt, or in any way aggrieved by their tyrannical authorities; all who were in any manner dissatisfied with the foreign dynasty, or felt a spark of patriotism, flocked to the Tien-wang's standard. And now, as the Bishop of Victoria has said, before the ancient capital of the empire, a body of some 100,000 men, bound together by one religious hope and by one political aim—the highest and most noble purposes of human ambition—those of civil and religious liberty—were congregated; following implicitly the guidance of a leader they believed sent by divine authority to expel their foreign masters, and overthrow idolatry throughout the length and breadth of the land. Marvellous and unparalleled beyond conception was this rising-up of the people—as a psychological phenomenon it stands unrivalled in extent and magnitude in modern history. To behold leagued together, not only the effeminate Chinese, but even their women—wives and daughters fighting by the side of their husbands and fathers, inspired by one common hope and

ardour—all animated by a great religious and political object, for the attainment of which they had suffered and fought many years—is an event never before realized in the history of China.

The Bishop of Victoria thus writes of them:—

"Throughout their long line of march, for 1,500 miles, over fertile and populous districts, plunders, murder, and rape, the usual attendant curses of Asiatic warfare, were denounced and punished by death. With more than Puritanical strictness, they waged an internecine war with the most dearly cherished sensual habits of their countrymen. The ten moral rules of the Decalogue were enforced, *and a stricter interpretation attached to its terms*. Amorous glances, libidinous songs, and all the common incentives to profligacy, were prohibited and abandoned. The drinking of wine, the smoking of tobacco, gambling, lying, swearing, and, above all, *indulgence in the fumes of opium*, were denounced and abolished with a moral determination which permitted no half measures."

During the triumphant march of the Ti-pings from the city of Yung-gnan, many proclamations were issued by the Tien-wang and his chiefs, to justify their rebellion and inform the people. The earliest and most important was the following, issued by Yang, the Eastern King:—

"We hereby promulgate our explicit orders in every place, and say, Oh, you multitudes! listen to our words. We conceive that the empire belongs to the Chinese, and not to the Tartars; the food and raiment found therein belong to the Chinese, and not to the Tartars; the men and women inhabiting this region are subjects and children of the Chinese, and not of the Tartars. But, alas! ever since the Ming dynasty lost its influence, the Manchoos availed themselves of the opportunity to throw China into confusion, and deprive the Chinese of their empire; they also robbed them of their food and clothing, as well as oppressed their sons and ravished their daughters; and the Chinese, notwithstanding they possessed such an extensive territory and multitudinous subjects, allowed the Tartars to do as they pleased without

making the least objection. Can the Chinese still deem themselves men? Ever since the Manchoos have spread their poisonous influence through China, the flame of oppression has risen up to heaven, and the vapour of corruption has defiled the celestial throne, the offensive odour has spread over the four seas, and the demoniacal influence has distressed surrounding regions; while the Chinese, with bowed heads and dejected spirits, willingly became the servants of others. How strange it is that there are no *men* in China! China is the head, Tartary is the feet; China is the land of spirits, Tartary the land of demons. Why may China be deemed the land of spirits? Because the true Spirit, the great God, our heavenly Father, made heaven and earth, the land and the sea (and the Chinese honour him); therefore from of old China has been termed the land of spirits. Why are the Tartars to be considered demons? Because the devilish serpent, the king of Hades, is a corrupt demon, and the Tartars have been in the habit of worshipping him; therefore may the Tartars be considered demons. But, alas! the feet have assumed the place of the head, and demons have usurped the land of spirits; while they have constrained our Chinese people to become demons like themselves.<sup>5</sup> If all the bamboos of the southern hills were to be used as pens, they would not be enough to detail the obscenities of these Tartars; and if all the waves of the Eastern sea were to be employed, they would not be sufficient to wash away their sins, which reach to heaven. We will merely enumerate a few general circumstances that are known to all men. The Chinese have a form peculiarly their own; but these Manchoos have commanded them to shave the hair round their heads,<sup>6</sup> and wear a long tail behind, thus causing the Chinese to assume the appearance of brute animals. The Chinese have a dress peculiar to themselves, but these Manchoos have caused them to wear knobs on their caps, with Tartar clothes and monkey caps,<sup>7</sup> while they discard the robes and head-dress of former dynasties, thus causing the Chinese to forget their origin. The Chinese have their own laws and regulations; but the Manchoos have

manufactured devilish enactments, so that our Chinese people cannot escape the meshes of their net,<sup>8</sup> nor can they tell how to dispose of their hands and feet, by which means our young men are brought entirely under their control. The Chinese have their own language; but the Manchoos have introduced the slang of the capital, and interfered with Chinese expressions, designing thus to seduce the Chinese by their Tartar brogue. Whenever drought and inundations occur, the government manifests no compassion; but quietly sees our people scattered abroad or dying of hunger, until the bleached bones are as thick as jungle, by which the country is depopulated. The Manchoos also have allowed corrupt magistrates and covetous officers to spread themselves over China, flaying the skin and devouring the fat of our people, until both men and women meet and lament by the roadside to see our fellow subjects reduced to want and poverty. Offices are to be obtained by bribes, crimes are to be bought off with money, rich fellows engross all authority, while heroes are filled with despair, by which means all the noble spirits in the empire are overwhelmed with despair, and die. Should any, animated with a patriotic feeling, seek to revive China from its ruins, they are accused of fostering rebellion, and their whole race exterminated, by which means all heroic ardour is repressed in China. But the ways in which the Manchoos have deluded China, and abused it, are too numerous to detail, for they are cunning and artful in the extreme.... These Tartars, forgetting the meanness and obscurity of their origin, and taking advantage of Woo-san-kwei's introduction, have usurped dominion in China, where they have carried their villanies to the utmost. Let us for a moment look into the origin of these Manchoo Tartars. Their first ancestor was a cross-breed between a white fox and a red dog, from whom sprang this race of imps that have since increased abundantly. They contract marriages without ceremony, and pay no regard to the relations of life or the rules of civilized society. At a time when China was destitute of heroes, they seized upon the government of the country; the wild fox thus ascended

the imperial throne, and these unwashed monkeys, having put off their caps, rushed into the royal court, while our Chinese people, instead of ploughing up their holes and digging down their dens, have allowed themselves to be taken in their devices, to be insulted over by them, and to obey their command; and what is worse, our civil and military officers, coveting the gains of office, have bowed down in the midst of these herds of dogs and foxes. A child three feet high is generally esteemed very ignorant; but if you were to tell him to make obeisance to a parcel of dogs and swine, he would redden with indignation. And what are these Tartars but dogs and swine? Some of you have read books and are acquainted with history: and do you not feel in the slightest degree ashamed? Formerly Wan-theen-seang<sup>9</sup> and Sea-fang-teh<sup>10</sup> swore that they would rather die than serve the Mongols. Sze-ko-fah<sup>11</sup> and Ken-shih-see<sup>12</sup> swore that they would rather die than serve the Manchoos. These facts must be familiar to you all. According to our calculations, the Manchoos cannot be above a hundred thousand, and we Chinese amount to more than fifty millions; but for fifty millions to be ruled over by a hundred thousand is disgraceful. Now, happily, a retributive Providence being about to restore the country to its rightful owners, and China having some prospect of a revival, men's minds being bent on good government, it is evident that the Tartars have not long to rule. Their three times seven, or 210 years' lease, is about to expire, and the extraordinary personage of the five times nine has already appeared.<sup>13</sup> The iniquities of the Tartars are full; high heaven has manifested its indignation, and commanded our celestial king sternly to display his heavenly majesty and erect the standard of righteousness, sweeping away the demoniacal brood, and perfectly cleansing our flowery land."

After exhorting the Chinese to join the rebel forces, the proclamation concludes thus:—

"You, our countrymen, have been aggrieved by the oppressions of the Manchoos long enough: if you do not change your politics, and with united

strength and courage sweep away every remnant of these Tartars, how can you answer it to God in the highest heavens? We have now set in motion our righteous army, above to revenge the insult offered to God in deceiving Heaven, and below to deliver China from its inverted position, thus sternly sweeping away every vestige of Tartar influence and unitedly enjoying the happiness of the Ti-ping dynasty."

In contemplation of making an immediate attack upon Nankin, during the march towards that city the following proclamation was issued by the Tien-wang:—

"Hung, Captain-General of the army, having entire superintendence of military affairs, and aiding in the advancement of the Ti-ping, or Great Pacifying Dynasty, in obedience to the will of Heaven, issues this important and triumphant proclamation, to announce that he has punished the oppressors and saved the people.

"It appears that, throughout the empire, rapacious officers are worse than violent robbers, and the corrupt mandarins of the public offices are no better than wolves and tigers, all originating in the vicious and sottish monarch at the head of affairs, who drives honest people to a distance, and admits to his presence the most worthless of mankind, selling offices, and disposing of preferments, while he represses men of virtuous talent, so that the spirit of avarice is daily inflamed, and high and low are contending together for gain; the rich and the great are abandoned to vice without control, whilst the poor and miserable have none to redress their wrongs, the very recital of which exasperates one's feelings, and makes one's hair to stand on end. To refer to the case of the land revenue in particular, it appears that of late the exactions have been

increased manyfold, while the taxes due up to the thirtieth year of the last king's reign were at one time said to be remitted, and then again exacted, until the resources of the people are exhausted, and their miseries grown to excess. When our benevolent men and virtuous scholars contemplate these things, their minds are deeply wounded, and they cannot restrain themselves from rooting out these plundering officers and wolfish mandarins of each prefecture and district, in order to save the people from the flames and floods in which they are now involved. At the present moment our grand army is assembled like clouds; the province of Kouang-se has been settled, and Chang-sha (the capital of Hoonan) tranquillized; and being now about to proceed towards the region of Keang-see (Keang-nan? that is, the province of which Nankin is capital), we deem it necessary to announce to the people that they need not be alarmed; while agriculturists, mechanics, merchants, and traders, may each peacefully pursue their occupations. It is necessary, however, that the rich should have in readiness stores of provisions to aid in the sustenance of our troops; let each clearly report the amount of his contributions to this object, and we will furnish him with receipts, as security that hereafter the money shall be all repaid. Should there be any bold and strong men, or wise councillors among you, let them with one heart and effort aid us in our great design, and, when tranquillity is restored, we will have them promoted and rewarded according to their merit. All the officers of prefectures and districts who resist us shall be beheaded; but those who are ready to comply with our requisitions must forthwith send unto us their seals of office, and then they may retire to their native villages. With regard to the rabble of

wolfish policemen, we shall, as soon as we succeed, hang up their heads as a warning to all. Being now apprehensive lest local *banditti* should take occasion from our movements to breed disturbances, we wish you people clearly to report the same, and we will immediately exterminate them. If any of the villagers or citizens dare to assist the marauding mandarins in their tyranny, and resist our troops and adherents, no matter whether they reside in great or small places, we will sweep them from the face of the earth. Be careful. Do not oppose.

"A special proclamation."

Another proclamation was issued on the march by the Eastern Prince:—

"Yang-sui-tsing, especially appointed General of the Grand Army engaged in sweeping away the Tartars and establishing the new dynasty, issues this second proclamation:—

"I, the General, in obedience to the royal commands, have put in motion the troops for the punishment of the oppressor, and in every place to which I have come, the enemy at the first report have dispersed like scattered rubbish. As soon as a city has been captured, I have put to death the rapacious mandarins and corrupt magistrates therein, *but have not injured a single individual of the people*, so that all of you may take care of your families and attend to your business without alarm and trepidation. I have already issued proclamations to this effect, with which I presume you are acquainted. I have heard, however, that throughout the villages there are numbers of lawless vagabonds, who, previous to the arrival of our troops, take advantage of the disturbed state of the country to defile men's wives and daughters, and burn or plunder the property of

honest people. I, the General, have already apprehended some of these, and decapitated about a score of them; now, because their localities are somewhat removed from the provincial capital (Ngan-king), these persons flatter themselves that I, the General, am not aware of their proceedings, *which are very much to be detested*. I have, therefore, sent a great officer, named Yuen, as a special messenger, with some hundreds of soldiers, to go through the villages, and, as soon as he finds these vagabonds, he is commissioned forthwith to decapitate them, while the honest inhabitants have nothing more to do than to stick up the word 'Shun' (obedient) over their doors, and then they have nothing to fear.

"A special proclamation."

While the number and moral power of the Ti-pings increased together, those of the Imperialists as rapidly declined; their extortion and cruelty driving numbers of the people to the ranks of the insurgents. Captain Fishbourne, (*Impressions of China*, p. 83,) has observed:—

"We know that the authorities at Canton were taking heads off by forties and sixties a day, and the Viceroy admitted that he had taken off three hundred in one day. I visited the execution-ground, and saw pools of blood from recent executions, and the heads were piled up in old bottle-racks. If these were the numbers for two or three provinces, what must those have been for the other provinces in addition? And yet, as the march of the insurgents was so triumphant, *these all could not possibly be the heads of insurgents, or even people remotely connected with the movement*. It is much more probable that they were the heads of *helpless and unoffending people*, that were taken off to satisfy the Emperor that Lin, the Viceroy, was making some progress against the insurgents."

These horrible atrocities of the Manchoo rulers were continued for years, and every province the Ti-pings had visited became drenched with the blood of innocent victims. Not only were the entire relatives of any man who had joined the rebellion slaughtered, but many thousands even upon mere suspicion. Do we not remember the brutal Commissioner Yeh's boast, that he had decapitated upwards of 70,000 rebels in one month, in the province of Kwang-tung alone? And these were peaceful villagers dragged from their homes without any crime on their part (for at that time the Ti-pings were far away), and without even knowing what had become of the relative for whose fault they suffered. This being only the slaughter effected by one mandarin, what must have been the enormous number massacred in cold blood by the numerous button, feather, and tail-dignified Manchoo butchers, sent to perpetrate their horrid revenge upon the helpless women and relatives of the men they have never been able to withstand in fair fight, and would never have been able to resist, even in their walled cities, but for the foreign assistance they received.

Almost the first point to be considered with regard to the Ti-ping revolution is its cause, and whether the cause justified rebellion. But few persons have ever denied the existence of ample grounds for the Chinese to rebel against the Manchoo dynasty; their bloodthirsty, murderous rule, their gross tyranny and corruption, their unrighteous usurpation and possession of the Chinese throne, being pretty generally acknowledged. I am no advocate of revolutionary principles or outbreaks against constituted authority, but we must always distinguish between the laws of a country and the unrighteous decrees of a tyrant usurper. Moreover, the progress of liberty and right has always been maintained through collisions with oppressive ruling powers; and the great leaders of the people may be the rebels of to-day, and yet should the morrow crown them with success, they may become the heroes and patriots of the age.

The state of China previous to the Ti-ping rebellion was deplorable in the extreme: the grinding oppression of nearly two centuries had apparently obliterated all that was good and noble in the land, and the debasing influence of the Manchoo invaders seemed likely to consummate the entire destruction of the moral, social, and political condition of the Chinese. To form a proper judgment upon the state of affairs, it is necessary to review Chinese history from the period of the Manchoo invasion.

The last Emperor of the last Chinese dynasty—the Ming—was driven to commit suicide through the success of an insurrection of the people, caused by his misrule, A.D. 1643. Upon the death of the Emperor, the insurgent chief met with universal submission, both at Pekin and in the provinces, and proclaimed himself Emperor. Woo-san-kwei, however, the general of an army employed in resisting an attack of the Manchoos, refused to acknowledge him. The newly made Emperor immediately set out for the city held by Woo, carrying with him from Pekin the latter's father in chains. The usurper having put him to death, to revenge that of his father, as well as that of the late Emperor, Woo-san-kwei made peace with the Manchoos and, calling them in to his assistance, soon defeated the would-be Emperor. When, however, the Tartar king found himself in Pekin, he instantly seized upon the sovereignty, and no effort of the Chinese was able to drive him from the throne, or defeat his hardy and veteran troops. Dying almost immediately after this acquisition, he appointed his son Shun-chy as his successor, A.D. 1644; and so commenced the Manchoo Tartar dynasty, the seventh emperor of which is now reigning. A great portion of the South held out against the foreign government for many years, especially the maritime province of Fo-keen. In Kwang-tung and Kwang-si provinces, the Manchoos were often severely defeated by the natives, who, to the present day, hate them with intensity, and it was not till A.D. 1654 that these provinces were subdued. In many other parts the Chinese still struggled gallantly against the invader; but dissensions amongst themselves, and a

general want of combination, proved fatal to their cause. But for this singular want of accord it is probable the Manchoos would soon have been driven back to their native wilds.

A.D. 1669, with the exception of Fo-keen province, the islands of the coast, and mere local opposition, the whole empire was subjugated by the Manchoos. To maintain their power, all the principal cities were garrisoned by Tartar troops of the Eight Banners (a regulation still observed), and these being constantly drilled and kept in a good state of efficiency, together with the main body stationed at Pekin, have succeeded in suppressing the patriotic efforts of the Chinese. At last, in 1674, Wu-san-kwei attempted to remedy his error of calling in the Manchoos, by raising the National standard and declaring against them. The southern provinces, and especially Kwang-tung and Kwang-si, constituted the area of the struggle. Wu-san-kwei dying soon after the outbreak, the national party were unable to find a single person competent to replace him, and although for nine years they successfully resisted the power of the Manchoos, after a long struggle without any combined action, they were compelled to submit. During the general dispersion of the patriots, the last of the Ming princes fled to the kingdom of Pegu for safety, but being delivered up to the Manchoos, was by them put to death; he was the last of his race, for man, woman, and child, every scion of the Ming, had been ruthlessly slaughtered. This was the last national effort of sufficient strength to endanger the power of the foreign dynasty, although to the present day many thousands of Chinese exist among the fastnesses of the mountainous regions of Kwang-si, Kwei-chow, Yun-nan, and Sze-chuan, who have never been subdued, or submitted to the badge of slavery—the tonsure—imposed upon their countrymen by the Tartars. Many of these having fled to the aboriginal independent tribes, have been included in the general term Miau-tze, and in Kwang-si alone they number upwards of 400,000 persons. Besides these, secret societies were formed, whose members were sworn to attempt the subversion of the

Manchoo dynasty; but none have been able, hitherto, to carry out their designs; not even the celebrated "Triad Society," at present existing, or the equally extensive one, "The Association of Heaven and Earth."

Upon the defeat of Wu-san-kwei's movement, the slaughter of the Chinese was immense, the province of Kwang-tung was nearly depopulated, upwards of 700,000 of its inhabitants having been executed within a month. This is vengefully remembered by the Cantonese even yet. Many thousands of Chinese families left their country in the course of the struggle, and not less than 100,000 are stated to have emigrated to Formosa, where they resisted the Manchoos till the year 1683.

To completely destroy the patriotic element, the Manchoos compelled the conquered Chinese to shave the thick tresses they had been accustomed to wear as a cherished ornament from the most ancient times, and to wear a tail, and in other respects to adopt the Tartar style of dress upon pain of decapitation. Many thousands are stated to have preferred death to this national degradation: an alteration of national costume is of all others the most open and crushing work of conquest; and in China it undoubtedly had the effect of breaking the spirit of the people—all who would not suffer thus, losing their heads. The ancient Chinese costume is now resumed by the Ti-pings, but previous to their outbreak was confined to the Miau-tze and refugees, and to a very exact representation upon the stage of the Chinese theatre.

So prompt and merciless have been the punishments inflicted by the Manchoo government, upon the slightest suspicion of rebellion, that, until the Ti-ping insurrection, they have successfully extinguished every outburst of national hatred. In 1756, during the reign of Kien-loong, fourth emperor of the Manchoo dynasty, a great rising amongst the Miau-tze, and descendants of the refugees, occurred; but, after several years' war with no material advantage upon either side, they relinquished their aggressive movement and contented themselves with their independent position. In

1806, a great combination amongst the hardy inhabitants of the southern sea-board—the provinces of Fo-keen and Kwang-tung—took place; a large fleet of more than 600 Ti-mungs (sea-going war junks, generally carrying about twelve guns) was organized, and for some years waged a successful war against the Manchoos, at one time seriously threatening the dominion of the latter. At last the usual cause of failure to all former and future national efforts—internal dissension—proved fatal to their cause. The two principal commanders having disagreed, led their respective divisions to a bloody combat. The Manchoo government now, with their usual policy of treacherous conciliation where they cannot conquer, commenced intriguing with the weaker of the two divisions, and eventually induced it to accept a general amnesty to such as would submit and return to their allegiance, at the same time rewarding the leaders with bribes of rank and riches. The insurgents who had submitted were then allied to the Tartar forces, and employed by the crafty government against their former comrades, who in a short time were compelled to surrender and accept the proffered amnesty. And now, throughout the land, the treacherous ferocity of the Manchoos ran riot. Hundreds of the deceived patriots were distributed over the numerous execution grounds, and, fed by the perfidious diplomacy of the government, the sword of the executioner terminated an association that at one time promised the liberation of the country.

This great naval rebellion was not the only endeavour made by the Chinese to break the foreign yoke. During the reign of Kea-king, the fifth Manchoo emperor, many formidable revolts had taken place, but again the want of unity proved fatal to their success. In 1813, the dissatisfied Chinese endeavoured to finish the Manchoo dynasty by assassination, many members of the insurrection having sacrificed themselves in the attempt. At the termination of Kea-king's reign, in the year 1820, all extensive rebellion had been suppressed. The reign of his successor, Taou-kuang, was, however, marked by more revolt and insurrection than had been known

since the time of the first Manchoo usurper. In 1832, a great rising took place among the Miau-tze, whose leader accepted the designation of "Golden Dragon," assumed the yellow (Imperial) dress, and announced his intention to overthrow the foreign dynasty and establish a native one. This rebellion had a wide-spread, though secret organization, but the outbreak not being simultaneous, the partisans in distant provinces were all cut off in detail; while the rising in Formosa failed owing to the dissension of its leaders. After successfully resisting the Manchoo troops, and several times defeating them with immense slaughter, the want of unanimity and simultaneous rising upon the part of the confederates induced the main body of insurgents to make favourable terms with the government, and retire unimpeded to their independent regions.

Slowly, but surely of late, the Chinese nation has been recovering from the crushed and subdued condition to which the sanguinary invasion and iron despotism of the Manchoos had reduced it. Gradually, as returning vitality and patriotism increased, opposition to the oppressor multiplied and became more formidable and portentous. As the Chinese have gained strength, so their masters have lost it; the power and resources of the latter have long become overgrown and exhausted, and nothing but the broken-spirited and abject state of slavery they had reduced the nation to could have prevented their expulsion long since. At length, during the reign of the last emperor, the national feeling could no longer be controlled, and in the year 1850 the great Ti-ping rebellion burst forth—so marvellous in every phase of its commencement, organization, and progress, that ere now, but for the unjustifiable meddling of England, it would have resulted, not only in the subversion of the Manchoo dynasty, but, in all human probability, the establishment of Christianity throughout the limits of the immense Chinese empire. Sir John F. Davis has observed:—"Distinctions sufficiently broad are still maintained to prevent the amalgamation of the original people with their masters;" these, combined with the intense hatred caused by the

horrible cruelties inflicted upon the people during the troublous times of famine and disturbance preceding the Ti-ping rebellion, undoubtedly tended to promote the success of the latter, and alienate the best disposed from the Manchoos. During the years 1838–41, many parts of the empire became plunged in misery and want;—so severe was the famine, that many thousands perished, while multitudes were driven to insurrection. The government, in order to quell the natural results of the distress, resorted to the most barbarous measures; it has even been stated by the Roman Catholic missionaries who were on the spot—"that after suffering severe torture, many of the people were burnt alive!" The war with Great Britain, in 1841, added to the miseries of the Chinese, for the Manchoo government, the weaker they became, were the more savage and ruthless in suppressing every indication of disaffection.

Mr. Tarrant, editor of the *Friend of China*, and a resident in China for a quarter of a century, in 1861 wrote thus:—

#### "THE WICKED AND CORRUPT GOVERNMENT OF CHINA.

"So little is known of the machinery of Chinese government that ignorance of it is the best, if not the only excuse for the countenance given by Western nations to the Manchoo dynasty. Conservative as we are in political principle, largely imbued with a feeling of veneration for what is ancient, if at the same time honour deserving, and desiring above all things peace on earth and goodwill amongst mankind, the repugnance which we entertain towards the Pekin government, and sympathy with those in arms against it,<sup>14</sup> has been solely produced by long observation of the thorough worthlessness of the rulers, and the impossibility for them to become better. We old-fashioned moralists of the West, in our ideas of the uses of a government,

give some consideration to the feelings of the mass; and no officer may fatten himself with impunity on the public purse, unless he give some show of service for the public weal. Here in China, on the contrary, extortion by officials is an institution; it is the condition on which they take office; and it is only when the bleeder is a bungler that the government, aroused by the victims' cries and riotings, step in to check the depletion. Are our readers aware of the smallness of the established salaries of provincial officers—of the two Kwang, to wit? Can they believe that the Viceroy, ruling over a country twice the size of England, is allowed as his *legal* salary the paltry sum of £60—say \$25 a month—not even the pay of four of his chair-bearers and an ostler? How does he live, then? will be the question. The answer is, by extortion, by selling justice. Fees of office would be the most polite term, perhaps, to apply to the thing, the average sum total of these per annum being £8,333.

"The system adopted throughout the empire is this:—You, the son of Dick, Tom, or Harry, get your qualification as a scholar, bring it to me at Pekin, fee the chancellerie, and then you shall have a post. Directly you have that, squeeze away right and left, and when you have enough to buy a higher post, you know where to come for it. As we said some years ago, when writing on the subject, 'it flourishes on its own rottenness,' the chances which high and low alike possess of fattening on the public vitals being the greatest support the Manchoo dynasty possess. Next to the Viceroy, or governor-general, is the governor, whose salary is £50, increased with fees averaging £4,333 a year. Each of these officials possess power of life and death without reference to the government.... The creature who—mayhap before he got into office, neglected by all his relations

—luxuriated on a miserable dole of rice and greens, and would no more think of paying a couple of mace<sup>15</sup> to chair-coolies to carry him, than he would think of flying, from the day he receives his diploma cannot walk a hundred paces on common earth if he were paid to do it. He rises with the sun from the couch of his speedily increased harem, either to receive the morning call of some other 'useless,' or to be borne in his chair, followed by pipe-bearer and card-deliverer, to make a round of calls on brother officials of similar uselessness. How is the work of the Mandarinate performed? we hear some say. Performed? By underlings who hold the entrée by the back stairs, and *sell* justice or service to each suitor according as he can pay for it.... And these are the *things* who govern the empire."

During the month of July, 1863, issues of the same newspaper—then established at Shanghae—contained the following statements; and statements that no person with the slightest knowledge of the position and history of China can deny:—

"Our local readers must be as able as ourselves to form an opinion on passing events; and hardly one of us, we think, but must be satisfied that we are on the eve of a crisis in the affairs of the great nation on whose borders we dwell. Let us take a hasty glance at the position. A little over two hundred years ago, the Manchoos, under an ancestor of the present incumbent of the throne, overran the country. The cruelties which these savages perpetrated were of the most horrid description—in Kwang-tung alone over seven hundred thousand people—man, woman, and child—being massacred within a month.

"The Chinese, prior to this inroad, were a rich people, the houses of the better classes being buildings of convenient formation and durability. There is not much apparent wealth among the Chinese now, any sign of it being a temptation to government officers to extort from the holders. From the day these Tartars came into the country, China has been steadily deteriorating, and now the people may best be likened to herds of grovelling swine, living merely for the day, stultified in intellect by the most degrading superstition. Under the Manchoos, in fact, China exhibits to the world the saddest of all spectacles—the spectacle of a people unable to raise themselves in the social scale, to attain the full stature of man. To keep themselves on the throne, the Manchoos determined on three courses:—

*"First.* To make every Chinese shave the front of his head, and wear a tail. Those who would not do this were deemed rebels, and decapitated.

*"Second.* They declared it treason in all those who met secretly.

*"Third.* They vested all elevation to civil office in the sovereign himself, at Pekin, making the language of the court the official medium, and guarding against local faction by permitting no one to hold office in the district in which he was born. Every civil officer of the Manchoo government, in short, is a stranger to the people he rules over; he knows none of the ties of friendship for his flock. And, further to widen the breach between ruler and ruled, the sovereign allows his officers little or no salary; but, in its place and stead, sanctions—directs—as

full a bleeding of the people's purses as said people can bear without open revolt.

"And these three courses have been as effectual as could be possibly anticipated.

"It was a long while before the Manchoos succeeded in the head-shaving and tail arrangements, especially about Shou-shing, in Che-kiang, and down south, in Kwang-se, where there are people (Miau-tze) who have never submitted to the badge.

"The secret meeting interdict, again, has met but small favour, and it was only last week that the Chinese newspaper, published at the N. C. Herald Office here, had a notice in it of the apprehension, by the Manchoos, of Messrs. Quan, Wan, and others, *within the British concession*, ostensibly because they were in league with the Soo-chow rebels, but really because they are leading men of the San-hoh-hwae (Triad Society, sworn to put down the Manchoos).

"The office-granting scheme has met the greatest success. The ambition of every petty farmer in the country is to train a son who is clever at his books, and, aided by his richer clansmen with the means to travel to the capital, has a chance of becoming one of the country's grandees; and, by a far-seeing device, the emperor grants antecedent honours; so that if a son is honoured, the father is honoured—that is to say, if a Chinese, by merit and skill, succeeds in raising himself to a mandarinate of the highest class, becomes, to speak equivalently, an earl or a duke, the father of that fortunate grandee, although performing on the homestead the functions of a cow-herd, becomes ennobled also; the honours, in short, are retrospective

from the son to the father, not forward, hereditarily, from the father to the son.

"And it has been by these means that the system of Tartar rule has become to be liked by the people. They overlook the villainous extortions which the sons have to practise on the people to elevate themselves. They are blind to all, and simply determine that the end justifies the means. There is a general fling around of stolen sugar-plums, he being happiest who, in the scramble, gets the largest handful."

The enormous multitude of victims slaughtered during the progress and maintenance of the Manchoo dynasty will never be known by Europeans; though—judging by all authentic records of their invasion of China, its constant rebellions against their authority, and the murderous rule they have exercised—the destruction of life considerably outnumbered the hosts sacrificed in the track of the greatest destroyers of the human species upon record, from Alexander the Great to Genghis-Khan. The barbarity of the Manchoo rule is unparalleled in ancient or modern history; while the fiendish nature of their punishments by torture—especially those for treason—and the records of the "board of punishments," instituted by them, constitute the blackest spot in the annals of mankind.

Upon the character of the last great rising of the Chinese against their oppressors, the Ti-ping rebellion, the Bishop of Victoria, in 1854, wrote:—

"The finger of Divine Providence appears to us signally conspicuous in this revolution. The moral, social, and political condition of China was almost hopelessly wretched and debased. Its whole system of government, of society, and religion, was to be broken up, remodelled, reconstructed, and renewed. In looking about for an agency available for such an

end, the mind was depressed and perplexed. The government was corrupt, the scholars were feeble and inert, the gentry were servile and timid, the lower classes were engrossed in the struggle for subsistence, the whole nation seemed bound hand and foot, with their moral energies paralyzed, their intellectual faculties stunted, and their civil liberties crushed beneath the iron gripe of power and the debasing influence of sensuality. Political subjection to an effete despotism, and addiction to opium, had enervated the national mind, and rendered the Chinese helpless as a race.

"From themselves no reformer seemed likely to arise. Their canonized virtue of filial piety was perverted and abused as the grand support of despotism. But it is in this state of perplexity and despondency that we turn to survey the present movement, its chief actors, and its accomplished results; and beholding we admire, and admiring we thank God for what our eyes are privileged to see."

## FOOTNOTES:

4. This strong tendency of the Chinese to combine and organize is well noticed in "Impressions of China," by Captain Fishbourne, at pages 415 to 418.
5. Alluding to the establishment of the Tartar Budhism.
6. The badge of slavery imposed by the Manchoo Tartars upon their conquest of China.
7. The form of head-dress and insignia of nobility introduced by the Manchoos.
8. Referring to the elaborate and merciless laws of treason and disaffection established by the Manchoos.
9. Wan-theen-seang would not submit to the Mongols, and was slain by Kubla Khan.
10. One of the adherents of the Sung dynasty, who, on being seized by the Mongols, refused to eat, and so died.
11. Killed himself when the Ming dynasty was irretrievably lost.

12. Lost his life in fighting for the Ming cause (1644).

13. "Allusion to an expression in the Book of Diagrams, under the Kœn diagram, or five and nine, where it is said that 'the dragon flies up to heaven,' which means that a new monarch is about to ascend the throne of China.—*Translator.*"

14. The Ti-pings.

15. A mace is worth about 5d.

## CHAPTER V.

### [Table of Contents](#)

Shanghae to Han-kow.—River Scenery.—Silver Island.—The Salt Trade.—Nin-gan-shan.—Tu-ngliu.—Its Auriferous Soil.—Kew-kiang.—River Scenery.—The Yang-tze River.—The Braves of Hankow.—Chinese Politeness.—Manchoo Policy.—Fire and Plunder.—A Chinese Rudder.—Scenery around Ta-tung.—Appearance of the Country.—Chinese Chess.—Perilous Adventure.—Crew of Mutineers.—Critical Position.—Gallant Rescue.—Explanation.—Alarm of Pirates.—Plan of Operations.—Its Advantages.—The Result.—Another Alarm.—"Imperialist" Pirates.

After remaining two idle weeks at Shanghae, our vessel was ordered to Hankow. This coincided exactly with my wishes, for, as we should pass Nankin, and possibly communicate with its garrison, it would be a good and early opportunity for me to become acquainted with the position of affairs, and the best and easiest method of fulfilling the object of my commission from the Chung-wang. Accordingly, with a limited cargo, and a good supply of coals, we weighed anchor again, and started upon our voyage up the great river, "the Son of the Sea."

We had but a rough time of it at first, for after leaving the mouth of the river—so wide that, but for the large island of Tsung-Ming in the centre, land is not visible from either side—we only reached the Lang-shan crossing, the most difficult navigation of the river, at night. It therefore became necessary to anchor, and a gale coming on from seaward, what with its fury, and the strength of a four-knot flood tide, we passed a remarkably unpleasant night; and, after continual apprehension of parting our cables and drifting ashore, found in the morning that we had dragged our anchors nearly a mile.

The banks of the river about its embouchure are bordered by highly-cultivated fields, in some parts covered with low wooded land. The banks

are increased and elevated under a regular system, the peculiar formation of the overhanging trees giving a pleasing and verdant aspect to the country. The numerous sand-banks about the Lang-shan hills on the north bank, and the town and hills of Fu-shan on the south, render that part of the navigation of the river (known as the Lang-shan Crossing, the channel taking a sharp turn towards the Lang-shan hills) particularly dangerous. Several fine vessels have been lost, and one, the *Kate*, a new steam-ship, became a total wreck there while engaged upon her first voyage. She ran ashore, and in a moment the immense strength of the tide capsized her, when, sliding off the sand-bank, she sank in deep water, many of the crew and passengers losing their lives, while the whole valuable cargo, including a large amount of specie, went to the bottom.

The dangers of the deep, or rather the shallow, are not the only perils of this part, for it is infested with pirates and robbers of every description. Sometimes they are rebels, sometimes fishermen, and sometimes large piratical vessels from the coast; but more frequently still they are Imperialist war-junks, whose crews, though consisting of government troops and sailors, are pillagers of the most ruthless description. At the time I made my first voyage up the Yang-tze-kiang, piracy, and murder of the crews, of the smaller European vessels engaged in the river trade, were of frequent occurrence. In fact, a ship scarcely ever made a voyage without being attacked.

The river scenery from Lang-shan to the city of Chin-kiang (115 miles), the first of the river treaty ports, for the greater part is flat, the surrounding country being of a low alluvial soil. It is, however, of a much more attractive description than might be supposed. The cultivated parts are embedded amongst luxuriant foliage, and the infinite variety of the smaller species of tree gives a variegated and shadowy appearance to the scene.

I have found some parts of really exquisite beauty. A thick border of trees, bushes, and bamboo seems to form a complete barrier to approach from the river, but at last a small creek appears running directly through this

wall of vegetation: for some little distance this is completely shrouded and arched in by the luxuriant growth of osier and small weeping-willows; but then a break in the vista discovers, through a network of foliage, a small lake of pure limpid water, whose sides are bounded by fruit-trees and highly cultivated gardens; while a snug little homestead, enveloped in flowering creepers, and half-buried by shrubs of Asiatic beauty, peeps out from amidst the surrounding mass of forest. I have come unexpectedly upon many little nests like this; the very suddenness with which they burst upon one being of itself charming.

At Chin-kiang the current is of great velocity; and, while attempting to steam round the south end of "Silver Island," we were literally overpowered by its strength, and swept down the river; but, trying the north end, we found a little more protection, from the formation of the river bank, and managed to pass the critical point.

Silver Island is a most picturesque and exquisite spot. It rises directly from the centre of the river to a height of some 400 feet. It is completely covered, from the river's brink to its very summit, with a rich display of every variety of Chinese vegetation. One of the most important Joss-houses (Budhist temples) in the empire is situated at the foot of this island, the interior filled with images of every devil and divinity the Chinese religious calendar contains; and besides all these monstrous representations, a modelled menagerie of every kind of wild animal known to the Chinese zoographer. A goodly number of Budhist priests are attached to this place, whose time is principally devoted to the cultivation of the island (the whole of the trees, plantations, and flowers having been raised by them), and to keeping up a ceaseless beating upon several drums to soothe the great fish they believe carries the world on its back, and so prevent it wriggling and producing earthquakes; which are caused, they say, whenever the drums throughout the world are silent, and the "Joss" fish cannot hear the beat of one.



SILVER ISLAND.

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At Chin-kiang is established a corps of the foreign mercenaries of the Imperialist maritime customs, an organization patronized by the British government as a means of securing the indemnity money guaranteed in payment of the British expenses for a war undertaken to avenge the capture of the opium-smuggler *Arrow*, and apparently to facilitate the opium trade in general.

Upon an island a few miles above Chin-kiang I found some capital deer-shooting. I brought down several, and found them of the hog-deer species, with large tusks. Great flocks of wild duck and teal were plentiful all over the river, and our guns kept the table well supplied.

Some eighteen miles above Chin-kiang we came to a great salt mart, a large village on the north bank, named E-ching. On the opposite side of the river we observed a considerable body of Ti-pings marching in the direction of Chin-kiang, which city was already invested. Although many hills in the neighbourhood of Chin-kiang were occupied by the Ti-pings, I was unable to communicate with them, our stay at that place being so short. E-ching is the emporium for the salt trade with the interior. Here the large junks from the coast discharge their cargoes, which are then stored ashore, and when disposed of to merchants from the distant provinces, re-shipped in river junks, and carried up the Yang-tze.

The salt trade is a government monopoly, from which they reap enormous profits; and if the British government had made war upon China for the purpose of establishing a trade in that article, and not in opium, they would, instead of destroying and demoralizing them, have conferred a vast benefit upon the Chinese, and benefited themselves.

Salt at E-ching, upon an average, is of the same price as the common rice (the staple article of food in China), seldom selling for less than three taels (one pound sterling) per picul (130 pounds weight). A few hundred miles farther up the river, though of the commonest and dirtiest sea description, it is frequently sold at more than double that price. Of course, where an article of such immense and important consumption is declared contraband, and monopolized by the government, a large amount of smuggling exists. Until the Yang-tze-kiang was opened to foreign trade, little, if any, smuggling was effected upon its waters; but upon the advent of Europeans, many of them made large profits by secretly conveying salt, even sometimes in their steamships, while numberless sailing craft—usually the semi-European, semi-Chinese lorcas—were solely occupied in this illegal traffic.

Soon after passing E-ching we came upon the Ti-pings at a place in the vicinity of Nin-gan-shan, a village some short distance inland, formed by a sharp bend of the river to the northwards. This elbow they had just fortified with a rather heavy, formidable-looking battery. The guns, however, were very inferior, being of the usual clumsy Chinese make and fitting. The river at this point was considerably reduced in width, being little more than half a mile across, and the south bank being formed of cliffs, some two hundred feet high, and being also in the hands of the Ti-pings, rendered the position highly favourable. From this point both sides of the river were in Ti-ping possession; therefore, whenever we required to stop we could do so, and land with perfect safety and immunity from insult.

Above Chin-kiang the country gradually assumes a more massive and imposing formation. High ranges of mountains are visible inland, and in some places descend even to the river's edge; while generally the country becomes of a more undulating, diversified appearance. In the neighbourhood of Nin-gan-shan the hilly part of the soil presents strong indication of auriferous qualities. I afterwards went over the spot with an old Californian miner, who declared the place was full of gold; but, unfortunately, we had no time to try it.

At Nankin I remained but a short time, barely sufficient to obtain the necessary permit from H.M.S. *Centaur*, stationed there to represent the British interests at the Ti-ping capital. The *Centaurs* seemed on good terms with the Ti-pings, for their ship was crowded with them. Several boats put off from the shore with provisions for sale, and one official came on board with a request for us to remain and trade. This was impossible, for though we much wished it, and though the foreign merchants were entirely dependent upon the Ti-pings for silk, and a great proportion of tea, yet the British government in its Elgin treaty (June 1858, by articles IX. and X.), had completely placed a veto upon trade with them; though afterwards they asserted that the Ti-pings would not trade. Of course, had we attempted to trade as the Ti-pings desired, we should have been seized and prevented by

H.M.'s representative on board the *Centaur*, for breaking the treaty with the Manchoo emperor of China.

After purchasing a few fowls and some eggs, we proceeded on our voyage to Han-kow.

Some forty miles above Nankin we passed between the East and West Pillars, two immense masses of rock nearly a thousand feet high, and projecting, with a sheer descent, some little distance into the river. Both were in the possession of the Ti-pings. The summits were fortified, and at the foot of each strong batteries were erected. These two giant sentinels are termed by the Chinese the gates of the upper river; beyond them the flood tide ceases to be perceptible.

When off the city of Tu-n gliu some 380 miles from the mouth of the river, we were compelled to seek a sheltered anchorage, and to remain there several days through stress of weather. Even at such a considerable distance inland, the storms are sometimes so violent, and the waves of the river so disturbed, that smaller vessels are unable to brave their fury; the swiftness of the current adding considerably to the danger.

The sheltered nook we sought already contained a weather-bound vessel. Our fellow-captive proved to be an English schooner upon a trading cruise about the river. She was manned by Chinese sailors, but the owners and another European were in charge. The three days we remained at anchor passed pleasantly enough, our position being perfectly sheltered, and the boisterous state of the river affecting us but little; while each day we visited the schooner's people, or they came to us.

I made several shooting trips ashore with our companions, and we always returned well rewarded for our trouble, the place literally swarming with pheasants. The country was mostly of a low hilly formation, and being uncultivated, the hills, full of low shrubs and gorse, made a capital cover. We shot pheasants even in the farm-yards of the few houses about, and the inhabitants told us we might catch them at night roosting all round their dwellings. My companions from the schooner, who had been in California

and Australia, declared the hills about Tu-nghiu contained gold; they also stated the whole river was full of it, and showed me some large specimens they had washed at a place named Hen Point, some twenty miles below the city of Ngan-king.

We fully intended to test the Tu-nghiu soil, but the weather clearing rendered necessary our immediate departure.


Some miles before reaching the treaty port of Kew-kiang, we passed a remarkable rock termed the Little Orphan. Several hundred yards in circumference at the base, at the distance of thirty fathoms from the north bank of the river it rises perpendicularly about four or five hundred feet. The summit is crowned by Budhist temples and idols, the only communication being by means of a stair cut in the sides of the rock by the priests. When passing this singular place once afterwards, my Chinese crew informed me no European could ascend the rock and live, it being protected by some Chinese demon, or genii, peculiarly averse to "foreign devils."

A few hours before arriving at Kew-kiang we passed the entrance to the Poyang Lake, a channel considerably broader than the river itself. The clear transparent waters of the lake afforded a pleasing contrast to the thick and muddy current of the river, and we steamed about a mile into it, for the purpose of obtaining a good supply and filling all our available casks. The appearance of this lake is magnificent in the extreme. Lost in the far distance, its limpid surface is surrounded by tall impending cliffs, in some places terminating abruptly at the margin of the water, while in others the intervening space is filled up with a most luxuriant growth of under-wood, overshadowed by the bending branches of gnarled and giant trees. The numerous valleys formed by the hills contain the summer resting-places of many of the Chinese nobility, whose handsome palaces fill every appropriate situation. The cloud-enveloped summits of one high range of mountains on the western shore, are crowned with eternal snow, presenting a most fantastic appearance, and affording many a wild and weird theme to Chinese romancers.

Kew-kiang we found in the direst state of confusion. The Imperialist troops had declared their determination to massacre the hated "Yang-quitzo," or drive him off their soil; and all the European residents were blockaded in their quarter. An English gunboat, and one of the large merchant steamers, were lying off the concession, prepared to render their assistance and protection, and when we arrived, at the request of the consul—who expected his consulate would be attacked again that night—we moored in a position where our guns would prove effective in case of danger. The night, however, passed off pretty quietly, and the braves only made a further demonstration by smashing the few remaining panes of glass they had left whole upon a former assault. A day or two previously they had made a grand attack upon the settlement, destroyed several new buildings of the merchants, and very nearly demolished the British Consulate; but when the residents, in self-defence, were compelled to shoot a few of them, they retreated for the time. The mandarins, as at all the river ports, pretended they could not control their soldiers; whereas, they deliberately set them on, to try and prevent the settling of the Europeans, and the fulfilment of the treaty.

Some of the river scenery between Kew-kiang and Han-kow is wild, and really sublime in its grandeur. In many places huge masses of mountain rise steeply out of the channel to more than a thousand feet. At one part an immense cliff, named Ke-tow (Cock's Head), overhangs the stream, its base washed by the waves; while, moving under its shadow, innumerable flocks of shag, startled by the passing vessel, rose from their nests in the time-worn crevices, and eddying round and round overhead, produced a loud rushing noise from their myriads of wings, while the shrill discordant cries they uttered, increased by the singular note of the great "Bramley kites," reverberated with a thousand echoes from the perforated and honeycombed face of perpendicular rock. If a musket be fired near Ke-tow, the very air becomes blackened by an immense multitude of birds issuing from the cliff, while the noise of their cries is perfectly deafening. Their number is so

prodigious that one might fairly suppose all the birds in China were congregated together at this place.



KE-TOW.

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Day & Son, Limited, Lith.

A little further on, another magnificent view of the river is found, where, between high impending mountains, at Pwan-pien-shan (the Split Hill) it is darkly imprisoned. The hills in this neighbourhood are covered with wild

tea, and numerous limestone quarries are burrowed along their sides. Wherever the mountains retreat from the river the intervening country is profusely cultivated, and the sloping sides of the hills, covered with a rich and varied semi-tropical foliage, sweep down to the low land. The distant pagodas, marking with their carved and many-storied, time-worn, monumental sculpture, the site of some town or anciently celebrated locality—the occasional village, partly hidden in some half-sequestered spot—the curious but ingenious apparatus of the fisherman on the river's brink, with his reed hut here and there peeping through the rushes of the bank—the peasants toiling and irrigating the paddy-fields—the bright Eastern sun, and clear sapphire sky, above the changeful bosom of the "Son of the Sea," now rushing between massive rocky walls, then bursting into lake-like fulness, studded at intervals with a low and feathery reed-topped or cultivated rice-waving island—and the waters, tipped with the snowy wings of the passing vessels—all these are objects which produce a landscape surpassingly beautiful. China has been termed "a vast and fertile plain;" but, I believe, a trip up the Yang-tze will show as diversified and grand a scenery as almost any part of the world.

But then comes a dark side of nature, for this is truly a land where "all save the spirit of man is divine." Throughout all these beauties of country one must tread with care, for it is a land of enemies; all through the Yang-tze's course we experienced nothing but aggravating annoyance and insult from the Imperialists; wherever they were, landing became not only disagreeable, but dangerous. This was a drawback of serious importance, but one which would have ceased to exist were it not for the policy of the British government, which, by preventing the success of the friendly Ti-pings, and strengthening the Imperialists, has perpetuated the evil.

In order to avoid the strength of the tide, we were obliged to keep close in to the bank, while at the same time we kept a stand of muskets and fowling-pieces well loaded to check our dastardly aggressors.

Although Kew-kiang was bad enough, at Han-kow we found confusion worse confounded. It was simply impossible to pass through the streets except in parties of four or five, well armed. The British consul, Mr. Gingall, had gone out with some of the petty local authorities to mark a ground for the consulate and British concession, but with his marine guard received such a heavy stoning from the *braves* and populace, that they were compelled to beat a speedy retreat. A placard had been posted by the *braves*, threatening to massacre all the European residents upon a certain date; this was succeeded by an official proclamation from the Chinese governor, calling upon the soldiers to remain quiet, because the "foreign devils" were to be "hired and used" to fight the Ti-ping rebels, after which his excellency would employ his *braves* to drive those "barbarians" out of China. At the time, I paid but little attention to this, looking upon it as a piece of the usual Chinese bravado; recent events, however, have led me to think otherwise. One part of the proclamation has been fulfilled, it remains to be seen whether the other will succeed.

While passing through a public street one evening, a *brave* made a spring at me from a narrow side alley; fortunately, I carried a coat on my arm, and throwing this up, received the blow of his short sword without injury. I was of course armed, and before my assailant could repeat the blow, his arm was arrested by a Colt's revolver ball. Several *braves* were collecting, but when they saw the fate of their leader, and found me armed, they "skedaddled" pretty sharply.

Some Europeans did not escape so easily, but were brutally murdered. Nearly a year later affairs were but little improved, for a Mr. Little, of Dent & Co.'s, was severely maltreated without having given the slightest provocation; and several of the firm's junks were seized and carried off by the *braves*. This was avenged by H.M. gunboat *Havoc* seizing and burning the gunboat whose crew had beaten Mr. Little. The Chinese officials, with their usual policy of exciting the people against Europeans, posted proclamations, and gave out as a fact, that the English had fastened all the

*braves* they caught to the gunboat, and burnt them alive. I explored the country in every direction, within a radius of twenty-five miles around Hankow, upon shooting excursions, and I invariably found, that wherever the natives were distant from Imperial troops, or officials, they were kind and courteous to Europeans. I entered numerous villages to rest and obtain refreshment, and at many received polite and dignified invitations from some of the people to enter their dwellings. I must say, the Chinese are one of the most polite and well-behaved people I have ever met. Although bursting with curiosity to ascertain my country and business, I never found them guilty of the slightest rudeness, or annoying inquisitiveness; upon the contrary, they would wait until their etiquette of presenting tea, etc., had been observed, and then, pretending to be unconcerned, commence their inquiries indirectly. With all this, I could not fail to notice the half-dubious, half-disliking style of their manner;—the universal result of their government's misrepresentation, and the stringent orders which they received to treat Europeans as barbarians unworthy of civilized (Chinese) treatment or consideration. Can we not remember the sort of treatment foreigners received till lately in China, upon the following Manchoo maxim of intercourse with Europeans?

"The barbarians are like beasts, and not to be ruled on the same principles as citizens. Were any one to attempt controlling them by the great maxims of reason, it would tend to nothing but confusion. The ancient kings well understood this, and accordingly ruled barbarians by misrule. Therefore to rule barbarians by misrule is the true and the best way of ruling them."

It was on this principle that all the benefits of Chinese law were denied Europeans; so that, even in cases of *accidental* homicide, they were required to be delivered up, not for trial, but execution.

Sir John Davis, formerly governor of Hong-Kong, wrote:—

"The rulers of China consider foreigners fair game; they have no sympathy with them, and, what is more, they diligently and systematically labour to destroy all sympathy on the part of their subjects, by representing the

strangers to them in every light that is the most contemptible and odious. There is an annual edict or proclamation displayed at Canton at the commencement of the commercial season, accusing the foreigners of the most horrible practices, and desiring the people to have as little to say to them as possible."

Although at the present time British subjects are not delivered up to be executed by Manchoos, and although Europeans are not defamed and attacked so openly as was the case previous to the late wars, the government is every bit as industriously maligning them to its subjects, and striving *all in its power* to prevent free trade or intercourse. Why are the Manchoos so inveterately embittered against foreigners? is the natural question. Certainly not because they are unable to appreciate the benefit of trade; they love their own interests too well to be averse to the only remaining prop to their rule—trade with foreigners, and consequent help to crush the rebellion. But the truth is, with unmistakeable foresight they see that the free contact of their Chinese subjects with European nations will eventually ruin *them*; they know their rule is hated and unrighteous, and they know that wherever the people become enlightened and improved, *their* murderous gripe will be torn from the throat of the nation. While liking our trade, they hate our communion! The latter they have reason to dread, though not if they can always succeed in obtaining our military aid against the effects of our intercourse, as they have done in the case of the Ti-ping rebellion.

At Han-kow I left the steamer, to take command of a new schooner belonging (nominally) to the same owners. As her interior accommodations were not quite finished, I took a small house until such time as she should be completed. While residing ashore, I suffered from an attack of fever—a complaint very prevalent amongst Europeans in China—that at one time seemed almost certain to destroy my life.

One night when convalescent, but still very weak, I was aroused by a strong smell of fire; in a moment almost, thick volumes of smoke rushed into the room, and I heard the loud crackling of burning wood close at hand.

Getting from my bed, and hurrying some clothing on as quickly as possible, I got to the door of my house, and found the next one in a complete blaze, and my own just igniting. My servants no sooner opened the back door and attempted to save my property, than a crowd of *braves* rushed in and commenced to plunder all they could lay hands on. I was too weak to do much, but, taking a sword, endeavoured to drive them off; I followed one a few paces from the door, and thrust at his body, but was too weak to hurt him much, and the point of my weapon glanced on his ribs; the fellow did not even drop his booty, but successfully made off with all the bedding. Fortunately at this juncture assistance from some neighbouring European residents arrived, or I should have lost everything. With their help and that of the coolies, the greater part of my things were saved, but much had been carried off by the "Imps." The origin of the fire was attributable to the incendiary acts of the Imperialist soldiers, who had set fire to the adjoining house, as also to an European dwelling, out of malice, and hatred of the "foreign devils."

For the few days before taking up my quarters on board the schooner, a friend kindly accommodated me. I then engaged a Greek seaman as mate, shipped a Chinese crew, a Malay boatswain, and prepared to leave. Our voyage progressed very favourably until we reached a place a little below the treaty port Kew-kiang, where, although hitherto dropping down with the tide at the rate of three or four miles an hour, my course was abruptly arrested for several days. Between Kew-kiang and the mouth of the Poyang Lake is situated a large island, and instead of taking the usual channel, my stupid Chinese pilot preferred the other side of the island. In consequence of this, when about half-way past, stem on we went, and stuck hard and fast aground. After a tiresome day's work we managed to get afloat again in about six inches more water than the schooner was drawing, and then made fast for the night. In the morning, after sounding in every direction, and finding the only channel very shallow, and as intricate as the maze at Rosherville Gardens, I obtained a fisherman from the shore, who, for the

consideration of a few strings of cash, piloted us out; our own pilot being perfectly ignorant of his duties. I have since found it a common thing for Chinamen who have spent all their lives sailing about the Yang-tze river, to be utterly unacquainted with its pilotage.

Through this affair, the vessel's rudder became injured, and we had barely cleared the island, making sail to a fresh breeze, when away it went.

It now became necessary to bring up for repairs: so picking out a creek with a village named Chang-kea-kau at its entrance, I ran the schooner into it, anchored, and sent ashore for carpenters to make a new rudder. In about a week's time, the village blacksmiths and carpenters managed to turn out a contrivance they termed a rudder; but of all the Rudders I ever saw it beat them hollow. They could neither make round bolts, nor long bolts: so instead of bolting the rudder together, they fastened the first part to the rudder-post with huge square nails (they could only cut square holes in timber, having no tool to bore large round ones), and the second part to the first, and the outside piece to the second, with huge iron clamps driven on at the sides: the whole concern stuck and plastered together with lumps of iron bands and braces in every direction, in a way that none but a Chinaman could contrive.

With immense exertion of mechanics, I managed to get this monster shipped in its place, after which I was enabled to make sail and proceed.

At the city of Ta-tung, about 150 miles above Nankin, and fifty below Ngan-king, the capital of Ngan-whui province, I anchored for three days. This city is the chief salt mart up river, all the salt from E-ching coming there, previously to being distributed over the country. The scenery about Ta-tung is very fine—lightly wooded hills gradually rising, range after range, far into the interior. I took a ramble ashore with Philip, my mate, to hunt up some game; our way lay over ridges of low hills covered with a forest of dwarf firs, none over six feet high, mingled with specimens of the smallest of all small trees, the dwarf oak. This Lilliputian forest was succeeded by a tangled undergrowth, and fine plantation, which compelled us to pursue the narrow tracks leading through it. During our progress we were often startled


with the loud whirr of the pheasant springing from almost under our feet, and although the high cover made it difficult to get a shot, we obtained several brace. At last we came to a more open part of the hills, where the forest was succeeded by wild flowers and shrubs, while small lakes were frequent in the valleys below us. The hills became higher and more rocky, the few trees about them being of large size—in fact, the tallest I have seen in China. From the rocky nature of the country, and the running appearance of the chain of lakes, I fancied a large spring was somewhere in the neighbourhood, and I was right; for, after following a beautiful and gradually ascending valley some distance, we came to a cold mountain spring of the purest water I ever tasted in China. We threw ourselves upon the grass and drank the pure mountain draught to our heart's content, and, while resting ourselves, inhaled the powerful aromatic odour of the wild magnolia growing in profusion around. The magnolia is the only flower I have found in China possessing fragrance, all others, however beautiful, being without perfume. Whilst rolling on the turf we had observed some birds, apparently of the duck species, fly overhead in the direction of some tall trees through a gorge on the hills; it being the middle of summer, these birds excited our curiosity, and we determined to follow them and if possible get a shot. When we arrived at the foot of the trees, to our surprise we saw many of these duck-like birds flying in and out of nests among the branches; we shot three brace and a half, and found them to be the beautiful and delicious little wood or summer duck. When I returned on board, I instantly sent some of my crew ashore with a small cask to fill at the spring, and ever afterwards I remembered that cool water and its romantic valley.

The few villages about seemed very poor; they had continually been visited by Ti-ping or Imperialist soldiers, and this, of course, had proved disastrous to the inhabitants, for we all know what hungry *disciplined* troops are in an enemy's country, but few of us realize the effect of *undisciplined* Chinese. The houses, however, had not been destroyed, and the only mark of the Ti-pings was the remains of a large Budhist temple, each separate brick,

as usual, being broken to pieces, so that nothing but heaps of rubbish remained. The people spoke very vengefully about the visits of the Imperialist troops, who, they said, had used their women shamefully, and killed several of the husbands and fathers who had attempted to defend them. The Ti-pings, they informed me, had treated them well, and had only made them contribute provisions for the army; one soldier having used violence to a girl, had been decapitated, and they showed me the place where his head had been exposed. They also spoke very kindly of one leader of the Ti-pings, the Ying-wang, who had allowed nothing to be taken from them without payment for it.

During my voyage in the schooner, I became acquainted with the Chinese game of chess, which, although resembling that of Europe in a few pieces, and the object of the game, is in every other particular totally different. I had several Chinese on board, passengers to Shanghae, and they taught me how to play.

The board, instead of being divided into black and white squares, as with us, is of one colour—generally black—and divided by lines on which the pieces stand, and move as shown in the following rules and annexed diagram:—



KING—Can only move one square at a time, and only straight or sideways as a castle, neither can he move outside his nine points, nor into a square exposed to the adverse king from the opposite side of the board, without any intervening piece.

MANDARINS, or SHIELDS—Can only move within the nine points, one at a time, diagonally, as a bishop; they take the same way.

BISHOPS—Can only move upon their own side of the ditch, always move two points at a time, and take the same way. Their move is diagonal.

KNIGHTS—Move and take the same as with us, go all over the board, but cannot move when the angle at the first point of the move is occupied by another piece. They cannot jump over a piece as with us, but must have the road clear.

CASTLES—Move and take, and have entirely the same value as with us.

GUNS—They move only as a castle, but can only take by jumping over an intervening piece.

PAWNS—Move one point at a time, straight forward, take the same way, and when they cross the ditch, can take and advance, forwards or sideways, like a castle; but still only one point at a time. They cannot, however, move backwards. It requires a move of the pawn, and half a move of the knight, to cross the ditch. Castles and guns can go as far beyond as willing in one move.

I passed close to the Nankin fortifications, but did not anchor, as I saw quite sufficient to guide me in joining the Chung-wang there without

stopping; the place being evidently open and easy of access.

At Chin-kiang I heard terrible rumours of pirates, about the Lang-shan crossing and entrance of the river; and the more the deeds of the pirates were talked about, the greater embellishment they received from the imagination of the narrator, so that, at last, bad as they certainly were, the deeds attributed to them would never have been recognized by the perpetrators themselves.

With all the exaggeration, the danger was really too great to be despised, and I made arrangements to sail down to Shanghae in company with two European vessels also bound there, one a fore and-aft-French schooner, the other an American lorchha.

The first night after leaving Chin-kiang, being in advance of my consorts, I observed an English schooner right ahead, with her ensign flying union down. At the time I made her out she was scarcely half a mile distant, and the moon shining brightly upon her, with my glasses I easily distinguished her signal of distress. As we approached each other from opposite directions, in a few minutes we had closed to within speaking distance; so, rounding to, I hailed to know what was the matter. I could only faintly distinguish, in reply, "Come on board; I will anchor."

After passing me by a few hundred yards the strange vessel brought up, and lowering a boat, I proceeded to board her, leaving my Greek mate to bring the schooner a little closer, and then anchor. Before getting alongside I noticed two Europeans on the quarter deck of the schooner, waiting to receive me, and to my surprise saw they were both armed. As this looked suspicious, when under the shadow of the vessel's side I loosened my revolver in its sheath. When I reached the gangway, I observed many of the Chinese crew watching my approach, and all, apparently, in a state of excitement. This put me upon my guard still more, for it was evident something was wrong; and, coupling the appearance of things with the signal of distress, that something was most likely dangerous. I ascended the gangway ladder with caution, and well I did so, for my head had scarcely

appeared above the rail when a Chinaman made a rush at me with both hands stretched out, evidently intending to push me overboard. Thanks to my watchfulness and sailor training, I was able to meet this attack successfully, in spite of my awkward situation. Clinging to the side ladder with my knees, I quick as thought ducked my head and shoulders inboard, seized my assailant round the waist before he could take hold of me, and, aided by his own impetus, threw him clean over my head into the river. He uttered one cry as, plunging into the fierce and turbid tide of the Yang-tze, he disappeared for ever. This passed within two seconds, and, drawing my revolver, I sprang on board before several other Chinese rushing to the gangway could reach me. The sudden display of the hollow barrel within a couple of feet, and pointing straight at the head of the foremost, checked them, and at that moment the whizzing of a bullet amongst them, accompanied by the sharp crack of a rifled pistol, and followed by the appearance of the two Europeans at my side, drove them back.

The whole crew, however, seemed springing from every direction, some from the hatchways, some from forward, and some from aft; and with the usual gesticulation of Chinese about to fight, commenced stripping themselves of their outer clothing, and uttering fierce crys and yells to encourage each other.

I had barely a moment to receive the explanation of the schooner's captain, who thrust a spare cutlass into my hand—that a mutiny had taken place, and having secured the ringleader he wished me to carry him down to Shanghae in irons—when the crew were upon us. Jumping and yelling like a legion of fiends let loose, they hurried towards us, brandishing the bamboo spears and the knives they had armed themselves with. For a moment we hesitated to fire upon them, but that moment's delay very nearly cost us our lives. Thinking they possessed no firearms, we believed we could awe them into submission with our revolvers. Suddenly one of them jumped forward and discharged two heavy horse pistols point blank at me and the captain of the schooner. The din of the report, the smoke, and our surprise, combined

with an indefinite sort of feeling (upon my part at least) that we were half blown to pieces, caused a moment's inaction almost fatal to us. The whole of the crew, some eighteen or twenty, rushed forward. Fortunately the captain (who I imagined was the mate) of the vessel, being farthest away from the discharge of the pistols, was not in the least startled, but firing at the man who held them, brought him to the deck, and then discharging several shots amongst the crowd, gave me time to recover myself.

I did not feel wounded. My next perception was, that I was engaged with half a dozen men pushing fiercely at me with their spears. For some seconds I defended myself desperately with the cutlass, successfully warding all their thrusts, actually forgetful of the revolver I held in my left hand. I was soon reminded of its use by another man coming towards me, pointing a huge pistol like the first two that had so nearly finished me. This entirely recalled my presence of mind, and bringing my revolver into play, I had the satisfaction of seeing him fall in the smoke. At the same instant, however, the slight distraction had nearly proved successful to my spear assailants; one transfixes me, as I thought, though afterwards it appeared I was barely scratched, and the transfixing sensation was caused by the spear tightly pinning my clothes, while before I could parry it, another made a thrust full at my breast. With no time to sweep my cutlass round, I dropped it, and seized the spear-hilt within an inch of my body, at the same time using my revolver and shooting the man. Before I could level at another enemy, the man whose spear was fast in my clothes abandoned it and closed with me. Over and over we rolled on the deck. I was unable to use my pistol, and he to use his knife. My left wrist was firmly grasped by his right hand, while my right hand was fully engaged restraining his left, armed with a large dagger.

While struggling on the deck I saw several Chinamen approaching with uplifted spear, to slaughter me in my helpless condition, but each time I had seen the schooner's mate jump over me, exclaiming, as he thrust with his sword, "Lā, lā," and each time I had seen an enemy fall. At last I received a

severe blow on the head, and, half-stunned, felt my antagonist releasing his left hand. Just at this moment I was sensible of some one dragging himself along the deck close to me, and ere I could distinguish who or what it was, my revolver was taken from my hand, the Chinaman who had hitherto been holding it abandoned his grip, and knocked my right hand from his left. Instead of feeling his knife pierce me, a pistol was discharged, so close that the flash singed my hair, and the Chinaman fell motionless across me.

From the effect of the blow I had received, and the shock of the near report, I lay for a moment unable to move. I was then aroused by the mate of the schooner dragging the Chinaman off me and assisting me to rise, exclaiming, "Eh, monsieur capitaine, hope I, be gar! vous have no die—Zese sacré—all dead, all run down le fond de calle—de hole, be gar!"

When I recovered my feet, I saw the deck was deserted, except by ourselves and seven or eight Chinamen lying dead or wounded, and the captain of the schooner, who was sitting on the deck with my revolver in his hand—for he it was who had so opportunely rescued me from my antagonist.

Upon examining the captain, we found he had received a severe-looking wound from the first discharge, a ball from one of the horse pistols having struck his breast, and then, glancing, passed through the fleshy part of his left arm.

Of the prostrate Chinese four were dead and four severely wounded. All this happened in far less time than it takes to read it, and just as it was all over my two consorts arrived, and the vessels being anchored close alongside, their owners came on board to ascertain the cause of all the noise and firing.

The Frenchman whom I had taken for the mate of the schooner, proved to be part owner of her. She was from Shanghae, and bound to Chin-kiang with a cargo of sundries and opium. When close to the Lang-shan crossing the crew were observed to be acting very suspiciously, and the *lowder* (Chinese captain) having altered the course of the vessel, to steer her away to

the northern entrance of the river, a favourite haunt of pirates, the captain and owner at once determined to seize and make him a prisoner, rightly suspecting that they had shipped a crew in league with the pirates.

Arming themselves, they went on deck and immediately seized the *lowder* at the helm, one making him fast while the other threatened him with instant death in case of resistance. Directly the crew saw this they seized up boarding-pikes, hand-spikes, &c., and commenced rushing aft to attack them; but while the captain kept them off with a levelled rifle, the owner, putting his revolver to the *lowder's* head, swore to blow his brains out if the crew advanced another step.

This had the desired effect, for the *lowder* quickly called to his colleagues to desist, who at once retired to the fore part of the vessel, leaving their leader in the hands of the Europeans.

After they had been sailing for several hours up the river in this position, they met me; and during their occupation, when I was boarding them, the crew had managed to release the *lowder*, and made the attack upon us to try and capture the vessel, well knowing the fate which awaited them at Shanghae as pirates.

Had it not been for the prowess and dexterous swordsmanship of the owner, the Chinamen, although with great loss, would undoubtedly have overpowered us. The Frenchman had been maître d'armes in a French regiment, and more than nine killed and wounded were due to his sword, for, besides those left on deck, five or six who had fled below were wounded. Poor fellow! some little time afterwards he was killed by pirates, almost upon the scene of our encounter, when, after bravely defending himself alone on the deck of his vessel against a host of assailants, and killing sixteen with his own hand, the pirates, unable to overcome his splendid swordsmanship, retired to their own vessel and killed him by throwing stink-pots<sup>16</sup> upon him.

We dressed the captain's wounds as well as we were able, and after throwing the dead overboard, and permitting the Chinese to dress their own

wounds, we made them all fast; and, remaining by the schooner all night, we had the satisfaction of seeing her taken in tow for Chin-kiang, by a passing river steamer, in the morning.

After this, in company with my consorts, I weighed anchor and proceeded on my voyage to Shanghae. Towards dusk we came within sight of the Lang-shan hills, and as it would have been dangerous to attempt the crossing at night, especially in the vicinity of pirates, we determined to anchor until daylight.

About midnight, I and the mate were alarmed by the look-out man, who rushed into our cabin, singing out—"Jen-dow-li! Jen-dow-li!" (Pirates coming! Pirates coming!)

Jumping out of our berths we hurried on deck, turning all the crew out to get the schooner under weigh.

Rather more than a quarter of a mile up river we observed two heavy junks, and as we were lying to the ebb tide, they were right straight ahead. As they were so distant, and apparently peaceful, people not so experienced as ourselves would never have taken the slightest alarm, and consequently would have become an easy prey.

I perceived at a glance the *modus operandi* of the junks ahead—they had anchored exactly abreast of each other, but some distance apart; they had then run out a stout rope from the bow of one to the other, and having waited for a dark and favourable opportunity, had weighed their anchors and were now dropping down upon us with the tide, rapidly and noiselessly, hauling in the rope on board either vessel as might be necessary, intending to let it catch across our bows or cable, and thus be swept alongside instantaneously by the strong tide, when their crowds of men could board and make short work of us. Many a vessel unsuspecting of this cunning device has been easily captured, when otherwise she might have beaten off the pirates, or escaped through superior sailing.

Getting under weigh, I determined to drop down with the tide according to the plan of the pirates, as it was likely by that means my movement would

for some little time remain undiscovered and give me an opportunity to close with my consorts, anchored more than a mile below.

The moon having just gone down, and the night become quite dark, my design succeeded admirably, and I lessened the distance between myself and allies by at least three quarters of a mile before the pirates gave any sign that they had discovered they were not closing with me. At last, however, we could dimly discern their spreading foresails through the darkness, as they made sail in chase; I was not slow to follow their example, and Philip and myself having armed, prepared to go on board our consorts, they carrying guns, while our vessel mounted none. The only danger was, that our friends might not be keeping a look-out, and that we should have no time to prepare them for defence, or get the guns ready.

We were soon relieved on this point, for our pursuers had the kindness to open fire upon us, and so effectually arouse the crews of the other vessels.

From the loudness and rapidity of the reports, I knew our antagonists were of the formidable west coast class (Ti-mungs), mounting ten or a dozen 12 to 32-pounders. I had but little fear of the result, however, if once on board our friends' vessels, for I knew they each carried two long nines, which well worked—and two of us were good gunners—would soon put the pirates to flight.

The cannonade had only lasted a few minutes, when I perceived the sails of my two consorts close by. I instantly put the *lowder* in charge of my vessel, and directing him to steer directly after us, took six of my best men in the boat, and pulling to our allies, left my mate and three of the crew on board one of them, and took the other three on board the second with myself.

According to pre-arrangement, I took charge of the operations. The plan I determined upon was to concentrate our fire upon one of the attacking vessels, and to manœuvre so as to bring her into the centre of a circle, the radius of which would be described by our two vessels and the other pirate ship. If this could be carried out, we would be in a position to keep one of the enemy's vessels in the way of the other—or that one which might be in

the centre of the circle, between the fire of its consort and our vessels. Hailing my schooner, I ordered her to keep away in the opposite course until I should open fire, and then to sail back and follow in my wake. This ruse had the desired effect, for while one Ti-mung bore away to engage the schooner, the other seemed inclined to follow our two fighting ships, and act as a cover to her consort's attack.

In a short time we had the satisfaction to bring the two Ti-mungs nearly in a line; and to prevent my own vessel getting too far away and thus running the risk of being carried by the board before we could come to her assistance, we opened fire immediately. The advantageous position we had obtained soon became evident; our opponent mounting about ten broadside guns could of course only fire five at a time, and as both the vessels under my charge carried swivel guns, we could reply with four; the only chance the pirates possessed to overmatch us, was by engaging each of our armed vessels, when the odds would have been more than double in their favour. This, however, they neglected to do, and while one was chasing my schooner—that now having tacked was following us round in a circle—and unable to bring a gun to bear on her, having nothing but broadside guns mounted, we were particularly engaged with our more immediate adversary, and completely sailing round her. The pirates' firing was bad and ineffective, not one shot in twenty striking us. I knew that, generally, vessels of the Chinese could only fire their guns with any aim when directly abeam; therefore the continual change of position I compelled her to observe, sadly interfered with their shooting.

In a short time the accuracy of our firing commenced to tell, and our antagonist hauled off to join his consort, making signals to her at the same time. The latter at once abandoned the chase of my schooner, and bore down to assist her companion. I now saw a good opportunity to finish the combat; both vessels were approaching us, and we were steering straight to meet them; I therefore loaded with a double charge of grape and canister, and

running down upon them, when within fifty yards, luffed right across their bows, and with our heavily charged guns raked them fore and aft.

It was too dark to see the result of that discharge, but we heard quite enough yelling to convince us it had proved sufficiently destructive to both vessels. The pirates, after a confusion in which it would have been easy to carry them had we had any men to board with, hauled off, and crowded on all sail to escape. This they might not have been permitted to do so easily; but while following them to bestow a few parting shots, the vessel I was on board ran bang ashore. This at once put an end to further pursuit; besides, the Ti-mungs could float in less than half the water we could, by reason of their flat and shallow build. I warned off our other two vessels, and both instantly lowered their sails and anchored while they could. Running a line out to one of them, we soon hove off the bank; as we were getting amongst the Lang-shan shoals, the only thing to be done was to remain at anchor quietly till daylight. We came out of the action with a loss of only one man killed—his head had been smashed with a round shot—one wounded by a splinter, one with a grape-shot lodged in his seat of honour, and a pet monkey, belonging to the captain of the vessel I was on board, missing. The loss of the pirates must have been heavy, especially from the salvo of grape and canister at close quarters.

The engagement had barely lasted half an hour, and upon its favourable termination we spent the remainder of the night, or rather morning, in glorification, winding up with a well-spread morning supper. We might fairly have expected we had had enough of pirates for one voyage, yet it was not so, and we were to see more of them before reaching Shanghae.

The morning broke dim and foggy, so thick, in fact, that we were unable to weigh anchor and proceed till late in the day. In consequence of the thick weather, we chose the north channel to pass the Lang-shan crossing, as there we could find good soundings to steer by. We had been following this for some time, and the day had become one of that unsettled changeable kind, leaving us at one moment in the centre of a dense fog, and anon in the midst

of a perfectly clear spot surrounded by thick banks, when, during a momentary glimpse of clear weather, a large fleet of Chinese trading junks passed us on their way up the river from Shanghae.

These junks reported that they had been attacked by pirates only a mile or so below, and that two of their number had been captured; the pirates, they said, were in long low boats, imperceptible in the fog until right alongside. This put us upon the *qui vive*; Philip and myself still remained on board the armed vessels, and sending my schooner on ahead, we followed her, one on each quarter. The fog again closed in upon us, and we had progressed but a very short distance when we heard a tremendous outcry from on board the schooner just ahead: it was so thick, that we were unable to discern anything, but we could plainly hear the Chinamen yelling out that they were attacked by "Jen-dow."

I was just about ordering a gun to be fired to frighten the pirates off, when, before I could give the order, we heard a splashing of oars, and the next minute bang went a gun within half a dozen yards, and a charge of grape or canister hissed and hurtled about our ears. I had barely time to jump off the gun I was sitting upon, depress it to the lowest limit, and fire it off with the cigar in my hand, when the long narrow boat I had laid the gun for—just issuing from the dense fog into the space of a few feet, within which anything could be distinguished—crashed alongside, full of the dead and dying. Every man in that boat seemed stricken, but we had no time for observation, for the instant she touched our side—probably torn to pieces by the grape and langridge—she turned over and sank. From the noise of oars all round us, it appeared as though many boats were rapidly pulling away; only one more came in sight, just sufficiently to receive a dose from the foremost pivot gun, after which she disappeared in the mist. In a few minutes the fog considerably lifted, and there in the distance we saw a squadron of the Imperialist gunboats—of the smallest size—pulling inshore as fast as they could. If instead of employing British gunboats against the Tipings, the British authorities had sent them against these, they might have

rendered a real service, for many a poor fellow has lost the number of his mess, slaughtered by these murderous wretches, who subsequently became the comrades of British officers and sailors in the waters of both Ningpo and Shanghae. The fog clearing, without further adventure or mishap, we safely reached our destination.

### **FOOTNOTE:**

16. An earthenware jar filled with a suffocating combustible, forming a very formidable weapon. It is thrown as a hand grenade.

## CHAPTER VI.

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Fall of Nankin.—Manchoo Cowardice.—Immense Booty.—Sir George Bonham's Arrival at Nankin.—"The Northern Prince."—The Ti-pings fraternize.—Sir George Bonham's Dispatch.—The Ti-ping Reply.—Further Communication.—Its Friendly Nature.—Ti-ping Literature.—Its Religious Character.—Bishop of Victoria and Dr. Medhurst's Opinions.—Ti-ping Publications.—The New Testament.—Monarchy Established.—Occupation of Nankin.—A Fatal Mistake.—Imperialist Advantages.—Advance of the Ti-pings.—Manchoo Operations.—The Tsing-hae Army.—The Retreat.—Tien-wang's Mistake.—His Opportunity Lost.—Manchoo Tactics.—Imperialist Outrages.—Ti-ping Moderation.—The Triad Rebels.—They Evacuate Amoy.—Captain Fishbourne's Description.—Triads Capture Shanghae.—Imperialist Aggressions.—Jesuits' Interference.—The French attack the Triads.—Shanghae Evacuated.—British Interference.—Its Consequences.

Upon the 19th of March, 1853, after a short siege of only eleven days, Nankin, the ancient capital of China, fell into the hands of the Ti-pings. Considering the importance of the city, and the strong garrison it contained, its capture was effected very easily. It was attacked from the river, upon the northern side, and while one division sprang a mine under the north-east angle of the wall, another blew down the I-Fung gate, both storming together and carrying the city with but little resistance. The Chinese troops in garrison are stated to have numbered about 15,000, though, considering the unusually large proportion of Tartar troops, it is probable their strength must have been greater. They made scarcely a show of opposition to the stormers, many taking to flight and escaping through the south and west gates, or surrendering and joining the Ti-pings. The Manchoo troops of the

Eight Banners are estimated to have mustered at least 8,000, and including their families, not less than 20,000. Yet these men, who had already, in the wars with Great Britain, shown they could fight well and bravely, and who were now in a position to offer a stubborn defence, were killed with hardly an effort to defend themselves. It might naturally have been expected that, for the honour of their nation, for their emperor, for their wives' and their children's, and their own lives, in fact, for everything dear to them, they would at least have made a determined resistance. They well knew from the insurgents' proclamations, and their previous acts, that they would meet with little mercy, but seemed to have been completely paralyzed, and neither able to fight nor flee, throwing themselves on the ground before the victorious Ti-pings and crying "Oh Prince, Prince, spare us! spare us!"

Two days after the capture of Nankin, the Tien-wang announced by proclamation that he had established his court and seat of government there.

It is believed the Ti-pings were materially assisted in the capture of the city by confederates within the walls, who lighted signal fires and created confusion; while the fact of their finding confederates everywhere, even in the Imperialist camps, to post their proclamations with impunity, proves the wide-spread popularity of the movement at that time. With remarkable celerity, within twelve days after the capture of Nankin, the principal adjoining cities were taken and garrisoned. Chin-kiang, Yang-chow, and Kwa-chow fell into the hands of the Ti-pings without opposition, the garrisons having fled with precipitation on their approach.

The capture of these important cities was even of more moment than that of Nankin; for Chin-kiang being situated at the southern entrance of the Grand Canal into the Yang-tze, and Kwa-chow at the northern, gave them entire command of the canal itself, the great medium of communication between the southern provinces and the capital, and the route by which all the grain supplies were conveyed to the north. Immense booty was captured at these places, and conveyed to Nankin. At the latter city the military chest

that fell into their hands alone contained about £120,000 sterling; while the stores of rice and provisions were enormous. At Kwa-chow they captured more than a thousand junks laden with tribute grain on its way to Pekin by the Grand Canal.

The singular panic of the Manchoos was probably caused by their fear of a retributive Providence having overtaken them for the indiscriminate slaughter of the Chinese by their ancestors; for in no other way is it easy to account for the helplessness with which they resigned themselves to their fate at Nankin.

The Chinese people at this time seemed to look upon the success of the rebellion as certain. Distant cities commenced to send tribute to the Tien-wang, and a deputation from Hang-chow was directed by the Ti-ping authorities to return, as they were not in want of money, and did not wish the people of Hang-chow to become compromised; thus displaying a praiseworthy consideration for their countrymen, whose fate they well knew would be sealed if they fell into the power of the Manchoos after offering allegiance to themselves.

Exaggerated reports of the Ti-ping successes had reached Shanghae, and it was rumoured they were on the point of attacking that city. In consequence of this, and to undeceive the Ti-pings with regard to the Manchoo proclamations which were diligently circulated, stating the foreign "barbarians" were about to send their war ships against the insurgents at Nankin, Sir George Bonham, H.M.'s plenipotentiary in China, decided to pay a visit to Nankin, partly to explain the British intention of *perfect neutrality*, and partly to ascertain the extent, creed, and objects of the revolutionists.

Before leaving Shanghae a meeting was held at the British Consulate, to consider the course of policy to be adopted in the event of an attack by the insurgents. Captain Fishbourne, R.N., senior naval officer upon the station, reports:—

"The question was raised as to whether we should undertake the defence of the city. Sir George Bonham, however, decided that it was incompatible with the line of policy he had determined on."

It is only a pity that later British representatives have not been influenced by a similar sense of justice.

With these views Sir George Bonham embarked on board H.M.S. *Hermes*, and started for Nankin on the 22nd of April, 1853. The first appearance of the Ti-pings is thus described by the commander of the ship:

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"The sight which met our eyes on our fairly opening Chin-kiang-foo to view was a very striking one. Their scouts had evidently sent forward the news of the approach of an enemy, which had flown like lightning almost, and had called up armed warriors in all directions to resist attack. The river-side for a full mile was lined by batteries and stockades, which were all occupied by men in red head-dresses—some with red belts, and dresses made parti-coloured by a large patch on each man's breast and back, with the badge of the Taeping-wang's army. Thousands, again, were occupying the heights, waving hundreds of banners in defiance. Many others were crowding down towards the river-side as if to be the first in the fight, should we attempt to land, or to support those in the forefront. Here and there were to be seen men in red or yellow hoods, and capes of the same colour, on horseback, galloping along the lines, their standard-bearers and guards hurrying after them as best they could, all evincing an enthusiasm and a unity of purpose that proved them something more than mere hirelings."

Upon the arrival of the *Hermes* at Nankin, she anchored outside gunshot from the batteries, in order to avoid misunderstandings, she having been fired upon at Chin-kiang by the Ti-ping forts, when she was followed closely by an Imperialist flotilla, which took advantage of her proximity to lead the Ti-pings to believe that she was one of the foreign vessels of war they had stated in many proclamations were engaged to assist them. Mr.

Meadows, of the consular service, accompanied by Lieutenant Spratt, proceeded on shore for the purpose of negotiating a meeting between Sir George Bonham and the chief authorities at Nankin.

Mr. Meadows was received in the northern suburb of Nankin by the Northern Prince, and the Tien-wang's brother, the Assistant Prince. In his report of the communication with these two chiefs, he says:—

"But I also explained, as authorized, the simple object of his (Sir George Bonham's) visit; viz., to notify the desire of the British government to remain *perfectly neutral* in the struggle between them and the Manchoos, and to learn their feeling towards us, and their intention, in the event of their forces advancing towards Shanghae.

"To all this the Northern Prince listened, but made little or no rejoinder; the conversation, in so far as directed by him, consisting mainly of inquiries as to our religious belief, and expositions of their own. He stated that, as children and worshippers of one God, we were all brethren; and after receiving my assurance that such had long been our view also, inquired if I knew the heavenly rules (Tien-teaou). I replied that I was most likely acquainted with them, though unable to recognize them under that name; and, after a moment's thought, asked if they were ten in number. He answered eagerly in the affirmative. I then began repeating the substance of the first of the Ten Commandments, but had not proceeded far before he laid his hand on my shoulder in a friendly way, and exclaimed, 'The same as ourselves! the same as ourselves!' while the simply observant expression on the face of his companion disappeared before one of satisfaction, as the two exchanged glances.

"He then stated, with reference to my previous inquiry as to their feelings and intentions towards the British, that not merely might peace exist between us, *but that we might be intimate friends*. He added, we might now, at Nankin, land and walk about where we pleased. He reverted again and again, with an appearance of much gratitude, to the circumstance that he and his companions in arms had enjoyed the special protection and aid of God, without which they would never have been able to do what they had done against superior numbers and resources; and alluding to our *declarations of neutrality and non-assistance to the Manchoos*, said, with a quiet air of thorough conviction, 'It would be wrong for you to help them, and, what is more, it would be of no use. Our Heavenly Father helps us, and no one can fight with Him.'"

Captain Fishbourne, of the *Hermes*, says:—

"Meanwhile the news soon spread amongst the insurgents that we were brethren, and numbers came immediately to fraternize. They appeared much pleased at our wearing our hair long in front like themselves, and without tails.... Numbers continued to flock on board, and as the question of friendliness was settled, we weighed, to move closer to the city walls, whilst many of the insurgents fell into the capstan to assist, and seemed to enjoy it all as great fun. In a manner *quite unlike any Chinese we had ever met*, they at once met us on the most friendly terms, and remained so the five days we were there. \*

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"29th (April). Again the decks were crowded with visitors; some, on going down amongst the men, observed some josses

(idols) that they had picked up as curiosities, some of them from Rangoon, and intimated by gestures that these were very bad and useless. They conducted themselves in a frank and friendly way towards all; their bearing was quite different to that of any Chinese that we had ever met; so much so, that our men remarked it; and had any one asserted ten days previously that so many hundred Chinese would have been on board, and yet nothing have been stolen, not one in the ship but would have said, 'It is impossible.'"

A slight misunderstanding having occurred with regard to the unceremonious style in which the Ti-ping chiefs replied to the first letter sent to them immediately upon the arrival of the *Hermes*, Lae, a secretary of state, proceeded on board to arrange matters for Sir George Bonham's reception. This was settled to take place the next day; but he, apprehending difficulties in the way of ceremonial might perhaps interfere with the good feeling then existing, sent an excuse, accompanied by the following dispatch, which was delivered by Captain Fishbourne and Mr. Meadows:—

"*Hermes*, off Nankin, April 30, 1853.

"I received yesterday your message conveyed through the ministers sent on board for that purpose, to the effect that you were willing to receive me in the city, in the event of my being desirous of paying you a visit. It was at first my intention to see you on shore, but the weather and other circumstances prevent my doing so, and therefore I have to convey to you in writing the sentiments I should have communicated to you verbally, had I visited you. These sentiments are to the following effect."

After stating the position of the British nation with regard to the Manchoo government, the existence of the treaty and trading regulations,

&c., the dispatch goes on to say:—

"Recently, however, it came to my ears that a contest was going on between the native Chinese and the Manchoos, and that you, the Eastern Prince, had taken Nankin. A variety of reports connected with the subject were in circulation, and certain of the Manchoo authorities had issued a proclamation to the effect that they had borrowed the services of ten or more steamers of Western nations, which would proceed up the Yang-tze to attack your forces. This is altogether false. It is the established custom of our nation *in nowise to interfere with any contests that may take place in the countries frequented by our subjects for commercial purposes.* It is therefore *totally out of the question* that we should now in China lend the services of our steamers to give assistance in the struggle. Of the lorchas hired by the Manchoo authorities, and the square-rigged vessels purchased by them, I know nothing. British merchant vessels are not allowed to hire out their services for such contest; but I cannot prevent the sale of vessels, the private property of British subjects, any more than I can prevent the sale of cotton manufactures or other merchandise."

Again the dispatch states:—

"In short, it is our desire to remain *perfectly neutral* in the conflict between you and the Manchoos."

This guarantee of neutrality would have effected much good, and avoided much evil, had it been acted up to; but unfortunately such was not the case—it did not suit the policy of England to act on that occasion in the same manner as when the Confederate steam rams were seized in the Mersey.

Sir George Bonham's dispatch was carried ashore by Captain Fishbourne, who was received by several chiefs, whom he thus describes:<sup>17</sup>

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"The appearance and bearing of all those men gave me the idea that they were clever, decided, and determined; and from the constant solemn appeal

to heaven to witness their assertion, or in reference to their belief, they showed themselves to be under a settled conviction that their mission was from thence."

The following dispatch is the reply of the Ti-ping chiefs to Sir George Bonham's:—

"We, Prince of the East, Yang, the Honae teacher, and the master who rescues from calamity (an ecclesiastical title), Principal Minister of State, and Generalissimo; and

"Prince of the West, Seaou, Assistant Minister of State, and also Generalissimo, both subjects of the Celestial dynasty, now under the sway of T'aí-ping, truly commissioned by Heaven to rule; hereby issue a decree to the distant English, who have long recognized the duty of worshipping Heaven (God), and who have recently come into the views of our royal master, especially enjoining upon them to set their minds at rest and harbour no unworthy suspicions.

"The Heavenly Father, the Supreme Lord, the Great God, in the beginning created heaven and earth, land and sea, men and things, in six days; from that time to this the whole world has been one family, and all within the four seas brethren; how can there exist, then, any difference between man and man? or how any distinction between principal and secondary birth? But from the time that the human race has been influenced by the demoniacal agency which has entered into the heart of man, they have ceased to acknowledge the great benevolence of God the Heavenly Father in giving and sustaining life, and ceased to appreciate the infinite merit of the expiatory sacrifice made by Jesus, our Celestial Elder Brother, and have, with lumps of

clay, wood, and stone, practised perversity in the world. Hence it is that the Tartar hordes and Elfin Huns so fraudulently robbed us of our celestial territory (China). But, happily, our Heavenly Father and Celestial Elder Brother have from an early period displayed their miraculous power amongst you English, and you have long acknowledged the duty of worshipping God the Heavenly Father and Jesus our Celestial Brother, so that the truth has been preserved entire, and the Gospel maintained. Happily, too, the Celestial Father, the Supreme Lord and Great God, has now of His infinite mercy sent a heavenly messenger to convey our royal master the Heavenly King up into heaven, and has personally endowed him with power to sweep away from the thirty-three heavens demoniacal influences of every kind, and expel them thence into this lower world. And, beyond all, happy is it that the Great God and Heavenly Father displayed His infinite mercy and compassion in coming down into this our world in the third month of the year Mowshin (1848),<sup>18</sup> and that Jesus our Celestial Elder Brother, the Saviour of the world, likewise manifested equal favour and grace in descending to earth during the ninth month of the same year, where, for these six years past, they have marvellously guided the affairs of men, mightily exhibited their wondrous power, and put forth innumerable miraculous proofs, exterminating a vast number of imps and demons, and aiding our Celestial Sovereign in assuming the control of the whole empire.

"But now that you distant English have not deemed myriads of miles too far to come and acknowledge our sovereignty, not only are the soldiers and officers of our celestial dynasty delighted and gratified thereby, but even in high heaven itself

our Celestial Father and Elder Brother will also admire this manifestation of your fidelity and truth. We therefore issue this special decree, permitting you, the English chief, to lead your brethren *out or in, backwards or forwards, in full accordance with your own will or wish*, whether to aid us in exterminating our impish foes, or to carry on your commercial operations as usual; and it is our earnest hope that you will, with us, earn the merit of diligently serving our Royal Master, and, with us, recompense the goodness of the Father of Spirits.

"Wherefore we promulgate this new decree of (our sovereign) T'aí-ping for the information of you English, so that all the human race may learn to worship our Heavenly Father and Celestial Elder Brother, and that all may know that, wherever our Royal Master is, there men unite in congratulating him on having obtained the decree to rule.

"A special decree, for the information of all men, given (under our seals) this 26th day of the 3rd month of the year Kweihaou (1st May, 1853), under the reign of the Celestial dynasty of T'aí-ping."

With a faithfulness above all praise, the Ti-pings have never broken their promises, and although the British government have thought fit to repudiate theirs, still, with an integrity really wonderful, the Ti-pings, although they might fairly have done so, have never retaliated. Had ministers of enlightened mind, or even ministers of honour, taken advantage of that clause of the Ti-pings' line of conduct—and which in spite of the British hostilities has remained unaltered—to go "out or in, backwards or forwards," how great a result would have been attained for themselves, and how glorious a future of freedom and Christianity for the Chinese!

Sir George Bonham, it appears, took umbrage at some imaginative want of respect in the dispatch of the Ti-ping chiefs; still, the following extracts from a communication received from Lo-thai-kang, commander of Ti-ping forces at Chin-kiang, the Triad chief who joined the society of "God-worshippers" in Kwang-si, should have appeased his indignation:—

"We humbly conceive that when the will of Heaven is fixed, man cannot oppose; and when views and feelings are correct, corrupt imaginations cannot interfere therewith; hence it is that honest birds select the tree on which they roost, and that virtuous ministers choose the sovereign whom they intend to serve. But, alas! these false Tartars have displayed their unruly dispositions, in fraudulently depriving us of our lawful patrimony; at home they have injured the subjects of our state, and abroad they have warred against foreign states. On a former occasion your *honourable* nation, with upright views, marched into our territory, for which you had doubtless good and sufficient reason; but the impish Tartars opposed your entrance, *which the inhabitants of China viewed with displeasure*; but now our royal master has received the command of Heaven to punish offenders, *to show kindness to foreigners*, and *harmonize them with the Chinese, not restricting commercial intercourse*, nor levying transit duties on merchandise, while he leads forward his martial bands, to the number of hundreds of myriads, overcoming every opposition; from which it is clear that the period has arrived when both Heaven and man unite in favouring his design, and faithful and brave warriors exert themselves on his behalf. But these fiendish Tartars, finding their strength gone, and their resources exhausted, have attempted to drive on your *honourable* nation to exert yourselves in their behalf,

unabashed by the recollection that, *on a former occasion, when matters went easily with them, they made it their business to oppose you; and now, when they are in extremities, they apply to you for succour, wishing to set our two nations at variance, in order to avail themselves of any advantage arising therefrom.* This, we presume, is already seen through by you.

"We remember, moreover, how on a former occasion we, in conjunction with Bremer, Elliot, and Wanking (?), in the province of Canton erected a church, and together worshipped Jesus, our Celestial Elder Brother. All these circumstances are as fresh in our recollection as if they had happened but yesterday."

It is utterly impossible that anything could have been more satisfactory than this first communication with the Ti-pings. Not only were all their documents couched in the most friendly manner, affording a striking and total contrast to those of the Manchoo; but in practice as well as theory their conduct was excellent. They substituted for the old and insulting epithets, "barbarian" and "foreign devil," hitherto applied to all Europeans, the kindlier appellation of "foreign brethren;" while instead of assuming the repellent and exclusive manner of the Imperialists, they evinced the warmest friendliness and most candid demeanour. So pleasing was their conduct generally, that all persons having communication with them were unanimous in expressing their favourable impressions. Captain Fishbourne, describing his visit in the *Hermes*, says:—

"It was obvious to the commonest observer that they were practically *a different race*. They had Gutzlaff's edition of the Scriptures—at least they told us so; we know they had twenty-eight chapters of Genesis, for they had reprinted thus much,

and gave us several copies; and some of them were practical Christians, and nearly all seemed to be under the influence of religious impressions, though limited in their amount. They believed in a special Providence, and believed that this truth had had a practical demonstration in their own case. That though they had had trials and incurred dangers, these were to punish and to purify. They had also successes, such as they could have had only by God's special interference. They referred, with deep and heartfelt gratitude, to the difficulties they had encountered, and the deliverances which had been effected for them, when they were but a few, and attributed all their success to God.

"'They,' said one, speaking of the Imperialists, 'spread all kinds of lies about us; they say we employ magical arts. The only kind of magic we have used is prayer to God. In Kwang-se, when we occupied Yung-ngan, we were sorely pressed; there were then only some two or three thousand of us; we were beset on all sides by much greater number; we had no powder left, and our provisions were all gone; but our Heavenly Father came down and showed us the way to break out. So we put our wives and children in the middle, and not only forced a passage, but completely beat our enemies.'

"After a short pause he added, 'If it be the will of God that our Prince of Peace shall be sovereign of China, he will be the sovereign of China; if not, then we will die here.'

"The man who, in every extreme, spoke these words of courageous fidelity to the cause, and of confidence in God, was a shrivelled-up, elderly little person, who made an odd figure in

his yellow and red hood; but he could think the thoughts and speak the speech of a hero. He, and others like him, have succeeded in impressing with their own sentiments of courage and morality the minds of their adherents."

The *Hermes* brought away from Nankin the following books, which were published and circulated amongst the Ti-pings, viz.:—

1. The Book of Religious Precepts of the Ti-ping Dynasty.
2. The Trimetrical Classic.
3. An Ode for Youth.
4. The Book of Celestial Decrees.
5. The Book of Declaration of the Divine Will, made during the Heavenly Father's Descent (in the Spirit) upon Earth.
6. The Imperial Declaration of Ti-ping.
7. Proclamations from Eastern and Western Kings.
8. Arrangement of the Army.
9. Regulations of the Army.
10. A New Calendar.
11. Ceremonial Regulations.
12. Book of Genesis, Chap. I.—XXVIII.

These furnished abundant proofs of the Christianity of the whole movement. Errors, and some very grave, undoubtedly existed; but although these have been sometimes animadverted upon in unmeasured terms, the grand truth that the Ti-pings admitted and recognized the principal points of the Christian faith, remained. Yet some persons seemed to imagine the insurrection totally unworthy of Christian sympathy and consideration, because their tenets of belief were not perfect; forgetting that everything must have a commencement, and forgetting the universally imperfect commencement of Christianity, even from the time of the Apostles. Those who have made the religious error of the Ti-pings an argument against them are not worthy of the smallest attention; for, although they have been

forward enough to declaim against the struggling Christians, they have been altogether backward in the slightest attempt to teach them better. Their own Christianity is scarcely so faultless that they can afford to consign tens of thousands of professing, though ignorant, Christians, to destruction; and were they ever so correct themselves, still less should they be guilty of so unchristian an act.

The earnestness with which the Ti-ping government endeavoured to promulgate the saving Word of God, is illustrated by the fact, that then, and ever since, they circulated the Scriptures and all religious publications entirely free of charge, a circumstance unparalleled in the history of the world. Captain Fishbourne reports:—

"Before leaving Nankin they furnished us with many copies of books which they had published, and of which they appear to have had a large store, as they circulated them by every possible means; they were seen by some officers of the *Hermes* in boats that they *had sent off to drift down the river amongst the Imperial flotilla.*"

This singular mode of proceeding seems to imply that even at that early period they recognized the truth of the Divine promise, "My word shall not return unto me void," and with a holy simplicity were acting in full confidence as to the results.

The Bishop of Victoria, in his estimate of the books of the Ti-pings, has used the following language:—

"There are important questions which we have to consider respecting the character of the religion of the insurgents; *e.g.:* Are its doctrines essentially those of the Christian religion? Do the elements of truth preponderate over those of error? Are the defects, which may be observable among them, such as constitute a reasonable ground for condemning the whole movement as one of unmixed evil, and the work of Satanic power? Or, on the other hand, are they the natural shortcomings

of a body of imperfectly enlightened men, placed in a situation of novel difficulty, labouring under almost unexampled disadvantages in their pursuit of truth, without spiritual instructors and guides, with only a few copies of the Holy Scriptures, and those apparently in small, detached, and fragmentary portions, with no forms of prayer or manuals of devotion, having their minds distracted amid the arduous toil of a campaign and the work of religious proselytism, with no definite views or clear knowledge respecting the sacraments, the Christian ministry, or the constitution of a Church—engaged in a struggle for life and death—and yet, amid all these hindrances and drawbacks, evincing a hopeful, praiseworthy, and promising vigour of mind and independence of action, in the great undertaking of a moral revolution of their country?

"*We do not hesitate to assert* that ours is the latter and more favourable view."

The following are the Rev. Dr. Medhurst's opinions of the same publications. Of one hymn in particular, from "The Book of Religious Precepts of the Ti-ping Dynasty," he says:—

"These lines constitute the redeeming feature of the whole book; they deserve to be written in letters of gold, and we could *desire nothing better* for the Chinese than that they were engraven on every heart. This one hymn is worth the four books and the five classics of the Chinese all put together:

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"How different are the true doctrines from the doctrines of the world!

They save the souls of men, and lead to the enjoyment of endless

bliss.

The wise receive them with exultation, as the source of their happiness;

The foolish, when awakened, understand thereby the way to heaven.

Our Heavenly Father, of His great mercy and unbounded goodness, Spared not His first-born son, but sent Him down into the world, To give His life for the redemption of all our transgressions, The knowledge of which, coupled with repentance, saves the souls of men."

Of "The Book of Religious Precepts of the Ti-ping Dynasty," he further says:—

"This is decidedly the best production issued by the insurgents. The reasoning is correct, the prayers are good, the ceremonies enjoined (with the exception of the offerings) *are unobjectionable*; the Ten Commandments<sup>19</sup> agree in spirit with those delivered by Moses, and the hymns are passable. The statements of the doctrines of human depravity, redemption by the blood of Jesus, and the renewal of the heart by the influence of the Holy Spirit, *are sufficient* to direct any honest inquirer in the way to heaven."

"The Ode for Youth," he says, "gives some admirable lessons regarding the honour due to God, who is the Creator and Father of all. It sets forth in very clear terms the coming of Jesus into the world for the salvation of men by the shedding of His blood on the cross, and then goes on to detail the duties that are required of us as parents and children, brothers and sisters, husbands and wives, relatives and friends; concluding with

instructions as to the management of the heart and external senses. Altogether it is an excellent book, *and there is not a word in it which a Christian missionary might not adopt, and circulate as a tract for the benefit of the Chinese.*"<sup>19</sup>

"The Book of Declaration of the Divine Will, made during the Heavenly Father's Descent upon Earth,' details the examination and detection of a traitor, on whom they were about to confer an appointment, when the Father is said to have come down from heaven in person,<sup>20</sup> on purpose to arraign and cross-question the delinquent; and having brought his reason to light, to have returned to heaven.

"There is no word of their having seen any form; but the idea of the Father's presence seems to have been impressed upon the minds of the bystanders.

"The Book of Celestial Decrees' purports to be a collection of communications from God our Heavenly Father, and Jesus our Celestial Elder Brother. This is little, if anything, superior to the preceding work.

"Their almanac appears to be in some measure founded upon that originally prepared for the Chinese by the Jesuits, but prepared by those who did not know much upon the subject, and therefore they have adopted 366 days, the almanac copied from having been one for leap-year. They, however, stated in contradistinction to the ordinary Chinese almanac, that there are not any such things as lucky days, 'as whoever shall with a true breast reverence the Heavenly Father, the High Lord God, will be looked upon by Him with complacency, and whatsoever

times such please to attend to their business, will be lucky and fortunate to them.'

"The book entitled 'The Regulations for the Army of the Ti-ping Dynasty' is very remarkable for the *complete organization* which it shows to exist amongst them, and for the *very enlightened regulations* it establishes for the treatment of the people amongst whom they may be.

"The Trimetrical Classic,<sup>21</sup> so called from each line containing only three words, is a very remarkable document, as evidencing that the writer, if there was but one, possessed great knowledge of both Old and New Testament history, of the plan of salvation, and of practical Christianity. He appears, also, to have much knowledge of Chinese history, and uses it to guard against the hostility likely to rise amongst Chinese against the Western nations, from the idea that they were entirely indebted to them for a knowledge of the true God."

Although the above reports are very favourable as to the Ti-pings' religion, still, upon many vital points they were undoubtedly defective; but to qualify their shortcomings they subsequently published the Bible in its full integrity, Old and New Testaments inclusive, copies of which, with the Tien-wang's Imperial seal, are in possession of several gentlemen in England.<sup>22</sup> Therefore, to denounce the Ti-ping movement as evil and anti-Christian, because there exist *some* errors of belief, is not only most unjustifiable, but even implies that a person using such an argument doubts the promised efficacy and result of God's Word.

The information gathered up to this time upon the religion of the Ti-pings is particularly interesting and satisfactory; and if all Christian men did not feel disposed to help them, they at least ought not to have interfered

against them; yet such was not the case, for even at that early period many misnamed Christians, without in the least *personally* knowing anything of the movement, very loudly decried it. Wrongful as this may seem, it only forms a part of the great psychological problem—why it is that the minds of men will always, by a vast majority, follow wrong instead of right?

The opposition the Ti-ping rebellion has met with from those whose profession of Christianity should have made them its friends, can excite no wonder; for, throughout the history of the world, has truth, freedom, or Christianity, ever become manifest otherwise than through a dismal vista of disbelief and bloodshed? It is a sad reflection, and a proof of our frail, if not vile, mortality!

Some few months after the visit of the *Hermes*, the French war steamer *Cassini* proceeded to Nankin; she brought to Shanghae a reprint of the remainder of Genesis, of Exodus, and a portion of the New Testament, consisting of St. Matthew's Gospel, printed from the version of the Rev. Dr. Gutzlaff.

This is the first account we have of the New Testament being seen amongst the Ti-pings, although in some of their previous proclamations it had been referred to: it proves the progress they were making; for many of their errors were to be attributed to the fact that their belief was grounded almost entirely upon the Old Testament. The Ti-pings have been sadly abused for polygamy, &c., although I do not remember that such facts have been made a *casus belli* against the Imperialists; but it must be remembered that as their laws were framed and already constituted when the New Testament first came into their hands, everything required to be altered; therefore people should recall the maxim of Bacon, "that nature should be imitated by politicians, in the *gradual* character of her changes," and have the justice to admit, that Hung-sui-tshuen, having made his laws as to marriage, &c., could not possibly either overturn them at once, or see any reason to do so until the truth either *gradually* dawned upon him, or was

inculcated by *some of the many missionaries* who overspread China. It seems very remarkable that *none* of them ever entertained this idea, excepting the American, Mr. Roberts, who turned it to no advantage.

In the meanwhile, the possession of Nankin entirely altered the tactics of the Tien-wang. Instead of continuing his rapid and triumphant march, overcoming the Manchoos almost by the terror caused by the advance of his forces, he settled down at what he had decided should become the capital of his new empire; gathering together his followers in and about Nankin and the neighbouring cities. For a month or two the whole Ti-ping forces were busily engaged drilling, and fortifying the cities they retained. During the same period, the Tien-wang and his chiefs were employed constituting a regular government, with its attendant courts and tribunals.

The government instituted was monarchical, Hung-sui-tshuen (the Tien-wang) being the monarch; the other chiefs, titled Wang, bearing the same relation to him as royal princes, that E-ching-wang, the Prince of Kung, and the Soong-wang (one of the late Manchoo emperor's uncles) do to the Manchoo dynasty.

The five principal leaders, besides their rank of Prince, constituted both the Privy Council and Ministry. Six boards were formed, similar to those of Pekin, with an additional one for Foreign Affairs. Yang, the Eastern Prince, was appointed Prime Minister; Wei, the Northern Prince, President of the Board of War; Fung, the Southern Prince, of the Boards of Justice and Finance; Siau, the Western Prince, of the Civil Office Board and Ecclesiastic Court; and Shih, the Assistant-Prince, of the Board of Public Affairs and the Foreign Office.

The above arrangement was, however, subsequently altered, in consequence of the increasing extent of the revolution. The five princes then resigned their inferior appointments to others, continuing their duties as Privy Council to the Tien-wang, and Supreme Generalissimos of the five military divisions, into which their whole rule and territory were divided.

Other chiefs were elected to the dignity of Wang, with a rank secondary to that of the Princes, and the whole formed a sort of parliament. All the important affairs of state, such as the military expeditions to be undertaken, plans of defence, &c., had first to receive the sanction of this parliament, and were then submitted to the Tien-wang for his approval. To a certain extent, the Tien-wang was despotic in his government, for nothing could be undertaken without his special sanction. This rule, although supreme, was still far from constituting a despotism; and the ultimate decisions vested in him, have, singularly enough, never created dissension in council. This is to be accounted for not only by the fact that his subjects regarded him as endowed with theocratical attributes, but also to the wisdom of his mandates.

As it was impossible, during their belligerent state, to give full effect to their Civil Boards or officials, the whole system of government resolved itself into a military one, pending such time as peace should be obtained, when they would be at leisure to cultivate the arts and sciences, and form a legislature upon an entirely civil basis.

The occupation of Nankin has proved fatal to the success of the Ti-pings hitherto. Insurrection, of whatever kind, to be successful, must never relinquish the aggressive movement; directly it acts upon the defensive, unless possessing some wonderful organization, its power is broken. The principal element of revolutionary success is rapidity of action, and when once this is forsaken, the consolidated strength of an established constitution is advantageously brought to bear against rebellion.

The Tien-wang, by settling down at Nankin and commencing to defend his position, committed a vital error, and one that lost him the empire. If, instead of so doing, and affording his enemies time to rally and recover from their wild panic, and concentrate their forces, he had aimed at the one terminal point, Pekin, beyond all doubt, the very *éclat* of his victorious march would have carried him with an almost resistless triumph into

possession of the capital, and the consequent destruction of the Manchoo dynasty would have given him the empire. The very fact that for years afterwards, in spite of this unfavourable re-action, the Ti-pings have been enabled, not only to hold their own against the Imperialists, but to have utterly crushed them—had it not been for the intervention of England—proves how easily they might have followed up their first advantages.

Two courses were open to the Ti-pings, either of which, judging by their career, would have led to the extinction of the oppressive Manchoo rule. The first was, without a pause, to have continued their march upon Pekin, abandoning each city as they seized it, and while enriching themselves from the captured stores and treasuries, and strengthening their forces by the crowds of discontented wherever they might pass, not to have permitted the slightest reduction of their numbers by detaching isolated garrisons.

The second would have been to have abandoned Nankin, and concentrated all their forces in the southern provinces—Kwang-tung, Kwang-se, Kwei-chow, and Fo-keen—a part of China, more than any other, bitterly opposed to the Manchoos, and more important still, the native provinces of the principal Ti-ping leaders. In this case, the whole of the country south of the Yang-tze river could in a short time have been completely wrested from the Manchoos, and then, if unable to obtain the whole empire, they would at least have established a southern kingdom in perfect integrity—and how superior this course of action would have been to the irregular one they pursued!

It was not only a great mistake, but a great absurdity for the Tien-wang to establish a capital, and set up a new dynasty before accomplishing either of the foregoing courses.

Although for several years numbers continued flocking to the Tien-wang's standard, still, they were not of the best material; the wealthier classes, directly they found the revolution paused, paused too, and time showed them that the obnoxious element was the Christian religion. So long

as the movement, in the earlier stages of patriotic excitement, was looked upon as a means of overthrowing the foreign dynasty, it was a national and a popular one; but as the foreign derived religious character transpired, the bigoted and proud Chinese naturally began to eye with suspicion a movement so vast, aiming not only at the subversion of the reigning dynasty, but of the time-honoured superstitions, ceremonies, and faith of the nation. The stationary phase, prejudicial to any revolution, was doubly so to the Ti-ping, as it fully displayed that the Christian, or foreign innovation, was as much their profession as the popular anti-Manchoo feeling; but for this, the whole population of China would have risen *en masse* to throw off the foreign yoke.

Through our Faith the Ti-pings have heroically, and, until the British *Government* added their weight to the adverse scale, successfully maintained an unequal struggle for years. Should we not then rather have assisted than opposed them? Why should we, who pride ourselves upon our superior freedom, oppose the advance of Christianity, and perpetuate a most corrupt and barbarous government in Asia—a government more foreign to the people whom it crushes than the Russian is to the Poles? Can the British nation sympathize with the rebels to one and not with those to the other, particularly when the latter are endeavouring to propagate the Christian faith? Can the English nation, one of the most Christian and enlightened in the world, deny all sympathy to those carrying on the greatest patriotic struggle on record, a struggle that *would*, by the admission of many high-minded missionaries, have Christianized more than one-third of the human race?

The Imperialists gained many advantages through the stationary position of the Ti-pings. Whereas, before, they contented themselves with following an advancing and triumphant army, and occupying the towns and districts as they were evacuated, they were now enabled to recover from the demoralizing effects of their numerous defeats, and to concentrate their

efforts upon one or two points. The prestige of success, a great element with Chinese troops, was for a time lost to the revolutionists, and the Tartar forces despatched from the north combining with those lately following at a respectful distance in the rear of the Ti-pings, soon invested Nankin and Chin-kiang with apparently overwhelming numbers.

The blockade of Nankin, notwithstanding the strength of the investing forces, was neither close nor effectual. Several expeditionary armies were formed and despatched by the Tien-wang to raise the country in different directions. He seems to have reckoned too much upon the patriotic spirit of his countrymen, besides committing the error of settling down and attempting to consolidate his own power before overthrowing that of the enemy. It is even very probable, if all these expeditionary armies had been combined into one and marched upon Pekin, that that city would have fallen.

In May, 1853, a small army of about seven thousand men crossed to the northern bank of the Yang-tze-kiang, and after defeating a body of Tartar troops who disputed their passage, proceeded rapidly in a north-west direction, through the provinces of Ngan-whui and Ho-nan. Kai-fung, the capital of Ho-nan, the city containing the only tribe of Jews found in China, was unsuccessfully attacked.

Passing rapidly on, the Ti-pings effected the passage of the Yellow River, and attacked the city of Hwae-king. Here they were likewise unsuccessful, and a large army of Imperialists having collected, some from the north, some from the neighbouring garrisons, and united with a considerable force that had been detached in pursuit from the army of observation before Nankin, the siege was raised, and the Ti-ping line of march to the northward checked. Diverging to the westward for nearly 200 miles, they entered the province of Shensi, and on the 4th of September captured the city of Yuen-keuh. This was the first city of magnitude taken since leaving Nankin, and the treasure and supplies found at this place

proved very acceptable to the worn and destitute army. They once more turned northwards, and marched steadily forward in the direction of Pekin, capturing many important cities on the way. Late in the same month they entered Chih-le, the most northern province of the empire, and that in which Pekin is situated. Advancing with rapidity, and capturing city after city, towards the end of October they reached the Grand Canal, and proceeding by this, in a few days arrived at and captured the town of Tsing-hae, distant some twenty miles from the port of Tien-tsin. Tsing-hae now became the head-quarters of the Ti-ping army; while the main body occupied the place, a column was detached against Tien-tsin, before which city it appeared on the 30th October; but being repulsed with considerable loss, the whole army went into winter quarters at Tsing-hae.

In the meanwhile, the Manchoo court at Pekin was seriously alarmed at the progress the Ti-pings were making, they being now distant but a few days' march. Every exertion was made to stop their further progress; not only was the Manchoo garrison of Pekin despatched against them, but large bodies of Mongols were engaged and sent before Tsing-hae early in November; and these forces combining with the Imperialist troops that had followed the Ti-pings from the first day they crossed the Yang-tze, and continually receiving reinforcements from every garrison town they passed, now closely blockaded the Ti-ping position.

Soon after the departure of the first northern army, in May, a large force was marched back upon the old route taken by the Ti-pings in their advance upon Nankin. Proceeding up the Yang-tze-kiang, Ngan-king, the capital of the province of Ngan-whui, was captured and made a base for further operations. Many cities were captured, and their stores and treasures convoyed down to Nankin. Two strong columns were now detached from Ngan-king, one in a westerly direction, penetrating through the provinces of Kiang-si and Hoo-nan, while the other started due north to the reinforcement of the army blockaded at Tsing-hae. Early in 1854, the

western army having passed the Tung-ting lake, retraced a part of their old line of march, capturing the numerous cities on the bank of the Yang-tze river. About May this army arrived before the three cities of Han-kow, Han-yang, and Wu-chang, the capital of Hoo-peh, conveying the immense supplies they had already captured; after a short siege, these important places fell, thus placing the Ti-pings in possession of all the principal cities from thence to Chin-kiang, a distance of more than 450 miles, and comprising the richest and most fertile portion of the Yang-tze provinces.

In the meanwhile the northern column (which left Ngan-king some time in November, 1853), making forced marches through Ngan-whui, struck the Grand Canal in the province of Kiang-su, and rapidly following its course through Shang-tung, city after city falling before its victorious march, crossed the Yellow River in March, 1854, and captured by storm, on the 12th April, the strongly-fortified city of Lin-tsing, on the border of the northern province, Chih-le.

During this time the army at Tsing-hae remained closely blockaded. While, entirely cut off from all supplies or reinforcements, it became fast reduced by sickness, famine, and the sword; the enemy, upon the contrary (but a few days' march from Tien-tsin, the great northern commercial city and grain dépôt; in the immediate vicinity of Tartary, and, moreover, hardy and inured to the keen wintry storms, so trying to the lightly-clad southerners, comprising the Ti-ping forces) had everything in their favour. Large bodies of Mongolian troops were hired and despatched by the Manchoo government against the blockaded rebels—the Manchoo reserves, and even a large contingent of volunteer Chinese, were sent to swell the imperialist ranks; and while time fast reduced the number and efficiency of the Ti-pings, their foe day by day became more numerous and formidable. The small Ti-ping army at the first scarcely mustered seven thousand strong. Owing to the rapidity of their march, the numbers who joined them by the way were inconsiderable, compared with the resources of the enemy;

the only addition they received of any importance was in the province of Ho-nan, where a detachment of local insurrectionists, nearly five thousand strong, joined them; but this reinforcement was more than cancelled by their losses in battle and from disease. The courage and discipline of this small army must have been something wonderful. The steadfast perseverance of their onward march, in the face of seemingly insurmountable difficulties; their steady resistance to the overwhelming numbers of the fur-clad hardy Tartar cavalry—an arm in which they were totally deficient, and could not effectually oppose; their firm endurance of the rigours of the northern winter, close to the icy steppes of Tartary, to which they were unaccustomed, and for which they were unprepared; their isolated march of more than fourteen hundred miles; the heroism with which they supported attack, and finally their successful escape—all constitute one of the most remarkable campaigns of modern times.

During the months of November and December the besieged made several desperate but unavailing sorties, the enemy in each case repulsing them with heavy loss. At last, early in February, 1854, after an occupation of more than three months, hopeless of success, with famine in their camp, and no prospect of succour from their friends, the whole garrison sallied out and succeeded in cutting their way through the besiegers. With gallantry hitherto unknown to the Chinese, this small but heroic band commenced the most arduous operation of any army—a retreat in the presence of a vastly superior enemy. Inch by inch they retired, continually facing about to repel the pursuing host. Masses of Tartar cavalry whirled around them, now charging impetuously on front, rear, and flanks, now hurrying in advance to dispute some difficult passage; heavy columns of infantry, surrounding them on every side, rushed incessantly to the attack, confident in their overwhelming numbers, and encouraged by the hope of reward; yet never for a moment did they succeed in breaking the unfaltering and orderly retreat of the Ti-ping army, which slowly retired with its face to the foe,

until, after three months' endurance, a junction was effected with the forces which garrisoned the city of Lin-tsing.

It is a singular fact that the Manchoo government dreaded the approach of the small Ti-ping army more than the advance of the allied English and French upon Pekin in 1860. An extract from a memorial of the Board of Censors to the Emperor, found in the Summer Palace, runs thus:—

"In 1853, when the Cantonese rebels overran the country, advancing impetuously towards the north, the alarm excited in the capital was many times more serious than that now manifested."

The fate of the Manchoo rule hung trembling in the balance, and the consciousness of well-merited destruction struck terror to the hearts of the corrupt and sanguinary government. A little more energy and determination at this period would have won the empire; had the first northern army been able to maintain itself at Tsing-hae until the arrival of the second, the dynasty of Ta-tsing would have terminated. The combined forces could assuredly have captured and held Tien-tsin until the arrival of further reinforcements from Nankin, even if the possession of that city, the grand supply dépôt of Pekin, had not caused the fall of the capital. The extraordinary northern march, and the length of time that little army was able to retain its menacing position, afford ample evidence that greater strength would have ensured its success. Through neglecting that favourable and momentous opportunity, the Tien-wang forfeited the grand object of his efforts when open to his grasp. That his powerful mind was unequal to the occasion is far less probable than that his expectations of his countrymen were not realized. It is impossible that he could be ignorant of the advantages of combination, and it appears certain that he reckoned upon the general rising of the Chinese, as well as on the omnipotent assistance of God. This is, in fact, manifestly plain from his proclamations, and affords the only reasonable explanation of his sending several small armies unsupported in totally divergent courses, rather than concentrating all his

available forces, and aiming directly at the head-quarters of the Manchoo dynasty.

Although several smaller detachments joined the Ti-ping army at Lin-tsing, it was unable to advance upon Pekin again; the favourable moment having once passed, did not return. Several severe actions were contested with no material advantage upon either side, and the semi-steel-clad warriors of inner Mongolia were well matched by the undefended revolutionists. Greatly harassed by the numerous cavalry of the enemy, in May, 1854, the Ti-ping army slowly turned towards the south, continually engaging the Imperialist forces and capturing many important cities to the north of the Yang-tze river.

It is not generally known that Le-hsiu-ch'-éng, subsequently famous as the Chung-wang, was the leader of the first northern expedition; but, during my acquaintance with him, he has frequently reverted to it. From his statements I inferred that he received no particular order to march on Pekin, but simply a general one to conquer the country, and deliver the people from the Manchoo rule. The direct march upon the capital was his own determination, and the reinforcement eventually despatched to his assistance was not at first intended, but was sent to him in consequence of the request for more troops which he forwarded to Nankin by disguised messengers after his passage of the Yellow River. He declared that his troops had been within sight of the walls of Pekin, and that he could easily have captured the city if the reinforcement had joined him earlier; also that his retirement from Tsing-hae was caused entirely by the volunteer troops of the Pekin district, the Mongols and Manchoos being unable to stand against the attack of his men. If this be true, it seems a singular fact that the Tartar dynasty should owe its safety to the Chinese, although in the Pekin district it may fairly be assumed that they have long become entirely Tartarized.

Meanwhile the Manchoos resorted to the most corrupt practices of a most corrupt government, in order to obtain the necessary supplies to make their defence. The sale of titles, offices, and degrees was carried to an enormous extent. Twenty-three notifications were published in the *Pekin Gazette*, putting up for sale every rank, honour, or emolument in the kingdom. Prisoners were allowed to purchase their freedom, exiles their return; functionaries were allowed to buy titles for their maternal relatives, and any one and every one was allowed to purchase for his father a rank superior to his own; in short, a system of entire bribery and corruption was established.

Posthumous honours were also accorded to those who had been killed in battle, extending to the fourth, fifth, or entire generation of their ancestors; while those who ran away to fight another day received every kind of degradation; all the complicated details of cunning deception and bombastic warfare were resorted to by the Manchoo government in its extremity.

The following document discloses facts connected with the troops of the "paternal" government which might well have aroused the people to join the Ti-ping standard of freedom.

Translated by Rev. Dr. W. H. Medhurst, Shanghae, Nov. 1, 1853:<sup>23</sup>—

"The petition of Luh-yu-ch'hang, Yuon-kwei-leang, Yeh-fung-chun, Chin-sze-hang, Kin-ping-chin, and Wang-keing-chau, with many others who reside in the various tythings of the 27th hundred, and have to complain of robbery, rape, murder, and arson, imploring that steps may be taken to repress further outrage, and save the lives of the people.

"We, the above-named people, living in the quiet villages of the various tythings of the 27th, and the 4th tything of the 25th hundred, two or three miles distant from the city of Shanghae, depend upon husbandry and weaving for our support, without

mixing in any outside disturbances. But recently, on the 30th of October last, in the afternoon, the volunteer soldiers belonging to the contingent from Hoo-kwang, came suddenly in a body, armed with weapons, and rushed upon our villages, entering into our several houses, to plunder our property; and when we reasoned the matter with them they answered with scorn, and proceeded to ravish our females; when we further pointed out the evil of these proceedings, they immediately beheaded Wang-chang-kin and Wang-keau-ke, while they stabbed to death Tsien-king-pang, Chang-ko-kwang, and How-seih-ch'hang, besides wounding nine others, both male and female. They then burnt down our houses, amounting to seventy-seven apartments, a list of which is appended to this petition.

"Our lives are now in the greatest danger, and the cry of complaint is heard throughout the whole country on this account. We have dared to prefix our names to the present petition, and pray in a body the great officers to compassionate the poor people, *who are after all the foundation of the country*. We implore your gracious attention to this request, and pray you to repress these volunteer soldiers, commanding them to obey the laws and protect the people. A most fervent petition. Hien-fung, 3rd year, 10th month, 1st day. November 1st, 1853."

The following was the only notice taken of the above petition by Lew, the Imperial commissioner:—

"Such things are doubtless very wrong, but they are the work of idlers and vagrants, who personate my soldiers. I will issue strict orders to my troops. Now go and be satisfied. *I hope a worse thing will not befall you.*"

While this was the common behaviour of the Imperialist troops in every direction, the Ti-pings were acting as real deliverers to the people; whatever excesses the besottedness of their spiritless countrymen may at a later period have driven their new levies to commit. I cannot do better than offer the contrast presented by the conduct of the Ti-ping soldiery, in an account the Rev. Dr. Medhurst gives, in a letter quoted in "Impressions of China," by Captain Fishbourne:—

"Having obtained admission into the city of Shanghae this afternoon, I proceeded to one of the chapels belonging to the London Missionary Society, where I commenced preaching to a large congregation, which had almost immediately gathered within the walls. I was descanting on the folly of idolatry, and urging the necessity of worshipping the one true God, on the ground that he alone could protect his servants, while idols were things of naught, destined soon to perish out of the land; when, suddenly a man stood up in the midst of the congregation, and exclaimed:—'That is true, that is true! the idols must perish, and shall perish. I am a Kwang-se-man, a follower of Thai-ping-wang; we all of us worship one God (Shang-te), and believe in Jesus, while we do our utmost to put down idolatry; everywhere demolishing the temples and destroying the idols, and exhorting the people to forsake their superstitions. When we commenced two years ago, we were only 3,000 in number, and we have marched from one end of the empire to another, putting to flight whole armies of the Mandarins' troops that were sent against us. If it had not been that God was on our side, we could not have thus prevailed against such overwhelming numbers; but now our troops have arrived at Tien-tsin, and we expect soon to be victorious over the whole empire.' He then proceeded to exhort the people in a

most lively and earnest strain to abandon idolatry, which was only the worship of devils, and the perseverance in which would involve them in the miseries of hell; while by giving it up, and believing in Jesus, they would obtain the salvation of their souls. 'As for us,' he said, '*we feel quite happy in the possession of our religion, and look on the day of our death as the happiest period of our existence; when any of our number die, we never weep, but congratulate each other on the joyful occasion, because a brother is gone to glory, to enjoy all the magnificence and splendour of the heavenly world.*' While continuing here, we make it our business to keep the commandments, to worship God, and to exhort each other to do good, for which end we have frequent meetings for preaching and prayer. What is the use, then,' he asked, 'of you Chinese going on to burn incense, and candles, and gilt paper; which, if your idols really required it, would only show their covetous dispositions, just like the Mandarins, who seize men by the throat, and if they will not give money, squeeze them severely; but if they will, only squeeze them gently.' He went on to inveigh against the prevailing vices of his countrymen, particularly opium-smoking. 'That filthy drug,' he exclaimed, 'which only defiles those who use it, making their houses stink, and their clothes stink, and their bodies stink, and their souls stink, and will make them stink for ever in hell, unless they abandon it.'

"But you must be quick,' he adds; 'for Thai-ping-wang is coming, and he will not allow the least infringement of his rules—no opium, no tobacco, no snuff, no wine, no vicious indulgences of any kind; all offences against the commandments of God are punished by him with the severest

rigour, while the incorrigible are beheaded—therefore repent in time.'

"I could perceive, from the style of his expressions and from his frequently quoting the books of the Thai-ping dynasty, that he was familiar with those records, and had been thoroughly trained in that school. No Chinaman who had not been following the camp of the insurgents for a considerable time could have spoken as he did.

"He touched also on the expense of opium-smoking, 'which drained their pockets, and kept them poor in the midst of wealth, whilst we who never touch the drug, are not put to such expense. Our master provides us with food and clothing, which is all we want, so that we are rich without money.'

"I could not help being struck also, with the appearance of the man, as he went on in his earnest strain. Bold and fearless as he stood, openly denouncing the vices of the people, his countenance beaming with intelligence, his upright and manly form the very picture of health, while his voice thrilled through the crowd, they seemed petrified with amazement: their natural conscience assured them that his testimony was true; while the conviction seemed to be strong amongst them, that the two great objects of his denunciation—opium and idolatry—were both bad things, and must be given up.

"He spoke an intelligible Mandarin, with an occasional touch of the Canton or Kwang-si brogue. His modes of illustration were peculiar, and some of the things which he advanced were not such as Christian missionaries were accustomed to bring forward. The impression left on my mind, however, was that a

considerable amount of useful instruction was delivered, *and such as would serve to promote the objects we had in view, in putting down idolatry, and furthering the worship of the true God.*"

At this time the city of Shanghae was in possession of the Triad rebels (the society sworn to expel the Manchoos), who have not unfrequently been confounded with the Ti-pings, to the prejudice of the latter.

Late in the summer of 1853, some few months after the capture of Nankin by the Ti-pings, the Triad society, alive to the advantages of the movement, rose up against the obnoxious Manchoos in many parts of the country.

About the end of July, a body of the Triads succeeded in gaining possession of the city of Amoy, one of the treaty ports, meeting with but slight resistance, the inhabitants being glad to receive them. By their singularly moderate conduct, the movement became very popular; in fact, all their supplies were brought in by the country people, and their principal strength was composed of these villagers, who remained and fought against the Imperialist troops as long as the insurrection lasted. Several cities in the neighbourhood were captured, and the wealthy classes remained aloof from both contending parties; their disposition towards the government was far too adverse for them to assist it; but they contented themselves with simply withdrawing their support, well knowing the savage revenge the "paternal" rulers would wreak upon them and their helpless families, if they were to join the rebellion, and it should afterwards fail. The country people throughout the district remained hostile to the Imperialists until their recapture of Amoy, when, to save their own and relatives' lives, they were compelled to return to the Manchoo slavery, those being lucky who escaped the indiscriminate vengeance of the government.

Captain Fishbourne, senior naval officer on the station, was present at Amoy when it was captured by the Triads. He reports:—

"The insurgents having placed guards over the European Hongs, *there was nothing to apprehend*, so we proceeded to Hong-kong, when, after landing Sir George Bonham, we returned in the *Hermes* to Shanghae."

Upon the 11th of November the city of Amoy, which had been for some time besieged by a vastly superior force of Imperialists, was evacuated by the Triads, who, being short of supplies, marched out of the city in broad daylight unmolested by the cowardly besiegers, who then marched in to perpetrate the most revolting barbarities, in their ordinary manner, upon the defenceless inhabitants. A large squadron of pirates composed the naval force employed by the Imperialists in their siege of the city, in the same manner as in their attack upon Ningpo when held by the Ti-pings, on the 10th May, 1862, although upon this latter occasion the Imperialist pirates were successful, an alliance having been entered into between them and the British squadron commanded by Captain Roderick Dew, R.N.

Captain Fishbourne, who was an eye-witness of the return of Amoy to Manchoo rule, thus describes it:—

"Having engaged pirates, the authority was committed to them, to sanction the atrocities that these would certainly commit; and, as if that were not sufficient, they encouraged them to more than they might otherwise be inclined to, for they promised them six dollars for each head they would bring in.

"On the entry of these savages, the first thing they did was to disperse in every direction in search of heads; regardless of anything save that the people who possessed them should be helpless; it mattered not to them that they were equally infirm and unoffending: they had heads—these they wanted.

"All found were brought to the Chinese admiral" (it is said, the same pirate chief who afterwards became Captain R. Dew's

ally), "whose vessel was close to us, so we saw all that was passing. He then issued a mandate for their destruction. At first they began by taking their heads off at the adjoining pier; this soon was fully occupied, and the executioners becoming fatigued, the work proceeded slowly, therefore an additional set commenced taking their heads off on the sides of the boats. This also proved too slow for them, and they commenced to throw them overboard, tied hand and foot. But this was too much for Europeans; so missionaries, merchants, sailors, marines, and officers, all rushed in, and stopped further proceedings. The mandarins, executioners, staff and all, took themselves off very quickly, for fear of consequences they could not calculate upon, but which they felt they had richly deserved: 400 poor creatures were saved from destruction; 250 of these were wounded—some with twenty, others less, but more dangerous wounds. Some had their heads nearly severed; about thirty died. The Mandarins then removed their scene of butchery a mile outside the town; and during the next two days, after having obtained possession, they must have taken off upwards of two thousand heads, or otherwise destroyed that number of people. For days bodies were floating about the harbour, carried out by one tide and brought back by another, each time not quite so far, so that finally they were only disposed of by being taken to sea.

"The only feeling the brutal pirates evinced, was that of disappointment at being deprived (as they said) by us of three thousand dollars.<sup>24</sup>

"Often during the operations, the poor people complained of the treatment of the Imperialists; and it was certainly pitiable to

behold the needless destruction of property—needless if the Imperialists had been soldiers or men—such never won or kept an empire; *yet none of the Imperial forces are better.*

"Nor can it be said that these were the acts of subordinates, for which the government was only remotely responsible, for they were specially dictated by the Viceroy of the province, who was a Tartar, and an uncle of the Tartar emperor. He even enjoined the violation of solemn compacts entered into between the Mandarins and heads of villages, before they would give up the leaders in the revolt. The Mandarins avowed, that after the government of Amoy was established, they meant to carry fire and sword through the surrounding districts, as the people were all tainted with revolutionary principles."

Well may it be asked—Were the people of England aware of these enormities when they cherished and sustained the Manchoo? It cannot be credited; and, therefore, it is well to point out what kind of government they supported, what description of men they made war upon, and what were the results of their interference.

On the 7th of September, Shanghae, another of the treaty ports, was captured, and several other places in the neighbourhood were attacked by different bodies of Triads. At this city also they seem to have behaved with remarkable moderation, and are said to have found about £70,000 in the treasury.

Although totally unconnected with the great Ti-ping revolution, they still looked hopefully towards it, and, after some little hesitation, sent a deputation, as likewise from Amoy, tendering their allegiance to the Tien-wang. He, however, refused to accept them, despite the enormous advantages he would have derived from the possession of the treaty ports,

until such time as they should understand and profess Christianity; and it was probably one of the teachers he sent to them, whose speech was reported by Mr. Medhurst in the letter quoted from a few pages preceding.

Captain Fishbourne reports of them:—

"They know nothing of Christianity, but are very tolerant, and allowed the missionaries a latitude in teaching, never before enjoyed. They have lost all faith in idolatry, and no longer cared to preserve appearances, by continuing idolatrous worship, though some of them still use superstitions and idolatries. They have behaved with much moderation, *and the facilities for trade have been even greater than under the Tartar Imperial rule.* Of course the import trade has been limited, because of the disturbed state of the country; the export trade, on the other hand, had been unusually great, not from any protection or facilities afforded by the Imperial authorities, but a desire on the part of holders of goods to realize."

While the Triad insurgents continued to manifest the most friendly feeling towards the European residents at Shanghae, the Imperialist troops collecting to the siege of the Chinese city, in their usual style, became very dangerous and hostile. It was reported by Captain Fishbourne:—

"Thus the Imperial troops made it a habit to place their targets for ball practice, so that the riding-course and principal place of resort for all foreigners, should be rendered dangerous, or impassable."

Several times the European settlement was attacked by them, and was once attempted to be fired; and, at last, so outrageous had they become, that the British and French forces—in all less than three hundred men—were compelled to attack their camp, and drive them further away from the settlement, inflicting a loss, it is said, of three hundred killed; losing themselves only two killed and fifteen wounded.

As it is universally known these Triad rebels were in every way *inferior* to the Ti-pings, and as they were allowed to capture the treaty ports, and their conduct was always so friendly to Europeans, and so far superior to

that of the Imperialists, it *does* seem a little extraordinary that the British public have not penetrated the falsity of the statement subsequently urged against the Ti-pings, in order to attempt the palliation of the infamous policy of driving them from Shanghae and Ningpo—that the treaty ports must be held against the Ti-pings, because, if the latter were to capture them, an immense amount of British property and British lives *would* be destroyed, &c.

During the Triads' occupation of Shanghae, a formidable, though at first secret, opposition was insidiously at work against them among the European community—the hostile intrigues of the Jesuits. These priests, with a constancy and perseverance worthy a better cause, are found plotting and making converts to a pseudo sort of Christianity all over the country. It so happens, that to propitiate the Chinese, or not to shock them by too great a departure from "old custom," they are allowed to retain most of their idolatrous forms of worship, to which are added the usual figures of the manifold saints, &c., of the Romish church. Now the Ti-pings, who are strict iconoclasts, having several times fallen foul of Roman Catholic establishments in the interior, and in each case mistaken the figure of the Virgin Mary with a male child in her arms for the very similar idol of Budha, have naturally confounded Jesuitism with the Budhism it resembles. Consequently, the Tartar-worshipping Jesuits are the most bitter enemies the Ti-pings have ever had, knowing, as they do, that the success of the latter would entirely destroy their work, and drive them from the many positions they hold throughout China. Therefore, when the Jesuits ascertained the Triads not only announced themselves as being about to join the Tien-wang, but had actually sent deputations to, and received instructors from him, they at once commenced intriguing for their overthrow. The French consul and the French senior officer on the station were both priest-ridden and bigoted men, and eventually, for certain valuable considerations, assistance was

afforded to the Imperialists, and the Triads were driven out of a Chinese city without the slightest shadow of justice or reason.

Both the English and French authorities deprived the Triads of the duties they were justly entitled to levy on all export or import trade. At last the French admiral, appropriately named La Guerre, determined that the time had arrived to fulfil his own and his Jesuitical colleagues' peculiarly unrighteous intentions. The Triads were suddenly attacked (December, 1854) without having given the slightest provocation, and several of their men, who were engaged constructing a battery outside one of the city gates, murdered by the French sailors. A few days later they surprised fifteen poor rebels asleep in the same battery, and these were also butchered. Two days previous to this, Admiral La Guerre savagely bombarded the city, although it contained upwards of 20,000 innocent inhabitants, among whom the shot and shell committed much slaughter. Allied to the ferocious Manchoo, the French closely blockaded the city, and cut off all communication.

Some people delight in terming the Ti-pings bloodthirsty monsters, &c.; but the following extract proves that the French not only excelled the rebels, but even surpassed the Imperialists in wanton cruelty. In "Twelve Years in China,"<sup>25</sup> by John Scarth, Esq., we find the following episode of the blockade by the civilized and most Christian allies of the Manchoo:—

"The French proclaimed a strict blockade, and shot down all that attempted to hold communication with the rebels. We saw one evening a poor old woman that had been attempting to take a basket of food for some poor person in the city, struck by a ball from the French lines; her thigh was broken, and she lay helpless on the ground. How horrible did war appear, when the sentry levelled his rifle again, and fired at the poor old creature, driving up a shower of earth close to her side. Another shot, and another, were fired; at last she was hit again in the back! she cried to us for help, but we could render no assistance, except by sending to report the circumstance at head-quarters. Shot after shot was fired. There were some rebels

watching the butchery from the walls; they could see us distinctly. We were within rifle distance; and feeling that if I were in their position, I would shoot at every foreigner I saw, while foreigners were committing such acts, I went away really for safety's sake, sick at heart to see such monstrous cruelty. The woman, it was afterwards reported, lay on the spot moaning till nearly midnight, when her cries ceased, and it was supposed *some of the rebels* had got her into the city out of the way of further immediate harm."

The French eventually breached the walls, and with their creditable allies assaulted the city, only, however, to be beaten back with a loss of one-fifth their number. The Triads were at last starved out, and upon the Chinese New Year's night (17th February, 1855) evacuated Shanghae, and cut their way through the Imperialist lines. Three hundred, who had surrendered themselves to Admiral La Guerre, were by that officer given up to the Mandarins, and tortured to death. During three days every atrocity was perpetrated by the Imperialists upon the unfortunate inhabitants caught within the city, or the rebels who were hunted down in the country. Upwards of 2,000 were barbarously put to death within three days. As Messrs. J. Scarth, Sillar, and others have written—"The Imperialist soldiers even burst open the coffins in the burial-grounds, and dragged out the rebel corpses and beheaded them." Women were horribly mutilated and put to death; rebels were crucified and tortured with red-hot irons; some were starved to death in the streets of the city; others were disembowelled, and very many slowly cut to pieces. When the Triads captured the city, they killed only two men, tortured none, and respected private property. The papers at Shanghae stated—"When the French and Imperialists got possession of the city, however, there was something like slaughter. Heads were hung round the city walls in bunches; the Pagoda Bridge had nineteen on it, and in some places they were piled up in heaps!"

The conduct of those British officials who seemed anxious to carry out the Manchoo-assisting policy of Sir John Bowring, Admiral Stirling, and

others, is thus severely reflected on by Mr. Scarth, who was present:—  
"The very inconsiderate zeal which characterized the conduct of Mr. Lay, the then acting Vice-Consul, and Mr. Wade, at that time one of the officials in the Chinese Custom-house service, and the open manner in which these gentlemen lent their aid to the Mandarins, was strongly commented on by nearly all the foreign community."

At page 217 of his interesting work he says:—  
"A schooner going from Woo-sung to Hung-kong was suspected of being about to take Chin-ah-Lin<sup>26</sup> and several other of the city people; a force consisting of Chinese troops *and some English marines, accompanied by the acting Vice-Consul (who seemed to be imbued with some extraordinary motives)*, went down to search the vessel. This was discovered; but those desirous of preventing further bloodshed quietly continued, notwithstanding, in the work they were determined upon, getting the unfortunate men away from danger."

Some who are acquainted with such matters may understand this "extraordinary" exploit, while those who know little of Chinese affairs may naturally wonder whether the "15,000 dollars" offered for Chin-ah-Lin's head by the Vice-Consul's Mandarin friends had anything to do with it.

Not only at the Shanghae massacre in 1855 did British officials display their taste for the Manchoo alliance. During 1854–5–6 Englishmen continually interfered against the rising of the oppressed Chinese. In 1854 Sir J. Bowring allied the British fleet with the forces of that notorious monster Yeh, and thus contributed to the extermination which desolated the province of Kwang-tung. The city of Canton was almost the only place in the province still held by the Mandarins. It was secured to them by British means, and its security doomed to death more than one million innocent people.

While Yeh busied himself with exterminating man, woman, and child, and razing to the ground nearly every village *through which the rebels had*

*passed*, H. B. M.'s ships of war chased the rebel squadrons along the China coast, dealing with them as pirates, because, forsooth, they were armed, and because they had captured Chinese vessels when endeavouring to force the blockade of Canton; H.M.'s ship *Bittern* and the steamer *Paou-shun* hemmed in one division of the rebel fleet in the Gulf of Pe-chi-le, sinking nearly every vessel, and giving up the crew of the only one captured to the Manchoo executioners. Two junks escaped and joined another squadron at Chusan. Yet these vessels shortly afterwards allowed two missionaries to pass their blockade, because, as the chiefs said, "they were good men, and preached the faith of Yesu!" In the harbour of Shih-poo the destruction of another fleet is described in "Twelve Years in China":—

"The junks were destroyed, and their crews shot, drowned, or hunted down, until at last the whole number, about 1,000 souls, were sent to their last account—the *Bittern's* men aiding the Chinese soldiers on shore to complete the wholesale massacre! the *whole* were not killed; *one* man was remanded and kept over for examination! The evidence against the fleet as pirates, was to be collected *after* the execution of the victims!"<sup>27</sup>

British policy towards China has, during the last decade, been influenced by men led by a small party of Chinese custom-house mercenaries, who, while hired by the Manchoos, were permitted to bias, not only Sir John Bowring, but even Lord Elgin. The independent and honourable policy of Sir George Bonham and his colleagues gave place to an "interested Mandarin-worshipping" diplomacy that has made England the ally and saviour of the most sanguinary, corrupt, and worn-out despotism in the world. Messrs. Wade and Lay, sometime Lord Elgin's interpreters, and sometime the custom employés of the Manchoo, *may* have thought the views they imparted to the former were correct; but at all events they were too much personally interested in the welfare of their Mandarin friends to be impartial. The principal effect of this has been that the Manchoo-influenced officials have united the representatives of England

with the Jesuit-influenced representatives of France in perpetuating the Tartar cruelties, and in destroying the Ti-ping attempt to liberate China and establish Protestant Christianity throughout the empire.

At Canton, Shanghae, and elsewhere, in 1854, the Chinese would have succeeded in their righteous endeavours to throw off the Manchoo yoke; at Shanghae, in 1860, at Ningpo and Shanghae in 1862, and upon other occasions, the Ti-ping revolution would have succeeded but for British intervention.

## FOOTNOTES:

17. See "Impressions of China."

18. Alluding to Hung-sui-tshuen's visions.

19. See Appendix A.

20. Dr. Medhurst here makes a misapprehension. The Ti-pings believe the Holy Spirit descended into their midst and possessed Yang-sui-tshuen, the Eastern Prince, who became its mouthpiece and medium. This closely resembles revivalist meetings in Ireland, &c.; but the religious metaphorical language of the original Chinese, with its fine subtilty, makes any literal translation impossible; therefore the most limited signification should be placed upon any English version of this, the *bonne bouche* of the anti-Ti-pings.

21. See Appendix A.

22. Copies of the first five books of the Old, and the whole of the New Testament, printed by the Ti-pings at Nankin, are now to be seen in the Indian Court of the Crystal Palace (Sydenham), where they are exhibited by Mr. J. C. Sillar.

23. Shanghae was at this time in possession of the Triad rebels.

24. They received ample satisfaction afterwards at Ningpo, when, allied with the British, they obtained 3,000 dollars' worth of heads, with full interest.

25. Page 207.

26. The Triad leader.

27. *Hong-kong Gazette*, 12th October, 1855.

## CHAPTER VII.

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Home.—Its Desolation.—Intelligence of Marie.—Consequent Proceedings.—Preparations for Pursuit.—River Tracking.—In Pursuit.—The Lorchia Sighted.—Stratagems.—Alongside the Lorchia.—On Board the Lorchia.—Critical Position.—A Friend in Need.—Failure.—Lorchia again Reconnoitred.—Increased Difficulties.—Another Attempt.—Alongside the Lorchia again. Marie Discovered.—Marie Rescued.—Safe on Board.—Marie's Explanation. The Lorchia in Pursuit.—She gains on us.—The Lorchia opens fire.—Safe among the Ti-pings.

Eager to meet my betrothed, I had no sooner moored my vessel in the Shanghae anchorage, and reported at the Consulate, than I sought her at her aunt's dwelling, which was situated at the back of the American settlement, at a considerable distance from any other European habitation.

When I drew near the house, an indescribable presentiment of evil seemed to possess me—one of those prophetic warnings, so common, but yet such a psychological mystery.

I walked rapidly along, until the turning of some rising ground, a little distance in front, brought me within sight of the house. When I reached the ridge that had concealed it from view, I paused a moment, almost expecting to find that the building had vanished.

There, however, stood the house, safe enough to all appearance; so, feeling reassured, I walked on. As I drew close, almost expecting Marie would run forth to welcome me, I failed to discern any smoke issuing from the chimneys, or any sign of life about the dwelling. My former fear now returned in full force; I was within a few paces of the house, and it appeared to be uninhabited.

I hurried forward to the door; it was unfastened; the lock was wrenched off, and had evidently been broken open. I passed within, and loudly called

upon the former tenants by name; but echo alone replied. Passing from room to room, I saw furniture scattered about in every direction, broken and thrown down. The house presented a picture of utter ruin.

I ran through the rooms, still vociferating, and still mocked by the echo of my own voice. They were silent and deserted. I was evidently the only living thing within the walls. At last, hoarse with shouting, I stood in silent despair, gazing on the destruction around. Marie and her relatives had disappeared, and the scene of ruin told a tale of violence.

For some moments all was still and quiet. At length, aroused by the sound of footsteps in the lower rooms, a sudden hope cheered me, and I hurried to meet them. A glance showed me I had deceived myself; a couple of Chinamen, with eyes and mouth wide open, gaping at the broken furniture, stood before me. I questioned them anxiously, trusting to gain some intelligence, but all to no purpose. To my inquiries they replied by stating that, having heard my hallooing, they had come to see what was the matter. Further questioning simply elicited, "Gno puh-shettah, gno puh-shettah" (I don't know, I don't know). Turning them out, I searched every nook and corner, but without avail. All my efforts were fruitless, no trace of anything that could enlighten me was apparent—not a vestige, not a clue, rewarded my long and anxious search.

All clothing and personal effects had been removed, and many light articles of furniture; the heavier ones were broken and overturned. It was impossible to tell what might have been destroyed or carried off by thieves after the house had been deserted.

At last I was compelled to confess to myself that further search was hopeless; I had searched diligently, and could discover nothing. Sorrowfully I turned away from the house, and proceeded to several Chinese dwellings in the neighbourhood; but at each received the unsatisfactory answer, "Puh-shettah, puh-shettah."

Taking my interpreter with me, I called at many houses, but without success; not the slightest information could I gather; the whole affair

remained a profound and impenetrable mystery. Everything led me to believe some violent act had been perpetrated; besides, I was quite certain that Marie would never have gone away willingly without first communicating with me.

One evening when in my cabin, tired out with the day's useless searching, and absorbed with bitter reflections, an old friend of mine, Captain L., erstwhile of the Turkish Contingent, came on board to see me, having just arrived from Hankow. After I had related the mysterious disappearance of Marie, L. suddenly jumped from his seat with a loud exclamation, and, questioning me a little further, declared he had obtained a clue as to her destination.

It appeared that, while on his passage from Chin-kiang, the steamer had passed close to a large Portuguese lorch, and he had just caught a glimpse of a girl on deck, of whom he then took no further notice, but who he now felt sure was Marie.

I felt overjoyed at the discovery. L., my friend, had called with me at Marie's relatives' several times, so I had every confidence that his opinion was correct, and I determined to follow the trail so singularly found. He declared he would accompany me, and kindly professed his readiness to start at once.

Early in the morning I went ashore to the owners of the schooner, and gave up the command to a friend. Philip, the mate, preferred joining me; he had served in the Greek insurrection against the Turks, and was a fine brave fellow.

Fortunately one of the river steamers—at that time few and far between—was to leave Shanghae in the afternoon, so it was just possible I might reach Chin-kiang before the lorch's arrival, though that would depend entirely upon the winds she had experienced. Accordingly, a few minutes before the bell rang, the whistle blew, and the skipper gave the hoarse command to "cast off." L., Philip, and myself, made our way on board the *Yang-tze* (named after the river) with our baggage. We each took an ample

supply of everything, as it would be necessary, in case the lorcha should have left Chin-kiang previous to our arrival, either to purchase or hire a vessel of some description to follow her. During the passage to Chin-kiang, we kept a regular watch the whole time, one or the other of us never leaving the deck, but, telescope in hand, keeping a sharp look-out. Heavily hung the time, until we made Silver Island ahead. I had put every possible interpretation upon Marie's presence—if, indeed, it were she—on board the lorcha. I had adopted every imaginable theory, but all to no purpose; the same idea would not remain five minutes, and I was forced to give up the mystery as unfathomable. Silver Island now hove in sight, and with my friends I waited impatiently on deck, and scanned the vessels in port, until, steaming slowly through the scanty shipping, we came to an anchor; but, although several lorchas were there, my friend did not recognize the one we sought for.

As the steamer remained but a short time at Chin-kiang, and it became necessary to leave her as soon as possible, I sent my interpreter (whom I had taken, together with my cook, and a female attendant for Marie in case I should find her), amongst the numerous junks, to hire one for us to live in for a few days, as there was no accommodation on shore. In a little while he returned successful, and leaving the steamer, we all took up our new quarters in a large Hankow junk, certainly not the most comfortable in the world, but still very well under the circumstances. The worst of it was, my sleeping berth that night happened to be in the joss-house, a little den surrounded by a broad shelf filled with the most horrible-looking small devils, of all colours and monstrosity, starting forth from red-painted and tinsel-gilded little temples; and although the crew seemed perfectly oblivious of the fact, by permitting the gods' or imps' desecration by the presence of the "foreign devil," a confounded old she-Chinese disturbed me at frequent periods throughout the night, by crawling into my place through a little hole at the back, to replenish the joss-sticks and incense, and to chin-chin Joss. The witches of Macbeth were nothing to that old hag, as she stuck herself at my

feet, faintly seen by the dim light of a distant pot of oil burning from the end of a small piece of pith, and slowly rocked herself about, muttering some unintelligible jargon, out of which I could only distinguish, "tomey feh, tomey feh, tomey feh!"

From the excited state of my mind; the irruptions of that aged party—probably the great-grandmother of half the crew; the surrounding phalanx of little devils, occasionally lighted up by a red and sudden glow of the burning joss-sticks; the distant noise of the gambling crew, in the fore part of the junk (Chinese sailors are inveterate gamblers, generally spending the whole night at it when practicable), and the irritable, restless thoughts all this induced, it may easily be imagined how very delightful my numerous dreams were that night. It seems a singular fact that nearly all the Chinese idols are of the most terrible and demoniacal aspect; it is, however, easily to be accounted for, as the Chinamen say the beneficent gods, being good, cannot do them any harm; but the devils and evil gods being bad, they think it necessary to propitiate them.

Directly we arrived at Chin-kiang, I proceeded to the Custom-house, and ascertained that a lorcha had passed up the river only the preceding day. I therefore at once sent my interpreter to look out for a convenient and fast-sailing junk, either for sale or hire. The next day he fortunately succeeded in finding one, a cut-down up-river junk, of a particularly fast and shallow description; she had been altered into a semi-European style, and furnished with a keel, and comfortable cabins inside, was about 60 tons burthen, and altogether just the sort of craft I wanted. On the river she would certainly be faster under sail than the lorcha, and without wind she could either be tracked along the bank or impelled by the large sweeps (*yulos*) she carried.

As, in the event of rescuing Marie, I determined to proceed with the vessel to Nankin, the Chinese owner, who was also skipper, would only come to terms upon my paying down half the value of his craft, guaranteeing the remainder in case of loss, and hiring her at a monthly rate. To this I

instantly agreed, and hurrying all the preparations forward, late on the same evening was enabled to start in chase of the lorcha.

A stern chase is proverbially a long one; but in this case I had means of progressing that the chase had not. The wind was too light for sailing against the strong current, therefore I knew the lorcha must either lay at anchor waiting for a breeze, or, if small and drawing but little water, progress slowly by tracking along the bank; while, upon the other hand, with my lighter vessel I should be able to keep close in to the shore, and track along at the rate of two or three miles an hour.

Tracking is a very common operation in China, resembling our canal tracking, only instead of horses the crew of the vessel pull her along, a rope being taken ashore from the mast-head, to which the men yoke themselves with a bridle having a wooden bar to rest upon the chest; then away they start, singing in chorus some melancholy falsetto monostich, or improvising as they go. At many parts there are regular trackers, who make it their business. It is a hard and unprofitable life, and these poor people, among others, are frequently seized by officials, and compelled to track government vessels for many hundred miles without reward, and then left to find their way home the best way they can, if they do not starve in the meanwhile.

The night was fortunately a bright moonlight one, and I was enabled to make considerable progress. Before daylight, however, the moon vanished behind the distant hills, and, with her disappearance, we were compelled to anchor till morning. At break of day I was up, eagerly scanning the distant bosom of the river for the bark I was following. Nothing but the sails of a few Chinese junks rewarded my long and anxious gaze. Yet it was possible the lorcha might be hid from view by the first bend of the river, where, scarcely three miles off, its waters disappeared behind the land.

Rousing up my friends, and leaving them to follow me by tracking slowly along, I dressed myself in Chinese clothes, put on a broad Chinese hat, took my rifle and a good glass, and landing with my interpreter, started off on the scout, making for an eminence some two or three miles distant,

close to the channel of the river. When arrived at its summit, I found it commanded a capital view of the water for many miles; a glance told me the lorcha was nowhere near, neither could I distinguish her in the distance. Suddenly, my interpreter declared he could see her. Knowing what powerful vision the Chinese frequently have, I instantly brought the spot he pointed out—some eight or nine miles away—again into the range of my glass. I saw several junks' masts, and after a long and careful scrutiny, made out a couple much larger than the rest, which might possibly be those of the lorcha; but at that distance, with nothing but the bare masts, amongst others showing over some low land, I could not be certain. The Chinaman still persisted that he was right; and, trusting he might prove so, I returned on board.

During all that day we tracked steadily forward, and towards evening I had the satisfaction of plainly observing the lorcha in the distance. She was also being tracked, but was too heavy to move fast, so that we were rapidly gaining on her, and in four or five hours ought to be alongside. The difficulty would be to ascertain whether Marie was on board, and if so, how situated. When I reflected that my friend had observed her from the steamer as he passed, it did not seem improbable that I might see her also; but her apparent freedom sadly interfered with the idea that she had been carried off by force and was detained against her will. Had it been so, she might have made signs of distress, or called for help, when the steamer passed so close.

It was impossible to form any plan, or arrive at any fixed conclusion. Circumstances alone could guide us. We had now entered the Ti-ping territory, so I felt quite confident of safety on shore, whatever might betide; besides, my commission from the Chung-wang would doubtless obtain me assistance if I required it.

It would be quite easy for us to pass right alongside the lorcha without exciting the slightest suspicion. In the first place, her people could have not the least idea of our pursuit; and, in the second, we had but to hoist a Chinese flag, and if they should happen to take any notice of our vessel, they

would simply think her a Chinese one, while we could closely observe them from our small cabin windows.

It was just about dusk when the lorcha ceased tracking, and came to an anchor under some steep hills. We were not more than half a mile astern, so, concealing ourselves, but making the Chinamen lounge about the decks, and stick up an old flag full of Chinese characters, without the slightest hesitation we held on our course. The lorcha had anchored within thirty yards of the bank, so, giving our vessel rather a broad sheer into the stream, we passed close to her, in fact, almost grazing her side. From our hiding-places we could see that her crew were mostly Portuguese, and that she was armed heavily enough to sink our lightly-built vessel in an instant; but Marie was not visible, neither could we distinguish any trace of her.

As my friend was positive it was the same craft he had previously seen, it was quite certain that some woman must be on board; therefore I determined to ascertain who she was. Continuing on past the lorcha for nearly a mile, until the turning of the river hid her behind the hills she was anchored abreast of, we hauled close in to the bank and made fast there.

Besides a larger boat, we carried one of the small canoes used at some parts of the Yang-tze. In this I decided to drop down the river whenever the moon should set, and endeavour to discover whether Marie was on board the strange vessel.

To favour my design, towards midnight the weather became heavy, and the moon soon after sank behind a thick bank of clouds; not a star could be seen, and the night was perfectly dark. I now dressed myself with loose black silk trousers, such as were used by the Ti-pings, tucking the ends into a pair of soft-soled Chinese boots, a tight black silk jacket, and a thick black felt Canton cap. I carried a pair of revolvers carefully loaded in my belt, placed a coil of rope in the boat, and also a common Chinese sleeping quilt. My friends desired to come with me; but I decided otherwise, for it would be desirable to use stratagem rather than force, and three of us, besides the man to manage the boat, would overcrowd her. Neither would I allow them to

cast off the vessel and drop after me; for if I should find Marie and rescue her, it would be necessary to keep out of the range of the lorch'a guns. I therefore pressed the hands of my comrades, took my interpreter, a Canton man, whom I knew I could depend upon, and, with one of the best men of my crew to manage the boat, pushed off and commenced dropping down with the tide. I had scarcely left my vessel when a sudden thought struck me, so, turning back, I requested my friends to walk down the bank, take a couple of the crew with them, all well armed, and station themselves on the shore directly opposite the lorch'a.

The strength of the tide swept the frail boat rapidly along, and soon I found myself abreast of the hills close to the termination of which I knew the lorch'a lay at anchor. It was so very dark under the shadow of the high land, that when we discerned the vessel we were within a few hundred feet of her, and drifting down right upon her bows. We instantly slipped overboard the small grapnel made fast to the end of the line I had placed in the boat, and when it reached the bottom, held on to it, and waited to make our last preparations for boarding. I found we were still undiscovered; indeed, it would have been impossible to distinguish our little canoe in the surrounding darkness even at that short distance. After waiting a few moments, I whispered Aling (my interpreter) to slack away the line, while the man in the stern steered us as required with his paddle. Crouching low down in the boat, we slowly glided under the bows of the lorch'a, till we drifted right upon her cable, grappling which I prepared to mount to the deck. Aling was to follow me so far, and then remain stationary; he would thus be able to assist me in case I should retreat to the bows with Marie, and, besides, would bring up the other end of the line, after reeving it through a ringbolt in the stern of the boat, both to secure a good means of descent and to prevent the boatman, who we knew had no knife, from shoving off in ease of alarm.

Slowly and noiselessly I clambered up the cable, and raising my head above the lorch'a's bulwarks peered cautiously around. At last I was able to distinguish the forms of many of the crew lying about the deck covered up in

their quilts. This was as I expected it would be, and, moreover, I trusted they were the Chinese part of the crew, for it was winter, and I calculated the Portuguese would prefer sleeping below.

I proceeded very deliberately with my investigations, knowing that I had plenty of time before daylight, and had no occasion to risk a discovery by being too precipitate. Aling soon joined me, and I was just whispering some instructions into his ear, when, with an exclamation, up started a man within arm's length, until then concealed by the foresail, upon the opposite side of which he must have been reclining. For a moment I feared we were discovered, and sending Aling down into the boat, drew a revolver, while I prepared to follow him. Instead of approaching me, the man walked aft. I then knew he must be the look-out, who, having slept on his watch, had probably gone aft to ascertain the time. Not a moment was to be lost if I intended to take advantage of his absence; softly calling upon Aling to return, I waited until he had reached me, and then, slipping over the rail, wrapped my quilt about me and walked aft.

Carefully stepping over the recumbent sleepers, I had just reached the main-mast when I saw the drowsy watchman returning. I instantly threw myself down on the deck, and, drawing the quilt over me, pretended to be seeking sleep. The device succeeded famously, for, whether the man had seen me or not, he evidently considered me to be one of the crew. Drawing the corner of the rug from over my eyes, I saw him disappear down the fore-scuttle. Most likely his watch had expired, and he went to rouse his relief. Directly his head was below the combings of the hatch, I started to my feet and continued getting aft. When I reached the cabin skylight I spread myself out by the side of it and gazed below. A bright lamp was burning, and everything inside was plainly visible. I could see a full musket-rack, table, books, telltale compass, an open chart, a revolver-case, and all the paraphernalia of a nautical drawing-room; but what riveted my eyes more than all were the sleeping-berths—one on each side—with their curtains drawn. It was useless gazing through the skylight; the only plan to see the

occupants of these berths would be to open the curtains and look in. Another instant and perhaps the fresh look-out man would be on deck. I had no time to spare. If the venture was ever to be made, now was the moment to put it into execution. I hesitated no longer, but, rising up, stole to the companion and cautiously crept down the stairs, lifting foot after foot with a noiseless cat-like movement. When I reached the bottom, I found myself fronting another berth; but the loud snoring I could hear satisfied me that she whom I wanted was not there. I passed on to the cabin door. After listening a few minutes, I became satisfied the inmates, whoever they might be, were fast asleep. Little did those wrapped in the sleep of security dream that one who might prove their deadliest enemy was in their midst! I must have strangely resembled the midnight murderer, as with stealthy step I glided across the cabin, and, reaching the lamp, turned it low and dim. One of the sleepers moved uneasily. I shrunk down into the darkest spot under the table. Again all was quiet. I crawled up to the nearest berth, moved the curtain half an inch, and peeped in; the back of a man was visible. Slowly I crossed over to the opposite side, and, performing the same operation at the foot of the berth, saw a bearded face on the pillow. Marie was not in that cabin.

A small passage led from the after-part of the saloon, apparently dividing two after-cabins from each other. I quickly passed into it, and paused at a door upon my left. I listened for a little while to the profound, oppressive silence, in which I could plainly distinguish the palpitation of my own heart; at last I fancied I heard a female voice within. I was just pressing my ear to the panelling when a coarse ejaculation in a man's voice proceeding from the opposite cabin made me start back; the handle was grasped; I had just time to crouch down at the farthest end of the passage, when the door was rudely thrust open. A man came forth, evidently in a state of intoxication, and, fortunately turning away from my direction, shook his fist at the door I had just left; then muttering a curse, blundered into the outer cabin. I could hear him unfasten a locker, take something forth, and then followed a gurgling, clucking sound; the bottle was dashed down upon the table with a clash, and

then the drunkard staggered up the companion-way on deck. Surely I heard a woman's voice again! I dared not remain to satisfy myself. I had not a second to lose; if the man should return before I could escape from the cabin, he would certainly discover me, and then all hope of rescuing Marie would be at an end. I hurried through the cabin and up the companion undiscovered, although an exclamation from one of the berths made me fear it was otherwise.

Upon reaching the deck, I found I was safe from any discovery upon the part of my intoxicated friend, for he was stretched at full length upon the deck, and already in the lethargic sleep of drunkenness. I stooped over him to scan his features, and while doing so plainly heard voices in the cabin. Undoubtedly I had been noticed passing through it. As I turned towards the forepart of the vessel, I saw the watchman coming straight towards me. He had most likely observed my movements, and was coming aft to ascertain what I was about, mistaking me for one of the crew. I snatched up my quilt from where I had left it, placed it over my head and shoulders, and pulling my trousers out of my boots, assumed the Chinaman as much as possible, and walked to meet him. Fortunately it was the darkest hour of the night—that immediately before the grey of morning—and the thick clouds made it still more sombre. Until close up to me I did not perceive he was followed by a Chinaman; the man himself was a Portuguese. I loosened one of my revolvers, and taking it by the barrel under my quilt, prepared to fell him. These Macao Portuguese nearly all speak the Canton dialect, with which I was unacquainted; and as the Chinese portion of the lorch'a's crew would certainly be Cantonese, I expected he would address me in their language, and discover me at once. To my surprise he spoke in the *Pidgin English* by saying:—

"What thing wantchee aft side, Jack?" To which I replied, with indignant emphasis—

"*Hi-ya!* what ting? wantchee look see what-tim, ga-la!"

The Portuguese, seemingly dissatisfied, seized hold of my rug. Just then the Chinaman who had followed him interfered, and, pulling me away, exclaimed to him—

"What for foolo pidgin? No wantchee play ga-la!"

The Portuguese still seemed suspicious; but, giving me a pull, Aling—for it was he—laid himself down as if to repose, and I quickly imitated him. Although this vigilant look-out now left us, for more than an hour he continued pacing the deck close by; daylight was fast approaching, and we were tied to the spot. Aling told me that when he saw the look-out come aft he suspected it was to overhaul me, and, thinking the man would speak to me in Cantonese, he followed him to assist me. It was principally for emergencies of this sort I had brought Aling with me.

At last the watchful mariner moved aft to see what time it was, I imagine; so, taking the opportunity, we both got forward, and, casting off the line, descended into the boat. It was impossible to attempt any further discovery that night, for although I had not been followed by the inmates of the outer cabin, it was evident they had heard me pass, or something had disturbed and made them wakeful; besides, it was too late now, for daylight was already breaking. Bitterly disappointed, I was compelled to order my companions to pull the boat away from under the lorch'a's bows by hauling in the line, to weigh the grapnel, and to paddle inshore. Directly we reached the bank, I was met by my friends, who rushed forward to inquire what success I had met with; in a few words I told them all. At first they declared they would return with me to the lorch'a, jump on board, force the cabin I had heard the female voice proceed from, and if Marie was there endeavour to carry her off; soon, however, they decided upon a more reasonable course. Our boat was too small to carry all; the sharp look-out would most likely discover us; there certainly would not be time to paddle the boat, heavily laden, up stream, and adopt my last manœuvre; and we were quite unequal to cope with the four or five Europeans and some ten or twelve Macao Portuguese, besides Canton men, on board. The thing was plainly

impracticable; our only course was to wait until the next night, and then try the same plan over again. I had made several important discoveries. If Marie was on board, I knew where to find her. I had acquainted myself with the interior arrangements of the lorcha, and I was enabled to form a pretty accurate estimate of her crew; so that I had obtained some valuable facts to guide me upon a second attempt.

I returned to my vessel much disturbed in mind; the menacing gesture of the drunken brute I had seen in the passage, the voice proceeding from the cabin he appeared to threaten, the possibility that Marie was the inmate who had evidently excited and angered him, were painful reflections.

Soon after my return on board the day broke, and my companions retired to obtain the rest they had been without all night. For my part sleep was out of the question; I was in a complete fever, and unable to do or think of anything else than the probable result of my next attempt to discover Marie. The day was perfectly calm; undisturbed by a ripple, the broad expanse of the mighty Yang-tze glided swiftly past, glistening in the lurid sun like a sheet of liquid gold. Unable to proceed, through want of wind and the strength of the current, the lorcha remained at anchor; while many times during the weary day I landed, and, concealed amidst the bushes, watched her through my telescope. I was unable to discover anything. The day was very cold, and but few of the crew were about the decks. At last, towards evening, I made my last reconnoitre, accompanied by my friend and one of our crew—the latter for the purpose of acting as a scout upon the movements of the lorcha; for, a light breeze having sprung up, it was just possible she might attempt to get under weigh.

It was upon this occasion I made a discovery that led to important results. My attention was attracted to her stern windows. It was a fortunate circumstance that we had gone rather below the vessel, as otherwise we could not have noticed them. After closely watching these ports until quite dark, and observing nothing of the interior of the after-cabin or its inmates,

we returned to our vessel with sanguine hopes for the issue of the night's adventure.

My impatience became gratefully relieved in one way by the early setting of the moon, but, upon the other hand, the night continued bright and starlight—in fact, so bright that it was evidently impossible to repeat my *modus operandi* of the previous night. Here was an apparently insurmountable difficulty, for I should never be able to approach the lorcha undiscovered! For several hours I remained in deep consultation with my friends; but after discussing every plan we could imagine, the fact remained patent, that none could be effected without attracting observation; unless, indeed, I could hit upon the exact moment for relieving the look-out man at some period between midnight and the dawn, and when the rest of the crew would almost certainly be fast asleep. I had almost decided to adopt this course, when my friend and Philip proposed another. Their idea was, to get our vessel under weigh in the middle of the night, tack down the river, and then get athwart hawse of the lorcha, as if by accident; drop an anchor foul of the lorcha's, and while all hands would be forward working to get the vessel clear, find an opportunity to prosecute my search. This certainly appeared feasible, and almost superior to the other plan; but, fortunately, while considering which to adopt, I hit upon something better than either. I suddenly remembered the ruse the Chinese pirates had attempted with me; prompted by this, I conceived a plan that in all respects promised to take me silently and undiscovered to the position I desired—under the stern of the lorcha. Directly I unfolded the project to my companions, they agreed with me that it was impossible to conceive a better.

It was already nearly midnight; we therefore commenced our preparations without delay. Upon this occasion, I decided to take my friend as a companion; we each dressed in black clothes, and besides taking our revolvers, placed a couple of rifles in the boat. In the meanwhile, according to my instructions, Philip had made the crew prepare a large drag, in the form of a cross, made with two short and broad spars, lashed together at their

centres. When this was ready, the end of a long coir rope was made fast to the middle, the other end being fastened to our canoe, with a few fathoms to spare, which were passed ashore. The drag was now placed in our large boat, and being pulled far out on the river, was tossed overboard; this was signalled by showing a lamp. Directly I saw the light, I gave the word to start away: Philip and three of the crew, well armed, taking the end of the rope, walked down the bank, keeping our canoe close under its shadow, and progressing as fast as the drag at the other end of the rope was drifting with the current. After proceeding in this order for twenty minutes, during which we had slowly been hauling in the line till we had coiled nearly half of it in the canoe, we arrived fairly abeam of the lorchha, and, almost immediately afterwards, felt the jerk of the rope as it caught across her cable. Gradually easing it out, our companions dragged us carefully past the vessel—scarcely a hundred feet distant. At length the rope was all payed out to the bare end, and taking a small line, one end of which was retained by our companions ashore, we let go from the bank, and the current quickly swept us into the stream until we were checked by it in a direct line astern of the lorchha, now dimly visible in the distance. We had one Chinaman in the boat to steer and paddle as necessary, and slowly and cautiously we began hauling in the rope. We had not proceeded far, when we came up to the drag towing some 70 or 80 yards astern of the lorchha. To the upper arm of this we made fast a lantern with a candle and matches in it all ready to light in a moment, and then continued hauling upon the rope, which, as we took it inboard, was passed over the stern by the Chinaman, and pulled ashore to Philip and his men, by means of the small line.

When within fifty feet of the lorchha, we paused awhile, and watched closely to ascertain whether any of her crew were visible; we were soon satisfied that our approach could be conducted with perfect impunity, for her stern was high, and not only protected us from the observation of the look-out in the fore part of the vessel, but would hide us from the view of any one except a person coming to look directly over the taffrail. We could

distinguish by the light from within, only half-subdued by thin drapery, four stern ports, two on each side; but to see who, or what, was in the cabins, it would be necessary to remove the curtains. Stealthily and silently we now urged ourselves forward, passing the rope along, hand over hand, till at last there we lay right under the lorcha's counter—like a pilot-fish under the lee of a huge shark. Erecting myself in the boat, I found that my shoulders reaching just to the sill of the ports, I could easily raise myself up; but, to my chagrin, found they were too small for me to pass through. It was evident that originally only two ports had existed, but they were now divided into four, by a slight stanchion, or framework, passing down the centre of each. The curtains of the starboard side were closely drawn, the glass part of a sliding sash closed, and it was impossible to see within. Slacking away the rope a little, I grasped the other part of it, and changed our position to the port counter.

The curtains were not so carefully closed at this side, and looking through the open space I was able to view the whole interior of the cabin. My first glance was attracted by the same man I had seen issue from it on the previous night; he was seated at a table, and I saw directly by his flushed face that he had been drinking again very freely. The light from a large lamp was brilliant, and I could observe his every expression with ease—he was evidently labouring under strong excitement, and in a few moments I saw him pour out a stiff "second-mate's nip" of neat brandy, and gulp it down. His appearance became, if possible, still more inflamed, and several times he started up and went towards the cabin door, snatching up a key from the table. Upon each occasion, after hesitating and listening at the open door, with a fresh effort, and a drop of brandy to obtain resolution, he resumed his seat, gritting his teeth and clenching his hands savagely. His manner plainly told of some evil intention, and that he was endeavouring to raise his determination to put it into execution. The glass sash was not quite closed, and as he retired from the door for the last time I heard a bitter "carajo!" hiss through his teeth with fierce aspiration; followed by a few words uttered

with energy in some Spanish patois, from which I could gather: "carajo! my proud beauty—you scorn my love, do you? Wait a little! wait a little, my lady; we shall change places soon."

The man's appearance was so unmistakably South American that I felt no surprise at his language. I had no doubt that his speech referred to the inmate of the opposite cabin, so I instantly returned under its windows to try and make some opening to see who she was. L., my friend, handed me a large bowie-knife he had fortunately brought with him; I managed to pick the window open with this, and moving the curtain with my fingers, I peered cautiously through. I had no occasion to search further—Marie was before me. Yes, there lay my betrothed; within a few feet, almost within reach of my hands; yet I could neither touch, or embrace her—she was in the power of the ruffian I had just seen. My fingers trembled nervously with the curtain and sides of the port, while my heart heaved with sudden and powerful excitement. For some moments I remained thus, riveted and powerless. At the first glance I saw nothing but Marie; but when the sudden shock had passed, a single moment explained the situation. She was sleeping upon a sofa couch, and the table, chairs, and every moveable article of furniture in the cabin, were piled against the door. Her face was turned away from me, but I needed not to look upon that to recognize her; the graceful form, perfectly outlined against the white drapery of the couch, told that it was Marie.

When my thoughts returned, I became convinced I could not be better placed for rescuing her. She was alone, within my reach, and I was at the most concealed spot about the lorcha to take advantage of the opportunity. A dark shadow surrounded the vessel, and, besides this, our little boat was drawn close up under her stern. Nothing seemed likely to interfere with my scheme to effect her escape except one thing, and that was, the ports were too small for egress by them! My friend took my place in the bow of our boat to survey the situation; the instant he placed his hand upon the port, he drew his knife and commenced hacking away at the stanchion: if this could

be removed, there would be room to pass through the two ports thus let into one. Desperately my friend slashed away at the woodwork; his knife was sharp, and he made rapid progress. Marie still slept on, and I would not awaken her for fear any sudden exclamation might startle him in the opposite cabin.

The observations and action thus described occupied but a short time. Thoughts are quick, but at such a crisis they speed like lightning. Our work, too, was rapid, and soon would be accomplished; and it would only remain to bring Marie from the cabin to the boat, through the stern ports of the lorchha.

The stanchion was about four inches thick, and my friend had cut it more than half through, when, suddenly he sank down in the boat, exclaiming, "hish." Reaching to me, he whispered that some one was unlocking the cabin door from the outside. I instantly changed places with him, and, raising myself cautiously to a level with the port, peeped through. I saw the door slowly opening, while a hand passed through was holding the furniture that had been piled up, and keeping it from falling as the door was gradually pressed inwards. Marie had evidently fallen into a deep sleep through excessive fatigue, for even this noise did not wake her.

Not a moment was to be lost. I turned to my friend, and whispered him to hand me one of the rifles from the stern of the boat. Upon receiving the weapon, I placed its muzzle close to the cut on the stanchion and fired. Before the smoke cleared away I grasped the sill of the port, the shattered woodwork gave way, and I raised myself into the cabin. Directly I was able to discern anything, I saw that Marie had started from her couch, and was gazing in a terrified manner in the direction of the report; but, calling upon her by name as I advanced nearer, she recognized me and rushed into my arms.

As I hurried her towards the stern ports, the door was pushed further open. For a second I paused, and fired my revolver at the man I had previously seen in the opposite cabin, just as he appeared in the doorway

with a pistol in each hand. My shot took effect, for he fell prostrate across the threshold. Immediately afterwards I heard the loud shouting of the alarmed crew, and the noise of hurrying footsteps approaching the cabin.

Upon reaching the port, I found L. all ready to receive me, and hastily passed Marie into the boat. Just as we shoved off, the door was burst wide open, and in rushed a crowd of men, some holding lights, and all armed. We hauled in upon the part of the rope fast to the drag, and, reaching it, set light to the lantern on its upper arm. Directly this was done we cut each part of the rope, letting go one end, and thus sending the drag floating down the river, while the other end was made fast to the bow of our boat. The lantern was not only intended to throw the people of the lorcha off our track, but it was to be a signal to our friends on shore to haul away upon the rope and pull us to the bank. It had just tautened, and pulled us out of a line with the drag, when crash went a volley of musketry from the lorcha, and we heard the bullets go singing past in the direction of the floating light.

Within three minutes after cutting the rope we reached the bank, and were tracked up stream by Philip and his men. Before getting abeam of the lorcha we had the satisfaction to hear a boat pull away from her in pursuit of the now distant lantern.

Upon reaching my vessel I took Marie to the best cabin, and left her with the *ayah* I had brought to wait upon and attend to her. For some time I was left to my own reflections, my friends being engaged getting the vessel under weigh, and making the crew track her along the bank.

At last Marie was ready to receive me, and on my joining her she gave me an account of all that had happened since our last parting. It appeared that everything had gone on quietly and happily until a few evenings previous to my arrival at Shanghae, when one night Marie and her relatives were startled by a loud knocking at the door. This was no sooner opened than in rushed ten or a dozen men, led by the one I had shot, who was no other than Manoel Ramon, the Chilliniian I had rescued her from in the first place at Whampoa. He declared he intended taking them all to Hong-kong,

where he stated Marie's father was waiting to receive her. He allowed them to take their clothes and a few light articles; they were then taken to a lonely part of the river, and carried on board the lorchha, which directly afterwards weighed anchor and commenced dropping down the river. Upon getting well clear of Woo-sung, at the entrance of the Shanghae river, the lorchha was stopped alongside a junk, and Marie's two relatives—her aunt and uncle—were put on board, and the vessels instantly separated. Ramon then informed her that her father was dead, that he had been made his heir, and that a settlement had been left her upon condition that she should marry him. For the first few days he had renewed his old protestations of affection, and treated her respectfully; but latterly, finding her aversion immovable, his bearing had entirely altered.

Rapidly flew the time, as, absorbed in our happiness, we remained unconscious of its flight; at last I was startled by the increased motion of the vessel, and knew that a fresh breeze had sprung up. This change had not lasted long, when my friend L. came to the cabin-door and beckoned me to go out to him. Wishing Marie good-night, and leaving her to obtain the repose she needed, I followed him into the outer cabin, and eagerly inquired what had occurred.

"Why, that confounded lorchha's in full chase, and will certainly overhaul us within three hours," said my friend.

I hurried on deck with him, and found it was just daylight, and although we had undoubtedly made considerable progress before the lorchha had started in pursuit, yet there she was, some five or six miles astern, and crowding all sail in chase.

After thinking it over a little while, we decided that sending the light adrift upon the river had brought about the pursuit. When the men sent in chase had come up to it, they doubtless saw at once that it had been sent to drift down the river, and as it was certain it could not have been started above the people they were in pursuit of, it was equally sure that we must be above it. We had not thought of this at the time; we only valued it as a ruse

to throw off the close pursuit we expected, and so give us time to return to our vessel undiscovered. So far we were successful, but the whole style of the drag proved to the lorcha's people that we must be above them, and *up* the river, which caused her to give chase so soon.

We were at this time some twelve or fourteen miles below Nankin, and I at once determined to make for that place with all speed. The sails were wetted down fore and aft, and everything done to make them draw as well as possible. The breeze was moderately strong, but freshening, and the stronger it came the quicker would the lorcha overhaul us, for being of an European and heavier build, and spreading loftier and lighter canvas than we did, it would tell considerably in her favour. Fortunately the wind was dead aft, so our flat and shallow bottom was in this case an advantage, whereas, a beam or leading wind would have made it quite the reverse. The wind increased so quickly that in less than two hours the lorcha had rapidly gained upon us, and was coming up hand over hand in a cloud of canvas. She was yet more than two miles astern, but I was still some six miles below Nankin, and although the breeze was now very strong, I could not, with an adverse tide, hope to reach that city before we were within the range of her pivot gun.

We tried every plan to increase our speed; an old awning was rigged out as a stun'-sail upon one side, and a spare tarpaulin on the other, besides which, several large flags were fastened together, bent to a large bamboo, and hoisted above the mainsail to serve as a gaff-topsail. It was now blowing half a gale of wind, and over a three or four knot tide, the old vessel was staggering along under a press of sail she had never felt before. Following directly in our wake, like a sleuth-hound on the trail, the lorcha presented at this time a striking, though to us unpleasant, picture. Rolling heavily from side to side, her snow-white sails pyramid-like in form, and reaching from the deck to the very summit of her long and taper spars, now bending like willows to the blast; a long furrow of foam following in her wake, and two lines of water leaping from each bow, and tossing high into the air a silver spray, through which the morning sun formed myriads of tiny rainbows; the

stoop of the vessel, as with a movement like the bending of a buffalo to the charge, she plunged forward burying her bows deep into the rushing surge, and anon raising them high above as though to shake the dripping element from her head—all these phases in the appearance of our pursuer made her look a thing of life and beauty. While gazing and thinking thus, I was abruptly recalled from the romantic to the stern reality of the scene. The lorcha suddenly luffed up, puff went a column of smoke from her lee bow, and while it was eddying amidst her cordage the splash of a shot a few fathoms from our stern, accompanied by the booming of a cannon, told me the danger had now commenced in earnest, and that our pursuer was aware of our connection with the affair of the previous night.

The shot had fallen so close under our stern that it was certain the next five minutes would find us within range and entirely commanded by the lorcha's guns. Upon the other hand, another half-hour might see us safe under the walls of Nankin, unless some of our spars should be crippled, or a shot strike us below the water-line. If either of these misfortunes should occur, before we could make repairs aloft the lorcha would be alongside; if hulled, before reaching the Nankin batteries we should sink. I therefore made every preparation to run into the bank and get ashore, in the event of such an emergency.

I placed Marie in the hold, right upon the bottom of the vessel, where she would be below the water-line far enough to be safe from the lorcha's fire. My friends and self got our rifles and a few things ready in case we should have to take to the shore. We had the sails continually wetted, and made the crew run fore and aft the decks to help the vessel's way. In a few moments the lorcha luffed up again, bang went her "long Tom," and the shot came whistling over our heads, passing some yards clear of our rigging. We were now fairly within range, and our pursuer fired at us as quickly as the pivot-gun could be loaded and brought to bear. This kind of work went on for some time, till at last the outworks of Nankin showed up only a mile or so ahead. The lorcha had hitherto fired exclusively at our spars, but directly

these forts opened to view, she began aiming at our hull. Several large rents were torn through our sails, though fortunately none of our spars had been struck; but the gunnery practice of our enemy now became close and dangerous. Two or three shots hurtled past a few feet over the decks, but then crash came one right amidships, tearing in at one side and passing clean through the other, as we rounded a sand-bank and became nearly broadside on to the lorcha. As we fell into line again another smashed through the stern, and, knocking off the helmsman's head, passed over the bows, raking us fore and aft, but fortunately killing no one else. The lorcha having to round-to each time she fired, in order to get her pivot-gun to bear, her way was checked very considerably; and to this may our escape be entirely attributed. At the time our helmsman was struck we had already reached the first of the Nankin batteries. The people on board the lorcha now saw their mistake, and, ceasing firing, kept steadily on in chase. They changed their tactics—fortunately for us—too late. Hoisting a flag the Ti-pings had given me when I left Soo-chow, I steered past the point of the island just below Nankin, and passing the batteries—crowded with soldiery gazing upon the chase—ran into the creek, leading between some fortifications direct to the walls of the city, and there anchored.



ESCAPE FROM THE LORCHA.

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Inn Fields.

Day & Son, Limited Lith.

Directly I ran up the Ti-ping flag I was boarded by an officer from the principal fort. To him I showed my commission from the Chung-wang, and requested protection from the pursuing vessel. He pulled quickly ashore, and just as the lorcha was rounding the point of the island and preparing to follow me into the creek, I had the satisfaction to see a gun fired across her

bows, upon which she hauled off and gave up the pursuit, her retreat accelerated by another shot from the fort sent right into her.

While watching her through my glass, I plainly observed her owner, Manoel Ramon, propped up in a chair on the quarter-deck.

## CHAPTER VIII.

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Towards the close of 1854, the detached armies of Ti-pings were gradually compelled to abandon their isolated positions, and retire closer upon their capital. During October, after forwarding all the supplies obtainable to the treasury and granaries of Nankin, the Western armies evacuated the important cities of Wu-chang, Han-yang, and Hankow, and collecting the garrisons of the many others between them and Nankin, retired quickly upon the latter, the siege of which the Imperialists were beginning to press with a vigour encouraged by the weakness of the garrison. This army falling rapidly upon the rear of the enemy's works, put them to flight with great slaughter, and completely raised the siege. After this, another force was marched to the relief of Chin-kiang, which was also invested by a considerable Imperialist army. At the close of the year, both Nankin and Chin-kiang were effectually relieved, and the besieging armies driven back upon the cities of Soo-chow and Shanghae in confusion. With the exception of the Northern army, in occupation of the north side of the Yang-tze from Ngan-king to Kwei-chow, nearly all the Ti-ping forces were concentrated in and about the cities of Nankin and Chin-kiang, when, again committing the

error former experience should have taught him to avoid, the Tien-wang separated his forces, and despatched several armies upon widely divergent courses.

The principal operations were conducted towards the south, in the provinces of Kiang-su, Ngan-whui, and the borders of Che-kiang and Kiang-si, and towards the west, along the old route of the Yang-tze and beyond the Tung-ting lake. Early in 1855 the Western division, successful in all its operations, reached the city of Hankow, and Wu-chang, the provincial capital, was for the third time carried by storm, the Manchoo defenders suffering fearful loss. The Ti-pings now held the three cities for a longer period than before; but, although they obtained numerous recruits, they were unable to occupy the adjoining provinces permanently and rescue them from the Manchoo rule. The people at large, finding the revolution was to a certain extent stationary, naturally waited for some grand and combined movement likely to overthrow the Manchoo rule, and, however much they would have rejoiced at the change, were careful to avoid implicating themselves against the government until the prospect of success became more apparent. The fearful experience of former failures warned the nation to be cautious—in fact, the cautious alone remained in the land of the living, the indiscriminate massacres after the slightest attempt at rebellion having exterminated nearly every noble and patriotic spirit in China. Besides, many who might otherwise have hazarded the venture held back on account of the Ti-ping profession of Christianity (a change of the ancient national train of custom and ideas what they not only looked upon with suspicion, but with actual abhorrence). The hatred of the Manchoo must indeed have been intense—or rather, the hand of God powerful—to overcome the old and jealous prejudices of more than 2,000 years, and give the Tien-wang even any adherents.

The Southern army, breaking into several divisions during 1855, was mostly victorious; many cities were captured, and large supplies of every

necessary and war material taken. Partisans were sent into all the southern provinces and many local insurrections stimulated, but all too feeble and desultory to be of any real assistance to the cause; though the prompt and savage punishments inflicted by the Manchoo authorities undoubtedly proved very damaging, the fear they inspired awing the people into submission, and terrifying them from rising in rebellion again.

For more than a year the Southern and Western armies maintained their position; but early in 1856 they were again forced to retire upon Nankin, which had become reinvested by the Imperialists. It will thus be seen that, while the Ti-pings were detaching small armies just able to overcome the local Manchoo authorities, the Imperialists, after reinforcing the provincial troops so as to enable them to dispute the ground with varying success, invariably concentrated all their reserves and spare forces before Nankin. Considering that the Imperialists had vastly superior numbers, and, moreover, held the whole of the revenue, and completely surrounded the insurgents upon every side, the greatly superior organization and courage of the Ti-pings is sufficiently proved by the fact that they were able to compete with their more advantageously situated enemy so successfully.

In the middle of the year, the Imperialists were attacked by the recalled Ti-ping forces, before the city of Chin-kiang, and were defeated with heavy loss; about the same time, their lines before Nankin were assaulted by another division and completely broken up.

In this year an event took place, the consequences of which have proved almost fatal to the Ti-ping revolution. From a period long anterior to the commencement of the movement, the position of Europeans in China was most unsatisfactory. The growing dread the Manchoos entertained of foreign intercourse urged them to the adoption of the most repulsive and arrogant behaviour upon all occasions, and it was just at the period this was becoming almost unbearable that the Ti-ping insurrection took place. It was therefore only natural that Europeans should regard the rising power

favourably. Directly the organization and professions of the Tien-wang became fully known, it was almost the universal practice to warmly advocate his cause, and sound thrilling pæans in his praise. The clergy and religious world went half mad with joy; the societies for providing Bibles for the naked savages who could not read them, almost feared their work was coming to an end; and the mercantile part of the foreign world entered into the wildest speculations (excepting the opium smugglers). Eagerly the clerical expounders of mercy and goodwill wrote home glowing accounts of the success of their teaching—blessed by an overruling Providence!—eagerly the whole body of merchants, officials, adventurers, &c., watched for some favourable prospect of *profit*, or, as the thing is speciously termed, of "placing our commercial and political relations upon a satisfactory basis"! All these benevolent and large-minded Europeans waited a little, and when they found the profitable change would probably take a long time to perfect, while in the interval their gain *might* be diminished, it was absolutely wonderful how their sympathy—like Bob Acre's courage—oozed out at their fingers' ends. Events soon occurred that extinguished the last remnant of philanthropy. The missionaries (only a certain portion of them, be it remembered) found out they could not take all the credit of the rebellion to themselves—or rather the religious element of it; therefore they gradually cooled down, and some of them began to revile it, at the same time taking precious good care not to put themselves to inconvenience by going to teach the Ti-pings where they were in error. The political and commercial body also found they would have to wait for their ambitious and profitable projects, which did not suit them at all.

It was at such a crisis, the seizure of the opium-smuggling lorcha *Arrow* afforded a pretext for an appeal to arms; and this furnished all those favourable circumstances, hitherto expected from the Ti-ping movement, by a shorter and more direct road. It was sufficient for a portion of the body mercantile, that they would get their nefarious opium traffic legalized, and

their general trade increased; it was sufficient for the body politic that they would be able to place their diplomatic affairs upon a satisfactory standing, and so humble the power of the Chinese government as to be able to do with it whatever they liked, *compelling* it to conform to their will in every way—and all for nothing, as the Manchoo government would be made pay the expenses England would incur by an aggressive war. The Ti-pings were at once thrown overboard. It mattered not that their cause was righteous and holy; it was no longer *profitable* to the British *trader* or his *government*, and with the usual error of mean selfishness, they took it for granted that the Manchoos would always remain powerless, or else forget to retaliate when they became able, for the gross treatment they had received; neither could they perceive that although delays might interpose before the final success of the Ti-pings, yet that, after a short probation, the willing and unrestricted commerce the latter would encourage, would be more profitable than the unwilling and forced trade the Manchoos were *coerced* into. Although meanness is generally the result of ignorance, it seems almost a fatality that so large a portion of Englishmen should have acted so wrongfully, and have been so forgetful of their national fair-play. The whole affair speaks too plainly of avarice and incompetent statesmanship.

Commander Brine, R.N., in his valuable and fairly-expressed work, "The Taeping Rebellion," at pages 271–2, very truthfully observes:—  
"The principal reason for the decline of the popularity of the rebellion amongst Europeans may be found in the great change that has occurred in our political relations with the Manchoo government."

Again, speaking of the treaty settled after the "lorcha Arrow war," he says:—

"Two of its clauses, noted below, not only made the further progress of the Taepings *unprofitable*, but absolutely made their simple existence most objectionable to all Europeans who hoped to open *trade* with those provinces lying adjacent to the upper waters of the Yang-tze. When Lord

Elgin proceeded to Han-kow, *he* evidently looked upon them as a mere body of rebels, sooner or later to be suppressed by government, and that they in the interval interfered with the due carrying into execution the terms of his treaty. Consequently he was not inclined to show them much favour."

In this perfectly true conclusion is concealed the real motive of the conduct the British *Government* has pursued towards the Ti-pings. Not only in China, but over the whole world—from Denmark to America, from Abyssinia to Brazil, from New Zealand to Japan—the policy of England has been derogatory to her dignity, and would be calculated to elicit merely feelings of contempt were it not so dangerous to her future welfare. It seems, however, that the majority of Englishmen are satisfied with a course of administration which advocates "peace at any price," except when war can be undertaken with impunity, and some aggression committed upon a weak neighbour, who is then compelled to pay all the expenses. I, for one, protest against such lowering of England's dignity and "just influence." I protest against the sacrifice of national honour to mercenary interest—of principle to profit.

Commander Brine's opinion has been amply verified—he wrote it early in 1862; since which period England, regardless of all pledges of neutrality, has deliberately upheld the Manchoo dynasty, and made war upon the Ti-pings, not to support any high principle, but prompted by regard for the indemnity money to be wrested from the Imperialists, influenced by the profits of the opium trade, and anxious to support the Elgin treaty, which otherwise would have become inoperative.

It is no less singular than true, that the wars with the Manchoo government in reality weakened it but very little:—in the first place, the British troops were always met by the local forces, none being withdrawn from opposition to the internal danger, which was dreaded much more than any arising from the foreign expeditions;—in the second, the indemnity money being deducted from the increased duties levied upon the foreign

trade, instead of impoverishing the Manchoo exchequer, was taken directly from the pockets of the foreign merchants; and although the exchequer was so much less in hand, it could hardly be looked upon as a loss, considering that only one-fifth of the gross customs revenue of the ports open to foreign trade was taken, and that the trade has enlarged amply enough to make the returns, minus the indemnity, more than equal to what they were before the war.

Subsequent to the visit of H.M.S. *Hermes*, and the French steamer *Cassini*, the next communication between the Ti-pings and Europeans took place a little more than a year later, when the American minister visited Nankin in the U.S. frigate *Susquehanna*. The few extracts I give from the accounts of the Rev. Dr. Bridgeman, and another writer, X.Y.Z., each members of the expedition, coincide exactly with all opinions ever given of the Ti-pings by credible people who have held personal intercourse with them; and it is a singular, if not a sinister circumstance, that these accounts are *all totally different* from the dispatches of Sir F. Bruce (British minister at Pekin), and consuls of similar tendencies, who have either never seen the Ti-pings, or at all events know nothing of their government, life, and manners.

The following are extracts from the Rev. Dr. Bridgeman:—

"1. Their government is a theocracy, the development apparently of what is believed by them to be a new dispensation. As in the case of the Israelites under Moses, they regard themselves as directed by one who has been raised up by the Almighty to be the executor of his will on earth.

"5. Their government is administered with *remarkable energy*.

"Far in the distance, hovering over the hill-tops—southward from Chin-kiang-foo, the guardian city of the Great Canal, and

northward from Nankin, we saw encamped small bands of the Imperialists, while all the armed multitudes in, and immediately around these two cities, wrought up almost to frenzy, seemed eager to rush forth and take vengeance on them as their deadly foes—'fat victims,' said they, 'fit only for slaughter.' They exulted as they exhibited to us the scars and the wounds they had received in bloody conflicts with the Manchoo troops, always called by them, 'monster imps.'

"6. Their *order* and *discipline* are no less remarkable than their energy. Under this new *régime*, both tobacco and opium are prohibited.

"Every kind of strong drink, too, would seem to come into the same category, and if any is used, it is only by special permission."

At the city of Wuhu:—

"The people had returned:—whole families—men, women, and children—were seen in their own houses, merchants in their shops, and market people going and coming with provisions; all most submissive to the officers and police, as they passed along the streets.

"It was at their 'holy city,' however, as they frequently called their new capital, that their *order* and *discipline* were observed in the greatest perfection. Parts of the city were appropriated exclusively for the uses of the wives and daughters of those men who were abroad, as their armies, or elsewhere employed in the public service.

"Everywhere else, as well as in the 'holy city,' extreme watchfulness was observed in the maintenance of order; and all irregularities, and infractions of the laws, were rebuked or punished with a promptitude seldom seen among the Chinese. All persons, without exception, had their appointed places and their appropriate duties assigned, *and all moved like clockwork.*"

Their unity of purpose Dr. Bridgeman speaks of as follows:—

"There is no community separate from their one body politic; at least none appears, and no traces of any could we find."

Of their religion he reported:—

"Christians they may be in name; and they are, in very deed, iconoclasts of the strictest order. They have in their possession probably the entire Bible, both the Old and New Testaments; and are publishing what is usually known as 'Gutzlaff's Version' of the same.

"Their ideas of the Deity are exceedingly imperfect. Though they declare plainly that there is 'only One True God,' yet the inspiration of the Holy Scriptures,<sup>28</sup> the equality of the Son with the Father,<sup>29</sup> and many other doctrines generally received by Protestant Christians, as being clearly revealed in the Bible, are by them wholly ignored. True, they have formulas in which some of these doctrines are taught; but then they are borrowed formulas, and they have used them without comprehending their true import. So I believe; and I think this is made manifestly plain in the new version of their Doxology, or Hymn of Praise, where Yang-sen-tsing, the Eastern King, is proclaimed the Paraclete—the Holy Spirit."<sup>30</sup>

Dr. Bridgeman continues:—

"Our Saturday we found observed by them as a Sabbath-day; but they appeared not to have any houses for public worship, nor any Christian teachers, ministers of the Gospel so called. Forms of domestic worship, forms of prayer, of thanksgiving, &c. &c., they have; and all their people, even such as cannot read, are required to learn and use these. We saw them repeatedly at their devotions; some of them were exceedingly reverent and devout, while others were quite the reverse. Most, who were asked to do it, promptly recited that form of the Decalogue which is given in their tracts.

"A form of baptism was spoken of by them; but no allusion was made by them to the ordinance of the Lord's Supper.

"We found them, according to their reformed calendar, discarding the old notions of lucky places, times, &c."

Speaking of the public notices seen on the walls, he says:—

"The distribution of food, of clothes, and of medicines; the payment of taxes, the preservation of property, the observance of etiquette and decorum; and injunctions to repair to certain quarters for vaccination—these were among the topics discussed in them. One document announced the names of sundry candidates who had been successful in winning honours at a recent literary examination in the Heavenly capital."

Thus, it appears, the "ignorant coolies" were literary coolies. It was late in 1854 when Dr. Bridgeman visited Nankin, and thus wrote concerning the power and extent of the rebellion:—

*"Their numerical strength, and the extent of territory under their control, are by no means inconsiderable. They said they*

had undisputed control from Chin-kiang-foo, four hundred miles up the Great River; and that besides the large numbers of troops garrisoned and intrenched about Chin-kiang, Kwa-chow, and the 'Heavenly capital,' they had *four armies* in the field, carrying on active aggressive operations; two of these had gone northward, one along the Grand Canal, and one farther westward; they were designed to co-operate, and after storming and destroying Pekin, to turn westward and march through Shansi, Shensi, Kians-oo, into Sze-chuen, where they are expected to meet their other two armies, which from Kiang-si and the Lake provinces, are to move up the Great River, and along through the regions on its southern bank.

"The *personal appearance* of their men in arms, and of their women on horseback, was novel. They formed a very heterogeneous mass, having been brought together from several different provinces, principally from Gnang-wui, Keang-si, Hoopeh, Kwang-si, and Kwang-tung. The finest men we saw were from the hills of Kiang-si, and those from Hoonan were the meanest and least warlike. Their arms and accoutrements were quite after the old fashion of the Chinese; but their red and yellow turbans, their *long hair*, and their silk and satin robes, so unlike the ordinary costume of the 'black-haired' troops, made the insurgents appear like a new race of warriors. All the people we saw were very well clad, well fed, and well provided for in every way. They all seemed content, and in high spirits, *as if sure of success.*"

It will be seen that Dr. Bridgeman thought—as every one else did until the arbitrary interference of the British *Government*—that the "progress,

and ultimate success," of the Ti-pings was certain, "under the inscrutable providence of God."

The following are extracts from the communication written by X.Y.Z., and published in the *North China Herald* at that time.

"There is no change of policy or of feeling towards foreigners since the visit of the *Hermes*. On the part of the people the same *friendly* feeling was manifested that was observed a year ago.

"The visit of the *Susquehanna* has put us in possession of facts which prove that the insurgents have undisturbed control of a large extent of country, so large as to furnish a guarantee to their ultimate success. There seems to be nothing that can prevent their triumph, but internal dissensions, of which at present no symptoms appear.

"The city itself (Nankin) is under strict martial law, and indeed is at present a mere military camp. The *most rigid discipline and perfect order are maintained*.

"In passing through the city, little was seen to distinguish it from other Chinese cities, except that some of the streets are very wide, and appear to be kept in a state of cleanliness not often seen in China.

"Whatever Hung-sui-tshuen may mean by calling himself the brother of Jesus, it is but justice to say that no evidence was found of its being insisted on as an essential article of faith among the mass of his followers. And several officers who subsequently visited the steamer, when asked what was meant by it, professed themselves unable to give any information

upon the subject. They were so *evidently puzzled*, that it was plain their attention had *never been called to the matter before.*"

Speaking of the composition of the Ti-pings, X.Y.Z. says:—

"A few were from Kwang-se. These latter were all young men of unusually fine appearance and more than ordinary intelligence, and they were distinguished by some peculiarities of dress."

Of the civil administration he says:—

"The expedition reached the city of Wuhu on Thursday morning. Here *the most cordial feeling was manifested* by the authorities and people. The visit to this place was of great interest, as it afforded an opportunity of learning from personal observation the character of the insurgent rule over the people in districts which are no longer the seat of war. The state of things is entirely different from that at Nankin. *The people are engaged in their ordinary avocations, shops are opened and trade carried on, as under the old régime,* though the former prosperity of the place is by no means restored."

Upon perusing such statements, the British public will doubtless wonder at the nature of the reports which emanated from their government, that "the Ti-pings destroyed everything and restored nothing,"—were "ruthless desolaters," "bloodthirsty marauders," "hordes of banditti," &c. It must, however, be remembered, that the authors of these statements knew nothing about the Ti-pings; in some cases had never seen one, and in all cases were anxious to meet the views of their official superiors by prejudicing the public mind against the Ti-pings, and thereby in some degree justifying the unwarrantable line of policy which the British Government had decided on.

The year 1857 passed over without any important military movement, and the Ti-ping Government was engaged in consolidating its power in the districts and cities it held. The extent of territory and amount of population entirely under their control was very considerable. They held possession of

about three-fourths of the large province of Ngan-whui, one-third of Kiang-su, one-third of Kiang-si, and parts of Hoonan and Hoopeh. In Kwang-si, Kwang-tung, Fo-keen, and Yun-nan, Ti-ping agents were actively at work inciting the people to rise.

In the meanwhile, the administration of their territory was being perfected;—the title "Wang" was reduced into a sort of feudal rank, into which all governors of cities, lieutenant-governors, and governors of provinces, and generalissimos, were admitted. The whole of their land was divided into departments, or circles, each department into four districts, and each district into twenty-five parishes. After the governors of departments, or provinces, came the district chiefs, or magistrates; then the parish magistrates; and then the five village magistrates, or authorities, appointed over each circle of twenty-five families. The Ti-ping territory included at this period not less than 70,000 square miles, with a population of about 25,000,000. At parts where the Manchoo troops had been driven out of the country, a regular system of monthly taxation was established, considerably more moderate than the old. A tariff for the whole empire was published; while throughout all their cities, the machinery of a regular government was constituted, and the whole conducted with considerable energy and success. The "Land Regulations of Political Economy of the Ti-ping Dynasty" were put into force, and a large part of China reclaimed to native administration. By these regulations, all land was divided into nine classifications, and arranged according to produce. Divisions of fields were arranged according to the number of persons in a family, and the whole property was regulated as the document states, "so that all the people in the empire may together enjoy the abundant happiness provided by the Great God, our Heavenly Father and Universal Lord." Periodical seasons were appointed for the examinations of literary candidates, and filling of vacant offices. Harvest regulations and community of interest were thus provided for:—

"As soon as harvest arrives, every vexillary must see to it, that the five-and-twenty parishes under his charge have a sufficient supply of food; and what is over and above of the new grain he must deposit in the public granary. This must be done with respect to wheat, pulse, flax, hemp, silk cloth, fowls, and money; for the whole empire is the universal property of our Heavenly Father, and when all the people of the empire avoid selfishness, and consecrate everything to the Supreme Lord, then the sovereign will have sufficient to use, and all the families in the empire, in every place, will be equally provided for, while every individual will be well fed and clothed."

From this system, and the vice-royalty of the governors, or wangs, the Ti-ping government assumed a patriarchal feudal constitution. The following regular conscription was levied:—

"If any man throughout the empire has a family, including wife and children, amounting to three, four, five, six, seven, eight, or nine individuals, he must give up one to be a soldier. With regard to the rest, the widowers, widows, orphans, and childless, together with the sick and feeble, shall be excused from service, and shall all be fed from the public granary."

Religious observances were thus enjoined, in a manner which evinces a spirit far different from that which the world was led to suppose actuated the Ti-pings:—

"In every circle of five-and-twenty families, the youths must every day go to the church, where the vexillary is to teach them to read the holy books of the Old and New Testaments, as well as the proclamations of the duly-appointed sovereign. Every sabbath the five cinquevirs in the circle must lead the men and women under their charge to the church, where the males and females are to sit in separate rows. On these occasions there will be preaching, thanksgivings, and offerings to our Heavenly Father, the Great God and Supreme Lord. All officers and people, both within and without

the court, must every sabbath go to hear the expounding of the Holy Book, reverently present their offerings, and praise our Heavenly Father." "All the officers throughout the empire, every sabbath day, must, according to their rank, reverently and sincerely provide animals, with meat and drink-offerings, for worship, in order to praise our Heavenly Father; they must also explain the Holy Book. Should any fail in this, they shall be degraded to the level of plebeians."

During 1858 the Ti-pings continued their work of organization, and undertook no military movement of importance. In consequence of so large a concentration of their forces, supplies began to run short, and the city of Chin-kiang was promptly abandoned, and a considerable force detached into the province of Kiang-si. They still retained possession of both banks of the Yang-tze for a distance of about 400 miles, and large reinforcements were sent from Nankin to all their possessions upon the northern side of that river.

In the meanwhile, Canton had been taken by the English and French forces, the Taku forts had been captured on the 20th of May, and on the 3rd of July the Elgin treaty was concluded; a treaty that in all respects proved nearly the death-warrant of the patriots.

On the 8th of November, Lord Elgin started from Shanghae upon the expedition up the Yang-tze-kiang as far as Hankow.

On approaching Nankin, the squadron came into collision with the Ti-pings in a similar, though more serious manner, than on the occasion of the visit of the *Hermes*. Lord Elgin, with the characteristic arrogance of Englishmen in foreign lands, disregarded the frequently repeated and urgent request of the Ti-ping authorities; namely, that to avoid misunderstandings as to men-of-war approaching their fortifications during a time of battle and blockade (especially considering the Manchoos had engaged some foreign vessels, and reported continually that foreign war-steamers were preparing to attack Nankin, &c.), "a small boat should be detached, to communicate

with the garrison; in which case there would be no chance of collision." By referring to the visit of the *Hermes*, and the correspondence that took place, it will be seen that she was followed by the Manchoo flotilla, which took advantage of her presence to engage the Ti-ping forts, the anxiety of the Ti-pings authorities upon which point pervades all their communications to Sir George Bonham. Perfectly indifferent, then, to the observance of a courtesy which any powerful belligerent in like circumstances to those of the Ti-pings would have *compelled*, Lord Elgin sent the gunboat *Lee* ahead of the squadron—"to communicate if possible," as he reported. But instead of attempting the only correct mode of communication in the case, by sending a boat in first, the *Lee*, by her backing and filling in front of the batteries and fortified positions, aided by the presence of a powerful squadron in the rear, apparently awaiting the result of her reconnoitre, naturally led the Ti-pings to suppose she was on the scout from a hostile fleet. In consequence of this, the batteries opened fire on the *Lee*, and the rest of the squadron, *prepared* for the event, steamed up and opened upon them with "considerable effect." Not satisfied with this, "they on the following morning re-descended the stream to Nankin and bombarded the forts, with but little reply for an hour and a half." What a gallant exploit for British seamen! To silence forts which were perfectly harmless, and slaughter the inmates at their ease.

The *Church Missionary Intelligencer* of December, 1860, gives the following account of the transaction:—

"In the latter end of 1858, a British squadron, with Lord Elgin, passed up the river as far as Hankow, not without exchanging shots, on more than one occasion, with the Tai-pings, and a consequent loss of life was caused, which, by due precautions, might have been avoided. On approaching Nanking, the capital city of Ngan-hwui, the insurgents and Imperialists were found to be in action. The British vessels were not recognized by the Tai-pings: they were the first bearing the British flag which had ascended

the stream so far. Under the misapprehension that they were acting in concert with the Imperialist fleets of junks which commanded the river, the Tai-pings fired a shot at the leading vessel, the *Lee*, and was replied to by the *Furious*, *Cruiser*, *Dove*, and *Lee*, in full chorus. The garrison of the forts was soon in flight, the guns abandoned. A little timely explanation might have prevented this collision. On the return voyage, when these forts were again approached, such an explanation was resorted to. The water had fallen so low that the two large vessels had been left behind, and the two gun-boats were alone on their way to the river's mouth. To engage the forts on going up, when the force was strong, was a pleasant *divertissement*; but to venture on the same experiment with two gun-boats, was, if possible, to be avoided; and that the more so, as the nature of the channel compelled them to steer immediately under the city walls, so that the decks could easily have been swept by gingalls. On this occasion, therefore, that was done which should have been done before—a communication was opened with the insurgents, and the gun-boats passed the forts unmolested."

The first act of the wolf and lamb drama was thus performed, and "those outlaws," the Ti-pings, who *might* possibly "interfere with the carrying into due effect the terms of his treaty," were reported to head-quarters, as not only having insulted and fired upon the British ensign, but having actually violated a flag of truce—but it was *not* reported that said flag of truce was unknown to the Ti-pings, and therefore could not be recognized.

The affair is thus reported by Secretary Wade:—

"My orders were to inform the rebels that *we took no part* (?) in the civil war, and interfered with no one who did not molest us. (?) That a gun-boat had been detached from the squadron before it passed Nankin, for the express purpose of explaining the object of our expedition *had the rebels desired to ask it*; that they had fired eight shots at the little vessel so detached without a single shot being returned by her; that the forts which had so fired had been made an example of, and that the fact, together with

the lesson they had themselves received, might satisfy them of the absurdity of provoking our men-of-war to hostility."

At the time the expedition passed Nankin it was generally supposed the four principal chiefs besides Hung-sui-tshuen, the Tien-wang, were dead. The Southern and Western Princes had fallen in action, and it was rumoured the Eastern and Northern Princes had lost their lives in the capital, in consequence of their attempt to rebel against the authority of their king. I can only say that the report of the execution of the Northern and Eastern Princes, together with large numbers of their particular followers, has been very much exaggerated. The princes, and some who supported them, seem to have been put to death for treason.

The earlier half of 1859 was unmarked by any important military movement upon the part of the Ti-pings. The most interesting event of this period was the arrival of the Tien-wang's relative, Hung-jin, at Nankin, after many fruitless attempts to reach that place.

It will be remembered that upon the capture of the first city in Kwang-si, Hung-sui-tshuen had sent messengers into Kwang-tung calling all his and Fung-yun-san's remaining friends and relatives to join his standard. Before this could be effected he was compelled to abandon the position. Hung-jin, in the meanwhile, had started upon the journey with some fifty friends of the two chiefs. Upon approaching the neighbourhood of the place appointed to effect a junction, they ascertained that the "God Worshippers" had raised their camp and marched away, and that the Manchoo authorities were seizing and cruelly murdering every one connected with them. Hung-jin now sent back into Kwang-tung all his friends, excepting three, who, with him, made their way deeper into the country, and endeavoured to join the army of "God-worshippers." The Mandarins were, however, so strictly upon the watch for all travellers or suspected persons, that he found himself under the necessity of abandoning his attempt and returning home. Upon reaching the Hwa-hien district, Hung-jin found that from henceforth home

to him was but a name. The Manchoo butchers were already in his native village, and he was compelled to seek a refuge amongst strangers. In a short time he again set forth, with several relatives of Fung-yun-san, to join the Ti-pings; but finding the vigilance and cruelty of the Mandarins still more severe than before, they were obliged to return unsuccessful. After another fruitless attempt in the beginning of 1852, the chosen messenger of Hung-sui-tshuen and his relatives in Kwang-tung, again arrived with letters calling upon all faithful adherents of the two clans, Hung and Fung, to join him at the city of Yung-gnan. Upon this, the old rendezvous at Paddy-hill was selected as a place for assembling. Before the day appointed for a general meeting, and when only some two hundred members of the respective clans had arrived, Kiang-lung-chong, the messenger, who had grown too bold and reckless after the easy triumphs he had been accustomed to with the Ti-pings, acted without precaution in the gathering, and involved those already present in destruction. With these insufficient numbers he raised the standard of insurrection, which being instantly reported to the district Mandarin, a considerable body of soldiers were sent against them. The insurgents went bravely to the fight, but being few and wholly unaccustomed to warfare, were soon thrown into confusion. Kiang-lung-chong and a few others were killed, a considerable number made captive by the troops, and the rest dispersed.

Hung-jin with about a dozen friends arrived at Paddy-hill just after the defeat, being totally ignorant of the disaster. He and his companions were seized by the people of the neighbourhood and imprisoned in a house, previously to being delivered up to the Mandarins. As the Rev. Mr. Hamberg's narrative states:—

"Hung-jin, lively and enthusiastic, desirous to lead his friends to honour and to glory, now sat down in the midst of them in deep sorrow and despair, and would gladly have given his own life to save those whom he had brought with him into distress."

Feeling the cords wherewith his hands were tied together give way a little, after some effort he got them free, and proceeded to unloose those of his friends who were accessible, and succeeded in liberating six of his companions from their bonds. After it had become dark, they opened the door, and in the rainy night hastened away to the mountains.

"Hung-jin, whose liveliest hopes had been so suddenly frustrated, who had drawn upon himself the hatred and revenge of so many involved in the present disaster, and who had no place of refuge left to himself, now felt his own guilt and despair too hard to bear. He therefore unloosed his girdle and was going to strangle himself, when one of the fugitives came up to him. Hung said, 'Try to escape and save your life, I will put an end to my existence in this place.' The other then seized his hand and drew him forward, exhorting him to continue his flight in company with him, which he did. The next day, when Hung awoke from a short rest in the bush, he missed his companion. He now prayed to God, the Heavenly Father, to spare his life and protect him amidst so many dangers. During the daytime he lay concealed in the bush, and during the night-time he went on. Once the people in search of fugitives passed very close to him without observing him. Finally, after having passed four days and four nights in the mountains without any food, he arrived at the house of some near relatives in a very exhausted state. Here he was concealed six days in a mountain cavern, and afterwards his relatives gave him some money, with which he went on board a passage-boat to go to another district, and seek refuge with more distant relatives of the Hung clan. But even among these, new trials awaited him; for also from their place a few of the Hung clan had gone to Paddy-hill,

whose further fate was unknown. Some of the relatives of those missing were now inclined to revenge the supposed death of their brethren, and deliver Hung-jin to the Mandarins, but an old venerable headman took him under his protection, and gave one of his grandsons to Hung-jin as a guide, and this young man, being a Christian convert, conducted him to Hong-kong in the end of April, 1852, and introduced him to me. I was astonished to hear a person from the interior of China speak with such interest of, and display so much acquaintance with, the Christian religion. I liked to listen to his animated narratives about Hung-sui-tshuen, Fung-yun-san, and their followers, though at the time I could form no clear conception of the whole matter, which then was little known and still less believed. He wrote a few sheets of paper, containing a short account of himself and Hung-sui-tshuen, which I put into my desk, until I should have further evidence as to their contents. I expected that Hung-jin, who wished to study the Christian doctrine and be baptized, would remain for some time at Hong-kong; but upon my return from a tour on the mainland he had departed, as he had no means of support in that place. In November, 1853, Hung-jin, who up to that time had been engaged as schoolmaster at some place in the interior, again visited me. He was still very desirous to be baptized, and seemed to be sincere in his wish to serve God. He declared himself willing to leave all matters in the hands of Him who worketh all things after the counsel of His own will, and to seek above all the Kingdom of God and His righteousness. Hung-jin, with three of his friends from Clear-far, have since been *baptized*, and are still studying the Holy Scriptures, with

the hope, in the Providence of God, hereafter to be enabled to instruct their countrymen in the way of salvation."

Early in 1854, with the funds from the sale of his little work, which Mr. Hamberg kindly gave him, Hung-jin embarked for Shanghae, *en route* for Nankin; he also carried with him a number of religious books. After remaining at Shanghae several months, during which he was neither able to reach Nankin nor communicate with his friends, he returned to Hong-kong. In the mean time Mr. Hamberg had died, and Hung-jin was received by members of the London Mission Society, and by them employed as a catechist and preacher during the years 1855 to 1858. In the *Missionary Magazine* he was soon after spoken of thus:—

"He soon established himself in the confidence and esteem of the members of the mission, and the Chinese Christians connected with it. His *literary attainments* were respectable; his temper amiable and genial; his mind was characterized by a versatility unusual in a Chinese. His knowledge of Christian doctrine was largely increased, and of the sincerity of his attachment to it *there could be no doubt.*"

Similar opinions were entertained by many devout and earnest missionaries who were intimately acquainted with Hung-jin for a period extending over six years; but Mr. Frederick Bruce, the British minister at Pekin (who never saw Hung-jin, or, I believe, any other Ti-ping in his life), true to the policy of his employers, thus writes from amidst his Manchoo friends at Shanghae:—

#### DISPATCH TO LORD RUSSELL.

"Shanghae, September 4th, 1860.

"Hung-jin has sent to the missionaries in manuscript a pamphlet which has made a considerable impression upon them. I see no guarantee for the soundness of his doctrine or for

the purity of his life. I rather look upon his pamphlet as a crafty device to conciliate the support and sympathy of the missionary body at the time when the insurgents meditated the seizure of Shanghae."

It may naturally be asked, What has this to do with England's policy towards China, and why should it affect the honourable neutrality she was pledged to maintain? The answer simply is—a misrepresentation of the acts and intentions of the Ti-pings might afford some colour of justification for a line of policy which could not be defended.

The Bruce dispatch further states:—  
"But as the chief (Hung-sui-tshuen) is an *ignorant fanatic, if not an impostor,*" &c.

We thus find this representative of the British Government not only volunteering his unsupported opinion against a weighty mass of evidence as to the religion, education, and acquirements of the chief, but actually constituting the same tribunal as the sole judge of a solemn question which must rest alone between Hung-sui-tshuen and his Creator.

About the middle of 1858, Hung-jin once more determined to try and join his relative, the Tien-wang, and with this intent started in disguise, and gradually made his way (by land) into the province of Hoopeh. In December of the same year, while Lord Elgin's expedition was at Hankow, he was heard from at a small town in the neighbourhood; in fact, he managed to put on board one of the vessels a letter for Mr. Chalmers, his teacher at Hong-kong. In the spring of 1859, he at last reached Nankin, and soon after was appointed to the high rank of Kan-wang (*i.e.*, Shield Prince), in which position, and his subsequent one of Prime Minister, he became familiar to Europeans. A letter which he wrote to the Rev. Mr. Edkins, nearly a year later, contained the following passage relating to the Tien-wang:—

"On meeting with his relative, the Celestial king, and having daily conversations with him, he was struck by the wisdom and depth of his teaching, far transcending that of common men."

Hung-jin—or rather the Kan-wang, as we must call him in future—joined his friends at a troublous time, more than usually so even to a man who, like him, had lived the prime of his life in difficulties and danger. Within a few months after his arrival at Nankin, that city was closely invested by a large and overpowering Imperialist army. Although since 1853, Nankin had frequently been in a state of siege, upon no previous occasion had it been so hardly pressed. Towards the close of 1859, the besieging forces were increased from 50,000 to upwards of 100,000 fighting men, all supplies were cut off from the city, and the Imperialists flattered themselves that a short time would see the garrison starved out. Darkly, though, closed that year around the Ti-ping capital—surrounded as it was by savage foemen, thirsting for the blood of its starving inhabitants—a danger, still more deadly, and more bitter, was looming in the distance, although at the time impalpable and scarcely conceived. It was a danger menacing the patriots from civilized and Christian men, men who, in other lands, have given their blood and treasure to causes far less deserving of their sympathy; in short, it was the creation of the "China indemnity" extortion. Evil as the effect of the Elgin treaty concluded in 1858 must have been to the Ti-pings, it is yet possible that the successes they shortly attained might have counteracted the prejudices so unjustly excited against them; but when to this was added the question of indemnity, the Ti-pings were doomed. It is probable that had they remained quiescent until such time as the love of gold was satisfied, they might then have been uninterfered with; unfortunately it was otherwise, a rapid series of victories threatened destruction to the Manchoo dynasty, and with it, of course, to the "China indemnity;" consequently, if the expenses of this "little war" were to

be secured, immediate action became necessary, and the ruin of the Ti-pings inevitable.

In June, 1859, the British plenipotentiary, not satisfied with the route *viâ* Peh-tang, as proposed and decided upon by the Chinese authorities for his passage to Pekin, had the coolness to choose his own path, and when the mandarins naturally resisted such arrogance, to endeavour to force it at the cannon's mouth. What would Englishmen think, and do, if a Chinese fleet carrying an ambassador were to arrive in England, and, refusing to land their ambassador according to our customs, advance their fleet past all our fortifications without paying them the slightest respect? This would be a very similar case to the Taku fort disaster; and, moreover, it must be borne in mind that the affair took place just after peace had been concluded, which must have given it the complexion of a resumption of hostilities rather than that of a peaceful embassy.

The excuse generally made for this sort of thing is, that it is impossible to deal with semi-civilized nations as you would with civilized ones, that is to say, the civilized nation is to descend to the level of the semi-civilized one. This reasoning, illogical and dishonourable at all times, is in this case totally inadmissible, for it is at the least doubtful whether any cause for an appeal to arms existed. It appears, however, that elasticity of principle and inconsistency in action may be regarded as the important elements in the policy of England—can it be better illustrated than by her conduct to Germany and Denmark, to America and Brazil, to Russia and China?

Admiral Hope, a useful man to such a ministry, to use a nautical simile, "went stem on like a Nor'-west buffalo" to the Taku forts, and sacrificed a number of brave men needlessly. This led to the resumption of hostilities, and we find Lord John Russell writing upon November 18th, 1859, to Mr. Bruce:—

"Unless, therefore, the most ample apology should be promptly made and the other demands specified in my previous dispatch complied with, you are

instructed to state that *a large pecuniary indemnity* will be demanded by her Majesty's Government from that of China."

By altering a few words, how like the ultimatum of a highwayman this would read. Lord John Russell evidently did all he could to justify the anecdote of Alexander the Great and the robber.

The Chinese indemnity plot thickened rapidly. Lord Russell's next dispatch to Mr. Bruce, dated January 3rd, 1860, contained the following:—"We go to seek redress for these wrongs" (the resistance offered by the Manchoo troops to the destruction of their barriers, defences, &c., at the Taku forts, by Admiral Hope), "and to require that the word of the emperor should be observed, and that an *indemnity* should be paid for the loss of men" (killed trying to kill the Chinese troops who very correctly opposed their unjustifiable attempt to force the fortified entrance of the Pei-ho river), "and the heavy expense of obtaining redress" (for their own fault).

Lord John Russell arrived at the superlative degree of the "China indemnity" upon February 8th, 1860, when he penned the following to Mr. Bruce:—

"It has been *decided* between her Majesty's Government and that of the Emperor of the French that the amount of indemnity-money to be demanded of the Chinese Government shall be in each case a sum of 60,000,000 *francs*," "towards the expense of the joint expedition now on its way to the China seas."

Here was decisive action following promptly upon threats and intimidation; who can say but that the finale to the Danish question might have been different had the Foreign Secretary possessed equal facilities for arranging the indemnity to be paid by Germany?

Upon the part of the British representatives it is denied that the Chinese Government proposed Peh-tang as the route our plenipotentiary should proceed by to Pekin; it is, however, admitted in the blue book upon affairs

in China, 1859–60, at page 43, that Mr. Bruce was requested not to pass the river barriers:—

"They" (the Imperial Chinese commissioners) "would wish that on his arrival at the mouth of the river he would anchor his vessels of war *outside the bar.*"

As this was disregarded by Mr. Bruce, it may naturally be inferred that the request so constantly reiterated throughout the Chinese dispatches, "that he (Mr. Bruce) must go by way of Peh-tang," was really made, but was treated by the British plenipotentiary with the same contempt and want of courtesy.

The instructions given to Lord Elgin upon his second embassy to China were issued from the Foreign Office, April 17th, 1860; the conditions of peace to be offered to China were:—

"First. An apology for the attack on the allied forces at the Pei-ho" (i.e. the Chinese Government must apologize for defending itself). "Secondly. The ratification and execution of the treaty of Tien-tsin" (a treaty extorted from the Chinese when under compulsion, the terms of which would probably not have been really evaded). "Thirdly. The payment of an indemnity to the allies for the expense of naval and military preparations." (No wonder the Chinese ministers wrote "then the demand for indemnity is yet more against propriety. Were China to demand repayment of England, England would find that her expenses did not amount to one half of those of China.")

Most undoubtedly previous to the *Arrow* war the position of Europeans in China was very unsatisfactory; but it is quite as certain that this resulted as much from our aggressive and lawless proceedings, as from the natural aversion of the Manchoo government for our intercourse. From beginning to end, the whole history of the British connection with China is discreditable. However just may have been the cause of complaint, it is beyond all doubt that mean and disgraceful subterfuges have been adopted as the *casus belli* for each campaign undertaken against that empire. Can an

Englishman be found (excepting the opium traders, &c.) who does not lament that blackest page of English history—the war that was waged upon China in 1840, under the following circumstances:—

"In agreement with a treaty signed by British merchants, Captain Elliott, her Majesty's superintendent of trade, caused 20,283 chests of opium to be delivered to Commissioner Lin. The opium was destroyed by order of the emperor. The conditions for terminating the war were, that China should pay £1,200,000 for the opium; £3,000,000, which amounts to £1,000 per head, for the destruction of 30,000 of her unoffending subjects, and bear the expense of her own defence!"

The last war, which commenced in 1856, and was ultimately concluded by the ratification of the treaty of 1858, by Lord Elgin in 1860, was equally iniquitous with the first, and in the same manner was originated by the detestable opium smuggling, the seizure of the opium smuggler *Arrow* being made the pretext for hostilities. Whatever may hereafter be alleged, at the present time but few can be found to deny the fact, that the wars with China have always been waged to force the opium trade, and that by the last one the legalization of that vile traffic was compelled.

Not without reason did the Manchoo great council of state use the following passages in their dispatch to Commissioner Ho, who was at Shanghae endeavouring to settle pacifically the Taku affair, and the ratification of the treaty of Tien-tsin, previous to the resumption of hostilities:—

"To come to the British minister's request to be properly (or courteously) received when he comes north to exchange treaties, if his intention be indeed peace (or friendly), he will (or let him) leave it to the commissioner to think over all details whatsoever of treaty arrangements in which management (adjustment, compromise) may with propriety be effected; and negotiations being set on foot at Shanghae, when both parties are perfectly agreed, let him come north without a fleet, and with a small retinue, and

wait at Peh-tang, for the exchange of the treaties; in which case China will certainly not take him to task for what is past."

Referring to his former attempt to force his passage past the Taku forts, when Admiral Hope was repulsed,

"But if he be determined to bring up a number of vessels of war, and if he persist in proceeding by way of Takoo, this will show that his real purpose is not the exchange of treaties, and it must be left to the high officer in charge of the coast (or port) defences to take such steps as shall be essential" (*lit. as shall accord with right*).

This proposition, of course, was not entertained by Mr. Bruce or Lord Elgin, who proceeded to act upon Lord Russell's instructions—"for the joint occupation of Chusan, or some other portion of the Chinese territory, in addition to the city of Canton, by the British and French forces till the *indemnity* is paid." So to obtain "material guarantees" for this indemnity, the civilized nations proceeded to batter the semi-civilized one into compliance, and the allied forces started upon the Pekin campaign.

However wrong the Manchoos may have been, it cannot be denied that the British *modus operandi* in China has been equally bad; and whatever right there may be on the civilized side, it would be difficult to read the correspondence between the two governments and not admit that the semi-civilized one has the best of the argument.

Commerce is a great and important element in the prosperity and civilization of every nation, and especially so to England; but there is something greater and more noble than commerce—that is, honour. The advantages of trade, to be permanent and beneficial, must be conducted honourably, and that is exactly what the Government of Great Britain has been unable to do. All over the world its foreign policy, and its attempts to force trade where it can be done with impunity, have not only lowered the "just influence" of England and brought her into contempt, but, in many cases, have created a burning resentment in the breasts of those who have

been wronged, that neither the present nor future generation will forget. In every quarter of the globe mischievous interference has taken place, often followed by those aggressive wars which have been denounced by every great and enlightened statesman from the time of Queen Elizabeth.

## FOOTNOTES:

28. This statement of Dr. Bridgeman's was incorrect. The opinions of nearly all the other missionaries—including the Rev. Drs. John, Medhurst, Muirhead, Edkins, &c.—acquainted with the Ti-pings and their works, agree with the following explanation by the Bishop of Victoria, of their acknowledgment of the inspiration of the Bible; besides which, the proclamation of the Tien-wang (see page 84) fully states their belief in the Divine equality of the Son (Celestial Elder Brother) with the Father.

"While the imperial titles are raised by only one space, it is interesting to observe that in their list of authorized books (published as a preface to each volume), with the *imprimatur* of Tae-ping-wang, the words 'Old' and 'New Testament' each receive *an elevation of three spaces* in the enumeration, whereas Tae-ping-wang's name, even when forming a portion of the title of books of their own original composition, is only raised by *one* space. This seems to be a plain recognition of the paramount divine authority of the Holy Scriptures as *God's Book*, above books of human authorship, and suggests the hope that where so vital an element of essential truth *is present*, errors will be rectified and defects expurgated, by the general circulation and perusal of the Word of God, as the best and surest corrective of imperfect views on the more mysterious doctrines of the Gospel. The portions of the Holy Scriptures which they have already published, exceed in quantity of contents all the other books which are of their own composition added together. In the books recently brought from Nankin, there is an impression in red ink, from a large moveable die or stamp, with the two characters, Che Chun—'the Imperial Will permits'—surrounded by the usual imperial symbols. This *imprimatur* is stamped upon the first page of the text in every book. With such a fact as this before us, every *unprejudiced* mind will perceive that there is a new era of hope for the Chinese empire."

29. Another part of the same explanation states the Ti-ping idea of Christ's Divinity; while again, the following verse from the "Ode for Youth" clearly sets forth his divinity and atonement. Were this not so, it would evidently be the height of injustice to blame a people just arising from the depths of idolatry and ignorance for a fault common amongst ourselves; for have we not Socinians as well as Unitarians?

"It has been customary in native compositions, whenever the Chinese names or titles of the Emperor occur, to commence a new column, as a mark of honour, and to place the imperial name higher in the page by the space of two Chinese words. The name of the Supreme Being is similarly honoured, but has the distinction of being raised three spaces in the page. An interesting

modification of this usage is perceptible in the imperial proclamations and manifestoes of Tae-ping-wang. The name of Almighty God the Father is elevated three spaces; that of Jesus Christ is raised two spaces; and the imperial name and titles of Tae-ping-wang himself *are lowered one degree from the customary position*, and receive the elevation of only one space. As minds are differently biassed, this fact will be differently judged. To us, however, it appears an indication that the insurgent leaders, although viewing Jesus Christ as inferior to the Father as touching his humanity, recognize his superiority to the most exalted of earthly potentates as touching his divinity."

The unmistakable interpretation to place upon this, is—no Chinese mind could possibly place the *Son* upon a *perfect* equality with the Father—their entire system of thought and education debars this from their comprehension; but with a reverence beyond all praise, the Tien-wang actually lowered his own position to avoid trespassing upon the divine attributes of his Saviour: which he has thus expressed in the verse of the "Ode for Youth":—

### "REVERENCE TO JESUS

Jesus, His first-born son,  
Was in former times sent by God;  
He willingly gave His life to redeem us from sin.  
Of a truth His merits are pre-eminent.  
His cross was hard to bear,  
The sorrowing clouds obscured the sun;  
The adorable Son, the honoured of Heaven,  
Died for you, children of men.  
After His resurrection He ascended to heaven,  
Resplendent in glory, He wields authority supreme.  
In Him we know that we may trust,  
To secure salvation and ascend to heaven."

Such are the sentiments of a man, who, besides his voluminous religious compositions, has written the history of China; corrected her classics: written innumerable works upon civil administration and foreign arts and sciences, and who has nevertheless been designated in England as an "*ignorant* impostor and coolie." The British public must indeed have been "green and greasy" (as Sir James Brooke once observed) to take in all the secretary and under-secretary's reports, and swallow the bullock, horns and all.

30. In this opinion Dr. Bridgeman is also wrong; even his fellow-voyageur X.Y.Z. thought differently, and wrote: "The titles applied to these kings are no doubt *mere empty names*, without any specific meaning, and are not necessarily to be understood as implying a claim to super-earthly dignity."

## CHAPTER IX.

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The Sz-wang's Domestic Life.—Approach to Nankin.—Interior of Nankin.—A Ti-ping Banquet.—Maou-lin, the Chung-wang's Son.—The Chung-wang's Palace.—The Chung-Wang's Levee.—Ti-ping Chiefs.—Chung-wang's appearance.—Council of War.—The Review.—Cum-ho.—The March.—The Ti-ping Army.—Its Organization.—Selection of Officers.—Equipment of the Army.—Its Formation.—The Enemy in View.—Their Retreat.—Preparations for Attack.—A Night Attack.—A Stockade carried.—Charge of Manchoo Cavalry.—The Repulse.—The Enemy retreat.—The Pursuit.—Complete Rout of the Manchoos.—Maou-lin's Bravery.—Return to Nankin.

When I found the lorcha so effectually driven off, I instantly landed, both to thank the chief in charge, and let him know who I was, and what I wanted. I went ashore with my friend, and found that the high official in charge of all the forts, batteries, and suburbs of Nankin, was the Sz-wang. We were received by him in his official dwelling with much civility, which changed into the greatest kindness directly he saw my commission, and found that we were aiders and abettors of the Ti-ping cause.

The Sz-wang was an elderly dignified man, and had formerly been a high mandarin at Hankow; but when the Ti-pings first captured that city, he had joined them with all his family. He entertained us very comfortably to a rather luxurious dinner, consisting of *bêche-de-mer*, bird's-nest soup, &c.; after which, the ladies and little Sz-wangs were introduced with the wine—just at the time they would have been retiring from the table if in Europe. I was quite surprised with their appearance, it was in such direct opposition to the strict seclusion in which the women are kept amongst the Chinese. I afterwards found that the free intercourse and elevated position of their women was one of the innumerable innovations which marked the Ti-pings'

superiority to the Imperialists. A little son of the Sz-wang—the eldest of two—was put into my arms, and, to my astonishment, commenced prattling the Lord's Prayer in Chinese, although certainly not more than four years old. The Sz-wang's wife, his two daughters, and several other ladies of his household, all took part in a free and general conversation, quite unlike anything ever seen amongst the Chinese elsewhere. About ten in the evening, after family prayers, they retired for the night. The prayers were commenced by the Sz-wang reading a chapter from the Bible; after which a hymn was sung, every one standing; and then he dismissed us all with a short extempore prayer. I returned on board highly pleased with my first night at Nankin.

The next morning I landed with my friend, and obtaining horses the Sz-wang had promised the previous evening to have ready, we started for the city, the nearest point of which was about two miles distant. Our way ran through a long and populous suburb, in which a very large provision trade was being carried on, and great numbers of shaven-headed Imperialists were to be seen about, all apparently busily engaged disposing of their merchandise. The walls of Nankin cover an immense area, being at the least eighteen or nineteen miles in circumference; but for many years the greater part of the enclosed space has been destitute of houses, and only used for gardens, or to cultivate corn and other cereal produce. The Chinese have an old saying "that if two men on horseback were to start in the morning and ride in opposite directions, round the walls, it would be evening before they met." This is hardly an exaggeration, on account of the angles and irregular turning of the ramparts.

When we arrived before the N.E. gate, much delay took place previous to our being admitted. The escort kindly furnished by the Sz-wang carried passes for us, and besides this I showed the gate-keepers my commission. None but *bonâ fide* Ti-pings were allowed to pass in or out, and then, only after a minute search; and I noticed that all who entered or came forth carried a little wooden ticket at the waist, which had to be exhibited to the

guard. The walls, although of immense thickness, and at the lowest part upwards of fifty feet high, were very poorly furnished with artillery, merely two or three light pieces being mounted upon each bastion, generally some 150 yards apart.

At last the warden-in-chief of that particular gate of Tien-kin (the Holy City), came to us, and after a severe questioning we received permission to enter. Passing through three high gates, under a tunnel at least 100 feet long, we stood within the capital of the Ti-ping. A sharp ride of more than half an hour brought us to the inhabited part of the city, in its southern quarter. Our way passed through fields of grain, interspersed with gardens, small villages, and detached houses. We passed many soldiers, each of whom halted to salute us as "Wa-choong-te" (foreign brethren). The southern part of Nankin was thickly inhabited, and seemed altogether of a better and more handsome style than any Chinese city I had previously seen. Many large palaces and official buildings occupied prominent positions; the streets were very wide and particularly clean, a rare thing in China; and the numerous people had all a free and happy bearing, totally the reverse of the cringing and humbled appearance of the Manchou-governed Chinese. Upon reaching the Chung-wang's palace, I had no occasion to announce myself, for almost the first person I saw was my old acquaintance Le-wang, the Commander-in-Chief's adjutant-general. I introduced my friend to him, who, welcoming us warmly, carried us off, taking each by a hand with his usual frank and friendly manner, and so leading us into the palace. The Chung-wang, it appeared, was engaged planning important movements with several of the generals and chiefs. The southern half of the province of Ngan-whui, at this time (early spring of 1861) entirely under the control of the Ti-pings, was threatened by a large Imperialist army marching upon its western borders; and the Chung-wang was about to take the field against them himself.

The Le-wang, having to join the council, left us to the care of the Chung-wang's son and attendants, who certainly gave us no cause to complain of

their want of attention or friendliness, with which they almost overpowered us.

Directly we were left to them, they took it into their heads that we must be hungry; it was no use protesting they were mistaken, because the polite thing in China is, if you want anything very particularly, you must persistingly declare that you do not. The cooks were accordingly set to work; and in a short time a table was spread; the two or three elderly officials seated themselves complacently with us, although I do not believe they were a bit more hungry than we were; and the crowd of youthful pages, sons of retainers, &c., formed themselves into an admiring circle all round. The Chinese have a wonderful idea of the eating capacity of foreigners, and the earnest manner in which the Chung-wang's pages pressed dish after dish upon us, as though our very lives depended upon the quantity of viands we could stuff with at once, proved they shared the common opinion of their countrymen.

Throughout the repast a regular flow of Ti-ping young gentlemen passed through the hall, each coming up to us and saying in a positively affectionate manner, "Tsin-tsin, Yang ta jen?" (How do you do, Foreign Excellency?) When the plates and dishes were cleared away, they came up and shook hands, and all lingered around us, each evincing the warmest and kindest feelings.

The remarkable kindness and respect I have always experienced from the Ti-pings, has long since filled my heart with sincere friendship for them; but in this I am not singular, for every European who has had communication with them has been similarly impressed.

The council of war having risen, I was very kindly received by the Chung-wang in the evening, who at once gave orders to prepare quarters for me and my friends in his own palace, and also expressed a wish that I should accompany him on his expedition. I then informed him about my betrothed, and the ladies of the palace, all eager to see her, kindly promised to take every care of her and supply every comfort and accommodation during my

absence. When all the arrangements were settled, I returned on board with my friend, accompanied by the Chung-wang's son, Maou-lin, who, from our first meeting, had seemed to attach himself to me, and who now wished to remain with me on board our vessel till our return to the city.

Maou-lin, at that time, although only fifteen years of age, was already celebrated for his courage and leadership in battle. He was excessively fond of Europeans, always shook hands, and could say "good bye," "how do you do," and use a few other English expressions. His appearance was beautiful and delicate as that of a young girl, his voice the softest and most melodious. How great must have been the enthusiasm that could inspire a form fragile as his with a spirit so heroic! From his young and feminine appearance it would never be credited that he could possess such dauntless bravery in battle, yet have I seen him eclipsing the valour of the bravest men; danger and fear were feelings he had never known: brought up amidst the struggles of the Ti-pings for their lives, he had been a soldier almost from his cradle, and had become inured to peril and warfare. Brave boy! as I write of him his sweet voice is ringing in my ear, and I almost *feel* the power of his large earnest eyes. During some years I felt the brother he always called me, and thoroughly appreciated his beautiful character—brave, generous, deeply religious, affectionate and impulsive—I never found, even amongst my own race, one so truly admirable. And now where is he? If living, an outcast and refugee in his native land, the land he loved so well and fought for so nobly. If dead, one of the many thousand victims to a cruel and unjustifiable hostility.

In the morning I moved my vessel farther up the creek, and leaving her in the charge of the *lowder*, close up to the city gate, landed with Marie, my two friends, and Maou-lin, and proceeded to take up our quarters in Nankin. The Chung-wang's ladies received Marie very affectionately, and, thanks to her knowledge of Chinese, she was soon quite at home with them. In a short time the stranger girl was amply supplied with rich dresses *à la Chinoise*, a style of costume excessively becoming, consisting of loose petticoat

trousers, and a nicely cut over-garment reaching just below the knees, tight at the neck, half tight at the waist, with loose sleeves, and a loose embroidered skirt, open at the sides.

The Chung-wang's palace was a very extensive and handsome building, only lately erected. Entering through an immense archway, supported by beautifully sculptured granite columns, the outer door of a large courtyard was reached. Passing through this, the covered way led direct to the grand entrance of the palace, with its carved and gilded columns, and roof covered with a brilliant representation of Chinese mythology. Upon each side of the spacious courtyard, a range of low profusely decorated colonnades extended past the front of the palace to the grounds in its rear. Over the principal door was placed a board with a gilded inscription, which told to what purpose the building was dedicated. The door itself was covered with huge painted dragons, and opened upon a court fronting the Chung-wang's tribunal. Here, and throughout the palace, the cunning of the Chinese artisan was thoroughly displayed, the stonework, windows, woodwork, ceiling and walls, forming a series of most exquisite and curious specimens of sculpture; while every available portion of the building was curiously carved in wood and stone; a work far from being completed, and estimated to occupy three years more at least. On either side of the grand entrance stood a gigantic drum, always sounded when the Chung-wang held a court, or for purposes of assembly or alarm. Immediately within the portals a magnificent piazza extended a short distance up to the open court fronting the tribunal, the roof formed of two immense domes, each one mass of gold and silver, twisted into spiral flutings resembling a shell-fish, peculiar to Chinese mythology. The domes were supported by a number of brilliantly decorated columns, twined by serpents. The Hall of Judgment, upon the other side of the stone court, was decorated in crimson, except the walls, which were hung with large yellow satin tablets, recording the honourable deeds of the Chung-wang, the compliments and rewards received from the Ti-ping king, and various moral proverbs from the Chinese classics; while, between these,


tablets of stone were engraved with texts from scripture; the intervening portions of the wall containing a tablature of mythology, battles, and landscapes, similar to the decorations around the outer colonnades, and all illuminated in brilliant colours and with much ingenuity. The sides of the Judgment Hall were ornamented in the same style as the other parts of the palace, with miniature landscapes, covered with natural shrubs and trees—peach, acacias, magnolias, with their powerful aroma, camelias of the most delicate hue, and others peculiar to China, all perfectly developed upon the most minute scale. Half shrouded by beautiful little weeping willows and the sensitive mimosa, diminutive porcelain cities rested on the sides of tiny lakes, sparkling with gold and silver fish; while here and there, hills covered with flourishing vegetation in one part, and barren and rocky in another, rose from amidst the trees, with several porcelain pagodas. The tribunal, the table fronting it, and the surrounding chairs, were covered with yellow satin, and directly behind and above the former a grand canopy of the same material, of yellow and scarlet, was suspended. The ceiling was hung with handsome glass lanterns and lustres, prettily ornamented with rich silken cords and tassels reaching almost to the cornices, the standards and banners of the Chung-wang drooped in heavy silken folds to the ground. Passing on from the Judgment Hall, after traversing several broad chambers, whose sides were filled with small offices containing secretaries, scribes, &c., another open court was reached, with an orchestra and musicians at each side; passing which, the Audience Chamber was entered; then the apartments of the palace officials, and another court, and finally the "Heavenly Hall," or place of worship; beyond which were the private rooms of the Chung-wang and his household. At the back of the palace a garden of rock-work, full of grottos, ponds of water crossed by Chinese bridges, and all manner of grotesque Chinese conceits, with a spacious summer dining pavilion in the centre, extended to the colonnade. The rooms placed at the disposal of myself and friends looked directly upon this, and prettier quarters it would have been impossible to find in all Nankin.

The Chung-wang's residence was the grandest and most gorgeous in the city, with the exception of the Ti-ping-wang's (Tien-wang), whose palace covered an immense area, and was surrounded by a large yellow wall, crowned with tall and graceful minarets, and a mass of green, golden, and scarlet roofs.

A few days after my arrival at Nankin, the Chung-wang held a grand levee to arrange the military operations for the year. Upon this occasion I had the pleasure of meeting the enlightened Kan-wang (Hung-jin, the Tien-wang's cousin), and the "accomplished prince," the Chang-wang. I have already given the opinions of our missionaries with regard to the Kan-wang's superior intellect and truly Christian character. In the *Overland Register*, published at Hong-kong on the 25th of August, 1860, he is spoken of thus:—"His intercourse with Chinese Christians was what is termed *edifying*, calculated to promote their *purity* and stimulate their zeal. With other Chinese he was the proselytizer, fearlessly exposing their errors, and exhorting them to repent and believe the Gospel. Over young men his influence was peculiarly beneficial. In fact, whether the individuals were young or old, the case was, as was once observed by Mr. Chalmers, 'Whenever you see any one having long and frequent intercourse with Hung-jin, you may be sure there is something good going on in him.'"

The Kan-wang was the head of the Ti-ping administration, and was called First Minister. During an intimacy of several years I proved him to be not only a good Christian, but a man of most honourable principles, of enlightened mind, and thoroughly civilized. It is, however, a task of much difficulty and delicacy to draw a distinction amongst the Ti-ping chiefs, simply because so many of them were equally distinguished. I may, however, say that after the Tien-wang, the Chung, Kan, Chang, Ying, I (the Tien-wang's eldest brother), and Tsan wangs were the greatest. The Chang-wang was a sort of Home Secretary or Minister of the Interior; neither this chief nor the Kan-wang held any executive military command, although both were frequently in the field in order to introduce civil administration into

conquered provinces. The Chang-wang was considered the most learned and accomplished man in the Ti-ping ranks, and hence his title, "Accomplished Prince." His modest and unpretending manner, politeness and education, made him one of the most agreeable of companions. This chief, the Kan-wang, the Chung-wang's son, Maou-lin, and several other men of rank, were studying the English language from books supplied them by some missionaries. The Rev. Griffith John, describing his visit to Nankin, wrote:—



THE CHUNG-WANG'S COUNCIL OF WAR.  
DAY & SON, LIMITED, LITH.

"The Chang-wang at Nankin begged of me to inform the 'Foreign Brethren,' for him, that the following are his views:—"You have had the Gospel for upwards of 1800 years, we only, as it were, eight days. Your knowledge of it ought to be correct and extensive; ours must necessarily be limited and

imperfect. *You must therefore bear with us for the present, and we will gradually improve.* As for the Gospel, it is one, and must be propagated throughout the world. Let the 'Foreign Brethren' all know *that we are determined to uproot idolatry, and plant Christianity in its place.*"

I can answer for it that Chang-wang has done all in his power to carry out his determination; his request for foreigners to "bear with" the Ti-pings for awhile, and the reason he gives for it, afford a good example of his just and liberal opinions. In age he was probably about 35, of middle height, and with a thoughtful, intelligent, and almost pensive style of countenance. The Kan-wang seemed at least ten years older, rather stoutish and tall, and with an open, pleasing face, expressive of a kind and benevolent character. His little son was being taught English, from a number of picture books written in Chinese and English, and would always put his little hand in mine and lisp, "Good morning, how do you do?" whenever I entered his father's palace.

The Kan and Chang wangs were well acquainted with geography and mechanics, and besides, possessed books of reference, with plates, upon every imaginable subject of Western civilization and science, which they were constantly studying.

The chiefs all attended the Chung-wang's levee in their state robes and coronets. The Chung-wang himself appeared with a beautiful crown; he was the only chief besides his Majesty, the Tien-wang, who wore one of real gold. The metal was beaten out thin, into beautiful filigree-work and leaves, and formed into the figure of a tiger, the eyes being of large rubies, and the teeth rows of pearls. At each side was an eagle with outstretched wings, and on the top a phœnix. The whole crown was magnificently decorated with large jewels set into the gold, while pearls, sapphires, and other gems hung all around. In his hand the Chung-wang carried a jade-stone sceptre or "yu-i," curved at each end, and covered with groups of sapphires, pearls, garnets, and amethysts. His state robe was a gorgeous affair, reaching almost to the feet, of beautifully embroidered yellow satin, stiff with gold bosses and

dragons worked in gold, silver, and scarlet threads. Yellow embroidered trousers, and boots of yellow satin, similarly ornamented, completed a costume, than which—set off by his handsome and energetic features—it would be impossible to imagine one more magnificent. When the Chung-wang entered the Audience Hall and proceeded to his state chair, all the assembled chieftains rose to their feet, and passing before him, dropped upon one knee and saluted him, and then returned to their seats, after which, the deliberations were entered into.



CHUNG-WANG'S CROWN.

When the result of the council had been submitted to and approved by the Tien-wang, orders were given to the generals to march at once upon their several destinations. The Ying-wang was despatched with a large force along the northern bank of the Yang-tze river, in the direction of Han-kow and the province of Hoo-peh. Reinforcements were ordered to the Shi-wang in Kiang-si, and the Kan-wang, with a large retinue, was sent to the borders of Kwei-chow to accept the allegiance of a strong body of insurgents from Kwang-tung, which had lately been tendered to the Ti-ping emperor. Each of these chiefs, when prepared to start upon their expedition, assembled their troops and harangued them in a most energetic manner. Their addresses were received with acclamation, and it required but little penetration to prophesy the Manchoo troops would have but small chance of successfully opposing these enthusiastic and determined men. With all their excitement they seemed possessed with a firmness of purpose, and settled conviction to succeed. I conversed with many while marching towards the city gates, and found all alike imbued with the earnest belief that God, or as they expressed it, "The Heavenly Father," was with them. Some were quite boys, of fifteen or sixteen years. I asked several if they were not afraid to go to battle and be killed, and one daring-looking little fellow, pointing to a great cicatrice along the side of his neck, and another on his breast, told me he had received the wounds fighting the "Demon-imps" (Manchoos), and that he intended soon to have his revenge. Several of the elder soldiers told me in a very serious manner that it was a good thing to be killed fighting the "demons" (the Manchoos were so called because of their idolatry), as they would then certainly go to heaven.

The Chung-wang, previous to commencing his march to Ngan-whui, reviewed his body-guard in the large parade ground. This brigade, 5,000 strong, marching under the Chang-wang's standard of green, was composed of one of the finest bodies of men I have ever seen in my life. Until the repulse from Shanghae it was their boast that they had never retreated or turned their backs upon a foe. They were all natives of Kwang-si, the

Chung-wang's province, and came principally from the Maoutze, or aboriginal mountaineers, who have never at any period of the Manchoo invasion, become subject to, or been subdued by them; and who, at the present time, still retain the ancient Chinese customs and their own form of government, entirely independent and free of all allegiance to the reigning dynasty. These Maoutze are the very bravest soldiers in China, and are easily to be recognized by the enormous quantity of their hair; for never having succumbed to and adopted the usurper's badge of slavery—the shaved head—their hair has grown from infancy, reaching almost to their feet when loose, and when dressed forming a tail of great thickness, which, when wound round the neck, acts as a protecting armour that no sword can penetrate in the day of battle.

Besides his brigade of guards, the Chung-wang reviewed another, composed of remarkably fine Honan men, and commanded by Ling-ho, an adopted son. This chief, celebrated for his reckless and dashing gallantry, had been repeatedly and dangerously wounded. He was particularly attached to Europeans, and at the time I met him, had two with him, one a Corsican, who held the position of Lieutenant-Colonel in his regiment, and the other a Sardinian, who was a Major. They had served with him several years, were both married, and perfectly happy and contented, although they had passed a considerable time without seeing another European than themselves. The men they commanded were greatly attached to them, and ready and willing to follow them anywhere. These two brigades, the body-guard of the Foo-wang, second in command, and a small body of cavalry, were all the troops the Chung-wang took with him from Nankin; but these were the very *élite* of the Ti-ping forces. The strength of the whole division was about 7,500, which was to be considerably increased by reinforcements in Ngan-whui.

At last, after all the other expeditionary forces had started, the Chung-wang himself set forth. Marie I left in tears, but perfect safety and comfort. After the last farewell she was led into the inner apartments by her particular friend, Cum-ho (the Good Gold), the Chung-wang's second daughter, a

remarkably pretty girl of about her own age. During the few weeks which had elapsed since our arrival at Nankin, her Excellency Mademoiselle Cum-ho had been the inseparable companion of Marie. My friend was generally with me, and I began to fancy that her "Foreign Brother" was latterly assuming a very unbrotherly and more affectionate relation. We were the first Europeans the Chung-wang's ladies had ever seen, and my friend was a fine handsome specimen of the race, therefore, it was not very astonishing that Mademoiselle Cum-ho should have looked favourably upon him. Poor fellow! he must have experienced considerable difficulty in making love, for at the time he scarcely knew five Chinese words.

Field artillery was a thing totally unknown to the Chinese armies when I joined the Chung-wang, but previous to leaving Nankin I prevailed upon him to give me men to work them and the requisite authority to mount three light 6-pound French field-pieces, and carry them with us. My friends and self were each capitally mounted with strong and hardy Chinese horses, for which the Chung-wang would not hear of payment. With our small battery of artillery we were attached to his guards, and marched rapidly forward. Besides my interpreter and cook, the Chung-wang very kindly supplied us with a couple of pages each. This system of pages is a very common one in the Ti-ping armies; every chief or officer of rank has a number of them; they accompany him into the thickest of the fight, each carrying a gun, which they hand to him and re-load as fast as he can discharge them.

At the cities of Wuhu, Taeping-foo, Taeping-hien, and several others we halted, and were joined by large reinforcements, so that before we approached the neighbourhood of the enemy the strength of our army was but little short of 27,000 men, independent of the camp followers, while the baggage, coolie, and commissariat departments amounted to upwards of 15,000. During the march I had capital opportunities of observing the greatly improved state of the country under Ti-ping rule, and also of admiring the conduct, character, and efficiency of their armies.

Much has been stated about the desolating and ruthless character of the Ti-pings, but I entirely deny the accusation. I have been on many a long march with them and have never found them act with the barbarity that marked the late American war, or commit the atrocities perpetrated in Poland and Circassia, or act as Englishmen have done to the unfortunate natives of New Zealand. The Ti-pings never committed wanton devastation, never destroyed crops of standing corn, as has been done by civilized troops in New Zealand, in Algeria, and in the Shenandoah Valley.

The perfect organization of the Ti-ping armies contrasted favourably with that of the Imperialists. The former, unpaid and voluntary, observed strict discipline; the latter, receiving hire, constantly mutinied; all military crimes, especially those of ill-using the villagers and opium-smoking, were promptly and severely punished. Outrages, no doubt, were committed by the Ti-ping forces, but, if so, it was by those raw recruits who neither understood nor cared for the Ti-ping cause. The great body of the army observed a moderation unknown to the Imperialists; were it otherwise, instant execution was sure to follow. If a village was invested, its inhabitants might command security by tendering allegiance and conforming to the customs of the conquerors. If a village was merely passed by, a moderate contribution was required. There may have been, particularly in latter years, exceptions to this course, but it was not the less the fundamental rule which guided the operations of the Ti-ping armies. If they occupied a district for any length of time, peace and contentment reigned there; it was only when they rested but for a short period, and were followed by the Imperialists, or, perhaps, by hordes of local banditti and straggling bands of camp followers, that the country was desolated. Such was my experience. Each Ti-ping Wang or Prince has under his special control 100,000 people, including one army. Between the Wangs and generals of armies come nine descriptions of officers, ranking as ministers, and other great officers in charge of civil and military departments of state. The military organization and all the titles, are those used previous to the conquest of China by the Manchoo Tartars. Each

Ti-ping army, or keun, is composed of 13,125 officers and men, under the command of a general (keun-shwae), and is divided into five divisions (ying), front, rear, right, left, and centre.

A division musters 2,625 strong, commanded by a general of division (sze-shwae), and contains five leu, or regiments, the front, rear, left, right, and centre.

A regiment is composed of 525 men and officers, commanded by a colonel (leu-shwae), and is divided into five tsuh, or companies, the first, second, third, fourth, and fifth.

A company is composed of 104 men and officers, commanded by a captain (tsuh-chang); then come four lieutenants (leang-sze-ma), distinguished as the north, south, east, and west, each in command of four sergeants (woo-chang), and twenty privates (woo-tsuh).

The lieutenants, and all above, have each a banner with his designation inscribed on it, which increases in size with the rank of the officer.

Each division of an army is divided into three classes, or brigades. The first consists of *bonâ fide* Ti-pings, that is to say, all who are of more than six years' standing; the second brigade, of acknowledged brethren, of more than three but less than six years' service; while the third, and generally largest brigade, includes all new levies, and less than three years' service men. Each brigade is again divided into three classes. The best and bravest men are armed as musketeers, or cavalry; the next class as heavy gingall and halbert men; and the third as spearmen. A great proportion of the three arms are flag-bearers, while the standards of the chiefs are borne by officers of stanch Ti-pingism and approved courage. The rank of these latter is upon an equal footing with that of the commissioned officers, and the position is considered the most honourable in the army. The bravest men I have ever seen in my life were some of these standard-bearers. It is their duty to lead on the whole army by advancing with their colours far in front, and I am certain many a brave ensign must have fallen by the fire of his comrades, at times wonderfully eccentric. Attached to each division of guards (or the first

class of the three brigade divisions) is one large black flag, and when this is advanced, the division is compelled to follow it upon pain of death, the rear rank men carrying drawn swords to decapitate any who might attempt to run. This flag possesses not only the signification the "black flag" does with Europeans, but must never be carried in retreat before an enemy, nothing but death being permitted to arrest its progress. This was well known to the Imperialists, and, until assisted by British troops, officers, and supplies of shell, artillery, &c., they rarely, if ever, awaited this terrible attack, and even if courageous enough to do so, their chance of success was but small indeed.

The absence of all mercenary attraction to their ranks arose from the wish of the Ti-ping Government to have no adherents who could possibly join them from other than religious or patriotic motives, these being recognized as the element that contributed so largely to success. The appearance of the men is quite a sufficient guarantee of the beneficial effects of the system, for, instead of being taken from the very lowest dregs of the people, as with the Imperialists, it is nearly always the case that they are men of respectability, from either the working, servant, or trading class; frequently they are of much higher social position, and this is generally the case with the Kwang-tung and Kwang-si men, whose superiority is such that it is mostly from their ranks the officers are selected.

One of the wisest and most advantageous regulations of the Ti-ping army is, that officers of every grade can rise by merit alone; a regulation highly beneficial, most of their leaders having proved very superior men; among others the Chung-wang, who, unaided, rose by his brilliant attainments alone to the highest military rank.

The total inability of the Manchoos to alone meet the Ti-pings with any chance of success, is easily to be understood when the different military constitutions of the two powers are made known; for how is it possible that armies entirely composed of the very lowest and most degraded of the people, and whose officers obtain their rank by corruption and bribery, can

be able to compete with the patriotism of the Ti-pings, or the superior talent of their chiefs?

The cowardice and cruelty of the Imperialists have long been notorious, and, after the experience foreign officers have lately had, the courage and humanity of the Ti-pings should have become equally so. I can assure my readers that it is no slight devotion to the sacred cause of civil and religious liberty, and not a little hatred of the Manchoo oppressor, that encourages these people in their gallant struggle for freedom, and makes them so cheerfully accept all the rigours, deprivations, and incessant dangers of their cause. Any one who had seen them undergo the terrible sufferings that I have would never afterwards doubt this. There is one case especially, which shall be related in its proper place, the horror of which I shall never forget, and that, sad to say, was caused entirely through the interference of the British *Government*. It was occasioned more particularly by the arrival of the Anglo-Chinese, or "Vampire-Fleet," as it was called by the foreign residents of Shanghae, under command of Manchoo *Admiral*—but British *Captain*—Sherrard Osborne, and the progress of the mercenary contingents commanded by Major Gordon, R.E., and others.

The equipment of the Ti-ping armies was much the same as that of the Imperialists. What few cavalry they possessed were armed with heavy swords of the yataghan shape, generally double-handled, and with a very broad and thick blade; their firearms were light matchlocks, and European muskets or pistols when they could obtain them. The musketeers carried matchlocks, useless in wet weather, and European-made double-barrelled guns, muskets, and pistols, generally of very inferior quality. The second-class brigades usually carried one large gingall to four men, the weapon when in use resting upon a tripod. The spearmen simply carried a long bamboo with an iron spike in the end, and the usual short, heavy Chinese sword, used by all their infantry. The spears were proportioned to the men, and ranged from eight to eighteen feet long. The flags were all attached to twelve-feet spears. Besides the above-mentioned weapons, many men from

the northern provinces were armed with the Tartar bow, which was a much more accurate-shooting weapon than either matchlock or gingall. Regiments of guards generally mustered upwards of 2,000 strong. To each regiment were attached twelve buglers in the shape of horn-blowers, the instrument used being a long brass tube like a French horn, and sounding like a number of cow-horns concentrated. Troops could be manœuvred by the notes of this instrument perfectly well. Besides the buglers, a corps of drummers formed the other part of each military band, together with players upon the hautboys, Chinese fifes, and serpent horns. Those who have seen a Ti-ping army will readily agree with me that it is one of the most picturesque and impressive sights in the world. The very becoming style of the soldiers' dress, the brilliancy of the colours, the quantity and richness of the silken flags, and the peculiar way in which the bearers wave them about, or carry them streaming in the wind—the forest of spears presented by the spearmen of the army, the number of mounted officers—all unite in producing a vivid impression.

It was in such style that after a twenty days' march we came upon the Imperialist troops in the neighbourhood of the Poyang Lake. Directly the Chung-wang became aware of the enemy's vicinity, clouds of skirmishers were deployed in front of the leading divisions, and the cavalry divided into two bodies, one covering each flank. The advancing army meanwhile continued its march in close columns, each column being four deep, and at wheeling distance from the parallel columns on either side. This formation of the Ti-ping armies much resembles the movement by "fours" of the British army; but the files are single—what is usually termed the Indian file, and each acts independently of the others. When it is required to form line of battle, the columns simply halt and wheel into line upon either flank, joining the points of the formations upon each side. It will thus be seen that, instead of marching front forward as European columns, they advance end on, and the front of each company when on the march is at right angles to the head of the column. The line of battle is formed four deep in consequence of this, but, if necessary, is easily made less by the rear files being right or left faced,

and marched off parallel to their former position. The leading battalions are always formed of the spearmen or poorest troops; the second line of battle is composed of the second class men; and the third, or reserve, of the best troops and guards.

In this order we advanced upon the Imperialists. I had divided my artillery—my friend with one piece and a company of thirty men joining the right wing; Philip with another gun and the same number of men, the left; while I remained, with the third gun, in the centre.

Throughout the day no collision with the enemy took place; numberless videttes and pickets of Tartar cavalry were driven in, but we nowhere came upon them in force. At last, just before dark, we came within full view of the Manchoo army, drawn up in battle array in the centre of a great plain immediately beyond the hilly ground from which we were about to debouch. Our army was immediately halted upon its commanding position, and a body of cavalry sent forward to reconnoitre. The Chung-wang himself went with this force, and I accompanied him. When we had approached to within a mile of the enemy, we halted and surveyed them through our glasses. I estimated their strength at somewhere near 50,000, but what puzzled me most was the fact that about a third of this force was well-equipped and hardy Tartar cavalry. The Ti-pings certainly could not form square to resist them, and how otherwise they could repulse their charges I did not know.

The Manchoos allowed us but small time to make our observations, for while we were busied with them a large body of cavalry had been detached from the nearest wing, and was galloping at full speed to intercept our retreat. As they considerably outnumbered us, we followed the tactics of that celebrated general who with twice 10,000 men marched up the hill and then marched down again; only he walked, and we galloped away as fast as we could. The Tartars could not catch us, and as we neared our lines gave up the chase with one of those yells Tartars alone know how to make.

The enemy occupied a remarkably unpleasant position for a Chinese army, because they had but small room for running away, and this made us

believe they must either be very superior troops, or else have large supports somewhere out of sight in their rear. Their situation answered to the rim of a fan, each side being cut off by water—the Poyang Lake on one hand, and the river Yang-tze-kiang on the other. At the very apex of this position we knew the Imperialists held the city of Hu-kau, a strongly-fortified place; therefore we suspected they either depended upon supports from thence, or on finding protection within its walls, in event of defeat in the field.

As it was too late to commence any operations, we encamped upon the rising ground for the night. Towards midnight, however, our pickets came in with the report that the enemy were in full retreat. The Chung-wang immediately ordered the army to follow in pursuit. Tents were struck, the different corps assembled, and in a few minutes we were advancing at a quick step, every man carrying a lantern, according to the practice of the Chinese troops at night. After crossing the plain, we met with more broken and irregular ground; skirmishing parties were sent out, and we had not advanced far when those from the front fell back with intelligence that the enemy were strongly posted in a row of stockades and intrenchments directly on our line of march.

The Foo-wang was at once ordered to make a reconnaissance in force, and feel the enemy's position preparatory to a grand attack at daybreak. With my two friends, L. and Philip, I joined this corps and with it pushed rapidly forward, the men still carrying their confounded lanterns; we had, however, taken with us fifty of our gunners armed with old Tower muskets, and, leading them without lanterns, marched a little aloof upon the right flank of the column. We soon discovered the enemy, whose whole line of intrenchments was illuminated with lanterns, and directly our lights were seen a most tremendous roar of gongs, drums, and war-horns commenced. Scouts were sent out dressed all in black, and without lanterns, to ascertain the nature and strength of the defences. With several of my men I went upon the same errand on the extreme left of the enemy. Crawling along the ground, and taking advantage of every inequality and cover, we got within

100 yards of the last stockade upon the left: it was apparently furnished with several pieces of artillery upon its front, surrounded with a moat, and altogether a formidable field-work. Before retiring, I crawled away to the left of it, and found the nature of the ground so unequal, and so many bushes scattered about, that I fancied, if no pickets were posted at that part, it would be quite practicable to advance a sufficient body of men under cover to carry the work by a *coup-de-main*. If this could be done, the position would be turned, and in all probability the enemy would be compelled to abandon his whole line of defences.

I rejoined the Foo-wang, whom I found manœuvring to alarm the Manchoos and induce them to discover their force. Every man was carrying two lanterns, one upon each end of his spear placed horizontally across his shoulders, while quite a number of others were made fast to bamboos stuck in the ground. After I proposed my plan to him, he decided to maintain his advanced position until the Chung-wang's opinion was ascertained; for which purpose one of his principal officers returned with me to our main body. The Chung-wang approved of my design, and placed 500 of his own guards under my command, and an equal number of the Foo-wang's; directing the attack to be given just before daylight, when the whole army should advance after and follow up my movements, while a grand demonstration should be made upon the right of the works by the Foo-wang's corps. At the appointed hour my division of stormers assembled, all clothed in black silk jacket and trousers, every man well armed with a musket, and carrying a bamboo spear to leap the moat with, if necessary; meanwhile, the main body of the army was noiselessly massed behind us, and the Foo-wang's division made more display of lanterns and more feints to attack than ever. Of course my party left their lanterns behind, and the main body took the same precaution for a wonder. Moving rapidly towards the cover, we reached it just as the Foo-wang commenced a false attack. Philip was with me, but I had left my friend L. behind with the guns, with orders to follow me into the stockade with them, in event of our taking it.

Slowly my men crept along in the direction of the work; we passed the spot I had previously made my observations from, and had actually reached within fifty yards of the parapet before we were discovered; the whole of the garrison being apparently crowded upon the right side, watching the distant firing instead of their own neighbourhood. Directly the enemy observed us, rising erect with a tremendous cheer, we rushed to storm the place, while the reserve kept up a heavy fire upon the defenders to cover our assault. Passing to the rear of the stockade with but little loss, for the fire of our supports swept the parapet, we charged up to the ditch under a shower of arrow-headed rockets. At this point men were dropping all around, for the fire of our comrades no longer supported us; fortunately the ditch was dry, and leaping into it, my men became well protected, for these Chinese stockades have no flanking angles. But now a new weapon was brought into play. Unable to show themselves, the garrison commenced throwing "stink-pots," over the parapet, amongst us. The burns and suffocating fumes of these singular missiles were fearful. Directly my men were all loaded—some placed upon the flank of the stockade and the rest in its rear, so as to open a cross fire—we clambered up the rampart, and lining the parapet, opened fire upon the crowd huddled up in the interior. The advantage of the position was entirely ours, for my men on the flank, enfilading the parapet, shot down all who attempted to dislodge us, while upon our side we rendered them the same service.

In almost perfect safety, for a few moments, we poured a close and deadly cross fire into the mass of the enemy; but then, our supports storming upon the front of the stockade, the defenders began to rush to their only side of escape, and went over the parapet as fast as they could. Jumping into the place sword in hand, we soon drove out or cut down the few who still resisted, though not without loss, for many of the defenders were armed with spears, with which they at first had a considerable advantage over my short-sworded comrades, the spears we had carried being left outside the ditch. The commander of the work was a brave Tartar officer, who fought

desperately and killed several of our men with arrows. When these were all used, he rushed into the *mêlée* with his heavy Tartar sword. If all the garrison had fought like him, I doubt whether our enterprise would have proved so successful, for we were considerably outnumbered. Wishing to save the life of this officer, I ran up to him with the point of my sword lowered, and called upon him to surrender; but, suddenly impelled forward by a rush of men, I came within reach of his weapon, which in an instant was descending full upon my head. Instinctively I raised my arm to the guard; at the same moment a pistol was fired. I felt a pressure on my head, and the Tartar rolled over at my feet; I turned to my rescuer, and found Maou-lin; the brave boy had just had time to interpose his blade, which was driven down with much force upon my head, and then so effectually to use his revolver.

By this time the stockade was ours: its former masters were all driven out or killed; but, rapidly as this happened, we had but small time for rejoicing, for scarcely had the last fugitive disappeared over the parapet, when we heard the noise of a heavy column of the enemy rushing to recapture the place. While the attacking troops were approaching the right flank of the work, the dull rumbling in the rear told us the whole force of the enemy, or at least a strong division, was moving to surround us. We had just time to man the parapets when the advancing column rushed forward to the assault. Crouched down in a double line, we waited until the foremost ranks were within a few paces of the ditch; our first line then delivered their fire, and stepped back to reload. The advance was checked, and the attacking forces, crowded together by the press from their rear, presented a living wall to our second volley, delivered within ten feet. Before the killed and wounded had well fallen, another volley poured in by our first line completely broke them, and, leaving a heap of stricken men all along that side of the stockade, they turned and fled.

Daylight had now arrived, and opened upon a crowded field of battle. The enemy appeared in great strength massed in rear of the stockades, while a movement to their left flank was being executed as fast as possible, under

cover of their whole cavalry, whose advance had caused the rumbling noise in our rear. At a glance, I perceived the enemy's left was completely turned, and the whole Ti-ping army was forming upon some hilly ground almost at right angles to the line of stockades. Up this the Tartar cavalry was charging at full speed in three strong lines, each at least 5,000 strong. I naturally expected to see them ride straight over the Chung-wang and all his men, for I had not at that time seen the Ti-ping method of resisting a cavalry charge. Suddenly, and while the cavalry were still at a considerable distance, the whole front of our army gave way, and wheeling to the left, ran to the rear at the double quick. I fully expected that when the lines reached the parallel marching order a general flight would take place; but, to my astonishment, the right files of each line stood fast, and the remaining files sweeping past the parallel position, doubled back and formed a complete circle. The second line advanced, and planted its gingalls in the intervening spaces, the halberdiers forming a second line of circles; while the third line, advancing from the reserves, doubled up to the front, and entering those of the spearmen, composed an inner circle of musketeers. Upon the left of the army, and in a line with the stockades, the Foo-wang's division was formed *en échelon*, extending from the front of the main body to little more than half a mile from the stockade I held. This force was slowly moving up so as to close with the position and rest its left flank upon it. Our cavalry was formed into two bodies, one upon the right of the army and the other in rear of the reserves. Such was the order in which the Ti-pings awaited the charge of the Tartar cavalry.

The bright rays of the morning sun now flashed across the serried ranks of the hostile armies and played fitfully on the glistening arms of the long lines of Tartar cavalry as they dashed up the slopes in all the pomp and circumstance of war. In far less time than is occupied in perusing the account, the foremost Tartars had mounted the crest of the rising ground, and charged full upon the front of our army. On they went, line after line sweeping up the slight ascent, waving their scarlet plumes and many-

coloured banners. At last this gallant array was burst asunder; a sheet of flame ran along the whole of our line, followed by the crash of rolling musketry, mingled with the frequent and hoarse reports of the heavy gingalls, before which the first line of cavalry fell back broken and disorganized. The second line spread out till the first had retreated through the openings, then closing again, they dashed forward, only to meet a like repulse; and now the third and strongest line advanced, doomed to utter destruction. Upon the extreme left of the Foo-wang's line, now within a few hundred yards of the stockade, my three pieces of artillery were suddenly unmasked and opened upon the charging cavalry. Within pistol-shot distance, grape and canister enfilading the dense lines of men and horses, carried destruction through their ranks. The fire was steadily maintained by alternate guns, and the hissing noise of the *mitraille*, as it rushed through the air, followed by the dull sounding thud as man and horse went down before it, was plainly heard at my position. Leaping and struggling clear of the fallen men and horses, the Tartars actually reached and endeavoured to break the formation of spearmen; but with knee to the ground and their lances firmly placed, these successfully maintained their ranks, while at such close quarters every shot told upon the crowd of horsemen with deadly effect, the circle of musketeers running round and round and keeping up an incessant fire, loading as they passed towards the rear of the circle and firing as they came to the front. Some circles were broken, and in a moment overwhelmed and trodden under hoof; but in those instances the victors paid a heavy penalty for their temporary success; from the circles on each flank and those of the second rank and the reserves in line, a withering cross fire swept their squadrons from front to rear and flank to flank.



DEFEAT OF THE TARTAR CAVALRY AT THE BATTLE OF HU-KAU.  
DAY & SON, LIMITED, LITH.

The last and most desperate charge of the enemy's cavalry was repulsed with tremendous loss. Their order was no sooner broken than, rushing from the right of the army, our cavalry brigade, nearly 2,000 strong, came sweeping along the whole front, and, falling upon the flank of the retreating and disordered enemy, completed their rout.

All this transpired in a few minutes, and even before the final repulse of their cavalry, the Imperialists, unable to change front with sufficient celerity or advantage, evacuated their line of intrenchments and commenced retreating in good order, waving their numerous flags in a figure of eight and sweeping the ground with them, according to that method of defying an enemy peculiar to China. The Imperialists had evidently received heavy

reinforcements during the night, for, without reckoning their defeated cavalry, their strength was at least double that of our entire army; but at that time this was considered by the Ti-pings as no great advantage.

The enemy was so completely outflanked, that, directly the last cavalry charge had been repulsed, the Chung-wang hastened to follow up his advantage. Line of battle was re-formed and the whole army advanced at a run upon the retreating and manœuvring columns. Abandoning the captured stockade, with my detachment I rejoined the army, and, passing through the Foo-wang's division, carried off the guns to the extreme right, now actively engaged with the retiring left wing of the Manchoos in Chinese fashion, that is to say, by waving of flags, distant volleys of gingalls, &c., with yells, abuse, and gesticulation. The position was still very unfavourable to the enemy; their long front was yet diagonal to ours, and although their left wing was falling back as fast as possible, so as to form a parallel line of battle, our whole line was performing a side march to maintain its flanking attitude, and moreover, was already engaging the troops attempting to take up a fresh alignment.

Consequent upon the imperfect system of Chinese drill, the retreating troops were unable to effect a regular formation; one company would halt too soon, another too late, and some not at all. Neither was our advance much better, for the only well-formed position of a Chinese army is when it remains stationary. The flag-waving and abusive part of the action did not last long, for, seizing the opportunity, the Chung-wang advanced the second brigades. Moving my guns well upon the right and out of the eccentric line of fire from the heavy gingalls, I took up a position enfilading whole divisions of the enemy, and opened upon them with considerable effect.

For a little while the Imperialists stood this, and returned a sharp fire from their gingalls and long matchlocks, but several lines of our third brigade, or musketeers, forming at intervals with the second and first, charged them amidst tremendous cheering. They broke, and throwing away their arms, fled in confusion upon their centre. A well-timed charge of our

cavalry changed their flight into a complete rout, and rushing frantically upon the stationary divisions of the centre, and those occupied in changing ground, they threw the whole into disorder.

Not a moment was lost in following up the blow; our right wing and centre, reserves and all, rushed upon the disorganized multitude, while the Foo-wang with our left wing and the cavalry moved forward obliquely, and attacked the enemy's right and the remnant of cavalry he had re-formed in its rear. For some little time this part of the field was well disputed, but at length, the left wing and centre, driven back upon the right with immense slaughter, involved the whole army in inextricable confusion. The reserves, without firing a shot, turned and fled from the field, while their comrades, struggling and surging in one huge mass, endeavoured to follow their example, while some few struggled to arrest the victorious advance. Vainly strove the bravest Tartar officers to animate their men; the hardiest veterans, extricating themselves from the confusion, uselessly sacrificed their lives attempting to re-form and gain time for the broken lines to rally and open out in order; equally vain were the fierce efforts of the main body, as, rolling and staggering along, they wavered, hesitated, and sent forth storms of fire upon friend and foe alike, while the rallied horsemen feebly charged the Foo-wang's cavalry, and, driven back, hovered in rear and flank of its defeated infantry. The day was irretrievably lost for the Manchoos. Nothing could stop our impetuous charge, as with deafening shouts the whole army swept on victorious, driving them back with fearful carnage. In vain the Imperialists endeavoured to deploy; the head of every formation no sooner appeared than the volleys of our musketeers swept them away, or the charging spearmen and halberdiers annihilated them. Thrown into disorder and mingled with the fugitive crowd, the right wing, no longer able to oppose the Foo-wang, was burst asunder by our cavalry. The Imperialists were totally routed. Halting the reserves and centre, the Chung-wang re-formed them and moved in the direction of Hu-kau, while the two wings and the cavalry pursued the panic-stricken multitude, eventually either driving

them into the waters of the Poyang Lake, some three miles from the field of battle, or making prisoners of them.

In the mean while the Chung-wang advanced rapidly upon the small city of Hu-kau, to where the reserves of the Imperialist army had already retreated. A quick march of less than three hours brought us before its walls, and, advancing my little battery, I prepared to enfilade the parapet and cover the advance of our stormers. This, however, proved unnecessary, for the enemy, profiting by their late experience, had evacuated the place and embarked in numerous junks and gunboats upon the Yang-tze river.

During the late engagement Maou-lin and Ling-ho had particularly distinguished themselves. In vain had my two friends and the Corsican and Sardinian officers attempted to compete with their valour. Foremost in every assault Maou-lin or his adopted brother made themselves conspicuous. All had received spear-wounds in the *mêlée*, but, fortunately, none were very severe, and under the soothing influence of the herbal decoctions the Chinese surgeons so well understand the use of, they soon became healed. Our total loss in killed and wounded was less than two thousand, while that of the enemy was immense: the whole battle-field and line of retreat was literally covered with their slain, while hundreds had perished in the waters of the Poyang Lake.

Hu-kau had been a military dépôt of the Imperialists, and in it we captured considerable stores of grain and war material. After an occupation of several weeks, the object of the expedition in the defeat of the Imperialist army, having been so successfully accomplished, the Chung-wang abandoned that place, and sending back the divisions that had joined him in Ngan-whui with large convoys of grain, and the sick and wounded of the army, to be carried to Nankin, he advanced with his first division through the southern part of Ngan-whui into the province of Che-kiang, upon a march of observation, preparatory to the grand campaign of the summer, that had been decided upon at Nankin by the military council.

I returned with the larger portion of the army to Nankin, and took my friends with me, as it was my intention to communicate with agents at Shanghae and transact various affairs connected with forwarding the Ti-ping cause. The Chung-wang was so pleased with the effectiveness of my little field battery that he kept it with him, and before parting with him I received his best thanks, whilst each of my friends were given a certificate for their gallantry in the action and the capture of the stockade.

# CHAPTER X.

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Prospects of the Ti-pings in 1860.—Their Operations.—Relief of Nankin.—Rout of the Imperialists.—Ti-ping Successes.—British Interference.—Ti-pings advance on Shanghae.—The Chung-wang's Address.—Mr. Bruce's Notification.—Mr. Bruce's Dispatch.—The Future of China.—The Chung-wang's Dispatch.—Mr. Bruce's Inconsistency.—Missionary "Holmes."—His Statement.—His Uncourteous Behaviour.—His Inconsistencies.—Suppressed Missionary Reports.—Rev. Griffith Johns' Report.—Newspaper Extracts.—The Shanghae Massacre of Ti-pings.—Newspaper Extracts.—The Author's Reflections thereon.

Gloomy, indeed, were the prospects of the Ti-pings at the opening of the year 1860. The garrison of Nankin, reduced to less than 20,000 men by the continual reinforcements despatched to the armies in Kiang-si, Ngan-whui, and the north bank of the Yang-tze—a proceeding rendered necessary by the shortness of supplies in the capital—was cut off from all communication with its armies in the field by a series of works forming a complete line of circumvallation from the Tsin-hwai river, which enters the Yang-tze a few miles above Nankin, to Yentzeke, a position about five miles below the city, and situated on the Yang-tze river. Large fleets of Imperialist war-junks blockaded the river communication of the city from below, while, far as the eye could reach, over hill and valley, the many-bannered hosts of the besieging army occupied the whole surrounding country. It seemed but a question of a few weeks more whether the Imperialists would have the courage to storm the city, or whether starvation would exterminate the noble and patriotic band of the first Christian movement in China. It was then the power and organization of the Ti-pings were displayed to their fullest extent; at no time, since the erection of their

standard of liberty, had their cause been threatened by so imminent a danger, and at no time had their movements been so skilfully conducted, as during the three months preceding the relief of Nankin. The tactics first adopted were those of distracting the attention of the besiegers, and obliging them to detach portions of their force. In accordance with this project, the army in the Eastern province of Ngan-whui, commanded by Le, the Chung-wang (formerly general of the first Northern expedition), and the army in Kiang-si, commanded by the I-wang (the Tien-wang's brother Shih-ta-kae), by forced marches placed themselves upon the rear of the besieging army, and seriously threatened its lines of communication.

The Chung-wang, starting from the vicinity of Wuhu and Tai-ping-foo, on the south bank of the Yang-tze, by a flank march in a south-easterly direction, placed himself immediately in the rear of the grand army of Imperialists encamped before Nankin. Detaching a strong column to threaten the cities of Soo-chow and Chang-chau, the principal depôts of the enemy, he hurried his main body by forced marches to the provincial capital Hang-chau, and, after heavy fighting, upon the 19th of March mined the walls, and obtained possession of the outer city. The Manchoo garrison, after holding out in the inner or Tartar city for six days, were succoured by a considerable force from Kiang-su, which joining them, recovered the city; the Ti-pings retiring, after inflicting severe loss amongst their opponents.

In the meanwhile, the I-wang, concentrating his forces upon the Kiang-si frontier, also invaded the Che-kiang province, but from a point more to the south. After capturing the prefectural cities Ku-chau and Yen-chau, and descending the Tsien-tang river to within a short distance of Hang-chau, he suddenly turned north, and effected a junction with the Chung-wang.

This strategy, however, had not the anticipated effect, and the Imperialist army, besieging Nankin, continued to direct their main efforts to the recapture of that city. The garrison, in consequence, became reduced to the greatest straits, and suffered terrible privations. During all their trials,

their hope and courage never faltered for a moment; in the midst of his perishing people, the Tien-wang calmly and sublimely taught them to call upon God as the sure means of deliverance from their pressing danger.

Hanging his banner from the walls of his palace, and seated within full view and range of the Manchoo commander's camp, upon a hill directly opposite, the Tien-wang devoutly composed a special doxology for the use of the garrison. From the soldiers on the walls to the little children in their mothers' arms, by day and by night, the voice of praise and supplication ascended to the heavens. Whatever we may consider the faults and errors of these men, most of them are now in the presence of their Maker; and if a full and earnest and Christian belief in His Word can benefit mankind in a future state, they—and, after a close intercourse of several years with the Ti-pings, I say it without a shadow of doubt—will be rewarded.

At last, finding it impossible to effect the relief of the capital by distant operations, it became imperative to assemble an army of relief without delay. Arrangements were accordingly made for a simultaneous attack by the armies in the field, and a sortie in force by the garrison. The combined forces of the Chung and I-wangs marched directly upon the rear of the besieging army, and on the 3rd of May, the garrison sallying forth from each gate of the city, according to preconcerted signal, the advanced guard of the approaching army burst through the Imperialist lines, and effected a junction with them. The day was bitterly cold, and, taking advantage of a thick snow-storm, the van of the army of relief—which, to the number of nearly 20,000, had, by a successful raid for horses, been mounted for the occasion—made their charge with complete success.

Directly the combination was effected, the entire force turned upon the Imperialist army. The right and left wing of the besiegers, considerably distant from the centre through which the Ti-ping cavalry had charged, and, moreover, unable to perceive the movements taking place, through the snow-storm and grey light of the morning, and being informed only of the

sortie, moved forward upon the city, confident in their numbers, and expecting to easily drive back the weakened garrison, and enter the city with them.

Meanwhile, leaving a detachment with the troops from the city to hold their ground, the Ti-ping cavalry charged straight back upon the enemy's centre, and falling upon them while they were yet re-forming and in confusion, drove them off the field with tremendous slaughter. Then, forming into two bodies, they attacked each wing of the Imperialist army, which, having discovered the arrival of reinforcements to the garrison, was now retreating to its lines. It was at this critical moment the Ti-ping cavalry, after literally riding over the reserves in rear of the lines, came down upon them. Pressed by the attack of the garrison in their rear, and unable to cross the creeks and ditches in face of the cavalry in any order, the carnage became fearful. All the trenches, dug by their own hands, were choked by the bodies of the Imperialists—scarcely a man that had crossed those limits escaped. When the work of slaughter could be safely entrusted to the garrison alone, the cavalry followed in pursuit of the retreating enemy. The whole Ti-ping army having now arrived upon the field, the rout of the Imperialists became total—arms, flags, ammunition, and provisions, everything that made them an army, were abandoned, and in the wildest panic its miserable remnants fled for refuge to the district city of Tan-Yang.

It is estimated that they lost no less than 60,000 men during the action and pursuit. The country for many miles was covered with their bodies, which also filled the creeks, and stopped the running waters.

Vigorously following up their successes, town after town, including that of Tan-Yang, fell into the hands of the Ti-pings. Several Imperialist armies marched from Soo-chow and Chang-chow to oppose them, but in each case were totally defeated; the second in command was killed, while Ho-chun, the Manchoo Commander-in-Chief, committed suicide. The mass of disorganized troops dispersed themselves all over the country for plunder,

and great numbers flocked to the magnificent city of Soo-chow, the gates of which were closed against them; they then gave themselves up to all kinds of excesses, and setting fire to the extensive and wealthy suburbs, committed every description of pillage and rapine. When the Ti-ping army approached, a few days later, the authorities abandoned it, and this, the most important city in Central China, fell into their hands upon the 24th day of May.

During the next three months the Ti-pings were engaged in taking possession of all the cities within a considerable distance, and in establishing their rule throughout the adjoining departments, including the silk districts of Ly-hong, Wu-seih, Kin-tang, Es-hing, Tay-saam, Tsat-lee, Kia-hing, Hu-chau, &c. Supplies were forwarded to Nankin in large quantity, the Budhist idols and temples were demolished far and wide, and in their stead the Ti-pings introduced the Holy Scriptures to every household within their jurisdiction. Their regular and moderate system of taxation was enforced, and those country people who at the first alarm had fled from their homes were gradually returning. At Shanghae, in the meanwhile, the report of the Ti-ping successes, and the prospect of their early advance upon that city, was made the occasion for the first display of that un-English perfidy that has since been carried to such a monstrous extent.

It will be remembered that the British authorities had already recognized the Ti-pings as a belligerent power, and were therefore not only bound to observe a strict neutrality by every article of international law, but had actually sought and communicated with them, and in the person of Sir George Bonham solemnly guaranteed in writing their observance of neutrality, receiving from the revolutionists a similar assurance. Yet, in flagrant violation of the professions of non-intervention, Mr. Bruce took upon himself, in his capacity as superintendent of British trade, to commit a breach of neutrality by the following proclamation and its fulfilment:—

"The undersigned issues this special proclamation, &c.

"Shanghae is a port open to foreign trade, and the native dealers residing therein have large transactions with the foreigners who resort to the place to carry on their business. *Were it to become the scene of attack and civil war, commerce would receive a severe blow*, and the interests of those, whether foreign or native, who wish to pursue their peaceful avocations in quiet, would suffer great loss.

"The undersigned will therefore call upon the commanders of Her Majesty's naval and military authorities to take proper measures to prevent the inhabitants of Shanghae from being exposed to massacre and pillage, and to lend their assistance to put down any insurrectionary movements among the ill-disposed, and to protect the city against *any attack*.

(Signed) "FREDK. W. A. BRUCE.

"*Shanghae, May 26, 1860.*"

The solemn pledges made by England were thus deliberately violated, but, as will be seen, that injustice was prompted by mercenary considerations, masked by philanthropic pretensions. Besides this, we find Mr. Bruce audaciously, if not idiotically, declaring his intention to violate a British guarantee:—

"And it appeared to me *that without taking any part* in this civil contest, or expressing any opinion on the rights of the parties, we might *protect* Shanghae from attack, and *assist* the authorities in preserving tranquillity."

As Mr. Bruce states defending cities for the Manchoos by shooting down the Ti-pings is "without taking any part" in the internecine war, it would be amusing to have his ideas as to the meaning of "taking part." Not

satisfied with injuring the rights of an acknowledged belligerent, Mr. Bruce, a few days after, adds insult to injury. The Kan-wang having forwarded a dispatch to the consuls of England, France, and the United States, Mr. Bruce issued the following instructions to the British Consul:—

"With reference to the letter addressed to you, in common with the consuls of France and the United States, by one of the leaders of the insurgents, I am clearly of opinion that it is both inexpedient and objectionable on principle that her Majesty's consuls should hold any communication with the insurgents at Soo-chow, and I have, therefore, to instruct you *to take no notice of it.*"

It would be satisfactory to know upon what "principle" Mr. Bruce excuses this act of injustice, and, also, where he obtained his ideas of belligerent and neutral "principles." The inconsistency of his conduct will be seen a little further on, when, although taking "no notice" of the Ti-ping dispatch, he sends them a communication which he expects *they* are to notice.

Throughout the rebellion, the Ti-pings had naturally been anxious to obtain possession of some seaport at which they would be enabled to trade with foreigners, and obtain supplies of arms and munitions of war, as the Imperialists did at the treaty ports. After Soo-chow had been occupied about three months, the Ti-pings, relying on the pledges that had been given, marched upon Shanghae to take possession of it, the Manchoo power being completely crushed.

Previous to this advance, Soo-chow had been visited by a large number of missionaries and mercantile gentlemen, who all reported most favourably upon the character, aim, and religion, of the insurgents. Of these reports, however, those only were made public to the people of England which contained false and garbled accounts, intended to justify the violation of neutrality and the defence of Shanghae. Before referring to the suppressed reports, we will notice the attack upon the city. Depending upon the British

guarantees and good faith, the Chung-wang—leaving the bulk of his forces to garrison different places, and march against the remaining Manchoos in the field—advanced upon Shanghae himself to treat with the foreign representatives; and expecting no opposition, instead of throwing his large and victorious army rapidly upon the city, simply brought with him a portion of his own body-guard, and some 3,000 irregular troops, more as an escort than for any offensive purpose. On approaching the city, the Chung-wang addressed and forwarded to the Foreign Ministers the following communication—the very same which Mr. Bruce ordered the consul to take "no notice of."

"Le, the Loyal King of the Heavenly Dynasty, &c., to the Honourable Envoys, &c.

"Previous to moving my army from Soo-chow I wrote to you, acquainting you that it would soon reach Shanghae, and that if the residences of your honourable nations and the mercantile establishments would hoist yellow flags as distinguishing marks, I would give immediate orders to my officers and soldiers prohibiting them from entering or disturbing them in any way. As you would consequently have received and perused my letter, I supposed you would act according to the tenor of it. I was not aware, however, until yesterday, that the people of your honourable nations had erected churches in other places in the prefecture of Sung-keang in which they taught the Gospels, when my army, being at the town of Sze-king, fell in with a body of imps (Imperialists), who resisted its progress, when my soldiers attacked and destroyed a number of them. Among these imps there were four foreigners, one of whom my soldiers killed, as they did not know to what country he belonged. However, in order to maintain my good faith to

treat foreigners well, I caused the soldier who had killed the foreigner to be at once executed, thus keeping my word.

"Afterwards, seeing that there was a church at Sze-king, I then knew for the first time that the people of your honourable nations came there to teach the Gospel, and that although they had not hoisted a yellow flag, they had not been assisting the imps.

"But though the past is done with, precautions can be taken for the future. My army is now about to proceed directly to Shanghae, and in the towns or villages through which it will pass, should there be churches, I earnestly hope that you will give orders to the people of them to stand at the doors to give information that they are churches, so that there may be no mistakes in future.

"My forces have already arrived at Tseih-paen, and they will soon reach Shanghae. I therefore earnestly hope that you the honourable envoys will call the people of your nations before you, direct them to close their doors, remain inside, and hoist yellow flags at their houses, when they need have no fear of my soldiers, as I have already given orders to them that they must not, in that case, molest or injure any one.

"As soon as I myself arrive, I purpose discussing with you all other business. In the meantime I send this hasty communication, and take the opportunity to inquire after your health.

"Tai-ping, Tien-kwo, 10th year, 7th moon, 9th day (August 18th, 1860)."

When the Chung-wang had arrived within a short distance of Shanghae, Mr. Bruce, although taking "no notice" of the Ti-ping communications, was sufficiently inconsistent to forward the following despatch:—

"NOTIFICATION.

"Reports having reached us of an armed force having been collected in the neighbourhood of Shanghae, we, the commanders of the military and naval forces of her Britannic Majesty at Shanghae, hereby give notice that the *city of Shanghae* and foreign settlement are militarily occupied by the forces of her Britannic Majesty and her ally the Emperor of the French; and they warn all persons that, if armed bodies of men attack or approach the positions held by them, they will be considered as commencing hostilities against the allied forces, and will be dealt with accordingly.

"Shanghae, August 16, 1860."

This precious notification was sent on board a gun-boat and taken to a place entirely out of the line of march of the advancing forces, and of course was not delivered. Unprepared for foreign hostility, the Ti-pings, upon the 18th of August, appeared before Shanghae, and driving in the Tartar outposts advanced with a run to the walls, perfectly unacquainted with the fact that they were manned by English and French soldiers. Instead of the friendly reception always given by the Ti-pings to foreigners, and which they expected would now be returned, they were met with a storm of shot, shell, and musketry. The few following extracts are from the official organ, and give an account of the unjustifiable slaughter of men whose great hope was to enter into close and friendly relations with their "foreign brethren," for whose "strict neutrality" the British Government had solemnly pledged itself:—

"The camp had an earthwork all round, on which several American cannon were mounted. Since the allied occupation of the city all executions have been perpetrated here. Against this place the rebels advanced with unusual boldness. The Chinese soldiers and officers fought for some time with great spirit, but at last ran away as fast as possible, followed by the insurgents, who hoped to rush pell-mell with them to the city, and get through the west gate."

Now commences the "reception" given to the patriots by men whom, from first to last, they have considered and treated as brethren.

"Captain Cavanagh then ordered the bridge to be destroyed, and gave the insurgents a rather *warm reception* from the city-wall with rifles and canister.

"In the course of the afternoon two guns of Captain McIntyre's Madras mountain train were seen coming along outside the city wall, with only a small moat between them and the foe"—(Foe! The word is false: the Ti-pings came as friends, not foes)—"who were dodging about behind graves, houses, and trees, towards the south gate; but, *curious to relate, not a shot was fired.*"

The "curious" thing to relate is the wonderful forbearance of those men, who, although several hundred of their comrades were mowed down by the savages on the walls, never retaliated with a single shot, but even permitted two guns to be placed in a commanding position from which they were subsequently used against them with fatal effect.

"The nature of the country outside the gates gave ample scope to the enemy to conceal themselves, so it was only when a group could be observed that the howitzers and a Chinese gun—the latter under Gunner Warwick—could be used with effect.

The insurgents, however, are certainly no cowards, and constantly showed themselves near the wall from the south and the west gates.

"The firing of the foreigners, both from the cannon and rifles, was excellent. As soon as canister was useless, the foe were treated to shell, thrown time after time into the very middle of their flags.

"When driven back from the south gate, the rebels retired past the south-west angle, where Lieutenant O'Grady, who was waiting for them in the piquet-house with some marines and Sikhs, gave them another dressing.

"Captain Maxwell, at the little south gate, had given his Loodianahs plenty to do, and although they were only armed with Brown Bess, they inflicted no small loss on the enemy.

"Gunner Deacon, Royal Marine Artillery, had rigged up a gun belonging to the *Taoutae*, and worked it in the coolest manner and with great success.

"Among others killed on the enemy's side was an European who had made himself very conspicuous. Accompanying him was a half-caste, who *unfortunately* managed to escape. There were several foreigners to be seen among the insurgents, and another is supposed to have fallen outside Captain Budd's position."

The murderous sentiment expressed in the foregoing passage would be much more appropriately applied to the conscience-bound mercenaries who defended Shanghae. All the *gallant* deeds related were, literally, the

slaughter of some 300 Ti-pings who made *no reply whatever* to the dastardly fire of men, who upon that day inflicted an indelible stain upon their nation's scutcheon.

The official report continues:—

"As soon as it could be done in safety, parties were sent from the various posts to *burn down* such houses in the suburbs as could afford shelter to the enemy, and the fires raged outside the west and south gates during the whole of Saturday night. Thus ended the first day's work, with *no small loss* to the enemy, but *without a single casualty* to report on the foreign side."

The officials not only carefully ignore the burnings and destruction committed by British troops, when they write of precisely similar doings upon the part of the Ti-pings, but actually report upon the "*gallantry*" of certain officers and men concerned in this butchery of unresisting victims.

The report proceeds with the next day's exploits:—

"Sunday morning broke upon a scene of conflagration and destruction. Our *gallant* allies (the French) set to work, in a manner peculiar to themselves, to drive away the danger, and, to prevent its recurrence, fired the suburb, which is by far the richest and most important collection of native houses. It is here that the Chinese wholesale merchants live. An immense quantity of goods, especially sugar, was stored there, and as the conflagration in its rapid progress licked up a sugar hong, or soy factory, the flames sprang up with fearful grandeur.

"About two o'clock the *Kestrel* and *Hong-kong* came steaming down against a strong tide past the burning suburb. The firing, too, had recommenced at the south gate from double-shotted guns and howitzers. Driven from their cover by these means, and compelled to take up a new position, the enemy laid himself open to some fine rifle practice. McIntyre's guns were

too well handled to let them hide in any of the buildings yet standing, and *Lieutenant O'Grady*, with some marines, opened a most destructive fire from the look-out. This *gallant* officer is really an excellent shot, and we believe it is reckoned in this affair twenty men fell to his rifle, with scarcely one intervening miss."

What can the people of England think of a British officer coolly resting his rifle, through sheer *gaîté de cœur*, upon the parapet, and shooting down twenty of his fellow-creatures while in perfect safety himself? not a single shot in reply being directed towards any part where Europeans were stationed.

The terrible work was thus continued:—

"On Monday morning, the 20th August, the enemy had advanced in greater strength than ever. It was really a curious sight to see them moving along every one of the little paths which run parallel to the city walls, each man carrying a flag, and all moving in Indian file, but in excellent order, *and quite calm and steady*. On they came *without hesitation*, perfectly within range, and seemed to direct their attention principally to the west gate. Lieutenant O'Grady had been sent there with some marines to assist Captain Cavanagh; and the Madras artillerymen having rigged up a gun, a heavy fire was kept up, and the insurgents have to thank the nature of the ground that their loss was not very large. *Strange to say, scarcely a shot was returned.*"

When interested people state this, one can easily imagine what the truth must be.

"During the night the dispatch boat, *Pioneer*, had proceeded up the river, and began dropping 13-inch shells in among the rebel flags. One of these exploded right in the very centre of about 100 red banners, which immediately afterwards disappeared.

"Some pretty examples might be given of the *splendid* way the shooting was carried on. A large number of yellow flag rebels were observed to enter a long white house about three-quarters of a mile off. Captain McIntyre" (who would have been killed on the first day outside the walls, if the Ti-pings had only thought fit to answer the murderous fire poured upon them) "put a shell through the roof, and among others is supposed to have wounded the second officer in command of the rebel army."

It was not the second in command, it was the Chung-wang himself who was wounded, a piece of shell striking him on the cheek, and causing a slight impediment of speech ever afterwards. The last attempt the Ti-pings made to enter Shanghae was repulsed on Monday night. Of the next day the report states:—

"On Tuesday but very little work took place, as the rebels had retreated quite out of range. The conflagration raised by the French in the water suburb was still raging, and it was melancholy to see hong after hong, full of valuable goods, falling a prey to the devouring element."

After the advance of the Ti-pings upon the first day, when they were unexpectedly driven back with a loss of about 3,000 men, they met Mr. Milne, a missionary. These men were Chinese, and must have been maddened by the unprovoked slaughter of their relatives and comrades, but instead of wreaking vengeance, as naturally to be expected from Asiatics, with a forbearance beyond all praise they did not even make him a prisoner, but, upon finding he was a missionary, sent him to the city gates with a guard to protect him from any straggling and vengeful soldier. Mr. Milne reached the gate in safety, but his guard while retreating were each shot down by British soldiers upon the walls!

At the time this unparalleled breach of faith took place at Shanghae, England was bound by every tie, legally or theoretically binding, to

maintain a strict neutrality between the two contending powers. Not only by Sir George Bonham's, Consul Meadows', Lord Elgin's, and Mr. Bruce's guarantees was the nation pledged to a neutral position; there was also an Ordinance of Neutrality passed by Sir John Bowring, Governor of Hong-kong, in 1855, the principal clause of which is as follows:—

"That it shall be a misdemeanour punishable by not more than two years' imprisonment, &c., for any British subject within any part of China to assist *either the existing Chinese government, or any or either of the different factions at present engaged, or who may be hereafter engaged in opposition to the government, by personal enlistment in the service of either of the said several parties, or by procuring other persons to enlist in such service, or by furnishing, selling, or procuring warlike stores of any description, or by fitting out vessels, or by knowingly and purposely doing any other act to assist either party, by which neutrality may be violated.*"

It is therefore highly improbable that Mr. Bruce dared upon his own responsibility to violate all these existing bonds and regulations: much more does it resemble the policy of secret instructions. A perusal of the despatches of the Minister at Pekin must lead to this conclusion, more particularly when a comparison is drawn between the following extracts from a despatch of Mr. Bruce to Lord Russell, dated Shanghae, June 10th, 1860, and his defence of Shanghae only a few weeks later:—

"Without discussing" (he is discussing with Earl Russell, therefore the plan of intervention was undoubtedly submitted to him) "whether intervention, under the peculiar circumstances of the civil contest in China, *be justifiable or not*, or whether it would be expedient, with a view to opening the Yang-tze river to trade, to recapture towns, such as Nankin and Chin-kiang, which command it, *I am inclined to doubt the policy of attempting to restore by force of arms the power of the Imperial government in cities and provinces occupied, or rather overrun, by the insurgents.*"

Yet scarcely two months elapse when Mr. Bruce acts in direct contradiction to this opinion!

The following passage from the same despatch speaks in the *very strongest terms against intervention*:—

"The Chinese officials, pressed for money, and relying on foreign support, would become *more than ever cruel, corrupt, and oppressive*; and the Chinese, deprived of *popular* insurrection, their rude but efficacious remedy against local oppressors, would *with justice throw on the foreigner the odium of excesses which his presence alone would render possible*. The consequence would be, popular hostility, reprisals, and that train of events which would render it necessary to *appropriate permanently* the province occupied, or to retire from it, *leaving behind a bitter ill-will among the people*. *No course could be so well calculated to lower our national reputation, as to lend our material support to a government the corruption of whose authorities is only checked by its weakness.*" (!!!)

Such is the opinion of a resident British minister, an opinion constantly reiterated. The people of England may then well wonder at conduct in such direct opposition to the reports of the Government representative in China. The observations of Col. Sykes, M.P., &c., in his advocacy of a high principle, are worthy of attention. At page 18 of his valuable little work "The Taeping Rebellion in China," he states:—

"Incredible as it may appear, while we were shooting down those who asked for our friendship, and were defending a city belonging to a government with which we were at war, and collecting custom duties by Mr. Lay and other British subjects, on account of the Emperor of China, that very emperor was sanctioning British and French officers and soldiers being tortured and put to death at Pekin, and the Prince Kung, the brother of the emperor, in whom we are now placing such implicit confidence, was at that time in such a position at Pekin as to have been able to prevent the cruelties perpetrated upon our officers and men."

People generally disregard everything connected with China, considering the policy towards that empire, and its affairs, of but small moment to themselves or state. Unless engaged in the China trade, in a selfish and narrow-minded point of view it may be so; but if we reflect upon the immensity of the Chinese empire, its direct population of one-third of the human race, and its indirect brotherhood with about one-half (including Malays, Tartars, Eluths, Mongolians, Thibetians, Cochinchinese, Anamese, &c.)—upon the fact that this vast Empire has outlived all the mighty ones of Europe—that her civilization, Christianity, and power, *has yet to come*—if we think why and for what purpose the Creator has fashioned one-half his people of the same race, or ponder as to the future of a people who constitute a body sixteen times more numerous than the population of Great Britain, and who may possibly at a future time attain a position in the world proportionately equal to the present greatness of England herself—if these facts are reflected upon, they will present deep and interesting themes to the mind of every man not entirely absorbed with his own littleness, and who can rise above the exigencies of the present moment.

Repulsed from the walls of Shanghae by those whom he had always regarded as brothers in the same Faith, the Chung-wang sent the following proclamation to the European consuls on the 21st August:—

"Le, the loyal Prince of the Heavenly Dynasty, &c., &c., addresses this communication to you, the Honourable Consuls of Great Britain, United States of America, Portugal, and other countries.

"That good faith must be kept is the principle which guides our dynasty in its friendly relations with other peoples; but deceitful forgetfulness of previous arrangements is the real cause of foreign nations having committed a wrong. When my

army reached Soo-chow, Frenchmen, accompanied by people of other nations, came there to trade. They personally called upon me, and invited me to come to Shanghae to consult respecting friendly relations between us in future. Knowing that your nations worship, like us, God the Heavenly Father and Jesus the Heavenly Elder Brother, and are therefore of one religion and of one origin with us, I placed entire and undoubting confidence in their words, and consequently came to meet you at Shanghae.

"It never occurred to my mind that the French, allowing themselves to be deluded by the imps (the Chinese Imperial authorities), would break their word and turn their backs upon the arrangement made. Not only, however, did they not come on my arrival to meet and consult with me, but they entered into an agreement with the imps to protect the city of Shanghae against us, by which they violated their original agreement. Such proceedings are contrary to the principles of justice.

"Now, supposing that the French take under their protection the city of Shanghae, and a few li (a mile or two) around it, how will they be able, within that small space, to sell their merchandise, and to carry on conveniently their mercantile transactions?

"I have also learnt that the French have received no small amount of money from the imps of Hien-Fung (the emperor), which they have without doubt shared amongst the other nations. If you other nations have not received the money of the imps, why did several of your people also appear with the French when they came to Soo-chow and invited me to

Shanghae to confer together? It is as clear as daylight that your people also appeared at Soo-chow, and urgently requested me to come to Shanghae. Their words still ring in my ears; it is impossible that the affair should be forgotten.

"My army having reached this place, if the French alone had broken their engagements, coveted the money of the imps, and protected their city, how was it that not one man of your nations came to consult personally with me? You must have also taken money from the imps of Hien-Fung and divided it amongst you. Seeing, again, you committed a wrong, without taking into consideration that you would have to go to other places than Shanghae to carry on commercial business. You do not apparently know that the imps of Hien-Fung, seeing that your nations are of the same religion and family as the Heavenly Dynasty, used money to establish a connection; this is employing others to kill, and using schemes to cause separations.

"The French have been seduced by the money of the imps, because they only scheme after profits at Shanghae, and have no consideration for the trade at other places. They have not only no plea on which to meet me, but still less have they any ground on which to come before God the Heavenly Father, and Jesus the Heavenly Elder Brother, or even our own armies, and the other nations of the earth.

"Our Sovereign Lord was appointed by heaven, and has ruled now for ten years. One half the territory he possesses contains the rich lands in the east and south. The national treasury contains sufficient funds to supply all the wants of our armies.

Hereafter, when the whole face of the country is united under our sway, every part will be contained within our registers, and our success will not depend on the small district of Shanghae.

"But with human feelings, and in human affairs, all acts have their consequences. The French have violated their faith, and broken the peace between us. Since they have in advance, acted thus contrary to reason, if they henceforth remain fixed at Shanghae to carry on their mercantile business, they may so manage. But if they again come into our territory to trade, or pass into our boundaries, I, so far as I am concerned, may in a spirit of magnanimity, bear with their presence and refrain from reckoning with them on the past. Our forces and officers, however, who have now been subjected to their deceit, must all be filled with indignation, and desirous of revenge; and it is to be feared that they will not again be permitted, at their convenience, to repair to our territory.

"On coming to Soo-chow I had the general command of upwards of one thousand officers, and several tens of thousands of soldiers, a brave army which has power to put down all opposition, and whose force is as strong as the hills. If we had the intention of attacking Shanghae, then what city have they not subdued? What place have they not stormed?

"I have, however, taken into consideration that you and we alike worship Jesus, and that, after all, there exists between us the relationship of a common basis and common doctrines. Moreover, I came to Shanghae to make a treaty in order to see us connected together by trade and commerce; I did not come for the purpose of fighting with you. Had I at once commenced

to attack the city and kill the people, that would have been the same as the members of one family fighting among themselves, which would have caused the imps to ridicule us.

"Further, amongst the people of foreign nations at Shanghae, there must be varieties in capacity and disposition: there must be men of sense, who know the principles of right, and are well aware of what is advantageous and what injurious. They cannot all covet the money of the impish dynasty, and forget the general trading interests in this country.

"Hence, I shall for the present repress this day's indignation, and charitably open a path by which to alter our present positions towards each other. I am extremely apprehensive that if my soldiers were to take Shanghae, they would not be able to distinguish the good from the bad, in which case I shall be without grounds to come before Jesus, the Heavenly Elder Brother.

"Out of a feeling of deep anxiety on your behalf, I am constrained to make an earnest statement to you foreign nations, as to what is wisdom and what folly in these affairs, and as to the amount of advantage and injury of the different courses open to you. I beg you, foreign nations, again carefully to consider what course would be gainful, what a losing one.

"Should any of your honourable nations regret what has occurred, and hold friendly relations with our state to be best, they need have no apprehensions in coming to consult with me. I treat people according to right principles, and will certainly not subject them to any indignities. Should, however, your honourable nations still continue to be deluded by the imps,

follow their lead in all things, without reflecting on the difference between you; you must not blame me if hereafter you find it difficult to pass along the channels of commerce, and if there is no outlet for native produce.

"I have to beg all your honourable nations to again and again weigh in your minds the circumstances; and now write this special communication, and trust you will favour me with a reply.

"I beg to make inquiries after your health.

"Taeping, Tien-kwo, 10th year, 7th moon, 12th day."

With strange, but most probably compulsory inconsistency, after the defence of Shanghae, Mr. Bruce, although previously opposing any intervention or help to the Manchoos in the strong terms already quoted in his despatch to Lord Russell concerning that event, abuses the Ti-pings almost as strongly, as if to justify the outrage he had been guilty of towards them. In one part of the despatch referred to, dated Shanghae, September 4th, 1860, Mr. Bruce, speaking of the Ti-ping advance upon Shanghae, states:—

"They were perfectly, however, aware of our intention to defend the town. It was explained to them in the most unequivocal manner by Mr. Edkins during his late visit to Soo-chow, to whom they seem to have attributed an official character. It probably conduced to the ungracious reception he met with."

Now this passage is entirely contrary to fact, which will be perceived directly on perusing the account given by Mr. Edkins *himself*. At another part of his defence, Mr. Bruce states:—

"It is certain that even Hung-jin (Kan-wang), from whom, as educated in a missionary school, and therefore *better instructed in religious doctrine*, and

of more *liberal* views than the Ti-pings in general, the Protestant missionaries expected great things, declined to abandon or postpone the attempt on Shanghae."

This hollow accusation against Hung-jin in particular, and the Ti-pings in general, is as ridiculous as it is so to call the Ti-pings *illiberal*, because they would not desist from capturing an important city of the enemy, the possession of which was absolutely necessary for their existence.

It is now desirable to notice the following extract from the same despatch. The Mr. Holmes referred to in it visited Nankin about the same time Shanghae was defended, and wrote an account of what took place in such terms as to render it difficult to believe it ever emanated from the pen of a minister of the Gospel, particularly when it is remembered that the stronger the grounds might have been to condemn the religious belief of the Ti-pings, the greater the duty of Mr. Holmes to fulfil his mission and teach them better. Mr. Holmes was sent to China as a missionary and not as a theological critic; neither was he required to teach those who were perfect in the Faith; his services were required by (and had he done his duty would have been given to) people struggling through the clouds of paganism and ignorance, such as he describes the Ti-pings to have been encompassed with. Why, then, did Mr. Holmes make no attempt to succour those who acknowledged the same Saviour, whose Word he professed to teach, who had accepted the Bible in its full integrity, and who, in my presence, have implored missionaries to remain among and teach them those mysteries they were not able to interpret? Why did Mr. Holmes report in such an uncharitable spirit of men freely receiving and professing Christianity, and make not the slightest effort to rectify the faults he so condemned? Mr. Holmes has thus laid himself open to severe censure; but he is not the only missionary to blame. Although vast sums of money are contributed in England, and expensive missions sent to people and countries that *will not profess*; how is it that *no attempt* has been made to help the millions at one

time constituting the Ti-ping revolution, who not only professed Christianity as their principal object, but who fought, suffered, and died for it.

Mr. Bruce goes on to state:—

"I enclose herewith a very interesting account given by a Mr. Holmes, a Baptist American missionary, of a trip he had made lately to Nankin....

"I beg *particularly* to call your Lordship's attention to Mr. Holmes's general reflections at the close of his letter....

"But as the chief is an *ignorant fanatic, if not an impostor*, and the bulk of his adherents are drawn from the dangerous classes of China, the result is the rule of the sword in its worst form....

"Their system differs in nothing, as far as I can learn, from the proceedings of a band of *brigands* organized under one head."

Mr. Bruce, it will be seen, went quite out of his way to enclose this "interesting account" from an "*American Baptist missionary*," but quite overlooked the reports of the British missionaries, which were entirely suppressed.

As for Mr. Bruce's reflections upon the "ignorance" of the Ti-ping-Wang, and the form of "brigandage," those who follow through this history will probably feel justified in questioning the accuracy of his conclusions and in condemning the spirit which dictated them.

The following are extracts from the "particularly recommended" account, and embrace the principal points:—

"We ran all night, and next morning anchored in the mouth of the creek which leads from the river up to the city of Nankin. On inquiring for some one with whom we could communicate, I was invited to enter the fort, and

on doing so was received by a tall Kwang-si officer. He greeted me as his *ocean brother*, and drawing me down to a seat beside him in the *place of honour*, entered at once into conversation."

Upon entering the city, Mr. Holmes states:—

"We were received by a venerable-looking and very polite old man, whom we learned to call Pung-ta-jen (his Excellency Mr. Pung). He had been requested by the Chang-wang to entertain us with supper.... We found him exceedingly polite and affable, and I thought I could discern some appearance of *real* religious character, which is more than I can say for any other man I met."

Mr. Holmes was thus received by the Chang-wang:—

"On being seated, he began the conversation as follows:—

"'Wha-seen-sung (be assured), foreigners and men of the Heavenly kingdom are all brethren. We all believe in the Heavenly Father and Son, and are, therefore, brethren. Is it not so?'

"I then mentioned the object for which I had come, speaking of the deep interest which had long been felt in their cause by foreign Christians.

"After receiving assurances from him of their *gratification* at my arrival, we retired.

"The Tien-Wang, we were informed on the evening of our arrival, was *much gratified* at our coming.

"After this, the Chang-wang invited me in to see him again. Being quartered in his house, it was quite convenient to go in at any time.... He then proceeded to give an outline of

Christianity, which, though very loose and general, *contained little that could be objected to*:—God, the Creator of all things; Jesus, his son, the Saviour of the world; the Holy Spirit—the words correct in the main, though I afterwards became convinced that neither he, nor any of them, had any adequate idea of their true signification. 'Was this what we believed, also?' he asked, when he had finished his recapitulation. I gave him to understand that I had *no objection* to make to what he had said, but that they appeared to have other doctrines which I did not understand the import of, for example, Mr. Pung had spoken of worshipping the Heavenly Father, the Heavenly Brother, and the Tien-Wang, and of these three being one. To this he simply replied *that Mr. Pung had preached erroneously.*"

Now this plain avowal of the *correct* and *intimate* knowledge the Ti-ping leaders possessed of Christianity might well, one would suppose, have satisfied even Mr. Holmes; for what more could be expected from men but newly awakened to the truth, and yet struggling towards the gradually increasing light?

Another striking example of the enlightened character of the Ti-ping chiefs is thus given by Mr. Holmes, and should certainly have impressed him favourably:—

"Another similar chair was placed near him (Chang-wang), on which he invited me to be seated, and at once began to question me about *foreign machinery, &c.* He had been puzzled by a map with parallel lines running each way, said to have been made by foreigners, which he asked me to explain. He then submitted to my inspection a spy-glass and a music-box, asking various questions about each."

The following account may be designated coolly insolent and not trustworthy, being founded on fictions:—

"John i. 1.—Christ is here pronounced to be God; does Tien-Wang claim to be God or man? Matt. xxii. 29, 30.—How is this to be reconciled with the statement that the Western Prince has contracted a marriage in the other world? Matt. xx. 25—26.—How is this to be reconciled with the Tien-Wang's assumption of authority in spiritual matters? John iii. 13, Gal. i. 8, Rev. xxii. 18—19.—How can Tien-Wang have another revelation? This document the Chang-wang was *afraid* to present to his chief. He returned it to me, and I supposed that I should hardly find a man bold enough to keep it in his possession."

This may be the *American* Baptist mode of procedure, but we may easily believe it is hardly the style in which an English missionary of ordinary good manners and education would act. If a Chinaman were to arrive in England and draw up a similar list of queries, and send them to the Queen, it would afford a precisely parallel case. The Chang-wang, after assuring Mr. Holmes his hyperbolical theories were "erroneous," must have felt himself grossly insulted by the latter's uncourteous catechising. When about to leave Nankin, Mr. Holmes states:—

"On Wednesday we had determined to return. On announcing our intention, we were *entreated* to remain a few days longer. He (Chang-wang) also invited me to *come back again*, and bring with me my family, *offering to give me a place in his own house*. On our departure a sum of money was offered us to 'buy tea,' as it was stated, 'on our way home.' This we declined.... He insisted that he would have no face if he sent away a guest without making him some present, and substituted a piece of silk, which, with several little articles received before, are preserved as memorials of the visit. A present of a small globe, with several other foreign articles, were very gladly received on his part."

From the extracts I have given, one might naturally suppose Mr. Holmes would have returned from his visit favourably impressed; with what astonishment, then, will be perused the following "reflections":—

"I shall content myself with a few general reflections upon the state and prospects of this movement. I went to Nankin predisposed to receive a favourable impression.... I came away with my views entirely changed. I had hoped that their doctrines, though crude and erroneous, might, notwithstanding, embrace some of the elements of Christianity. I found, to my sorrow, nothing of Christianity but its names, falsely applied, applied to a system of *revolting idolatry*."

How does this agree with the well-known uncompromising iconoclasm of the Ti-pings? How can it be reconciled with the statements given by Mr. Holmes as to the Christian knowledge of the Chang-wang? which, he says, "*contained little that could be objected to*," or the passage, "I gave him to understand that I had *no objection* to make to what he had said"? Is it from this Mr. Holmes derived his idea of "revolting idolatry"? The narrative continues:—

"Their idea of God is distorted until it is inferior, if possible, to that entertained by other Chinese idolaters. The idea which they entertain of a Saviour is likewise low and sensual, and his honours are shared by another." (Compare this with the Tien-Wang's proclamation at page 84, giving the titles to the chiefs, and *strictly forbidding* himself to be addressed by any appellation that may infringe upon the attributes of the "Celestial Elder Brother" (our Saviour), and then judge of its truth.) "The Eastern King is the saviour from disease, as he is the saviour from sin." (The Eastern King had been dead some years.) "Among the features of their theology that *shocked* me most may be mentioned the following:—They speak of the wife of the Heavenly Father, whom they call Tien-ma (Heavenly Mother), &c., &c."

If Mr. Holmes was so "shocked," it would have been his duty to teach instead of to criticise them, especially as they "entreathed" him to remain, or "come back" to them.

He further states:—

"I had hoped, too, that though crude and erroneous in their notions, they would yet be ready to stand an appeal to the Bible" (meaning his arrogant list of queries), "and to be instructed by those competent to expound its truths. Here, too, I was disappointed."

This is palpably unjust, when in the same narrative he states they "*entreated*" him to stay with them. Such are the opinions of the missionary on whose testimony the British Government mainly rely.<sup>31</sup>

It now becomes necessary to notice the *suppressed* missionary reports, furnished by members of the London Mission Society and Propagation of the Faith Society.

These reports appeared a few years back in the *Missionary Magazine*, but I venture to again make them public, not only to support and prove my own view of the Ti-ping revolution, but because I feel certain that only a very small proportion of the British people can have seen them, as, if it had been otherwise, a far different policy would have been employed in the treatment of the Ti-pings.

The following extracts are from the narrative of a journey amongst the Ti-pings, by the Revs. Edkins, John, Macgowan, and Hall, bearing date "Shanghae, July 16, 1860:"—

#### "THE RELIGIOUS VIEWS AND PRACTICES OF THE INSURGENTS.

"From the information acquired, it is evident that the religious element enters very powerfully into this great revolutionary movement. Nothing can be more erroneous than the supposition that it is a purely political one, and that religion occupies but a subordinate place in it. So far is this from being the case, that, on the contrary, it is the basis upon which the former rests, and is its life-perpetuating source. The downfall of idolatry, *and the establishment of the worship of the true*

*God*, are objects aimed at by them, *with as much sincerity and devotion* as the expulsion of the Manchús, and the conquest of the empire. In opposition to the pantheistic notions of the philosophers of the Súng dynasty, they hold the doctrine of the personality of the Deity; in opposition to the popular polytheistic notions, *they have the clearest conception of the unity of God*; and in opposition to the fatalism of philosophical Budhism, they believe in and teach the doctrine of an all-superintending Providence. This appears on the very surface, and no one can be among them for any length of time without being impressed with it. They feel that they have a work to accomplish, and the deep conviction that they are guided by an unerring finger, and supported by an omnipotent arm in its execution, is their inspiration. Success they ascribe to the goodness of the Heavenly Father, and defeat to his chastisements. The Deity is with them, not an abstract notion, nor a stern implacable sovereign, *but a loving father*, who watches tenderly over their affairs, and leads them by the hand. The Scriptures of the Old and New Testament are their proposed standard of faith now, as they were at the commencement of the movement.

#### "THE FEELINGS ENTERTAINED BY THE INSURGENTS TOWARDS FOREIGNERS, AND THEIR PROSPECTS OF FUTURE SUCCESS.

"The feeling which they entertain towards foreigners is apparently of the most friendly nature; they are always addressed as 'our foreign brethren.' 'We worship the same Heavenly Father, and believe in the same elder Brother, why

should we be at variance?' They seem to be *anxious for intercourse with foreigners, and desirous to promote the interests of trade*. *The opening up of the eighteen provinces to trade, they say, would be most pleasing to them.* Some would say that policy would make them talk in this way—suppose it did; how is it that policy, or something akin, does not make the Imperialists speak in the same way? They say that foreigners will be respected whenever they pass through their territory; and the respectful attention they have paid to those who have visited them is a sufficient proof of their sincerity.

"A great deal has been said about the cruelty of the 'long-haired rebels'; but in this there has been *much exaggeration and misrepresentation*. *In no instance have we witnessed any traces of wilful destruction.* It is true they kill, but it is because they must do so or submit to be killed. They burn, but so far as our observation went, it is invariably in *self-defence*. Much of the burning is done by the Imperialists before the arrival of the rebels, and the cases of suicide are far more numerous than those of murder. The fact that all the women have been allowed to leave Súng Kiang, and that they are known, in many cases, *to have made attempts to save men and women who had plunged themselves into the canals and rivers*, is a *proof that they are not the cruel relentless marauders that they have been represented, to be by many.* They are revolutionists in the strictest sense of the term; both the work of slaughter and of plunder are carried on so far as is necessary to secure the end. These are evils which necessarily accompany such a movement, and are justifiable or otherwise in so far as the movement itself is so."

The following letter was written by the Rev. J. Edkins and the Rev. G. John, giving a report to the secretary of their society of a visit to the Tipings at Soo-chow. It is dated "Shanghae, August 16, 1860," and proves the incorrectness of Mr. Bruce's statements, that Mr. Edkins informed the Tipings, "in the most unequivocal manner," that Shanghae would be defended against them, and that Mr. Edkins met with an "ungracious reception."

"REPORT OF REV. GRIFFITHS JOHN TO REV. DR.  
TIDMAN.

"Shanghae, August 16, 1860.

"By the last mail you were informed that two letters had just been received from Soo-chow; one from Hung-jin, the Kan-wang, to Mr. Edkins, and another from the Chung-wang, to Mr. Edkins and myself, inviting us both to Soo-chow, to meet the former king. We felt that only one course of action was left open to us as Christian missionaries. We were exceedingly anxious to have an interview with this man, for the purpose of ascertaining the truth on various points of interest—of encouraging him in his praiseworthy endeavours to correct the errors connected with the movement—of learning what might be done towards spreading the truth among his people—and of suggesting plans and improvements for his consideration. With this object we left Shanghae on the 30th ult., accompanied by three other brother missionaries. At one point we passed a floating bridge, which had been constructed by the Insurgents, and left in charge of some of the country people. A proclamation was put up on shore, exhorting the people to keep quiet, attend to their avocations, and bring in presents as obedient subjects. One of the country people remarked, as we were passing along, that the proclamation was very good, and

that if the rebels would but act accordingly, everything would be all right. 'It matters very little to us,' said he, 'who is to be the emperor—whether Hien-fung or the Celestial King—provided we are left in the enjoyment of our usual peace and quiet.' Such, I believe, is the universal sentiment among the common people. A part of the bridge was taken off to allow our boats to pass through, after which it was closed again very carefully. *The country people were, for the most part, at their work in the fields as usual.* The towns and villages presented a very sad spectacle. These once flourishing marts are entirely deserted, and thousands of the houses are burnt down to the ground. Here and there a solitary old man or old woman may be seen moving slowly and tremblingly among the ruins, musing and weeping over the terrible desolation that reigns around. Together with such scenes the number of dead bodies that continually meet the eye were indescribably sickening to the heart. It must not be forgotten, however, that *most of the burning is done by the Imperialists* before the arrival of the Insurgents, and that what is done by the latter is *generally in self-defence*, and that more lives are lost by suicide than by the sword. Though the deeds of violence perpetrated by the Insurgents are neither few nor insignificant, *still they would compare well with those of the Imperialists.* The people generally speak well of the old rebels. They say that the old rebels are humane in their treatment of the people, and that *the mischief is done by those who have but recently joined them.* We were glad to find that, both at Soo-chow and Kwun-shan, *the country people were beginning to go among them fearlessly to sell; and that they were paid the full value for every article.* We were told at the latter place that to sell to the rebels is good

trade, as they give three and four cash for what they formerly got only one cash.

"We reached Soo-chow early on the 2nd inst., and had an interview with the Kan-wang on the same day. He appeared in a rich robe and gold embroidered crown, surrounded by a number of officers, all of whom wore robes and caps of red and yellow silk. On our entering he stood up and received us with a hearty shake of the hand. He said that our visit made him very happy, and that his heart was quite set free. He then made kind inquiries about his old friends in Shanghae, both native and foreign. He was much pleased to hear of the progress of the Gospel at Amoy; of the recent accession of converts to the Church in the neighbourhood of Canton and Hong-kong; and of the late revival in the West. 'The kingdom of Christ,' said he, 'must spread and overcome every opposition; whatever may become of the celestial dynasty, there can be no doubt concerning this matter.'

"He then put off his crown and robe, and dismissed his officers; after which we had a free and confidential conversation on various points. We gladly accepted an invitation to dine with him. Before partaking of the viands prepared for us, he proposed that we should sing a hymn and pray together. Having selected one of Dr. Medhurst's hymns, he himself started the tune, and sang with remarkable correctness, warmth, and energy. After a short prayer offered up by Mr. Edkins, we sat at table. The conversation turned almost exclusively upon religious subjects, in fact, he did not seem to wish to talk about anything else. He seemed to feel very grateful to Dr. Legge, Messrs. Chalmers, Hamberg, Edkins, and others, for their past

kindness to him. He told us that his object in leaving Hong-kong for Nan-king was solely to preach the Gospel to the subjects of the celestial dynasty; and that on his arrival he begged permission of his cousin to be allowed to do so. The chief, however, would not hear of it, but insisted upon his immediate promotion to the rank of king. Though thoroughly devoted to the new dynasty, and determined to live or die with it, he told us repeatedly that he was much happier when employed as a Native Assistant at Hong-kong, than now, notwithstanding the dignity conferred upon him and the authority with which he is invested. We were escorted on horses to our boat at a late hour.

"We visited him again on the following day. On our arrival at his residence, we found a foreign merchant waiting upon him, and the Kan-wang considerably agitated in mind. The reason of this we afterwards learnt was, that he had heard that the letters which he had sent to the representatives of foreign powers at Shanghae had not been opened; and that the city was held by English as well as French soldiers. *The first he spoke of as a personal insult to himself, and the second as a direct violation of the principle of neutrality which foreigners should adopt between the two contending parties.* \* \* \*

"Though we told him that these were matters with which we, as *Missionaries*, had nothing to do, still we could not but feel a secret sympathy with him.

"After the merchant had left, we had a very interesting conversation with him on various matters, but especially the character of Taeping Wang, the chief. Before separating, he

proposed that we should commend each other to the care of Almighty God, and invoke His blessing in prayer. After singing a hymn, he engaged in prayer. His prayer was exceedingly appropriate, fervent, and scriptural. *He prayed that all the idols might perish, that the temples should be converted into chapels, and that pure Christianity should speedily become the religion of China. This was a most interesting spectacle—a spectacle never to be forgotten.*

"We were all much pleased with the Kan-wang. His knowledge of Christian truth *is remarkably extensive and correct*. He is very anxious to do what he can to introduce pure Christianity among his people, and to correct existing errors. He says, however, that he can do but very little actively in this work, and that hence he is very anxious to get as many Missionaries as possible to Nan-king, to teach the people. 'I cannot do much,' said he, 'but if you will come, I will get you chapels, exhort the people to attend, and will attend myself regularly.' He has prepared a prayer for the use of the soldiers, which is remarkably good. He wished us to prepare a series of simple prayers for general distribution. We took with us a number of copies of the whole Bible, and a good selection of tracts, all publicly delivered to his care. These will, I have no doubt, do their work among not a few. He expressed his opinion that the Chief is a pious man, notwithstanding all his errors. He devoutly worships God, and is a constant reader of the Scriptures. The Bible and the 'Pilgrim's Progress' seem to be his favourite books. The Kan-wang thinks that much may be done in course of time towards putting him right on various points. *It is very gratifying to find that he does hold the Scriptures of the*

*Old and New Testaments as the inspired Word of God, and the standard of faith."*

The following extracts are quoted from the press of China, upon the subject of repelling the Ti-pings from Shanghae. The *Overland Register*, Sept. 11th, 1860, in its general summary, states:—

"However affairs may be affected at the North by the action of the Allied Forces, the late proceedings at Shanghae will probably inflict a damage which no success at the North will or can compensate for, and the case is the more dangerous because that *interested* persons are led to scandalize the insurrection, that the shame of the slaughter of the Insurgents before Shanghae by the arms of Christian England and Catholic France may be lessened. It will be seen from the details given elsewhere that the advance of the Insurgents upon Shanghae has been checked by the *direct* interference of the allied forces in concert with the Imperial rabble, and by way of adding insult to injury, and of stemming the tide of indignation which a *truly* christian public sentiment might be expected to pour upon the policy which dictated such action. Sundry individuals are *persuaded* to *write* down the Insurgents who have survived the *shooting* down, and make them out worse than their heathen countrymen. Hardly had the echo of the Christian muskets died away and the heathen allies finished cutting off the arms and legs of the slain to secure their ornaments, when it is found out suddenly that the rebels are blasphemous outlaws, and do not understand the *doctrine of the Trinity* as taught in the theological schools of England and other Christian countries, and upon the word, every man who would save the reputation of the allied councils, at once commences to damn the Insurgents for blasphemy, that he may be able to bless the Allies for *foul and cruel murder*. We have especial reference to a lengthy dissertation by one Rev. J. L. Holmes, which is far too long for republication in this edition, and which should not find place if it were possible; and though shame may cause many to accept any excuse for the *unwarranted and cruel*

*slaughter* of the half-christianized victims who came to be converted, not killed, yet we trust there may be found some whose Christianity will take precedence of nationality even, and that the Insurgents may find sympathizers, even though that sympathy involve condemnation of the policy which prompts either to shoot them or write against them.... The fact is, a gross and unmitigated error has been committed at Shanghae, and all the writing that can be published cannot alter the error or excuse it. The Insurgents did not come professing a pure Christianity, on the contrary, every missionary who has visited them, and even their traducer, who shared their hospitality at Nankin, received their parting gifts of friendship, and then returned to print five columns of detraction and abuse in the *North China Herald*, bearing testimony that the Insurgents admit the imperfection of their religious knowledge, and only beg that teachers might be sent them, so that they might know the truth *as it is in Jesus*; and the Christian world may well cry 'shame!' upon any Missionary of the Gospel, who going among them, instead of seeking to instruct them, spends the time of his hospitable reception in seeking out their errors and publishing them in order to turn sympathy away from them and palliate the crime that had already been perpetrated at their expense."

Speaking of the French Jesuitical influence working against the Tippings, *The Overland Register* continues:—

"That France should spurn the Rebellion, it is but natural, for the Insurgents have the *Bible*, and next to the devil, a free Bible may be supposed the object of direst attack on the part of a Jesuitical priesthood. But it will be long ere the stain upon British honour and justice and Christian profession is erased. It is currently stated that the French are savagely bent upon the utter destruction of the Insurgents, and that they will insist upon an attack upon Nankin." (This was mooted at that time, as per Mr. Bruce's despatches, but was not executed, because, as

another writer stated, "They have it in their power, we are told, and nobody doubts the truth of the statement, to ruin the foreign trade at Shanghae, and they also have it in their power to form with the representatives here of foreign powers provisional regulations by which in existing circumstances the destruction of that trade may be prevented." This was thoroughly appreciated; therefore, while gradually destroying the Ti-pings and undermining their cause, *neutrality* was also pretended.) "Such a thing is by no means beyond the bounds of possibility, so that ere long the world may be edified with the sight of the 'Defender of the faith,' in company with the 'woman arrayed in purple and scarlet,' and the disciples of Buddha, all joining in the hue-and-cry after the rascally Bible-reading insurgents.

"Happy are they who fall by the merciful administration of Christian warfare, for if once their power is broken, there are other Governor Yehs in China to take the place of the cowardly brute who tortured and slaughtered 60,000 of his countrymen in the Canton province, and Shanghae may be treated to the same spectacle which six years ago sent a thrill of horror all over the civilized world, with only this difference—that the responsibility will rest upon those professedly Christian nations who will have been the cause of them."

This has happened; but the thrill of horror was either not felt, or the professing Christian nations have become exceedingly callous; but then, "six years ago," it was Yeh who did all that; during 1860–1–2–3–4, it was done by Christian nations.

"The political creed of the insurgent leaders is *all* that could be wished by the most enthusiastic admirers of what strong nations call 'international comity,' when the weaker party have anything worth possessing. If the proclamations and other writings from insurgent sources are sufficient authority (and we know of no reason why they should be otherwise regarded), their position is about as follows:—

"1. That *Chinese*, not Tartars, shall rule China; and surely no Western nation can find fault with that.

"2. That the exclusive policy heretofore maintained by the Imperial Government shall be superseded by a liberal policy, so that China may become one in the great Congress of Nations, instead of standing aloof in childish pomposity.

"3. That a free access be given to the arts and manufactures of other nations.

"4. That kindly relations be cultivated with all foreign people, and the resources of the country be developed by a liberal exchange of its products for those of other lands.

"5. That the improvements in various mechanical arts, the inventions of foreign nations, be introduced into the country.

"We have neither time nor space to complete the list, but it may be said, generally, that in the political creed of the insurgent leaders there appears, from beginning to end, a complete revolution of the Chinese ideas in every important particular, and there is not an item of it that should not meet with the warm sympathy of every man who cares for the welfare of any

country besides his own, or even any man whose only interest in foreign nations is limited to what may be got out of them...."  
"

It has lately been the common practice to represent the Ti-pings as "monsters of cruelty," "ruthless devastators," &c. The following extracts, from a communication by a "correspondent of the *North China Herald*," republished in the *Nonconformist* of Nov. 14th, 1860, give some authentic particulars respecting the Shanghae massacre of Ti-pings. Upon the approach of the Ti-pings to the walls of the city, the writer states:—  
"When it was discovered that they were real rebels, orders were given to fire on them. They waved the hand, begged our officers not to fire, and *stood there motionless*, wishing to open communication and explain their object. No notice was taken of this, but a heavy fire of rifles and grape was kept up on them for about two hours, when they retired with a loss estimated at two hundred. Here, as at the South-gate, they seem to have essayed to open communication, and to have been replied to in the same way. After they had been driven back, the French soldiers rushed frantically among the peaceful inhabitants of the place, murdering men, women, and children, without the least discrimination. One man was stabbed right through as he was enjoying his opium-pipe. A woman, who had just given birth to a child, was bayoneted without the faintest provocation. Women were ravished and houses plundered by these ruthless marauders without restraint. Everything was taken away from the poor people, who were trying to escape, and thrown into a heap, so as to do away with the possibility of ever being reclaimed. Unless the article or articles were immediately yielded, the bayonet was brought in to decide the question."

The truth of these statements can be supported by the evidence of my personal friends, some of whom were wounded when trying to rescue helpless women from unheard-of barbarity.

"After this sort of work had been going on for some time, the beautiful temple of the 'Queen of Heaven' was set on fire by the French. The fire had been extending ever since, so that now the Eastern suburb presents a sad spectacle. The burning of the Southern and Western suburbs by the English, and the greater part of the Eastern suburb by the French, has deprived thousands of their happy homes and reduced them to irretrievable poverty."

Recounting the events of the following day, the author states:—

"Now the firing and shelling commenced. The Insurgents stood it for several hours *like men of stone, immovable, without returning a single shot.* At length a well-directed shell from H.M.S. *Pioneer*, bursting in the midst of one of the hamlets, and another from the *Racehorse*, which followed the former in about two seconds, bursting in the midst of the other hamlet, started them fairly."

At Si-ka-wei, a village some few miles from Shanghae, the following proclamation was found posted upon the Roman Catholic church:—

"The Chung-wang herewith commands his officers and soldiers that they may all be thoroughly acquainted with it. Having received the Heavenly decree to lead my soldiers everywhere to fight, the soldiers have already come to Shanghae and have pitched their tents at the chapel. Now it is ordained *that not the minutest particle of foreign property is to be injured.* The veteran soldiers are supposed to be acquainted with the Heavenly religion, that foreigners together with the subjects of the celestial dynasty all worship God and equally reverence Jesus, and that all are to be regarded as *brethren* (or to belong to the body of brethren). The veteran soldiers will surely not dare to offend, but I have been thinking that the soldiers who have but recently joined us are ignorant of this being a place of worship, and are unable thoroughly to understand that their religion is one with, and their doctrine has the same origin as, ours. Hence the propriety of issuing this command. Because of this, all the soldiers, whether veterans or otherwise, are commanded to be fully aware that, hereafter should any one

be found guilty of injuring the property, goods, houses, or chapels of foreigners, it is decreed that he will be decapitated without mercy. Let all tremble and obey. Don't disobey this command. 7th month, 15th day."

The *Times* of India contains the following, in the article from its Shanghai correspondent, dated October 24th:—

"I thank you for having done what you could for your suffering fellow-creatures in China, but the work is not done yet. Hitherto you have heard nothing but the details of rebels being handed over to the Imperialists for torture; of Shanghai, with its notorious execution-ground, being held by English and French troops; of a steamer manned by sailors from French ships of war, and loaded with rice, being sent to the relief of Imperialist cities; of English officers and sailors fortifying cities and mounting guns, and instructing the Tartar soldiers in fighting against the rebels; of guns being plundered from the Taepings; of duties being collected for the Imperialists; and last, not least, of innocent blood having been shed by Englishmen, and all this *without one single act of retaliation*, a circumstance perhaps *unparalleled in the history of the world*."

But enough of extracts from the press; it is sufficient to state that, with few exceptions, the whole British press of China and India emphatically condemned the flagrant violation of honour, of international law, and of solemnly pledged neutrality. Although too late to prevent the deeds in China that have tarnished the national honour of England, it is yet possible that similar atrocities may be in future arrested, if the British people will only be a little more watchful of the dealings of their Government with foreign nations, and will seek wider sources of information as regards them than such as may be presented through ordinary channels. It is, moreover, of particular importance that, upon every question of foreign policy, a man should be competent to judge for himself: to content oneself with "home policy" is simply absurd, for while other nationalities and other races exist, home policy will entirely depend upon foreign conduct, and the relations

that are established abroad; in fact, as much so as the conduct and management of a household is regulated by society and the customs of its neighbours.

## **FOOTNOTE:**

31. The opinions of Mr. Holmes afford a fair sample of the anti-Ti-ping missionaries.

## CHAPTER XI.

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Ti-ping Polygamy.—Ti-ping Women.—Their Improved Position.—Abolition of Slavery by the Ti-pings.—Its Prevalence in China.—Moral Revolution effected by Ti-pings.—Their Religious Works.—Their Conduct Justified.—Jesuit Missionaries.—Consul Hervey's Despatch.—Apathy of Missionaries.—Its Consequences.—Chinese Antipathy to Christianity.—Christianity of the Ti-pings.—Their Forms of Worship.—Ti-ping Marriages.—Religious Observances.—The Ti-ping Sabbath.—Its Observance.—Their Ecclesiastical System.—Forms of Worship.—The Mo-wang.—Ti-ping Churches.

During my intercourse with the Ti-pings, if one part of their system and organization appeared more admirable than another, it was the improved position of their women, whose status, raised from the degrading Asiatic *régime*, approached that of civilized nations. This improvement upon the ignorant and sensual treatment of 2,000 years affords strong evidence of the advancement of their moral character. Although the practice of polygamy has by some war Christians been used as an argument to justify murdering the Ti-pings, I do not remember an instance in which those ultra-moral personages have endeavoured to teach the Ti-pings the difference between the law of well-beloved Abraham's time, upon which many of their religious rules are framed, and the later dispensation of the Gospel. It is, however, a great mistake to imagine that the Ti-pings are either confirmed or universal polygamists. In the first place, as they have thrown off *all* the other heathen practices of their countrymen, there is no reason to suppose they would make this an exception. In the second place, I know that many who have become enlightened by the New Testament, have abandoned polygamy; while a vast number of the rest, only partially instructed, are either averse to it, or simply maintain the establishment of one principal and several inferior

wives, or concubines, according to ancient custom, and as a mark of high rank. It is also a fact that in some countries a plurality of wives is rather beneficial than otherwise; and it may be that China is one of these. But above all, however detestable we may consider polygamy, where is the *Divine* command against it?

The Ti-pings have abolished the horrible custom of cramping and deforming the feet of their women. But although, under their improved system, no female child is so tortured, many of their wives have the frightful "small feet;" having, with the exception of the natives of Kwang-se, some parts of Kwang-tung, and the Miau-tze, originally conformed to the crippling custom. All children born since the earliest commencement of the Ti-ping rebellion have the natural foot. This great benefit to the women, their consequent improved appearance, and the release of the men from the tail-wearing shaven-headed badge of former slavery, form the two most conspicuous of their distinguishing habits, and cause the greatest difference and improvement in the personal appearance of the Ti-pings as compared with that of their Tartar-governed countrymen. The much higher social position of the Ti-ping ladies over that of their unfortunate sisters included within the Manchoo domestic *régime*, has long been one of the brightest ornaments of their government. A plebeian Ti-ping is allowed but one wife, and to her he must be regularly married by one of the ministers. Amongst the Chiefs, marriage is a ceremony celebrated with much pomp and festivity; the poorer classes can only marry when considered worthy, and when permitted to do so by their immediate rulers. In contradistinction to the Manchoos, the marriage knot when once tied can never be unloosed; therefore, the custom of putting away a wife at pleasure, or selling her—as in vogue among the Chinese—or the proceedings of the British Court of Divorce, has not found favour in their sight.

Every woman in Ti-pingdom must either be married, the member of a family, or an inmate of one of the large institutions for unprotected females, existing in most of their principal cities, and superintended by proper

officials; no single woman being allowed in their territory otherwise. This law is to prevent prostitution, which is punishable with death, and is one which has certainly proved very effective, for such a thing is unknown in any of the Ti-ping cities. The stringent execution of the law has, in fact, been rather too severe, for I have seen cases where women have rushed about the streets to find new husbands directly they have received the melancholy tidings of their late beloved's decapitation by the "demon imps." It is possible these bereaved ladies may not have been on the strength of the regiment; but at all events this acting of the law was rather too exaggerated. The conduct of the Chinese lady who fanned her husband's grave to dry it previous to her early acceptance of a new lord, and so preserve a correct propriety, is more excusable than this. Woman is by the Ti-pings recognized in her proper sphere as the companion of man; the education and development of her mind is equally well attended to; her duty to God is diligently taught, and in ordinary worship she takes her proper place; many of the women are zealous and popular teachers and expounders of the Bible; in fact, everything is done to make her worthy of the improved position she has attained by reason of the Ti-ping movement.

The institutions for unprotected women are presided over by duly appointed matrons, and are particularly organized and designed to educate and protect those young girls who lose their natural guardians, or those married women whose husbands are away upon public duty, and who have no relations to protect and support them. Very many of the women accompany their husbands upon military expeditions; inspired with enthusiasm to share the dangers and severe hardships of the battle-field. In such cases they are generally mounted upon the Chinese ponies, donkeys, or mules, which they ride à la Duchesse de Berri. In former years they were wont to fight bravely, and could ably discharge the duties of officers, being however formed into a separate camp and only joining the men in religious observances. The greatest physical comfort to the women is their enjoyment of natural feet and the ability to move about as they wish; though,


unfortunately, it is only amongst the youngest that this prevails entirely. It is utterly impossible to describe a more striking contrast than that presented in the walk and carriage of two women, one having the compressed, and the other natural feet; the former, even when standing still, has a very unsteady appearance, but when stumping along with the usual uncertain tottering gait, apparently in danger of rolling over at every step, the crippling custom excites the utmost disgust and the greatest commiseration for its victims. And yet this revolting exhibition is by the Chinese described as "swaying elegantly from side to side like the graceful waving of the willow tree!"

It is, probably, due to the feet—and Chinese feet are naturally very well formed—being of their natural shape, and the consequent elegance of carriage, that many of the Ti-pings' wives have been selected as the handsomest prisoners captured during the war, and that they appear in such advantageous contrast with the Imperialists.

The detestable system of slavery is totally abolished by the Ti-pings, and the abolition made effective by punishment with decapitation upon the slightest infringement of the law by male or female. The law as far as the slavery of men was concerned had no great occasion for existence, such cases being uncommon in China; but the real necessity for such an important innovation consisted in the fact that every woman was more or less a slave. The head wives of the aristocrat and the plebeian, although not actually recognized as slaves, are still purchased by the bridal present, upon receipt of which, and never otherwise, they are handed over to their purchaser, or husband. The inferior wives are simply bought; with or without the knowledge of their family, for no equality of position is required, as they are selected according to the fancy of their future master, from relatives or slave-dealers as the case may be. Besides those who are purchased for wives, a great proportion of the women of China become the concubines of successive masters, by whom they are sold from one to the other; many are bought for domestic slavery; but vast numbers are purchased for a life of public infamy. The establishments set apart for this purpose are immense,

and contain several hundred women purchased at the tenderest ages and reared to this wretched existence. At Hong-kong, at Shanghae, and several other places in China, buildings of this class are maintained upon the British territory, and the Hong-kong colonial government, and Shanghae municipal council, regularly tax and recognize them. It is the common practice of the poorer Chinese to sell their female children, and when the vastness of the population, and the fact that these children are mostly purchased for immoral purposes, is considered, the consequences may easily be imagined. At many and widely separated parts of China, I have seen comely young maidens from twelve to twenty years of age, offered for sale by their mothers, or speculators, at prices varying from six to thirty dollars, so that, as I have frequently heard the Chinese say, "You may sometimes buy a handsome girl for so many cash a catty (weight of one pound and a third) *less* than pork." This is the precise state of things which the Ti-pings would not tolerate amongst themselves, and which they would in time have taught all China to abhor were it not for foreign interference.

If the Ti-pings had not been interfered with, it is possible, though very improbable, they *might* have caused a temporary falling-off of trade, consequent upon the nullification of Lord Elgin's treaty, the usual effects of civil war, &c., and it is quite certain the residue of indemnity, as far as the Manchoos were concerned, would have been lost; but whatever might or might not have been the result, trade would not have suffered much, for the Ti-ping power would soon have been supreme. Far nobler, then, would it have been for England to have avoided the contamination of the Manchoo alliance, and to have preserved the respect and friendship of at least a portion of the Chinese empire.



SALE OF A CHINESE GIRL AS WITNESSED BY THE AUTHOR AT E-CHING, ON  
THE RIVER YANG-TSE-KIANG.

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Inn Fields.

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The wonderful achievement of the Ti-pings, not only in effecting an important moral revolution, but also a national deliverance of their countrymen, affords an almost incredible psychological phenomenon. Rising, as it were intuitively, from the lowest depths of moral degradation,

they suddenly recognize and instantly abandon all those vices and national evils which had become engrafted upon the Chinese mind by the solemn and unswerving practice of 2,000 years. With meteor-like perception, the great originator of the revolution becomes convinced of the degradation of his countrymen. China, rooted to her antiquity, her seclusion, and her apathy, beyond the most distant hope of change or improvement, yields to this new influence, and bows before the teaching of the almost unknown student, Hung-sui-tshuen. The traditional lore of more than 2,000 years, the mystic and deeply-venerated teaching of ancient sages, the profligacy and idolatry sanctioned and indulged in for ages, are suddenly disregarded. But in one way can this be accounted for. Divine Providence has manifested itself in a manner as marvellous and superhuman as in the recorded miracles of old. The miraculous interpositions of Divine Power in the olden times appealed to the senses of small portions of a semi-barbarous people by a physical and visible wonder. This most extraordinary of revolutions has effected the moral regeneration of a vast proportion of the human race by an invisible and wonderful agency. Therefore, whatever may be the apparent result of the hostility of foreign dynasties, of this we may rest assured, the Almighty Power that has seen fit to kindle the glimmering sparks of the first Christian movement in modern Asia has lighted a torch that may not easily be extinguished, faint and obscure as that light may burn amid the gloom of persecution which, in all climes, and in all ages, has marked the dawn of Christianity. Nations may rejoice over the seeming triumph of their policy, and may witness unmoved the martyrdom of the noble Ti-ping leaders, but nevertheless the moment will arrive when that smouldering spark will burst into a fire that may not be controlled by human agency.

I have probably had a much greater experience of the Ti-ping religious practices than any other European, and as a Protestant Christian I have never yet found occasion to condemn their form of worship. In the first place, the principal and most important article of their faith is the Holy Bible in all its integrity—Old and New Testaments entire. These have always been

circulated through the whole population of the Ti-ping jurisdiction, and printed and distributed to the people gratuitously by their Government. Besides the Bible, numerous religious works by the Tien-wang (the Tai-ping king), and Kan-wang (his prime minister), have been commonly circulated among their followers; but I entirely deny that these, or any single one of them, tend to alter, modify, or supersede any part of the Word of God, as some persons have taken upon themselves to intimate. These works have been issued as the individual explanations and opinions of the two authors, but never as any essential article of belief. Had such not been the case, is it likely the Bible would have been given in a complete form, by which any peculiar and erroneous teaching of the Tien-wang would have become exposed? And is not this free and unlimited circulation of the Scriptures the very best and most certain prospect of improvement? So anti-Christian, however, have been the arguments of nearly all opposed to the Ti-pings, that it is even possible some of their sect may dispute this truth.

Any one influenced by a sense of justice or Christian feeling will naturally wonder why a large proportion of idolaters, suddenly converted to the faith and accepting the Bible with joy, should require any defence for their unavoidable errors—errors common among the most perfect, and such as new disciples must, in the natural order of *learning* the holy mysteries, have been surrounded with. The answer must be, that all those in any way interested in the suppression of the Ti-pings, carefully circulated all the errors they could detect and all they could invent, cautiously concealing the fact that, whatever errors there might be are to be attributed to the Ti-pings not being able to thoroughly master, and rightly interpret, in a few years what no Christians have been able to do unanimously in nineteen centuries.

It may be asked, What had the religion of the Ti-pings to do with the war that has been waged against them?—was that religion the true *casus belli*? Was any *casus belli* ever stated? Assuredly not. With none of the circumstances allowed by *men* to justify killing their species—such as a just war, a defensive war, &c.—the Ti-pings have been most wantonly

massacred. It may be urged by some that the sanguinary war maintained by the revolutionists can be held as a proof of their un-Christian character, and that they are endeavouring to propagate their faith by the sword. The simple reply to this is, that the Ti-pings have proved themselves to be far more merciful than their enemies. Oppressed and persecuted, their patriotism became aroused; they sought not to establish their faith by the sword; they sought to recover their patrimony from the usurping Tartar. They fought to uphold Christianity, not to crush it. Far from being incited by fanaticism to deeds of blood, it is a well-known fact—particularly stated by the Revs. Griffith John, Joseph Edkins, Lobschied, Muirhead, and others—that the Ti-ping chiefs have always deplored the great loss of life consequent upon their struggle for liberty. In the tenth century, Christianity was introduced into Denmark by the sword, in the thirteenth into Prussia, and became established throughout Europe by religious wars. All Christianity has been compelled frequently to maintain itself by force of arms. The seventh century witnessed the wars against the Saracens; and if, as some people have stated, the Ti-pings had been fighting for the purpose of *establishing* their religion, and were wrong for so doing, then it is a sad reflection that all Christianity must be wrong, and that our Christian ancestors should have become either martyrs or Mohammedans.

The annals of history, and the practices of modern civilization, sufficiently prove the necessity of civil liberty for the enjoyment of Christian worship; why, then, should the Ti-pings be blamed if, in order to obtain the latter, they have been compelled to fight for their freedom?

The rise of the Ti-ping rebellion singularly resembles many events mentioned in sacred history, and many of the Ti-pings have delighted in comparing themselves to the Israelites of old. Even should the revolutionists have placed a warlike interpretation upon such passages from the *New Testament* as, "Think not that I am come to send peace on earth; I come not to send peace, but a sword;" "for he beareth not the sword in vain;" who among us dare judge them as misinterpreters of Gospel, remembering the

conversion of the heathen is executed according to the will and pleasure of the Lord, and not by any rule or formula laid down by man? It would be idle and presumptuous to say this must be the plan, or that shall be the manner; and yet there have been found ministers of the Gospel who are ready to justify the outrages committed on the Ti-pings, because they think they have not accepted the Word of God in the manner they should have done!

When the statements of the various missionaries are perused, it must be wondered how it is that those who have been sent to China through the Christian generosity of the British public, have never yet attempted to succour or guide aright the great Christian revolution. The Bishop of Victoria, the Revs. Griffith John, Muirhead, Edkins, Mills, Milne, Lobschied, Lambath, and many others too numerous to mention, have rejoiced in the most eloquent terms about the Ti-pings, have partially approved, and criticised their acts, when sending *their reports* to England. What have they *done* to assist those who have "entreated" them, as Mr. Holmes, the Baptist missionary, was entreated, to come and teach the Word of God? Absolutely nothing!

Last year, it was estimated that the whole number of Protestant Christian converts in China, the result of more than thirty years of missionary labour, was some 1,400, and these included all the employées of the different mission establishments, many of whom, I have good reason to know, have an amount of faith similar to that of the Portuguese rice Christians of Macao, who, not long since, struck in a body, and told the priests they would not be Christians any longer, unless they received another quarter of a catty more rice per day. England sends more missionaries amongst the poor benighted heathen than any other nation; yet the work of all she has sent to China put together will not equal the proselytes of one Jesuit. The Jesuits penetrate the vast Chinese empire in every direction, shaven-headed, and dressed as natives. With a sublime earnestness of purpose, many of them devote their lives to their missionary work; adopting the strange and hostile country, and giving up for ever all ties of home, kindred, or nation, these devoted men

never depart from China, but, till death relieves them, labour with that unfaltering perseverance so eminently characteristic of the order of Jesus. I do not, by any means, advocate either the principles of the Jesuits, or their peculiar mode of propagating them; but what I do maintain is, that while the self-sacrifice of the Jesuits forms one extreme of missionary labour, so the confinement of Protestant missionaries to the treaty ports constitutes the other, and that many could be well employed in the interior.

What excuse can missionaries give for their surprising negligence of the Ti-ping rebellion? Can it be that ministers of the Gospel egotistically preferred their 1,400 converts to the 70,000,000, and upwards, of those who might have become Christians under the Ti-ping authority during 1861–2, had our missionaries helped them, and our Government permitted them to exist? Of course not! Well then, why? Let the British officials who prevented the few missionaries who would have gone to the Ti-pings reply for them, and those who would not go at all reply for themselves. Their reasons must indeed be plausible to find approbation. If the Ti-pings were *very* bad, all the more occasion for teaching them; if very good, how is it the missionaries allowed them to be sacrificed without protest? In all probability no reply would be given; but the conduct of the British consuls at Canton, Ningpo, and Shanghae, affords the true answer, as far as those missionaries who were willing to preach the Gospel to the Ti-pings are concerned. At Canton they were refused passports to the territory of insurgents. At Ningpo the missionaries were withdrawn from that city when it was captured by the Ti-pings, as Mr. Consul Hervey states in his despatch of Dec. 31st, 1861, to Mr. Bruce:—

"I would here state that with a view of avoiding needless discussions with the insurgents.... I thought it best to desire our missionaries to abandon the city.... The city has now become a gigantic camp, and a scene of desolation and riot, and has therefore ceased to be the fit and proper abode for teachers of Christianity and propagators of the gospel. (?) *This step will tend to simplify considerably our future relations with the Taepings at Ningpo.*"

This sinister passage must be remembered when considering the treacherous expulsion of the Ti-pings from the city by the allied Anglo-Franco-Manchoo piratical fleet.

Do the subscribers to the mission funds expect Mr. Consul Hervey to be the director of the missionaries, or a competent judge of "a fit or proper abode for teachers of Christianity"?—if so, in the latter case they are wofully deceived.

Captain Corbett, R.N., writes to Admiral Hope from Ningpo on the 20th December, 1861:—

"The missionaries are gradually removing out of the city. I thought it my duty to remonstrate with them against remaining *where, in the event of any difficulty arising between ourselves and the Taepings, they would prove a source of great embarrassment to us.*"

Why all this anxiety to force the missionaries away from their duty? To get them out of the way before the commencement of the hostilities already decided upon, seems the only answer!

At Shanghai Mr. Consul Medhurst has interfered with the missionary work; but, above all, Mr. Bruce's regulations actually *prohibit* the communication of missionaries or any other British subject with the Ti-pings; in consequence of which, I was compelled to *smuggle* the Rev. W. Lobschied up to Nankin in May, 1862.

It will thus be seen, the teaching of the Word of God, and the spreading of the Gospel unto the uttermost ends of the earth, has, in China, been made subservient to official intrigue. This may somewhat explain the extraordinary apathy of missionaries, although it certainly cannot justify their neglect of their Master's orders. Missionaries should be servants of Christ alone; but out in China, it appears, they are either politicians, or they permit the object of their sacred mission to be perverted by unscrupulous officials, and thereby become secularized.

Whatever may have been the benefit of the missions hitherto, their wanton, cruel sacrifice of the greatest Christian movement this world has

ever witnessed has dimmed their glory with a shadow all time cannot remove; it is even needless to blame them for neglecting the innumerable and less favourable points of the Ti-ping religion—the grand and unalterable *fact* was the possession of the whole Bible as their only faith, and the hitherto unparalleled free circulation of it by the martyred revolutionists.

Only last June, the Bishop of Victoria, at the Highbury College grounds, referred to some of the remarkable scenes incident to the rebellion, and observed—"that in Amoy, which had suffered deeply, missionary work had made more progress than in any other city in China! One effect of the Ti-ping movement had been the wide-spread destruction of idolatry, by which a vast work had been done, preparatory to that of the missionary."

The idols, indeed, *were* all destroyed, but the missionaries did not step in. And now that the Ti-pings have been driven from their former possessions, and nearly exterminated, all the idols have been replaced by the Manchoos; and the missionaries may rest assured it will take them infinitely longer to overthrow the re-established Budhism than it occupied the Ti-pings in the first place. The Chinese have been edified by witnessing the Europeans fighting to suppress what has always been looked upon by natives as a religious movement, alien to the ancient and national faith of the country, in fact, as Christianity, or the religion of the foreigners. This being the case, it would be absurd to expect the Chinese will again come forward and adopt the creed for which they are daily beholding the Ti-pings suffer—a creed to which they are naturally averse, and dare not profess if they would, not only from dread of their Manchoo Government (which will certainly keep a sharp look-out to suppress any new outbreak of a movement which so nearly overthrew their own dynasty), but from the very fact that they have seen the strong and resistless "foreign devils" allied to the Manchoos for the express purpose of exterminating the Ti-ping Christians. There can be no ground for cavilling about the right of the Ti-pings to such denomination, the fact being that they accepted the Bible, acknowledged it as the Word of God, and worshipped His Son, as the Tien-wang has written,

"as the Saviour of men's souls." Can the missionary-made Christians do more?

For my part, I shall ever rejoice, because I have been in a position to render what little assistance I could to many hundreds of the Ti-pings who have requested me to give them the foreign interpretation of different articles of faith; and I shall ever regret that, while missionaries are sent with exhaustless munificence into parts that *will not profess* Christianity, to the Ti-pings, under whose authority millions *have professed* and accepted the Scriptures with an enthusiasm and firmness of purpose never excelled, not one has been sent or volunteered to go.

It is difficult to understand, how ministers of the Gospel should not have felt a generous sympathy with men, whose profession of Christianity not only entitled them to the brotherhood they have always claimed with Europeans, but actually deprived their movement of a very great element most essential to its success—the popular national rising against the Manchoos.

Even Mr. Bruce, their greatest enemy, has stated—

"My impression is that both the prospects of the extension of pure Christianity in China through the instrumentality of these men, and the success of the insurrection among the Chinese, viewed as a political movement against the Tartar Government, have suffered materially from the religious character Hung-sui-tshuen's leadership has imparted to it.

"Not only the gentry and educated classes, but the mass of the people, regard with deep veneration the sages upon whose authority their moral and social education for so many generations has reposed. And the profession of novel doctrines resting on the testimony of a modern and obscure individual, must tend not only to deprive the revolt of its character as a

national rising against the Tartar yoke, but must actually transfer to the Tartars and their adherents the prestige of upholding national traditions and principles against the assaults of a numerically insignificant sect."

What could appeal more powerfully to our sympathy than this statement of an enemy? But for their profession of Christianity the Ti-pings would have carried the whole population of China with them long ago. Mr. Bruce in the above statement, and all persons acquainted with Chinese character, agree that the minds of the people are so immutable and apathetic, and so fixedly rooted to the ancient superstitions and idolatry of their country, that all change seems impossible. This being admitted, is it not certain that some superhuman effort must be made?

The Chinese, with their strong and peculiar idiosyncrasies, will never be *taught* Christianity: whenever they become Christians, it will be in exactly the same manner the Ti-pings became so, viz., by their own readings of Scripture, as the Author shall see fit to inspire them, but certainly not through foreign teaching or interpretation. If the Ti-ping rebellion *should* be utterly extinguished, the result will be dismal for generation after generation. The cause of true religion will have been delayed and driven backwards. It is to be hoped that it may be otherwise, and that the Bishop of Victoria prophesied truly when he said that—

"On the eventful day on which the flag of Taeping-Wang floated triumphantly from the battlements of Nankin, a light has been kindled in the empire of China, which shall *never* be extinguished, and those first and faint glimmerings of truth will brighten with increasing clearness, and 'shine more and more unto perfect day.'"

As I have already stated, the principal feature of the Ti-ping faith is their acknowledgment of the Holy Bible as the word of the True God. All their religious practices are deduced from its authority, and, in so far as they have been able to effect it, their form of worship and belief assimilates to

Protestantism. All the principal sacraments of the Protestant religion are either observed or celebrated with such error or approximation as they have been interpreted with. The holy communion, unfortunately, has not been correctly understood; in its place every fourth Sunday the Ti-pings are in the habit of partaking of grape-wine. Each Sabbath three cups of tea are placed upon the altar as an offering to the Trinity; it is only since 1859, when Hung-jin, the Kan-wang, joined the Ti-pings, that the cups of tea have been tasted; previously, they were a part of the offerings rendered up at each worshipping —a custom generated by their confusion of the ancient sacrifices mentioned in the Old Testament with the offerings and the Lord's Supper of the New.

Baptism constitutes the principal and most important of their sacraments. Until the arrival of the Kan-wang at Nankin, none but grown-up persons who, after a strict and lengthened examination, were found duly qualified, were admitted to the fellowship of the Ti-pings and baptized as Christians. The following were the forms observed, as issued by the royal authority of the Tien-wang, in the "Book of Religious Precepts of the Ti-ping Dynasty":

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#### "FORMS TO BE OBSERVED WHEN MEN WISH TO FORSAKE THEIR SINS.

"They must kneel down in God's presence, and ask Him to forgive their sins; they may then either take a basin of water and wash themselves, or go to the river and bathe themselves; after which they must continue daily to supplicate Divine favour, and the *Holy Spirit's*<sup>32</sup> assistance to renew their hearts, saying grace at every meal, keeping holy the Sabbath day, and obeying all God's commandments, especially avoiding idolatry. They may then be accounted the children of God, and their souls will go to heaven when they die; all people throughout the world, whether Chinese or foreigners, male or female, must observe this in order to obtain salvation."

The prayer of the recipient of baptism was as follows:—

"I [A. B.], kneeling down with a true heart repent of my sins and pray the Heavenly Father, the Great God, of His abundant mercy, to forgive my former sins of ignorance in repeatedly breaking the divine commands, earnestly beseeching Him also to grant me repentance and newness of life, that my soul may go to Heaven; while I, from henceforth, truly forsake my former ways, abandoning idolatry and all corrupt practices, in obedience to God's commands. I also pray that God would give me His Holy Spirit to change my wicked heart, deliver me from all temptation, and grant me His favour and protection, bestowing on me food and raiment, and exemption from calamity, *peace* in this world and glory in the next, through the mercies of our Saviour and elder Brother, Jesus, *who redeemed us from sin*. I also pray that God's will may be done on earth as it is done in Heaven. Amen."

These prayers, together with many others, were slightly altered by the Kan-wang, whose superior, in fact perfect knowledge of Christianity as practised by the English Protestant Church, led to the improvement of many and important forms of the Ti-ping worship. Unfortunately through the total loss of the numerous and valuable original Ti-ping documents I had gathered during my service and intercourse with those people, I am unable to give my readers a literal translation, or do more than notice what may be never otherwise known or rendered verbatim to this world. All my journals, manuscripts, and other original papers, collected upon the spot, have, although often recommenced, been successively captured by the Imperialist troops, with the rest of my baggage; therefore I must request those who may feel an interest in my narrative, to excuse the incompleteness of any parts I have recounted from memory.

Marriage among the Ti-pings is solemnized with remarkable strictness, and the ceremony is performed by an officiating priest, or rather presbyter. All the heathen and superstitious customs of the Chinese are completely relinquished. The ancient customs by which marriages were celebrated—the semi-civilized espousal of persons who had never previously seen each

other; the choice of a lucky day; the present of purchase-money, and many others—are abolished. Those only that seem to be retained are the tying up of the bride's long black tresses, hitherto worn hanging down, and the bridegroom's procession at night, with music, lanterns, sedan-chairs, and a cavalcade of friends (and in the case of chiefs, banners and military honours), to fetch home his spouse. As a natural consequence of the absence of restraint in the enjoyment of female society, marriages amongst the Ti-pings are generally love matches. Even in cases where a chief's daughter is given in alliance to some powerful leader, compulsion is *never* used, and the affianced are given every opportunity to become acquainted with each other.

I have frequently seen the marriage ceremony performed, and I can only say that, excepting the absence of the ring, it forms as close and veritable an imitation of that practised by the Church of England as it is possible to imagine. When the bridal party are all met together, they proceed to the church (*i.e.* "the Heavenly Hall," within the official dwelling of each mayor of a village or circle of twenty-five families, excepting in the case of chiefs, who are married in their own hall), and after many prayers and a severe examination of the bride and bridegroom's theological tenets, the minister joins their right hands together, and when each have accepted the other, pronounces a concluding benediction in the name of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. To the best of my belief divorce is not only not permitted, but actually unknown or thought of. Adultery is punishable with death; and it may be that this is the only case in which the Ti-pings consider a complete release *a vinculo matrimonii* justifiable. All their rules upon the subject, and in fact their entire penal code, I once possessed; unfortunately I have no translations, and none are to be obtained outside their ranks.


All Budhistic ceremonies are rigidly prohibited at funerals, and also the common Chinese sacrifices to the manes of their ancestors, while a form of Christian burial is established, and a regular service read over the coffin by an officiating minister.

Various forms of prayer, ceremonies, and thanksgivings are used upon all felicitous or adverse events:—upon the commencement of all expeditions, at births, building of houses, previous to battles, after victory and after defeat, for daily use, for all sick and wounded persons, for harvest, for rulers and princes, for blessings and success vouchsafed, which they invariably attribute to God.

In every household throughout the length and breadth of the Ti-ping territory the following translation of the Lord's Prayer is hung up for the use of children, being painted in large black characters on a white board:—

"Supreme Lord, our Heavenly Father, forgive all our sins that we have committed in ignorance, rebelling against Thee. Bless us, brethren and sisters, thy little children. Give us our daily food and raiment; keep from us all calamities and afflictions, that in this world we may have peace, and finally ascend to Heaven to enjoy eternal happiness. We pray Thee to bless the brethren and sisters of all nations. We ask these things for the redeeming merits of our Lord and Saviour, our Heavenly Brother Jesus' sake. We also pray, Heavenly Father, that Thy holy will may be done on earth as it is in Heaven; for thine are all the kingdoms, glory, and power. Amen."

Frequently I have watched the Ti-ping women teaching this prayer to their little children, the board containing it being always the most prominent object in the principal apartment of their dwelling. Children have often run up to me on entering a house, and then pulling me towards the board, commenced reading the prayer.



TEACHING THE LORD'S PRAYER IN A MIDDLE-CLASS TI-PING HOUSEHOLD.  
DAY & SON, LIMITED, LITH.

The seventh day is most religiously and strictly observed. The Ti-ping sabbath is kept upon our Saturday, and no sooner has the last knell of the Friday midnight sounded, than, throughout Ti-pingdom, the people are summoned to worship their God. The Sabbath morn having been ushered in with prayer, the people retire to their rest or duties. During the day two other services are held, one towards noon and the other in the evening. Each service opens with the Doxology:—

"We praise Thee, O God, our Heavenly Father;  
We praise Jesus, the Saviour of the world;

We praise the Holy Spirit, the sacred intelligence;  
*We praise the Three persons, united as the True Spirit," &c.*

This is followed by the hymn:—

"The true doctrine is different from the doctrine of the world.  
It saves men's souls, and affords the enjoyment of endless bliss.  
The wise receive it at once with joyful exultation.  
The foolish, when awakened, understand thereby the way to heaven.  
Our Heavenly Father, of His infinite and incomparable mercy,  
Did not spare His own Son, but sent Him down into the world,  
To give His life for the redemption of all our transgressions,  
When men know this, and repent of their sins, they may go to  
heaven."

After this the minister reads aloud a chapter of the Bible, and then follows a creed, which is repeated by all the congregation standing, similar to that contained in the Ti-ping trimetrical classic, than which a more closely resembling counterpart of our Apostles' Creed it would be difficult indeed to imagine.

"But the Great God,  
Out of pity to mankind,  
Sent His first-born Son  
To come down into the world.  
His name is Jesus,  
The Lord and Saviour of men,  
Who redeems them from sin  
By the endurance of extreme misery.  
Upon the cross  
They nailed His body,  
Where He shed His precious blood,

To save all mankind.  
Three days after His death  
He rose from the dead,  
And during forty days  
He discoursed on heavenly things," &c.<sup>33</sup>

After this the whole congregation kneeling, the minister reads a form of prayer, which is repeated after him by those present. When this litany is concluded, the people resume their seats and the minister reads to them a sermon, after which the paper containing it is burnt. During the singing of hymns the voices are accompanied by the music of very melancholy-sounding horns and hautboys. Upon the conclusion of the sermon the people all rise to their feet and with the full accompaniment of all their plaintive and wild-sounding instruments, render with very great effect the anthem:—  
"May the king live ten thousand years, ten thousand times ten thousand years."

Then follow the Ten Commandments, with the special annotations affixed to each:<sup>34</sup>—

- "1. Worship the Great God.
2. Do not worship depraved spirits.
3. Do not take God's name in vain. His name is Jehovah.
4. On the seventh day is the Sabbath, when you must praise God for His goodness.
5. Honour father and mother.
6. Do not kill or injure people.
7. Do not commit adultery, or practise any uncleanness.
8. Do not steal.
9. Do not lie.
10. Do not covet."

The services are concluded with a hymn of supplication, and then large quantities of incense and fire-crackers are burnt.

The Sabbath is most strictly kept; not the slightest infraction is permitted: shops are closed, work suspended, and even military operations if possible. Upon that day, between services, the chiefs meet together to discourse upon religious subjects and frequently to supplicate the assistance of Divine Providence for a deliverance from the incessant dangers and perils of their hazardous life. Meanwhile the ecclesiastics, until church-time arrives, proceed through the camps and dwellings, examining and instructing the soldiers, women, and children.

The ecclesiastical system of the Ti-pings is a form of presbytery. The Tien-wang is king and high priest over his people; four princes occupy the next rank in the lay government of the Church, and after them several grades of clergy, who have to pass special and very severe examinations before obtaining their orders. These clerical examinations are conducted by the Ecclesiastical Court, presided over by the four principal divines and four princes, at Nankin; but before office is bestowed upon successful candidates, the whole of the papers, essays, and work of the student are submitted to that extraordinarily diligent man, the Tien-wang, subject to his approval or rejection. Not only this, but the whole work of his vast territory and numerous followers, passes through and is culminated in his hands.

Over each parish of five-and-twenty families, a minister is placed, and a Church, or Heavenly hall, is built for him; over each circle of twenty-five parishes, a superior or elder of the Church is appointed, who, in rotation, visits all the churches under his control upon successive Sabbaths. In like manner the chief ecclesiastic of the district performs his duty, and above him, the superior of the department. Once during each month, the whole of the people are assembled—soldiers, civilians, men, women, and children, in some prominent locality under the canopy of heaven; a platform is erected, and their chief Wang or governor preaches to them, and gives a general lecture upon the subject of all orders, military, civil, and social administration. This mass meeting is also practised previous to any grand or important movement taking place.

Issuing forth from the gates of the city, the entire populace follow their governor, who, proceeding to the elevated position selected for him, generally a small hillock or rising ground, harangues them with great energy and enthusiasm. His large—eight-foot square—wang flag is planted by his standard-bearer immediately behind him, while his two snake flags (the armorial insignia of the chiefs) are held upon either hand by their particular bannermen. The foot of the hillock is encircled by the chief's body-guard, outside whose cordon the troops, with their numerous and many-coloured banners, are formed in brigades; between which, the civilians, men, women, and children, are congregated.

As nearly as I can remember, the following is *verbatim* the delineation of an address I heard the Mo-wang deliver at Pau-Yen. Upon reaching a table in the centre of the elevated platform, he said aloud, "Let us praise the Heavenly Father;" upon which he knelt down, the whole multitude following him and praying for several minutes. The Mo-wang then rose and asked, "Are all the country magistrates present?" Receiving an affirmative answer, he then spoke as follows:—

"The great God our Heavenly Father has sent the Tien-wang to rule over us, and to subdue the rivers and mountains to his dominion. This is by the great goodness of the Heavenly Father. All you country people, therefore, should listen reverently to the commands of the king, which I now proclaim. Formerly the people suffered much; now you have found peace, and the land is again becoming rich. I exhort any who still remain away from their homes to return to them without fear. The previous distresses which you have endured were sent by the will of Heaven. They are now past, to return no more. *All among our troops who are so wicked as to rob or abuse you shall be punished with death. If there be any such now among you or prowling through the country, bring them to me, and I will punish them as they deserve.* I also exhort you to regularly render the tribute and taxes due to the king. You have eaten the bitter, you may now enjoy the sweet. As for you, O Heavenly soldiers (Tien-ping), we trust only to the help of the Heavenly

Father, and expect to obtain the empire. Listen then to the commands of the king. From the beginning till the present all our sufferings and battles have been for you, O people of the middle kingdom, that you might be freed from the hated dominion of the Manchoos. We have hitherto succeeded only by the favour of the Heavenly Father. Whenever, therefore, you go to fight them, let your heart be true to Him, and never suffer the imps to overcome you. When you go forth, do not rob the people, do not commit violence upon females, nor burn houses. If any of you do these wicked things, I will not pardon but certainly punish you."

At these gatherings, the infinite variety of military costume, the bright and gorgeous colours, the rich floating folds of the silken flags, the whole variegated appearance of the multitude of well and becomingly dressed members of a new people, as it were, united for the cause of freedom, and imbued in a wonderful and enthusiastic manner with the fixed determination of Christianizing their mighty empire—all these combined, presented to the moralist a grand and imposing aspect.

Besides the priests appointed to regular parochial duties, great numbers are attached to the army, and each Wang, or chief of high rank, is provided with several, both to perform the household religious services, and instruct the immediate followers of the chief.

The clergy are all dressed entirely in black; the elders, or superiors, being distinguished by an ornament of pearls worn on the front of their head-dress.

The churches of the Ti-pings are not separate buildings, but consist of a Sacred, or "Heavenly hall," specially constructed for the purpose of Divine worship, in all the principal official buildings, and palaces of the princes or Wangs. In every case the Heavenly hall is the most important portion of the building, and its consecrated character is never violated by being used for other than religious purposes.



TI-PING LADIES OF RANK.

## **FOOTNOTES:**

32. It has, notwithstanding such evidence of their appreciation of the fact, been stated that the Ti-pings denied the Trinity and the Holy Ghost.

33. Trimetrical Classic. See Appendix.

34. Annotations. See Appendix.

## CHAPTER XII.

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Ti-pingdom in 1861.—Its Armies.—The Foreign Policy of England.—Its Consequences.—Admiral Hope's Expedition.—Comments thereon.—Its Results.—Lord Elgin's Three Points.—Official Communications.—Secret Orders.—Evidence of such.—Their Object.—Official Communications.—Mr. Parkes' Despatch analyzed.—Newspaper Extracts.—Official Papers.—Mr. Parkes' Measures.—His Arrogant Behaviour.—Result of the Yang-tze Expedition.—Ngan-king Invested.—Modus Operandi.—The Ying-wang's Plans.—His Interview with Mr. Parkes.—Sacrifices his Interests.—Sketch of the Ying-Wang.—Hung-jin's Adventures.—The Chung-wang's Operations.—The Results.—Siege of Hang-chow.—Its Capture.—Manchoo Cruelties.—Position of the Ti-pings in 1861.

Far brighter dawned the spring of 1861 upon the Ti-ping cause than did the opening of the previous year. In nearly every direction the revolutionists were victorious: the principal forces of the Manchoo emperor were completely routed, and a considerable portion of the most valuable territory in China had fallen into their hands, and was fast becoming thoroughly consolidated as a part of their possessions. It seemed as though at last their heroic struggles were about to receive their well-merited reward. So great was the prestige of their late triumphs that, wherever they marched, whole armies of Imperialists vanished away without striking a blow, or, if unable to seek security in precipitate flight, defended themselves with the wild unorganized desperation of despair.

The extent of country entirely under the Ti-ping rule was very considerable. Along the line of the great Yang-tze river, from N.E. to S.W., their territory extended from its banks below Chin-kiang into the central part of the province of Kiang-si, south of the Poyang lake, a distance of more than 360 miles; while from the boundaries of their possessions N.W. of the

river to the opposite limits in the S.E., an irregular breadth of 200 to 250 miles included the whole of their settled dominions, forming an area upwards of 90,000 square miles, and containing a population of some 45,000,000. Besides this, large portions of the provinces of Hoo-peh, Hoo-nan, Fu-keen, Che-kiang, and the distant Sze-chuan, were occupied by powerful Ti-ping armies. The lowest approximate strength of their forces at this time might be estimated at 350,000; but a large proportion consisted of mere boys. This force was divided into five principal armies, the remainder doing garrison duty at Nankin, Soo-chow, and many other of the most important cities within their jurisdiction. One of the five armies in the field was commanded by the Ying-wang in the province of Hoo-peh: the Chung-wang commanded a large force in the southern districts of Ngan-whui; the Shi-wang, with a very powerful army, was operating in the central part of Kiang-si; and the Kan-wang, having proceeded to the province of Hoo-nan, was joined by upwards of 40,000 insurgents from the old seats of rebellion against the Manchoo dynasty—the provinces in the southern limit of the empire, Kwang-tung, Kwang-se, and Kwei-chow; and, besides this force, far away upon the western boundary of China, Shih-ta-kae (I-wang), the Ti-ping emperor's brother, in command of a large army, was successfully operating in Sze-chuan. In fact, north, south, east, and west, the star of the patriots shone brightly in the ascendant, while that of the Manchoos seemed setting in the gloom and darkness, through which, upwards of two hundred years ago, it had struggled into existence. The greatest empire in the world appeared at length about to be relieved from that incubus which for two centuries had paralyzed its hopes and energies; the enlightenment of China seemed approaching, step by step with the advent of Christianity, which, following rapidly on the expulsion of the Tartar, with its vast train of benefit and improvement, promised, not alone to place that empire upon the pedestal of greatness yet reserved for her, but to realize corresponding advantages for the whole civilized world. One dark cloud alone appeared to cast a shadow upon so bright an horizon—the policy of the British Government. Language

can scarcely express how seriously the interests of the universe, and of England in particular, have been prejudiced by a persistence in the suicidal measures dictated by a policy so mistaken.

Forcibly as the moral effect of the general foreign policy of England has been denounced by statesmen, how few have been found to raise their voices in the British senate in protestation against the practical evils which that policy has engendered in the far East, a country abounding in tea and silk, and now paralyzed by opium instead of being enriched by the manufactures of Great Britain. The moral effect of bad statesmanship, however much it may weaken England's just influence and the future peace of Europe, cannot sensibly affect the *present* wealth and pursuits of the people. Trade, politics, civilization, and religion, are pretty well balanced and regulated throughout Europe; therefore, whatever evil might result from the foreign policy of the British Government, no particular improvement could be expected to take place in a state of affairs which we consider almost perfect. But very different are the results of our peculiar kind of foreign policy in the case of China. With that extensive empire present relations are unsatisfactory, and the mutual benefits to be derived from a free intercourse are yet hidden in the vale of futurity. Mutual benefit is hardly the correct expression, for from a country which may be regarded as the richest in the world in proportion to its extent and population, England would derive far greater commercial advantages than she could possibly bestow. Whenever a prospect of the most satisfactory relations offered, and whenever a free intercourse was not only offered, but actually established by any section or part of that innumerable people, it would be only natural for England to rejoice, if not for the sake of the Chinese, and the higher objects of humanity, at least for selfish motives. But this is exactly what the British *Government* has proved incapable of appreciating, by preferring temporary interests to those which were much greater and far more lasting.

The Ti-pings offered not only satisfactory relations and free intercourse, but every advantage that England could possibly wish for or be benefitted

by. Christianity and civilization, as practised among ourselves, would have become morally and physically certain under their rule. The detestable opium trade would have been completely annihilated, and British produce would have taken its place, to the benefit of the Chinese, and the relief of the choked markets and distressed operatives of England. The fulfilment of the Ti-ping law, that European "brethren" should "go out or in, backwards or forwards, in full accordance with their own will or wish," whether for pleasure or "to carry on their commercial operations," *did* throw open the whole of their territory to free intercourse and trade, and would have done the same for the entire Chinese empire. The exclusiveness and hatred of the Manchoo Government to the "outer barbarians" and "foreign devils" was by the Ti-pings changed into friendship and kindness. Modern improvements would have been extensively introduced. The trade, at present restricted to a few treaty ports, would have become universal throughout the empire, and the vast stores of mineral riches, almost unknown to foreigners, would have yielded forth their mines of wealth, while a general and enormous commerce, perfectly free and unfettered (excepting opium), would have thrown open an empire richer in itself than all Europe. To England especially, as the greatest commercial power, an inexhaustible source of profit would certainly have been established, and would have produced, without aggression or usurpation of territory, a revenue far excelling any derived from India. All these and many other important advantages were partially established by the Ti-pings, and would undoubtedly have been completed upon the final overthrow of the Manchoos.

Strong as these inducements should have been to cause England to adopt a different policy towards China, and much as such a course would have tended to her own advantage, there was another and a higher consideration which she should have permitted to influence her. As a powerful and influential nation, a duty was cast upon her, if not to extend the hand of friendship to a people who were nobly struggling to follow her in the path of civilization and to learn the true religion, at least not to thwart such efforts,

and, by untimely interference, render them hopelessly inoperative. Personal experience, the reports of men of intelligence and honour, all prove but too plainly how the friendly Ti-ping nation was crushed by British interference. It has been urged that the friendly professions of that people were not genuine, and that their undertaking would never have been performed. Had such a course, so opposed to their nature, been pursued, surely it would have been more grateful to the martial spirit of England to resort to arms for the purpose of enforcing an observance of good faith and honour, than for that of avenging the capture of a wretched opium smuggler.

Upon the 11th of February the expedition under command of Admiral Hope, started for the Yang-tze-kiang with the object of opening that river to foreign trade, in accordance with the treaty lately concluded at Pekin. In all respects this expedition was of the greatest importance, as well to the Chinese as the foreigners whom it most particularly interested. Its results were entirely prejudicial to the Ti-pings. The diplomatic and military authorities of the expedition mostly opposed the Ti-ping movement for its interference with the "carrying into due effect the terms of the treaty" just forced from the Manchoo at the cannon's mouth, and the almost certain prospects of its success, which would not only sadly affect the "China indemnity," but their own individual prospects of office and aggrandizement expected through their intercourse with the suddenly changed polite and obliging Manchoo mandarins. The deputation of the mercantile community attached to the expedition was utterly absorbed with its trading pursuits, and looked upon anything and everything likely to interfere with its *immediate* profits with no little amount of hostility: the *future* was completely ignored; its expectations were an uninterrupted trade for *three* years, and a return to England with a large fortune; therefore it is hardly to be wondered at that it looked with hatred upon the change progressing in the shape of the Ti-ping revolution. Besides the personal and spontaneous prejudice entertained by these two classes against the Ti-pings, it seems pretty certain that directly after all the efforts of the Manchoo Government to repel foreigners by *force*

had failed, intrigues to deceive and induce them to act against the rebels they were unable to subdue, were successfully adopted. Even Mr. Bruce (who had stated in his despatches—"If there is one art of diplomacy understood by the Chinese it is that of separating interests which ought to be identical") seems to have been thoroughly imposed upon, while the false professions of the Manchoos, in order to obtain the assistance of the British against the Ti-pings, have had no small share in consummating that gross outrage. Again discussing the policy of assisting the Imperialists (which the latter had requested, making great protestations of "friendship," "mutual commercial interests," &c.), he says:—"It is evidently for the interest of the Chinese authorities to induce us to embark in a course of action which will embroil us with the insurgents."

Yet, eventually, Mr. Bruce chose to place implicit faith in their professions, and took one occasion out of many, in that disgraceful affair of the Anglo-Chinese fleet (depending upon the truth of the truthless Prince Kung, whose hands yet reeked with the blood of our murdered countrymen), to give his favourable opinion to the British Government; and the British people, depending upon their representatives, who depended upon the Government, who depended upon Mr. Lay, who depended upon Wan-siang, president of the Manchoo Foreign Office, who depended upon Prince Kung, who depended upon some one else, actually permitted the very laws of the land to be set aside, by allowing the ordinance of neutrality to be broken, and the Foreign Enlistment Act to be declared null and void. Fortunately the disgraceful affair terminated in the most ignominious manner, and the British sailors were saved the degradation (that had been thrust upon the soldiers) of becoming the mercenary braves of a corrupt and sanguinary despotism.

Upon the opening of the Yang-tze to trade, and the selection of the cities of Han-kow, Kiu-kiang, and Chin-kiang as the treaty ports, it became necessary to enter into some agreement with the Ti-pings, who commanded the river throughout its principal positions; in fact, by their possession of

Nankin, Wu-hoo, Tae-ping-foo, the cities of Seaou-shan, Tung-shan, and several others, this trade was almost as completely in their power as the valuable silk trade had been since May, 1860. In consequence of this, Admiral Hope (ignoring, with all the arrogance of superior strength, the fact that the murderous repulse of the Ti-pings from Shanghae had given them a perfect right to make it a *casus belli*, and to retaliate upon British commerce, lives, or any other possession) communicated with the Ti-ping authorities at Nankin, and *pledged* the neutrality of the British nation once more.

The Earl of Elgin's instructions to Admiral Hope contain the following:<sup>35</sup>

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"It is obvious, however, that before British vessels can navigate the river in safety, some understanding must be arrived at with the rebels, who are believed to be in possession of certain points upon it. It is with the view of obtaining your assistance towards the accomplishment of this object that I now address myself to your Excellency.

"Nothing, I am confident, would so surely tend to the establishment of such an understanding on a satisfactory basis as your Excellency's own presence and authority, if your other engagements should permit of your proceeding up the river in person. At any rate, I would venture to suggest that a naval force, sufficiently large to inspire respect, should present itself before Nankin, and that the rebel authorities should be informed *that we do not appear as enemies, or with the intention of taking part in the civil war now raging in China*, but that we require from them some sufficient assurance that British vessels proceeding up or down the river for trading purposes shall not be interfered with, or subjected to molestation by persons acting under their orders."

In his letter of instruction to Mr. Parkes, who accompanied the admiral as diplomatic secretary or agent, Lord Elgin gave three points to be observed:

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"THE EARL OF ELGIN TO MR. PARKES.

"Hong-kong,  
"January 19, 1861.

"1. That attempts on the part of foreigners to introduce into the disturbed districts munitions of war and recruits should be vigorously repressed."

"2. That the dues of the Chinese Government on foreign trade, both inwards and outwards, should be collected at Chin-kiang or Shanghae."

"3. That we should maintain an attitude of *strict neutrality* between the Imperial Government and the rebels."

HOW LORD ELGIN'S INSTRUCTIONS WERE  
INTERPRETED AND ACTED ON.

Notwithstanding existing pledges of neutrality, the Imperialists were supplied with ships, stores, arms, and every munition of war *they* required, at Shanghae and all the *treaty ports*.

The revenues were secured to the Tartars, and the ports of collection defended against the Ti-pings.

By assisting the Imperialists in every possible way; protecting the treaty ports and constituting Imperialist bases of operation against the Ti-pings at each of them; allowing trade with the Imperialists and prohibiting any with the Ti-pings;—by

supplying the Imperialists with revenue, and protecting it against the Ti-pings;—by defending Shanghae for the Imperialists and shooting down the Ti-pings when they demanded it in 1860 and 1862;—by supplying the Imperialists with arms to the prejudice of the Ti-pings.

The following passage appears in the letter of instructions addressed by the Earl of Elgin to Mr. Parkes, viz.:—

"It is not possible to anticipate with certainty the reply which the rebel leaders may give to the communication which the admiral is about to make to them, although there is, I think, reason to hope that they will not receive it in an unfriendly spirit; nor, if it were possible, would it be necessary that I should attempt to do so on the present occasion, *as you are already fully acquainted with the views that I entertain respecting the policy which it is expedient to adopt towards them*, and the objects which we ought to endeavour to accomplish under the provisional arrangement for opening up the Yang-tze, which has been entered into by Mr. Bruce and Prince Kung."

Reading these instructions together with the third of the three articles above cited, it would not be unreasonable to conclude that a policy of neutrality was intended to be acted upon: how far such intentions were sincere may be gathered from the following "orders" addressed to Commander Aplin.

#### "ORDERS ADDRESSED TO COMMANDER APLIN.

*Coromandel, Nanking, March 28, 1861.*

"Memo.

"You are, in company with Mr. Muirhead, to wait on the chief authorities of the Taepings, for the purpose of making the following communication, leaving a copy with them, should

they wish you to do so, and noting their answers in the margin for my information.

"(Signed) J. HOPE,  
"Vice-Admiral, and Commander-in-Chief."

"Commander APLIN,  
Her Majesty's ship *Centaur*, Nanking."

"COMMUNICATION MADE BY COMMANDER APLIN TO THE  
TAEPING  
AUTHORITIES AT NANKING.

"I am directed by the Commander-in-Chief of the naval forces of her Majesty the Queen of England in China, to acquaint you that it is his intention to have beacons put up on the river-side between Woo-sung and Fu-shan....

*"That the Governments of England and France having ordered that any attempt of the Taiping army to enter Shanghae or Woo-sung shall be repelled by force; and it being clear, therefore, that the presence of the Taiping troops in that vicinity can be productive of no good to them, and may lead to collision, it is very desirable that they should not approach within two days' march of these places, and the Commander-in-Chief requests that orders may be sent to the officers in command of their troops to this effect; copies to be supplied to me. Should this be done, he will exert his influence to prevent any hostile expedition issuing from these places for the purpose of attacking the Taiping troops."*

With regard to this document, in the first place, the statement that the English Government had "ordered" Shanghae and Woo-sung to be defended

*vi et armis*, is simply untrue. The Foreign Secretary's first "orders" with regard to the defence of Shanghae, or any other treaty port, bear date, "Foreign Office, July 24th, 1861," and are given to Mr. Bruce:—

"I have received from the Admiralty, together with other papers, a copy of Vice-Admiral Hope's letter to you of the 8th of May.... I have caused the Admiralty to be informed, in reply, that I am of opinion that Vice-Admiral Hope's measures should be approved; and I have *now* to instruct you to endeavour to make arrangements to secure the neutrality of all the treaty ports against the rebels. The Government of Pekin will probably make no difficulty in abstaining from using the treaty ports as bases of operations against the rebels, provided the rebels on their side refrain from attacking those ports.... *You will understand, however, that her Majesty's Government do not wish force to be used against the rebels in any case, except for the actual protection of the lives and property of British subjects.*

"I am, &c.,  
"(Signed) J. RUSSELL."

If then orders had been issued to Admiral Hope or any one else, they must have been *secret* orders, for none are upon record to such effect as stated in the communication to the Ti-ping authorities. Moreover, the *condition* upon which the neutrality of the treaty ports was proposed in the Foreign Secretary's despatch was *not* observed. The Pekin Government was never asked to abstain from using Shanghae as a base of operations against the Ti-pings; on the contrary, they were not only assisted to make it one by the moral and indirect support of the British authorities, but by the actual assistance of British soldiers and sailors in the field, chiefly headed by Admiral Hope, who almost before the ink of his guarantee was dry openly violated it. What renders this flagrant disregard of all truth and honour still

more to be deplored is the fact that the Ti-pings, in their wonderfully earnest endeavours to cultivate the friendship of Europeans, complied with every requisition of *even* Admiral Hope and his colleagues. They agreed not to attack Shanghae for the space of *one year*, upon the special understanding that the British upon their part would prevent the Imperialists from using that city for any aggressive or belligerent purposes; and although not even the shadow of an attempt was made by Admiral Hope, or any other *British* authority, to fulfil the pledges given upon the part of England, with an almost incredible forbearance and good faith, the Ti-pings to the very day, nay, nearly to the very hour, faithfully, but entirely to their own prejudice, refrained from any attack upon Shanghae. As for the orders with regard to *Woo-sung*, they can only be attributed to the exuberant imagination of the diplomatic Admiral, such place having never upon any occasion been referred to by the "orders" from the Foreign Secretary.

It is difficult indeed to consider Admiral Hope's communication, either in accordance with the *public* instructions of Lord Elgin and Earl Russell, or other than in direct opposition to them. Of course it would be idle to suppose that either Mr. Bruce, the minister to Pekin, Admiral Hope, Mr. Parkes, the diplomatic agent, or any of the consuls, would have dared to systematically violate the orders of their Government; it can therefore only be concluded that secret orders were given.

To those who cannot reconcile Admiral Hope's and Mr. Parkes's communications with the Ti-pings, with the explicit instructions they had each received, and can neither approve of their idea of "strict neutrality," it must appear that the Admiral's communication at Nankin was simply a very unsailor-like trap to catch the Ti-pings. The plot was doubtless very creditable to the ingenuity and diplomatic finesse of those who planned it; but those admirable politicians, though remarkably indifferent moralists, cannot easily reconcile it with honour and justice. Had the drama been enacted nearer to home, it would from its very clumsiness have attracted

attention; but as it occurred so far away, scarcely a soul but those personally interested either knew or cared anything about it.

The intention evidently was to induce the Ti-pings to promise not to attack Shanghae, and then, by converting that city into a base and nucleus for the Manchoos, to *compel* them to do so for their self-preservation. The theory was a bold one, and would have been realized were it not for the extraordinary forbearance of the Ti-pings, which forced Admiral Hope, and the others, to commence hostilities themselves. The *conditions* upon which the insurgents had agreed not to attack Shanghae, the violation of the British pledges, and the *true* position of affairs, of course, formed no part of the programme to be made public; and it was correctly considered that China was too far away, and the British people not sufficiently interested to scrutinize matters very closely. Thus it is that a few unprincipled officials have been able to attempt the justification of their conduct, upon the pleas, that the Ti-pings *broke faith* and attacked Shanghae, and that the leaders of this great Christian and patriotic movement were a horde of banditti who desolated everything, and meditated the destruction of Shanghae, &c. &c. &c.

The reply of the Ti-ping authorities to Admiral Hope's "strict neutrality" despatch, as translated by government interpreters, is thus:—

"Mung, the Tsan-sze-keun (successor elect to the Prince Tsan), of the heavenly Tai-ping kingdom, issues the following urgent orders to the Ching Tsin-kwan, Ai-teene, and Moh-hun-te" names of certain high officers, "for their information:—

"Whereas officers, deputed by the Admiral of Great Britain, have come to the palace of the Tsan-sze-keun, and stated that, as Shanghae and Woo-sung are depôts of their commerce, *they* have undertaken the protection of those two places, in order that the safety of all classes of the people living there may be

secured; they therefore request that the forces of the Celestial dynasty may not go to those two places, the same being *unnecessary*, and not likely to be attended with any material advantage. The Tsan-sze-keun accordingly issues these urgent orders to his younger brethren, in order that they may direct the troops composing the different divisions that, whenever they arrive in the vicinity of the places named, they must not approach nearer to them than 100 li, an arrangement which will conduce to the advantage of both parties. They are also to understand that the capture of those places is to form no part of the plan of campaign for the PRESENT YEAR."

This decree sufficiently evinces the anxiety of the Ti-ping Government to act in accordance with the wishes of that of England.

Commander Aplin thus reported the result of his mission to Admiral Hope:—

"With reference to the communication made by me to the chief Taeping authorities at Nankin.... I received a promise to-day that the order should be given, as requested, respecting the beacons; that, with regard to the 2nd paragraph of the communication, an order would be sent to their officers in command not to attack Shanghae or Woo-sung THIS YEAR"....

Mr. Parkes, in his report of the means by which the agreement of the Ti-pings to Admiral Hope's communication was obtained, states:<sup>36</sup>—

"We replied that, of course, any insurgents having the folly to attack Shanghae, after the Governments of France and England (?) had determined to protect that port, would meet certain destruction, but that the object of the Commander-in-Chief was to prevent collision and unnecessary bloodshed. We had long been doing all in our power to avoid this; (!!!) we took no part in the struggle between the Taepings and the Imperialists, with whom we were also at peace, and should fall out only with those who injured us... and any Taeping movement upon Shanghae would be considered as an attempt to

injure us. (!!!) Were they, on their part, equally anxious to maintain a friendly understanding with us, they would surely write the orders they had been requested to furnish if this were the case, and a refusal to do so would naturally lead us to mistrust their intentions." (!!!)

Mr. Parkes continues:—

"I endeavoured to make clear to them the objects of British policy in China; (?) that our interests here were strictly commercial, and that they must disabuse their minds of an impression which I fancied they entertained, that we, like themselves, sought the possession of territory, and therefore that our interests were opposed to theirs. It was for the protection of our commerce, and for that purpose only, that we stationed a force at Shanghae."

Mr. Parkes had ample room to dilate on this subject, for it is difficult to imagine in what light, save that of an usurpation of territory, the Ti-pings could behold the seizure of Shanghae, Woo-sung, Ningpo, &c.

"Experience," continues Mr. Parkes, "had proved to us that we could not trust to the Imperial Government to protect the place, either against the Taeping forces, or the inferior bodies of insurgents...; that experience had also shown that, owing to their imperfect organization and discipline, plunder and violence marked the progress of the Taepings; and consequently, *to secure the safety of our people and their property, it was necessary we should protect ourselves.* (!!!) That this mode of protection was perfectly efficient, but as it put us to expense and inconvenience, we should be glad when it was rendered no longer necessary by the restoration of the country to order, whether this was effected by its becoming wholly Taeping, or by reverting to Imperial rule, and when Shanghae or any other place that the English Government might see fit to protect, would revert to the hands of the governing power.... They (the Taepings) wished to know, however, in which way the Admiral would 'use his influence' to prevent their being attacked by the Imperialists from Shanghae; and whether one of their officers would be allowed to visit Shanghae to learn what arrangements were made in this respect."

This very singular extract is much open to objection. 1. If "experience had proved" that the Imperialists were unable to withstand the Ti-pings, how is it that Mr. Parkes states, with regard to the defence of Shanghae, &c., "we should be glad when it was no longer rendered necessary by the restoration of the country to order," particularly when the policy that was pursued naturally prolonged the struggle and delayed that result? 2. The inaccuracy of the statement that, "to secure the safety of our people and their property, it was necessary we should protect them ourselves," is thoroughly proved by the capture of Ningpo by the Ti-pings on the 9th December, 1861, when not the slightest particle of British property was touched, and all foreigners were treated as "*brothers*" by the Ti-pings; and, moreover, by the fact that *not a single case is upon record* in which the Ti-pings have ever retaliated upon European life or property when they might have done so with every justification. 3. Then, with regard to the "any other place that the English Government might see fit to protect," when the whole of the province, with the exception of Shanghae, was in the possession of the Ti-pings, and when the entire silk and a great proportion of the tea trades were also in their undisturbed possession, why was not Shanghae surrendered to the rising and triumphant power, as Ningpo had been; particularly when we are told that "it was rendered no longer necessary, by the restoration of the country to order," to pursue the policy of defending the treaty ports, or any other place, "that the English Government might see fit to protect"?

Mr. Parkes continues his report thus:—

"I then said that our discussion had chiefly related to Shanghae, and to the warning given them by the Admiral not to approach that port; but I was anxious to learn how far the friendly dispositions they professed" (more than the Imperialists ever did) "would induce them to abstain from obstructing our commerce, and whether they were disposed to agree to propositions of the following nature:—

"1. No Taiping force to advance within 100 li of any Chinese port or place open by treaty to British trade, *provided* that the Tartar government do not send out expeditions from those parts or places to attack the Taepings." (It was upon this condition the Ti-pings promised not to attack Shanghae during the "present year," 1861.)

"2. The Taiping authorities or forces not to obstruct the transit of native produce to the aforesaid ports or places, nor to prevent British merchandise passing from thence into the interior." (This clause always was, and has been, faithfully and regularly observed; and such being the case, upon what grounds but the extraction of the "indemnity" from the Imperial customs at Shanghae, can the plea of injury to trade upon the capture of that city by the Ti-pings rest, seeing that elsewhere they never injured, but did their utmost, even amidst the sanguinary and fierce prosecution of civil war, to foster and preserve it?)

"At the close of the interview I had to go into some further explanations as to the rights and duties of neutrality, in consequence of their having asked whether the English vessels of war at Nankin would carry supplies from them to the besieged garrison at Ngan-king, which I, of course, told them could not be done."

This savours rather highly of hypocrisy when it emanates from one of those fully acquainted with what was to be. "Of course," their destruction being predetermined, the Ti-pings "could not be" assisted; can Mr. Parkes and his superiors explain the conduct described in the following extract by the same "rights and duties of neutrality"?

"TO THE EDITOR OF THE *Shanghae Times*.

"Sir—Do the authorities think that the terms of the treaty were that foreign vessels should be allowed to transport troops and ammunition for the suppression of this revolutionary movement in China?

"That foreign vessels should be the chief instruments in the hands of this imbecile government to do their *dirty work*, although garnished with *gold*. Can it be possible that H. B. M.'s Government will allow its ships to take passengers from here—*ostensibly as coolies, but really as soldiers*—a fact to which the whole foreign and native community here are alive? Can it be possible that, after so much experience and the sacrifice of so many of our countrymen, we are going to throw ourselves needlessly into the boiling caldron?

"Let us look before we leap. Vessels are loading here with soldiers for Shanghae" (Imperialist soldiers). "The fact is known at Hong-kong, and it will create much difficulty. Let the history of the three past wars with China teach us not to create another.

"Yours, &c.,  
"A FRIEND TO CHINA.

"Hankow, January 11, 1862."

For some months this disgraceful work proceeded, till at last the following official sanction appeared:—

"CONSUL MEDHURST TO MR. BRUCE.<sup>37</sup>

"Shanghae, March 21, 1862.

"Sir—The Taoutae" (Manchoo governor of the walled Chinese city of Shanghae) "having been anxious for some time past to

get a reinforcement from the army under General Tseng-kwo-fan" (Manchoo general commanding Imperialist troops up the river Yang-tze) "for the relief of this garrison and that of Sung-kiang-foo, and having repeatedly questioned me as to the possibility of allowing a few British vessels to be chartered for the purpose of bringing the troops down....

"The Taoutae accordingly entered into negotiations with a house here for the employment of a certain number of steamers for the conveyance hither of 9,000 men.... I at once addressed Sir J. Hope a letter,... and from his answer... you will observe that he entirely approves of the measure.

"I have, &c.,  
(Signed) "W. H. MEDHURST."

This arrangement, in accordance, we are bound to believe, with the "duties of neutrality," was executed by the house of Mackenzie, Richardson, & Co., of Shanghae, *in consideration of the sum of 180,000 taels (£60,000)* paid by the Manchoo Government.

While the British steamers have passed the walls of Nankin, crowded with Imperialist troops, hastening to the destruction of the Ti-pings in the neighbourhood of Shanghae, I have sat on the silent batteries and sympathized with the too credulous people who, faithful to *their* promises of neutrality, foolishly allowed the Tartar troops to pass scathless right under the muzzles of their guns, simply because they were safely sheltered by the British ensign flying over them. The *ruse* of shipping the soldiers as coolies, and so smuggling them past the Ti-ping positions, was abandoned upon the *legalization* of the trade by the same admiral and authorities who, but a few months previously, had explained the "duties of neutrality" to the Ti-pings, and had given them to understand it was impossible *their* stores could be conveyed to Ngan-king, as any such act would constitute a breach of

neutrality! After the *legalization*, the Imperialist braves were carried down to Shanghae by thousands, and many a time I have longed to put a shot through the hulls of their conveyances; but the Ti-pings would not allow me, because, as they said, it might hurt the "foreign brethren"! Meanwhile, directly the cowardly rabble had passed out of range of the batteries, their yells of bravado could be plainly heard, and British oak and British seamen became hidden and disgraced by a cloud of Manchoo flags waved in defiance, whenever it could be done in safety.

As Mr. Parkes and his co-adjutors did not obtain an instant compliance with their grossly unjust demands upon the Ti-pings, viz., not to attack Shanghae, a city belonging to them by every known right as natives of the soil, if they were able to capture it from the Manchoos; not to levy duty upon the British vessels passing through their territory, and to avoid all the principal ports, the great sources of revenue to their enemies, simply because their capture of such places *might* interfere with the British trade—they took more active measures, *viz.*:—

"To effect this, we proceeded early on the following morning to the palace of the Tien-wang... and on arriving there at 10 A.M. handed the following note to an officer, with the request that it might be sent to the Tien-wang:—

"The undermentioned British officers, namely, Captain Aplin, senior naval officer in the Yang-tze river, and Mr. Parkes, having been engaged during the last five days in fruitless endeavours to arrange certain important business with the Taeping authorities, and being greatly inconvenienced by the delay thus occasioned, respectfully request admission to the Tien-wang, or that the Tien-wang will appoint an officer to meet them with full authority to settle their business without further trouble."

Let Englishmen apply this arrogant document to themselves. The Tien-wang was crowned sovereign over a vast territory; his large armies were in victorious possession; and he, being invested with all the mystery and divine attributes common to eastern monarchs, became a much more unapproachable object than western rulers, even to his own people. What would Englishmen do if some foreign official, dissatisfied with waiting "five days" in negotiation with their proper authorities "to arrange certain important business," were to force themselves into Her Majesty's palace, and "request" her to personally treat with them, or "appoint an officer to meet them," and so infringe official etiquette?

Not satisfied with issuing this presumptuous summons, Mr. Parkes proceeds:—

"After having repeatedly inquired whether the Tien-wang had taken any notice of our application, and been as often told that it had been sent in to him, we at last ascertained that instead of this having been done, our note had been forwarded to the Tsan-sze-keun" (one of the Ti-ping secretaries of state, and the proper authority to receive any communication). "We now told the officer who had deceived us to bring back our note, and while waiting for it the Tsan-sze-keun and Le Teen-tseang, a chief who had taken a prominent part at all the interviews, sent to tell us that the orders we wanted should be ready to-morrow. *We took no notice of this message*, and they sent a second time to say that they wished to see us at the Tsan-sze-keun's residence. To this we replied that having found it necessary to make an application to the Tien-wang himself, we could not now return to them, *and that if they*" (the persons appointed by the Ti-ping Government to transact such business) "*wished to speak with us they should come to the palace.*"

If Mr. Parkes had met with the fate of Mr. Richardson and others in Japan, or experienced indignities similar to those suffered by Mr. Edan, political agent at the Bhootanese court, during his superlatively arrogant dictation to the Ti-ping chiefs, can it be denied that it would have been his own fault?

In his explanation of thrusting himself into the Tien-wang's palace, and outraging all the Ti-ping rules and ceremonies, Mr. Parkes has evidently forgotten himself, and represented his own conduct as that of the Ti-pings. He says:—

"It was clearly necessary to take a stand of this kind when we saw that the ignorance and pride of these people induced them to assume the same absurd and insufferable pretensions in their treatment of foreigners that characterized the Mandarins in days that are past."

This little conceit of the diplomatic agent is really amusing, by reason of its being perfectly unique. I cannot remember another instance in which the Ti-ping has been compared with the Manchoo in behaviour to foreigners or anything else. When people set themselves to work deliberately to injure others, it generally happens that they strive to vilify them in order to justify themselves. To this motive, I suppose, we must ascribe the "clearly necessary stand" of Mr. Parkes.

The result of the Yang-tze expedition, in so far as the Ti-pings were concerned, amounted to a treaty of neutrality between them and England; a promise on their part not to attack Shanghae, and to remain 100 li (about 30 miles) away from it during the "*present year*" (1861), upon *condition* that the British authorities prevented the Imperialists from attacking them from that place, or using it for belligerent purposes; and a pledge from Admiral Hope, that if the Ti-ping forces were to attack the other treaty ports, all British subjects being "unmolested both in their persons and property, the commanders of the vessels of war stationed there will receive directions in *no way whatever to interfere in the hostilities which may be going on*, except for the purpose of protecting their countrymen, should it be necessary to do so." It also resulted in their being compelled to break their engagements, and thus expose themselves to British hostility and encourage the violation of solemn pledges of neutrality. Grave as are the accusations which may be brought forward against a number of British officials, it must be admitted that their conduct fully justified the most severe animadversions.

In the meanwhile, during the negotiations at Nankin, the Ti-ping forces mentioned in the first pages of this chapter were severally engaged prosecuting, upon the whole, a very successful series of operations.

The city of Ngan-king (capital of Ngan-whui province) having become closely invested by an Imperialist army of some 20,000 men, and a flotilla of several hundred gun-boats, the Ying-wang was charged with the relief of that city during his march up the course of the Yang-tze to his destined operations in the province of Hupeh.

Although Ngan-king had been threatened by Imperialist forces during some eighteen months, until the spring of 1861 it had never been seriously menaced, the Manchoo *braves* having contented themselves with the ordinary phase of Chinese warfare—watching, flag-waving, and yelling at a safe distance from any probable vicious attempt of the dangerous Chang-maous.<sup>38</sup> Ngan-king, however, was a place of great strength for Chinese warfare; it formed the *point d'appui* of all Ti-ping movements either to the northern or north-western provinces, and previous to any attack upon their capital, Nankin, or its fortified outposts, its reduction was an absolute necessity. The city being built right on the brink of the great river, was absolute mistress of that important highway, without which, and its invaluable water communication, any extensive movement of the Manchoo armies in an easterly direction became impracticable. At last, therefore, the Manchoo warriors girded up their loins, that is to say, tucked up the bottoms of their petticoat inexpressibles, fiercely wound their tails around their cleanly-shaven caputs, made a terrible display of huge flags, roaring gongs, horridly painted bamboo shields, and a most extravagant waste of gunpowder, and moving forward with terrific cloud-rending yells, established themselves safely out of cannon-range of the walls, and proceeded to complete the investment of the doomed city by building themselves in with a formidable series of earth-works and stockades, from which they could neither climb out nor enemies climb in. As a rule, the Chinese never fight unless they are obliged to. Not that they are so cowardly

as some Europeans have mistakenly seemed to believe, but rather from those singularly refined traits of reasoning which, with these peculiar people, border closely upon the absurd. For instance, having myself often spoken with Chinamen regarding their ineffective and almost childish, but for the merciless treatment of the vanquished, military tactics, I have always been answered to the following effect:—

"Hi-ya, how can? Two piecee man no can stop one place aller same time, spose nother piecee man *must* wantchee come, mi *must* wantchee go; spose mi *must* wantchee stop, nother piecee man no can come."

Singularly enough this principle is generally applied. If a determined resistance is *certain*, those who should attack content themselves by safely fortifying themselves at a distance, as in the case at Ngan-king; but should the determination of the defensive party be doubtful, then an attack, with no little impetuosity and daring, will almost surely take place.

Now, the Ti-pings have never been known as remarkable for the logic, cowardice, or whatever it may be termed, generally peculiar to the race of Chinese: upon the contrary, their reputation has ever been that of fighting men. In consequence of this certain prospect of hard knocks in the event of their being irrational enough to try and climb over the walls of Ngan-king when the Ti-pings were determined to try and prevent them, the Imperialists very wisely made themselves masters of the situation by establishing a complete cordon of stockades around the city, extending from the river above to a point just below its walls, calculating, with a perfect philosophy, that when the rice within the city became finished, those without might make a good breakfast, then scale the walls free from any "hard knocks," and, better than all, gather the heads of the helpless and famished garrison, *ad libitum*; thus capturing the city, obtaining the emoluments of a long and easy campaign, and winding up with the head-money, all without the danger of fighting.

Meantime, although the city was fast becoming straitened for provisions, the Ying-wang confined his efforts for its relief to distant operations,

probably considering its garrison amply sufficient not only to maintain the place, but to prevent any complete blockade by sallying forth upon the Manchoos, as their strength, although less than half that of the besiegers, was considered such as would not be likely to diminish their possible chance of victory. In this case, however, too much was expected from a mostly newly-levied force, exposed to the attack of Honan *braves* and Tartar troops, the best forces in the service of the Manchoo emperor.

The Ying-wang, his plans, and the success attending his hitherto operations, became known to the Yang-tze expedition, under Admiral Hope, in March. Upon the 22nd of that month Mr. Parkes visited the Ying-wang at the city of Hwang-chow, situated upon the northern bank of the river, 50 miles from the treaty port Han-kow. In his report of the interview he states:

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"At the gate by which we entered I observed a proclamation in the name of the Ying-wang, assuring the people of protection, and inviting them to come and trade freely with the troops. Another proclamation, addressed to the latter, prohibited them from that date from wandering into the villages and plundering the people. A third notice, *appended to the heads of two rebels*, made known that these men had been executed *for robbing* the people of their clothes while engaged in collecting grain for the troops."

This statement, to those who know anything about the Ti-pings, appears perfectly true; how does Mr. Parkes reconcile it with his report that "plunder and violence marked the progress of the Ti-pings"?

"He informed me that he was the leader known as the Ying-wang (or Heroic Prince); that he was charged from Nankin to relieve Ngan-king, and had undertaken a westward movement with the view of gaining the rear of the Imperial force, and besieging that city on the western side. So far he had been completely successful.

"Leaving Tung-ching, a city forty miles to the north of Nankin, on the 6th instant, he marched in a north-westerly direction upon the city of Hoh-shan, thus avoiding all the Imperialist posts in the districts of Yung-chung, &c. On the 10th he took Hoh-shan, where there was no considerable force to oppose him; and then turning to the south-west, reached Yung-shan on the 14th, which fell in the same way. Hastily securing the munitions of these two places, of which he stood in need, he pressed on to Kwang-chow, and succeeded in surprising a camp of the Amoor Tartars, killing, as the Ying-wang said, all the men, and capturing all the horses. This, and a small affair at Paho, placed him in possession of Kwang-chow, which he entered without opposition on the 17th instant. He had thus taken three cities, and had accomplished a march of 600 li (say 200 miles) in eleven days, and was now in a position either to attack in rear the Imperial force which he had just turned, and draw them off from Ngan-king, or, postponing that operation, to occupy Han-kow, from which he was distant only fifty miles. He added, however, that he felt some hesitation in marching upon the latter place, as he had heard that the English had already established themselves at that port.

"I commended his caution in this respect, and advised him not to think of moving upon Han-kow, as it was impossible for the insurgents to occupy any emporium at which we were established, without seriously interfering with our commerce, *and it was necessary that their movements should be so ordered as not to clash with ours.*"

Now this exaggerated "caution" and absurd regard for "*our commerce*" made the Ying-wang sacrifice his *own* interests.

His expedition was planned for the express purpose of capturing Han-kow (preparatory to that of Wu-chang, the capital of the Hupeh province, situated directly opposite, on the other side of the Yang-tze); the relief of Ngan-king was to be effected *en route*, either by the direct attack of his army or by the effect of its success elsewhere. At the time of his interview with Mr. Parkes, either operation was simply a matter of choice, for Han-kow was almost undefended and offered an easy capture; while having completely outmanœuvred the besiegers of Ngan-king, he might have fallen upon their rear, and, with a sortie of the garrison, probably exterminated them. Of course, to effect either plan a continuation of his hitherto prompt and decisive action was imperative; this, however, became arrested by the unfortunate and prejudicial presence of the English, who, in the midst of his successes, established themselves at the city the capture of which formed the terminal point of his campaign. Of course, Mr. Parkes does not report the threats of hostility thrust upon the Ying-wang to deter him from advancing upon, and occupying the Eldorado on which foreigners of every degree were greedily intent, trusting to the terms of the Elgin treaty with the Manchoo Government for the fulfilment of their golden visions. But it were idle, indeed, to suppose so energetic a commander as the Ying-wang would allow all the fruits of his past operations and the favourable prospects of a rapid prosecution of his movement, to be lost either by "hesitation in marching upon Han-kow," or by the *advice* of Mr. Parkes. The Ying-wang undoubtedly received a threat of "strict neutrality" in event of his appearing at Han-kow—that sort of "neutrality" with which Mr. Parkes was "fully acquainted," and which has invariably been assumed towards the Ti-pings, but which some might interpret by the words, "gratuitous hostility."

The Ti-ping cause suffered from British contact in this, as in every other instance, as the Ying-wang delayed his march upon Han-kow, and sent to Nankin for orders. His army, although mustering nearly 50,000 men, did not possess a fighting strength of more than half that number, the rest being simply the coolies in usual attendance upon all Chinese armies; therefore

delay in the enemy's country simply meant defeat. The critical and favourable moment to strike a successful blow was lost, and while the great cause of Christianity and freedom was once more paralyzed by the incubus of British interests, the opponents to both received such ample time to concentrate their out-generalled forces, that when, after a delay of several months, the Ying-wang received orders to advance upon Han-kow, and open communication with the British authorities, he encountered their vastly superior army close to the city of Ma-ching, and after a most desperately contested battle, was defeated with heavy loss, and then gradually driven beyond the city of Ngan-king without having been able to succour that position, or obtain the slightest advantage from his previous brilliant exploits.

The Ying-wang, although only twenty-four years of age, had already, by his extraordinary courage, obtained one of the highest positions among the Ti-pings, ranking at this time as a generalissimo of the army, and a noble of the first degree, with the honourable title of Ying-wang (Heroic Prince). By the Imperialists he had received the cognomen of "Sze-ngan-kow" (Four-eyed dog), in consequence of his remarkably rapid and successful strategy; and next to the Chung-wang his presence inspired more fear in Manchoo bosoms than the vicinity and operations of any other Ti-ping leader. Singularly romantic were the antecedents of this young and gallant chieftain. A youthful Cantonese student, while immersed in studying the wise proverbs of the Chinese classics, he chanced to meet a fellow-scholar related to some of the Hung family, who had originated and still formed so important a part of the Ti-ping rebellion. Shortly afterwards, having been unfairly treated in his examination by the corrupt government officials, he turned towards the new doctrines of the Ti-pings, and, with the assistance of his friend, paid a visit to Hung-jin, the future Kan-wang, who at this time, 1857, was fulfilling the duties of Christian teacher and catechist to the London Missionary Society at Hong-kong. Of an impulsive and enthusiastic disposition, he soon became a convert to Christianity, which Hung-jin preached with an

eloquence that obtained the future Prime Minister of Ti-ping-wang the confidence and entire approval of all missionaries and Christians for many years, though, singularly enough, when the time of Hung-jin's elevation to the second place among the Ti-pings arrived—that is to say, the moment when by his power and influence it might naturally have been *known* that his exertions to Christianize China would have become immense, and would have been accompanied by proportionately gigantic results—his English pretended friends for the most part abandoned him.

The Ying-wang added one more to the large number of proselytes obtained by the earnestness and devotion of the warm-hearted and noble-minded Hung-jin. He had been for some months under the tuition of the latter, and had become greatly attached to him, when, deeply impressed by the information of the imprisonment of Hung-jin's mother, wife, and several other relatives, by the Canton mandarins, because of their connection, though very distant, with the principal members of the Ti-ping rebellion, and that they were only saved from execution by the efforts of some missionaries, he formed the determination to rescue them from imprisonment and ill-treatment.

Proceeding with his fellow-student to the city of Canton, they managed, through bribing some of the prison warders, to obtain a moment's admission to the aged mother of Hung-jin. To their surprise they found with her, besides other relatives, a granddaughter of surpassing beauty, who was the orphan of Hung-jin's brother—a brother who, with nearly the whole of his family, perished during the ruthless massacres of the innocent kindred of the Ti-ping rebels. Although their first meeting lasted but a few minutes, it seems the future Ying-wang and the beautiful captive maid became mutually attached. In their case, however, the romance admits of explanation. I have myself seen both the Ying-wang and the lady, and I consider that of each sex they were by far the most handsome I ever beheld in China. I can, therefore, easily believe that when in the wretchedness of her captivity, the young and noble-looking student appeared before her surrounded by all the extra

attractions of his position as her deliverer, the lonely and miserable girl turned towards him with her whole heart. Not less natural seems the passion of the student, whose newly-aroused religious enthusiasm predisposed him to entertain the warmest feelings towards those he came to rescue and whose cause he had already espoused. During the short moments of his first interview, he told the prisoners to be prepared for an attempt to escape upon a certain night. The appointed time arrived, but no rescue, for the would-be deliverer, betrayed by one of the gaolers whom he had bribed and trusted, was seized while making his way into the prison by means of false keys, and thrust, helpless as themselves, among those anxiously awaiting his assistance. Brought before the cruel Manchoo mandarins, he was sentenced to the barbarous death by "cutting into a thousand pieces," while Hung-jin's mother, wife, niece, and several other relatives, were condemned to torture and decapitation.

Time flew onwards, and at length the evening before the fatal day arrived. What dread and overpowering feelings those poor doomed creatures felt upon that last day of life, while anticipating the horrid tortures coming with the morrow's sun, I do not know; but what I can tell is, that suddenly, about midnight, the doors of their prison were burst asunder, and the whole of the captives liberated by an insurrection of famine-maddened Chinamen.

These tumults, created for want of rice, are of very frequent occurrence in China, and are often attended with great loss of life; in nearly all such cases the rioters break open the prisons and augment their strength with the released captives. To such an event were the Ti-pings indebted for their brave Ying-wang, for many a future victory, and for the Manchoos' oft-repeated defeat.

Making his way down to the European settlement, Hung-jin's pupil, with his teacher's mother, wife, and niece, and several male relatives of the Hung family, found safety under the kind protection of some European missionaries. In the morning they all embarked and took passage to Hong-kong on board an American river steamer plying between the two places,

and within four or five hours anchored in safety under the folds of the flag of freedom.

Hung-jin's happiness in the release and society of his wife and mother may easily be imagined; but soon rumours of other Manchoo persecution reached him, and, dreading the sudden death of his dearest relatives, if captured, he determined to make his way to Nankin, and then return for them, if such a plan proved practicable. His travel through the country and ultimate arrival at Nankin has been noticed in another chapter; suffice it, therefore, to say, he was accompanied by him who afterwards became the Ying-wang, himself disguised as an itinerant surgeon, and the latter as his attendant. Upon their arrival at Nankin, Hung-jin was detained and created Kan-wang by his relative the Ti-ping-wang, while his companion, receiving a commission in the Ti-ping army, was given letters to a number of Ti-ping partisans in the provinces of Kwang-tung, Fo-keen, and Kiang-si, and also received instructions to bring the Kan-wang's relatives from Hong-kong, and having delivered his despatches, to return to Nankin in company with those who would join his party (several Ti-ping officers accompanying him) by the way. Reaching Hong-kong safely, disguised as wandering mendicants, the whole of the refugees succeeded in arriving at the first rendezvous in small parties of two or three, under his guidance. At this place several hundred men mustered in arms, and recruited at other parts of their route. After many encounters with the Manchoo troops and many perilous adventures, the Ying-wang having principally contributed to the successful efforts of his comrades by his distinguished gallantry, re-entered Nankin with the Kan-wang's family. Soon after the successful issue of his mission, the Ying-wang was promoted, and received the beautiful niece of his patron and friend in marriage.

The Ying-wang having studied for a military life and possessing undaunted bravery, soon rose in the Ti-ping army, and during the famous victories obtained over the besiegers of Nankin in May, 1860, while in command of a small division, defeated the Tartar body-guard of Chang-

kwoh-liang, second in command of the Imperialist army, and killed that general, falling himself desperately wounded in the moment of victory. Upon his recovery he received the title and position of Ying-wang.

While in the west, successes that would undoubtedly have led to the capture of Han-kow and other important positions were rendered nugatory through the presence of the English; in fact wherever the Ti-pings carried on their operations apart from that baneful influence, good fortune crowned their efforts.

The Shi-wang in Kiang-si, the I-wang in Sze-chuan, the Kan-wang in Hoo-nan, and the Chung-wang in Che-kiang, were successful in each province.

Although the movements of the three former Wangs were very extensive, and although the Shi-wang had captured the capital and many other large cities in Kiang-si, and in June had occupied the city of Wu-chang-hien (situated a few miles below the Ying-wang's position at Hwang-chow, but on the opposite side of the river, and from which two points the armies of the Shi and Ying Wangs would have co-operated in the reduction of Han-kow, but for the stoppage of their movements caused by the presence of British authorities and merchants at that city, and the menaces they had been treated to by the politicians of the Yang-tze expedition), all these operations paled before those of the Chung-wang in Che-kiang. Pressing rapidly forward with a small army of observation, the Commander-in-Chief made a false attack upon the important city of Hang-chow, the provincial capital, strongly garrisoned by Tartar troops of the Eight Banners, and after satisfying himself as to the strength of the enemy, by a rapid and brilliantly executed series of manœuvres, succeeded in capturing the important cities of Chapoo, Hayen, Kashen, Hoo-chow, Hi-ning, &c., and, in fact, obtaining complete possession of all that most valuable territory extending from the south of the Ta-hoo lake to the walls of Hang-chow, and from the banks of the river Yang-tze to the sea at Shanghae, with the exception of that small portion

adjacent to the latter city that was guaranteed by the agreement with Admiral Hope to remain a neutral ground during the "present year."

In consequence of the tactics pursued by the Commander-in-Chief as the result of his short campaign of observation, the main body of the two armies respectively commanded by the Shi and Kan Wangs were recalled from their distant successes and concentrated at the important cities of Hwuy-chow (capital and centre of the green tea districts in Ngan-whui, upon the south of the Yang-tze, at the time completely under the jurisdiction of the Ti-pings) and Soo-chow, with a large force already under the personal command of the Chung-wang himself. These two columns were marched, the one from Soo-chow in a south-westerly, and that from Hwuy-chow in an easterly direction, co-operating with each other upon the city of Hang-chow.

The Manchoo force concentrated at Hang-chow for its defence, and for the general defence of the Che-kiang province, numbered 125,000 men, of whom 35,000 were Tartars of the Eight Banners, the whole commanded by the Imperial commissioner and Tartar general, Luy-chang, assisted by the noted Chinese commander Chang Yuh-leang.

At the commencement of the Chung-wang's campaign, a movement took place which was attended by a success that put in action the hostile operations of the British Government, and thus brought disaster to the Ti-pings, whose available forces amounted to about 295,000 men, as opposed to 420,000 Manchoo Imperialists. Although to a casual and uninformed observer these figures may appear greatly advantageous to the Imperial cause, such was very far from being the case. With the exception of their Tartar troops and certain portions of the Chinese regulars, the Manchoo Government could not depend upon its defenders. Those who might fairly be trusted did not exceed two-thirds of the total number; the rest, comprising the militia (*braves*), were comparatively useless in the field, and many of the veteran Ti-pings confidently advanced against a greater odds than ten to one.

The two divisions of the Chung-wang's army uniting under the walls of Hang-chow, commenced the siege of that city with much vigour. The Tartar

garrison being of great strength, and aided by an army in the field, for nearly a month the progress of the besiegers was not very material. Numerous actions occurred, and a severe struggle was maintained, without any decided success upon either side. At last, unable to carry the city by direct attack, after severely repulsing a sortie of the garrison, combined with an attack of the army of co-operation, the Chung-wang determined to reduce the city by cutting off its communications, and with this intent organized operations that, judging by their results, proved of the very gravest importance to Manchoo, foreigner, and Ti-ping alike.

Establishing the main body of his army in lines of circumvallation around Hang-chow, a strong division of nearly 50,000 men was detached under the command of the generals Hwang and Fang, with orders to capture all the important cities to the south-east of Hang-chow, and terminate the expedition with the full possession of the seaport Ningpo, one of the treaty ports open to foreign trade.

Dividing into two columns, respectively commanded by the above-mentioned generals, the division pushed rapidly forward, acting under the direct orders of the Shi-wang, who superintended the movement against the enemy's communications, while the Chung-wang himself conducted the siege operations. The columns of Hwang and his colleague Fang, during the month of November, successively captured all the cities to the south and south-east of Hang-chow, while other expeditionary columns detached by the Shi-wang obtained possession of all situate between the possessions of the Ti-pings in the north and north-east, round to the westward, and to the positions occupied by the two subordinate generals; thus completely cutting off every communication of the besieged city. After reducing the departmental and district cities, Shaou-shing, Fung-wha, Yü-yaou, Yen-chow, Tsze-ke, and many others, and after receiving a deputation from the European residents of Ningpo, who left them highly satisfied, the leaders of the two columns effected a junction of their forces, and, moving upon Ningpo, carried that city by a sudden assault on the 9th of December, 1861.


Meanwhile, other divisions, detached from the Chung-wang's army, captured and garrisoned all the southern, western, and eastern departments of the province, so that when, upon the 29th of December, the garrison of Hang-chow succumbed to famine and the determined assault given by the besiegers on that day, the whole of Che-kiang became subject to the Ti-ping Government.

In consequence of these successful operations, the end of the year found the Ti-pings in almost entire possession of the two richest and most densely populated provinces of China, Che-kiang and Kiang-su, while the small portion of Kiang-su yet held by Manchoo authorities was comprised within a radius of thirty miles around Shanghae. Faithfully observing *their* part of the agreement made with Admiral Hope and his coadjutors, the Ti-pings refrained from any advance upon Shanghae, even although the non-fulfilment by the British authorities of the *conditions* upon which the said agreement was made fairly released them from its obligations; but directly the "present year" had expired, every other position in the province being already in their hands, troops were moved forward to drive the Manchoos from this their last stronghold in the province.

As has been already observed, the position of the Ti-pings was one which but for the interference of the British Government must undoubtedly have caused the overthrow of the Manchoo Tartar dynasty. They possessed the valuable silk districts, the tea districts of Ngan-whui and Che-kiang, the cotton districts of Kiang-su, and the potteries and porcelain manufacturing districts of Kiang-si, which together constitute the principal sources of revenue in the empire. The repulse of the Ying-wang, and consequent fall of Ngan-king upon the 5th of September, afforded the Imperialists but little compensation for their defeats everywhere else. Ngan-king, completely invested by land and water, and unrelieved by the Ying-wang, after its garrison had endured the most terrible privations, fell into the hands of the besiegers. Three regiments of the garrison, unable to endure the horrors of the famine raging within the doomed city, which had reduced them to

cannibalism of the most frightful description, human flesh being eagerly sought at the price of eighty cash per catty<sup>39</sup> and devoured with avidity, surrendered to the Imperialists upon condition of a free pardon, but were massacred to a man, and their headless bodies cast into the Yang-tze. After this the remaining portion of the fighting men came to the usual Chinese arrangement with the besiegers, and leaving the city unmolested, reached the Ti-ping position at Loo-chow. Then came the triumph of the Manchoos, who, entering the city, ruthlessly slaughtered the non-combatant inhabitants: men, women, and children, whose mutilated bodies were borne down towards the sea by the swiftly rushing waters of the great river. I beheld them mangled with every atrocity that fiends could perpetrate, floating down the stream in hundreds, huddled together, while the river steamers, *Governor-General* and *Carthage*, surrounded by the ghastly remnants of mortality, became impeded in their movements.

**MAP OF CHINA** Showing the position of Ti-ping Tien-Kwoh, or the settled dominions of the Ti-pings at the close of the year 1861, the zenith of the Ti-ping Power. Also indicating the most important movements places &c., connected with the Revolution from its commencement.



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commencement.  
London Day & Son (Limited)

The capture of Hang-chow and the entire of the Che-kiang province concluded the operations of the Ti-pings in 1861. They had now attained a magnificent position; the richest provinces and most important cities of China had become subservient to them, the most valuable sea-coast in the world was partly theirs, their base of operations against the Manchoos could not be surpassed, and it only now remained to capture the commercial city of Shanghae. The whole of the trade of the interior, valuable beyond calculation, was justly theirs—it had been so since 1860; but yet that city was maintained by British forces as the citadel of the Manchoos, whereby the Ti-pings were defrauded of the export and import duties which belonged to them, but which, in the hands of the Manchoos, not only answered for the "indemnity," but served to obtain for them all munitions of war needed to carry on the struggle. Under these circumstances, the possession of Shanghae became imperatively necessary, and yet such was the chivalrous observance of good faith on their part that they refrained from hostilities until the expiration of the "present year," although long since released from all moral obligations, and prompted by all considerations of self-interest and aggrandisement to subjugate Shanghae without a moment's notice or delay.

## FOOTNOTES:

35. See Parliamentary "Correspondence respecting the opening of the Yang-tze-kiang river to foreign trade."

36. See Blue Book, "Upon the Rebellion in China," presented to Parliament April, 1862.

37. See "Further Papers relating to the Rebellion in China," presented to both Houses of Parliament by command of her Majesty.

38. Long-haired, a name given the Ti-pings because of their tresses.


39. About fourpence per 1.333 lb. avoirdupois.

## CHAPTER XIII.

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Life in Nankin.—Ti-ping Character.—Its Friendly Nature.—Religious Observances.—Cum-ho.—Curious Adventure.—A Catastrophe.—Love-making.—Difficulties.—Trip to Shanghae.—Reflections.—On the Yang-tze River.—Life on the River.—An Adventure.—The Deserted Lorcha.—The Murdered Crew.—"Mellen's" Fate.—Arrival at Shanghae.—Return Voyage.—Sin-ya-meu.—A "Squeeze Station."—The "Love-chase."—Fraternizing.—Wife-purchasing.—The Grand Canal.—China under Manchoo Rule.—Its Population.—The Manchoo Government.

After my return to Nankin from the Chung-wang's army, I spent some very pleasant months in that city. The warm summer weather of central China produced a sort of lassitude both of mind and body, and for a time, while leading a happy and listless life, mixing with the kind and enthusiastic Tipings, or wandering through the beautiful gardens of the Chung-wang's palace with Marie, the outer world became forgotten. Aroused each day with the rising sun, my friend, Philip, and I would meet the Chung-wang's household at the morning prayers in the "Heavenly Hall." Here, from about six o'clock till seven, I regularly joined in the prayers of people whose devotion I have never seen excelled elsewhere. The men and women were separated by occupying different sides of the Hall, and the worship was generally conducted by the Chung-wang's chaplain. After a long form of supplication, the anthem was chanted, followed by a doxology and hymn; the officiating minister then closed the service by reading a written prayer, which when finished was always set on fire and consumed.



A TI-PING CHURCH.  
DAY & SON, (LIMITED) LITH.

Oftentimes while kneeling in the midst of an apparently devout congregation, and gazing on the upturned countenances lightened by the early morning sun, which poured its golden rays through the quaintly carved windows, have I wondered why no British missionary occupied my place, and why Europeans generally preferred slaughtering the Ti-pings to accepting them as brothers in Christ; and while scanning the assembled Christian Chinese, praying from the Bible we Europeans trust in and declare to be our guide, I have felt a sympathy and enthusiasm for their cause that never can be weakened or subdued.

About an hour after prayers the great drums at the palace entrance would sound for the morning meal. When the family were assembled, the following

form of grace was given by the master of the house, or, in the absence of the Chung-wang, by his brother:—

"Heavenly Father, the Great God, bless us thy little ones. Give us day by day food to eat and clothes to wear. Deliver us from evil and calamity, and receive our souls into heaven."

After breakfast the household would disperse upon their various daily occupations—the ladies to their private apartments, there to employ themselves with embroidering the exquisitely ornamented shoes and silken garments in vogue among the Ti-pings, to perform more domestic duties, or amuse themselves with music and singing.

The Chung-wang's cousin, Yu-wang (the Admired Prince), being Vice-President of the Board of War, and member of the Tien-wang's Privy Council, seemed generally overwhelmed with business. First he would gallop off with a numerous escort to the offices of the "Board of War." Having returned from thence, after the mid-day meal he would don his state robes and attend the royal court. This chief possessed a high reputation for wisdom in council, sanctity in living, and bravery in the field.

Besides his civil appointments, he was a general of the "Loyal troops of the palace of the Tien-wang" (the veteran *élite* of the Ti-ping forces). He was married to but one wife, though many of his associates were polygamists, and, although a young man, was of a remarkably grave and religious character, so much so, that even his little running pages seemed affected by it and forgot their wild mischievous propensities.

Each day the major-domo mustered his people to prayers, to feed, and to work. The captain of a detachment of the Chung-wang's body-guard regularly drilled them in the large courtyard of the palace. The Commander-in-Chief's adjutant-general, Lee-wang, daily conducted the business connected with his office, employing an immense number of scribes, officials, and soldiers, who waited and carried away huge sheets of yellow proclamations almost larger than themselves. In another part of the Chung-wang's palace his private secretaries seemed for ever writing, or rather

painting, interminable Chinese characters on large-sized paper and small-sized paper, which they continually added to the vast heaps of manuscript piled up around them, while I have often wondered what it could all be about.

These various duties were executed with a wonderful exactitude and regularity, almost mechanical; indeed, throughout Nankin and every part of Ti-pingdom I have always found a similar state of methodical organization.

I frequently visited the Minister of the Interior, the Chang-wang (Accomplished Prince), and other chiefs, with my two companions, and we were always received with such kindness and hospitality that every house in Nankin became our home. We usually employed a part of each day instructing the Ti-ping soldiers in gunnery or drilling them upon a plan combining the line and column formation of European tactics with their own more undisciplined manœuvres. The Chinese are well known for their imitative ingenuity; but we found these *free* Chinamen still more easily taught, their quick acquirement of English words and extraordinary aptitude for every kind of instruction being really marvellous.

When I look back upon the unchangeable and universal kindness I have always met with from the Ti-pings, even while their dearest relatives were being slaughtered by my countrymen, or captured by the Manchoos to be tortured to death and their wives and daughters when not killed infamously outraged and passed from hand to hand by the rabble Imperialist soldiery, it almost seems to be a dream, so difficult is it to comprehend their magnanimous forbearance, when, according to the *lex talionis* in vogue among civilized nations, they should have executed every Englishman they met with similar barbarities to those practised upon the unfortunate Ti-ping prisoners given up by British officers (during the years 1862–3–4) to the Manchoo authorities.

During all my intercourse with the Ti-pings I can recollect nothing *more* unpleasant than being made "bogie" to frighten unruly children; and even this was of rare occurrence, so great a feeling of respect for Englishmen did

their parents entertain. Sometimes, while strolling through a city, I have been pointed out as a white man bogie to little yellow-skinned Ti-pings by their black-haired pretty mother, qualified, however, in most cases by a polite invitation to enter and partake of a cup of tea; and so the only offence that could be taken at becoming "bogie" would be from the unflattering opinion one's appearance caused in the juvenile imagination. How different are the scowling looks and the epithet "Yang-quitzo" applied to us with the aspiration of hate by our Manchoo allies!

The kind and friendly feeling of the Ti-pings I often found so excessive as to be absolutely annoying. For hours together I have been quite wearied out by their attentions. Some impulsive Ti-pingite would seize a hand of his "foreign brother" and retaining it between his own for several hours, all the time maintain an energetic conversation, perfectly regardless as to whether I understood him or not; probably when tired he would leave me in the hands of a particular friend, who in turn, after exhausting his own conversational powers and my patience, would give me up to another. To those who have experienced the ordinary dislike and contumely of the Chinese, the surprising friendliness of the Ti-pings is no less remarkable than pleasant. The ingenuous earnestness with which they always welcomed Europeans as "Wa-choong-te" (brethren from across the seas), and the apparent sincerity with which they would claim the relationship as fellow-worshippers of "Yesu," seems to have impressed all who have really been among them with similar feelings of unmixed pleasure.

When I remember in what manner these people have been treated by my country, I almost feel the blush of shame at being an Englishman. None who love their country can behold its foreign policy with satisfaction, or hope for its future. It requires but a glance at the history of the greatest nations of ancient and modern history to perceive our danger, and the parallel between our present position and the meridian of their greatness. The yearning for self-aggrandizement has caused the overthrow of many nations, and day by day we see the rich colonies forming part of some overgrown aggressively

created empire, seceding from and breaking the power of their former oppressor. Well for us or our descendants will it be if by changing our policy and pursuing one of righteousness and non-aggression, England is preserved from destruction amid the regular and successive crash of falling nations.

Can we look upon our acquisition of India, of our old American colonies, of New Zealand and the Cape of Good Hope annexations, &c., or our wars with China, Burmah, Japan, and last though not least, our war upon the Ti-ping Christian revolution, without remembering the fate of the mighty empire of Imperial Rome? Can we ponder with satisfaction over the former greatness of Spain, Portugal, and Holland, the decline of their power, and its causes? In connection with this subject I cannot forbear quoting the following extract from a letter written by the Bishop of Victoria to the Archbishop of Canterbury, dated Hong-kong, May 23rd, 1853, and in which, referring to the Ti-ping revolution, he states:—

"And if Britain, and, above all, Britain's Church, neglect the call, and arise not to her high behest as the ambassadress of Christ and the heraldress of the cross among these Eastern empires, then the page of history will hereafter record the melancholy fact that, like Spain, Portugal, and Holland, who each enjoyed their brief day of supremacy and empire in these Eastern seas, and then sank into insignificance and decay, so Britain, wielding the mightiest sceptre of the ocean, and ruling the vastest colonial empire of the world, failed to consecrate her talents to Christ, and, *ingloriously intent on mere self-aggrandizement and wealth, fell from her exalted seat in merited ignominy and shame.*"

At Nankin each day the signal for prayer was given from the Tien-wang's palace, when the great gongs within the first courtyard were sounded. The signal was then repeated from house to house, till at last the brazen reverberation having died away in the most remote corners of the city, and having been echoed along the massive ramparts by the solitary watchmen to the distant suburbs, the knee of every man within, or in the adjoining villages without the walls, became bent in prayer. Often have I stood upon

the old time-worn mural defence of Nankin, with the last lingering light of sunset throwing strange fantastic shadows around me, and listened to the humming noise rising up from the praying people below. At other times I have gazed from that same ancient wall at midnight, as the last hollow tap from the sentinel's bamboo drum was sounded, have seen the whole populace assemble to welcome the Sabbath day; then turning towards the distant hills, crowned with the fortifications and numerous tents of the idolatrous Imperialists, I have felt that God would never forsake those who so fervently believed and studied his word.

Dark days have come upon the Ti-ping cause; but although many have perished who hopefully assured me "the Heavenly Father would protect them," and although others are now wanderers from what they had settled as a Christian territory, so long as even one righteous believer shall remain, I have faith in God's word for their eventual success.

The idol-worshippers and the worshippers of mammon have together made merry over persecuted Christians, but if right is ever vindicated upon earth, and if the Bible shall not for the first time in its history cause the entire extermination of those who suffer for professing it, a day will come when their unholy rejoicing shall be turned into trouble and lamentation. That day of retribution may be far distant, yet recent events would seem to prove it near; and whenever it does come, how terrible it will be.

Time flew onward at Nankin with seemingly treble rapidity, so happily passed the days with myself and European comrades. At last a shadow came athwart the general happiness. My friend, since our return to the city, had taken every advantage of his honourable scars to forward his dumb suit of her ladyship Cum-ho, the Chung-wang's daughter, and as *he* thought with great success. Nearly every day Miss Cum-ho and Marie would join us in the palace gardens, and from simple "Chin-chining," pressing one hand on the region of his heart, &c., my friend somehow managed to pick up a little Chinese in a very short time, by which his courtship no doubt was considerably benefited. For awhile things went on thus; but one unpropitious

morning the pretty princess was entrusted with a little brother for a ramble in the gardens. As usual, at the commencement of a large shrubbery my friend and her ladyship took the wrong path, and so became separated from Marie and myself.

We could not have strolled far, when suddenly a most tremendous screaming arose in the direction of the palace. Leaving Marie to follow me, I ran in the direction of the noise as fast as possible. When close up to the termination of the shrubbery, I heard voices proceeding from a little by-path, and, following it up, soon ascertained the cause. It appeared that the princess having become absorbed with my friend's endeavours to study the Chinese language, forgot her young brother, and left him to his own devices, when, with the usual perversity of small people, he straightway got into mischief. Not content with making mud pies on the open walks of the shrubbery, or otherwise innocently amusing himself, this wretched child saw fit, in an evil moment, to investigate the dark and tortuous windings of the path in which I found him.

Late rains had made the out-of-the-way part this infant mind determined to explore, a perfect quagmire, through which he had successfully wriggled along, until, reaching one of those large earthen jars peculiar to China, sunk into the ground, and filled with agricultural compost, the Chung-wang's youngest "olive-branch" tumbled in. After the first suffocating dip, he had managed to stick his head out and give tongue in his loudest key. The scene of disaster being only a few hundred yards from where the servants lived in rear of the palace, the noise had attracted the attention of several, who at once hastened to the spot; and they had just succeeded extracting their young lord from his unenviable position when I arrived among them.

His little Excellency was led off by the faithful serving-men, while I returned for Marie, and after seeing her to the palace, ran down the shrubbery to its end, and there, calmly oblivious to all besides themselves, found my friend and his companion side by side on one of the garden seats. Miss Cum-ho was terribly frightened at my tale, not only for the sake of her

brother, but because the affair would make known her meetings with my friend. We had no time to make any arrangement by which this might be avoided, for I had scarcely told them of the mischance when up came a couple of young pages in search of the lady.

Upon reaching the palace, the Mrs. Chung-wang appeared, superintending the washing of her son and ready to receive her delinquent daughter. Two old duennas, of particularly vinegar aspect, advanced upon the girl, who for a moment clung to my friend's arm. That moment, however, must have sufficed to show the Chung-wang's better-half the state of her daughter's affections, whom she now sharply upbraided while being dragged into the palace. Poor Cum-ho disappeared in tears, doubtless severely pinched by her two guards, while the injured "parent," after seeing her purified boy carried in before her, retired with a Parthian exclamation of "Yang-quitzo," thrown at my friend.

It was the first time I had ever heard an European called "foreign devil" in Ti-pingdom, and Mrs. Chung-wang must have been hugely offended to have uttered such a thing. Turning to L——, I exclaimed, "Well, old fellow, what do you think of it?"

"Think," he answered; "why it's the last I shall see of Cum-ho."

"Yes, I suppose it will be; but that won't trouble you much?"

After a moment's thought, my friend seriously said to me:—"My dear fellow, I really believe I love that girl; Chinese or not, she is a good, warm-hearted creature, and—I think she loves me; besides, she is very pretty. What do you think of her hair? is it not long and beautiful? I do not believe any English girl has such tresses. She has a straight nose too, and her eyes are very fine; don't you think so?"

"Yes, there's no question about it; she is a very good-looking girl, but, unfortunately, you must remember she is the Chung-wang's daughter."

"I don't care if she's the Lord Duke of Macaciac's daughter; if she loves me I *will* see her again."

"Have you spoken to her about love?" I asked.

"I cannot exactly say I have, for I do not know the Chinese version of the verb, but I believe she understood what I meant when I tried to. How do you express "I love you" in Chinese?"

"Gno gnae ne," I told him as well as I knew.

"Noo nay nee; well, I think I shall remember that; noo nay nee; yes, that's simple enough; but how shall I meet Cum-ho again to tell her so? that's the question."

"Trust to the Chinese Cupid, if there is one; besides, if she loves you, depend upon it you will hear from her somehow before long; but I must say I still retain a vivid remembrance of some of your Hong-kong attachments; there was A-far, the pretty daughter of Canton Jack, our boatman; do you forget how desperately in love you fancied yourself with that sun-burnt, black-eyed, rough-headed 'Sanpan girl?'"

"Oh, nonsense," replied my friend, pettishly, "there's a vast difference between the two; at that time I was fresh from England and could not be much smitten by a Chinese boat-girl, with the thoughts of the dear girls at home filling my mind. But now I have been so long in China I have almost forgotten what an English woman is like; you cannot deny that Cum-ho is handsome; see what a beautiful little mouth she has, what teeth, what——."

"There, that will do, my friend; it is needless to recapitulate the fair celestial's charms, you are evidently a victim of the little Chinese god; but I will just ask one thing; apart from the danger of becoming obnoxious to so powerful a chief as the Chung-wang, who would certainly never look with pleasure upon an alliance between his daughter and yourself, leang-sze-ma (lieutenant) in his guards though he has made you—how would you feel disposed to carry home to England a Chinese wife?"

"Home!" said he, bitterly; "most likely I shall never see home again, at all events I love the girl, and I am determined not to give her up so easily; if I escape the gingall-balls and rusty spears of those rascally Imps, the Chung-wang may yet be willing to give me his daughter; it appears to me the

marriage ceremony of the Ti-pings is much like ours, and if nothing else will succeed, why, an elopement à la Ti-ping Gretna Green may."

"You shall never do anything so rash," I responded, as we entered the palace and proceeded to our quarters, "we shall be leaving Nankin for some days very shortly, and when we return, if you are still of the same mind, we will resume the subject and see what can be done."

After this event Cum-ho was never permitted to meet us, although she managed now and then to send a message by Marie to the "Yang-quitzo." The misfortune of that confounded child would have proved a source of much merriment, but for the interruption of our pleasant promenades it effected. Besides making a prisoner of Cum-ho, it very considerably annoyed Marie and myself; for the vigilance of the elder ladies of the household having become aroused, they carefully watched over my betrothed wherever she went. I cannot but admit that, one and all, the women of Ti-pingdom were paragons of modesty and propriety, and although in this case their espionage proved rather vexatious, I did not admire them less for it.

Previous to this, I had determined to take a trip to Shanghae in order to ascertain, if possible, the purport of the will left by Marie's father, and also to make various arrangements with regard to obtaining supplies of grain, European arms, &c., for Nankin; all of which the Manchoos were able to obtain *ad libitum* from Europeans at the treaty ports, although furnishing the same articles to the Ti-pings was strictly prohibited by the British authorities, in spite of their pledged neutrality. Before setting out upon my journey, I had an interview with the Minister of the Interior, Chang-wang, who gave me a number of passes, requesting me to bestow them upon respectable Europeans and inform them Nankin was open to trade. A few foreign vessels were occupied trading to the city, and among them my friend Mellen, with two of his own lorchas. I had met him several times when in port, and shortly before I set out for Shanghae he had sailed with the vessel he was on board, intending to return with a cargo of rice, &c.

When all was ready for a start, I had no small difficulty in getting my friend away with me; Philip I left behind to continue drilling and otherwise instructing the soldiery, and also as my agent for other affairs. Besides the bother with my friend, I experienced a more serious one before getting the crew of my vessel to obey orders. These men during my stay had become thoroughly Ti-pingized, and having allowed their hair to grow, did not seem at all inclined to shave and adopt the Manchoo badge of slavery again. So attached to the Ti-ping re-establishment of Chinese customs had they become, that I was compelled to call in the Sz-wang to make them shave and leave Nankin. It may be that, as a rule, the Chinese are pretty well contented with and accustomed to the monkey tail, but let their national spirit once be aroused upon the subject, they feel the degradation bitterly. With scarcely an exception, the whole crew violently protested against resuming the guise of the Tartar, and one fine young fellow felt so acutely while under the hands of the barber that he actually cried like a child.

At last, however, the tresses were all shorn off, and having parted with Marie with the full intention of making her my wife when I returned, and having given her a letter for Cum-ho, concocted by my friend from a Morison's Chinese and English Dictionary, the anchor was rudely dragged forth from its snug hiding-place in the muddy bottom of the Nankin creek; then clapping my shiny-headed men on to the halyards fore and aft, all sail was made, and Nankin bidden adieu for a time.

The Yang-tze river, at its mildest mood and lowest period in the middle of winter, is still a mighty and a swift-running stream; but in summer, when swollen with the vast torrents from the melted snow of the region of great mountains, amid which it rises far away beyond the western limits of Thibet, its waters rush fierce and foaming far into the country upon either side of its proper channel. Such was the case upon my departure from Nankin.

Sailing was out of the question, because what little wind there came was, as the sailors say, dead on end. But although our canvas could not help us on our way, the boiling tide did, and that at the rate of nearly five knots an hour.

I have many a time floated along the bosom of that grand Yang-tze, and with nature all beautiful around me, crew and servants obedient to the slightest wish, and, above all, a sympathizing friend, fancied more complete happiness impossible.

At such moments I have often reflected upon the great Ti-ping movement, and wondered whether my partisanship could have blinded me to any of its defects, and so led me to disagree with the manifold tales of horror and detraction narrated by persons who opposed the rebellion. I have even tried to persuade myself that I was a fool, that I had been imposed upon and deceived by the Ti-pings as to their real character, and that the hostile reports were true. But then I could not help feeling myself sincerely a well-wisher of the rebels; I knew that I became a partisan from my conviction of the righteousness and favourable characteristics of their cause, and from no mere worldly interest or attraction; and, moreover, against the hearsay adverse testimony I could certainly plead, "seeing is believing," and prefer my own eyesight and personal experience to the tales of others, the greater proportion of whom had never even seen a Ti-ping under any circumstances, much less when at their home and uninfluenced by the horrors of Asiatic warfare. Besides this, nearly all my friends and acquaintances were entirely of the same opinion as myself, including the Revs. W. Lobschied, Griffith John, and other missionaries, who had really seen Ti-ping life and manners.



A Mast Head View Of Nankin From The River As It Appeared On The Morning Of  
Departure.

London, Published March 15th 1866 by Day & Son, Limited Lithogr's Gate Str, Lincoln's  
Inn Fields.

Day & Son, Limited, Lith.

These driftings on the Yang-tze were productive of much meditation. Far from the trammels, disturbance, and troubles of the great cities of men, with the warm pure air blowing freshly upon us, we could think only of the justice and reason of things, completely unbiased by the stereotyped customs and formal conventionalities of society; but the living voice of

Nature all around us, manifested in the murmur of the moving waters, the humming noise of manifold insects, the myriad lamps of the fire-fly at night, and the brilliant-coloured feathery songsters in full chorus among the reed-beds' luxuriant foliage by day, whispered a better and more comprehensive theory of existence. So far as society was concerned, it might have been extinct, for we were at such times perfectly isolated, myself and friend were alone with regard to companionship, will, and authority. Of course this sort of life requires change; it is all very well for a few months; but then one seems to wish for something more than the voice of nature, and the novelties of strange people, new faces, and busy life, become excessively attractive.

To descend unto the mere creature comforts of such living:—at four in the morning we arose; As-sam, with meek devotion, or rather serpent-like Asiatic stealthiness, would bring coffee, containing just a dash of strong waters, with a little breakfast of rice-cake or toast, by way of fortifying oneself in a cholera country. This sailors' inseparable morning stimulant despatched,<sup>40</sup> habited in thin white silk, we were douched with many buckets of water, drawn overnight and separated from the thick muddy particles of the Yang-tze by settling and cooling till morn, when the clear part was poured off for use; then a couple of brawny Chinese mariners would rub us down like young horses, and our day began.

If the *locale* was favourable and the breeze light, a stroll along the river's bank, gun in hand, keeping time with the progress of our vessel with the tide, almost surely supplied us with many fat pheasants, wild pigeons, and some of the numerous Chinese summer water-fowl, or snipe and curlew of singular variety. A stroll to the trees and bushes further inland would possibly reward us with a few woodcock, rice-birds or ortolan, and other delicious game peculiar to China.

Whenever the game-bag became full, or the sun too high to be pleasant, we returned to our floating home, probably with some fish purchased from a solitary dip-net fisherman, working at a little clear spot among the tall

bulrushes overhanging some tideless deep pool, the favourite resort of his legitimate prey.

About 11 a.m. our breakfast was served, that breakfast a feast for an epicure: choice and fragrantly-scented tea the principal beverage, and fish, newly plundered from the rich stores of the river, the standing dish. How shall I sing your praises, ye finny tribes of the Yang-tze? Large and small, long and short, thick and thin, flat and deep, every conceivable shape and colour, with every possible flavour appertaining to fishes of any part of the world, or the most approved delicacy, I safely pronounce ye unequalled by your brethren of foreign seas, lakes, or running streams. Above all ranks the delicious Ke-yu (chicken-fish), combining the qualities of British salmon, turbot, and whiting, equally the favourite of natives and Europeans, and in some of the distant cities eagerly purchased at fabulous prices by the wealthy gourmands.

The remnants of fish being carried away, the hot and greasy face of Assam would be thrust into our cabin, followed by that individual's other parts, carefully bearing to his yet strong-appetited masters a brown and juicy pheasant or wild duck, done as he knew how to do them, with Chinese ingenuity and cunning spices. A plentiful supply of fruit—oranges, pears, pumelos, peaches, li-chees, and Chinese preserves—finished a cheap, though almost Sybarite repast; and last, but not least in a hot climate, one glass of ice-cold water was forthcoming.

If the day was not oppressively hot, we would while away the time with books, or my friend would bring out his soft-toned flute, and join in melody with the birds, huge dragon-flies, and other flying, creeping, and crawling things, which had all woke up to be happy in the bright sunshine.

Should we, perchance, fall in with some fellow wanderer, we met as brothers and equals; but this did not often happen. Swiftly roll the yellow waters, yellower still in the fierce sunlight, spreading away over islands, villages, and cultivated fields, far into the interior. Sometimes, when in flood, even 500 miles from its mouth, this mighty river is bounded here and

there by the glittering horizon of its own waters. At one spot the roof of a tall house just shows above the stream; at another the tops of some great trees may be noticed bending along with the rushing tide.<sup>41</sup>

Purple, dim, and vast, rise the mountains, lazily flaps the white canvas, while through the tall bulrushes beautiful little summer ducks skim about, great "Bramley" kites wheel high above, uttering their piercing cries, and in and out of the feathery-topped bamboo strange and brilliantly-plumaged birds incessantly play. Still we glide with the flowing waters, which, from unknown mysterious regions flow onward, flow ever, towards the great outside ocean, whither for hundreds of centuries it has flowed, untired and unceasing, and whither it will flow to all eternity.

"Ho-li" is echoed along the decks, and reverentially our long-tailed cook brings burning charcoal between iron pincers. The day is too hot now for work, for talking, almost for thinking, and whilst the tide sweeps along, we slowly puff our cheroots and recline under the grateful shade of the awning in a state of semi-coma.

Lying on the flat of our Saxon backs, and lazily wreathing reflective-producing columns of smoke from our Manilas, we build castles in the air, loftier far and not so grim as those which ever and anon frown back at the mountains on either side. We dream with revolver in belt and gun at hand, ready to knock over stray unwary ducks, or savage, plundering, military Manchoos, should it become necessary. Little kings are we in our own right; obsequiously bends As-sam, pattern of boys and servants, to our lordly nod; meekly answers A-foo, *lowder*, captain, and pirate that he is; for the white men are strong, the Chinese think, and we must be civil to them while awake, even if we murder them when asleep.

We have no bad smells here, no wear and tear and flurry of cities; our habits are primitive, and for the most part, we own the open heavens only as our roof, and breathe the pure and uncontaminated atmosphere of the temperate zone.

A mid-day siesta, for at night we must be watchful of straggling piratical Manchoo gunboats, followed by another gunning excursion in the cool of the evening, or possibly a few minutes passed in some secluded village; then dinner at dusk, almost the same as breakfast, excepting the addition of curry (real curry, not as is often the case, a yellow-looking mess of that name only), some of the many descriptions of Chinese vegetables, and pastry made by that clever As-sam; followed by a game of chess, a duet with my concertina and friend's flute, and a fragrant Manila to accompany the constitutional after-dinner quarter-deck promenade, terminate the pleasures of the day.

While daylight lasted we were generally safe; but whenever night spread her sable mantle over river, shore, and man alike, the utmost vigilance was required. By generally keeping underweigh all night, and choosing the centre of the stream, with one or two exceptions I avoided any serious danger from the Imperialist *braves* and gunboats, as one well-directed shot would mostly satisfy them; some of my friends, however, were not so fortunate, and on this occasion of my river life I came upon a scene of horror I never shall forget.

After successfully running past the fortifications and flotillas situated at the commencement of the Imperialist jurisdiction, early one morning, when within a few miles of Chin-kiang, we came in sight of a lorcha close in to the river's bank. As the wind was too scant to be useful for vessels bound up the river, at first I paid but little attention to the otherwise singular position of the strange craft, but when nearly abreast, to my astonishment I discovered her to be the *Fox*, my friend Mellen's lorcha. The daylight was now pretty well developed, and almost at the same time I was enabled to discern some one on deck waving a large white signal. Upon this I steered directly for the lorcha, and when sufficiently near, saw the figure was that of a woman, apparently alone; that the vessel was evidently derelict, from the confusion and dismantled state of her rigging, and that she was run ashore high and dry, her bow actually projecting a considerable way over the land.

Running as close alongside as we could without grounding, we anchored in the stream right abeam of her, and arming ourselves and a couple of good men, my friend and I proceeded to board the lorcha. Upon doing so we were met at the gangway by the old nurse of Mellen's children, who was wringing her hands and loudly vociferating the peculiar lament in vogue among the Chinese women when in grief.

A deserted ship has at all times a disheartening, melancholy sort of effect, upon a sailor at all events; but although I had seen such a thing before, even far away upon the vast ocean hundreds of miles from the nearest land, I never experienced so sudden and so fearful a chill as the moment my feet touched that lorcha's deck. It was not the grievous aspect of old As-su, neither was it the deserted appearance of the vessel itself, but the atmosphere seemed heavy with some undefinable horror, that unearthly smell, or rather perception, of human blood which those who have discovered deeds of slaughter will easily appreciate, but which I cannot further explain.

Of course my first endeavour was to gather something from the old nurse, meanwhile my friend proceeded aft towards the lorcha's cabin. Before I could distinguish anything tangible from the sobbing "hi-yo hi-yo's" of As-su, I was startled by his horrified exclamation.

"Great God! come here, A——," called he in the sharp accents of powerful excitement. In a moment I was by his side and gazing down through the torn-off cabin skylight.

I have passed among the bodies of thousands killed in the sanguinary Chinese battles; I have moved slowly along creeks, ay, even the broad Yangtze itself, literally choked with poor remnants of humanity; quite lately I have wandered through once happy Ti-ping villages, at this time tenanted alone with the starved, dead, and the miserable living cannibals, yet existing upon their former companions. I have passed through all these fearful scenes, yet never did I feel the overpowering horror I experienced while

gazing into that lonely cabin; lonely, indeed, for only the bodies of the ruthlessly murdered composed its ghastly tenancy.

Blood stained the sides, the ceiling, and the furniture, while the deck of that gory cabin seemed one coagulated mass. Doubled up at the foot of his berth my poor friend Mellen, one of the bravest among the brave, lay mangled and hideous; above him, in the very attitude of protecting her husband, stood the corpse of his noble-hearted wife, frightfully disfigured and covered with wounds; while the innocent little child lay gashed and lifeless by its father's side. I will not further horrify my readers with a description of the fearful nature of the wounds inflicted upon these unfortunates; suffice it to say that although Mellen himself was cut up with many, his brave wife was literally hacked to pieces.

I afterwards ascertained, through inquiries made in the vicinity by my interpreter A-ling, and from the testimony of the nurse As-su, who escaped the fate of her mistress by secreting herself, that my friends had been thus brutally murdered by a number of Imperialist soldiery in combination with some of the crew.

Poor Mellen had on board a large amount of money, some £6,000 sterling. At E-ching his crew had informed the Mandarins of this, and they, taking the opportunity to pocket a large sum by simply gratifying their hatred of a solitary "foreign devil," had authorized a party of soldiers to murder him. These soldiers assembled on board a large *Ti-mung* close to where I found the *Fox*; but as the latter happened to pass them during the day, and moreover, in company with another vessel, their designs were frustrated for a little while. With true Chinese cunning, however, these wretches managed to get Mellen into their murderous clutches. At the village of Kwa-chow, within sight of the treaty port Chin-kiang, the Chinese *lowder* (captain), by making some plausible excuse, induced his master to anchor there and allow him to go on shore. Returning on board with a couple of soldiers disguised as merchants, this wretch (who was actually the father of Mellen's wife, and whose life his master had once saved at the peril of his

own) pretended the pseudo traders were anxious to have a large cargo taken to Nankin, to be embarked some distance up the river, and for which they agreed to pay a very high freight. Mellen was very unwell, and trusting to the statements and integrity of his Chinese father-in-law, unfortunately agreed to return up the river and take in the fictitious cargo for the Ti-pings. That same night his vessel was anchored but a short distance from the *Ti-mung* and her bloodthirsty crew. About midnight the assassins took to a couple of small boats and pulled for their prey. At this time the confederates among the lorcha's crew made a noise on deck, probably to get Mellen out in the dark, when their work would be safer than in a light cabin with a deadly revolver to oppose them. Mrs. Mellen, leaving her sick husband below, ran on deck with a revolver, and seeing the two boats close alongside, instantly fired several shots at them. As the yelling savages swarmed on board, she ran down to her husband closely followed by them, and then the butchery commenced. Poor Mellen was killed rising from the berth, and ere he could draw the sword I found half unsheathed just underneath him. His wretched wife, after suffering every torture and atrocity the cruel Chinese particularly excel in, died over her husband's body, faithful to the last, with one arm round his severed neck, the other upraised as though to ward the blow her eyes had seen coming ere they closed for ever. Poor girl! I can never forget the horribly mutilated state in which I found her: it would hardly have been possible to touch an unwounded spot on her body. She had killed one and hit another of the murderers; they stated ashore that she was as bad as a "Yang-quitzo" (all this my interpreter ascertained); and they wreaked a most ferocious vengeance upon the defenceless woman. When the victims were killed, the treasure was carried off, and the whole vessel pillaged fore and aft; and when everything of the slightest value had been taken, the crew and soldiers, after running her ashore upon the bank, took their departure. The old nurse, after some time, had ventured from her hiding-place, and for four days had been living on the deck of the charnel ship when we boarded her.

Having sent news of the tragedy to Chin-kiang, a steamer came to the spot and towed the *Fox* down to Silver Island, where the mangled bodies were removed and given Christian burial. And so terminated my friendship with poor Mellen and his courageous wife; since then all my friends, I may say, in that distant and fatal land have perished by the sword, by sudden death, or by the deadly diseases of the country.

The facts of the foregoing barbarous murders I forwarded to H.M.'s consul at Chin-kiang, who, with the officers of the gunboat on the station, beheld the bodies and saw them buried, yet no redress was ever sought from the allies of the British Government. This is but one of many and many a similar specimen of the Manchoo feeling towards Englishmen, and this is the style of people who are to be firmly established throughout China by the overthrow of the Ti-ping rebellion by the aid of British arms.

Leaving my vessel at Chin-kiang (I had at this time entirely purchased her from the previous owner), in charge of A-ling, I took a passage to Shanghae with my friend on board one of the river steamers. When all business was arranged, I set out upon my return to Nankin, leaving L—— in charge of a fine lorcha we had jointly purchased as a blockade-runner to the Ti-ping capital, to follow me as fast as wind and tide would allow. I found out Marie's relatives, and they told me that Manouel Ramon had inherited all her father's property, that he had raised a foreign contingent of Manila-men and Portuguese, with which he had joined the Imperialists, and that he was determined to be revenged upon myself and betrothed.

While at Shanghae I sought out many Europeans who owned lorchas, Ningpo boats, and other river craft, and stating the advantages to be derived from trade with Nankin, induced a goodly number to undertake the risk, to whom I bestowed the passes given me by the Chung-wang. When I had settled various transactions with regard to obtaining arms, agents, and a correspondence with that portion of the Shanghae press known to be impartial, I returned by steamer to Chin-kiang, accompanied by Captain P——, whom I had formerly seen in command of the schooner whose crew

had mutinied at the Lang-shan crossing. I had met him in Shanghae, and he willingly took a share of my vessel at Chin-kiang, agreeing to run her himself in the Nankin trade.


Upon reaching Chin-kiang and taking up my quarters on board the old craft, I determined to proceed with her to a town some thirty miles up a branch of the Grand Canal, purchase a cargo of rice, and take it with me to Nankin. This idea was soon put into force, and after the *lowder* had collected his men from the gambling dens in the village immediately opposite the city of Chin-kiang, on the other side of the river, we got underway. With a light breeze and beautiful weather we proceeded merrily on our trip, with that exhilarating feeling the prospect of a visit to a strange and interesting country always produces.

After being swept down stream for more than an hour, just below Silver Island, we came to the entrance of the creek up which lay our further course. Steering into its mouth, we left the swift and turbid waters of the great Yangtze, and landing our crew with their collars and rope, slowly tracked along the quieter stream. Our destination was the town of Sin-ya-meu, the great emporium of that part of China. From the river inland the whole country is richly cultivated, and the style of agriculture and farm-house seems more nearly approaching that of England than I have observed elsewhere. Barley, wheat, rye, and oats greet the eye in place of the interminable paddy-fields of most parts of China. Haystacks are seen about the farms, and the dwellings are all of a large and spacious build. The country is slightly wooded and full of wild pigeons, and of these my friend and self obtained many, thanks to our double-barrels. These pigeons are quite unlike any I have seen in other countries; their colour very closely resembles that of the dove, but the breast and wings are like the golden plover; and a beautiful circlet round the neck, similar to the ringdove, with a large black tail, completes their exquisite plumage. The delicacy of this bird excels that of any other I have ever tasted, yet the Chinese pay no attention to their

presence, and neither attempt to catch, eat, tame, or do anything else with them.

This country would be perfect were it not for the imperfections of the people who inhabit it, or rather, the evil qualities of its rulers, for I believe the Chinese themselves are capable of almost any improvement. During my trip to Sin-ya-meu I particularly noticed the abominable extortion of the Manchoo Government. Although the distance from the mouth of the creek to the town is considerably less than thirty miles, I passed no fewer than fifteen custom-houses established along its banks. The creek is a very broad one, and forms the principal route for the wood rafts bound from Han-kow (up the Yang-tze) to the town. I passed many on my journey, and conversed with the merchants to whom they belonged, who all bitterly complained of the gross extortion of the Customs officials, and assured me that by law no more than two duty-stations were authorized, yet at each of the fifteen they were squeezed of the same amount of duty that ought only to have been paid twice.

Sin-ya-meu I found to be a very extensive unwalled town, the centre of an immense trade. What little business is transacted at the treaty port Chin-kiang, is entirely dependent upon Sin-ya-meu; and unless the native merchants can be induced to establish themselves at the former city, it will never become a place of much commercial importance.



A MANCHOO SQUEEZE STATION.

While the invaluable A-ling was negotiating for the rice, I took a trip as far as the walled city of Yang-chow-foo with my friend P——. This town and the district has long been famous for its women, who, the natives say, are the handsomest in China. Although our experience was limited to a couple of days, from what we saw in the country and town during daylight, and in the sing-songs at night, we were able to form the same opinion. The women, though darker than those of the Honan province, are quite as straight-featured and much more rosy and robust. They also appeared taller than is usual in south and central China, and their eyes seemed larger and not quite so oblique.

When within a few *li* of Yang-chow, a turn of the creek placed our boat close to a pair of damsels on the bank, but they no sooner espied the strange faces of myself and P——, than they rushed towards a neighbouring farmhouse, screaming "Yang-quitzo-li" (foreign devils are coming) at the top of their shrill voices. We had just that moment been talking of the reputed loveliness of the Yang-chow ladies, and P——, with his head full of the subject, jumped ashore and ran after the two fugitives in order to have a nearer opportunity to satisfy himself as to their superior charms. With my boy As-sam I followed my friend on shore. The girls, terrified by the pursuit of the "foreign devil," were headed by that individual just before they managed to hobble up to the house. Their crippled feet sadly interfered with what would otherwise have been their very graceful figures. Their faces were certainly very pretty, and the excitement added not a little to their interesting appearance. At first, when P—— appeared between themselves and their home, they clung to each other and continued to yell, while several Chinamen came running towards them armed with hoes and spades, and the dogs of the farm joined chorus with a tremendous barking. But when the ladies found my friend did not attempt to carry them off, but continued in front of them bowing and scraping like a French dancing master (although this, of course, they did not know), and when the advancing Chinamen observed my fowling-piece and one of the snapping curs had been saluted with a large stone between its eyes, which changed the baying into howling, the commotion gradually subsided, although paterfamilias, and materfamilias, who now put in her appearance, seemed by no means satisfied.

When the farmer's men, carrying hoes and other agricultural instruments, for the nonce converted into warlike weapons, arrived upon the scene, P—— suddenly thrust a hand into an inside breast pocket of his coat, and winding up a small musical-box he carried there, changed the combative feeling of the natives into the greatest surprise and curiosity. Taking advantage of the pause, while the astounded people seemed to look upon my friend, with "the

"British Grenadiers" issuing from the region of his heart, as a "Joss" man, I told As-sam to inform the head of the family that we had landed to inquire the way to Yang-chow. This seemed to brighten the old fellow's dingy countenance without the aid of water, although he still seemed dubious as to whether we were "Joss" men, robbers, or honest travellers. One of his sons at this moment displayed a remarkable genius by guessing the cause of my friend's music, and it afterwards transpired that the clever youth had an old musical-box in a forgotten corner of the paternal dwelling, which had been obtained from the foreign-frequented city of Chin-kiang a year or two ago, but had been broken by over-winding just when it began to play.

The two pretty daughters having been conveyed to the inner apartments by their watchful mother, who, I believe, penetrated the real cause of our visit, and did not seem very much inclined to dazzle the vision of the strangers from afar with their celestial charms, we were invited to tea by their father, and the musical-box was produced for the general delight of the company.

After tea and rice-cakes had been despatched, the musical-box nearly worn out, and the girls peeping through the bamboo screen fairly propitiated by our gentle manner and extraordinary tales, the old farmer discovered that he had in former days been acquainted with As-sam's father in Canton; at once we were pressed to remain and partake of dinner, and the already genial humour of the old man became redoubled.

The day passed over very comfortably, except that at dinner the Chinese yeoman would persist in being polite, and as this involved the fishing-up of pieces of meat from the dinner bowls with his own chop-sticks and the careful depositing of the same morsels in his visitors' basins, it was not exactly pleasant.

Towards evening we were gratified by the presence of the young women to perform various duties in the principal room, in which we were established. Whether the small cups of rice-spirit at dinner had made their father unusually relaxed in domestic *régime* I do not pretend to say, but he

certainly called his daughters up to him, and actually permitted them to be gazed upon by strangers and to gaze in return, and to listen to their marvellous tales of other lands, these latter singularly improved upon by As-sam whenever my knowledge of the Chinese language was at fault.

To my unqualified surprise, when upon the point of taking our departure, As-sam asked me to let him have fifty dollars and stop it from his wages, as he wished to buy our host's youngest daughter! It appeared that the old gentleman, warmed with the recollection of his friendship for our servant's father, or impressed with As-sam's importance and wealth through the eloquence of that cunning individual himself, and seeing him in connection with Europeans, whom the Chinese always look upon as overburdened with dollars, had offered him his daughter in marriage for the sum of fifty dollars. I refused to be a party to the transaction, so As-sam had to leave without a bride, although he promised to return and claim her whenever he had saved her value. I bade the farmer and his household farewell, wishing more than ever for the success of my Ti-ping friends, who had abolished this buying and slavery of women among themselves, and intended, God willing, to do so throughout the land.

Upon reaching Sin-ya-meu I found the faithful A-ling had obtained the cargo of rice and loaded our craft with it. We therefore at once set out upon our return to Nankin, choosing the route by the Grand Canal, which would bring us into the Yang-tze river at Kwa-chow, some few miles above Chin-kiang.

Placing the crew on to the *yu-lo*'s (which, working in a figure of eight motion, urge a vessel along upon the same principle as the screw propeller), by these large oars our vessel was soon impelled beyond Sin-ya-meu and into the Grand Canal. This magnificent work of olden time is artificial for an extent of some 550 miles. Originally throughout nearly the whole of this length, its sides were built of marble, with an uniform breadth of more than 150 feet, and a depth of not less than 25. Since the conquest of China by the Manchoos, however, this great work has been sadly neglected, and at many

parts the marble sides are no longer visible. At frequent intervals between Hang-chow (the capital of the Che-kiang province, where the canal terminates in the waters of Hang-chow bay) and the city of Lin-tsing (where it joins a branch of the Pei-ho river and continues on for about 180 miles up to Pekin, the capital of China), the canal is no longer navigable, while the sluices, having become neglected, have broken down the raised embankment and flooded the surrounding country. This vast work was executed about 600 years ago by Koblai Khan, the first Emperor of the Yuen or Mongol dynasty, as a means of supplying the sterile province of Chi-le (in which the capital is situated) from the rich and fertile provinces of Keang-su, Shang-tung, and Che-kiang, through which the canal is constructed.

Not only the Grand Canal, but every other work of art, antiquity, and manufacture, has been injured and allowed to fall into decay by the Manchoo dynasty. Although the latter claim descent from the refugee Mongol Princes, who were expelled from China by the first of the native dynasty of Ming, A.D. 1366, they have done far less towards any advancement of the physical or moral prosperity of China. During the Mongol era many great works of public benefit and improvement were preserved and others created, but since the epoch of the Manchoo China has seriously deteriorated in every phase of her antique civilization. The Manchoo conquerors are self-evidently preying upon the nation at the present day, even although they have been in possession two hundred years, and exhibit not the slightest wish to improve or benefit the people, whom they only plunder. They seem to be actuated by the knowledge that their reign is but for a time, and consequently rule against freedom or improvement in order to make that time as long as possible. They have proved themselves to be unequalled destroyers, and have produced absolutely nothing. All Chinese of mind and education declare that the Manchoo dynasty cannot last; even the highest officials of the very Government itself have made the same observation to members of the last British Embassy to China. Had the Ti-pings not possessed Christianity,

China would have risen to their standard as one man; had the revolution not seemed likely to interfere with British "indemnities" and opium trading, it would have succeeded; and had not England interfered, the wretchedness of China would have been relieved by the change of dynasty, the necessity for which becomes more apparent daily.

The only advancement China has undergone during the Manchoo rule has been her rapid increase of population within the last century. For more than one hundred years after the conquest the depopulating effect continued in full force. Thousands of the Chinese emigrated to Formosa, Hae-nan, Thibet, Cochin-China, Ava, Siam, the territories of the Miau-tze, and other independent tribes; while many thousands fell by the sword, and a greater number perished by famine, the inevitable and most deadly companion of war in that densely populated and closely cultivated country. But since the Chinese have become used to the Tartar yoke, about the middle of the eighteenth century, the population has continued increasing at the Malthusian ratio of doubling every twenty-five years. Still this enormous increase is estimated to have simply restored to the land the number of people it maintained before the Manchoo invasion. This conclusion is formed from the most moderate data, but, as Malthus himself observes, "The more difficult as well as the more interesting part of the inquiry is to trace the immediate causes which stop its further progress." The loss of life by the Ti-ping revolution may be one cause, for it is a moot question whether war be not one of the ordained methods to arrest the pro-creative power. This, however, is a consideration for those who have made such theories their study. At all events it is certain that the great increase of the population of China has ceased, and it is palpable that, with already more than three hundred inhabitants on a square mile, the soil is unable to support any further multiplication of its children.

The increase of the population of China seems another likely enemy of the continuance of the Manchoo dynasty. The ranks of the people having become full again, all the old hatred of the Tartar, his tail-wearing badge of

servitude, extortion, monopoly of office, oppression, &c., naturally assume a more formidable aspect. The means of livelihood are also more precarious, and the famine riots have become more frequent and threatening, the impoverished people of course turning against the Government whose extortion not a little helps to create their misery. The number of malcontents become continually increased, while the impotence and corruption of the Government, or rather the Manchoo subjugators, is daily more apparent to them.

It is a singular fact that the Tartars have never amalgamated with the Chinese, and that at the present day, by their organization of the eight tribes of "Bannermen," they are as distinct as during the reign of their first Emperor. Manchoo troops of the "eight banners" garrison every important city in China, Manchoo officers hold every military command, but I never found a Chinaman who would admit relationship to one, or that did not feel himself insulted by the supposition.

Whether the cause may be patriotism, famine, increase of population, or the extortion and oppression of the Government, certain it is that at this period<sup>42</sup> the Chinese are unusually disaffected towards their rulers, and that, besides the Ti-ping movement, there are distinct rebellions progressing in each of the eighteen provinces.

The Manchoo Government is generally admitted to be hopelessly oppressive, cruel, and totally corrupt; it is also believed that they have, and by their system are compelled, to oppose Christianity and modern civilization. In the face of all these facts he must indeed be a very wise or a very foolish man who will either venture to believe that the Manchoo-Tartar dynasty can endure, or will wilfully criminate himself by upholding their cause. Most probably the British Government thought only of their own interests during their late interference, and it is at least doubtful whether a sincere mercenary motive or a sincere desire to perpetuate the Manchoo dynasty would have been the most wicked.

## **FOOTNOTES:**

40. The coffee of the morning watch (4 a.m. to 8 a.m.) has become so inveterate and cherished a custom that I have had a main-yard carried away in a sudden squall while rousing the men from the galley-fire and their hook-pots.

41. The immense volume of water composing the Yang-tze in the middle of summer must be incredible to those who have not seen it. In consequence of its great rise (some 35 feet) and strong current, villages and towns are always built upon high ground throughout the whole length of its course.

42. Commencement of the year 1865.

## CHAPTER XIV.

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Ti-ping Revolution in 1861.—Official Correspondence.—Its Review.—Professions of Neutrality.—How carried out.—Captain Dew's Interpretation.—Ti-ping Remonstrance.—Cause of British Hostility.—Mr. Bruce's Assertions.—Mr. Bruce's Second Despatch.—Mr. Bruce's Difficulty.—His Inconsistency.—Despatch No. 3.—Inconsistent Statements.—Ti-pings approach Ningpo.—Interview with Ti-ping Chiefs.—Mr. Hewlett's Interview with "Fang."—General Hwang's Despatch.—General "Fang's" Despatch.—Capture of Ningpo.—British Intervention.—Ti-ping Moderation.—Open Hostilities commenced.—Commander Bingham's Despatch.—Taiping Reply.—Commander Bingham's Rejoinder.

In order to form a just appreciation of the position of the Ti-ping revolution at the close of the year 1861, it becomes necessary to review briefly the political relations of each party engaged in it from the period of ratification of the Yang-tze expedition treaty of neutrality with the Ti-pings (by Admiral Hope), and the commencement of actual hostilities against them at the opening of the year 1862.

By the following review of the official correspondence (as given in Blue Book form of "Papers relating to the Rebellion in China" for 1861) men of every party, partial or impartial, may form an opinion as to British policy in China.

Exactly thirty-six days after his solemn pledges of non-intervention—given in accordance with his instructions from Lord Elgin—to the Ti-ping authorities, at their capital, Admiral Hope, upon hearing of the capture of Chapoo, penned the following orders, dated H.M.S. *Scout*, Nagasaki, May 8, to Captain Dew, H.M.S. *Encounter*:

"You are further to put yourself in communication with the leader of the rebel forces, and to point out to him that the capture and destruction of the town of Ningpo would be extremely injurious to British trade, and that of foreigners generally, and, therefore, that you require him to desist from all hostile proceedings against the town, and, without committing yourself to the necessity of having recourse to force, you will remind him of what took place last year at Shanghae, and the impossibility of his capturing the place should you find yourself compelled to assist in its defence, a course, you will add, you are unwilling to adopt, as placing you in a hostile position in regard to the Taepings generally, *with whom we have no wish to quarrel.*"

In this despatch the Admiral states he has no "wish to quarrel" with the Ti-pings, yet, in violation of his own pledges, and his orders to "maintain an attitude of *strict neutrality,*" he constitutes himself dictator over their operations—operations unavoidable during their expulsion of the Manchoos, and essential to their self-preservation, general interests, and military honour—and interferes between the belligerents and their natural rights; and then continues as follows:—

"You will further, immediately on your arrival at Ningpo, place yourself in communication with the Chinese authorities for the purpose of ascertaining what their means of resistance are, and the probabilities of their proving successful; and should you find them amenable to advice, you will point out to them such measures as circumstances may render expedient, *and you will place every obstruction in the way of the capture of the town by the rebels....*"

At this time not only was British national faith pledged to a neutral course, but the Admiral's actions were diametrically opposed to his instructions.

Mr. Bruce, writing some time previously to Lord Russell upon this subject, in a despatch dated Tien-tsin, January 3, 1861, states:—

"But I have directed Mr. Sinclair" (Consul at Ningpo) "not to undertake the defence of the city, and *to confine his efforts*, should it be attacked, to a *mediation*, which may save the place from being the scene of pillage and massacre."

In a despatch to Admiral Hope, upon the same affair, Mr. Bruce writes:

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"I do not consider myself authorized to protect the town of Ningpo from the insurgents.... "

In his instructions to the consul at Ningpo, Mr. Bruce stated:—

"But I do not consider myself authorized to afford any military protection to the town of Ningpo, or to take any active measures against the insurgents.... Your language should be, *that we take no part* in this civil contest, but that we claim exemption from injury and annoyance at the hands of both parties.... "

These *professions* of neutrality received the following sanction from the British Government:—

LORD J. RUSSELL TO MR. BRUCE.

"Foreign Office, March 28, 1861.

"Sir—Her Majesty's Government approve the instructions which you gave to Mr. Consul Sinclair, as reported in your dispatch of the 3rd of January last, with reference to the probability of the rebel forces attacking Ningpo.

"I am, &c.,  
(Signed) "J. RUSSELL."

How, then, can Admiral Hope's offering "every obstruction in the way of the capture" of Ningpo by the Ti-pings be accounted for, otherwise than as the result of secret instructions from the British Government; for it would indeed be preposterous to imagine that the Admiral dared act in direct

opposition to the public orders, or that, having done so, his disobedience would have received the unqualified approval his "every obstruction" policy did.

Admiral Hope, in a despatch to Mr. Bruce, of the same date as the "every obstruction" one, in detailing his plan, wrote:—

"There can be no doubt of the importance of Ningpo to *our trade* under existing circumstances, and should you therefore find it expedient to sanction forcible interference for its security, I request you will communicate with Captain Dew direct...."

By this it appears that a British Admiral would have felt himself justified in considering his Government's orders, his own pledges, and the national honour, secondary in consequence to the temporary advantages arising from "*our trade*." Lord Russell, upon receipt of the Admiral's "every obstruction" despatch, instructed Mr. Bruce as follows:—

"I have received... a copy of Vice-Admiral Hope's letter to you of the 8th May, respecting the measures adopted by him for the defence of Ningpo.... I have caused the Admiralty to be informed, in reply, that I am of opinion that Vice-Admiral Hope's measures should be approved.... You will understand, however, that Her Majesty's Government *do not wish force to be used against the rebels in any case except for the actual protection of the lives and property of British subjects.*"

Professions of neutrality are here reiterated, although at the same time the Admiral's hostile policy is approved of. Meanwhile, in the face of these plain orders to "observe neutrality," Admiral Hope thus addressed the Ti-ping chief in command of Chapoo:—

"The following communication from Vice-Admiral Sir James Hope, K.C.B., commanding the naval forces of Great Britain in China, is made to the General commanding the Taeping troops at Chapoo:—

"1. I have been informed that the troops under your orders have lately captured the town of Chapoo, and that there is an intention on their part of advancing on Ningpo.

"2. As the capture of Ningpo would be extremely injurious to British *trade*, and that of foreigners generally, I beg you to desist from advancing on that town within a distance of two marches.

"3. Should these my wishes be disregarded, and I sincerely trust they may not be, as it would be with deep regret that I should place my forces in a hostile position towards the Taepings, *with whom we wish to maintain amicable relations*, I may be compelled to assist in the defence of Ningpo, and in that case I need hardly point out to you the hopelessness of success on your part, whilst what occurred at Shanghae last year is still fresh in your memories.

(Signed) "R. DEW, Captain.

"*Encounter*, June 11, 1861."

In this despatch the Ti-ping general is insulted by menace; an unmanly reference is made to Shanghae; a hostile attitude is threatened if the Ti-pings capture cities the possession of which is most essential to the success of their cause—and yet, withal, a wish "to maintain amicable relations" is professed!

Upon the 8th August, 1861, after the singular interpretation of neutrality by his subordinates and Admiral Hope, Earl Russell indited the following order to Mr. Bruce:—

"Her Majesty's Government desire to maintain, as they have done hitherto, neutrality between the two contending parties in China. If British subjects

are taken prisoners by either party, you should do your utmost to save them from torture or capital punishment, but otherwise you should *abstain from all interference in the civil war.*"<sup>43</sup>

When the massacre before Shanghae, in 1860, is remembered, when the subsequent approval of Admiral Hope's hostile intentions is considered, and when the various modes in which our pledges of neutrality were indirectly violated are counted, this despatch will require no comment.

In fulfilment of the desire (to maintain neutrality, "*as they have done hitherto,*" upon the part) of his Government, Captain Dew gave all the assistance he possibly could to the Manchoo defenders of Ningpo; besides framing eight plans<sup>44</sup> for the defence of the city against the Ti-pings; according to Mr. Bruce:—

"He fitted twelve heavy guns with carriages, &c., to mount on the walls."

Again, in the same despatch,<sup>45</sup> Mr. Bruce states:—  
"Captain Dew had gone farther, than he was strictly warranted in doing, in his desire to save the city of Ningpo.... "

We are forced to believe this fitting of heavy guns, and defence of Chinese cities, a part of the neutrality Her Majesty's Government had "hitherto" maintained, and in their opinion a true interpretation of this order, "that excepting intercession for British prisoners our authorities should abstain from *all* interference in the civil war!"

Captain Dew's next interpretation of this order took the form of a buccaneering exploit against the Ti-ping custom-houses. Upon the occupation of the country between the silk districts and Shanghae by the Ti-pings, Europeans were sent in charge of the silk boats plying on the inland waters, one being placed with each valuable boat load, in order to pass it through the Ti-ping territory as foreign property. Consul Medhurst, in a despatch to Captain Dew,<sup>46</sup> writes:—

"The consequence is, that foreign escorts go inland without passports, and a number of irresponsible seamen are introduced into the country ... the result

of this state of things cannot be good.... The *principal* danger to be feared by persons sending up country arises, not so much from the acts of the rebels themselves, as from the squeezing and plundering propensities of the *Imperialist forces*, and from the pilfering attacks of lawless peasantry.... Both kinds of marauders might be kept in good check through visits made periodically by Her Majesty's gun-boats.... If you approve of this scheme, I would suggest your sending a gun-boat up in the course of the next few days.... "

Captain Dew having approved the "scheme," we will proceed to notice what he did. Instead of paying attention to "both kinds of marauders" pointed out by Consul Medhurst as the "principal danger," the Captain, towards the middle of June, as stated in *The Friend of China*, employed himself about the following piratical outrage:—

"Sixteen boats freighted with bales of silks and cocoons, with some Europeans in charge of them, and belonging to European firms in Shanghae, were passing a Taeping custom-house at Loo-chee, some distance up the Shanghae or Wong-poo river. They were brought to, and a small duty of four dollars per bale of silk was demanded. The boats belonging to two of the firms paid the duty and proceeded on their voyage, but the person in charge of the boats belonging to Messrs. Adamson & Co., of Shanghae, refused to pay it, and he was then told he could not proceed until the duty was paid, and the boat and bales of silk were consequently taken possession of. This was construed into an act of 'atrocious piracy,' and the *Flamer* and Captain Dew went to Loo-chee to demand restitution. Explanations were given by the Taeping Governor of the district, but they were unavailing; the unqualified restoration of the silk was insisted on under a threat of bombardment; the boats and bales of silk were therefore surrendered to Captain Dew, but as some small arms were missing, Captain Dew took possession of the guns of the custom-house, and seized some customs' police, and took them away with him to be detained until the arms

missing from the boat should have been returned. The letter written by the Governor of the district, named Wan, to the authorities of Shanghae, consequent upon this outrage, is dignified and forbearing, and it were well for us to act in the spirit it manifests. The above are only examples of our professed neutrality; many others, however, have occurred."

The following are extracts from the letter written upon the subject by the Ti-ping chief, Wan:—

"I find on inquiry, that the silk, &c., lost by your merchant, was seized in lieu of duties, in consequence of an attempt on his part to get by the custom-house and *evade* payment of duties, on which he was arrested, and your charge, therefore, that he was plundered, is utterly without foundation.

"The Truly Sacred Lord who has established the Divine Dynasty, has also *established custom-houses wherever the country is quiet*, and by his law all merchants who pass these must pay the *regular duties*, and your merchant *in daring to force his way through and evade the payment of customs, and you* in coming here and making a disturbance *and squeezing the money back*, have behaved in a manner at utter variance with propriety....

"A special communication."

Meanwhile, Mr. Bruce, the chief diplomatist, unable to justify this increasing aggression otherwise, fiercely assailed the Ti-ping theology and civil administration. In a despatch to Lord Russell, dated at "Pekin, June 23, 1861,"<sup>47</sup> he takes upon himself to state (supremely indifferent to, or rather ignoring, the valuable testimony of the Revs. Griffith, John, Edkins, Medhurst, Muirhead, Legge, &c.):—

"The evidence of *all* classes of observers seems unanimous, both as to the destructive nature of the insurrection, and as to the blasphemous and immoral character of the superstition on which it is based."

Does Mr. Bruce and those who agree with him, venture to term *our* Bible the so-called "blasphemous and immoral superstition?"—for on that, and that alone, is the Ti-ping faith established. The following extracts from the same dispatch, and two others, having been approved by Her Majesty's Government, contain a complete key to the course taken against the Ti-pings, and lay bare a policy deduced from false premises, and founded upon utter violation of principle. The three despatches under consideration consist of—1. Mr. Bruce to Lord Russell, June 23, 1861; 2. Mr. Bruce to Vice-Admiral Sir J. Hope, Pekin, June 16; 3. Vice-Admiral Sir J. Hope's reply to Mr. Bruce, dated, *Impérieuse*, Hong-kong, July 11.—Dispatch No. 1 states:—

"In the enclosed letter to Sir James Hope, to which I beg to draw your Lordship's attention, I have stated at length the dangers to which the progress of the insurrection exposes British interests in China.... Our permanent interests are those of *trade*, the prosperity of which is linked with order and tranquillity. We have, in addition, a *temporary interest arising out of the indemnities* payable from the custom-house revenue, which is, however, intimately linked with the former.

"What is to become of these interests if the ports fall into the hands of the rebels?"

Here we have the true cause of British hostility to the Ti-pings. Not that our Government feared the trading "interests" would suffer if the Ti-pings captured the treaty ports—by no means; but they dreaded the certain loss of the "temporary interest arising out of the indemnities." They knew full well,

as a quotation from dispatch No. 3 will prove, the Ti-pings had never injured our trade; that although the capture of the ports *might* cause a temporary stagnation, those who would take them came as their "brothers" in Christ, and ultimately would have established a free and general commerce throughout the country; but they also knew that the success of the Ti-pings would imperil their existence, by stopping the indemnification for the last unnecessary and aggressive war with China, and by sweeping away the immense revenue derived from the vile opium traffic.

In the same despatch, Mr. Bruce, with his usual acumen, winds up his syllogism of fallacious assertions—"The nature of the insurrection is destructive" and its religion "blasphemous and immoral;" the insurrectionists are able to capture the Imperial cities, therefore, the "commercial prosperity" of the treaty ports and the "temporary interests" would be destroyed by the success of the Ti-pings—in the following words:

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"The motives of the far larger part of the force are, I apprehend, a desire to live on the spoils of the rich and industrious, to carry off women, and to lead a life of alternate adventure and licence, with little feeling for the Taeping cause.... I see, therefore, little hopes of communities like those of Shanghae and Ningpo escaping destruction.... The commercial prosperity of the ports would receive a fatal blow.... The proceeds of the custom-houses would fall off, and nothing but force would enable us to receive the proportion of duties we are entitled to" (the indemnities) "under the convention of Pekin, out of their diminished receipts."

Now, I submit, these forebodings with regard to the indemnity having been verified by the capture of Ningpo and the rapid success of the Ti-pings, led to the participation of England in the Chinese internecine war. If Mr. Bruce, by the above-quoted statements, intended to advise his Government to assist the Imperialists—and they cannot admit of any other interpretation—how can that distinguished and consistent statesman

reconcile them with his strong disapproval of any such policy expressed only a few months before, and which I have already quoted in a previous chapter:—

"No course could be so well calculated to lower our national reputation, as to lend our material support to a Government the corruption of whose authorities is only checked by its weakness."

Mr. Bruce first states, the worst possible policy England could choose would be to interfere against the Ti-pings; and then he declares, if we do not interfere, "that nothing but force would enable us to receive" indemnities and enjoy trade. The *present* British Government has thought fit to adopt the suicidal course pointed out by Mr. Bruce, and now it has experienced the fact that "no course could be so well calculated to lower our national reputation." The last testimony of Mr., or rather, Sir F. Bruce; of Mr. Lay, C.B., late Inspector-General of Chinese Customs; of Captain Sherrard Osborne, R.N., late Admiral of the so-called Anglo-Chinese flotilla; and of all who have the least opportunity of knowing anything about the subject, unite in confessing the evil of the past policy exercised towards the Ti-pings, and state that the Manchoo Government, despite the fact that it owes its very existence to the help of the British, has thoroughly returned to its exclusiveness, its evasion of treaty obligations, and its hatred of the "outer-barbarians" who have saved it from extinction.

We will now proceed to notice despatch No. 2, addressed by Mr. Bruce to Admiral Hope, which affords further proof of the false principles on which British interference was founded:—

"The Government will soon be in possession of the accounts ...  
of the agreement entered into by the rebels not to attack  
Shanghae for a *twelvemonth*, and of the corresponding  
assurance that, *if we are not molested in trading up the river*,  
our *desire* and *intention* are to remain *neutral* in the civil  
contest now in progress in China....

"Her Majesty's Government will probably abstain from rendering active assistance *at present* to the Imperial Government, both on account of the assurances of neutrality we have given to the insurgents, and on account of the serious and indefinite consequences to which any such intervention would in all probability lead."

The signification of the "at present" will be seen upon perusal of the following paragraph, which exactly describes the plan very shortly adopted by the British Government, in direct violation of those "assurances of neutrality we have given to the insurgents":—

"Another course is open to consideration, namely, that of taking the open ports or the principal ones under our protection and safeguard, and declaring that we will repel by force any attack upon them by the insurgents. *Considering that by treaty we have an interest in the revenue derived at these ports from trade, and that this, the only source of our indemnities, would be materially diminished, if not altogether destroyed, should they be assaulted and captured...* I think it may be urged, with truth, in justification of such a course, that it affords the best means of protecting our interests.... But this course is not unattended with difficulty. The insurgents would naturally object, that in leaving the revenue and administration of these places in Imperial hands, we do in reality assist the Imperialists."

This conclusion is correct; for, so impossible was it to usurp the treaty ports and not "in reality assist the Imperialists," that the mask was thrown off by openly making war upon the Ti-pings. The only "difficulty" to allude to, which indeed is really almost creditable to the conscience of Mr. Bruce, was the fact that England was pledged to the opposite policy; but it must be remembered that the only tie which bound her to carry out that policy was one of justice and honour, while strong temptations to its violation were in

existence; also, that it is not the lot of every minister to be able to discern how the commercial interests of his country may be best provided for.

"To this we should reply that we exercise the legitimate right of self-defence in protecting our own interests, and that if in doing so we are obliged to limit the belligerent *rights* of the insurgents, *the cause* is to be found in the ruthless nature of the war they wage."

This excuse is the principal one given by the British Ministry to justify its breach of faith; but "the cause" must, from what has already been stated, be regarded as utterly false.

But, should we for a moment admit the hypothetical "ruthless nature of the war they wage," by what right were we "obliged to limit the belligerent rights of the insurgents," when it is universally admitted that the Imperialists are quite as ruthless, if not more so? Moreover, did the British Government attempt to limit the belligerent rights of either North or South in America? yet the one was ruthless enough, and the cotton trade was injured. Unscrupulous persons who would justify the destruction of semi-civilized people, when it can be done with impunity, may say these cases are not parallel; nevertheless, the only difference is, that with America we have treaties allowing Englishmen to settle and trade everywhere, while in China the treaty limits the settling and trading to certain parts. The principle of non-intervention applies quite as strongly to the one nation as the other; moreover, the Ti-pings never did, or would have attempted to, blockade the trade of any port at which Europeans were settled. Did either belligerent so far study foreign interests in America?

To resume our review of despatch No. 2, Mr. Bruce continues:—  
"The Government would, no doubt, wish to hear from you whether Nankin could be attacked with success by a purely naval force."...

After deprecating any partial hostilities against the Ti-pings, the despatch continues:—

"And on the other hand, we should lose a favourable opportunity of placing our relations with the Emperor on a satisfactory footing, if we were deprived by some incidental event of the power of making our aid *a matter of bargain* with the Imperial Government.... The longer we are able to preserve an indifferent attitude between the two parties, the more inclined they will be to *bid higher* for our friendship and support."

What an accomplished frequenter of the Rialto the author of these creditable sentences would have made! This despatch was written on the 16th June, 1861; within seven months open hostilities were initiated against the Ti-pings by Admiral Hope, in direct violation of his Government's existing orders to maintain neutrality; and within nine months the British Government adopted the policy "of taking the open ports under our protection," and violated all pledges of neutrality by prosecuting a regular, though never openly declared, war upon the insurgents.

The following are the most important passages from despatch No. 3. They plainly state that our "commercial interests" would *not* suffer from the acts of the rebels, and that trade was *not* injured by them, although completely in their power.

After disapproving of any attack upon Nankin, Admiral Hope states:—

"The Taeping authorities will be open to easy access by us so long as Nankin remains the seat of Government; and from such experience as our short intercourse has afforded, I see a fair prospect of our acquiring sufficient influence with them to enable us to carry *all points which are essential to our commercial interests*, even to that of eventual abstinence from molesting the consular ports.

"It is further clear that we cannot afford to quarrel with them, as *at any moment they might stop the whole trade of Shanghae*, at this time by far the largest portion of that from China."

Nothing can be more to the point than this admission that the Ti-pings did not injuriously affect our trading interests; but the opium traffic and indemnities *were* threatened, and to save them the treaty ports were held against the victorious patriots.

In his reply to the three despatches quoted from, Earl Russell wrote:— "I have to state to you that Her Majesty's Government agree with Admiral Hope in regarding an attack on Nankin as highly impolitic, but it *might* be expedient to defend the treaty ports *if* the Chinese" (Manchoos) "would consent not to use those ports for purposes of aggression."

It will thus be seen Lord Russell did not authorize the defence of the treaty ports even "*if* the Chinese (Manchoos) would consent not to use those ports for purposes of aggression," as he indefinitely states that in event of such action upon the part of the Manchou Government, "it *might* be expedient to defend" them. Yet, although even this ambiguous suggestion could not become an absolute order in the absence of the fulfilment of the condition precedent, the British authorities in China acted as though Lord Russell had imperatively *ordered* the military occupation of the ports, upon the proviso having been agreed to by the Imperial belligerent; and it was not till *after* the open violation of the oft-guaranteed neutrality by the commencement of systematic hostilities against the Ti-pings, that the Foreign Secretary publicly authorized the proceedings.

Admiral Hope declared "all points" could be carried with the Ti-pings, even regarding their avoidance of the treaty ports, "*essential* to our commercial interests." Most undoubtedly he was correct. The Ti-pings never injured the trade, and would have abstained from molesting the treaty ports had they been made neutral; but the ports having become the principal depôts of the enemy, naturally compelled them to endeavour to obtain possession of them.

When the agreement or treaty of neutrality was made with the Ti-ping authorities by the leaders of the British expedition opening up the Yang-tze

to trade, Mr. Parkes reported:—

"They wished to know, however, in which way the Admiral would use his influence to prevent their being attacked by the Imperialists from Shanghae; and whether one of their officers would be allowed to visit Shanghae, to learn what arrangements were made in this respect."

No such arrangements ever were made, although upon that *condition* had the Ti-pings consented to refrain from capturing Shanghae for "one year." When at length they were driven to attack the very citadel of the enemy, they truthfully gave this reason:—

"If there were no impish (Manchoo) forces at Shanghae and Woo-sung, the Chung-wang and She-wang would certainly not think of sending their troops to take those places."

Upon July 28, the British Consul at Shanghae wrote to Mr. Bruce:—

"The Imperialist authority does not extend beyond a circuit of from fifty to sixty miles from Shanghae, and I see no reason whatever to suppose that they will ever be able to drive the rebels beyond that limit.... The presence of foreign forces in this city alone saves its authorities from summary ejection. But, if the rebels were allowed to take possession, the country in our immediate vicinity would at once lapse into the wretched state of anarchy which exists beyond the rebel lines; the native population would inevitably disappear, property would miserably deteriorate."...

Mr. Bruce, in his notice of this despatch to Lord Russell, states:—

"Your Lordship will observe that he states that the capture of Shanghae would be fatal to the commercial prosperity of the port. To me it is rather a matter of surprise that trade should continue at all.... The export of silk between June 1860 and June 1861 has, in spite of these disadvantages, amounted to 85,000 bales."

Directly after this we find Mr. Bruce bearing testimony that Ti-ping "success in any locality is attended with its total *destruction!*" Admiral Hope admitted that the insurgents had the Shanghae trade, "by far the

largest portion of that from China," entirely in their power, but did *not* stop it; Mr. Medhurst (Shanghae Consul) declared the whole country within "fifty to sixty miles" was under Ti-ping jurisdiction; and Mr. Bruce notices the large export of silk from the districts where silk, he states, meets with "total destruction"! Now, common sense may inquire whether this totally destroyed country, "wretched state of anarchy," "native population that inevitably disappeared," and "property that miserably deteriorated," could have managed to produce 88,112 bales of silk in the year 1861? This, with only one exception, was the largest amount *ever* exported from China in one year. The silk districts were entirely in the possession of the Ti-pings, and every bale had passed through their hands. A reference to the table of statistics<sup>48</sup> will convince the most sceptical that the Ti-pings actually *increased* the valuable trade, but that since their expulsion from the silk districts, the produce and exportation of that article *has fallen off more than one half*.

There is another matter to be considered with regard to the political morality of Mr. Bruce. At the beginning of the year 1861 he officially stated:—

"It does not appear to me necessary to take any part in this conflict; but our material interests at Shanghae justify us in insisting on its being exempted from attack *until* the insurgents have sufficiently established their superiority to enable us to consider the contest as respects that part of China at an end. In that case, the population of the town will be quite ready to acknowledge the new power, and the authority of the Mandarins will fall without a blow."

Yet, when, according to the extracts from the despatch of Consul Medhurst, this "*until*" had arrived by the complete establishment of the Ti-ping superiority, Mr. Bruce singularly enough forgets his declaration of only a few months previous.

The Ti-pings at length, after successively capturing the important cities of Shou-shing, Fung-wha, Yü-yaou, and Tsze-kee, came in contact with the British authorities at Ningpo. Having occupied every part of the Che-kiang and Kiang-su provinces, to the south of the Yang-tze, with the exception of the three treaty ports, Shanghai, Ningpo, and Chin-kiang, the Ti-pings, both to preserve their conquests and prosecute their cause, were obliged to advance upon those cities, which had become the strongholds of the enemy. Upon their approach to Ningpo, a conference was held by the representatives of Great Britain, France, and the United States. The official report of this meeting states:—

"It has been decided that the undersigned<sup>49</sup> shall proceed this day (28th Nov.), on board Her Majesty's gun-boat *Kestrel*, to the rebel head-quarters... and having obtained an interview with the insurgent leaders, shall convey to them verbally, as well as in writing, the following message:—

"1. That the undersigned take *no part* in this civil contest, but that they claim exemption from injury and annoyance at the hands of both parties."...

This fresh pledge of neutrality, together with three other clauses respecting the forthcoming occupation of Ningpo, the foreign settlement, and the lives and property of the European residents, was given to the Ti-ping generals at Yü-yaou and Fung-wha. Nothing could have been more satisfactory than the result of this communication. The following are extracts from the account given by Mr. Hewlett (Consular Interpreter) of the interview with the Ti-ping chiefs:—

"We at once informed Hwang (Commanding-General at Yü-yaou) of the object of our visit," to which "he gave his unqualified assent, 'although,' he added, 'in the event of the

Mandarins resisting, and of my having to attack Ningpo, I cannot be responsible for the lives of any of your countrymen who may remain inside the city. Otherwise, I will do all I can to prevent their being molested, and will at once behead any of my followers who dare to offer them any annoyance.'

"He assured us that his desire was to keep well with foreigners, with whom *he was anxious to open trade*; spoke of us as worshippers of the same God and the same Jesus as themselves, and denominated us—'Wai-hsiung-te'—*their foreign brothers*.

"He seemed to entertain no doubt whatever of being successful in his attack on Ningpo.

"Eager inquiries were made on all sides for foreign firearms, of which they seem to have but few—a want that would be sufficiently felt were they ever to come in contact with troops courageous enough to stand against them."

This paragraph may fairly account for the successes afterwards gained over the ill-armed Ti-pings by Major Gordon's and other troops, well provided with British artillery, shell, rifles, &c., &c.

"As far as human life is concerned, the rebels, at the capture of Yü-yaou, appear to have used their opportunity with forbearance; we saw but few dead bodies, and of those some, as we were informed, *were their own men who had been caught plundering and burning*.

"Hwang having informed us that another body of troops, also under the She-wang's orders, and commanded by one Fang, a

general of equal rank with himself, was advancing on Ningpo from the Fung-wha, or south-west side, we proceeded up that branch of the river early on Monday morning, the 2nd instant, and found the said insurgents encamped at a place called Pih-too, but ten miles from Ningpo."

The following account of Mr. Hewlett's interview with Fang is worthy of the best attention, proving, as it does, the earnest desire of the poor Tipings to be on terms of friendship, even brotherhood, with all the nations of their "foreign brethren;" and that *any reasonable* wish of the British authorities would have been complied with.

"We at once went ashore, and put ourselves in communication with the leader, Fang, a man of only 25 years of age, and a native of Kwang-se. We hastened to represent to him the serious injury to trade that must ensue on the capture of Ningpo by his forces, and the consequent loss that would accrue to foreign interests, besides the danger, in reality no slight one, to foreign life and property, to be apprehended both from the lawless characters in his own ranks, and equally so from the bands of unruly Cantonese and Chin-chew men at Ningpo, ever on the look-out for an opportunity of indiscriminate plunder. We ended by eagerly dissuading him from advancing on Ningpo.

"To our two objections Fang replied by assuring us that his party were most anxious to keep well with foreigners, who, indeed, were no other than their brothers, inasmuch as both worshipped one God and one Jesus; and that as for trade, that would be allowed to go on as formerly, while he begged us to feel quite at ease as to the persons and property of our

countrymen, any molestation shown to whom would be followed by instant decapitation. *Their object being the overthrow of the present dynasty, they could not allow Ningpo to remain in the hands of the Imperialists.*

"It was with difficulty that we succeeded in persuading Fang to delay his attack on Ningpo for one week; another day, he said, was to have seen him there, had we not interposed.

"One could not help feeling struck with the earnestness and apparent sincerity of this young leader. Whilst alive to the dangers attending the cause in which he was engaged, he seemed to be confident that the support of Heaven would carry them through all their difficulties, and that, so aided, they must prevail. He told us that nearly the whole province was in their hands, or would be before long, and that Hang-chow, the provincial capital, would fall, 'as soon as Heaven should see fit to give it into their hands.'"

The General Hwang gave the following reply to the communication of the foreign representatives, which, together with Fang's, fairly expresses the aim and feeling of the Ti-ping Government:—

**"HWANG, TAI-PING LEADER AT YU-YAOU, TO CONSUL HARVEY."**

"Hwang, a noble of the rank of E,<sup>50</sup> with the prænomen 'Paon teen' ('Precious Heavenly'), and Commander-in-Chief of the chief army of his Highness Prince<sup>51</sup> Tsung, who is of the Royal body-guard in the capital of the Heavenly Dynasty, which is the dynasty patented under the true Divine Commission as the Heavenly Kingdom of Universal Peace, addresses an official

communication to F. Harvey, Esq., Her Majesty's Consul; W. Breck, Esq., United States Consul; Lieutenant H. Huxham, Royal Navy; Captain L. Obry, His Imperial Majesty's Navy, in reference to the interview held (this day) for the purpose of deliberating on the maintenance of friendly relations between the respective countries.

"From the foundations of the heavens and the earth, the world has been divided into the central kingdom, China, and the external kingdoms, foreign countries. Each kingdom, whether China or those of foreign countries, has been ruled over by men of its own nation. (This has been the universal practice.)

"But in the time of the Ming dynasty the Tartar imps, originally serfs from beyond the northern frontier, stole into China, and usurped the emblems of royalty [*lit.*, seized upon the divine materials], making unclean and polluting the land to a degree that no tongue can tell of [*lit.*, to a degree difficult for the fingers to reckon].

"Even till now, and during a period of more than 200 years, have they been going on in their wickedness, until at last their cup of iniquity is filled to the overflowing.

"At these their sins the Heavenly Father being exceeding wroth [*lit.*, his anger was as an earthquake], would have destroyed the world; then Jesus, the Heavenly Elder Brother, out of his mercy and lovingkindness towards mankind, sent down the true and holy Lord, the Heavenly King, to wash out the stains of the northern serfs, and to set up anew the house of Han [*i.e.*, to re-establish a purely native dynasty].

"These, then, are the times of changing the dynasty, and of reforming the kingdom prescribed by Heaven and submitted to by man.

"The command of the valiant troops of this great army has been conferred upon me by royal commission, with the allotted task of rooting out of the earth all that is unholy [*lit.*, of destroying in the east and exterminating in the west, part of a complete sentence, signifying a thorough eradication of evil from all the four quarters of the globe], and of visiting on the heads of their rulers the afflictions of the people.

"The highest object of my mission is none other than the foundation and establishment of the dynasty; subordinate to that, my aim is the welfare of the people [*lit.*, the black-haired multitudes], that I may weed out from among them those that oppress, and give peace to such as are true of heart.

"Hence it is that throughout the whole of my onward course 'there were none' (as it is written) 'that came not forth with meat and drink to welcome the soldiers of the King.'<sup>52</sup>

"Our great army having at this time invaded the province of Che-kiang, and the representatives of your several countries, stationed at Ningpo, having come this day to my head-quarters at Yü-yaou, to deliberate about maintaining amicable relations with us, on the understanding of mutual non-interference, and having requested me to order my troops to abstain, on their arrival at Ningpo, from injuring the persons or property of your respective countrymen at that place, I hereby promise to issue the above orders to my troops, and to command them to respect the terms of the agreement.

"In case any of my troops should dare, contrary to my orders, to molest any of your countrymen or to injure their property, I will, on your arresting and handing over to me the offender, at once behead him.

"In the same way, if any of the subjects of your respective countries should, contrary to your orders, take upon themselves to assist the imps in repelling our advance, you will in your turn direct them to refrain from so doing.

"From and after this date the friendly arrangement now agreed upon is to be binding on both parties.

"Sincerely trusting that you will not allow yourselves to feel anxious about this matter, and with wishes for your good health, I beg to forward this special communication.

"19th day of the 10th month of the 11th ('Sin-yew') year of the Heavenly Kingdom of Universal Peace" [November 29, 1861].

The General Fang gave the following answer:—

**"FANG, TAI-PING LEADER AT FUNG-HWA, TO CONSUL HARVEY.**

"Fang, Commander-in-Chief of the Forces, charged with the reduction of the disobedient, and a member of the Royal body-guard in the capital of the Heavenly Dynasty, &c., in official reply to F. Harvey, Esq., Her Majesty's Consul; W. Breck, Esq., United States Consul; Lieutenant H. Huxham, R.N.; Captain L. Obry, His Imperial Majesty's Navy, requesting them to set their minds at rest.

"The Almighty God, the Supreme Lord, the Heavenly Father, and Jesus the Heavenly Elder Brother, sent our true and holy Lord, the Heavenly King, down into the world, and ordained him to be Ruler over the Central Kingdom. To destroy the imps, to deliver the people, and to rescue the Central Empire; these are the chief objects of his desires.

"The special task of chastising the nation<sup>53</sup> [lit., those without the palace doors], with a view to the establishment of the Dynasty, has now been conferred upon me by royal commission. My mission is simply to show compassion to the people, and to punish the crimes of their rulers.

"The troops of my great army have now entered the department of Ningpo, and I fully purpose capturing the departmental city, and making it revert to the King to serve as a basis from which we may give peace to and console the four estates of the nation [scholars, husbandmen, mechanics, and traders].

"I have this day received your letter, and informed myself completely of its contents; all the requisitions therein contained I promise to comply with. I will, therefore, order my troops to frame their conduct after the Divine pattern, and to abstain from tumult and acts of aggression.

"Wherfore I beg of you to set your minds at rest.

"Good faith, as a principle of action, being a most important desideratum, no retraction must be made in respect of the number of days conceded prior to our advance on the city.

"With reference to the persons and property of your respective countrymen, I will issue the strictest orders, forbidding either the one or the other to be injured in the very least degree. Trade shall be allowed to continue as usual, with the additional advantage of being conducted on a fairer footing. On no account will acts of violence or robbery be permitted.

"One word from the superior man is sufficient to settle any affair; he is true, he is sincere, and hence no mistake or misunderstanding can arise.

"Whilst forwarding this in reply, I beg to express my wishes for your happiness.

(Enclosed, twenty-one Proclamations.)

"22nd day of the 10th month of the 11th ('Sin-yew') year of the Heavenly Kingdom of Universal Peace" [2nd December, 1861].

Faithfully fulfilling that extraordinary example of their willingness to preserve friendship with foreigners—the promise to delay their occupation of Ningpo one week—the Ti-pings, immediately upon the expiration of the seven days, on the morning of December 9, moved up to the city walls, and within an hour Ningpo was completely in their possession; the Manchoos, Mandarins, regular troops, *braves*, pirates, and all, having fled from the city, scarcely striking a blow in its defence.

Although the British authorities contented themselves upon this occasion with underhanded hostility against the Ti-pings, the same unworthy procedure was equally as much a violation of the principle of their pledged neutrality as the open warfare they shortly commenced in the neighbourhood of Shanghae. As all assertions of this description require

proof, it is necessary to encumber this narrative with extracts from the official documents that, for the honour of England, should remain in oblivion for ever, were they not necessary to prove the disreputable transactions of various officials, and my reasons for advocating the Ti-ping cause.

I have already noticed the singular sort of interpretation put upon the "no wish to quarrel," "the wish to maintain amicable relations," and the orders to "abstain from all interference in the civil war," "maintain an attitude of strict neutrality," &c., by Admiral Hope and Captain R. Dew. We will therefore conclude the review of "fitting twelve heavy guns," &c. at Ningpo, by one other example of breach of faith and neutrality.

The instructions to the Ningpo Consul by Mr. Bruce were to "take no part" in defending the city. The written guarantee forwarded to the leaders of the *powerful* advancing army were precisely similar. "The undersigned take *no* part in this civil contest." Now, in spite of these pledges, we have seen Admiral Hope order "every obstruction" to be placed before the Ti-pings. In his account of the capture of Ningpo he fairly admits his own faithlessness thus:—

"2. Everything had been done to assist the Imperialists in the defence of the town, except the use of force, in their favour, and their Lordships will not fail to observe how utterly useless such measures proved, in consequence of the cowardice and imbecility of the Mandarins."

This taking "no part" and at the same time doing "everything to assist" one belligerent requires no comment.

When the Ti-ping forces assaulted Ningpo, the Commander-in-Chief of the Imperialists ran away, and being lowered over the city wall with a number of retainers, received protection from the British Consul, who facilitated their escape. This same Consul, in his report of the city's capture to Lord Russell, states:—

"Ningpo is now in the full and unquestionable possession of the Taeping forces. I am glad to state that, up to the present time, there has been no slaughter, or massacre, or fires, within the walls; and that, with the exception of a few men killed, and a certain amount of destruction of property, the rebels have, so far, conducted themselves with *wonderful moderation*."

Admiral Hope, in his report to the Admiralty of the same event, states:

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"The behaviour of the rebels has been good hitherto, and they profess a strong desire to remain on good terms with foreigners."

Here we find the most positive proof that the principal alleged reason for the defence of Shanghae against the insurgents, namely, because their "success in any locality is attended with its *total destruction*," is utterly false. While "the ruthless nature of the war they wage" is thus urged (as though even it could justify the dishonouring of British pledges) against the Ti-pings, we find that upon the only occasion this theory was subjected to proof, by the reports of their most bitter opposers, they behaved "*with wonderful moderation*."

Mr. Parkes (late Secretary to Lord Elgin's Embassy), in a memorandum upon the capture of Ningpo, still further proves the great friendliness of the insurgents. He says:—

"The Ningpo rebels have shown the utmost desire to be on friendly terms with foreigners. Outside the south gate, which formed the point of attack, stands the establishment of the Sisters of Charity, which, if occupied, would form excellent cover for an assaulting force, as its upper windows command the city walls; yet, although they crouched underneath its enclosures, as they collected for their rush on the gate, they did not trespass for a moment within the premises. Another large Roman Catholic establishment was one of the first buildings

they had to pass, as they poured into the city, flushed and excited with their success; but they only stopped to *welcome* a small knot of foreigners who were standing underneath the porch, and to charge their people to offer them no harm. Roman Catholics and Protestants they hailed indiscriminately as being of the same religion and fraternity as themselves....

"The house of one of the principal Chinese of Ningpo, who is well known at Shanghae, from his wealth and the prominent support he has always given to the Government, remain untouched, *simply because he has hired a Frenchman to live in it, and give his name temporarily to the premises.*"

Now the ignorant and designing have delighted themselves by exhausting the most damning epithets upon the so-called "bloodthirsty marauders," "ruthless brigands," &c.; yet the following extract from the same memorandum (of an enemy, be it remembered) seems to indicate those persons as being either remarkably imaginative or mendacious:—  
"It must be stated, however, to their credit, that as yet the capture of Ningpo, and it is believed also of the other cities of this province, has *not* been marked with those atrocities which the rebels are known to have committed elsewhere."

The "atrocities" committed elsewhere were those occasioned by the hard necessity of the war, and when the Ti-pings had no choice but to kill or be killed. But the question of Ti-ping atrocities could not possibly be construed into any fair cause of hostilities against them, it being a well-known fact that of the two belligerents they were by far the most humane.

The occupation of Ningpo by the Ti-ping forces may be justly considered the culminating point of their successes, and the termination of a period of British policy towards them, that period being the deceitful one. Almost immediately after that important event, the hitherto covert hostility

of the British Government became exchanged for a more decided action, and the epoch of open hostility was established by the commencement of direct military operations against the Ti-pings from Shanghae, shortly followed by the same policy at Ningpo.

Some few days after the fall of Ningpo, Admiral Hope proceeded to Nankin for the purpose of obtaining a renewal of the promise by the Ti-ping authorities not to attack Shanghae for one year, as the former agreement expired at the end of 1861. The arrangement, however, was not again approved by the Ti-pings, not only because the British contracting officials had broken faith with regard to their pledge of preventing the Imperialists from using Shanghae for purposes of aggression against them, but from the fact that Shanghae had become the very arsenal and rallying-place of their enemy. To these principal and all-sufficient causes, others might be added, such as the undeniable belligerent right of the Ti-pings to capture any city just as they captured Ningpo.

The Ti-ping authorities having very properly refused to become a party to prejudice their own interest, Admiral Hope conducted the following communication with them, as if to find some pretext for making the approach of the Ti-pings upon Shanghae a *casus belli*. The correspondence is well worthy of the closest attention. The open arrogance and unsound reasoning of the British portion being no less conspicuous than the righteous tenor and sound argument of the Ti-pings.

**"COMMUNICATION MADE BY COMMANDER  
BINGHAM TO THE TAEPING AUTHORITIES  
AT NANKING, ON THE 27TH OF DECEMBER, 1861.**

"I am directed by the Commander-in-Chief of the Naval Forces of Her Majesty the Queen of England in the Chinese Seas, to acquaint you—

"1. That during the last year certain British subjects have sustained losses by robberies committed in the territories which are held by your armies, and that it is therefore necessary that you make immediate and satisfactory arrangements for their receiving compensation. These losses amount to 7,563 taels 1 mace 7 candarenes, 4,800 dollars, 20 bales of silk, and 2 muskets, as shown by the accompanying list.

"2. That junks which carry British colours are no less British vessels than those which are foreign-built, and that they must be allowed to pass up and down the river free from examination or any other molestation, in conformity with the agreement made with you in the early part of this year. That in order to insure that no junk hoists a British flag which is not entitled to do so, their papers will be examined by the senior officer here, who will take the British flag away from any vessel not entitled to wear it, and will give notice of having done so to the Chief Officer of the Customs.

"3. That the promise made by you that your troops should not approach within 100 *li* of Shanghae and Woo-sung has not been faithfully observed. The Commander-in-Chief now requires that, in proof of your good faith you select an officer of high rank who shall accompany him to Shanghae and who shall from thence proceed in company with one of his officers to the ports in its vicinity, which are held by your forces, so that the order on the subject may be shown to the officers commanding them, with the view of preventing further mistakes.

"4. That a large and valuable British trade having sprung up at Kiu-kiang and Hankow, the Commander-in-Chief is under the

necessity of requiring a promise from you that your forces will not approach these places within 100 *li*; also that you are distinctly to understand that Silver Island, the residence of the British Consul at Chin-kiang-foo, is not to be molested.

(Signed) "HENRY M. BINGHAM.

"*Renard*, Nanking, December 27, 1861."

"REPLY OF THE TAEPING AUTHORITIES AT NANKING  
TO COMMANDER BINGHAM.

"Mung, the young Prince of Tsan, Jin, Prince of Chang, and Se, Prince of Shun, Defenders of the Court, Pillars of Heaven, in the Divine Kingdom of Universal Peace, being the Kingdom of the Heavenly Father, the Heavenly Elder Brother, and the Heavenly King, make this joint reply to Captain Bingham, British Senior Naval Officer at Nanking.

"On the 18th day (December 28) of the 11th month of the 11th or Sin-yew year of the Divine Kingdom of the Heavenly Father, Heavenly Elder Brother, and Heavenly King, we received your letter setting forth four points, which you state you had been directed to communicate to us by the Naval Commander-in-Chief of your country.

"We have acquainted ourselves with the contents of your communication, which has occasioned us the greatest surprise; we bear in mind that while your country pays adoration to Jesus, our Divine Kingdom respectfully worships Shang-te.

"The worship of Jesus is the fount and origin of our religions, and thus from age to age we have been as one family; therefore when your country came to discuss matters with us in the spring, our Lord the Heavenly King issued to us his sacred commands ordering us to receive you with courtesy, and to deal with you in perfect sincerity, in order to mark our high regard for those who are allied with and are of the same origin as ourselves. Being thus united by our religion, which is the worship of Heaven, and also by our friendly (political) relations, it is above all things necessary that we should respectively adhere to our Heavenly principles both in mind and action, and that we should compare our wants with those of others, instead of seeking only our own profit at the expense of the interests of our fellow-men. It is thus that you prove your friendship to be indeed sincere.

"On considering the four proposals set forth in your communication, we find that our Divine Kingdom cannot assent to them, and we shall proceed to state in detail the grounds of our refusal.

"The first point is a demand for compensation for 7,360 taels and odd silver, 200 taels' worth of copper cash, 4,800 dollars, 20 bales of raw silk, and 2 muskets, all said to have been taken by people of our Divine Kingdom in the 5th, 6th, and 7th months of the present year at Soo-heu, Suh-kea-kiang, Lew-hoo, Kaou-ching (Laou-ching), and other places.

"There is an absence of right in this demand. Everything deserving of credit admits of proof. Although the places named are not 1,000 *li* distant from our capital, they are situated

several hundreds of *li* from it, and nearly half a year has elapsed since the alleged occurrences took place.

"It is unreasonable to demand compensation for claims, when no proofs can be produced, and the assertion of such claims is in itself a very unfriendly act. Were we, of the Divine Kingdom, to put forward such unfounded claims, what course, may we ask, would your country pursue? If our nation have indeed established a custom-house at San-le-keaou, and exacted a double levy of duty in the manner stated, how is it, as your merchant-boats are constantly passing that spot, that a single instance only of such conduct should have occurred? We will not, however, take upon ourselves to deny that your boat had to submit to the exaction; but, granting that it occurred, it should be remembered that at this juncture, when a movement is going on throughout the Empire, local marauders and wandering people naturally take advantage of the opportunity afforded them to commit depredations. How, therefore, do you know that these robberies were not the work of parties of these vagabonds, simulating the appearance and profiting by the fear inspired by the troops of the Divine dynasty? Or how do you know that some of the Tartar imps have not personated the officers and troops of the Divine Kingdom, and in that feigned character plundered your merchant-boats, with a view, by these nefarious means, of causing ill-will between our two families? Moreover, if the places named have indeed been brought under the rule of our Celestial dynasty, our lieutenants must be there in garrison; and if these irregularities were committed by their troops, how is it that your country did not immediately bring them to the notice of those officers, in order that they may at once take steps for the punishment of the offenders? Instead of

doing this, however, you allow a long time to elapse, and then you suddenly come to our capital to raise discussions with us on the subject at this distance!

"In the second point of your communication you claim, 'that junks which carry British colours are no less British vessels than those which are foreign-built, and must therefore be allowed to pass up and down the river free from examination or any other molestation, in conformity with the agreement made in the early part of this year.'

"On this we have to observe, that an agreement once entered into should be most faithfully and strictly adhered to, and cannot be departed from. Now in the agreement concluded with you in the spring, it is not stated that junks carrying British colours are no less British vessels than those which are foreign-built, and are therefore entitled to pass free from examination or molestation.

"The idea is now suddenly started by your country for the first time. But in the transaction of business, an open and straightforward course of action must be pursued, if distrust and suspicion are to be avoided. Suppose that a Chinese merchant has goods, the duties on which amount to a considerable sum, and that your country would not ask him to pay more than half that sum in return for a flag and papers which should free him from all charge on passing our custom-houses, is it not evident that the dishonest trader would gladly turn such an opportunity to account, and that in that case we should soon find that our custom-houses had been established to no purpose?

"Moreover, the rules of the custom-houses of our Divine Kingdom permit the merchants and people of all places, and those who still shave their heads, to pass to and fro, and trade in salt and other goods on payment of the duties that are defined by regulation. This institution has been too long in existence to make it reasonable that it now should be set aside.

"Again, in the former agreement, no arrangement whatever was made respecting the employment of Chinese junks by your country, the stipulation as to the free passage to the river being confined to vessels of your own country. We agreed to this arrangement as a friendly act to those who are of the same family as ourselves. But if native junks should be largely employed by your nation, we have good cause to fear the treachery of the Imperial imps, who will employ these junks in the furtherance of their own dark and evil designs by falsely passing them off as your trading-craft. If this were the case, how greatly would our difficulties of defence be increased!

"Furthermore, the customs form the most important source of revenue on which we depend for the support of the soldiers of our Divine dynasty; and if, by undue protection granted to native junks, the payment of duties is avoided, general indignation would be felt among all our princes, high functionaries, officers, and soldiers; and they would never allow such an arrangement to continue in force. In putting forward this proposal, your country shows that you seek only your own profit, regardless of the welfare of others; and you are acting in a manner that is calculated neither to promote friendly relations, nor to induce reliance on your own promises.<sup>54</sup>

"The third point states that the promise made in the second month of the present year, that the Taeping troops should not approach within 100 *li* of Shanghae and Woo-sung has not been faithfully observed, &c.

"It is true that in the spring of this year we did make an agreement of this nature, but if we discuss it by strict principles it will be seen that there is no spot under the wide canopy of heaven that was not created by Shangte, that upon us rests the obligation of recovering by our arms the whole of China for Shangte, and that it is difficult for us to make any exception in the matter of territory, even to the extent of a foot of soil. It was only in consideration of your nation being of the same origin as ourselves that we acted as we did.

"Though commerce may be to you the means of livelihood, to us the possession of territory is all-important. It was only as a mark of our benevolent and just regard for our fellow-men that we consented for the space of the present year to avoid making any attack on Shanghae and Woo-sung, and when we entered into that agreement we issued our commands requiring it to be observed at all places in our possession, and have received reports from our various commanders, assuring us that our orders have been most scrupulously observed. But as it is obligatory on our Divine armies to kill the imps wherever they are to be found, how can our heavenly troops be forbidden to fulfil this duty? If there were no impish forces at Shanghae and Woo-sung, the Chung-wang and She-wang would certainly not think of sending their troops to take those places; and should you be willing to undertake the expulsion of the impish soldiers, then our Divine dynasty will send officers to

tranquillize those places, and to protect not only the people but your trade also.

"Why, then, should the advance of our Divine soldiers within 100 *li* occasion you any apprehension? The present year is now drawing to a close, and with it the time named in our agreement, and we can never consent that our Divine troops shall not prepare to attack those places, simply out of consideration for your trade. It occasions us, therefore, great surprise to suddenly receive from you such a proposal, at the very time when the Chung-wang and She-wang, at the head of several millions of the Divine soldiers, are engaged in recovering from the enemy Soo-chow, Hang-chow, and the whole province.

"Your fourth point is to the effect that, as a large and valuable British trade has sprung up at Kiu-kiang and Hankow, you wish us to promise not to approach these places within 100 *li*, and also not to molest Silver Island, the residence of the British Consul at Chin-kiang.

"We have well considered this proposal, and consider that in putting it forward your country has committed a grave error. The case stands thus:—It is now long since our vast and illustrious Empire of China became the prey of these Tartars, who know no respect for Shangte, nor any other worship than that of devils. All sons and daughters of Heaven should be moved with the deepest enmity against them, with a hatred too deep to allow of their living together with them in the same world, and, therefore, wherever they are to be found, death should await them at our hands. Strange that just at the very

time when we are about to despatch troops to take Hankow, Kiu-kiang, Chin-kiang, and Silver Island, your country should seek, under the guise of maintaining friendly relations with ourselves, to render secret assistance to the Tartar imps, by occupying several of their most important positions, and thus completely fettering our movements.

"How can we possibly consent to such a proposal?

"When we have taken Hankow, Kiu-kiang, Chin-kiang, and Silver Island, and tranquillized those places, if your country should then wish to conduct trade there as before, what is there to prevent your entering into further negotiations with our nation on these points? That being the case, what object can you have in requiring us not to take those places? If you entertain fears as to the conduct of our soldiers, and think that they may commit wanton slaughter or destruction, you should know that Heaven guides all our actions, and that while we kill all those who pay Heaven no respect, we save, on the other hand, all those who prove themselves, by worshipping Heaven, to be Heaven's children.

"All our power is derived from Shangte, and from Christ comes our support; all our acts are done in their sight and receive their entire approval.

"If you make the anticipated dispersion of the merchants and people of those ports an argument in favour of your proposal, we meet it by observing that when your officers conferred with us in the spring, this very point came under discussion. At first it was proposed on your side that we should not attack Kiu-kiang and Hankow, but afterwards, when we made it clear (to

your officers) in the orders we gave them that it was necessary that we should attack and take the whole of China, as being the territory of Shangte, they replied, If your troops do not kill or injure British subjects, or do not burn or plunder British houses or property, then we shall remain neutral and assist neither party. To which we replied that you should not only remain neutral, but should also take no offence at our troops, if the people in their alarm were to disperse, and thus cause your trade to be interfered with. Your officers replied, We shall take no offence, but we shall require you to give us notice of your intention to attack these places. To this we answered, We will not refuse to give you notice before we make our attack, but we are afraid that our communications with you may be obstructed by the impish camps, and that when we shall have succeeded in sweeping these away, the time then left will not be sufficient for the purpose, and the omission may prove a cause of trouble. We added, however, that your country must not again act as you did at Shanghae, where you received the letters of our nation, and yet assisted the Tartar forces to defend that city. Thus it will be seen that the point has been already fully considered, and that it is useless to enter into any further discussion.

"To resume. As friendly relations exist between us, let us regard each other as people of the same family. Those whom we are thus hotly engaged in slaughtering are no other than the Tartar imps and robbers, and the whole empire of China is the conquest we intend to effect. As the Tartar imps have not yet been exterminated, and the great work of conquest is still incomplete, we cannot give our consent to such proposals as those which your country now makes to us.

"Your only course, therefore, is to wait until the Tartar imps shall have been annihilated, when we shall be ready to give our attention to any advantageous measures that your country may have to propose.

"We trust you will listen to this advice and raise no further questions; also that you will firmly maintain the present peaceful relations, and give no occasion for distrust or ill-will. These are the hopes that should be earnestly entertained on both sides.

"P.S. We observe that the translation of the letter before us, and the paper communicating the points under discussion (the English original?) are written on white paper and bear no seal. It is very difficult for us to know whether documents thus prepared are spurious or authentic, and we fear that they could easily be imitated by the Tartar imps, and that the fraud might be attended with serious consequences.

"We trust, therefore, that in order to establish the authenticity of your documents your country will in future observe the practice of affixing your seal to them.

"Dated the 22nd day of the 11th month of the 11th or Sin-yew year of the Divine Kingdom of Universal Peace, being the Kingdom of the Heavenly Father, Heavenly Elder Brother, and Heavenly King (January 1, 1862)."

**"COMMANDER BINGHAM TO THE TAEPING  
AUTHORITIES AT NANKING.**

*"Reward, Nanking, January 1, 1862.*

"I am directed by the Commander-in-Chief of the Naval Forces of the Queen of England in the Chinese Seas to acknowledge the receipt of your reply to the communication made by me four days ago, and to acquaint you—

"1. That in bringing the demands for compensation for the robberies committed on British subjects to the notice of the authorities at Nanking, instead of exacting redress for them on the spot where they were committed, he has given you the strongest proof of his desire to treat you in a friendly manner.

"Your refusal to do justice gives him the right to take his own measures for procuring adequate redress for these injuries.

"2. That he will take effectual measures to prevent any vessel carrying the English flag which has not the right to do so, but that he will not permit vessels, whether of European or Chinese construction, which are owned by British subjects, to be interfered with in any way or under any pretext, in their undoubted right of navigating the Yang-tze-kiang River free from all molestation, and you will do so at your peril.

"3. The towns of Shanghae and Woo-sung, as you well know, are occupied by the military forces of England and France, and if you repeat the absurdity of attacking them, you will incur, not merely a repulse as on a former occasion, but such further consequences as your folly will deserve.

"4. Your refusal to enter into an engagement to leave Silver Island, Kiu-kiang, and Hankow free from molestation, all places which you have not the slightest chance of attacking with success, proves to the Commander-in-Chief that your

expressions of friendly feeling are mere words, and the necessity of dealing with you accordingly.

(Signed) "HENRY M. BINGHAM."

## FOOTNOTES:

43. See page 46, Blue Book.

44. See page 50, Blue Book.

45. See page 64, Blue Book.

46. See page 50, Blue Book.

47. See page 51, Blue Book.

48. See Appendix B.

49. William Breck, Esq., United States Consul.

M. Leon Obry, His Imperial Majesty's Navy, commanding steamer *Confucius*.

Lieutenant Henry Huxham, R.N., commanding H.M.'s gunboat *Kestrel*.

Frederick Harvey, Esq., Her Majesty's Consul.

50. "E" corresponds to the Chinese title "Kung," or Duke.

51. i.e., She-wang (the Assistant Prince).

52. A quotation from the "Sze Shoo Mencius," tom. i. chap. 2. The King of Tse is inquiring of Mencius whether he ought to take possession of the kingdom of Yeu, lately conquered by him. Mencius, instancing the practice of the ancient kings Wan and Woo under similar circumstances, replies that, unless the voice of the people invites the invader to take possession, he is not justified in so doing. Hence the rebels would have it believed that they have enlisted in their cause the sympathies of the nation, without which, according to received notions, it will be impossible for them to obtain the "Teen-ming" (the Divine Commission), and, by consequence, the Empire.

53. i.e., those of the nation who do not submit.

54. "On the occasion when they recently stopped some British junks at Woo-hoo, eventually retaining two (subsequently released by the *Bouncer*), in pledge for payment of duty, on the whole their demand amounted to 2,000 taels. Their right to levy moderate duties on all vessels trading in the territories they hold was allowed in the original arrangement entered into with them, but they were, at the same time, distinctly acquainted that I had stationed a vessel of war at Nanking for the express purpose of securing to British vessels entire freedom in the exercise of their right of navigating the Yang-tze. The necessity of preventing any interference whatever with the passing trade by the rebels, arises from the impracticability of recovering any duties they might extort

without a serious collision. In the case of Imperialists, redress could always ultimately be obtained by reference through the Minister to the Government at Peking.—J. HOPE."

This is the excuse given for depriving the Ti-pings of their revenue.

# Volume 2

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Chinese Custom-houses.—Attempts at Extortion.—An Adventure.—Ruse de Guerre.—Its Success.—Peace Negotiations.—Their abrupt Termination.—The Plot thickens.—A Companion in Misfortune.—Negotiations renewed.—Their Failure.—Hostilities.—Critical Position.—Danger increases.—Attempted Rescue.—The Mud Fort Mandarin.—His Fate.—The Civil Mandarin.—Rescued at last.—*The Williamette.*

The route by which I returned to the broad expanse of "The Son of the Sea" was, if possible, more infested with so-called custom-houses than that by which I had reached Sin-ya-meu. Every two or three *le* some wretched little bamboo-hut would make its appearance round a bend of the creek, with a long pole and a dirty white rag on the end, containing huge red and black characters, setting forth the official nature of the den. Then sundry opium-stupified, villainous-looking mandarin soldiers would rush from their pipes and gambling, catch up their rusty gingalls and long bamboo spears, and loudly call upon my Chinese captain to "soong mow" (let go the anchor), and pay a duty, or squeeze, into their dirty hands. Upon such occasions P —— and myself would be compelled to get on deck with our fowling-pieces, and drive the harpies off, when they would sullenly retire to their opium and cards, muttering curses upon the *Yang-quitzo*, and trusting for better prey next time.

This sort of thing may seem very like smuggling, but it was really far from being so. The duty upon my cargo was levied at Sin-ya-meu, previous to embarkation, and was paid to the customs officials; and from that town to Kwa-chow the fifteen to twenty custom stations were every one of them charging in excess of the legal duty. Chinese have frequently informed me that the governor of a province lets these squeeze stations out to subordinate mandarins, who then farm them at discretion. The mandarins have *braves*

enough to enforce their extortion; all passing junks are stopped until payment is made; and if the aggrieved people should complain, their petition goes before the governor who thrives upon the system. This is one of the many forms of Government corruption throughout China; to many the extortionate *régime* of the Manchoo must appear incredible, though it is a fact pretty widely known, even by those who are striving to uphold it.

Although during our dinner a couple of *braves* succeeded in getting on board from a squeeze barrier, which led to their tailor becoming acquainted with our shoemaker during the process of summary ejectment, myself and friend reached the great river without further mishap than an occasional exposure to the ill-aimed gingall balls of some of the baffled plunderers. At Kwa-chow, the entrance to the Grand Canal on the northern bank of the Yang-tze, we passed through a large fleet of Imperialist *Ti-mungs*, row-gunboats, and a big customs station; the officials evidently wished to squeeze us, but, I imagine, the vicinity of the treaty port Chin-kiang deterred them. Shooting into the yellow waters once more, a fair wind carried us bravely over the strong adverse current.

Winter having now set in, and the north-east monsoon commenced to blow up the whole length of the Yang-tze-kiang, thus enabling vessels to sail against the tide very well, we made considerable progress on our way to Nankin before anchoring for the night. At daylight we were underway and sailing merrily along, myself and P—— keeping regular watch and watch—a course rendered necessary by the danger apprehended from the numerous Imperialist gunboats and fortified positions in the neighbourhood of Tippingdom.

Till noon we carried the breeze, but the day becoming hot the wind fell, and so we were obliged to run close to the bank, land our crew with a mast-head rope, and slowly track up stream. Just before dusk a light breeze sprang up again, and getting the men on board we made sail to round the "Mud Port," situated on the extreme point of the elbow formed by the river at Ningan-shan. This fort, upon my passage down from Nankin, was held by the

Ti-pings; upon this occasion, to my sorrow, I found the Imperialists in possession; its former garrison having betrayed their charge, and sold it to the enemy.

We had barely rounded the point, making almost imperceptible headway, when the wind failed, and the tide, at this point very strong, began to carry us down stream. At this moment, five gunboats put off from the shore and pulled directly towards my vessel. Upon nearing her, they hailed and ordered us to anchor. I now perceived that they were Imperialists, and, from the flags displayed, that they were of the squeezing, or custom-house genus. P—— and myself immediately armed ourselves, and ordered the *lowder* to hold on his course. The tide was fast drifting our vessel in to the bank, right under the guns of the fort, and directly the men in the gunboats perceived this, and saw only two foreigners on board, and that we mounted no guns, they surrounded us and opened fire.

Our position was now decidedly unpleasant. We had drifted to within a few yards of the bank, the guns in the fort were manned, several more boats were putting off, filled with men, and the shore was lined with soldiers, placing their gingalls and matchlocks, and making ready to fire upon us. I well knew the unscrupulous nature of these plundering Imperialists, that our duty-receipts from Sin-ya-meu would not be regarded, and that they would most willingly cut our throats for the value of five dollars. With the force opposed to us, and no chance to make even a running fight, it would have been madness to have returned the gunboats' fire with our rifles and fowling-pieces; we therefore took it like lambs, and devoutly wished for a sudden puff of wind to waft us from our perilous situation. Not a breath, not the very gentlest zephyr came, excepting the wind caused by the shots that were flying all around, some of which, better aimed than the majority, were smashing into our poor old vessel, quite regardless of the consequences. The men on shore and the guns of the fort now opened fire; while the gunboats, finding we did not seem inclined to fight, appeared to be getting ready to board.

At this critical juncture a fortunate thought came into my head. I had my old uniform on board, and the idea formed was to use it to personate a foreign official, and so endeavour to save our heads by giving the imps an impression as to our importance, and a dread of the consequences in case of molestation. Jumping into the cabin, I quickly reappeared with uniform and sword. My friend P—— also had some uniform he had worn in the Indian navy, so following my example, he dived into his chest and then rushed on deck gorgeous in brass-bound array. We were not a moment too soon with our device, for P—— had just got on deck when one of our Chinese sailors was knocked over by a shot, and the rest, taking fright, suddenly let go the anchor, and casting adrift the halyards of the sails, let them go by the run; after which they ran and hid themselves down below. I now hailed the nearest gunboat to come alongside, telling my interpreter to state that we were foreign officers, or mandarins, that we were followed by a man-of-war, and that we were sailing about in the junk for pleasure.

When the *braves* observed our uniform, and were invited to board, their hitherto noisy courage seemed to vanish, and they would not come. However, they ceased blazing their confounded guns at us, much to our satisfaction, for although Chinese shot, with a tremendous whistling by reason of its uneven casting, makes much more noise than effect, and generally performs parabolas of singular eccentricity, *some* strike the object, especially when fired at a distance of only a few yards.

Our vessel was anchored within 30 feet of the bank, we were therefore completely in the power of the imps, who mustered at least 600 strong at that place. I again hailed the gunboat containing the man I imagined to be the principal officer, to come alongside, and let me know what they wanted; but the fellows seemed suspicious of some trap, and continued to lay on their oars, all talking and yelling together at the top of their individual voices, each trying to make himself heard above every one else, in approved Chinese style.

At last the mandarin in charge of the fort made his appearance on the bank, and after his attendants had shouted themselves hoarse, trying to make his orders heard above the din, the jabbering in the gunboats ceased, and the one I had hailed proceeded very slowly and cautiously to come alongside. She contained a couple of officers, whom we got on board, showing them our revolvers, and politely informing them, in pure mandarin dialect, that if their men followed them, we should be under the painful necessity of depositing a bullet or two in their yellow carcasses. This had the desired effect, and the fierce-looking *braves* were ordered to remain in their boats, much to their disgust, for their fingers, no doubt, were itching to handle the valuables of the "foreign devils."

When we had seated the two officials in our cabin, an old number of the *Hong-Kong Daily Press* was produced as our commission in the service of His Majesty the Emperor of America, while a Manchester rug, of the stars and stripes pattern, was displayed as our banner. To all this the Chinamen "chin-chin'd" with the greatest respect, but they still referred to the fact that our vessel carried a cargo, and declared their chief's intention to squeeze a certain amount of dollars out of us. The duty-passes we had received at Sin-ya-meu were then produced and the officers took them ashore to their superior. They soon returned, and requested me to accompany them to an interview with the head mandarin, stating that he was determined to have some money, which he chose to term "duty," for conscience' sake, I suppose, although it was certainly a most unmitigated attempt at robbery.

Before landing, I made my conductors fully understand that, upon the slightest attempt at treachery I should shoot *them*. I took my revolver with me, and proceeded to the mandarin's presence, leaving P—— on board, to preserve our effects from the plundering propensities of the villainous mob into whose clutches we had fallen.

My interpreter A-ling, our cook, Ganymede, and the *lowder*, accompanied me on shore as a retinue of state, somewhat suitable for the dignity of representatives of our supposed emperor. The *Daily Press* was

carefully carried in an old glove-box by A-ling, while the cook was deputed to carry our cards (in the shape of two labels from bottles of Bass's pale ale) to the mandarin; the boy carried presents, consisting of a couple of empty eau-de-cologne bottles, an *Illustrated London News*, and a box of damaged percussion caps; the *lowder* brought up the rear with our (Manchester) banner streaming from a tall bamboo. Although the soldiers crowded round us they did not offer much annoyance; probably they were awed by our stately bearing and procession. We reached the Yamun (official residence), the pale-ale labels were duly delivered, and then we were ushered into the august presence of the cruel, sensual, dirty-looking mandarin, my followers imposingly taking up their position behind me. The *Daily Press* was displayed by A-ling, who, clever fellow that he was, to show its importance, bent on one knee while presenting it.

The display of the newspaper, the presents, and our uniform, seemed to make a decided impression upon the mandarin, and we should probably have been set free but for a *mal-à-propos* circumstance that now occurred. I had sent the *lowder* down to the beach, loudly ordering him to look out for the imaginary man-of-war steamer I gave our captors to understand was following me, and to report her approach whenever she came in sight. This had considerably subdued the mandarin's arrogant tone, for he was evidently not well up in foreign affairs, and provincial Chinese have a wonderful idea of the "fiery dragon ships" of the "foreign devils." He was just commencing a set apology for the mistake committed by his "ignorant braves," when in came our pig-headed *lowder*, or rather, into the apartment he was kicked by a couple of soldiers holding on to his tail, and most unmercifully thumping, kicking, and bumping him along from behind.

It appeared that the wretch had got into conversation with some of the *braves* on the beach; they had asked him where our vessel was bound, and he naïvely told them to Nankin, *the rebel capital!* They instantly seized and dragged him before the mandarin. The long-winded apology came to an abrupt termination, and the orator turned his attention to examining the

miserable *lowder* as to our connection with the Ti-pings. The stupid captain of our sailors now declared that he only *thought* we were going to touch at Nankin *en route*, to make some demand upon the rebels with regard to the seizure of some foreign-owned junks. The mandarin at last ordered him to be taken into the fort, and dismissed us with an intimation that we must wait till the next morning to have a duty levied upon our cargo, and to adjust the whole affair.

The *Daily Press* was ceremoniously returned to the glove-box, the stars and stripes were rolled up, and we were escorted back to our vessel by the two officers. Upon getting on board, I found P—— all safe, and promenading the deck like a moving armory, with a rifle over his shoulder, a revolver and brace of horse-pistols in his belt, and a sword by his side; while four gunboats were chained fast alongside, the crews of which, with their heads poked over our bulwarks, were viciously eyeing the Cerberus who prevented them from indulging their natural propensities.

I found our vessel thoroughly secured by the imps, who had taken every precaution to guard against a *coup-de-main* upon our part. Chains were rove through each ring-bolt on our deck and fastened on board the gunboats, two of them being lashed on each side, full of armed men watchful and on the alert. A long chain was passed from our bows to the shore, and a number of matchlock men were encamped for the night right abreast. Even had it been possible to strike a sudden blow and release ourselves, as it was a dead calm they could have pulled after our vessel and blown her to pieces, if they could not have mustered courage to board us. There was nothing to do but to trust to the chapter of accidents for a way out of the difficulty, and, if necessary, to sell our lives dearly.

It was a matter of considerable surprise to myself and friend that the Imperialists did not behave worse to us, for they neither yelled "Yang-quitzo," threw stones, nor seemed so anxious to attack us as the generality of Manchoo troops would have been. This we afterwards accounted for by the fact that they had formerly been Ti-pings, and had not quite forgotten that

they had once been worshippers of Yesu, and had looked upon strangers from the West as "foreign brethren." Their chief had turned traitor to the Tipping cause, and betrayed the "Mud Fort" to the Manchoo, in consideration of retaining his own followers, receiving *carte blanche* to squeeze all passing vessels, and being decorated with a mandarin button and feathers. They were a savage-looking set, these "Mud Fort" banditti, yet, bad as they seemed to be, were much better than the usual style of Imperialists; had we fallen into the hands of the latter we should have been treated with much indignity and violence, if not killed.

We were aroused in the middle of the night by a tremendous hubbub, and, running on deck, found it was the Mud Fort people engaged seizing another unfortunate European vessel. Getting into our boat, I went on board, and found she was a *Ningpo Boat*, from Shanghae to Hankow, and that the only foreigner on board was an Englishman, to whom she belonged. The soldiers hauled his vessel close in to the bank a little below mine, and there made her fast in a similar manner. After talking over our mutual misfortune, we agreed that in the morning I should land, and endeavour to obtain our release; failing which, I was to get on board his craft with P——; we were then to man her guns (she carried two six-pounders), try to force both vessels adrift, and make a fight to escape.

After a not particularly refreshing sleep, I again went on board the *Ningpo Boat*, to settle our plan for the last time, preparatory to putting it into execution. Upon returning to my own vessel, we carefully loaded all our firearms; I then concealed my own revolver and a long bowie knife under my uniform, took A-ling and our cook with me; the one carrying the *Daily Press*, and the other two more pale-ale labels; and proceeded on shore.

The imps had at daylight cast off the chains wherewith they secured our vessel for the night; leaving, however, a couple of thick ropes fastening her to the bank by head and stern; these P—— had prepared an axe to cut in case of emergency. Our cabin was formed by a half-raised deckhouse aft, on the top of this a few bags of charcoal were placed, so as to form a sort of fortlet,

inside which the arms, with a good supply of ammunition, were hidden; the ropes were laid ready, fore and aft, to make sail, and the *Ningpo Boat* was hauled quite close to the bank, so as to enable me to get on board her in event of hostilities, while P—— could pull to her in our boat.

As I walked away from the bank, and observed P——ensconce himself among the bags of charcoal, my feelings were not of the most pleasant description. However, there was no choice of conduct; so, making the best of a bad affair, I proceeded straight for the den of the bandit chief, assuming a stolid, immovable sort of Dogberry officiality, peculiarly effective with the Chinese. Upon sending in our extemporized cards, and being admitted to the mandarin's state hall (a dirty apartment in a dirty house within the dirty fort), I was kept waiting till noon for the appearance, from among his many wives and opium pipes, of the owner.

Meanwhile, a breeze had sprung up, and was gradually increasing; so that, although the delay proved rather discreditable as to my veracity about the expected man-of-war, a chance of escape was apparent. If we could not obtain our release by fair means, we might be able to get our vessels clear, make sail, and keep up a running fight.

At length, half-stupified with opium, the mandarin made his appearance, the remaining part of his senses seemingly concentrated into a dull cunning sort of ferocity. His first act was to summon quite a number of armed soldiers to his Yamun, who stationed themselves in and about the building. Our wretched *lowder* was then dragged forth, and presented a pitiable sight. He had been tortured by having his ankle joints crushed between logs of wood, and by placing smaller pieces between his fingers, which were then pressed together by several men, causing intense agony, and severely injuring the fingerbones. The torture had compelled him to divulge all he knew of our proceedings at Nankin, besides a great deal more which he did not know, but simply stated to anticipate the wish of his interrogators and another squeeze of the wooden bars, failing a satisfactory reply. He was now examined before me, and confessed that we had left Nankin, and were

returning thither. The mandarin then declared that he must have 2,000 dollars, or else he would keep our vessel, and send us into the interior *as Tipping prisoners for execution.*

For some time I argued against either proceeding, displaying the *Daily Press*, the duty-passes I had received at Sin-ya-meu, and endeavouring to convince the mandarin as to the serious consequences of exciting the anger of the Emperor of America by molesting either myself and friend, or the vessel seized during the night. At last, after the robber had lowered his demand to 1,000 dollars, and while the discussion was becoming very warm, a soldier brought a report to the mandarin, who instantly issued some order to an attendant officer. What the tenor of this might be I heard not, but my cook did, and it evidently alarmed him, for, exclaiming, "More bettah, go just now," he rushed out of the room and disappeared. A-ling immediately told the mandarin that he would pay his so-called custom-house authorities a sum of 500 dollars, and then, telling me not to stay any longer, left the Yamun, begging me to accompany him. Making a bow to the angered official plunderer, I leisurely walked forth, and, upon reaching the rear of the fort, quickly passed through the gate, just as he appeared in his doorway, and gave a sharp command to some of the attendant soldiers.

Before I had turned the angle of the fort and got within sight of my vessel, half-a-dozen officers with drawn swords came running after me, calling upon me to stop and return with them to the mandarin. A-ling, stating he would run to the pseudo custom-house, a few hundred yards distant, and bring with him the officials to receive the squeeze of 500 dollars that we had offered to pay, advised me to get on board as quickly as possible.

I waited until my pursuers had reached to within a few feet, and then, suddenly drawing my revolver, jumped towards them with it levelled to the foremost. They instantly turned tail and rushed back to the fort, while I ran down towards the beach, holding the revolver above my head to signalize P —— and the master of the *Ningpo Boat* that danger was at hand.

Ere I had reached more than half-way between the fort and the river, a tremendous outcry arose from the former, accompanied by the blowing of horns, the beating of gongs, and the noise of the Chinese drum. As I ran, I turned my head in the direction of the uproar and observed the mandarin, followed by a crowd of soldiery, rushing after me. Before I could gain the beach, to my surprise, I saw the *Ningpo Boat* land some of her crew, cast off from the bank, and proceed to track up stream, thus breaking the terms of the agreement upon which I had landed, and cutting off my only chance of escape from the pursuing imps. When I did reach the river bank, every boat had been warned away by the shouts and gestures of the mob behind me, and the *Ningpo Boat* was some distance off the shore, and fast tracking away.

For a moment I gazed around, and found myself completely at the mercy of my pursuers; in front ran the swift current of the Yang-tze—behind came the savage yelling crowd of armed men.

I had just time to notice P—— on the top of our cabin deck, rifle in hand, and hear him shout, while pointing to the receding *Ningpo Boat*: "The coward has made terms with them and deserted us—jump up in the boat on the beach; I will open fire on the imps if they attempt to seize you, and I'll get you off with our boat if I have a chance; the imps have stolen the oars, and our crew have stowed themselves away below!"

The boat my friend referred to was a large one hauled up slantingly on the beach, one side touching the water of the river, and the other turned towards my pursuers. She stood some four or five feet off the ground; and climbing into her highest part, which was about level with the edge of the river bank before it shelved down into the narrow beach upon which she rested, I turned to face the enemy, after answering P——, and telling him not to fire until I gave him the signal to do so by commencing with my revolver.

By this time the horde of banditti were within a few yards, armed in every fashion, and neither dressed as Imperialists nor Ti-pings, but clad in a multitude of colours. The whole garrison of the place seemed to be turned out, and with much gesticulation, and the usual terrifying yelling of Chinese

soldiery, rushed along after their leader. Bamboo spears, gingalls, matchlocks, scythe-headed halberts, broad three-pronged pikes, and large knives, were waving all about, and beyond all I distinguished *the apparatus to which a prisoner is fastened when barbarously put to death by "cutting into a thousand pieces."*

On they came, with their fiendish cry, "Tah! tah!" until right down to the edge of the bank, where they formed a tumultuous crowd, brandishing their arms, some opening their clothing and beating their breasts in defiance, but all arrested by my levelled revolver. The mandarin used his utmost exertions to urge them on, but one and all seemed disinclined to become the *first* to draw a bullet from the six-shooter. The men who carried firearms in the front rank I sharply observed, and instantly took aim at any one who attempted to handle his weapon offensively. Meanwhile, upon either side, the men above and below my position got down on the beach, and gradually advanced towards me, while those not immediately covered by my revolver began firing their matchlocks.

I now, for the first time in my life, *really* experienced fear. In front and flank I saw nothing but a dense array of savage men thirsting to slay me; beyond them were a corps of executioners erecting their triangles in anticipation of having the cruel delight to slowly cut me into pieces; and when I gave a sidelong glance behind (I dared not attempt more, or the imps would have taken advantage and rushed forward) the deep and turbid river met my view.

For a moment or two, during which the enemy might have cut down or seized me without my being able to pull trigger, I became quite nerveless, while an icy chill came over my heart and made me feel both sick and helpless. Fortunately, I soon rallied. It is unpleasant to mention such a fear as I had felt, much less to dwell upon it. Just as the events of my life seemed striving together in a confused jumble for the first place in a rapid mental panorama, my presence of mind returned. I felt a sudden glow of enthusiasm for the Ti-ping cause, through which I had got into the danger, and a

determination to die, if death it was to be, in a manner worthy of an Englishman before a mob of Chinese.

To this day I am surprised at the sudden revulsion of feeling I experienced. One moment I was powerless, trembling, and terrified; the next, I was keenly alive to every incident in the scene, collectedly watching each movement of my individual assailants, and confidently prepared for any result.

At this moment P—— hailed me: "I have covered the mandarin; shall I shoot him? I can cut her" (our vessel) "adrift. Jump into the river and swim off, I will pick you up."

A little sooner I should have done this, but now I was prepared to take advantage of the slightest chance of escape; the soldiers were still to be kept back by my revolver; a peaceful termination of the difficulty *might* be obtained; but if I were to take to the water I should almost certainly be shot like a dog in it, even if I were not swept away and drowned by the swift current.

I shouted to P——, "Hold on yet. I think I can keep them at bay myself." He had hitherto been supporting me with his rifle levelled at the mandarin. "Try and take me off with the boat."

Although our vessel was lying some little distance above me and some 30 feet from the bank, and although the oars had been stolen from our boat, P—— was a thorough sailor, and I trusted that he would find some means of dropping it down to me with a line. I did not think so without reason, for he replied to me:—

"Look out, then! I am going to put down my rifle. I will drop the boat down to you; stand by to jump into her!"

Meanwhile, the imps seemed striving to work themselves into a frenzy, when they would probably rush forward, receive my few shots, and overpower me by numbers. The mandarin kept running to his men and trying to make them point their matchlocks at me, but directly any one attempted to do so, my revolver barrel stared him full in the face.

At last, I had the satisfaction to hear P——'s voice again:—

"Stand by, old fellow," he hailed; "I am just going to shove the boat off from our inshore quarter with a line fast to her."

Without daring to turn my head for a moment, I replied: "All right, shove her off, and hail me directly she comes close enough for a jump."

The suspense of the next minute or two was very great, then I heard my friend shout: "Now, jump now if you can; I am covering the imps with my rifle."


I gave a half glance over my shoulder, but, alas! the boat was too distant. The rope had tautened too soon, and she had been swept into a parallel line with our vessel, without reaching within twenty feet of my position. Hauling her alongside, P—— and As-sam, our boy, got into her, and shoving well off with a boat-hook, drifted down, endeavouring to grapple the boat I stood in. Again she fell short, and was swept out by the tide, amid a storm of bullets splashing all around her, from the men behind, from whose fire I was sheltered by the front rank, but who were easily able to shoot at the boat, and who managed to wound As-sam in the arm.

P——, finding that without oars it was impossible to reach me with the boat, reluctantly returned on board to his former position behind the bags of charcoal, and there resumed his rifle. Just at the same time the mandarin, finding his soldiers afraid to break the ominous pause by attacking me and exposing their leaders to certain death, began to set the example himself. He was certainly a far braver man than any of his followers, for dashing forward, sword in hand, he got to the lowest end of the boat and clambered into her, although I could easily have shot him at any instant. Steadying himself, he began to advance towards me, along the gunnel of the boat, which was open amidships and had a decked bow and stern.



#### THE MUD FORT MANDARIN.

It was now a most trying moment for me. The mandarin was already within nine or ten feet, and another second would bring him to striking distance. His life was entirely in my power; I could have shot him; but the *first* blow was only wanted to break the treacherous calm, and cause the immediate slaughter of myself. I felt that my last chance of life depended upon delay; two more seconds would decide it one way or the other. The suspense of that smallest passage of time was indescribable; many days of intense excitement and danger seemed crowded into one moment. The short though terrible hesitation in my mind, whether to shoot the mandarin, fire the remaining barrels of the revolver at his followers, and then jump into the river and swim off, or to delay another second, so as to lose not the merest chance of saving my life, seemed to occupy an age of anxious and momentous thought. At this crisis P—— spoke to me again:



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 BROUGHT TO BAY AT THE MUD FORT.

"Shoot the mandarin," he shouted. "I will cut the vessel adrift, sheer her in, and try to pick you up. If I cannot quite reach you, take to the water; you can easily get on board, and I'll protect you by opening fire on the imps."

Rapidly glancing, as I fully expected for the last time, upon the clear blue sky above, the bright sun shining upon and making the earth so

beautiful and attractive, and vividly recalling a far distant home and a loved mother for my latest earthly thought, I took steady aim at the mandarin's heart and pulled the trigger, shouting to P——, "Cut her adrift, and be sharp about it!"

I naturally expected to hear the report of my pistol, and to see the mandarin fall, while the soldiers would rush forward to avenge his death. Although I am certain I gave the trigger a sufficient pull, the hammer never fell and the mandarin at the moment, when another step towards me would have brought his uplifted sword upon my head, suddenly lost his balance and fell from the narrow gunnel of the boat to the beach. I instantly hailed P—— to "hold on," and he returned to his former position to watch the progress of events.

When the mandarin rolled on the beach, several of his officers seized him and dragged him up the bank, regardless of the struggles he made to return and attack me. Fortunately A-ling arrived upon the scene at this moment, and going to the mandarin, told him that he would go on board and bring the money required. While the leader of the robbers was being brought to his fort, A-ling was taken on board our vessel, after receiving my assent to procure the dollars from P——. Meanwhile the soldiers remained in the same position around myself, while I endeavoured to show them my indifference by producing a cigar and lighting it.

After A-ling had paid the money into the coffers of the banditti, he came to me with two inferior officers, and getting the soldiers to fall back, induced me to descend from my position of vantage, believing all danger was over. Although at first they seemed quiet enough and retired from the boat, I had no sooner reached some little distance from it than they crowded round me. Suddenly, and before I could use my revolver, I was seized from behind by many hands, and while every incident of my life rushed with supernatural rapidity and minuteness of detail through my mind, I was forced upon my knees, when one of the soldiers raised a long and heavy sword to behead me.

The steel flashed as it was raised above me, and commanding myself to God, I shivered while for a fearful moment awaiting the blow. Again, however, I was saved from the very jaws of death. My would-be executioner was thrust aside, and I believe that I fainted for a second or two. I then found myself surrounded by a strange mandarin and his attendants, A-ling, my cook, and a few of the more kindly disposed among the robber band. A-ling informed me that the stranger was a "civil" mandarin who had just arrived from a neighbouring city; that he had happened to notice my gold band, and had opportunely rushed forward and rescued me. Thus for the first time the uniform had done me good.

At first, after expressing my gratitude, I felt perfectly safe under the protection of the fresh arrival, for I knew that the rank and authority of a civil mandarin was far superior to that of a military one like the commandant of the Mud Fort. However, upon the people around me moving a little away, I saw three soldiers on the ground, two dead and one severely wounded; for it appeared that P——, upon observing my seizure, had opened fire on the crowd. It was now evening and the dusk was fast approaching, and it was evident that not a moment should be lost in getting away from the place. Two men had been killed, and their chief would undoubtedly endeavour to avenge their death. After giving the watch I wore as a memento to the mandarin who had so kindly saved me, and being supplied with a boat by him, I at last got safely on board with A-ling and the cook.

My friend P—— had barely gripped me by the hand and congratulated me upon my escape, when we were startled by the blowing of the war-horns on shore, and the clang of gongs. While we were hard at work getting our vessel underway, the soldiers came rushing down to the beach again, waving their flags and arms about, planting their gingalls, and swearing vengeance for the death of their comrades. In a few minutes they opened a heavy fire upon us, while a number of them ran along the bank in the direction of a creek where their gunboats were moored.

The wind had fallen comparatively light, and we would not have been able to escape from the smaller vessels of the enemy, when, to our great joy, a steamer rounded the bend of the river below, and came into full view. At this moment the gunboats were just shoving off from the shore, but directly they observed the steamship only a few miles distant they pulled up the creek again, while the men along the beach ceased firing and ran into the fort, doubtless believing that the approaching vessel was the man-of-war I had told them about.

When the steamer had arrived pretty near, I signalized her, and saw that she was one of the American river boats. To my horror, when close alongside she hoisted the Imperialist flag, and I then knew her to be the *Williamette*, a vessel belonging to the Manchoo Government. When right abeam she stopped and sent a boat to my vessel. Fortunately she was manned with an American crew, and in consideration of the sum of 300 dollars, her captain, whose name, singularly enough, happened to be Friend, Imperialist though he was, agreed to tow my vessel up to the Nankin forts.

Before dark we had the satisfaction to bid adieu to the Mud Fort, as we ploughed up the fast rolling yellow waters astern of the *Williamette*. To our sorrow, however, we were just able to discern on the beach the execution of our *lowder*, who was dragged down and decapitated there before our eyes, while we were powerless to save the poor fellow.

## CHAPTER XVI.

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Hang-chow.—Ti-pings approach Shanghae.—Their Reception.—The *Casus Belli*.—The First Blow.—Filibuster Ward.—Admiral Hope's Exploits.—Captures Hsiun-tang.—The Consequences.—Hope's Policy condemned.—The real *Casus Belli*.—Defence of Shanghae justified.—Inducements to oppose the Ti-pings.—Official Reports.—Mr. Consul Meadows.—Recognition of the Ti-pings.—The *Shanghae Times*.—Mr. John's Report.—Edict of Religious Toleration.—Report continued.—Mr. Muirhead's Report.

Hang-Chow, the provincial capital, was carried by assault upon the 29th of December. The Chinese part of the garrison, unable to endure the horrors of the close siege, after everything in the shape of food had been consumed, and even human flesh exposed for sale in the market-place, opened the gates of the outer city and surrendered to the Ti-pings. The Manchoo troops defended themselves to the last, neither giving nor accepting quarter, and when the walls of the inner city were carried by the victorious insurgents, the Tartar general, Luy, and a number of his men, sprang a mine and blew themselves up with their citadel.

The capture of this important city and of the treaty port Ningpo having placed the Ti-pings in possession of the whole Che-kiang province, with the exception of Shanghae and a few miles around it, they resolved, upon the termination of the year, as previously agreed to, to follow up the enemy to this last stronghold.

Although, before his unsuccessful trip to Nankin, Admiral Hope had seemed willing to treat with the Ti-pings, when he returned to Shanghae, after finding it impossible to again deceive them, his conduct underwent a marked change, as evinced by the eager way in which he sought the

opportunity to indulge his warlike propensities. This opportunity was soon afforded him.

Immediately upon the expiration of the year, Chung-wang, the Ti-ping Commander-in-Chief, moved an army towards Shanghae. No attack was made upon the city, but this force gradually occupied every position in the neighbourhood, till at length not an Imperialist soldier remained beyond gunshot range of its walls. The Ti-pings again manifested their extraordinary friendliness towards foreigners by not attacking the city, and with similar forbearance and moderation to that evinced upon their approach in 1860, endeavouring to open peaceable negotiation with the foreign authorities. The leaders of the different *corps d'armée* sent in the usual nobly worded proclamations, relating to the oppression of the Manchoo and their own mission to free and Christianize China; the success hitherto vouchsafed to their cause by the "Heavenly Father"; the earnest desire to enter into friendly relations with the "foreign brethren"; their wish to continue all present trade and to open the whole country up, &c.

Now, at this time the political position of England with regard to the rebellion was as follows. By the written guarantee of Sir George Bonham, by that of Admiral Hope, by that from the British representative at Ningpo, and by many other acts, her national honour was pledged to maintain a strict neutrality. The last orders to her officials in China were, as already quoted:—

"Her Majesty's Government desire to maintain... neutrality between the two contending parties;" save British subjects from punishment, "but otherwise you should abstain from all interference in the civil war."

[Dated, Foreign Office, August 8, 1861.]

This was the standing order; the only later direction being Lord Russell's suggestion: "But it *might* be expedient to defend the treaty ports *if* the Chinese would consent not to use those ports for purposes of aggression."

The way the British Consul, Admiral, and General, at Shanghae, abstained from all interference was by converting that city into the grand rendezvous of the Imperialist forces, and then helping them to defend the Chinese city by garrisoning it with British troops; by conveying Manchoo soldiery down the Yang-tze to Shanghae in English steamers; by supplying the Imperialists with artillery, &c., while strictly prohibiting any trade in the same articles with the other of the two "contending parties"; and by attacking the Ti-pings when they found that the Ti-pings would not attack them. That useful triumvirate—the sailor, the soldier, and the diplomatist—placed the following construction upon Lord Russell's ambiguous *ifs* and *ands*. "It *might* be expedient," they singularly understood to mean, it was expedient; and "*if* the Chinese, &c.," they converted into assisting and joining the Chinese "*to use* those ports for purposes of aggression." Consequently, in direct violation of their public orders, but in conformity with the conduct I have just stated, they issued the following reply to the friendly overtures of the Ti-ping chiefs:—

"Whereas we, the Commanders of the French and British forces now occupying the city and environs of Shanghae, have received letters from Lion and Ho, persons styling themselves..., informing us that said Lion and Ho are intending to attack and occupy Shanghae; and whereas we have no means of communicating with the said Lion and Ho, or any of their people:—Therefore, this is to give notice to whomsoever it may concern, that Shanghae city and its environs, Woo-sung included, are at present in the possession of the troops under our respective commands, and that if Lion or Ho, or any persons claiming fraternity with them, attempt to attack these places they will do so at their peril."

Even this was insufficient to effect the desired object, namely, to drive the Ti-pings to defiance, and force them to acts of retaliation. When, therefore, it became apparent that, notwithstanding all the aid afforded to the Imperialists, they could not succeed, and that eventually Shanghae must be given up to the revolutionists, or become annexed to France or England, the British Government threw off the mask, and prepared for open hostilities.

Consul Medhurst, in a despatch to Admiral Hope, dated "Shanghae, February 19, 1862," states the grounds upon which the good faith and honour of England were to be openly violated.

"Granting, of course, that a *strictly neutral policy* is at present the only correct one, and that whatever is done in the protection of this city and settlement must be undertaken with *careful regard* to that important axiom, it follows, I think, that there are two points to be considered as bearing materially on the present crisis. The first is, what resources we have in the way of supplies for the city and settlement; and the second, how far the present action of the Taepings so endangers those supplies as to make it necessary for us to interfere with them in our own defence."

The falsity of this shallow pretence for war becomes at once apparent. In the first place, it was simply necessary to allow the Chinese city to revert peaceably to the Ti-pings, when the inhabitants as well as they would have had ample supplies. In the second place, the vast river and sea communication of Shanghae was entirely open (excepting the Wong-poo branch), while a fleet of some two hundred European steamers and ships and several thousand large native junks crowded the anchorage, and could easily have furnished a line of communication for any amount of supplies. Evidence is abundant to prove what a mere pretence this *casus belli* was, but two reasons will be sufficient justification for so designating it. First. If the Ti-pings, by surrounding Shanghae, endangered its supplies, when they came with the most friendly feeling for Europeans, they would certainly, if

driven to become enemies and to use the justifiable retaliation of enemies, have it in their power to utterly destroy those supplies by devastating the whole neighbouring country; therefore, in all human probability, an attack upon them would render imminent the very crisis to avoid which it was thought justifiable to violate a nation's pledges. Secondly. The following extract from Admiral Hope's despatch shows that he conceived that Consul Medhurst had not made a sufficient case. Upon the 21st of February, 1862, the Admiral struck the first blow. Upon the evening of the same day, in his despatch to the Admiralty, he gave this reason for his open violation of his own and his Government's faith:—

"These proceedings" (movements of the Ti-pings) "have been conducted at a distance much too close to be consistent with the *respect due to the occupation of the town* by French and English forces, or to leave its supplies of provisions and native trade *unaffected*."

Is it to be supposed that any city could be captured or placed in a state of siege without native trade or supplies being affected, or is it to be argued that the Ti-pings should be crushed in consequence of the natural results of their patriotic struggle?

The presence of the Ti-pings only "*affected*" the trade and supplies it seems; when, had they been so disposed, they might have stopped the entire, excepting what could have been obtained by water.

The only thing that affected the supplies of Shanghae so far as Europeans and citizens were concerned, was the increase in the price, which was quickly raised by the provision-dealers, who are always ready to seize the smallest opportunity to make a little extra profit. Probably Admiral Hope saw this, and its damaging bearing upon his alleged *casus belli*; at all events, he thought fit to add another, though equally flimsy.

"The tract of country enclosed within the line BC, which this village, with others in their" (Ti-pings) "possession, entirely commanded, is that from which the supplies of Shanghae are chiefly drawn, and its proximity to the

Woo-sung river was such as to afford the PROSPECT of the Chinese traffic, also material to the support of the town, being seriously impeded, if not altogether stopped; and for these reasons I considered the case to be one calling for my interference."

On these pretences war was made upon the Ti-pings. It will be noticed that nothing material has ever been *proved* against the revolutionists, or urged as an established fact, sufficient to justify hostilities, or even a remonstrance. The British officials in China and the Government at home attempt to justify their course of action by mere conjecture as to what they might do, but never do we find a plain or straightforward accusation made against them for anything they *had done*.

Admiral Hope, in his attack upon the Ti-pings, associated himself with one Ward, an American filibuster, in the service of the Manchoos. Previous to this, and to the Admiral's unsuccessful attempt to juggle the Ti-ping authorities into another agreement not to approach Shanghae, the said Ward was persecuted and reviled very fiercely; but no sooner did the Admiral and his colleagues think it necessary to pull in the same boat, than the Yankee filibuster became their pattern and ally. The whilom *rowdie* companion of *ci-devant* General Walker, of Nicaraguan memory, mercenary leader of a band of Anglo-Saxon freebooters in Manchoo pay, and sometime fugitive from English marines sent to weed his ruffians of their countrymen, suddenly became the friend and ally of the British and French Admirals, Generals, and Consuls. The surprise of Ward can only have been equalled by his gratification upon finding his very questionable presence, and still more doubtful pursuits, patronized and imitated. No doubt, at first, he felt considerably elated and vastly astonished at the idea of filibusting having become an honourable and recognised profession; but soon, poor fellow! a black, or rather green, shadow came across his uncertain dream of happiness and respectability—he became jealous of his friend Admiral

Hope, whose talent and zeal for making war without declaring it or being authorized so to do by any Government, he found surpassed even his own.

The village of Kao-kiau was garrisoned by a few hundred Ti-pings, and several thousand country people, who had just joined them, the whole mostly armed with bamboo spears. The force led against them by Admiral Hope comprised 350 British seamen with a six-pound rocket-tube, and about 600 disciplined Chinese, under Ward, besides which, the French Admiral, Protet, commanded 160 Frenchmen, with a couple of field-pieces. Of course, the ill-armed Ti-pings were unable to resist the European artillery and arms of precision, and were consequently driven from the village, with a loss of more than 100 men killed. This gallant exploit was safely performed by the Anglo-Franco contingent, who, completely out of range of the few wretched matchlocks of the Ti-pings, shot them down at their ease with rifles and artillery, with a loss to themselves of *only one* French sailor, killed by a stray shot.

This murderous and cowardly deed was quickly followed up by the gallant Admiral, who seemed unable to refrain from action, especially when it could be indulged with comparative safety.

We have already noticed that one excuse Admiral Hope made to justify his broken faith was the probability that the Ti-pings might injure the supply of provisions. Strange to say, the Admiral did the very things he pretended the rebels might have done. At the capture of Kao-kiau all hands dispersed to loot whatever the Ti-pings had left behind; and, quoting from the official report of the affair, "Large stores of grain were discovered about the place, *the greater part of which were burned.*"

After the exploit of Kao-kiau, Admiral Hope, with a small party of seamen and Ward's filibusters, went roving about the country for a week in search of some one to fight. His warlike spirit was gratified at a place named Hsiau-tang, in the vicinity of Ming-hong (nearly twenty miles away from Shanghae), a fortified village occupied by several thousand Ti-pings.

Directly he found this place in the way, an order was sent to Shanghae for reinforcements to attack it with. These having arrived, upon the 1st of March, 1862, the whole force, consisting of 750 of Ward's disciplined Chinese, 350 British sailors and marines, and 35 artillery-men, with four light howitzers, one field-piece, and some rocket-tubes, and 200 French, with two brass howitzers, moved forward to the attack. Again, as at Kao-kiau, the murderous work was executed, and the poorly-armed Ti-pings slaughtered with impunity. For more than an hour they bravely held their mud and brick entrenchments, but at last the crushing fire from the foreign artillery, and the sharp practice of the Enfield rifles, carried the day. After standing to their few gingalls to the last, amid a storm of shot and shell (all fresh from British arsenals and paid for by British tax-payers), they were driven from the lines of defence and through the village with immense slaughter. As they retreated from the rear, the shell from the irresistible foreign artillery "were thrown rapidly amongst them, committing fearful havoc. Numbers also fell under the fire from the rifles of the French and English sailors." In the centre of the village the rear guard made a gallant effort to repulse their pursuers, but they could not withstand the deadly volleys and bayonet charge of the marines; and although their bravest men fell in heaps, while many hand-to-hand conflicts took place, they were ultimately driven out with a loss of 1,000 killed and 300 taken prisoners, the English and French *not losing a single man*. A great massacre of the unfortunate non-combatants was perpetrated by the Imperialist soldiery, who actually forced very many of the living wounded into the flames of the burning village. In one official report it is stated:—

"The streets and houses presented an awful spectacle, the bodies in some places lying in heaps; and the plain beyond the village was strewed with those shot down in the flight."

Another report states:—

"The rebels ran from the fortifications and came to a stand in the main street.... Upon this, the field-piece from the *Impérieuse*, in charge of Lieutenants Stuart and Richardson, swept them down with grape and canister shot; after this their retreat became a flight, when the party of marines and Chinese detached to cut them off did considerable execution, some 900 or 1,000 having been killed and wounded."

The same report concludes with this sentence:—

"After all was over, *the village was set on fire*,<sup>1</sup> and the foreign troops embarked for Shanghae."

What will those who falsely accuse the Ti-pings of devastating and destroying say to this? They have declared that the Christian patriots' "success in any locality is attended with its total destruction," &c.; but it appears that these totally destroyed places were reserved for Admiral Hope to burn down.

As this history progresses we shall find that although the Admiral made the damaging effect which the presence of the Ti-pings *might* have upon supplies one element of his *casus belli*, *he* actually destroyed the very supply of grain which he dreaded might be affected by the rebels!

There is a more serious matter to be deplored with regard to the numerous raids commenced and followed up by Admiral Hope, namely, the cruel slaughter of so many hundreds of his fellow-men. We have reviewed the unmeaning pretences invented by the Admiral and his co-adjutors, but even should it be admitted they were valid, is it possible any Englishman can be found willing to justify the massacre of thousands of human beings, because, although ever friendly to them, they affected the mercenary speculations of a few merchants? If, in order to maintain the immediate profit of their mercantile adventurers, any Englishman can attempt to justify or palliate these summary proceedings against the unfortunate Ti-pings, then I say, far better should that unholy traffic perish, cursed as it is by the

slaughter of thousands of our fellow-creatures, whose blood has cried aloud to Heaven for vengeance upon their assailants.

Even the pretence that the revolutionists would have injured our "commercial interests" falls to the ground by the testimony of the very merchants themselves, for the leading mercantile house in China, Messrs. Jardine, Matheson, & Co., in their business circular, dated "Kong-kong, 27th February, 1862," referring to Admiral Hope's first massacre of Ti-pings, state:—

"During the interval that has elapsed since the date of our last circular there is no particular change to notice in the state of matters about Shanghae; but the policy the Allied Commanders are adopting will, it is feared, lead to disastrous consequences.... *Our interests call for a strict neutrality*, but so far from this course being pursued, our last advices report a combined expedition of English and French marines and sailors in conjunction with a force of Imperialists, commanded in person by their respective Admirals, against a body of some 6,000 rebels, which of course they defeated with great slaughter.... The whole country being in the hands of the Taepings, should this *suicidal* policy be persisted in, must in the end materially interfere with, if not ruin, all trade, as it cannot do otherwise than exasperate a foe by no means to be despised."

What stronger condemnation of the policy pursued against the Ti-pings can be made, coming, as it does, from the principal representative of the very class whose interests it was pretended necessary to protect? That this opinion of Messrs. Jardine, Matheson, & Co. was correct has at the present time been pretty well ascertained, for it did "in the end materially interfere with" trade, as the fall off of silk *after* the expulsion of the Ti-pings from the producing district proves. This, however, was not occasioned, as that firm expected, by the exasperation of "a foe by no means to be despised," for the Ti-pings (with a Christian humanity far excelling that possessed by their *civilized* enemies) never retaliated either upon the trade (entirely in

their power) or the lives of Europeans. The decrease of silk was caused entirely by the ruthless nature of the war carried by British officers and Imperialists into the once happy districts of Ti-ping-tien-kwo. The Ti-ping patriots were either fools or saints, for by their mad forbearance they suffered themselves to be driven from their former possessions with incalculable loss of life; whereas, a system of retaliation on their part would have endangered the entire trade of the district, and consequently have forced the enemy to relinquish hostilities which so conclusively endangered the prospect of our "commercial interests."

As the first mercantile house in China considered the policy of the British Government "suicidal," we may safely pronounce the affected anxiety for commercial interests a shallow pretext. What then remains to constitute the real *casus belli*, unless it be "the temporary interest arising out of the indemnities," and the great revenue arising out of the vile opium traffic, the loss of which would have caused a deficit of many millions in the British treasury?

The seeming inconsistency of allowing the Ti-pings to take Ningpo and yet defending Shanghae against them is easily explained. At the capture of the former city no British force was present, and although the seven days' grace so cunningly obtained from the Ti-ping leaders seems to have been employed in endeavouring to raise a sufficient force to oppose their entrance, this, in the shape of H.M.S. *Scout* and several other vessels, arrived too late, having reached Ningpo some hours after its fall. Then, as Admiral Hope very wisely observed with regard to the policy of exasperating the Ti-pings, "We cannot afford to quarrel with them, as at any moment they *might* stop the whole trade of Shanghae." Their wonderful forbearance had not at that time become assured; directly it was, hostilities were commenced. Before taking up the sword for good, it became necessary to try the temper of the Ti-pings. This Admiral Hope effectually did by his arrogance at Nankin; his "every obstruction" plan at Ningpo; his

raids around Shanghae; an example followed by the British and French authorities by their unwarrantable notifications and defence of Shanghae Chinese city.

There are, in fact, very many reasons by which the defence of Shanghae may be accounted for; but five of the most important will sufficiently illustrate the principle of the whole.

Firstly. The British Government and its officials interfered in order to save the indemnity and opium trade, which the capture of Shanghae by the Ti-pings would have annihilated, and they were strongly supported by the opium merchants, who, by this vile traffic, made their largest profits.

Secondly. A large number of the Shanghae foreign landholders approved of the defence of the city, because it enabled them to obtain fresh lots at their own prices from the Chinese proprietors. From the "minutes of a meeting of land-renters, held at the British Consulate, Shanghae, January 12, 1862," it appears that during a council of war with the Manchoo authorities of the Chinese city (all in accordance with the pledges of "strict neutrality," of course?)—

"The Taoutae undertook to do this also" (open a road to facilitate military operations) "*by obliging the Chinese renters interested to part with their land to the foreign applicants whose names stood recorded first for purchase.*"

Thirdly. A certain proportion of traders having taken advantage of the Ti-ping movement to circulate unfounded reports as to its brigandage, in order to monopolize the trade by frightening outsiders away, naturally sanctioned the defence of Shanghae, as the capture of the city would have exposed the trick by proving the Ti-pings were not brigands and robbers.

Fourthly. Many land and house speculators opposed the success of the insurgents for this reason. The foreign settlements in the vicinity of the Chinese city had become crowded with fugitives awaiting the firm establishment of Ti-ping jurisdiction in the interior; by numerous lawless

Chinamen attracted by the shadow of foreign protection and the opportunity of establishing gambling hells and bagnios, *ad libitum*; and by the manifold parasites and hangers-on of the Imperial authority in its last stronghold. Therefore, while this state of affairs lasted, the land speculators made prodigious wealth by the letting of their property to the natives at almost fabulous rents, but the capture of the city by the Ti-pings would have altered all this. The vile manner in which many colossal fortunes have thus been obtained is lost sight of in England by the glitter of the ingots.

Fifthly. A large proportion of partners in mercantile houses *upon the spot*, expected to make their fortunes and retire to their home in three years; but the occupation of Shanghae by the Ti-pings, and the natural effect of the civil war, must have interfered with the import trade and injured their immediate profits.

Upon these grounds British faith was dishonoured and a murderous war waged against the unfortunate Ti-pings. Admiral Hope continued the work of destruction with his artillery and rifles from a safe distance, until his recall to England. Violation of good faith, misrepresentation, and partial aggression, became superseded by regular hostilities, carried on without any previous declaration of war, or even statement of grievance. What would such manner of warfare be denominated in Europe?

Having reviewed the policy of the British Government, and the conduct of its officials in China, it may be well to notice a few reports upon the Ti-ping rebellion, well worthy of attention, even though ignored by the British Ministry. These testimonies prove that the Ti-pings have not been decimated because they were misunderstood by the British Government, but that the latter were as well acquainted with their Christianity, friendliness, political object, superiority to the Manchoos, and generally improved character, as the writer of this history, or the authors of the statements he quotes. Therefore, when the evil policy of those who authorized the unnecessary and unjustifiable hostilities upon the part of

England shall become more generally admitted, they cannot palliate their wickedness by pleading ignorance of the true merits of the people. It is difficult to speak of this British interference in any but the most forcible and unmeasured terms of condemnation. Not a solitary excuse can be truly made for it; and when the selfishness of that policy is thoroughly appreciated (which is rapidly becoming the case), the atrocities committed by its sanction, and their consequences, will be looked back upon with grief and sadness by every loyal Englishman.

The first and most important of the above-mentioned reports was made by Mr. Consul Meadows to Lord Russell. Mr. Meadows was better acquainted with the Ti-pings than any other English official in existence. He was the most talented in China, the most honourable and disinterested; therefore, it may be that his statements were not regarded, and that his presence at Shanghae became an inconvenience. This difficulty was soon surmounted by the removal of Mr. Meadows from Shanghae to New-chwang, very soon after his truthful and independent exposition of the Ti-ping rebellion, and by naming as his successor a Consul who was more pliable.

The following despatch of Mr. Meadows bears date "February 19, 1861," and is worthy of most attentive perusal:—

"CONSUL MEADOWS TO LORD J. RUSSELL.—(Received April 12.)

"Shanghae, February 19, 1861.

"British trade and British-India trade with this country, and the revenues derived from the one and the other, are among the most important of British interests abroad. A necessary condition to the flourishing of these is the existence of order—of security to life and property—in this country; and the

existence of this order and security, again, requires the existence of a strong national government. These propositions are so well established that I merely state them.

"But the hitherto existing Imperial Government, that of the Manchoo or Ta-tsing dynasty, which was already becoming weak from internal causes, has received its death-blows from the external action, first of British arms alone, and now of British and French combined. No strong national government now exists anywhere; and in large, and to us very important, portions of the country, anarchy and insecurity prevail.

"It becomes, therefore, of the utmost importance to look around us for some other power in the nation to take its place. If we find any such other power, we must not only not attack it, but must earnestly desire its speedy growth. An adherence, not less wise than just, to the principle of non-intervention, together with the due observance of the treaties with the Ta-tsing Government, should prevent our taking direct positive steps to aid that growth; but assuredly it would be a most suicidal course, as regards those large interests to which I have pointed, first to achieve the destruction of the government we find existing, and then to proceed to prevent any other from coming into existence.

"Now we have such another power in the Taepings, and such another government in the government which they have established at Nanking.

"It has been, and by many is still, denied that the Taepings have any regular government, or can be considered a political power.

"For one moment I will grant this, but only in order to point out that after maintaining themselves for eleven years in arms in China, and for eight in the centre of the empire, the Taepings are manifestly a power of some sort, and to ask—Are we, because this power does not come up to all that is expected of it, are we, therefore, gratuitously to attack it, and either greatly lessen or altogether destroy its chances of ever realizing those expectations? What else have we got to look to for the re-establishment of a government having power to preserve order?

"But I entirely deny that the Taepings have no regular government, and have no claim to be considered a political power.

"Ten years ago, almost immediately after they rose in arms, they threw off the characteristics of local insurgents, and proclaimed themselves the irreconcilable enemies of the Tatsing dynasty. From that time to this they have never left us in doubt of their object. It has always been the great one of making themselves the heads of the first state in Asia, and the governors of the largest people in the world. So much has been established, not only by their own published manifestoes, but by the official documents of their enemies.

"As to their manner of pursuing that object, whether it is such as befits a power assuming to be political, it would too much prolong even this letter to meet in detail all the objections of those foreigners who declaim against them.

"Speaking generally, these objections may be classed under two heads. First, those which are based on the application to this region and its peoples, of arguments drawn from the state of

society and modes of political action of Western Europe, in defiance of the fact that these arguments are wholly inapplicable to a state of civilization and a polity so different; and secondly, those which are applied in entire disregard of the parallel transactions in Western Europe itself, a disregard of obvious analogies, which can only be the result of great ignorance or of wilful prejudice.

"Among the former, are nearly all the objections to their military discipline, tactics, and strategy, and to their administrative forms, whether of a civil or a military nature.

"Among the latter, are objections such as that they do not fix themselves in the places they take; that they take them and then leave them again, &c.

"The obvious rejoinder, drawn from the history of Western Europe is, how often, during the great rebellion in England, were important cities and strong places taken and evacuated or retaken? Did that prove that the English noblemen and gentlemen who first headed that rebellion were unfit to establish a government? Did it prove that Cromwell was neither a general nor an administrator? And when, ten years ago, the Italians left Milan to be reoccupied by its former oppressors, after these had been once expelled, and also allowed the foreign dynasties to reinstate themselves in their principalities, did that prove that the Italian party which aimed at expelling all these foreigners was not a political power?

"A stock argument against the Taepings was drawn from their destruction of the suburbs of the cities they occupied. This, however, was finally silenced when, on the approach of the

Taepings to Shanghae a few months ago, the British and French garrison in that city fired all its suburbs, not excepting the densely peopled and commercially important suburb between the city and the river.

"Then, again, ruthless and wanton slaughter, not only of the foreign Manchoos, but of their Chinese countrymen, has been urged against the Taepings as a proof that they were a mere gang of robbers and murderers. But was there during the revolutionary struggle in France no mutual killing of the opposing parties of Frenchmen? I mention only the Reign of Terror, and the 'Noyades,' and, leaving it to your Lordship's memory to add further illustrative transactions, I ask, do such well-established historical facts prove that the revolutionary party were merely a large gang of robbers and murderers, and not a political power?

"While, however, considering it an established fact in the history of the Taepings that they, on taking Nanking, put the whole of the Manchoos to death, not sparing even the women and children; and while thinking it highly probable that they will treat in the same way any other of the military colonies of the Tartar conquerors of their country that may fall into their power, I have long ago arrived at the full conviction that the tales of the slaughter committed by them on their own countrymen are not only exaggerated, but very grossly exaggerated.

"My own experience has furnished me with an instructive example of gross exaggeration of the kind. In the beginning of September, 1853, when, not the Taepings, but the Triad Society

rebels, suddenly rose and seized the city of Shanghae, I was travelling alone from Ningpo to Shanghae, *via* Chapoo. It was on reaching this latter place, about sixty miles from Shanghae, that I first got the news from the crew of my own river-craft, which had come there to meet me. The insurrection having broken out just as they had left, they themselves could give no particulars about it. But from other vessels, and from the local merchants and officials, I learnt that there had been a fearful slaughter in the city of Shanghae; that the streets were covered with dead bodies and blood; that the foreigners and the rebels had been fighting; and that the whole of the foreign community had retired in the shipping outside of Woo-sung. So uniform and consistent were these reports, and so certain did it appear that I should be unable to pass Shanghae out to Woo-sung, that I set about studying the Chinese maps, with a view of finding a succession of river-passages by which I might, keeping some twenty or thirty miles distant, make my way through the country inside of it, and so out into the Great River, and down that to the reported position of the foreign shipping. But before undertaking so serious a circuit I, of course, determined to approach nearer to Shanghae city. As I did so, I found the prevalent reports less and less alarming; and at length, when about twelve miles distant, ascertained the fact—one well known here at the time—that there had been no fighting whatever with the foreigners, and that, in the whole city the slaughter and bloodshed was limited to the killing of one man. Yet the current and fully-believed reports only sixty miles off were exactly like those we have so often heard of the slaughter committed by the Taepings. We know, from the experience of British troops during the last twenty years, that much loss of

life usually ensues on the forcible occupation of Chinese cities from men destroying their families, and then themselves; from women, young and old, committing suicide; and from an unreasoning terror, that drives people into deep canals or rivers, in vain attempts to cross them. In these very ways several lives were nearly lost, a few months back, in the Chinese portion of this settlement before an alarm subsided which was caused by a sudden outcry that the Taepings were entering it, none being at the time within twenty miles' distance.

"From these habits of the Chinese, we may infer that there has been, in the many populous cities occupied by the Taepings in this province, much loss of life among women and children, as well as grown men—non-combatants; and the inference is supported by the fact of foreigners who having visited such cities seeing in the canals many unwounded bodies. But that the Taeping troops have directly put to death a greater proportion of their non-combatant countrymen, or have even refused quarter to the armed, to a greater extent than have done revolutionary parties in the civil wars of England and France, is, I am fully satisfied, a prejudiced repetition on the part of inimical foreigners of the interested calumnies of the Ta-tsing party.

"Some time back it had become a good conclusion that in the tracts of country occupied by the Taepings there must be greater security for life and property than in those occupied by the Ta-tsings. We knew that the Taepings had long given up that system of universal conscription on which they acted in 1853, and which then made their approach a source of peculiar terror. We knew that they depended on voluntary enrolment for

the support of their fighting force, and that they were earnestly endeavouring to get the inhabitants generally of hamlets and open towns to remain at their usual occupations. This being the case, it was plain that the Taepings could preserve the public peace better than the Ta-tsings. For the bulk of the leading officials among the former were themselves not only fighting men, but about the best fighting men that they had; men who owed their position to their military qualities. To them there could, among their own party, be no open defiance. There might be nothing of that military drill and tactics which characterize European armies, but that discipline, which consists in strict obedience to orders could not fail to be there. On the other hand, the bulk of the leading Ta-tsing officials, the mandarins, were about the most inactive and timid, the most unwarlike of their party, and were, we knew, compelled to employ, as their chief fighting men, the ex-pirates of the south-eastern coast-land, who, with their followers, would not content themselves with their official pay, but would also, in defiance of the wishes of their weak employers, exact money from, or plunder outright, the peaceable populations whom they were hired to protect.

"These inferences have been amply confirmed by recent unquestionable experiences. Mr. John, an English missionary of education and intelligence, went two or three months ago from Shanghae to Soo-chow, and thence to Nanking, where he stayed for seven days. Mr. John put the question to the Taeping officials why it was that the walled cities held by them were so entirely deserted by their former populations of tradesmen, artificers, &c. He received answers to the effect that those cities had been transformed into fortresses, necessary to be held for

the reconquest of the country from the Manchoos; that having been once deserted, no population was readmitted, as, under the guise of tradesmen, &c., they might gradually be filled with hostile forces; but that, as soon as their own progress advanced their frontier to other points, they themselves would be anxious to see these places repeopled by a peaceful population. In the mean time they were doing their best to protect, in the hamlets, villages, and open towns, all who choose to remain in them, in quiet submission to the Taiping rule.

"Now these explanations and statements were fully supported by the nature of the circumstances and by what Mr. John saw himself. He was altogether about a month in the country held by the Taepings. He traversed a tract of that country of about 120 miles in extent (Tsing-poo to Nanking), and travelled by night as well as by day, quite unarmed, and never molested. He found the country people quietly pursuing their usual occupations; and—a proof of the understanding between them and their Taiping rulers—saw the soldiers of the latter moving from place to place in large bodies without inspiring terror, and in parties of three or two without being assailed. At Soo-chow, both Mr. John and a well-educated and observant Chinese who accompanied him, and whom I questioned closely, saw the veritable landed gentry coming in parties to give in to the civil governor their adhesion to the Taiping dynasty.

"What, on the other hand, is the state of the country on this side of the Ta-tsing lines? Not only do the exactions of the mandarins for military objects equal any similar demands that can be made by the Taepings, but piracy and robbery are well known to be everywhere rife. During an excursion, in the end

of October, of some ninety miles up the Yang-tze, I had myself full opportunity of observing the prevalence of piracy and the alarm of the country people; and reports came constantly in, on all sides, showing that the reign of lawless violence is rather increasing than diminishing.

"It is impossible to say how much of China proper the Taepings hold altogether, clear of Ta-tsing authorities or troops. But in proof of their right to be considered a political power, we have the fact that their armies are operating successfully up into Shang-tung in the North, down into Kwang-tung and Kwang-se in the South, and in Sze-chuen in the West, while nothing prevents their penetrating to the sea in the East but the presence of the foreign forces at Shanghae.

"On the religion of the Taepings little need here be said. Viewed as a piece of contemporary history, the fact of the rise and progress, in this old seat of Confucianism and Buddhism, of the Bible-spreading Taeping Christianity—be its exact character what it may—is one of the most interesting spectacles that the annals of the human race present; and if the Taepings succeed in becoming the rulers of the Chinese people, it will prove one of the most momentous. A foreign official agent, whose nature or the limited extent of whose information permits of his viewing that spectacle with indifference, must surely be adjudged mentally unfitted for the career he has chosen. But except as a deeply interesting piece of contemporary history, we have nothing to do with it. If we aid the Taepings on account of their professed creed, we propagate religion by the sword; if we attack them on account of it, we engage in a religious persecution.

"One circumstance, which does not directly interest us, remains to be considered; the disposition of the Taepings towards us. On this point, the testimony is continuous, always consistent, and remarkably satisfactory. On three or four occasions, on which foreign war-vessels have, without any previous communication, steamed right up to the river batteries of the Taeping fortified places, they have exercised the right—a right inherent in every belligerent power—of endeavouring to keep off a suspicious and, for their means of defence, formidable force. But so soon as they have been told that it was not the hired foreign steamers of their Ta-tsing enemies, but the Government vessels of neutral foreigners that were before them, they have in every instance at once ceased firing. Their superior officers have fully explained that if foreign neutral vessels would send small unarmed boats in advance, they would not be fired at; and whenever this has been done, they have kept faith. As for the white flag of truce, it is simply absurd to suppose that that purely conventional signal of the Western world can be known to the commander of every Taeping battery. But the Taepings have a complete justification for disregarding it, even if they knew it; they are fighting with an enemy who would not hesitate an instant about sending in his own foreign steamers to open fire or effect a hostile landing, with a white flag or a British ensign flying at each mast-head. In no one of the numerous cases of one or more unarmed foreigners advancing to the Taeping outposts, since I first landed at Nanking in April, 1853, up till the most recent visits of Shanghae traders to Soo-chow, have they been received otherwise than peacefully; while in several cases those who have visited them as prejudiced unfriends have been

converted into well-wishers by the friendliness of their reception.

"They appeared in force before Shanghae six months ago, but I have good reasons for feeling satisfied that they were deluded into so doing by certain foreigners who wished to bring on an irremediable hostility between them and us, and who had held out to them the hope that we should give up the place to them. They fired a few ineffectual shots at the Chinese troops who were mingled with the British on the walls, and who kept discharging their matchlocks. But they did not fire at all where there were only British in front of them, and not one of the foreign soldiers received a wound, though a number of the Taepings were killed by our fire. Lastly, during the half-year that has elapsed since they retired, foreigners have been received at their places, if not with the same hopeful cordiality, as peacefully and as civilly as before.

"We have a long succession of irrefragable proofs that the Taepings do earnestly desire friendly commercial relations with us. The fact is so well known that inimical foreigners have been constrained to endeavour, with a curiously blind ingenuity, to turn it against them. 'All that is mere pretence,' it has been argued; 'if they felt sure they were strong enough to attack us with advantage, they would do it.' In reply, I ask if it be so, in how far do the Taepings differ in that respect from the Russians, French, and Americans? Is the peaceful and civil reception the English get from these nations the result of pure friendliness or of policy? Would they attack us if they felt sure they could do so with advantage? What are our Channel fleets, our fortifications, and our 150,000 volunteers for?

"A few years back the aid of a small British army and naval squadron, operating along a portion of the Great River, could perhaps have enabled the Manchoos to suppress this particular Chinese rising against their rule; but now it would require a large fleet of steamers, operating throughout some 1,500 to 2,000 miles of the Great River and its larger branches, and some 20,000 troops, operating in three or four complete small armies in different parts of the tract of country mentioned above as being more or less in the occupation of Taeping forces, and which extends about 800 to 900 miles from north to south, and 1,000 to 1,100 from east to west. It would prove one of the most troublesome and costly wars that England ever engaged in; costly as regarded the direct outlay, and still more costly as regarded the consequences to our trade; for the region in question is that which, practically speaking, produces the whole of our tea and silk exports, and which consumes the larger portion of our manufactured imports; and the effect of our hostilities in it would be to overspread it with anarchy and desolation."

From this despatch it will be seen that every point upon which the British Government has based its hostilities against the Ti-pings is plainly disproved. The last paragraph may be regarded by some few bigoted pro-Imperialists as an exaggeration; but when they glance at the present state of China (1865), and see the Ti-pings still victoriously disputing the supremacy of the Manchoo, when they look upon the very diminished export of silk, and upon the rebellion rampant in every province of China, they can hardly dispute that a "large fleet of steamers" and 20,000 troops was correctly considered by Mr. Meadows necessary to suppress the revolution.

As for the justice of the British intervention, it is hardly necessary to speak any further. The belligerent character of the Ti-ping rebellion was recognised immediately after its origin, simply because the British remained neutral towards a Power carrying on war, and moreover, from the fact that English representatives sought out and made guarantees of neutrality with the Ti-ping authorities. But, while openly recognising the belligerent rights of the revolutionists, the British Government has invariably evaded a strict interpretation of its professions, and given a tacit support to the Manchoos, thereby making themselves a party to the war, and constituting themselves the allies of the latter Power.

The Ti-pings were fully entitled to equal rights with the Imperialists, whether upon the high seas, neutral waters, at the treaty ports, or elsewhere. They possessed a settled Government at Nankin, a vast territory, and *several* ports; and such being the case, should, and had the British authorities acted honourably would, have enjoyed any and every privilege given or allowed to the other party in the civil war. When the Spanish colonies cast off their allegiance to Spain, when Brazil revolted against Portugal, when Texas seceded from Mexico, when Greece rebelled against its Turkish rulers, when the Southern States of America seceded from the Union, when Santo Domingo rose against Spain, when the Neapolitans revolted against their Government, in every one of these, and countless other cases, each belligerent as a matter of right received equal privileges from neutral Powers.

Had England and other neutral Powers acted according to their own laws, they would have been bound to recognise the independence of the Ti-pings, for the utter inability of the ousted Manchoo Government to recover its authority within a reasonable time was apparent. More than this, it was universally admitted that the Tartars, if unassisted by foreigners, would be overthrown, and when such contingency became certain, England was dragged in to assist them. The excuse about danger to British lives and

property from the occupation of the treaty ports by the insurgents is proved false by the capture of Shanghae in 1853, and the capture of Ningpo in 1861. The only other excuse of any moment is the "*might injure trade*" one; but is that to be considered a sufficient justification? In all the cases of rebellion just cited, England remained neutral; why then has she been made to assume to herself, in China *only*, the right to interfere in internecine strife? Why not interfere in America for the sake of trade and to prevent so-called rebels from collecting duties? As principle has nothing to do with the policy pursued in China, why should it elsewhere? Or why may it not be boasted that England feared to interfere in America, and therefore refrained; but acted differently in China, having no fear.

The *Shanghae Times*, a paper giving its general support to the Government, in its issue of March 15, 1862, thus describes the initiation of hostilities against the Ti-pings:—

"We believe that Admiral Hope is the first English officer of the present century who has adopted the unsoldierly practice of making war without having declared war. Having recognised the Taepings as a Power, according to the usage of civilized nations, he ought to have given them the alternative of retreat, submission, or butchery, before commencing the latter. This he did not. But as the Imperialists served him at Taku, he served the Taepings at Ming-hong. Honourable men condemned the conduct of the Imperial general at the Taku, and if the code of honour has not changed since then, it has been *grossly* violated in the two recent attacks on the Taepings."

We have in a former chapter noticed the false assertion of the British minister in China with regard to "all classes of observers" condemning the religion of the revolutionists, and his equally unfounded statement that the Revds. J. Edkins and Griffith John met with an "ungracious reception." The following reports by the Rev. G. John (of the London Missionary Society) will not only expose the truthlessness of Mr. Bruce, but also multiply proofs

as to the Christianity of the Ti-pings, the evil policy of the British Government, and the astounding apathy of the missionary body at large.

The Rev. Griffith John, in a report to the secretary of his society, dated "Shanghae, December 6, 1860," states:—

"They" (the Ti-pings) "have created a vacuum, not only in the temples, but also in the hearts of the people, which remains to be filled. This is the missionary's work—*a work that might be done immediately, were it not for the unaccountable policy of the representatives of foreign Powers at this port.* My principal object in going has been fully realized.

"My object was to obtain from the chief an edict of religious toleration. This I have obtained. It gives full permission to missionaries of every persuasion to enter into and live in the insurgents' territory, for the purpose of carrying on missionary work. The phraseology, in some parts, is bombastic, and therefore objectionable; but the simple meaning is full toleration to all Christians, whether Protestant or Catholic. 'I see that the missionaries are sincere and faithful men, and that they do not count suffering with Christ anything; and because of this I esteem them very highly.' Such are the words of the edict. Then comes a command to the chief officers to issue orders to all the (insurgent) brethren to treat the missionaries well. I showed the edict at Su-cheu, and asked the chiefs if they would help me to get a house, a chapel, &c. 'Yes,' said they, 'you come, and it will be all right.' I send you the original of this edict, written by the young prince himself, and bearing the seal of his father, and I intend to furnish you with a translation by the first opportunity. *I firmly believe that God is uprooting idolatry in the land, through the insurgents, and that He will by*

*means of them*, in connection with the foreign missionary, plant Christianity in its stead. Let the prayers of our brethren in England be more fervent than ever in behalf of China. If these men succeed, the days of idolatry are numbered in the land. I am fully convinced that, should they succeed to establish order within the boundary of the Keang-sú province, it would be *nominally* a Christian province before the expiration of twenty years. The same observation will hold good of all the other provinces."

This is the edict referred to by Mr. John:—

"EDICT OF RELIGIOUS TOLERATION,' BY THE CHIEF  
OF THE CHINESE INSURGENTS.<sup>2</sup>

"Having received the decree of my Heavenly Father (God), of my Heavenly adopted Father (Christ), and of my Father (the Celestial King), I command all the King's officers, both civil and military, and all the Brethren, to be acquainted with it. The true doctrine of my Father (God), and of my adopted Father (Christ), is the religion of Heaven. The religion of Christ (Protestant religion), and the religion of the Lord of Heaven (Roman Catholic religion), are included in it. The whole world, together with my father and myself, are one family. Those who lovingly and harmoniously observe the regulations of the heavenly religion are permitted to come and visit (us). Now, from the *memorial* presented to us by my uncles, Kan, Tsan, Chung, and others, I learn that the foreign teacher G. John and his friends, esteeming the Kingdom of Heaven, and reverencing and believing in my Father (God), and my adopted Father (Christ), to whom be thanks for the bestowment upon us

of authority, power, and wonders, of which those who are far and near have reverentially heard—have come for the express purpose of seeing the light, of beholding God and Christ, and of requesting permission to spread abroad the true doctrine. Seeing, however, that the present time is a time of war, and that the soldiers are scattered abroad in every direction, I am truly afraid that the missionaries might be injured by following the rabble soldiery, and that thus serious consequence might ensue. Still, I truly perceive that these (missionaries) are sincere and faithful men, and that they count it nothing to suffer with Christ; and because of this I esteem them very highly.

"Let the kings inform all the officers and others, that they must all act lovingly and harmoniously towards these men, and by no means engender contention and strife. Let all know, that the Father (God), my adopted Father (Christ), my father and myself, are one family; and let these men (missionaries) be treated exceedingly well.

"Respect this.'

"NOTE.—The Kan-wang told us that the chief is anxious that his son should feel an interest in the propagation of the Gospel, and therefore directed him to write it....

"The expressions 'to the light,' and 'behold Christ and God,' are explained in the fact that Nanking is the Jerusalem of the Celestial dynasty. I asked the Kan-wang if the above edict opens up the whole of the insurgents' territory—Nanking not excepted—to missionary operations. He replied that it does....

"Thus, then, the above throws open the whole of the insurgents' territory to missionary work, so far as the insurgents themselves are concerned. Here and there the phraseology is objectionable; still, this point is quite clear: they have done this not in ignorance, but with their eyes quite open to the difference which exists between them and ourselves."

In a letter, dated twelve days later than that already quoted from, Mr. John gives this reason for not going to live among the Ti-pings:—

"When I returned from Nankin I fully intended to go to live in that city, if practicable; but after much thought, *and some consultation with those who are in authority*, I have come to the conclusion that it would be premature to do so just now.... The river, I am told on good authority, is to be opened at once, and the ports of Han-kow and Kin-kiang are to become consular ports. Another expedition is about to go up the river, and then it will be determined what is to be done with the insurgents. They may be treated as friends, or, on the other hand, as foes. If not as friends, I AM CONVINCED THAT IT WILL BE OUR FAULT, because they cherish the kindest feeling towards us, in spite of our conduct towards them when they visited Shanghae."

We will conclude Mr. John's reports with three short extracts; the first of which clearly shows what good might have been effected by the British missionaries had they performed their duty; the second goes far to establish the superiority of the Ti-pings over the Manchoos.

1. "The insurgents are making rapid strides, and are determined, as you will learn from my journal, to uproot idolatry in the land, *and to plant Christianity in its room*. The former they will do with a strong hand, and the latter will not be left undone, *if the Churches and missionaries are alive to their duty in reference to this great movement.*"

2. "They have doubtless gross defects; but in every respect—religious, political, social, &c.—they are centuries ahead of the Imperialists, and I cannot but wish them God speed."

The third and last extract from Mr. John's reports is taken from one dated "February 2, 1861," and fully shadows forth what England has *now* been compelled to understand, and what every sensible person fully comprehended long since. Mr. John states:—

"It is fortunate for us that the Tartars have their hands full just now, *as the value of the recent treaty rests solely on the weakness of the existing dynasty.* The Tartars hate us with an insatiable hatred, and would, in spite of the treaty, recommence warlike operations to-morrow had they the power. To break faith with the *barbarian* is not crime but virtue, according to their creed, if his humiliation and expulsion might thereby be effected. From the Manchoos we have nothing to hope, but everything to fear. They are sworn enemies to Christianity and civilization, and they have set their iron faces determinedly against both. They *can* do but little at present. The wonderful progress of the insurrection in the South, during the last year, and the repeated defeats and the complete discomfiture of the Tartar hosts in the North, have thoroughly undermined the Manchoo power. It must fall. There is no power in China to uphold it. The Kwang-si insurrection, on the other hand, must triumph, *if foreign Powers do not interfere.* The Manchoos might as well attempt to blow the sun out of the heavens as to quench this flame which their folly and tyranny have kindled....

"The insurgents themselves are still determinately opposed to idolatry in all its features. At their approach the idols vanish, and the priests of Buddh and Tau disappear. The downfall of idolatry in the land seems to be bound up with their success. Never did China present such a spectacle to the Christian world. Will the Church, *unfaithful to her Head and false to herself*, as the depository of the blessings of light and life for the world, look on with indifference? Shall the four hundred millions of China remain in their state of darkness and death, *because of the worldliness and deadness* of the people of God?"

To these questions the British Government appears to have returned an affirmative answer.

A few extracts from a report of the Rev. W. Muirhead, in harmony with the testimonies of other missionaries, both as to the death-blow idolatry had received from the victorious arms of the Ti-pings, and the general knowledge of Christianity possessed by them, shall close our quoted evidence for the present. In the spring of 1861, Mr. Muirhead spent a month among the Ti-pings at Nankin, and while there was constantly engaged in preaching about the city, and thus describes his experience:—

"Going about sometimes for several hours a day, I have been abundantly encouraged by the number and attention of the audiences. It seems as if there were a foundation to go upon, from the amount of religious knowledge diffused among the people. There is a response, if not in their hearts, at least in their thoughts, to the tidings of mercy. They are made familiar at every step with the name and compassion of the Heavenly Father, *by the unprecedented practice of recording the fact over every door*. When, therefore, the same truths are announced in their hearing by a foreign missionary, *they give a ready assent, and express their cordial approval*. How different is all this from our experience in Shanghae and

elsewhere! There we have a hard and strong ground to work upon; ignorance and *opposition* prevail in abundant measure. Here, on the part both of the military and civilians, there *is* knowledge, and there *is* appreciation of the truth to a certain extent, which renders the spiritual enforcement of it a more easy and pleasant duty."

These extracts must naturally make one believe that the "all classes of observers," so cunningly invented by Mr. Bruce and his ministerial friends, consist of Mr. American Baptist Missionary Holmes.

The Kan-wang, the missionaries' friend, having left the city while Mr. Muirhead was there, that event was mentioned in the following language:—"In prospect of his going out, I had occasion some time ago to allude to his constant dependence on God, and to urge upon him the duty of earnest prayer. But in this I was anticipated by a previous request of his own, when, after describing the trials and difficulties of his situation, he said to me: '*Mr. Muirhead, pray for me!*' He has need of our prayers, and I trust his request will be attended to by many friends at home."

Poor Kan-wang! The only prayers have been those devoutly entertained by opium traders and "indemnity" interested people for the destruction of him and his confederates.

Of the Ti-ping women Mr. Muirhead states:—  
"While walking along the streets, the number of females that are seen on the way is rather a novelty. They are in general well dressed, and of very respectable appearance. Many are riding on horseback, others are walking, and most of them have large feet. Not a few stop to hear our preaching, and always conduct themselves with perfect propriety. *This is new, as compared with the former course of things, and the whole reminds one partly of home life.* It will be a blessing if the revolution should tend to break up the system of female exclusion, hitherto practised."

We will conclude our extracts from Mr. Muirhead's report with the following interesting account of a conversation between himself and a

young Ti-ping soldier:—

"And now a word or two, with regard to the character and prospects of the movement. Those engaged in it speak not boastfully, but calmly and confidently, of its success. They acknowledge the difficulties in the way, yet believe in the Lord God that they shall be established. They do not apprehend it will be an easy thing to overcome their enemies; but fighting, as they think, under the banners of the 'Heavenly Father' and 'Heavenly Brother,' they contemplate a happy issue as a matter of course.

"As Kan-wang's followers were assembling in front of his palace, a young man came upstairs. I asked him if he was going out to join the army. He said yes. 'Was he not afraid of being wounded or killed?' 'Oh, no,' he replied, 'the Heavenly Father will befriend me.' 'Well, but suppose you should be killed, what then?' 'Why, my soul will go to heaven.' 'How can you expect to go to heaven? What merit have you to get there?' 'None, none in myself. It is entirely through the merits of the Heavenly Brother that this is to be done.' 'Who is the Heavenly Brother?' 'I am not very learned,' he said, 'and request instruction.' I then began to tell him that He was the Son of the Heavenly Father; but before I had finished the sentence, he replied correctly. 'What great work did Christ do?' I asked. The young man gave an explicit statement of the Saviour's work for sinners, of his coming into the world, suffering and dying in the room of sinful man, in order to redeem us from sin and misery. I inquired if he believed all this. 'Assuredly,' was his reply. 'When did you join the dynasty?' 'Last year.' 'Can you read?' 'No.' 'Who instructed you in these things?' 'The Tsan-wang.'

'What does he in the way of instructing his people?' 'He has daily service in his palace, and often preaches to them alike at home and when engaged in the field.' 'What book does he use?' 'He has a number belonging to the dynasty.' 'Do you know the New Testament?' 'Yes, but cannot read it.' 'Can you repeat the doxology of the Heavenly Father?' He went over it correctly. It contains in simple language the fundamental tenets of Christianity. 'Are there any special laws or commands connected with the dynasty?' 'There are the ten commandments.' 'Repeat them.' He went over a number of them, till he came to the sixth. 'Now,' I said, 'how is this command observed by you, seeing that so much cruelty and wickedness are practised by your brethren all around?' 'Oh,' he replied, 'in so far as fighting in the open field is concerned, that is all fair play and cannot be helped. It is not intended in the command.' 'No,' I remarked, 'that is not my meaning; but look at your brethren going privately into the country and robbing and killing the innocent people; what of that?' 'It is very bad, and such will only go to hell.' 'What, notwithstanding their adherence to the dynasty, and fighting under the same banners as yourself?' 'Yes, that is no matter; when the laws of Christ and the Heavenly Father are not attended to, these guilty individuals ought to die and go to hell.' 'But is not this the case with a great number of your adherents?' 'Alas! it is especially among our new recruits, whose hearts are not impressed with the true doctrine.' 'In all the public offices is care taken to instruct the soldiers and civilians connected with them?' 'Yes, every man, woman, and child of reasonable age in the capital, can repeat the doxology of the Heavenly Father.' 'And what about those in the country?' 'Those who have short hair are not

yet sufficiently taught, but books are being distributed amongst them, in order that they may learn those things."

Can this be called a "blasphemous and immoral" basis of religion? If those who so designated it possessed but a tithe of the temporal practice and spiritual faith of this illiterate young Ti-ping, they would be happier men; but it must be admitted that their sentiments and actions hardly induce such a belief.

## FOOTNOTES:

1. *Vide* p. 6, "Further Papers relating to the Rebellion in China, 1862."

2. "The original is written by the young prince, in the name of his father, on satin, with the vermilion pencil, and stamped with the seal of the Taeping-wang, the Celestial king."

## CHAPTER XVII.

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On board the *Williamette*.—Blockade running.—Arrival at Nankin.—Solemn Thanksgiving.—Domestic Arrangements.—Phillip's Wife.—The Wooing.—The Dowry.—The Wedding.—Trade established.—Imperialist Corruption.—Preparations for leaving.—An Elopement.—The Journey.—The Surprise.—The Repulse.—Arrival at Hang-chow.—Its capture.—The particulars.—Cum-ho.—The Chung-wang.—His mistaken Policy.

Thanks to the impish steamer *Williamette*, we escaped any further annoyance at the hands of her friends, for, according to agreement, she towed us past all the Imperialist positions. Although I had paid rather dear for this favour, the danger we had escaped at that atrocious Mud Fort, and those troubles we avoided by towing past the unscrupulous batteries and piratical squadrons of the enemy, made it well worth more. Had we sailed to Nankin, our nights would have been far from pleasant, sleep being rendered impossible from the unceasing watching for some hostile demonstration, and the excitement attendant on the several skirmishes which we must have had with the Manchoos.

The worry and excitement of running the Nankin blockade can only be thoroughly appreciated by those who have experienced its perils. The Ti-ping adherents certainly found few pleasures to reward them, and their lot was very far indeed from being cast in pleasant places. Such dangers as myself and many others have endured while assisting the cause of these patriots have left an impression which even time cannot efface.

Perchance, we are sailing peacefully and slowly along the broad Yangtze, dreaming of home or philosophizing upon the spread of liberty and Christianity by our Ti-ping friends, when crash comes a discharge of artillery from some Manchoo fort, as the first intimation that we were within the meshes of those who would destroy all hope of improving China or of

realizing our own dreams, with equal indifference. This danger passes over, and the wearied have sought for slumber, when those on their anxious watch suddenly discover a squadron of the sometime pirate *Ti-mungs* hired to fight the battles of the Manchoo; and at the same instant those below are startled by the broadsides fired at their devoted vessel. After running the gauntlet of these heavily-armed vessels, the sleepers, with rifles by their side and revolvers under pillow, are subject to incessant disturbance from the attack of the centipede gunboats, as the latter pull from sly corners and creeks, in twos, tens, or twenties, and chase the passing ship, eager for the blood of those on board, or the pleasure of looting their effects.

Many of the few Europeans who were engaged assisting the Ti-pings were captured and barbarously killed by the Imperialists; yet, in spite of these dangers, and the certain prospect of a cruel death if unfortunate enough to fall into their hands, every man willingly incurred them, with a full conviction that the cause was worthy of any risk or sacrifice.

Some have been found daring enough to allege that personal profit was the motive which induced so many to incur suffering and danger in support of the Ti-pings. The absurdity of such a statement is made clear by the fact, that from 1860 to 1863 the principal supply of silk and tea was derived by the merchants of China from the Ti-pings, and that it was possible to carry on trade with the Imperialists with perfect safety, and with as large, if not larger, profit.

The true reason why those engaged in assisting the Ti-pings preferred that course, with all its troubles and dangers, is that, having once met the revolutionists, the immense superiority of the latter to the Manchoos had enlisted their sympathies and active support. Money, of course, in many cases had a great deal to do with the transactions of those who *traded* among the Ti-pings; but others, I am certain, were solely actuated by disinterested motives. He must, indeed, be a singular specimen of a man who could really know and experience the society of the Ti-pings, and not become a warm friend to them.

The *Williamette* was a powerful steamer, and on the evening of the day after she had taken us in tow, we had the satisfaction to be cast off right in the mouth of the Nankin creek, while the good ship continued on her way to Ngan-kin, whither she was bound with munitions of war freshly obtained from the British arsenals in China, to be expended in the slaughter of those who held England's pledge of strict neutrality.

Upon bringing up in the creek, I landed and paid my friend the Sz-wang a visit. He gave me a hearty welcome, and immediately set his servants to prepare a regular feast for myself and friend. I could not refuse the kind hospitality of my worthy host, even impatient as I was to get into the city and see Marie, who, he assured me, was in perfect health and happiness, and a vast favourite among the ladies at the Ti-ping capital, at the same time astonishing me by saying that Phillip had been married since my departure from Nankin.

At last, while the dinner was progressing, and the Sz-wang had for a moment been called away by a courier from the city, I left the table, and, assisted by his eldest nephew, who was a great friend of mine, I mounted one of his best horses and set off for Nankin, leaving my friend P. to excuse me and relate our adventures and the intentions of the so-called "foreign brethren" at Shanghae towards the Ti-pings; a point upon which the Sz-wang always felt the deepest anxiety.

Upon reaching the Chung-wang's palace, I found a large number of chiefs assembled in the "Heavenly Hall," and all greatly elated by despatches just received from the Commander-in-Chief detailing the capture of the seaport Ningpo. Anxious as I naturally felt to meet my betrothed, I was yet obliged to join the chiefs in the solemn thanksgiving they were about offering to the Great Giver of all victory. Upon this occasion, as usual, whether after triumph or defeat, the Ti-pings attributed their important success entirely to the will of "The Heavenly Father." Their absorbing reliance upon God, because of their belief in the righteousness and Christianity of their cause has often startled me by its singular devotedness

and simplicity. It was not only those who had been of the original "Society of the Worshippers of God" in Kwang-si, that were so fervent and hopeful, but all *bonâ fide* Ti-pings, and even many among the latest recruits were equally inspired. It is a well-known fact that young boys, of twelve to fifteen years of age, are commonly the bravest soldiers and most daring spirits in the ranks of the Ti-ping soldiery. Formerly the very women fought by the side of their male relatives; at the present time they still undergo the hard dangers of the camp. Thus, upon consideration of all the facts bearing upon the motive and practice of the Ti-pings, it cannot be difficult to understand that some mighty inspiration has affected a large portion of the Chinese in a remarkably striking manner. Some term the cause and effect evil; others, not so self-conceited and hypercritical, say "it is good." By some the great Ti-ping revolution has been considered a religious fanaticism, an extensive leaguing together of banditti for the sake of plunder; the fact being that the only religious enthusiasm is to establish our Bible throughout China, and the only physical action an endeavour to liberate that vast empire from what even their worst opponents declare a hopelessly corrupt and oppressive Government!



Day & Son, (Limited), Lith.

A VIEW IN THE INNER APARTMENTS OF THE CHUNG WANG'S PALACE

When the thanksgiving prayers in the "Heavenly Hall" were brought to a conclusion, I soon found my way to the inner apartments, and had the happiness to find Marie looking, if possible, better and more handsome than ever. She was delighted with the kindness of the Ti-ping ladies, and particularly noticed their sincere piety and continual study of the Holy

Scriptures. Before long her inseparable companion, Miss Cum-ho, appeared, and considerably amused us by her roundabout inquiries after my friend L., who, much to her satisfaction, I stated might be shortly expected.

While taking a stroll in the garden, Marie informed me that during my absence she had been much annoyed by the importunate attentions of a young chief, the son of the Tsan-wang, one of the principal members of the Ti-ping Government. In fact, to so unpleasant an extent had his sudden passion carried him that, upon two occasions, his emissaries had attempted her abduction, the last attempt having taken place only a few evenings before my return, and while she was walking in the palace grounds alone. The young chief I knew by reputation as a wild and unscrupulous character, but his father was a most influential personage; therefore, though I might readily have avoided further trouble by representing the affair to the authorities, I decided to take Marie with me and join the Chung-wang at Hang-chow, rather than excite any bad feeling by making a public case when it could be avoided. Ti-ping justice was remarkably prompt and severe, and conviction of the chief would very likely have led to decapitation. Before putting my plan into execution, it was necessary to await the arrival of L. with our lorcha.

In the evening I found Phillip with his wife waiting to see me in the old rooms at the back of the Chung-wang's palace. I had ample occasion to congratulate him upon his choice, for the lady was by no means wanting in personal beauty. She was a really fine girl, taller than the generality of Chinese women, with very pretty and regular features, light-complexioned and rosy-cheeked, and was quite black-eyed and long-haired enough to please the greatest brunette admirer; besides which she was fortunate enough to possess nice little feet, not deformed according to Imperialist Chinese taste. How Phillip met her, and how she became his wife, took place, as he informed me, in the following way:—

A week or two after my departure from Nankin, intelligence was received of the capture of the city of Ngan-kin by the Imperialists, and the

defeat of the Ying-wang, who had been prevented effecting its relief through the delay caused by his communication with the British expedition up the Yang-tze. Reinforcements having been ordered from Nankin to the north bank of the river, so as to co-operate in the Ying-wang's retreat, Phillip accompanied them, taking charge of the few pieces of artillery they carried.

One day, while with the foremost of the advanced guard, he became engaged in an attack upon a fortified hamlet, which was obstinately defended by some Manchoo troops, who were assisted by the inhabitants. In such cases, of course, the Ti-pings treat the villagers as enemies, making prisoners of those who escape the battle, and seizing their effects.

While driving the Imperialists out of the palace, Phillip received a slight though painful spear-wound in one of his hands, and, upon entering a house to obtain some water, he saw his future wife for the first time. The house was, apparently, one of the poorest in the village, and the young woman, with her aged father and a little servant-girl, constituted its only occupants. They were naturally much alarmed by the conflict raging about them, and while the timid daughter supplied him with a draught of water, her father threw himself at his knees, *ketowing* and imploring protection.

Phillip was considerably impressed by the charms of the celestial damsel, and with his brave though tender heart sincerely pitied her unprotected state, so he waited until the arrival of the main body of the forces; and then, after obtaining from the chief in command a protection *chop*, or paper, to affix to the door of the house, and thereby make it inviolate, he continued on the march, leaving father and daughter showering Chinese blessings upon his foreign head.

My friend had not proceeded very far when he reflected that a great proportion of the rear guard (which in this case was a position of no moment) was composed of quite new levies, many of whom had been Imperialist *braves*, and had only lately been enlisted as Ti-pings, and who, probably, still retained the old propensities to excess and plunder strong within them. Thinking thus, and, I dare say, with a lively remembrance of

the daughter's pretty face—her equal not being seen every day in China—he determined to ride back and protect the old man's house, if necessary, till the last of the force had passed through the village. During his return he had met a number of the recruits as prisoners for looting houses and robbing country people, the punishment for which would almost certainly be decapitation, and upon reaching the place he found many were plundering and destroying all they could lay hands on.

Phillip had scarcely noticed this when the little girl he had seen at the house came running up to him, screaming and holding out her hands, and with the blood pouring from a large gash across her cheek.

Fearing the worst, and blaming himself for not having made greater haste, he left one of his men to attend to the poor child, and galloped up to the house with the rest.

The building was beginning to smoke where some of the marauders had just applied the torch, while, right across the threshold of his once happy home, the apparently lifeless body of the old man lay before my friend. Hearing the noise of voices inside the house, Phillip expecting at each step to come across the daughter's corpse, drew his revolver and entered. He arrived not a moment too soon, for, upon reaching the inner chamber, he found the poor girl struggling in the hands of several soldiers. The next instant and his pistol had effectually released her, when she rushed fainting and dishevelled to his arms. Carrying her to the outer apartment, he laid her on a couch, and then turned his attention to the father. The latter still lived, but death was evidently fast approaching as his life ebbed away from several ghastly wounds inflicted by the heavy knives of the ruthless murderers.

The fire being extinguished by some of his men, Phillip got the poor old man moved into the house, and, assisted by the sorrow-stricken daughter, did all that was possible to save him. It was, however, soon apparent that his end was drawing near; he seemed quite sensible, though for some time unable to speak. At last, with a flickering revival before the total eclipse of life's lamp, he pointed with one nerveless hand to the wainscot, and ejaculated, "Tseen!

—che-mo!" (Money!—take away the wood!) Upon going to the spot indicated, Phillip found a crevice in the panelling, and, using the blade of his sword, he managed to wrench away a large piece, exposing a hollow containing a small bundle tied up in blue Chinese cloth. While lifting this up he knew by its weight that it must contain gold, and when he placed it by the side of the dying man, the latter with difficulty managed to say "Gno—show —ne!" (I—give—you). Then, calling his daughter, he with a last effort stretched forth his arms, and, grasping her hand and that of the stranger from the far West, and feebly endeavouring to place them together, fell back, and in a little while expired.

After a distressing scene with the bereaved girl, Phillip was compelled to order the interment, under a few inches of earth, of her father's body. Immediately afterwards it was necessary to set out for the now distant army, and when Phillip overtook it his future wife was with him, as her fate would have been certain had she remained alone at the desolated village, defenceless, with her gold and beauty, before the incursions of Imperialist or Ti-ping marauders. There were many Ti-ping women accompanying their husbands with the army, so the poor girl had some of her own sex to comfort her. The expedition was not long away from Nankin, and upon its return to the city, Phillip and the orphan were married in the Ti-ping church, thus accomplishing not only what they supposed to have been the wish of the dead father, but also what accorded with their mutual inclination.

And so it was that my friend Phillip obtained a wife and a fortune with her, for that heavy little bundle contained more than sixty gold bars, each worth about 300 dollars. Phillip Bosse, or Boze, declared himself so satisfied with his wife, his present affairs, and the Ti-pings, that he vowed he would never leave them. He kept his word, for he died amongst the patriots, and as his relatives in Greece may never otherwise hear of his death, I give his name as I knew it; so that should this book ever fall into their hands, they may at least have the melancholy satisfaction to know where his body rests,

and that he died like a gallant and noble-hearted man, serving a righteous and a great cause.

A few days after my arrival at Nankin, my friend L. brought our lorcha safely into the creek, accompanied by three other vessels of the same class, the owners of which had availed themselves of the passes I had given them from the Chang-wang. Each craft was deeply laden with rice and other provisions. My own junk and lorcha, containing rice belonging to the Ti-ping Government, we left in charge of certain officials, and my friends all joined me in the city. Soon after the arrival of L., several vessels came in from Shanghae to trade; these were succeeded by others, and a regular commerce sprang up and was continued for a year or two. In a few months the trade had become so great that it was quite common for more than thirty vessels (both foreign and Chinese-owned) to arrive in one day. The large supplies received by this line of communication were stored in the extensive Nankin granaries, and while these were always kept full, the residue was distributed through the town and villages of the district, the neighbouring country being much impoverished by the continual warfare raging around the Ti-ping capital.

The fraudulent and corrupt revenue institutions of the Manchoo Government have long been notorious. The enormous extortion practised upon foreign trade until the wars with Great Britain compelled a more regular tariff, and the plundering squeeze stations scattered over every half-mile of Imperialist territory, each of which pilfer a sum from the unfortunate owner of all passing merchandise, be he a foreigner who ought to pass clear by virtue of the transit duty clauses of the treaty, or a Chinaman who is legitimate prey, have made China a vast system of independent official violence and rapacity.

No wonder the naturally astute Chinese appear so particularly cunning and deceitful to Europeans! The possession of money is a sure attraction for the mandarin vultures; so that beyond the pale of the foreign settlements at the treaty ports, throughout the country, every native merchant and civilian is

bred up to habits of mendacity, and particularly to conceal his real income and condition.

The endless ramifications of the Manchoo administrative extend from each remote corner of China to the central power; and although every one of the myriad feelers sucking away at the substance of the nation (in the shape of mandarins, all appointed with merely nominal salary, but given *carte blanche* to obtain emolument after sending an annual stipulated sum to the emperor), crams its individual self with spoil, the squeezing and contracting of the Manchoo canker feeds the insatiable core at Pekin. It is useless to think of curing or mitigating the evil, though some have vainly advocated doing so. The only remedy must necessarily be a change of dynasty, such as the Ti-pings would certainly have effected had they not been wickedly opposed by foreigners. Every branch of civil, military, social, political and religious organization has become so hopelessly corrupted since the Manchoo era, that any attempt to change or improve the deplorable results of their evil rule might be carried on *ad infinitum*, only to result in certain failure. But one course affords a prospect of cure and a consequent chance of happiness for China: that is, a radical change of Government.

Let foreigners be righteous, and permit the native to expel the Tartar; and the Chinese, when ruled by Chinese, will become benefited by western civilization, and (if the Ti-ping should not become exterminated by British intervention) in all probability Christianized.

In striking contrast to the excessively corrupt Imperialist customs, the Ti-ping revenue organization was just, regular, and simple. Throughout every part of Ti-ping-tien-kwoh but one custom-house was established at each town or village where trade was carried on. The rate of tariff has always been moderate, and the great advantage of the system consisted in being able to clear goods by one payment, upon which a pass would be given to take them free of further charge or hindrance to their destination. The Ti-ping Government deserved no little credit for the simplicity and effectiveness of their Board of Revenue, and it is mainly due to that branch of their

administration that the valuable silk trade *increased* and continued progressing so favourably during their possession of the producing districts.

Not only can all who have traded at Nankin testify to the entire superiority of the Ti-ping custom-house, but many silk and tea merchants now revelling in England have to thank the admirable regulations and forbearance of the revolutionists for their well-lined pockets. Every customs establishment in the late Ti-ping territory was composed of a superintendent, several deputies, and a very efficient staff of surveyors, clerks, and weighers, and at places frequented by Europeans, one or more interpreters were always found. Rice and other grain were quite free of duty, and that upon dried and preserved provisions was very low. All other produce and general merchandise were moderately taxed, either by tariff or *ad valorem*. Such were the regulations, which were not (like the Imperialist maritime customs) simply binding upon foreign goods, but were applicable in an equal degree to the property of natives.

Before putting into execution the design I had formed to depart suddenly from Nankin, D., an old friend of mine, arrived from Hankow, where he was established as the principal partner of a large mercantile firm. He brought several vessels to trade with the city, and he came to an arrangement by which he was to sail with Captain P., and another European as mate, in our lorchas *Anglo Ti-ping*, the latter to convoy his junks and our old one. D. was a perfect Chinese linguist, and to him I am indebted for much valuable information.

I waited until P., in charge of the lorchas and her consorts, had sailed up the river to obtain cargoes of rice, edible oil, bacon, salt fish, and other articles of consumption, and then prepared to leave the city.

During a few days I sent Phillip and L. into the country to buy some horses, and at last, together with our own, managed to muster fourteen strong animals, which were then stabled at a remote part of the city, close to the north-east gate. Since the return of my friend and companion L., we had successfully concealed his presence from the female part of the Chung-

wang's household, with one exception, and by this *ruse* he had obtained several interviews with the lady of his affections, the (according to his idea) incomparable Cum-ho. The result of these meetings soon transpired.

At length the day came, the close of which was settled for our exit from Nankin. Six picked men, belonging to an artillery corps we had formed of some of the Chung-wang's troops, were selected to accompany myself and comrades. The horses were particularly attended to, and our weapons were well cleaned and then carefully loaded, for danger had warned us against the risk of rusty locks and carelessly charged fire-arms. When all had been arranged, L. informed me that he had determined to carry Cum-ho, who had agreed to elope with him, to Hang-chow, and so induce her father to sanction their marriage. I found it impossible to dissuade him from doing so, and he assured me that the lady's mind was equally decided; therefore, much as I feared the affair would injure our satisfactory and friendly relations with the Chung-wang, I had no choice but to accede. Cum-ho, in order to find an opportunity to join us, had paid a visit to the Ying-wang's ladies, and as their dwelling was close by, she was only accompanied by her own female attendant.

Just when the shadows of evening were cast in long dark lines from the tall battlements and high pagodas of the city, we prepared to assemble at the appointed rendezvous. Phillip, with the six Ti-ping soldiers, I sent on to the stables, while L., with our boy As-sam, waited outside the Ying-wang's palace for Miss Cum-ho; and I, taking A-ling, my trusty interpreter, joined Marie in the Chung-wang's gardens. As the hour fixed upon for a general meet drew near, myself and party, each carrying a small quantity of baggage, left the gardens by a small door and proceeded to the somewhat distant stables. Upon reaching the rendezvous, I found Phillip had brought his wife with him, and also another horse for her use. We had not long to wait for L., who, with his fair runaway and her maid, arrived soon after myself. The horses were now led forth, and we, numbering fifteen persons, having mounted, the word was given to spur and away.

Upon reaching the city gate we were detained for a long while by the warder, in consequence of the late hour, although I had taken care to provide myself with the requisite pass from the proper authority to permit my egress or ingress at any time. At last the surly guardians of the portal turned out, shuffling their clothes about their backs with a style peculiar to the Chinese, who generally sleep quite naked, and have a curious way of drawing their arms from the sleeves of their clothing when dressed, and shrugging them up next their body. After the shuffling, stocking-pulling, and preliminary spitting (a great and indispensable habit with Chinamen), had partially subsided, the sleepy guards managed to draw back sundry huge wooden bars, to undo any amount of rusty locks and bolts, and then the massive doors creaked slowly open. While the gates of the city clanged together, we set off at a gallop for the road leading south, to reach which we turned westward and skirted a considerable part of the walls.

Chinese horses, though small, are wonderfully strong and enduring, and it was not till the close of the day after our start that we came to a regular halt, and only then because our fair companions were fatigued. My literally fair readers need not take umbrage at this appellation, for yellow-tinted celestial and dusky Portuguese as they were, their beauty was undeniable, and their figures such that many a European dame might justly envy. The rough riding through the mountain-passes on the southern road from Nankin affected our hardy animals but very little; and when our camp was pitched for the night under the shelter of the wall of a ruined Buddhist temple, and they were picketed in a semi-circle around, they set to work cropping the short grass as leisurely as though they had just left the stable. We carried three tents with our baggage, and these were pitched; one for the women; one for my comrades, A-ling, and our boy; and the other for our six men.

A large fire was lighted, and we had nearly finished the supper served up by As-sam, when crash came a volley of musketry among us, directed from the crest of a small hill directly fronting and overlooking our camp at a distance of some eighty or ninety yards. I had stupidly neglected to choose

the other side of the wall for our resting-place. Of course, we instantly started to our feet and snatched up the arms at hand, and while the Ti-pings shortened in the tether of our horses, forming a close array of the well-trained, docile animals, fastened together head and tail, the rest of our party placed the women directly under the shelter of the living rampart. These measures were barely effected when a body of more than fifty horsemen dashed round the hill and charged upon our position. We had no difficulty in discovering them to be Ti-pings, and when they came closer we saw the Tsan-wang's son was at their head. Their first volley had fortunately been aimed far too high; it may be that, fearing to injure the woman he pursued, the chief had done this, trusting to cause an alarm, during which he might dash forward and carry off the prize. Our reply to the advancing party was not so bloodless as the commencement of their attack. My own comrades, and even A-ling and As-sam, were capital marksmen, while the six men had been selected for their approved courage and the well-known skill so peculiar to Chinese when properly instructed.

Every man of our party was armed with either an Enfield or some other rifle (two being Sharp's breech-loaders), and all were able to use them with deadly accuracy; therefore, the number of the approaching foe gave us but little dread, especially as we saw they were armed only with short European-made double-barrelled guns and Chinese matchlocks. We waited until they had galloped to within twenty yards, but receiving only the war cry, "Tah! Tah!" in reply to our challenge, we then took steady aim, and commenced firing upon them by successive volleys from each half of our number. The affair was settled in a moment almost. The leader and half a dozen of his men, with twice that number of horses, were quickly rolling on the turf, for at that short distance the difficulty would have been to miss them with our rifles. When their charge was entirely repulsed we ceased firing, a dozen men came forward on foot and carried off their fallen comrades and chief, and then they all slowly disappeared in the direction of Nankin. During their advance they had kept up an irregular fire, which, with the exception of

grazing the other arm of our boy, As-sam (one had been wounded at the Mud Fort), and shooting away the ear of one of our horses, did no damage.

Upon the fortunate termination of the skirmish we dispatched the remainder of our supper, turned in for the night upon the opposite side of the wall, and kept three men on sentry till morning. Upon resuming our journey, we soon came to a rich and thickly-populated country, and during the next few days, while traversing the silk districts from end to end, along the eastern shore of the Ta-hoo lake, *via* the city of Soo-chow, Kia-shing-foo, and the Grand Canal, I particularly noticed the vast improvement that had taken place since my first visit to Soo-chow some eight months ago. Everywhere around the traces of war (always excepting the demolished Buddhist temples) had disappeared before the progress of peace and plenty; and although I may be accused of exaggeration, I do not hesitate to affirm that the establishment of Ti-ping supremacy and administration over these, the most valuable districts of China, had restored them to prosperity and happiness in a shortness of time hitherto unparalleled in the case of either Chinese or any other civil war desolation.

Although during my previous visit I had seen amply sufficient to undeceive me as to the wickedly false allegations of Ti-ping devastations, &c., still I was hardly prepared for the flourishing state in which I found the *settled* territory of the revolutionists. I knew that the export of silk within the current year (1861) had already increased to upwards of 20,000 bales more than during the corresponding period of last year (when till May the districts were under Imperialist rule); but then I imagined the great increase might be due to the wish of holders to realize. I found, upon the contrary, that the improvement was entirely due to the Ti-ping occupation. In less than two years the districts under Ti-ping jurisdiction had produced silk representing a sum of not less than £3,000,000 per annum more than previously! At each of the many villages and at every peasant's cot, the happy-looking people were engaged tending their silkworms for winter, reeling the last cocoons, or tilling their fields.

Great as the prosperity of the country seemed, there was something even more gratifying and interesting in the changed appearance and disposition of the people. All the unfavourable characteristics of the Manchoo-oppressed Chinese had vanished, and their natural character was manifested in a way which illustrated their candour, hospitality to foreigners, and native good temper.

After a twelve days' journey, the later part of the time in large canal boats, we arrived within a day's march of Hang-chow. Leaving the water route, we disembarked our horses and set forward in the direction of the provincial capital, guided by the continual booming of heavy guns. Upon reaching the crest of some high ground, the city lay before us in the clear frosty air of a fine December morning. But, as we find the case every day, the beauty of nature was marred by the passions and strife of mankind. The extensive city was in flames in several quarters, and the dense columns of smoke shrouded as with a pall the slaughter taking place beneath. As we rode forward through the beautiful neighbouring country, we were enabled gradually to discern dark masses of troops rushing forward against the city amid the constant roar of artillery and the rattling crash of smaller arms. It was evident that we had arrived at the moment of a grand assault by the Ti-ping forces.

As our soldiers each declared that the Chung-wang's head-quarters were to the west of the city, we made a considerable detour in that direction. We had not proceeded far when a disorderly crowd came in sight, hurrying away from the city. Directly they observed my party, the greater number turned off and precipitately fled in another line of retreat. As those who stood their ground were making ready with spears and gingalls to give us a warm reception, and as we were not out like a parcel of knights errant seeking adventure and fighting from pure love, we wisely followed those who ran away, and succeeded in catching one of the hindermost, to question as to the state of affairs in the city. At first the man was terribly frightened, and we could make nothing of him; then he became still more alarmed, and we

found out all we wished. His fear was the usual one accompanying the flight of disorganized *undisciplined* troops, which with Chinese becomes a wild panic; not because the men fear death, for no people can meet it with the stolidity and callousness with which they will suffer execution and torture, but from the simple fact that they are not sufficiently disciplined to know how to be killed in an orderly manner on the field of battle. They see a chance of escape, and on one taking it the whole follow like a flock of sheep.

Having ascertained from our prisoner, who with his friends were all Imperialist soldiery from the garrison of Hang-chow, that the Ti-pings had just captured the city, we set him at liberty, and then galloped for the west gate. On the way we passed many fugitives fleeing in every direction. Upon reaching the rear of the Ti-ping lines of circumvallation, we found them almost denuded of troops, the few remaining being fully occupied in guarding prisoners. We soon found the Commander-in-Chief's head-quarters, but no Chung-wang was there. The scanty number of soldiers on guard were in a great state of excitement about the success of the siege, and we managed to elicit from them that the Chung-wang had entered the city with his whole force, and was now engaged attacking the Tartar quarter, an *imperium in imperio*, city within city, being protected by its own walls, and with a central citadel towering above all. Leaving the women in a house protected by the main guard, with the remainder of my party I rode towards the city. Upon entering by the nearest gate, we found the streets unoccupied, except by the bodies of the slain; but the noise of battle guided us to the spot where living men were busily engaged increasing the number of the dead and dying.

Hang-chow, cut off from all communication with the outside world, every line of supply severed by the besiegers, and famine raging among the unfortunate garrison and inhabitants, fell to the investing army upon the 29th of December, 1861. Early on that day the Chung-wang had commenced a grand assault, conducted upon each gate of the city. After a fiercely contested fight, the assaulting columns having gained some advantages at the south and east gates, the Chinese portion of the defenders at those points

surrendered, probably induced to take that step by the very short rations to which they had been reduced. When the gates had been given up, the Ti-ping troops poured into the city with such ardour that the Tartar bannermen were quickly driven within their inner defence. Hundreds of the miserable citizens of the provincial capital were starved to death during the siege, hundreds more, with their families, committed suicide. The nature of war in China has usually been so merciless, and the conduct of victorious troops at the capture of a city so outrageous, that in many cases during the civil war, and the wars with Great Britain, the people, probably imbued with a dread of these consequences, have committed wholesale suicide when they were not in the slightest danger of being molested.

I managed to find the Chung-wang just in time to join the last attack upon the inner or Tartar city. The Commander-in-Chief, surrounded by his officers, received myself and friends with evident signs of satisfaction. His men had just been repulsed by the Manchoo troops, who were fighting with the greatest bravery and determination. The Ti-pings had eight or nine pieces of artillery turned against the wall of the inner city; but these were established in one position, firing point blank upon the rampart, so that when the assaulting parties moved forward the guns became useless. I instantly advised the Chung-wang to move two or three guns away upon each flank, so as to enfilade the parapet and protect the advance of his stormers. This was quickly done, and upon joining the leaders of the next assault, we had the satisfaction to find it successful. The Tartar bannermen retreated to the citadel in the centre of their city, fighting to the very last, assisted by their women, who fought with them like men, and one of whom inflicted a severe spear-wound upon Ling-ho, a Ti-ping general, when he would have saved her life. The greater portion of the Chinese troops garrisoning Hang-chow were captured, but the Manchoos fell almost to the last man. Their loss during the capture of the city was very great, and when at length they were driven into their citadel, Luy, their general, blew the remnant into the air, the entire Tartar force, men, women, and children, perishing in the ruins.

After the capture of Hang-chow, the anti-Ti-pings, who were in the habit of howling over Ti-ping atrocities, though oblivious to those of the Manchoo, indulged their distorted though vivid imaginations by inveighing against such indiscriminate slaughter. It is true that a great loss of life occurred, but not a man fell except in battle, neither were any non-combatants killed except by starvation or their own hands. It is a singular fact that those who have been loudest to exclaim against Ti-ping cruelty, have always delighted in Imperialist barbarities and success, the words being synonymous.

When the last note of conflict had died away, and the Chung-wang had fixed his head-quarters within the city, I broached the subject of his daughter's presence and her attachment to my friend. The time was propitious, for it was the moment of a great triumph, and I suppose it had put the Ti-ping generalissimo into an immensely good and benevolent frame of mind, for he simply expressed his intention to take her back to Nankin, and settle the affair upon our return to that city. In the evening Cum-ho waited upon her father, having taken up her quarters with the rest of our feminine fellow travellers in a house close to the large building occupied by himself and staff.

On the morning of the first day of the new year, a large body of the army was dispatched in the direction of Shanghae, under the command of the Shi-wang, with orders to occupy every town and village up to the walls of that port, and then to open negotiations with the British and other authorities, who had so unjustly assumed to themselves the right of holding a Chinese city for the Manchoo against the Chinese patriots. During the next few weeks the Chung-wang busied himself establishing the different offices of Ti-ping Government in Hang-chow, and completing his plans for the occupation and retention of the remainder of the provinces of Kiang-su and Che-kiang. At length the Commander-in-Chief, seldom more than a month in any city (during his remarkably energetic and rapid conduct of the Ti-ping operations), took his departure for Nankin, there to mature further tactics as

to the mode of prosecuting the war against the Manchoo, and also to consult with his king the Tien-wang, and receive further commands.

I had ample opportunity to notice the exceeding popularity the Chung-wang had attained among the country people, for everywhere we passed they turned out to welcome his arrival, and all I questioned declared him to be a good and just man, who respected and protected the rights of the meanest peasant of the land. Many of the Ti-ping chiefs were popular with the civilians, some were disliked, all were considered better than the Manchoo, but none were so beloved as the Chung-wang. Before the troops had been marched towards Shanghae, a day of thanksgiving was held at Hang-chow; and although the motive of the Ti-ping is that of justice and Christianity, I could not help thinking of the similar practice among Europeans, who never fail to return thanks to God for triumph over their weaker brethren, whether their cause be righteous or quite the reverse.

On our march to Nankin, the Chung-wang took a route which embraced all the principal cities captured during the last year, including Hoo-chow, Kar-shing-foo, Soo-chow, Wo-kong, Quin-san, Tat-san, &c., and at each thanksgivings were offered up for the late important success. About this time the Commander-in-Chief committed his first great error. His mistake consisted in breaking up a large proportion of his forces into garrisons for the numerous walled cities in Ti-ping possession, and in moving the rest of his troops to other quarters.<sup>3</sup> It is true, he had nothing to fear from the enemy, all their armies in the field (with the exception of those operating against the Ying-wang, on the line of the Yang-tze river, above Nankin) having been utterly dispersed; but no preparation whatever was made to resist the probable hostility of England and France, beyond such defence as the widely separated fortified towns might be able to make. This neglect, when the British scheme of intervention came into full play, proved fatal to the welfare of Ti-pingdom. City after city was captured in detail by British artillery and troops; when, had the patriots only concentrated their numerous but greatly scattered forces, the result might have proved very different. I

wearied myself, the Chung-wang, and many other chiefs, by continually representing the danger in case of foreign hostility (which I felt certain would be the result of Lord Elgin's policy in China), but the poor Ti-pings seemed infatuated, and resolutely refused to believe that the unbrotherly so-called "foreign brethren" entertained such perfectly unprovoked and cruel intentions. Fatally have they been undeceived! Deeply responsible have England and France become for the consequences!

### **FOOTNOTE:**

3. This was, however, in accordance with the Tien-wang's orders.

## CHAPTER XVIII.

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Earl Russell's Despatch.—Its Effect.—"Taking the Offensive."—Official Reports.—General Staveley.—Attacks the Ti-pings.—General Ward.—Hope and Ward repulsed.—Che-poo attacked.—Its Capture.—Loot Regulations.—Kah-ding attacked.—Its Capture.—Ti-ping Loss.—Newspaper Comments.—Tsing-poo besieged.—Inside the City.—Ti-ping Losses.—Na-jaor besieged.—Cho-lin besieged.—Ti-ping Bravery.—Cho-lin captured.—The Chung-wang.—Kah-ding evacuated.—Consul Harvey's Despatch.—Despatch reviewed.—Ning-po threatened.—Captain Dew at Ning-po.—His Despatch.—The Reply.—Captain Dew's Rejoinder.—Preparation to attack Ning-po.—Captain Dew's Inconsistency.—His Ultimatum.—Official Despatches.—Ning-po attacked.—Ningpo evacuated.—Newspaper Reports.

After hostilities had been commenced by Admiral Hope, and upon hearing of the capture of Ningpo by the Ti-pings, Earl Russell endorsed the violation of British faith by approving the hostile maintenance of Shanghae and the other treaty ports against the Ti-ping belligerents, in the following despatch to the Admiralty, dated, "Foreign Office, March 11, 1862":—  
"I have, therefore, to signify to your Lordships the Queen's commands that Vice-Admiral Hope should be instructed to defend Shanghae, and to protect the other treaty ports not in the hands of the rebels, so far as it is in the power of Her Majesty's *naval forces* to do so."

Before, however, these instructions were received (they bearing date March 11, and occupying at least three months in reaching Mr. Bruce at Pekin, and being by him communicated to Admiral Hope at Shanghae), the war was carried far into the interior and thoroughly established, although, in

the first instance, it had been pretended that the operations were only undertaken in defence of Shanghae.

Mr. Bruce having stated his opinion by the following passage in a despatch, dated March 4, 1862:—"Shanghae is threatened, and its supplies cut off, and the insurgents will be emboldened by our passiveness and their success at Ningpo to press us still closer. I have stated to Sir J. Hope that, in my opinion, we are perfectly justified in taking the offensive against the insurgents;"—Lord Russell again approves of the disobedience of his former orders, by stating in a despatch, dated "Foreign Office, June 2, 1862:—"I have to convey to you my approval of the views expressed in your despatch of the 4th of March, with regard to the course to be pursued towards the Taepings." This sanction for the British authorities in China to take "the offensive" was, of course, tantamount to a declaration of war against the revolutionists; yet Earl Russell and his co-adjutors preferred working in secrecy, the approval of Parliament was not sought, neither did Her Majesty's Ministers ever deign to trouble themselves by announcing their policy. This, however, can hardly be a matter of surprise, considering that they had no *casus belli* to set forward as a justification—the multitude of excuses sent home by those who violated solemn pledges in China no more constituting one than a number of petty faults would justify hanging a man in England.

Admiral Hope having reported his breach of faith and neutrality by the murderous raid upon Kao-kiau, which he termed "certain *moral* support;" and having requested the shadow of the Ministers' countenance and support in these words, "I therefore strongly recommend that the French and English commanders should be required by yourself and M. Bourboulon to free the country from the rebels within a line commencing at Kading on the Yang-tze above Woo-sung, through Tsing-poo to Sung-kong on the Woo-sung river, and thence across to a walled town opposite on the Yang-tze;" he

received full approval from Mr. Bruce to continue as he had commenced, at his own goodwill and pleasure.

In his despatch, authorizing the very course he had previously stated would be more calculated than any other "to lower our national reputation," Mr. Bruce, with his usual bad memory and inconsistent policy, states of Ti-pingdom and the people "that its sources are exhausted; that neither money nor supplies are to be drawn from the *deserts* to which the provinces overrun by them are reduced;" completely oblivious of the "85,000 bales" of silk he had declared, only a few months previous, were drawn from the producing districts—the *deserts* of his vivid though forgetful imagination.

The report of the Admiral and the reply of the Minister each discuss the radius project shortly established against the Ti-ping belligerent only, and the further increase and support of Ward's and fresh legions of mercenaries. This is the first official mention of those now notorious schemes.

When the Kao-kiau massacre, the radius plan, and the organization of foreign-disciplined filibustering corps, à la Ward, were reported to him, Earl Russell again followed the path already laid out by his subordinates in China—a system of policy that could not be defended on principle, and still worse in execution.<sup>4</sup> The officials in China always acted directly against the spirit and letter of their *public* instructions; then reported what they had done, and obtained the sanction of the British Government.

Admiral Hope, immediately upon receiving the support of Mr. Bruce, gathered together his well-armed sailors and marines, his big guns and his little guns, and, assisted by the French Admiral, Protet, and Brigadier-general Staveley in command of the British troops, eagerly continued "taking the offensive" against the badly-armed Ti-pings. The war upon those to whom England was pledged to observe neutrality—a war never stated to the British Parliament—and, moreover, a war never even declared to the Ti-pings themselves, was rapidly prosecuted. General Staveley having assumed chief command of the allied Anglo-Franco-Manchoo

filibuster operations, did so entirely against the spirit of the orders of his Government, for not until some months later did the approval of Admiral Hope's conduct (bearing date, "Foreign Office, June 12, 1862") reach China, and even these instructions only referred to the *naval expeditions*, already authorized by the despatch of March 11, 1862.

Mr. Bruce admits this in a despatch to General Staveley, dated "Pekin, April 23, 1862," although at the same time he prompts him to join the Admiral's raids. He thus states:—

"It is clear that, at that date, Her Majesty's Government had not resolved on doing more than aiding in the defence of the treaty ports by means of the naval forces on the station."

Now, it is utterly impossible that Mr. Bruce can have received the instructions to *employ* the naval force so soon as the 23rd of April. The first despatch of Lord Russell, authorizing Admiral Hope to defend the treaty ports against the Ti-pings bears date March 11, and has already been noticed; but even supposing it left England on the same day, it could not have reached Pekin when Admiral Hope and General Staveley had taken the offensive, and made incessant attacks upon every Ti-ping position within some thirty miles of Shanghae. The last instructions from Earl Russell were those suppositional ones, dated 7th September, 1861:—

"It *might* be expedient to defend the treaty ports, *if* the Chinese Government would consent not to use them."

Referring back to the only definite order of Her Majesty's Government at the time of the unparalleled breaches of neutrality, we find it to be that bearing date August 8, 1861:—

"Her Majesty's Government desire to maintain, as they have done hitherto, *neutrality* between the two contending parties in China."

Thus, it cannot fail to be seen that hostilities were established against the Ti-pings, not only in violation of the pledged faith of England, but also in direct opposition to the *public* orders of her Government. Eventually the

Government sanctioned and authorized a continuance of these raids, although they carefully avoided making any straightforward announcement of their policy. Their plan was always to approve the aggressive action of the officials in China, but never to order them publicly. The despatches approving General Staveley's unjustifiable attack upon innocent men respectively bear date—"Foreign Office, July 7, 1862," and "War Office, July 23." These documents, however, which take the odium and responsibility of the massacres from the active agents, and place them upon the British nation, could not have reached Pekin, and been communicated to the naval and military commanders at Shanghae, until late in September. We shall see what unauthorized and unnecessary hostilities were perpetrated previous to their arrival.

General Staveley, having assumed the principal command of the raiding expeditions, finding that the friendly Ti-pings would not come and fight him, went to fight them. Upon the 3rd of April a strong force of 2,207 British and French troops, with naval detachments under command of Admirals Hope and Protet, and thirteen pieces of artillery, moved out from Shanghae to continue "taking the offensive." The place doomed to destruction was a large, and for Chinese warfare, strong, entrenched Ti-ping camp at Wong-ka-dza, garrisoned by about 4,000 men. After a hot day's march, the whole force, including some hundreds of Imperialists dragging the guns, carrying portable bridges, extra loads of ammunition, and every requisite appliance of modern warfare, arrived at a deserted village within twelve miles from Shanghae, and about two from the Ti-ping camp. Here they encamped for the night. Early on the following morning the combined forces,<sup>5</sup> taking advantage of the cover afforded by a thick mist, moved on the position of the Ti-pings, establishing themselves within a few hundred yards of the defences just as the fog cleared away. The entrenched camp consisted of some ten or twelve stockades, each surrounded by a ditch, yet communicating with the others. The Ti-pings, as usual, waited for those

they invariably looked upon as "foreign brethren" to take the offensive. They had not long to wait. Having taken up a position fairly within range of their Enfield rifles and artillery, but safely out of range of the useless gingalls and matchlocks of the Ti-pings, the "foreign brethren" opened a murderous fire upon the line of entrenchments. The devoted defenders replied as well they could, without artillery or effective fire-arms, and bravely held their stockades for nearly an hour, amid the storm of shrapnel-shell, rifle-balls, &c., poured in upon them with terrible effect. At length the irresistible foreign artillery drove them from the stockades with heavy loss, and played upon their retreating columns with deadly accuracy. During the attack and retreat the Ti-pings lost upwards of 600 killed and wounded (the wounded falling into the hands of the Imperialists were all put to death), while the allies had *one* man killed and another wounded.

Admiral Hope, who grounded his precious *casus belli* upon the *possible* destruction of supplies by the *Ti-pings*, states in his report of this and the following actions:—

"All these camps, which contained large quantities of rice collected from the surrounding country, were burnt, AND THE GRAIN DESTROYED."

A few days before the attack upon Wong-ka-dza, H.M. gunboat *Flamer* attacked and destroyed a fleet of 300 Ti-ping boats, "*deeply laden with rice and live stock.*" Who, then, proved to be the devastator and marauder; the uncivilized Chinese, or the civilized Christian? Yet the principal pretence given for attacking the Ti-pings was that they *might* do what Admiral Hope and his colleagues so effectually *did*.

After chasing the fugitives so long as the Enfield would reach them, the allied force gave up the pursuit, and retired to the village of Che-poo, where they had rested the previous night. Meanwhile, those who escaped from this slaughter met with another enemy, in the shape of a strong contingent of the filibuster Ward's disciplined Chinese. This ally of Admiral Hope, chagrined at having lost this opportunity, determined to attack another fortified camp

with his own men. The position assigned to this respectable person during the first engagement was to cut off and kill the Ti-pings as they fled from the fire of the British and French artillery. Fortunately for those unoffending people he arrived too late. When he did honour his worthy friends with his presence, history telleth not whether they were tired, or engaged looting, or making merry; but certain it is that they let him make his attack unassisted, except by Admiral Hope.

This PAR NOBILE, on valorous deeds intent, heedless alike of mud, heat, and fatigue, marched for several miles by intricate pathways, through creeks, ditches, and swampy paddy-fields, to the rebel camp near the village of Lu-ka-kong; and elated, doubtless, by the Admiral's narration of his chivalrous deeds at Wong-ka-dza, and assured by his loss of only one man, halted in front of the Ti-ping stockade.

Drawing his mercenary sword, and brushing back the Yankee locks, General Ward gave the word to assault in a tone of assured victory. The disciplined Chinamen, led by their foreign officers, rushed forward bravely enough; but the Ti-pings had not been half destroyed by shot and shell; neither at that time had they lost their best troops in conflict with the British and French, nor the moral effect of their former triumphs. Consequently, after three attempts to storm the stockade, when five officers and seventy men were placed *hors de combat*, Admiral Hope advanced to call off the men, and was rewarded with a Ti-ping bullet lodged in the calf of his leg. Ward, having none of the resistless artillery to mow down the patriotic Ti-pings, found them more than a match for his men—disciplined, led by foreigners, and well armed as they were. A retreat was therefore sounded, and the British Admiral was ignominiously carried away upon a litter borne by sundry cursing Celestials.

To avenge the glaring insult and audacity of those rebels who had dared to deposit a bullet in the calf of a leg of a British Admiral, who was doing his utmost to kill them, the next morning the allied forces brought their

artillery to bear, and without a single casualty succeeded in driving the Ti-pings from this and several neighbouring entrenchments, killing some 300, and burning and destroying the large quantities of grain, as stated by Admiral Hope. Not only in this instance, but very many others, the allies acted with far more wanton destructiveness than ever the Ti-pings did.

The next attack upon the Ti-pings by the gallant allies came off on the 17th of April. Upon this occasion the redoubtable Admiral was unable to act, in consequence of his injured limb. The place at which the combined English, French, and mercenaries gathered fresh (Chinese) laurels, was the village of Che-poo, with its defences, situated about 18 miles S.E. of Shanghae. The attacking force mustered some 2,500 strong, with 14 pieces of artillery, the whole commanded by General Staveley and Admiral Protet, assisted by Captain Borlase, R.N., and the filibuster Ward.<sup>6</sup> These troops were embarked in a flotilla of British and French gunboats, and carried up the Shanghae river, to cause as much devastation and bloodshed as they had already created elsewhere.

It was a splendid morning, and the landscape seemed beautiful, as the troops, after landing in the neighbourhood of Chee-poo, marched forward on their mission. Through fields rich with the ungathered crops, which it was pretended the Ti-pings might devastate, over seven or eight miles of smiling and profusely-cultivated country they wound their way. Upon arriving within a mile of the village, they halted for their guns to come up, and rested preparatory to the coming attack.

The guns having arrived, at 2 p.m. were in position, and opened a most destructive fire at 500 yards, and in half an hour the rebels were in full retreat. The poor fellows endeavoured to face the overwhelming hail of shot and shell; and, as one official report states, "returned a desultory fire, *but without doing any mischief*, while the allies made dreadful havoc amongst them." Driven from their works by the irresistible artillery, the Ti-pings retreated in three columns in the direction of the walled city, Chan-za,

when, as the official report states, "the Royal artillery and naval guns were brought to bear upon the retreating mass with terrible effect." The loss of the Ti-pings, out of a total strength of less than 4,000, amounted to more than 600 killed and 300 taken prisoners, who were, of course, cruelly executed by the Manchoo mandarins; the allied loss was *nil!*

The Ti-pings had not expected any attack upon that day, and when the camp was entered, their dinners were found smoking in the cups, while half-finished letters were lying on the chiefs' table.

The report published in the *Shanghae Daily Shipping List* states:—  
"As the houses were *ransacked*, great quantities of valuable jewels, gold, silver, dollars, and costly dresses were found, which was fair (?) *loot* to the officers and men. One blue-jacket found 1,600 dollars, and several soldiers upwards of 500 each, while many picked up gold bangles, earrings, and other ornaments and pearls set with precious stones. *It was a glorious day of looting for everybody*, and we hear that one party, who discovered the Tiping treasury chest with several thousand dollars in it, after loading himself to his heart's content, was obliged to give some of them away to lighten his pockets, which were heavier than he could well bear—a marked case of *l'embarras des richesses*. The rebel stud of ponies was well supplied also, and many of the soldiers rode back with their booty."

All this *looting* and butchery of unresisting men (it would be absurd to term the defence of the Ti-pings, resulting in one Englishman wounded, but hundreds of themselves killed—a resistance according to military *parlance*) was executed, we must particularly remember, because their cause, which had for its sole object expulsion of the foreign Manchoo and establishment of Christianity, *might* interfere with British commercial interests, and that "temporary one arising out of the indemnities!"

The *Shanghae Daily Shipping List*, just quoted from, was the paid official organ of the British Government, and when it stated the above, it may easily be imagined what the disgraceful scene really was. This journal,

under a variety of style and title, has been repeatedly quoted in the Blue Books upon China, issued by Her Majesty's Government, as the opinion of the press in China. Its truthfulness may fairly be estimated from the following comparison of a statement which appeared in its columns upon the massacre at Wong-ka-dza, and another upon the one at Che-poo. Both places are situated in the same tract of country, and only a few miles apart. In its detail of the first affair, the official organ, speaking of the slaughter of the Ti-pings, terms it:—

"A just retaliation on those wretches who had made their smiling land *a scene of misery and desolation.*"

Reporting the second affair, it states:—

*"The aspect of the country looked charming,* as the expedition threaded its way among *cultivated fields covered with the green crops* sown by the industrious inhabitants."

Like all other unscrupulous sources of opposition to the revolutionists, the *Shanghae Daily Shipping List* is sufficiently condemned by its own words. It needeth not a partizan to advocate Ti-pingdom; any person not blinded by prejudice or dollars, and who will take the trouble to study both sides of the question with proverbial English fair-play, cannot fail to become favourably interested in the insurgents, simply through the rabid diatribes which prove the bigotry of opponents and the inadvertent contradictions which prove their falseness.

In order to avoid quarrelling about the plunder, General Staveley and the Admirals entered into the following agreement with regard to the future freebooting exploits. Immediately after the heavily laden heroes, sailors, soldiers, marines, and all had deposited their *loot* in safe quarters, the triumviri, in solemn conclave, assembled upon the 22nd of April, and made the following formal regulations:—

"Previous to the capture of Kah-ding and the other towns from the rebels, proper arrangements shall be made... to collect whatever may be of value,

in order to its fair distribution amongst the troops, to whom the same is to be made known before the commencement of the operations."

Eager to try the merit of their regulated loot hunting, on the 27th of April, the allies again set forth to attack the Ti-pings. Upon this occasion their looting propensities were indulged in at the town of Kah-ding, situate about 30 miles to the N.W. of Shanghae. The allied force consisted of nearly 4,000 men, with 30 pieces of artillery,<sup>7</sup> assisted by an army of Imperialist *braves*, under the command of Le, a Chinese general.

The advance guard of the allies having been arrested by two small stockades, defending the water approach to Kah-ding, upon the morning of the 29th, the artillery was brought into play and the defenders of the outwork driven back upon the city, losing some 50 men during their resistance and retreat, the European enemy following in rapid pursuit up to the walls of Kah-ding without a single casualty.

The last day of April was spent by the allies in reconnoitering the city and landing the heavy guns, which had been brought in boats from Shanghae. Before dawn on the morning of May the 1st, the whole of the guns were in position, and the troops safely under cover in the ruined suburbs, ready to pick off the defenceless Ti-pings with their far-reaching rifles. The country traversed during the preceding days is thus spoken of in the *China Mail*, a paper bitterly hostile to the insurgents:—

"After marching along a good road, and through *a beautiful country with fine thriving crops*, the troops reached the southern suburb of Kah-ding."

Daylight of the 1st of charming May was ushered in by the roar of a large park of foreign artillery. Kah-ding, although a walled town, was undefended with cannon, and its garrison of some 5,000 or 6,000 men were, for the most part, armed with bamboo spears. The European troops having invested three of the city gates, the fourth, the only way of retreat for the besieged, was watched by the Imperialist *braves*, commissioned to cut up the Ti-pings as they fled from the British and French artillery. To the

concentrated and terrific fire of thirty pieces of large ordnance, the defenders of the city replied with a brisk though totally ineffective discharge of gingalls. The storm of iron poured upon them soon silenced their fire and drove them from the walls, and with a loss of several hundred, they fled from the town, cutting their way through the Imperialist troops, who watched their only line of retreat. In order to delay the storming of the city, and so afford time for its evacuation, a small body of the Ti-ping soldierly nobly remained and sacrificed themselves for their comrades. This devoted band, numbering about 130, held their post at the south gate, the principal point of attack, until the European stormers were on the walls, three little 2-pound Chinese guns on the gate tower having been worked till the parapet, overthrown by the crushing fire of the siege train, fell upon and buried the gunners beneath the *débris*.

Driven back by the overwhelming advance of the storming party, the heroic few retired to the north gate, through which the garrison had made their escape; here to a man they fell, while courageously placing themselves between the foe and their retreating comrades. The greater number of them were mere boys, and from the richness of their dress, evidently of good position among their friends. Three little fellows, each armed with a small matchlock, were seen by a friend of mine to rush forward directly a large shell would knock down a portion of the parapet and fire off their puny weapons at the foe. They were too small to reach the loop-holes, and so waited till the 32-pound shot of the besiegers made a hole for them to use. To avoid the deadly rifles they never used the same hole twice, but nevertheless were all killed, for my friend, when passing round the walls, found their bodies lying close together and crushed by a mass of fallen stonework.

The *China Mail*, in its account of the assault, states:—  
"The scene was now most picturesque. A shell had set fire to part of the city close at hand; the early morning sun was shining pleasantly upon the fields,

*rich with ungathered crops*, and the French band played as the troops scaled the walls."

The loss of the Ti-pings at the capture of Kah-ding was nearly 500 killed in the city; 2,000 slaughtered while escaping from the murderous artillery, by the Manchoo troops under Le, who had the bodies mutilated, and offered to produce their ears to General Staveley; and about 1,000 taken prisoners, who, although captured by the assistance of British soldiers, perished in the Manchoo execution shambles.

The stolen property agreement proved very useful at the capture of Kan-ding, nearly 200,000 dollars' worth having been seized in that city without the loss of a single life to the brave allies.

The *China Mail*, in its issue, "15th May, 1862," although mistakenly considering the Ti-ping revenue (obtained from taxation, silk, &c.) as "the poor people's property," very rightly condemns the wholesale system of brigandage practised by the allies. After referring to the "mercenary" and "sordid" nature of the intervention, it states:—

"There is another matter of regret, and that is, that while we are stigmatizing the rebels as robbers and bandits, we should take their treasures and divide it among ourselves."

Again it continues:—

"It would be difficult to say which are the more shameless robbers of the two, the Taepings who spoil the people, or the English forces who retake the spoil and share it among themselves, while those originally robbed are famishing in Shanghae. It may well be questioned whether the whole history of warfare can record a parallel example of forgetfulness, utter forgetfulness, of all propriety to this loot-hunting game which Admiral Hope is now engaged in. An expedition against the rebels is now shown to be so harmless to those engaged in it that we may expect to hear of gentlemen giving their wives and sisters a picnic in front of the next town that is besieged, when we have no doubt that much amusement could be

had among the engineers and artillery by allowing the girls to point the guns. And this is the sort of warfare in which the heart of the jaded and harassed soldier is to be cheered with *loot!*... There is every reason to believe that England's chivalry is likely to be kept a profound secret from the people of China so long as her affairs are under the present guidance."

Such is the opinion of a journal always hostile to the Ti-pings.

Having loaded their boats with plunder, and placed a garrison of some 500 European troops in Kah-ding, the British and French warriors returned to Shanghae and vain-gloriously displayed their evilly acquired riches about the rum-shops of that model settlement, while their worthy allies, the *braves*, made a gallant and triumphant entry, with trophies of Ti-ping heads, cruelly hacked from the men vanquished by British and French artillery. When these heads became unpleasant to parade about the foreign settlement, and the *loot* became exhausted, or the allied commanders eager for more, the combined forces were mustered together for another desolating raid into a country that would have been happy and peaceful but for their wicked interference.

The city of Tsing-poo, situated close upon 32 miles to the west of Shanghae, although falsely represented by officialdom as "in the neighbourhood," was next selected for sack and pillage.

Starting from Shanghae in British gunboats (which, by the by, always returned towing long tiers of loot laden boats) upon the 7th of May, the expedition, after being placed in country boats about twenty miles up the river, arrived before Tsing-poo on the evening of the second day.

General Staveley was Commander-in-chief, assisted by the French Admiral, while the English Admiral, in spite of his wound, was present as an admiring non-effective.

The combined force comprised 2,613 British and French troops, with nearly forty pieces of artillery; about 1,800 of Ward's filibusters; and an

Imperialist army of 5,000 to 7,000 men, under their general, Le.<sup>8</sup> Tsing-poo was garrisoned by some 4,000 Ti-pings, very few of whom escaped.

Before daylight on the 12th of May, the besieging forces, with guns and ladders, covering and storming parties, were in position. They moved up silently in the dead of night and early morning, and were in their places by 4 a.m. Then came a short half-hour of the peculiar suspense before battle, while all those valiant British and French well-armed troops lay flat on their faces, safely under cover, and breathing not a word, for fear the doomed Ti-pings *might* by a singular piece of good fortune manage to hurt some of them. By this time, however, the warm summer day was dawning, and the beleaguered garrison, discovering the formidable array against them, opened fire with the few small guns they possessed, sending their uneven roundshot whizzing over the heads of the crouching enemy.

Almost at the same moment the besiegers opened fire from their numerous and overwhelming artillery. Armstrong guns, naval 32-pounders, French rifled guns and mortars (with one French 68-pounder, rifled piece, mounted on board a light draught gunboat) in breaching and enfilading batteries, commenced a terrific bombardment of the south gate and wall.

The city, during the night, had been surrounded by the Chinese *braves*; no hope of escape presented itself, and the besieged fought as desperate men will fight for their lives. Amid the torrent of shells, shrapnel, Moorsom, conical, diaphragm, Armstrong, and other scientific engines of destruction crashing and continuously exploding among them, they bravely stood to their four or five 2-pounders, and resolutely manned their walls under the fearful and murderous fire. The poor Ti-pings, in order to protect themselves from the irresistible foreign shell, or "twice eye shot," as the Cantonese in their *pidgeon* English term it, had built a sort of stockade all round the city wall; this, with the parapet, formed a passage, which was covered in with a beamed and tiled roof. Instead of affording safety to them, however, this work added to the destructiveness of the enemy's fire, though

it would have been better for the doomed men to have been killed outright by British shot than be captured and tortured to death in the execution grounds of the Manchoos. A battery of four Armstrong guns enfilading the wall sent almost every shell through the roof, to burst between the parapet and stockade, thereby inflicting fearful havoc among the crowded defenders.

After about an hour's bombardment, two practicable breaches were effected by the besiegers; the English and French storming parties then advanced, protected by strong covering parties, who kept up a deadly rifle fire on the besieged, while the field-pieces being dragged forward enfiladed the parapet and breaches, mowing them down by dozens as they courageously crowded behind their broken wall to repel the stormers. The two snake flags of the Chief were planted on the summit of the breach, while his bravest men surrounding him did their utmost to drive the assaulting column back. The carnage at this point was immense; the defenders no sooner rushed into view than withering volleys of musketry and a storm of grape and canister destroyed them. The principal Ti-ping chiefs were killed at the head of their men; still, a smart fire from jingalls was kept up till the stormers gained the top of the breach and effected a lodgement; and then, it is sufficient to say, the defenders were attacked with the British bayonet. Even when driven from the wall, several hundred of the Ti-ping soldiery rallied at its foot, and fruitlessly sacrificed themselves in attempting to expel the successful enemy.

The Ti-pings lost upwards of 1,000 men in their obstinate defence, the Allies 2 killed and 10 wounded! About 2,000 were taken prisoners, the greater part of whom supplied the Shanghae execution ground, while the remnant of the garrison succeeded in cutting their way through the hostile lines. Not more than half of the prisoners were fighting men.

Whether the most Christian and civilized allies had not obtained sufficient loot, or killed enough fellow-creatures to satisfy them, I am

unable safely to state, but I opine that in neither particular were they satiated. At all events, after sacking Tsing-poo and delivering up their unfortunate captives to the tender mercies of the merciless Imperialists, General Staveley and his co-adjutors started off in quest of further glory, dollars, and Ti-pings. These noble crusaders at length came to the fortified village of Na-jaor, where one of the *triumviri* met with his death.

Na-jaor was simply a village, but a wall having been built around it, a small outwork erected, and the whole surrounded by dykes and dry ditches, with *chevaux de frize* and pallisades between them, it would have been a difficult place to capture without artillery. The outwork mounted three small guns, and a few others were divided between the usual square flanking defences of a Chinese wall. The garrison of this place can scarcely have numbered 1,000, all told.

The Armstrong guns and other artillery of the British and French opened fire and shelled the defenders out of the small redoubt, upon the afternoon of the 17th of May. While this was going on the garrison of the village made a spirited sortie, but, with only an armament of bamboo spears and rusty jingalls, were of course driven back with great loss. At last the fire of the besieged seemed silenced, while their wall was breached and crumbling in every direction. The stormers now rushed forward with their usual bravery, sword in hand and bayonet to the charge, to assault a Ti-ping post that had been thoroughly shelled for a couple of hours, and in which nought but a few frightened fugitives and the bodies of the slain were likely to be found. In the case of Na-jaor, however, there was more courage required than the attacking force imagined, for, instead of finding the walls deserted except by the killed and wounded, and the garrison in flight, they were suddenly faced by an ambuscade which had been concealed under comparative protection at the interior slope of the wall during the bombardment. The British and French were rushing forward at the double, their leading files had already reached the ditch at the foot of the rampart,

when the Ti-pings, starting from their cover, remanned the walls and opened a sharp fire with jingalls, matchlocks, and the few European-made fire-arms which they possessed. Cheering vigorously, or rather yelling, the defenders maintained a well-directed fire for some little time, killing the French Admiral with a ball through his heart, and wounding about a dozen other of the assailants. The allies experienced a momentary check, but the whole resistless array of artillery having swept the walls with their iron tempest, the storming parties again rushed forward and succeeded in establishing themselves upon the walls before the defenders were able to reman them. Then the work of slaughter was continued with the rifle, the unwieldy bamboos, with iron spikes at the ends, proving a worse than useless defence.

Mercy seems never to have entered into the minds of those Christian warriors, who loudly inveighed against the Ti-pings as "bloodthirsty monsters," &c., &c.; for when victory crowned their unparalleled feats of arms, no effort to save the defenceless and unresisting fugitives was ever made, but while those who had thrown down their arms were vainly trying to hide or flee from the deadly rifle, or stood blocked in a gateway of the tower, the valorous conquerors calmly and easily continued to shoot them down so long as they remained within range.

The total loss of the Allies at the capture of Na-jaor was, the French Admiral killed, and sixteen men wounded. The Ti-pings left dead at their posts, which they had *really* bravely though fruitlessly striven to defend, upwards of 500 men, more than half their whole force. Directly the place was fairly in their possession the respectable victors dispersed in search of plunder; as one report has it, "looting parties were formed, the French looting one half and the English the other."

The ill-gained spoil having been stowed away in the boats, the Allies marched on for the next Ti-ping position devoted to destruction, leaving a strong detachment in charge of Na-jaor. The place which had now attracted

the cupidity, love of military *glory*, or some unknown sentiment of the Allies, was a small town named Cho-lin, situated about six miles from Na-jaor, 26 miles to the S.S.W. of Shanghae, and within two miles of the sea.

Having arrived before Cho-lin during the night of May 18, the Allies began to establish their powerful batteries, and on the morning of the 19th opened fire upon the town. The Ti-pings in garrison, some 2,000 or 3,000 strong, replied to the best of their resources with a few pieces of immovable Chinese artillery, jingalls, and matchlocks. At noon the besiegers ceased firing and refreshed themselves with *chow-chow* and brandy. Meanwhile, a Ti-ping chief performed an act of the most daring courage with remarkable coolness and audacity. Having observed the occupation of the besiegers, this chief, leaving the town by the opposite side, made a circuit, and coming upon the rear of the enemy's position, calmly rode right through it with a few followers, satisfying himself as to their composition and numbers. "Everyone took him for an Imperialist and allowed him to pass on. When he got near the town he rode for his life, and got to his friends inside the city." So reported one of the officers engaged in the attack. Undaunted by the powerful artillery and formidable array of the European troops, the Ti-ping chief determined to hold and defend his trust against them, even although he must have been convinced that he had no effectual means by which he could repel or reply to their attack. The day passed on and with it the last hope of the beleaguered garrison, who scorned to take advantage of the opportunity to evacuate the town and save their lives.

At daylight on the 20th all the Allies' guns, being in position, opened fire again, the Armstrong guns and field pieces sweeping the defenders from the walls, and the hoarsely-roaring 32's steadily firing to effect a breach. Storming, covering, and sharpshooting parties waited around the devoted place until the murderous shelling should subdue all opposition to their heroic advance. At length, two practicable breaches were effected, the

enfilading batteries, established on either flank, poured their crushing *mitraille* along the parapet, sweeping away every man who dared to show himself, and the assaulting column pushed forward to the breaches. The Ti-pings had in this case been able to maintain a small number of troops on the wall by means of some ingeniously contrived bomb-proofs. A few narrow pits were dug behind the parapet and covered in with planks overlaid with earth, under which some hundred or two found shelter. When the artillery ceased its fire as the stormers mounted the breach, these men made a desperate defence, while the rest of the garrison, emerging from their places of concealment, rushed to man the walls and assist them. But what could these miserably armed men effect against the hundreds of perfectly equipped Europeans pouring over their shattered walls? They fell bravely, disputing every inch of ground.

The defenders driven from the ramparts or killed, the gallant Allies rushed through the small town, *indiscriminately massacring every man, woman, and child within its walls*. The Ti-pings had so earnestly endeavoured to shut out the besiegers that they had most effectually blocked themselves in, and were consequently butchered almost to a man. After the massacre was over, an officer of the force, writing to the *North China Herald*, stated, "Almost every house we entered contained dead and dying men."

The *China Mail*, in its report of the affair, terms it: "A most indiscriminate carnage on the part of our Allies at the taking of Cho-lin." The *Overland Trade Report*, in its issue of June 10, states:—

"Since the death of Admiral Protet the French troops have been behaving like fiends, killing indiscriminately men, women, and children. Truth demands the confession that British sailors have likewise been guilty of the commission of similar revolting barbarities—not only on the Taepings, but upon the inoffensive helpless country people. It is a most singular circumstance, but no less strange than true, that the Taepings *have never yet*

*committed an act of retaliation* upon any European who may have fallen into their hands."

Cho-lin captured and the *loot* safely packed up, the conquerors, who only lost *one* killed and four slightly wounded, proceeded to destroy the town itself.

The correspondent of the *North China Herald*, in his report, says:— "At two o'clock the order was given to set the city on fire, which was executed with such rapidity that the Sikhs had hardly time to get the ponies out of the town, and most of the last collected had to be abandoned."

The poor horses were admittedly roasted alive; but, when the writer goes on to state "a great many dead bodies" were left in the fired city, he forgets the wounded and "dying men" whom he found in "almost every house," and who no doubt perished in the flames.

With the destruction of Cho-lin the murderous and desolating track of the British and French was for a time arrested. Hitherto, without exception, they had, in Mohawk Indian style, surprised and captured isolated towns and villages. Nothing but the garrisons of these places had opposed them. Upon the day of their last exploit, however, intelligence reached General Staveley that the Chung-wang, with a large army, had taken the field against him, and that Kah-ding was already invested, Tsing-poo threatened, and the Imperialist troops everywhere flying like chaff before the stormy wind. Hastily returning to Shanghae, the authenticity of these reports was at once confirmed by the abject state of terror in which the Manchoo authorities were plunged. It appeared that, during General Staveley's laurel-gathering exploits, nearly the whole available force of Imperialist troops had been concentrated upon Kah-ding, and, having moved upon the next Ti-ping city, Tat-seang, had been there totally defeated; the fugitives, a few hundred out of an army nearly 20,000 strong, having been chased about thirty miles, and into the village of Woo-sung under the protection of the Allies' artillery.

In consequence of this, and the inability of the Manchoo authorities to even garrison the places captured from the patriots by the allied forces, General Staveley proceeded to the relief of Kah-ding with a strong force of British troops. Upon reaching the village of Na-zain, a few miles from the city, they were continually attacked by the Ti-ping force investing it. In all these attacks, however, the assailants were driven back by rifle and artillery fire with heavy loss, the English losing but *one* Sepoy killed and four wounded. It now appearing that the Ti-pings were in the field in force, that the communications of Kah-ding were in their hands, and that the towns of Tsing-poo and Soon-kong were also invested, General Staveley decided upon evacuating Kah-ding; and, pending the arrival of reinforcements, discontinuing his raids upon the Ti-ping strongholds.

We must now for a while turn to other quarters, and record the performance of another act of the Ti-ping drama. While the allied forces were violating their pledges, their orders, and the ordinary laws and usages of civilized or Christian men, the Ti-pings at Ningpo, as everywhere else, were scrupulously observing all their promises, and striving to enter into friendly and commercial relations with foreigners.

It will be remembered that the withdrawal of British missionaries from Ningpo, upon the capture of that city by the Ti-pings, has already been noticed; also Mr. Consul Harvey's sinister reason: "This step will tend to simplify considerably our future relations with the Taepings at Ningpo." We will now proceed to notice what those "future relations" were.

Mr. Consul Harvey having been requested by Mr. Bruce to report upon the character of the Ti-pings, and having been prompted even in the *public* despatches, forthwith indulged his feelings of hostility against those people. It is desirable to notice some of the more salient and characteristic features of the despatch of Mr. Harvey as briefly as possible.

The despatch containing Mr. Harvey's exposition bears date March 20th, 1862, some three months after the occupation of Ningpo by the Ti-pings,

and *after* hostilities had been established against them by Admiral Hope and his friends.

Mr. Harvey states:—

"*Not one single step*<sup>9</sup> in the direction of a 'good government' has been taken by the Taepings; *not any attempt* made to organize a political body or commercial institutions; *not a vestige, not a trace of anything* approaching to order, or regularity of action, or consistency of purpose, can be found in any one of their public acts."

In a despatch dated "Ningpo, December 31, 1861," he had stated as follows:—

"They *have* even established a native custom-house, wherein duties will be levied on the Chinese after ten days' grace.... It has been reported to me that the insurgents propose establishing a foreign custom-house at this port, such being, it is said, one of their favourite ideas, and forming part of their programme in the capture of Ningpo."

And again—

"The Taepings possess a regular embodied force, a draft from which forms the nucleus of the body of men sent upon any special service."

Mr. Harvey, with an extraordinary self-complacent assumption of impartiality, proceeds to declare that he "judged of Taepingdom in sober sense and dispassionately," yet he concludes the same paragraph by stating that at Ningpo "the last three months had produced ruin, desolation, and the annihilation of *every* vital principle in *all* that surrounds the presence, or lies under the bane, of the Taepings." Again, only a few lines further on, he says:—

"It is palpable that a party which, after ten years' full trial, is found to produce *nothing*, and to destroy *everything*, cannot pretend to last, or be admitted, even indirectly, into the comity of nations."

Now, as Mr. Bruce himself reports that "85,000 bales of silk" were obtained from people who "destroy everything," and as the Ti-pings did

"pretend to last"—so much so, indeed, that British and French assistance to the Manchoos was necessary to save them from total destruction, Mr. Harvey's "sober sense," to say the least, seems very doubtful.

The despatch under review is one of the most extraordinary series of contradictory terms ever produced, and really deserves a place in the British Museum or some old curiosity shop, as the "sober" creation of a person who takes remarkable care to assure his readers that he is perfectly "unbiased." Within half a dozen lines of the last quoted passage Mr. Harvey audaciously protests:—"I repeat I have no bias one way or the other...." He then proceeds to state:—

"I have found in official dealings with them" (the Ti-ping chiefs) "*a rough and blunt sort of honesty quite unexpected and surprising*, after years of public intercourse with the Imperial mandarins."

Now, in the very next paragraph he speaks of them as—"The naturally suspicious Taepings, who, amongst other peculiarities, possess *a power of concealment and general secrecy quite wonderful* to meet in China."

Mr. Harvey attempts to prove the plundering propensities of the Ti-ping soldiery by the following invention:—

"On questioning decently-dressed Taeping soldiers as to how they liked their profession, the reply has ever been the following:—

"'Why should I not like it? I help myself to everything I choose to lay hands upon; and if interfered with, I just cut the man's head off who so interferes.'"

By the side of this we will just place Mr. Hewlett's report to Consul Harvey of his embassy to the Ti-pings at Yu-yaou, upon their advance to Ningpo:—

"We saw but few dead bodies about, and of those some were their own men  
*who had been caught plundering and burning.*"

Endeavouring to vilify the social *régime* of the Christian patriots, Mr. Harvey trusts to his inventive genius again, and writes:—

"Your Excellency is doubtless aware that marriage is strictly forbidden amongst the Taepings, and forms, with opium-smoking, a capital offence."

Now, Mr. Harvey makes this false assertion in face of the "Proclamation by Tien-wang, establishing a scale according to which the number of wives are to be regulated in all ranks," as published in 1862, at page 45, Blue Book upon "The Rebellion in China," and which commences—

"Formerly I made a decree as to the canon of marriages...."

This unbiassed official winds up his sober and dispassionate effusion with a few equally temperate conclusions. For example—

"I now, therefore, take the liberty of declaring, once for all (*and for ten years I have firmly adhered to, and been consistent in, this opinion*), that the Taeping rebellion is the greatest delusion as a political or popular movement, and the Taeping doctrines the most gigantic and blasphemous imposition as a creed, or ethics, that the world ever witnessed.... There is nothing in past records so dark or so bad; such abominations committed under the name of religion; such mock-heroic buffoonery; such horrors accompanied by pantaloony; and so much flimsy web worked in the midst of blood and high tragical events."

If the "ten years" of obstinate adhesion to an opinion formed before anything was known of the Ti-pings, is Mr. Harvey's idea of "sober sense" and "no bias" (and he declares it is), we can easily believe that the "dispassionate" ruminations of so long a period destroyed what little reason and religion he may at one time have possessed. His partizanship even lays him open to the charge with which he has so falsely accused the Ti-pings when stating that their doctrines were "the most gigantic and blasphemous imposition," &c.; inasmuch as the Ti-ping doctrines are taken from our

Bible, are in all essential particulars precisely similar to our own, and alone constitute their "creed, or ethics."

Mr. Harvey terms himself "a sensible and reasoning Englishman," and proceeds to declare the revolution—

"A sanguinary raid, and an extended brigandage over the country, burning, destroying, *and killing* EVERYTHING *that has life in it.*"

In a surprising manner, after a few sentences, he brings the dead to life:

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"They come, and the helpless inhabitants crouch down and submit. They (the Taepings) go, and the people breathe again and rejoice."

"Tel maître, tel valet," it is said, and Mr. Harvey seems to have likened into Mr. Bruce amazingly. Mr. Bruce has stated, "every locality is totally destroyed by the Ti-pings." Mr. Harvey chimes in with the above, "killing everything," and "not a vestige" diatribes. Mr. Bruce, in a despatch dated "Pekin, April 10, 1862," inclosing Mr. Harvey's precious production to Earl Russell, states with regard to the Ti-pings:—

"No commerce can co-exist with their presence, and NO specific relations are possible with a horde of pirates and brigands, who are allowed to commit every excess, while professing a nominal allegiance to an ignorant and ferocious fanatic."

Again, in a despatch dated "Pekin, April 18, 1862," Mr. Bruce states that their presence in any district is "accompanied by the *utter* destruction of the materials of trade."

Singularly enough, General Staveley, although chief leader of the massacres of Ti-pings, in a despatch to the Secretary of State for War, dated "Shanghae, July 3, 1862," entirely and absolutely contradicts the imaginary devastations of Mr. Bruce and his Consul by the following statement:—  
"Europeans continue to visit the rebel country *for purposes of trade*, and are treated with civility; *large quantities of silk* have been brought into Shanghae during the last fortnight, *and trade seems in a thriving state.*"<sup>10</sup>

Mr. Harvey concludes his judgment passed in "sober sense and dispassionately" by the following words:—

"Your Excellency may rest assured that we shall only arrive at a correct appreciation of this movement, and do it thorough justice, when it is treated by us as land piracy on an extensive scale—piracy odious in the eyes of *all* men—and, as such, to be swept off the face of the earth by *every means* within the power of the Christian and civilized nations trading with this vast empire."

Such are the avowed sentiments of the man who protests that he has "no bias" or prejudice.

Although the occupation of Ningpo by the Ti-pings actually increased the export trade, and although even Mr. Consul Harvey admitted that it was captured and held with "wonderful moderation;" still, when hostilities had become established by Admiral Hope and General Staveley, it was impossible either their designs could succeed while Ningpo was in Ti-ping possession, or the anomalous policy of holding Shanghae, and not Ningpo, be continued. Consequently, both to stop the supplies and munitions the Ti-pings obtained at the port, and to follow out the hostile policy settled upon, the British authorities determined upon driving them out of Ningpo on the first opportunity. As the scrupulous good conduct and friendliness of the revolutionists afforded no cause of hostility, it became necessary to invent one. How this was effected the following account will show.

One day (the 22nd April, 1862), while giving a salute upon the return of the General Fang from Nankin, several shots appear to have been fired by some Ti-pings in the direction of the foreign settlement. It was thereupon *reported* that these shots had killed a Chinaman or two in that location. This, however, seems very doubtful. At all events, the affair was immediately taken up by Captain Cragie, of H.M.S. *Ringdove*, who wrote to the Chiefs upon the subject, and received a completely satisfactory answer, stating—

"I beg to assure you that, as soon as I have discovered the offenders, I will punish them very severely. I hope, then, that you will think no more about the matter."<sup>11</sup>

Upon the 26th of April Captain R. Dew, with H.M.S. *Encounter*, arrived at Ningpo from Shanghae, having been ordered there by Admiral Hope. Judging by the conduct of the Admiral at that time, and by the whole circumstances of the war upon the Ti-pings, it becomes morally certain that Captain Dew was dispatched with the reinforcement to Ningpo on purpose to drive them out. The day after his arrival (27th April, dates are important), Captain Dew wrote as follows to the Ti-ping generals in command of the city:—

"*Encounter*, Ningpo, April 27, 1862.

"Sir—We have received from Commander Cragie your communication regarding the *accidental* discharge of bullets whilst firing a salute... as well as the communication from General Hwang. Both these are *so satisfactory*, and tend so much to impress on us your wish to maintain friendly relations with the English and French, that we beg to inform you *that we shall not insist on the demolition of the battery at the point*,<sup>12</sup> but we still do that you remove the guns....

"We again inform you that it is the earnest wish of our Chiefs to remain neutral<sup>13</sup> and on good terms with you at Ningpo. Till the late acts, they had every reason to be satisfied with your conduct, and you may rest assured that no breach of friendly relations shall emanate from our side....

"(Signed) R. DEW."

As Colonel Sykes, M.P., has very justly observed in his work, "The Tipping Rebellion in China," incredible as it may appear, the very day after the above letter was sent, which condoned all previous offences, and which expressed the most earnest wish to remain on friendly terms, Captain Dew, in oblivion of his promises, addressed the following letter to the Generals:

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"*Encounter*, Ningpo, April 28, 1862.

"Sir—" (After mentioning the firing of musket balls during the salute, he continues) "I have been sent here *with a considerable force to demand apology.... Having consulted with the officers here in command, I have come to the conclusion that the foreign settlement is now being seriously menaced by a large battery in course of construction at a point outside the city wall... so I have to request that you will cause it to be immediately pulled down*, and that all guns now mounted on the walls opposite our settlement, be removed as well. I am requested by my Admiral to inform you that it would grieve him much<sup>14</sup> to be obliged, by the hostile acts of your people, to come into collision with them. He will be very sorry to resort to force (?), as he has not the intention or wish to interfere with the Imperialists and yourself at Ningpo, and if the former should attack the city, *we should be entirely neutral, and will not even allow the foreign settlement to harbour the Imperialists.*" (After threatening to destroy the battery and capture Ningpo if the guns and fortifications were not removed in "twenty-four hours," Captain Dew concludes with the following passage:)

"When these, my *reasonable* (?) demands, have been carried into effect, I beg you will report them.... "

"I have, &c.,  
(Signed) R. DEW."

It is to be remembered that Captain Dew had received and accepted the "apology" on the 27th, and had replied by stating, "we shall *not* insist on the demolition of the battery." The renewal of the demands which had been formally abandoned on the previous day convinced the Ti-ping generals that Captain Dew was determined to quarrel with them. That officer knew perfectly well, as Colonel Sykes has forcibly expressed it, "that no human being with an ounce of militant blood in his veins would comply with such insulting demands."

The Ti-ping generals, ever forbearing, and always truly earnest in their efforts to obtain the goodwill and friendship of the "foreign brethren," made the following admirable reply to Captain Dew's grossly offensive despatch, and its readers will find every word truth and sound reason:—

(Précis.)

"Hwang, General, &c., Pang, General, &c., in official communication with Captain R. Dew, R.N., H.M.S. *Encounter*: —In reply to your letter requesting the removal of the battery and guns, we would remark that ever since the capture of Ningpo, both parties have been on most friendly and intimate terms. No suspicions or dislikes; *we have done everything in our power to protect your trade, and kept good faith in every respect*; have always inquired into complaints made to us of our soldiers, and even beheaded some men who broke into a foreign hong; *have wished to keep a lasting peace with you, and have done all in our power to that end*.

"The discharge of bullets in firing the salute the other day was quite accidental;—have already taken steps towards punishing offenders. With regard to the erection of a fort at the point, *it is a precautionary measure that a proper regard for the lives of our soldiers renders indispensable, and has nothing whatever to do with foreigners*, as has been already stated to Captain Montgomerie. It is now completed, and we cannot assent to its removal; so also we cannot agree to the removal of the guns from the walls. We have continually esteemed good faith and right....

"With good faith and right feeling as the alpha and omega of one's conduct, each party can afford to put up with one or two trifling matters. With regard to that part of your letter having reference to a probable outbreak of hostilities (we would inform you) that we are not in the least concerned thereat [*lit.*, we are not apprehensive, nor do we take offence thereat]; *we could not bear to break the oaths of friendship we have sworn.* We cannot remove the fort or the guns; should you proceed yourselves to move the same, then it is evident that you have the intention of quarrelling with us. You can, if you please, lead on your soldiers against this city; you can, if you please, attack us; *we shall stand quietly on the defensive* [*lit.*, we shall await the battle with hand in the cuff, *i.e.*, we shall not strike the first blow].... You still wish to be on friendly terms with us; let, then, these dislikes and suspicions be committed to the deep.... In any large army good or bad are to be found; do not, therefore, let a small matter like this occasion a breach of such a grand principle as amity. Good fellowship would request you to give our argument your very best consideration."

The remainder of the despatch is irrelevant to the subject of the correspondence. It was received 29th April, 1862. If the Ti-pings had acted rather as angels than men, their rights would not have been respected. Captain Dew, neither satisfied by their arguments nor conciliated by their tone, addressed to them the following cartel:—

"*Encounter*, Ningpo, May 2, 1862.

"SIR—We have the honour to inform you that your letter of the 29th ult., in reply to my demands for the insults offered to the French and English flags, and in which you refuse to comply with those very moderate demands,<sup>15</sup> have been forwarded to our admirals. In the mean time, pending the decision of our chiefs, I have moored the foreign ships two miles down the river, and cut off communication with the city, and am, moreover, ordered by our chiefs, in the event of the following demands not being complied with, to prepare to blockade Ching-hae, and prevent all foreign ships entering the river:—1. *An ample apology.* 2. Removal of all guns from battery and walls opposite our ships. 3. That an officer shall be specially appointed, and that proper measures, by means of guards, shall be taken to prevent anybody whatever coming on the wall opposite the ships or into the battery.—I have, &c.,

"(Signed) R. DEW."

This repeated attempt of Captain Dew to make the Ti-pings disarm themselves, and his attempt to ignore the apology he had already accepted in his letter to the chief dated 27th April, must afford convincing proof that a premeditated and organized arrangement to quarrel with the Ti-pings existed. The generals in command at Ningpo gave the following reply to Captain Dew. They declared the battery and guns necessary to defend the

city against an attack by a fleet from the coast, which in fact appeared, commanded by the notorious pirate Apak, on the 7th May. They promised to remove all ammunition from the guns and to prevent armed men going on the ramparts, but, as Colonel Sykes says in his review of the affair, "Had the generals chucked the guns into the river there would have been some new demand." In their reply the generals state:—

"In reply to letter of 2nd inst., submitting three demands, we beg to inform you that we have carefully examined its contents, and that we will agree to those demands as far as we are able. In reference to the first, our previous letter *has afforded full explanations on that head*, how that it was the result of an accidental discharge of bullets during the salute.... In reference to the second point, demanding removal of guns, &c., *our former despatch has already explained that those guns are meant as a precaution against an attack from Ting-hae*, that the multitude of lives in the city that have to be taken care of urgently demands.... We shall on no account fire the guns, unless the imps attack us. Under the circumstances stated by you, we agree to stop up the port-holes of all the guns bearing on Keang-pih-gan, and to remove all the shot and powder from thence, *so as to manifest to you our desire for lasting amity*. Infer from the third point in your letter that you are afraid that, if people are allowed on the wall, there will be some lawless persons who will fire the guns by mistake. Far from allowing anybody whatever to come on the walls, there are most strict orders against allowing any one to go on the walls, not only on those opposite to Keang-pih, but also all round the city.... *We are inordinately desirous of remaining on good terms with you*, and this is our reason for this distinct statement." (Dated 3rd May, 1862.)

Affairs remained in this position till the 7th of May, when Captain Dew wrote to Admiral Hope, stating that on the evening of the 5th, Consul Harvey received a communication from the late Manchoo Governor of Ningpo, to the effect that he was about to attack the city with a strong force,

and requesting support from the English and French admirals. The same evening Captain Dew proceeded down the river, found the Imperialist fleet (consisting of the pirate Apak's vessels), and visited the Governor; again, on the following morning, Captain Dew visited that functionary, and the latter, accompanied by his pirate-admiral Apak, returned the visit. While closeted with Captain Dew, they made their arrangements for the forthcoming attack on Ningpo, and the former wrote to his senior officer:—

"So I told them that in consequence of the rebels refusing certain demands we had made, I should have no objection to their passing up, *but that they were not to open fire till well clear of our men-of-war.*"

Now Captain Dew may flatter himself that this statement has hoodwinked the people of England, but unfortunately for his reputation, people judge a man by his actions. Instead of these piratical vessels keeping "well clear" of his ships, they proceeded to execute their part of the programme of attack by keeping *well foul* of his men-of-war, according to previous arrangement.

On May 9th, Consul Harvey reported to Mr. Bruce the movements of the Imperialist, or rather pirate fleet, under the notorious Apak, as follows:

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"Their fleet of junks is at the present moment *lying in front of our settlement*, making preparations for an assault on Ningpo."

He then adds:—

"The Taoutae<sup>16</sup> Chang, with Commander-in-Chief Chin, came to see me this morning (9th) at the Consulate, *in a private manner*, and he informed Captain Dew and myself, that if no unforeseen event happened, the Imperialist attack on Ningpo would take place to-morrow morning *at daylight.*"

Now Captain Dew (as the representative of Great Britain) having made the following formal declaration in his despatch to the Ti-ping chiefs, dated April 28th,

"That he has not the intention or wish to interfere with the Imperialists and yourself at Ningpo; and if the former should attack the city, we *should be entirely neutral, and will not even allow the foreign settlement to harbour the Imperialists.*"

And again, in his despatch dated April 27th:—

"You may rest assured that no breach of friendly relations shall emanate from our side"—

He was bound to fulfil his pledges of neutrality. He was perfectly well aware that the city could not possibly reply to the fire of the Imperial fleet without endangering the men-of-war and foreign settlement. It was therefore his duty, as he himself expressed, "not to allow the foreign settlement to harbour the Imperialists," or, to have withdrawn the ships of war from the line of fire, as Admiral Hope had no "wish to interfere."

Yet we find Consul Harvey stating that the pirate lorchas are "lying in front of our settlement, making preparations for an assault on Ningpo," and Captain Dew not only authorized this proceeding but declared it a *casus belli* should the Ti-pings venture to return their fire! There are, in fact, ample grounds for the statements in some of the China newspapers, and in many private letters, that the whole affair was arranged between the ex-Governor, the pirate Apak, Captain Dew, and Mr. Consul Harvey: and the idea seems strengthened by the fact that Mr. Harvey, in his letter to Mr. Bruce, dated May 9, terms the arrival of the piratical fleet "an extraordinary but fortunate coincidence, and that it was far too good an opportunity to be lost."

Immediately *after* his second interview with the ex-Governor and the pirate, Captain Dew and the French senior officer sent the following crafty and equivocal ultimatum to the Ti-ping chiefs, dated May 8th:—

"This is to inform you, on the part of the English and French senior naval officers, that had you agreed to their demands, and removed your guns from the walls, they should have felt bound in honour to have acted up to their

promise, and have prevented an attack on you on the settlement side by Imperial forces, which in countless numbers and heavily-armed ships advance to attack you. We now inform you *that we maintain a perfect neutrality*, BUT IF YOU FIRE THE GUNS OR MUSKETS FROM THE BATTERY OR WALLS OPPOSITE THE SETTLEMENT ON THE ADVANCING IMPERIALISTS (thereby endangering the lives of our men and people in the foreign settlement), WE SHALL THEN FEEL IT OUR DUTY TO RETURN THE FIRE AND BOMBARD THE CITY."

This was equivalent to saying, "If you defend yourselves against the Imperialists we shall kill you;" for in firing upon the pirate vessels as they advanced from the foreign settlement and amongst the British men-of-war, these latter must inevitably have been endangered.

The following extracts from official despatches and other memoranda will show how the British squadron joined the fleet of pirates in driving the Ti-pings out of Ningpo.

On the 10th of May, Captain Dew wrote to Admiral Hope:—

"SIR—I found it necessary to capture the city of Ningpo, and drive the rebels out, under the following circumstances:—

"You are aware, Sir, that the rebel chiefs had been informed that if they again fired, either on our ships or in the *direction* of the settlement, we should deem it a *casus belli*. This morning at 10 a.m., the *Kestrel*, and French vessels *Etoile* and *Confucius* were fired on by the Point battery. I cleared for action in this ship, when a volley of musketry was fired on us from the bastion abreast. The undermentioned vessels, viz., *Encounter*, *Ringdove*, *Kestrel*, and *Hardy*, with the *Etoile* and *Confucius*, French gunboats, now opened fire, with shell, on the walls and batteries, which was replied to with much spirit from guns and small arms."

The despatch continues to this effect:—At noon the Ti-ping guns were silenced and practicable breaches effected. At two o'clock the city was stormed, and at five o'clock, all opposition having ceased, the ex-governor and his troops landed from their junks. Captain Dew gave them charge of the city, and re-embarked his men. We must now find out what had become of the ex-governor, his troops, and Apak's fleet during this time. Captain Dew carefully avoids stating whether they had made the attack *at daylight*, according to arrangement, or left him to play the bravo alone, for he does not mention *one word* about his allies, until he hands over the city to them. Consul Harvey, however, in a despatch to Mr. Bruce, dated May the 16th, throws some light upon the subject; he states:—

"Shot and shell were poured into this large city with very little intermission for a period of five hours *by the combined fleet*, at the end of which time the walls were scaled, and the Taeping forces were at once completely routed and dispersed."

The only fleet was *eighty* lorchas of the pirate Apak, the English and French aiding by six vessels only, a fact suppressed by Captain Dew.

The final expulsion of the Ti-pings from Ningpo was thus effected:—

Early on the morning of the 10th, the piratical fleet commenced the attack upon Ningpo, advancing from the foreign settlement and then manœuvring round and round the British and French gunboats, firing at the Ti-pings when *between* their line of fire and the foreign vessels. Captain Dew never attempted to enforce his pretended order for them to keep "well clear" of his vessels. For some time the Ti-pings bore this attack silently and without reply, doubtless trusting that Captain Dew would either move his vessels or make the pirates give them a clear berth. This, however, was not done, the intention being to compel the Ti-pings to open fire on the attacking fleet, when, as the latter were placed directly between the British and French men-of-war and the guns of the town, any shot must necessarily pass in the "direction" of those vessels, and thereby constitute the false

*casus belli* required, and eagerly watched for by Captain Dew with his vessels quite prepared and his guns loaded and ready.

At last human nature could bear no more, and the Ti-pings opened a musketry fire upon the pirate lorchas, yet still with extraordinary forbearance, and such a desire to avoid endangering the foreign ships or settlement, that they did not make use of their artillery. It is perfectly certain that the Manchoo piratical fleet dared not have ventured to make their attack unless fully assured of foreign co-operation. That such assistance was guaranteed and arranged has scarcely ever been doubted.

Many of the Ti-ping soldiers had been killed by the fire of the pirate fleet before they replied with musketry. The very instant they did so, the British and French vessels came to the aid of their allies, and commenced bombarding the town. It is said that a couple of bullets from the volley fired upon a lorcha, which having just delivered her broadside was tacking under the stern of the *Kestrel*, struck the quarter of the latter vessel. This may have accidentally occurred; but it is, however, perfectly certain that the Ti-pings did not fire upon the foreign men-of-war, as stated by Captain Dew.

The Ti-pings fought their battery against the overwhelming fire from the heavy pivot guns of the smaller vessels and the broadsides from the *Encounter* until every gun was dismounted and the work knocked to pieces. When the British and French storming parties carried the walls of Ningpo, the defenders offered a determined resistance; but shell and Enfield rifles at last overcame it; though not until both the generals Hwang and Fang were severely wounded did they evacuate the city, leaving about 100 dead within and around the walls. The British loss was only 3 killed and 23 wounded.

Even Consul Harvey termed the conduct of the Ti-pings when they captured Ningpo "wonderfully moderate." What will the British public think of the following account of the behaviour of Captain Dew's allies when re-established in the city? Contrasting the events which followed the Ti-ping seizure of the city with those which occurred on its subsequent

capture by the British and French, can any question arise as to which was the most civilized and merciful? The correspondent of the *China Mail*, under date the 22nd May, 1862, states:—

"The rebels retreated through the west gate—the pirates then entered the city and began the work of destruction, and in a few hours did more damage than the rebels did in the whole of the five months that they had possession.... On Sunday the reinstated Taoutae was busy chopping off the heads of the unlucky rebels that he caught, and otherwise torturing them. I saw some fearful sights; such as a boy with his entrails cut right out, from a great gash across the stomach, carried round the back—a man with all the flesh torn off his ribs, leaving them quite bare—a man whose heart had been torn out and his head cut off; together with others equally revolting.... On Monday the same scenes were enacting.... One of the principal murderers and torturers of the poor fellows found in the city was one A-fook, the *British Consul's* boy or personal attendant, who was dressed up in silks, and who, stuck upon a pony, paraded the city with attendants, ordering them to execute unfortunates, and issuing orders (which were actually obeyed) to the English soldiers."

Now it can safely be declared that the Ti-pings have *never* committed similar atrocities to the above. They have, it is true, often killed large numbers at the capture of obstinately defended towns, but their prisoners were never tortured to death as their comrades, captured by British troops and then delivered up to the cruel Tartar mandarins, have been under the shadow of the Union Jack.

The *China Overland Trade Report* of October 14, 1862, states:—

"So much mystery and double-dealing has been practised by the allies to wrest this port from the Taipings, and so little regard for veracity pervades the official despatches regarding their doings, that the truth is most difficult to arrive at, and has certainly never yet been published.... The possession of

Ningpo by the Taipings was peculiarly adapted to thwart those schemes for aiding and abetting the Imperial cause, which have so peculiarly characterized the British minister. The Taipings held the province, and it is evident that the possession of a seaport would have enabled them not only to have deprived Shanghae of the greater proportion of the customs duties,<sup>17</sup> but to have diverted the same into their own exchequer. Now Mr. Lay was acting Chinese ambassador in London, and the absorption of these duties would have entirely frustrated the object of his errand<sup>18</sup> and indeed have destroyed the main stay of the Imperial cause. Besides, the possession of Ningpo would have enabled the Taipings to have obtained all the munitions of war which they stood so much in need of. It would have dispelled the *illusion* of their being inimical to foreign trade.... Admiral Hope... from some such cogent reasons as are above named, fell into the British minister's views, and clearly resolved on the recapture of the place by fair means or foul. The mode of accomplishing this design reflects *indelible disgrace* on British prestige....

"Admiral Hope detached a portion of his fleet to Ningpo under command of Captain Dew, of H.M.S. *Encounter*, clearly to act in concert with this piratical squadron, with which daily communications were established. The day before the Taoutae arrived at Ningpo, the British ships had taken up their stations, and had cleared for action. Captain Dew had opened a correspondence with the Taiping chiefs, the drift of which was a demand that they should remove a certain battery on some absurd pretext, which they refused to do. The night prior to the attack, a council of war was held on board the *Encounter*, and a private note was seen by several Europeans at Ningpo, written

by a certain British official, which stated that the city would be attacked the following morning. The pirate fleet arrived accordingly, and proceeding in driplets *between* the British men-of-war and the city, opened fire. This could not possibly be returned without directing the guns towards the men-of-war. The result is known and need not be repeated."

The *Hong-kong Daily Press*, in a long article upon the capture of Ningpo by the Anglo-Franco-Manchoo-piratical fleet, makes precisely similar statements to those quoted from the *Overland Trade Report*, and commences with the following paragraph:—

"There never was a falser, more unprovoked, or more unjustifiable act than the taking of Ningpo by the allies from the Taipings. It should, in fairness, be recorded *to the eternal disgrace of Captain RODERIC DEW, of H.M.S. Encounter.*"

## FOOTNOTES:

4. Lord Palmerston's Government had one great quality—it manfully supported its subordinate officials whether right or wrong; it is at least doubtful whether his successors will have courage to pursue the same policy.
5. The forces consisted of:—

French, under Rear-Admiral Protet:—	
Small-arm men and Marines; field-piece party and	
4 guns	410
English, under Brigadier General Staveley:—	
Royal Artillery, 6 guns	78
5th Bombay N. I.	440
H.M. 99th Regiment	56
22nd Punjab N. I.	519
Under Captain Borlase, R.N.:—	
Field-piece party, 3 guns	45

H.M.S. <i>Pearl</i> small-arm company	60	
Axe party	16	
Under Captain Willes, R.N.:—		
H.M.S. <i>Impérieuse</i> small-arm company	189	
Marines of Squadron	94	
	—	1,497
Disciplined Chinese of General Ward's legion	300	
	—	
Total	2,207	

6. The force consisted of:—

British Naval Division, with 3 howitzers	350	
Royal Artillery, with 4 howitzers	90	
H.M. 99th Regiment	80	
22nd Punjaub N. I.	400	
5th Bombay N. I.	400	
French Contingent, with 5 rifled guns and 2 field-pieces	700	
Disciplined Chinese of Ward's legion	400	
	—	
Total	2,420	

7. The allied force consisted of:—

British troops, under General Staveley:—		
Royal Engineers	22	
Royal Artillery, with 7 guns and 6 mortars	100	
H.M. 31st Regiment	552	
H.M. 99th and 67th Regiments	280	
5th Bombay N.I	350	
22nd Punjaub N.I	350	
French force, under Admiral Protet:—		
Algerian Infantry, Chasseurs, Marines, and Seamen, with		

8 guns	900
British Naval Division, under Captain Borlase, R.N.:—	
Seamen and Marines, with 9 guns	330
Ward's disciplined Chinese	1,000
Total	3,884

Assisted by Imperialist troops under Manchoo General Le 5,000

8. See Note, p. 509.

9. Italics are by the Author.

10. Vide "Further Papers relating to the Rebellion in China," 1863, p. 43; Inclosure in No. 27; Brigadier-General Staveley to Sir C. Lewis.

11. This and all following extracts are taken from the Official Correspondence presented to both Houses of Parliament in Blue Book form.

12. Compare this with the next despatch of Captain Dew's.

13. These Chiefs were at the time conducting the murderous raids from Shanghae, already described.

14. Did it grieve the philanthropic Admiral "much," I wonder, to massacre them in his raids from Shanghae?

15. We may safely presume that Captain Dew was gibing the chiefs.

16. Governor of a city.

17. From these duties the indemnity for the war was being extracted.

18. The errand was to obtain the notorious Anglo-Chinese flotilla.

## CHAPTER XIX.

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A Double Wedding.—Its Celebration.—The Honeymoon.—Its Interruption.—Warlike Preparations.—Soong-kong Invested.—General Ching's Despatch.—Tsing-poo Recaptured.—Ti-ping Seventy Excused.—England's Responsibility.—Curious Chinese Custom.—The Chung-wang's Policy.—His Explanation.—The Ti-ping Court of Justice.—How Conducted.—Opium Smoking.—Its Effects.—Evidence thereof.—Forbidden by Ti-ping Law.—Opium Trade.

Soon after our return to Nankin, the Chung-wang, having left the Shi, Mo, Ting, and other Wangs, in charge of the lately captured Shanghae and Hang-chow districts, despatched considerable reinforcements to the Ying-wang, on the northern side of the Yang-tze river, and to the Ti-ping positions along the southern bank. These troops quickly dispersed the Imperialist force supposed to be investing Nankin from the hills on the opposite side of the river, and recaptured many towns on the southern side.

Meanwhile, at the Ti-ping capital, Marie became my wife, while my friend L. received the Chung-wang's youngest daughter in marriage. When Cum-ho's father ascertained the state of that young lady's affections, he sanctioned her union with L., although his better half made no little opposition at first, her ambitious mind being directed to the Mo-wang as a suitable son-in-law. This, however, she eventually accomplished by giving the chief her next eldest daughter as a wife. We were married according to the ritual of the Ti-ping church, but with the addition of using a ring, in conformity with the usage of our own. The Kan-wang's own chaplain, who was an ordained teacher of the London Missionary Society at Hong-kong, performed the ceremony.

Since the arrival of the Kan-wang at Nankin, he had altered the Ti-ping marriage service so as to closely resemble that of the English church, to

which he had been used when principal native instructor and catechist of the London Mission. Although by the laws of the state polygamy was allowed, the improvements introduced by the Prime Minister, in fact we may term them regulations, had almost abolished the custom, so that few among the people married more than one wife.

Although L. and myself were married on the same day, and nearly at the same time, there was a vast difference between the style of the two ceremonies. Marie agreed with me in preferring a quiet solemnization, with only a few friends present; but L., taking to wife a chief's daughter, was obliged to undergo the usual pomp and festivity.

After my own marriage had been concluded, preparations for that of my friend were made in the "Heavenly Hall" of the Chung-wang's palace. The Hall was decorated with flowers and a profusion of silken flags and streamers. Several large tables in a side chamber were loaded with bridal presents from friends, who, with all the household, were assembled to witness the ceremony. The Chung, Kan, Foo, and all the other Wangs present, wore their state robes and coronets, while the dresses of many of the ladies were still more beautiful and dazzling. Besides the Kan-wang's chaplain, the principal ecclesiastic in Nankin officiated, dressed in a splendid black silk garment broidered with gold and silver crosses, both of whom, attended by several priests, took up their position before the altar, which was decorated with large garlands of flowers.

At last, when everything was ready, the bride, completely enveloped in a long white veil, was escorted to the Hall by nine young girls dressed in scarlet, and with red flowers in their hair. At the same time L., in the full costume of a Ti-ping chief of the "Woo" rank (to which he had been raised by the Chung-wang's wish), came to the right side of the altar attended by nine young chiefs. After the bridegroom and bride were united, the ceremony was concluded by a short service, nearly approaching to that of the Sabbath, and then, entering two magnificent sedans, they were conveyed to their new home (a house given them by the Chung-wang) by a vast and

gorgeous cavalcade. The newly-married couple now entertained a number of guests to a festive meal in the principal hall of their house. Meanwhile, with my wife, I removed from the Chung-wang's palace and took up my abode with L., the house being divided between us.

During several months, as it is, I presume, with nearly all newly-married people, we paid but little attention to the outside world, and, with the exception of the periodical arrival and departure of our friends D. and Captain P. with the vessels, and the addition of three Frenchmen, who had served in the French artillery at Shanghae, to our corps of the Chung-wang's army, but little occurred to divert us from our honeymoon. In the mean time the Commander-in-Chief was occupied making his plans for further operations against the Manchoo, with the intention of recapturing the towns and territory that had lately fallen into their possession, and making a movement against their capital, Pekin. Before, however, these tactics could be put into execution, news came from the Shanghae district of the hostilities commenced by the British and French, and of the consequent defeat of the Ti-ping local forces, and the capture of their cities and villages. Immediately, orders were sent recalling the reinforcements despatched to the Ying-wang, and the force operating along the southern bank of the Yang-tze, while from the garrisons of Nankin and other cities troops were concentrated upon Soo-chow.

With natural reluctance I prepared to accompany the Chung-wang on his march to the threatened districts, accompanied by my friend, who felt how difficult it was to part with his youthful Ti-ping bride. Our feelings were not indeed to be envied when, upon a misty, heavily raining, and more than usually disagreeable Chinese morning in May, between the chilly hours of three and four, we set out on the march for Soo-chow. Even Phillip, although his honeymoon had terminated long before ours began, appeared to feel as gloomy as myself and L. upon parting with our wives.

As we slowly rode through the high city portal, dimly lighted by the glare of lanterns and torches, the rain poured down in continuous streams, as

though it never intended to cease again. Fortunately we had the promise of the rainbow, and I imagine the Chinese must have known it also, or the whole force might have become panic-stricken with the dread of another deluge. Splash, splash went our horses, and tramp, tramp came the soldiery, through the mud, the former drooping and the latter dripping. The tenacity, consistency, and otherwise sticky properties of Chinese mud, are really wonderful, and in wet weather cause the pedestrians' feet, to sound like a huge sucker suddenly torn from some sympathetic substance. The rain beating in our faces every now and then compelled us to close our eyes and risk their being picked out by the iron spikes on the ends of the bamboos carried by the surrounding spearmen. Every thing and animal presented a miserable and draggled appearance. The few trees in the neighbourhood of the city, dimly seen in the hazy grey of morning as we passed under their shadows, looked more like huge spectres outlined against the foggy background. The very houses presented a weird and desolate aspect as they became faintly visible through the heavy rain and dense atmosphere.

A march of five days brought our forces to the city of Soo-chow, when preparations were immediately made to move the troops to the defence of the Ti-ping territory in the vicinity of Shanghae and Ningpo. The Tow-wang, with the principal part of his forces, had been recalled from the northern side of the Yang-tze, leaving the Ying-wang in command of the different positions still held. This contingent, with those from Nankin and Soo-chow, the Chung-wang's immediate command, and other detachments, composed an army of some 50,000 men. The Commander-in-Chief, a few days after his arrival at Soo-chow, moved forward in three columns to the threatened quarter. With my company of partly disciplined men and a few light pieces of artillery, I accompanied the division attached to the Chung-wang himself. Each of the other *corps d'armée* were respectively commanded by the Mo and Tow Wangs.

Marching rapidly upon the places lately captured by the allied Anglo-Franco-Manchoo forces, those garrisoned only by Imperialists were very

quickly retaken. On Kah-ding and other cities held by the foreigners with their irresistible artillery, no direct assault was at first made. The Chung-wang's tactics were, circulating exaggerated rumours that with an immense force he was marching for Shanghae, and by continual mock attacks upon Kah-ding, Na-ziang, &c., with men carrying numberless flags, to harass the garrisons so as to compel them to abandon their positions. These tactics were entirely successful. General Staveley, and the other commanders, fearing for the safety of Shanghae and the fate of their detachments guarding the lately captured towns, evacuated all excepting Soong-kong, which was held in conjunction with the filibuster General Ward's disciplined Chinese.

Having recaptured Kah-ding, the Chung-wang established his headquarters at the city of Chang-za, some forty miles north-west of Shanghae, while his subordinate generals successively occupied the places evacuated by the allies. The brave Ling-ho, with his regiment of Honan guards, made a dashing attempt to carry Soong-kong by storm. Just at daylight on the morning of May the 30th, this gallant chief, with less than 1,500 men, made a desperate attack upon the north-east side of the city. So suddenly was the attempt made, that when the garrison had manned the walls, the scaling-ladders were actually planted against them. These ladders consisted simply of two long bamboos secured together at either end about two feet apart, the man to ascend being pushed up by men from below with another bamboo, while he assisted himself with the uprights. Soong-kong would certainly have been captured but for the circumstance of its being held by a strong detachment of the seamen and marines of Ward's dear and invaluable friend Admiral Hope, who, at the expense of the British tax-payers, instead of attending to his ships, chose to scour Chinese territory, hunting for Ti-pings wherever they were to be found. The first to man the walls of Soon-kong were the men of H.B.M.S. *Centaur*, who opened a heavy fire upon the assaulting column at a few yards' distance. In spite of this, Ling-ho led his men up their scaling-ladders, and was himself the first upon the wall, the second being the French commander of his regiment. Their gallantry,

however, was unavailing, the deadly Enfield rifles and the showers of grape and canister crashing among the Ti-pings within half pistol-range proved irresistible. Ling-ho fell mortally wounded while striving with his usual surpassing courage to animate his men to follow him, and his brave French officer was killed by his side. This settled the action, and sorrowfully carrying off their wounded leader, the Ti-pings retired from the attack.

During the next few days a part of the Chung-wang's division having arrived before the place, Soong-kong was closely invested. On the 2nd of June a large Imperialist force was driven out of some strong stockades they had erected close to the city, while one of the *Centaur*'s gigs and a dozen Chinese gunboats loaded with arms and ammunition were captured in a neighbouring creek. Seeing this, the whole British force, accompanied by a body of Ward's Chinese, made a powerful sortie, and succeeded in recapturing the gig and two or three of the gunboats, the rest being carried off by the Ti-pings. During the 3rd, 4th, and 5th of June, each day an attempt was made to storm the city, and outside the west gate a battery was erected, from which the besiegers opened fire in the morning, but upon every occasion it was effectually silenced by the superior fire of the British guns on the walls.

The gig's crew and some other Europeans captured in the gunboats were not harmed by the Ti-pings, although, had the latter simply followed the law of retaliation, they would have met with the fate of the unfortunates who were delivered over to the Manchoo execution-grounds, after having fallen into the hands of British soldiers during the late freebooting raids of Admirals Hope and Protet, and General Staveley.

I cannot do better than give a few extracts from the summons to surrender sent into Soong-kong by Ching, the chief in command of the besiegers. General Ching, after a preamble setting forth the object of the Ti-ping revolution, stated:—

"Now, having received our king's commands to hold the city of Soo-chow, we had intended to remain there, and give the Heavenly<sup>19</sup> soldiers rest, and

not to take your place, not imagining you would league with the foreigners and attack my cities, forcing me to rise up and retake them. *For this causeless misfortune, for this injury to the people, who then is to blame?* Had you not invaded my territories, I should not have troubled you; *the people would have remained undisturbed.* Would not this have been better for both sides?

"Again, all the officers, both military and civil, all the soldiers, too, and the people, are without exception Chinese; and you eat the bread of the Tsing<sup>20</sup> dynasty, serving a stranger....

"As for you, O foreign troops, you had best return to your native country, as quickly as may be; *for, being a distinct race, AND SEEKING TRADE ONLY, why should you contend with me, or why should I be compelled to overcome you?*... If you are resolved and will fight with me, I fear, indeed, your trade will suffer."

Upon the 10th of June the Mo-wang succeeded in recapturing Tsing-poo, the garrison of Ward's Chinese, a British force 600 strong, with six guns, evacuating the city *after almost completely destroying it by fire!* The filibuster officer (Colonel Forrester) in command of Ward's force having, in his hurry, forgotten to carry off some of his loot (gathered during the late successful campaign against the Ti-ping cities), ran back for it, and was captured by the Mo-wang's men just as he was rushing away loaded with sycee and dollars. This man, whom the Europeans captured at Soong-kong, as also eleven British seamen taken prisoners at the evacuation of Kah-ding by the allies, were all liberated by the Ti-pings. In vain I represented to the Chung-wang the policy of retaining them as hostages for any of his own chiefs who might fall into the hands of the enemy, and most probably be delivered over to the reeking execution-shambles at Shanghae and

elsewhere. He would not retain them, but had them released, so as to exhibit his unalterable friendship for Europeans.

I would not willingly screen a single fault upon the part of my Ti-ping friends; but, after viewing all events calmly, when many thousand miles away from aught that could bias or warp the judgment, I must confess that I can scarcely find the slightest grounds for censure upon any point.

I had certainly intended to blame the Tow and Mo-wangs for the severity of their measures towards the people of those villages, which, upon the successful raids of the allied forces, had proved renegade, and had given in their allegiance to the Manchoo. But, consideration of the primary cause of the destruction of many Ti-ping cities and villages, and the subsequent devastation of some that had been left whole by the allies, conclusively fixes the guilty responsibility upon the latter, by reason of their wanton attack upon the Ti-ping territory. After the recapture of some places, people who had been well known as subjects of the Tien-wang were found with the shaved head (the badge of the Manchoo) and other strong and irrefragable proof of their traitorous conduct; many of these were decapitated, and their property confiscated. In like manner, some of the villages that had, with Chinese apathy, at once gone over to the Imperialists, were burned down, and the people compelled to labour as coolies. These measures may appear harsh; but, if events had occurred otherwise, and the Imperialists had occupied the position of the Ti-pings, fresh evidence would be given that there were prototypes of the notorious Yeh in every Manchoo official!

The Shanghae district had been captured by the revolutionists; after that event, the people were gradually settling down to the new state of affairs, while those who had naturally fled from the shock of war were fast returning to their homes and giving in allegiance to the dominant power. In fact, so well were the lately disturbed departments recovering from the effect of the civil war, that in a short time they would certainly have attained the high state of prosperity enjoyed by the silk districts, then thoroughly settled under Ti-ping rule. The question as to the relative right of each belligerent has

nothing to do with the present argument. Each party to the civil war had their own causes and reasons, and these certainly concerned no one but themselves. The simple question is this:—After the Ti-pings had proved their power to successfully dispute the Manchoo authority, and had wrested large tracts of land from their foreign yoke, who became responsible for again carrying the horrors of war, with its attendant misery and desolation, into a country which would otherwise have remained happy in its freedom, peaceful and nominally Christian? Who other than England?

Upon the suppositional "mights" elsewhere described, Admiral Hope and his colleagues captured the cities and villages within a radius of thirty miles from Shanghae, burning and destroying (as proved in this work by the words of the Admiral himself) everywhere. These places were then captured a second time by the Ti-pings, and subsequently recaptured by the allies. Now, for the cruelties and devastations inflicted four times over by the sword of Asiatic warfare, in the words of the Ti-ping general long since in the presence of his God, I ask, "For this causeless misfortune, for this injury to the people, who then is to blame?"

Plain it is to all who will judge fairly and honourably, that England is heavily responsible for the effects of the unprovoked hostilities carried by her soldiers and sailors into the Ti-ping dominions. Besides the more direct evil consequences of that most evil policy, there were others not so well known though closely connected with it. In the first place, few people are aware, or trouble themselves to reflect, that the wholesale destruction of grain and rice by the allies (as per Admiral Hope's despatches) led to the starvation of many thousands of the unfortunate country people. The Ti-ping system of Government is one of a paternal form (so favorite with the Chinese, but so seldom obtained), involving a community of interests upon the part of every subject. Consequent upon this, all rice crops and other descriptions of grain were gathered regularly into the state granaries, and from thence supplied to every person and family in the respective departments of the "Land divisions of the Ti-ping dynasty." Consequently,

when the whole stores of food were destroyed in the districts ravaged by Admiral Hope and others, the miserable people had literally nothing to eat; so that, although the Ti-ping soldiery were killed in hundreds by the irresistible foreign artillery, the non-combatants perished by tens of thousands from famine.

Then again: the only means of support for the large Ti-ping armies, the Government and administrative machinery, were precisely similar to those of other nations; that is to say, from direct and indirect taxation. Naturally, therefore, when England maintained the treaty ports against the Ti-pings, and when Admiral Hope invaded their territory, many valuable sources of revenue were cut off. If a nation, or organized body of people, possess neither settled territory nor regular revenue, they must plunder their neighbours in order to exist, and by this mode of reasoning it is evident that England is responsible for all plundering or brigandage committed by the Ti-pings when driven from their dominions, and defrauded of their just dues by her intervention. At the time, however, to which we have now arrived (summer of 1862), the revolutionists had not been expelled from the valuable silk, and a great proportion of the tea, districts, the revenue upon the productions of which exceeded £2,500,000 sterling per annum. Previous to their expulsion from these districts, the Ti-pings only acted as marauders when literally compelled to do so in order to save their own lives, and when any people in the world would have acted in the same manner. When driven back by the raids of Admiral Hope and General Staveley, the troops and people, rendered destitute, fell upon the nearest places to forage and subsist. Otherwise, the only plundering ever indulged in by Ti-ping soldiery was upon the *public* property of the enemy. Private property, except in dire cases of necessity, was always respected: most especially were the troops careful to avoid injuring the standing crops of grain—a course of conduct which forcibly contrasts with the destruction of the cultivated fields of the unfortunate New Zealanders by English soldiers, and with the outrages committed by the forces of the Emperor of the French in Algeria! Most

unjustly the Ti-pings have been represented as "hordes of banditti," "ruthless marauders," &c.; but these statements may invariably be traced to interested quarters. If a few examples of sack and pillage have been selected to blacken the character of the Ti-pings, are we to forget the names of Magdeburg, Badajos, and Ciudad Rodrigo? Are we not to remember the progress of the Federal General, Sheridan, through the Shenandoah Valley, as recorded in the columns of the *Times* of the 30th March, 1865? "Burning houses and barns, he passed through the valley, and may boast of a destruction such as no Asiatic chief ever surpassed!"

When Admiral Hope ascertained that Soong-kong, the only remaining Manchoo place outside the walls of Shanghaie, was seriously threatened by the Ti-ping forces, he sent up strong reinforcements to it, commanded by Captain Borlase, R.N. Upon this, the Chung-wang gave orders to abandon the siege; and, after placing strong garrisons in all the recaptured cities, returned with the rest of his forces to Nankin. During the march from Soochow to the capital, I became acquainted with a singular custom of the Chinese. We had just passed through a village, when we came upon a party of country people carrying a coffin to the burial-place. To the great surprise of myself and European comrades, instead of interring the corpse or building a grave over it, according to the usual Chinese customs, two forked wooden stakes were fixed in the ground, and the coffin placed upon them at either end. Upon inquiry, we were informed that the dead man had been killed by lightning, and that the common practice throughout the country was to dispose of the bodies of those who perished in such a manner by placing their coffin on stakes which would support them above the ground.

Soon after reaching Nankin, the Chung-wang seriously turned his attention towards operating against the Manchoo forces further up the Yangtze, whose successes, though unimportant when compared with the great Ti-ping victories in Che-kiang and Kiang-su, were yet becoming dangerous to the supremacy of the revolutionists in that part of China. When the Commander-in-Chief drew off all his troops from the Shanghaie district, after

having retaken all the places previously captured by the allies, he did so under the impression that neither England nor France would again make war upon the re-established Ti-ping territories. A man so noble-hearted, large-minded, and honourable, could not realize the determined hostility entertained against his cause, or credit the intention of Admiral Hope and General Staveley to resume active warfare upon the arrival of reinforcements from Tien-tsin and India; he therefore left garrisons amply sufficient to repel any effort of his natural enemies, but neglected the precaution of leaving in the district even a single *corps d'armée*, which would have frustrated the future triumphs of his unexpected foemen. It was certainly necessary that large additions should be made to the Ti-ping forces opposing the progress of the Imperialists from the upper waters of the Yang-tze towards the city of Nankin; still, this could have been thoroughly accomplished, and a field force of at least 50,000 men left in the neighbourhood of Shanghae at the same time. Had any such disposition been made, the easy success of the allies, during their next campaign, would have been exceedingly different; the disasters that subsequently befell the Ti-ping cause would never have taken place; while the standard of liberty and Christianity would now wave erect and triumphant.

During the interval between our return to Nankin and the commencement of further military operations, I was frequently closeted with the Chung, Kan, and other chiefs, upon the discussion of political matters. On one occasion, at an interview with the Commander-in-Chief, my friend D—— was present, and translated a certain speech, which was subsequently published in some of the Shanghae papers. He asked the Chung-wang "why he had ventured within the limits of Consular Ports;" and received this reply:

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"Why? Because foreigners have broken faith with us! The English and Americans stipulated with us to remain strictly neutral in regard to our war with the Manchoos. This agreement

was kept on their part by assisting, in every way they could, in the collection of the very 'sinews of war' for the Imperialists; allowing their subjects to enter the Manchoo employ, and at the same time sending a man-of-war to force, at the cannon's mouth, the return, and even punishment of the few foreigners who had joined us! Was *this* neutrality?

"This was not all: they actually, with their own Government troops, *invaded* our territory, and violated the most sacred usages of war, by permitting, or not preventing, the Chinese troops from committing the most atrocious barbarities. It has been told us that, among foreigners, the proof of courage is clemency towards the vanquished. But the torture inflicted lately upon some of your helpless prisoners proves to us the quality of your *neutrality*! Neutrality! Every few days we see several Manchoo steam vessels, laden with munitions of war, all to be expended to our destruction, passing under the very walls of our capital, but flying the American flag! They are called by foreigners the *Koong-foo-tze* (Confucius), *Kee-me-et* (Williamette), *An-te-lok* (Antelope), etc. But for that flag we would have sunk them hundreds of times. Is *this* neutrality? Is it not a most shameful perversion of the American nationality? Is it not a vile trading—a base jobbery in the dignity and honour of a noble people, who have never permitted their officers to *openly* violate our rights? Would not these great foreign sovereigns blush to see the degradation of their flags, perverted to such ends as private aggrandisement and infamous prostitution?

"Moreover, as lords of our immense territory, we have a perfect right to levy taxes on goods of natives passing through our

dominions; but by acts of gigantic fraud,<sup>21</sup> the foreign consuls have given to native craft papers, and their national flag, simply for a fee—thus robbing us of our revenues, in as far as they *could!* Would any *other* nation have borne these outrages for years, as we have done, without making reprisal? And we have been accused of relentless barbarity; of burning towns, slaughtering the people, &c. Well, granted. It is the hard necessity of war, which we would avoid if we could; but knowing, as we do, the conduct of Napoleon in Europe, of the British in India, &c., and the Americans in their own country, we think such accusations come with a bad grace from foreigners. The Ming dynasty was founded by a revolution such as is now in progress; and we have never heard of a people who expelled tyrants from their country who did not suffer both offensively and defensively.

"That the foreign Powers are playing a game to suit their own profit in China, is to us perfectly clear. When, some time ago, we addressed their authorities on this subject (at the Consular Ports), our communications were returned *unopened*. This contemptible insult taught us that you foreigners" [the translation of this part cannot be literally given, by reason of the Chung-wang's use of idiomatic and figurative language, but may best be expressed as follows:—] "thought our cause a sinking one, or intended to make it so; and, like rats on shipboard, you would desert—not us, but your own professions towards us. Not long after, our capital was called, in a public print, the 'City of Coolie Kings.' This title, which was meant for a sneer, we thought the highest compliment possible: we are indifferent as to what the Duke of Pa-le-chiau<sup>22</sup> thought of the remark, or the Americans, whose capital might be called by the same name

with equal justice. It was easy to judge, from these circumstances, and many others, at what value we could esteem the lofty sentiments of honour, justice, and equity, which foreigners professed towards the Chinese people. 1st. They struck a nearly fatal blow to the Manchoo power; then, in pretence of seeking the real good of the nation, they bolster up the tottering *simulacrum*, and actively carry on operations against us. They reform not one abuse of the Tartar Government, and send for Captain Osborne's fleet!<sup>23</sup> Will the most noble Empress of England, the mother of her people, permit her brave soldiers, and noble-minded naval officers, to serve under the most cruel and corrupt Government officials in the world, and furnish them with means to come to the Middle Kingdom, to crush out at the cannon's mouth the last vestige of liberty, and freedom of being governed, while professing our religion, as seems to us most conformable to the sacred book (Bible)? We cannot think so, though her officers have refused to receive our communications!

"Will not one of you here present make it known to the sovereigns of England and America, that by this conduct we can only judge of them, and that it seems that they desire to exterminate us. Of the French we have nothing to hope; *they* have never professed any friendship for us! They (the French Jesuits) materially assisted the Manchoos in getting possession of the throne, for the sake of propagating a religion which English missionaries have taught us to condemn. But, at least, they have never deceived us by false professions!"

Within two months after our return to Nankin, I became utterly prostrated by one of the forms of low fever prevalent in China. My illness

was long in duration and slow in disappearing, even when recovery commenced. During many months I was confined to a sickbed, from whence, but for the tender and unremitting attentions of my wife, I should never have risen again. In the meanwhile my comrades had all left the city, having proceeded with another expedition against the Manchoo.

Shih-ta-kae, the I-wang and brother of the Ti-ping king, had been recalled to the capital, and in the month of September, 1862, marched forth in command of an army destined to operate along the south bank of the Yang-tze. The Chung-wang, with a still larger army, crossed the river, and commenced a campaign having for its principal objects the recapture of Ngan-king and the capture of Pekin.

While these armies are marching along their several routes, we will digress for a little and notice two subjects particularly favourable to the moral aspect of the Ti-ping revolution, though one of them has excited no little hostility to the great movement.

The justice courts of Ti-pingdom form the theme of our first eulogy. These are invariably conducted with the strictest and most simple equity. The disgusting scenes, the inseparable concomitants of the Manchoo magisterial dwelling, or *yamun*—such as the torture of litigants, criminals, and prisoners—are entirely abolished. Defendant, plaintiff, and witness, are fairly confronted; but under the sway of the Tartar despotism either the one or the other is tortured if any party chooses to bribe the presiding mandarin; or, if none have the sense and means to sooth the majesty of justice with lumps of virgin sycee, the *whole* are tortured by that impartial functionary. The infamous system of bribery is entirely unknown in a Ti-ping court of justice; *not one* form of torture is permitted by law,<sup>24</sup> and prisoners or litigants are afforded every facility to defend themselves consistent with justice. In no way can a rich and superior adversary obtain any unfair advantage over a poor man, none being convicted or punished but upon the clearest and most decisive proof of guilt.

Ti-pingdom is one of the last places in the world likely to please a lawyer; plaintiff, defendant, and prisoner having to plead their own cases, which are then decided upon according to their respective merits by the presiding chief and his assistant officers. All trials are conducted more by the dictates of right and justice than the trammels of law, so that the glaring injustice frequently caused by European legal technicalities and quibbles is seldom committed.

The Ti-pings have one very singular custom in connection with their "Judgment Halls." Two large drums are always kept hanging just inside the porch of the outer gate, and are at the use of any person who may consider himself aggrieved, or may wish to present a complaint, when he is at liberty to strike upon the drums and demand justice from the chief. A Ti-ping court of justice is generally a very imposing affair. The gorgeous dress of the chiefs, their numerous attendants and body guard, the many beautiful silken banners around the walls, and especially the brilliancy of colour, strongly impress the observer's imagination with an idea of what Europe must have been during its earlier career, when it delighted in the same barbaric splendour and feudal display.

The second subject of our digression is the abolition of opium-smoking by the Ti-pings, which is almost the principal cause of the hostility the British Government and nearly all merchants who trade in the drug have hitherto entertained against the revolutionists. Although the arguments to prove the utterly health-destroying and mind-pervading effect of opium are many and incontrovertible, we may dispense with them and give a few facts to establish the value of the prohibition by the Ti-pings. In India, as well as in China, the unfortunate natives are thereby utterly destroyed. In a communication forwarded by General Alexander to Earl Shaftesbury (then Lord Ashley), from Mr. A. Sym, dated the 13th of March, 1840, the following passages occur:—

"The health and morals of the people suffer from the production of opium. We are demoralizing our own subjects in India; one half of the crime in the

opium districts—murders, rapes, and affrays—have their origin in opium-eating.... One opium cultivator demoralizes a whole village. Thus thousands of our fellow-subjects in India are oppressed, and their health and morals destroyed, for the sake of this infernal opium trade. So completely is the production of opium in the hands of the East India Company<sup>25</sup> that not a single poppy can be grown in the extent of their vast territories without either the permission of the Government or an infraction of its laws. The grower of the poppy derives only a bare subsistence for its cultivation, and the difference between 250 rupees and 1,200 to 1,600 rupees a chest goes to the Government, which exchanges the drug for silver at the auction mart."

This sort of thing has been continually on the increase since the above statements were written, and the opium trade has now reached an enormous extent, being fully equal to if not greater in value than either the silk or tea trade. While the price of opium has been steadily maintained or increased, that of western manufactures has gradually fallen off to one-third the former rates, although the latter trade has not largely increased, and that in opium has been more than doubled. The vast amount of specie drawn from China in payment of this deleterious drug is diverted from a more beneficial and righteous trade in British manufactures, or in the cultivation of cotton, which the East Indian districts now devoted to the poppy are so well adapted to produce. If Lancashire would only look abroad it might see a mode of easily increasing the British exports to China, till the eight or nine millions annually paid in cash for the produce of China were replaced by them, and the abolition of the opium trade had enabled the Chinese to barter for English manufactures to a greater extent. The amount of clear profit realized by the Indian Government upon the sale of opium is considerably upwards of £5,000,000 per annum,<sup>26</sup> being the difference between £25 a chest they give for it, and £115 they sell it at. The opium, upon reaching China, extracts from that country the vast amount of specie above mentioned, which would otherwise be expended on British produce.

Only a few years ago the following evidence was adduced before the Select Committee of the House of Commons, on our commercial relations with China, by Mr. Montgomery Martin, who was Her Majesty's treasurer in India:—

"I inquired of the Taou-tae of Shanghae what would be the best means of increasing our commerce with China, and his first answer, in the presence of Captain Balfour, was:—'*Cease to send us so much opium, and we shall be able to take your manufactures.*'... The true remedy for our deficient trade with China is not to be found in the reduction of £1,000,000 to £2,000,000 sterling of tea duties, but in perfect freedom of intercourse with China; in facilities of access to the interior of that vast country; and in the abolition of the pernicious opium traffic, which absorbs £4,000,000 per annum, which would be devoted to the purchase of British manufactures."


Proofs of the immense injury the opium traffic inflicts upon British export trade to China might be multiplied *ad infinitum*. The drug not only destroys the moral and physical principles of those who connect themselves with it in any way, but it has been the direct cause of every war England has had with China. The following statement by Mr. Martin is so identical with what I would say myself that I cannot do better than quote it with the appreciation it so well deserves. It was adduced before the Committee of the House of Commons already referred to:—

"Minute 3491. In what respect do you think the trade injurious to us in our relations with China?

"3492. Politically, with reference to our position with the Government of China, had France, or America, or Russia, granted us an island on their coast as a commercial station,<sup>27</sup> had they prohibited the use of opium, believing it to be injurious, we dare not, in that case, have made it a smoking-shop for the empire; and I would not act to the Chinese

Government in a different manner than I would act to a Government in Europe. Then, socially speaking, I believe it is the duty of this Government to uphold moral principles and to disseminate religious truth, and she cannot do that with one hand, while on the other she is introducing into China an amount of opium which furnishes 17 grains a day to each of 3,000,000 of people, and which, in the language of Mr. Lay, Her Majesty's late consul at Amoy, 'is ham-stringing the nation.' I think it is desolating China, corrupting its Government, and bringing the fabric of that extraordinary empire to a state of rapid dissolution. Commercially speaking, it is injurious to us, because it prevents the extension of our manufactures in China. Four or five mercantile houses are engaged in the traffic, and derive a large amount of revenue from it; *but the trade of England is materially cramped by the extension of its consumption in China to the extent of at least four million sterling a year.*"

Now, this truthful statement was made in the year 1857, since when the evils mentioned have increased to more than double their extent at that period. We will also examine the opinion of the Chinese themselves with regard to the introduction of opium into their country. Kinshan, one of the most celebrated of the *literati* of China, has written on the subject, and how correctly all can affirm who know anything of opium-smoking in that empire. The following is his statement:—



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Lithogrs Gate Str. Lincoln's Inn Fields.  
Day & Son, Limited, Lith.  
INTERIOR OF AN OPIUM SMOKING SALOON.

"Opium is a poisonous drug brought from foreign countries. At first the smokers of it merely strive to follow the fashion of the day, but in the sequel the poison takes effect, and the habit becomes fixed. The sleeping smokers are like corpses—lean and haggard as demons; such are the injuries it does to life; it throws whole families into ruin, dissipates every kind of property,

and destroys man himself. There cannot be a greater evil than this. 1st. It exhausts the animal spirits; hence the youth who smoke will hasten the termination of their years. 2nd. It wastes the flesh and blood; the faces of the weak who smoke become black and cadaverous. 3rd. It dissipates every kind of property. 4th. It renders the person ill-favoured—mucus flows from his nostrils, and tears from his eyes. 5th. It promotes obscenity. 6th. It discovers secrets. 7th. It violates laws. 8th. It attacks the vitals. 9th. It destroys life. When the smoker has pawned everything in his possession, he will pawn his wife and sell his daughters; such are the inevitable consequences."

To every word of the above statement, from my own personal experience, I can give the most unqualified assent. The following extract from a manifesto addressed by the distinguished Imperial Commissioner Lin to the Queen of England, with regard to the *forcible* introduction of opium by British subjects, places the wrongly despised Chinaman in pleasing contrast with the opium trafficking European. Commissioner Lin said:—"That in the ways of Heaven no partiality exists, and no sanction is allowed to the injury of others for the advantage of one's self—that there is not any great diversity (for where is he who does not abhor death and seek life?), these are acknowledged principles. Though not using opium one's self, to venture, nevertheless, on the manufacture and sale of it, and with it to seduce the simple folk of this land, is to seek one's own livelihood by the exposure of others to death—to seek one's own advantage by other men's injury; and such acts are utterly abhorrent to the nature of men, and are utterly opposed to the ways of Heaven."

No wonder the Rev. Dr. Medhurst, one of the most experienced missionaries in China, has said: "Opium is demoralizing China, and become the greatest barrier to the introduction of Christianity which can be conceived of." And to prove this he states that almost the first reply of a native, when urged to believe in Christ, is, "Why do Christians bring us opium, and bring it directly in defiance of our laws? The evil drug has poisoned my son, has ruined my brother, and well nigh led me to barter my

wife and children. Surely those who import such a deleterious substance, and injure me for the sake of gain, cannot wish me well or be in possession of a religion better than my own. Go first and persuade your own countrymen to relinquish this nefarious traffic, *and give me a prescription to correct this vile habit*,<sup>28</sup> and then I will listen to your exhortations on the subject of Christianity."

Never has there been a viler or more utterly debasing institution upon earth than that of the opium-smoking dens in China. "Truly," as the Rev. E. B. Squire, formerly a missionary to that empire, once said, "it is an engine in Satan's hands, and a powerful one." It is necessary to remember that this same engine of wickedness and abomination has been systematically, and by the medium of several wars, forced upon China by the English nation and the produce of her Indian possessions.

The very day that the monopoly of the China trade by the East India Company ceased, the British Government commenced forcing the opium traffic, by which means they brought about the first opium war. Although the drug destroyed by Commissioner Lin was surrendered up *according to agreement* by H. B. Majesty's representative, Captain Elliot, yet its destruction was afterwards perverted into a *casus belli*. From that event may be dated a course of policy that all posterity will assuredly condemn, terminating as it did in the Chinese Government being compelled to legalize this nefarious trade.

Opium has ever been made contraband by the Ti-ping law, its use being forbidden under penalty of death, and all cases of infraction being strictly visited with the punishment of decapitation. As opium has in every case been the primary cause of each war with China, and as it was universally known that the success of the Ti-pings would have utterly abolished the trade, it is by no means unfair or unreasonable to ascribe a great proportion of the hostility the revolutionists have experienced (from those bound by every other motive to be their warmest friends) to the same cause. It is indisputable that nearly all who became acquainted with the Ti-pings during

the early part of their career, and even many who did not, entertained for them the most friendly feelings; but no sooner was it thoroughly understood that they were determined not to submit to the introduction of opium, when, in spite of their Christianity, &c., a strong party arose against them.

In China it is quite notorious that one of the principal mercantile houses (Dent & Co.), after vainly endeavouring to establish an opium trade with the Ti-pings at Wuhu (a city some fifty miles above Nankin, on the Yang-tze River), by the means of their opium-ship *Nimrod*, which was stationed there for six months, and where I have myself seen her, did, after the failure of the attempt, become their most signal revilers, and use all the interest they possessed against them.

Too many merchants, and, unfortunately, their national representatives interested in maintaining the great opium revenue, have, in China, by the blind pursuit of profit, sacrificed principle to lucre, heedless of the grievous consequences. It is no less unfortunate that many of those who are now designated "merchant princes" some years before made their capital by opium smuggling; equally deplorable is it that still their largest profits result from what by fire and sword has become the legalized trade. Such, however, is the case, and principally for this reason has it become popular to stifle the birth of freedom and Christianity in the opium-ruined Chinese nation.

## FOOTNOTES:

19. The title (Tien-ping) of the Ti-ping soldiery.

20. The Manchoo.

21. Perfectly true.

22. The French General in command during the Pekin campaign, who received this title from his emperor.

23. The proceedings to raise the "Vampyre" fleet in England were then nearly concluded, and were known to the Ti-pings.

24. The different methods of legal torture are numerated in the Imperialist code by hundreds.

25. The power has, of course, reverted to the Home Government since the Sepoy revolt.

26. By the last official return (1863–4) the export of opium from India to China is given as 42,621 chests, and the gross revenue derived therefrom, Rupees, 52,072,358.

27. Alluding to Hong-Kong.

28. These very words have frequently been addressed to myself by Chinese opium-smokers, and I fancy scarcely any European has been in China without having experienced the same.

## CHAPTER XX.

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Ti-ping Disasters.—The Vampyre Fleet.—Important Letters.—Mr. Roberts's Case.—Mr. Consul Harvey.—Letters continued.—Misrepresentations.—Anti-Ti-ping Meeting.—The Sherrard Osborne Theory.—The Fleet Afloat.—The "Lay" and "Osborne" Agreement.—The Fleet repudiated.—Pecuniary Loss to England.—A Resumé.—General Burgevine.—Lieutenant Ridge.—Act of Piracy.—A Tartar caught.—Exit of the Anglo-Chinese Flotilla.—General Ward's Proceedings.—Progress of the War.—Death of General Ward.—Captain Dew's Disgrace.—How caused.—His Mode of Proceeding.—Its Effect upon Trade.—Operations before Kahding.—"Wong-e-poo."—General Burgevine dismissed from his Command.—Major Gordon takes Command.—Sir F. Bruce's Despatches.—His Objections to Gordon's Appointment.—Also to General Brown's Interference.

During the absence of the Chung-wang on his campaign to the north, and while I was still confined by illness in Nankin, important events disastrous to the Ti-ping cause were occurring elsewhere. These events, which must be described before continuing my personal narrative, consisted of the organization of that extraordinary flotilla known in England as the *Anglo-Chinese*, but principally as the *Vampyre* fleet in China; the resumption of hostilities against the Ti-pings by General Staveley and his colleagues; and the conversion of Ward's old mercenaries into a British contingent, besides the formation of several other similar legions both at Shanghae and Ningpo.

The origin of the *Vampyre* scheme to regenerate China by exterminating the Ti-pings, is as yet uncertain, although Mr. Lay (late Inspector General of Chinese Customs) in his pamphlet intituled "Our Interests in China," thus describes its first practical adoption:—"Threatened by Sir F. Bruce, 'that

Her Majesty's Government will not go on protecting Shanghae for ever,' ... [Blue Book, 1863, pp. 13 and 67], and alarmed by the news of the loss of Ningpo, and of the advance of the Ti-pings upon Shanghae... they (the Manchoo Government) saw that they must comply,<sup>29</sup> or perish.... The Prince Regent (Kung) accordingly declared himself ready to adopt any measure that Sir F. Bruce might advise. What was his bidding? 'Get foreign ships and engage foreign officers.'<sup>30</sup> 'Procure us the ships and the officers,' was the rejoinder."

Accordingly some one whom Mr. Lay terms "my *locum tenens*, Mr. Hart," received from the Manchoo Government "a certain sum of money for transmission to England for the purchase of a steam fleet." Meanwhile arrangements were made between Mr. Lay and Captain Sherrard Osborne, R.N., by which that officer agreed to receive the *elevation* to a Manchoo Admiralsip. The British Government suspended the Foreign Enlistment Act, ignored the pledges of neutrality, and "at the Court at Windsor, the 30th day of August, 1862," passed an "Order in Council authorising the enlistment of officers and men, and the equipment and fitting-out of vessels of war for the service of the Emperor of China."

Although fearing I may tire my readers, I cannot resist quoting from a small book of official letters under my hand in order to prove by most conclusive authoritative testimony the *false pretences* upon which the raising of the flotilla and the enlistment of British subjects in the service of the barbarous Manchoo despotism was permitted in England. The letters have been lent to me by a distinguished Member of Parliament, and are written by one of the first Shanghae merchants to his brother, a member of the present Government. These letters have, I am informed, been submitted to various ministers; therefore, it may be concluded that in addition to the despatches of Consul Meadows, &c., the Government had ample means of becoming acquainted with the favourable characteristics of the unfortunate Ti-pings they have devoted to destruction.

The letter I now propose quoting is written in reference to Earl Russell's speech in the debate upon China in the House of Lords on the 2nd of July, 1862, and commences by stating "Earl Grey's view is far sounder than that of the Government." Passing over Earl Russell's preamble the letter states:

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"II. Earl Russell next propounds two questions:—

"First.—Will the Ti-pings give us the same advantages which the Government of China is bound to give us?

"Second.—Can the Ti-pings form a Government with which foreign Powers can treat?

"He argues a negative answer to these questions, and I take issue with him on his argument as follows:—

"First.—He alludes to the agreement made with the Ti-pings at Nankin by Admiral Hope, restricting them to a limited distance of thirty miles from Shanghae. The arrangement was made about the end of 1860, and was generally understood at the time to be limited to the space of one year. *The agreement was faithfully kept for that time.* When Admiral Hope and Mr. Parkes went to Nankin at the close of 1861,<sup>31</sup> they found the Ti-pings stubborn, and, I believe, the latter would give no further pledge, while Shanghae, under our protection, was made the arsenal, mint, and storehouse of their opponents!... I believe that the Ti-pings acted in good faith, as far as they knew, and that *the accusation is fallacious*.

"Earl Russell, on the assumption of their want of faith, proceeds to say:—"They approached very near to Shanghae.

Junks belonging to British owners were seized, the crews were imprisoned, one European was murdered, and every determination was shown to interfere with the British *trade* at that port.'

"This is a very sweeping sentence, and to a great extent fallacious.

"A. The Ti-pings certainly, early *this* year, came in strong force close to Shanghae. Their leaders sent in a note immediately to the British and French authorities.... *All negotiation was repudiated by our authorities.*'

"Seeing that Shanghae was the centre, from which, under cover of our flags, safe from harm, the Imperialists organized all their plans, provided all the necessaries of war, and found a ready treasury in the customs' revenue, it is not to be wondered at that the Ti-pings were most anxious to get possession of a place so important to the success of their cause; and it is scarcely reasonable, in this view, to suppose that they ever intended to pledge themselves in perpetuity, to allow such a state of matters to continue.

"B. Junks belonging to British owners were seized, and their crews imprisoned.'

"This is so vague, that it is difficult to know what instances are alluded to. Some boats, British owned, were, during last season, stopped at the passes from the silk districts, in possession of the rebels, *from their attempting to run the pass without paying the usual toll.* I have never heard of any boat

being molested which stopped and paid the moderate duty exacted by the *de facto* power....

"C. One European was murdered.'

"To what case does this allude? Several Europeans have been murdered. A Frenchman, named Salabelle, having imprudently gone up the Yang-tze in a China boat with a lot of dollars, was murdered by pirates in collusion with the boatmen. The Ti-pings had nothing to do with that.

"Another man, in charge of a silk-boat, was attacked on his way to Shanghae by a band of robbers. He was killed, but the robbers turned out to be Imperial soldiers—not Ti-pings. I have not heard of any European being so murdered by the Ti-pings. On the contrary, both last year and this season, numbers of Europeans have been engaged in the silk and green tea districts in pursuance of their business, and have been perfectly welcome, on paying the duty on their produce....

"D. And every determination was shown to interfere with the British trade at that port.'

*"This, to a person on the spot, is a most extraordinary statement.* Both last year and this season the Ti-pings have had possession of the entire silk district, and a great part of the green tea district. Yet, for the year ending the 30th of June last, we exported 75,000 bales of silk, and fully 50,000 bales have come to market already of the new crop. What sterling money do these 125,000 bales of silk represent? Take them at £80 per bale, you have £10,000,000 sterling, or one-third of the £30,000,000, which Earl Russell correctly states as about the

present annual value of the Shanghae trade. The Ti-pings might have cut off nearly all this, had they been so inclined, but they have allowed it all to come to market on payment of a moderate duty. I have not the figures of the green teas by me at this moment, but a very full supply was exported up to 30th June last, a great part of which came from districts in possession of the Ti-pings.

"Are these facts consistent with Earl Russell's assertions?

"I think they confute them altogether.... You are trying to patch up a rotten Government, which will only get weaker for all your efforts to mend it. Finally on this head, the Ti-pings have all along professed anxiety to keep on friendly terms with us, till our decided hostility, and harbouring of the Imperialists at Shanghae, has made their wish impracticable. They are not inimical to trade, as the facts above prove. They are not the savages who would murder every European who goes among them on peaceable pursuits, as many who have been among them could prove; and I believe that if we could only give up the unfortunate Imperialism we have espoused, we should find them quite ready to give every facility of trade we have now, and to restore this unlucky province to peace.

*"Second.* Earl Russell asks:—

"Is there any chance, supposing the Ti-pings consented not to annoy us any longer, and we made peace with them, that they could form a regular government?—and upon this point we have most convincing testimony.'

"Convincing testimony, indeed! Mr. Roberts<sup>32</sup> is the first.... Some time back Mr. Roberts went to join his former pupil at Nankin. Whatever faults the chief might have, he was always most kind to his former teacher. The reverend gentleman, however, was alarmed one day, and left the place precipitately, and therefore wrote a recantation of his former belief in Ti-pingdom. He could not have been quite in his senses at the time, for the boy whom he said was murdered before his eyes, was seen alive and well afterwards....

"His opinion is not worth much.

"The next authority is Mr. Consul HARVEY of Ningpo."

The writer of the letter deprecates the idea of using this gentleman's testimony in a grave debate, especially because it was permitted to overrule the opposite evidence adduced by the talented and trustworthy Mr. Consul Meadows. It is unnecessary to say more upon this subject than notice the fact that Mr. Meadows is a man of honour, of noble mind, and possesses a thorough knowledge of Ti-ping and Manchoo; Mr. Harvey is—Mr. Harvey!

The letter continues:—

"On the strength of these valuable witnesses, Earl Russell proceeds to say, 'It must therefore be clear to your lordships that it is quite impossible anything like civil relations can be established with the Ti-pings, or that they can govern the Chinese empire, or conduct relations with foreign countries upon the footing of amity upon which alone peace can be preserved.'

"Well, if their lordships are content to come to this conclusion on this valuable evidence, they are very likely to find out their

mistake in doing so."

After citing proof of the "very great system in their military department," the writer of the letter goes on to state with regard to the Ti-pings:—

"If men can thus conduct the details of a military department, is it not probable that they have also the power of conducting the details of a civil department, when the military necessity is past? At Soo-chow, which the Ti-pings have now had for eighteen months, the country people round about are now living quietly enough, and carrying on their usual avocations....

"With regard to the attack at Ningpo, Earl Russell asserts that the Ti-pings first fired on Captain Dew. The fact was, I believe, that the pirate, 'Apak,' anchored his boats near the English ships, so that in firing at 'Apak,' the shot from the rebel batteries came close to, or over, the foreign ships. An excuse for attack was wanted, this was enough, and the place was taken.

"The Earl goes on to say, 'It appeared clear from this that there was no chance of our being able to maintain any relations of amity with the Ti-pings; and as they seemed determined to destroy us, all that we could do was to protect our trade and the lives of our merchants.'

"It is not to be expected that we can be on terms of amity while we make Shanghae the arsenal of the Imperialists, and carry out our intervention on the principle by which it has hitherto been characterized.

"A most disgraceful affair took place the other day. Nine young gentlemen, members of the Shanghae Mounted Volunteer Corps, went out one afternoon with Captain BORLASE, of H.M. ship *Pearl*, and a party of men, to reconnoitre. They came on a number of Ti-pings, who on seeing the horses, immediately threw away their arms, and ran off half naked. Captain Borlase gave the order to pursue and *to give no quarter*.<sup>33</sup> These young gentlemen accordingly amused themselves that afternoon in cold-blooded murder, and their captain distinguished himself, it is said, by the chivalrous action of killing a man lying badly wounded on the ground. One of the number, a young friend of mine, I am glad to say, refused to obey the order he received. I say that if H.M.'s officers are to be permitted to give such brutal orders, the sooner we cease to talk of Ti-ping cruelties and the savageries of General Butler the better.... A cry has been *got up* about the cruelties of the Ti-pings, for want of a better war-cry, and our people are taught to illustrate Christianity by the perpetration of cruelties, considering our lights, infinitely more atrocious. The conduct of the Ti-pings, notwithstanding all the provocation they have received, towards foreigners who have had to enter their lines on business, contrasts in their favour with our conduct to them.

"From Captain Osborne's appointment, I infer that my friend Lay has been entirely Imperialist in the advice he has given the Government.

"I regret that Osborne should have taken such an appointment, and that Government should have sanctioned it.

"I regret still more that Palmerston should be making what I consider such a grave mistake on this question, and that is one of the main reasons why I write these letters. Another is that I am convinced our present policy will be detrimental alike to British interests, and to the interests of the Chinese people."

We have seen that Messrs. Jardine and Matheson pronounced the policy of their Government "suicidal." We have now noticed the important evidence of another of the principal merchants, in whose interest it was alleged to be necessary to slaughter the Ti-pings. The British Parliament was persuaded by fallacies, and the "Vampyre" fleet was made ready and sent to China, while the British people were led into the belief that it was organized merely to act against Chinese pirates, the Government organs representing the Ti-pings as "attempting to force a way to the sea coast, where they hope to take to the amphibious life a Chinaman always loves, and prowl at sea or penetrate the inner waters as necessity or opportunity may tempt or dictate." This, and innumerable similar fabrications, are perfectly astounding by the depth of their untruth and the total absence of any foundation. The above-quoted statement is only surpassed by another in the same article of the same newspaper:—"It is, however, *the people of China* who have broken the force of the Ti-pings, and it is under the dread of their terrible reprisals that the Ti-pings are now attempting to force a way to the sea-coast"!!!

This article, so horribly wicked in purpose and so thoroughly false in substance, was one of those written upon the grand meeting held at the rooms of the Royal Geological Society upon the subject of the "Anglo-Chinese flotilla." The leaders of the quasi-regenerating expedition here held forth to the scientific gentlemen of the Society, their friends, and sundry members of the Government. The speeches they made, their arguments, facts, and declared intentions, were equally reasonable and trustworthy as the statement in the newspaper article eulogising them, and which, by some

most extraordinary perversity of knowledge, represented the bitter and ruthless warfare prosecuted by Admirals Hope and Protet, Generals Staveley and Brown, and others, against the Ti-pings, as "*the people of China* who have broken the force of the Ti-pings." Certes, had such been the case, it required an astonishing quantity of British shot, shell, artillery, and men, to enable the Manchoo Government to occupy any single village or foot of land held by the "broken force!" And one can hardly discover the object of the flotilla if the "people of China" had already done the only thing for which it was being organized; for which Prince Kung was paying, and Mr. Lay, Captain Sherrard Osborne, and his men, receiving a goodly share of that Manchoo mintage. Five months later, this "broken force" was found to be so well able to convert its opponents into a similarly unpleasant state, that upon the 9th day of January, 1863, another order in counsel was passed, making it "lawful for all military officers in Her Majesty's service to enter into the military service of the Emperor of China."

To resume the history of the "Vampyre" expedition. At the oratorical display of the civil leader and the naval chief, the Chancellor of the Exchequer (with a keen eye to the guarantee the flotilla might afford for the payment of the indemnities by China) was present to see, to hear, to judge, and to wind up in most affecting and impressive style by giving the well-paid, and doubtless well-deserving, adventurers his blessing.

Mr. Lay, with a surprising theory for a questionable purpose, told the meeting that the great cause of the civil war in China was its crowded population, "which the productive power of the soil was not sufficient to maintain." Emigration of the Ti-pings (when he caught them) was his remedy. Now, how that clever, though it is just possible, mistaken gentleman, expected to forward the change of habitation with the Armstrong and Whitworth guns, and other deadly weapons of exceedingly killing power he was carefully providing, is by no means clear, unless, indeed, the emigration was to be eternal. Neither is it by any means easy to

understand that if the production of the soil was not sufficient to maintain the natives, the distress could be alleviated by making it support, in addition, a large number of very expensive foreign officers and men, besides a costly fleet of steamers.

Captain Sherrard Osborne then succeeded the would-be Dictator General of China, and with no less extraordinary principles than his civilian superior, made the astounding declarations:—1. "That his first duty in China would be to bear in mind that he was a member of the Geographical Society." 2. "That he was going to China to spread peace, and not to shed blood" (with his Armstrongs and &c.s). 3. "That his object was to teach the Chinese rather the duty of sparing than the art of killing" (singular that such pains were taken to procure the most effective armament England could furnish). 4. "And that he hoped to report that Nankin was taken without the loss of one life after the assault was over."

1. As the *Daily News* wrote at the time, "Though this may be very advantageous for Burlington House, it affords an adequate explanation of the way China is to benefit by his vaunted advent. Perhaps, however, it may be accepted as a proof of his being a philanthropic adventurer; that his first care will be to look after, not the interests of the Chinese Government, which pays him 3,000*l.* a year, but those of a society to whose funds he is called on to contribute."

4. This naïve announcement is a startling one for the "pirate" dodge of the gallant captain's friends, and proves that the only motive, which, in fact, is admitted by all save a few bigots, was suppression of the Ti-ping revolution.

Of Mr. Lay and his fighting-man, the *Daily News* well said, "As these gentlemen seem to have the power of carrying on their scheme for the present, they will doubtless do so, but it is a mistake for them to depart from the policy of reserve which they have hitherto followed."

In dire alarm and trouble, Prince Kung grasped at the offer of a fleet to save the Manchoo dynasty, as a drowning man will clutch at a straw. The British Government, wisely thinking that the fleet would guard the treaty ports against the Ti-pings, and thereby protect both the payment of the indemnity and the opium trade at the expense of the Chinese, quickly seized the opportunity it shadowed forth. The justice of their conduct is a very different matter, and it would be interesting indeed to know by what right the capture of Nankin was undertaken—a city far in the interior of China, the owners of which only entreated the friendship of foreigners, while striving to throw off a foreign yoke and enjoy the blessing of the Christian faith and self-government.

The worst part of the tale has now to be related. Upon the individual authority of Mr. Lay, the flotilla (consisting principally of British men-of-war) having struck the English flag, hoisted a green and yellow rag, and without commission or any authority to constitute them national ships of war, proceeded to the high seas in true pirate fashion. The laws of England were unscrupulously violated, her navy indelibly disgraced, and all who took share in the expedition perfectly fooled, by the *unofficial* countenance of a Manchoo Prince, and the indecent haste of British ministers to comply with his ambiguous request for a fleet, in order to gratify their own ulterior motives.

Prince Kung simply authorized Mr. Lay to buy a number of vessels, but those ships were despatched from England fully manned and armed, as though they had been duly commissioned, which was not, and never became, the case. Mr. Lay and Captain Osborne, between them, prepared an agreement (that being the authority and regulation upon which the crews were engaged, and merely a private understanding, strangely resembled the bond of a piratical organization), which, had it been carried into execution, would virtually have consigned the destinies and executive of China into their hands. These were the salient features of the agreement:—

"4. Osborne undertakes to act upon all orders of the Emperor which may be conveyed direct to Lay; and Osborne engages not to attend to any orders conveyed through any other channel.

"5. Lay, upon his part, engages to refuse to be the medium of any orders of the reasonableness of which he is not satisfied."

No wonder the Manchoo Government repudiated this pretty arrangement, fleet and all, when it arrived in China. There is, however, another reason to account for the ignominious failure of the "Vampyres,"—ignominious because they had neither right nor justification to be placed in the position of mercenaries, or to be subjected to dismissal by a barbarous court. The Imperialists were willing enough to receive a fleet upon *any* terms when the success of the Ti-ping revolution was certain unless foreigners interfered; but when the "Vampyres" did arrive, the dread of the avenging Ti-ping no longer existed. By English troops and English officers in command of Chinese disciplined legions, the revolutionists had been driven back from Shanghae and Ningpo, and were still retreating before the shock of foreign arms. Mr. Lay and Captain Osborne came too late. They could not become the slaves of the Manchoo, neither could they constitute themselves his tyrants, and consequently Prince Kung repudiated all his obligations with characteristic treachery.

When the flotilla reached China the Imperial Government endeavoured to place it under the command of the provincial authorities, and by this determination they effected its dissolution. Captain Osborne refused to lower himself into the position occupied by British officers in the neighbourhood of Shanghae and Ningpo—that of filibusters, subordinate to the *local* authorities—but the Tartars had the best of the argument, for the precedent existed in the terms upon which the military had taken service with them; they were therefore justified in applying the same reasoning to make the navy of England subservient to their inferior officials. Prince

Kung and his colleagues were decided upon this point and the repudiation of other guarantees; Captain Osborne remained equally firm; consequently Mr. Lay lost his lucrative appointment as Inspector General of Chinese customs, Captain Osborne did not become a Manchoo Admiral, and the naval force of no nationality was sold, while the officers and men had to go back to where they came from.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer's magniloquent benediction, in which he prophesied of "the day when its leaders would come back rich in professional fame, and bringing also with them fresh glory to their country," vanished and disappeared in thin air, thanks to the failure of the attempt to "spread peace" with rifled artillery. Mr. Lay, since his tardy appreciation of the Manchoo, in "Our Interests in China," thus describes the state of affairs which led to the failure of his regenerating scheme:—

"When I left China, the Emperor's Government, under the pressure of necessity,<sup>34</sup> and with the beneficial terror established by the allied foray to Pekin in 1860 fresh in their recollection, was in the best of moods, willing to be guided," &c. "What did I find on my return? The face of things was entirely changed. There was the old insolent demeanour, the nonsensical language of exclusion, the open mockery of all treaties, the declared determination to yield nothing that could be evaded. In short, all the ground gained by the treaty of 1858 had been frittered away, and we were thrust back into the position we occupied before the war—one of helpless remonstrance and impotent menace."

A pretty state of affairs truly! Re-established, too, by British politicians, who, by supporting the Manchoos, have perpetuated a system which the Tipings would have altered for ever.

Time has already proved the truth of the above assertion by Mr. Lay; time will yet prove the bitter hatred the present dynasty of China entertains towards Great Britain, the nation which has frequently chastised them, forced them to break their own laws and receive the obnoxious opium,

humbled them before their people and compelled them to eat the fruit of humility, and worse than all, originated the once irresistible Ti-ping revolution by the importation of Christianity. They would not be men did they forget the blows (not always justifiable) they have received; they would not be Manchoo did they forget to revenge themselves *when* able.

Financially considered, this Anglo-Manchoo expedition was rather a serious matter for the British Government. The only authentic estimate of the expenditure which is at present available shows that the portion consequent merely on the return of the flotilla when its services were rejected, amounted to 213,000 taels, or £71,000, which was advanced in the first instance from the Manchoo customs and subsequently refunded by England when receiving the quarterly payment of the Indemnity.

Here is what Captain Osborne says:—

"Dire necessity made Pekin accept our aid in a form likely to be beneficial to China and England. Reason or argument had nothing to do with it, so far as the mandarins were concerned. Most unexpectedly to them, our authorities repulsed the rebellion, without taking any guarantees from Pekin for future behaviour. The mandarins were at once rampant; they are not such fools as to spend their revenue in maintaining order, if we Englishmen will do it for nothing. The fear of rebellion is past. Lay, I, and the force may return to England."

With regard to the failure of the Osborne, Lay, and Gladstone theory, we can only say that it was deserved. Mr. Lay was dismissed from the service of the Manchoo, through the "Vampyre" embroilment. The many years that he had faithfully and energetically served them were lost sight of in the squabble arising from this unparalleled affair. He most likely was sincere in his efforts to regenerate Tartars; he has certainly been badly treated by them. Lay's motive in undertaking the notorious flotilla scheme seems to have been his philanthropical idea (brightened by the receipt of £5,000 a year), of regenerating China. Some people say he was a puppet in the hands

of "taller men" behind, who worked the wires. Osborne's acceptance of the command without a commission may be ascribed to the erratic notions of that gallant officer, and *his* natural philanthropy.

The arrival of the "Vampyre" fleet was hailed with general disapprobation upon the part of the foreign community at Shanghae; its flight, without spreading peace, with no less satisfaction. During the short time the would-be mercenaries—the cream of the British navy, as they were loudly proclaimed to be, by ultra-philo-Imperialist papers and people—remained at that port, they managed to create no little ill feeling against themselves. Although they possessed neither warrant nor Imperial authority for their position and action, they nevertheless had the audacity to constitute themselves into a sort of police by *land* and water. No business could be transacted on shore, no vessel move upon the waters of the harbour, or work its cargo, unmolested by their inquisition. Vessels were seized, and their crews imprisoned in irons, upon the merest suspicion that they might be destined to assist the Ti-pings; houses were broken into and searched throughout the British and American settlements for supposed Ti-ping refugees, by parties armed to the teeth. They took, however, particular care not to venture upon the French settlement, as the Gallic authorities had given their own police orders to arrest them if they went there; and, if they resisted, to shoot them. The whole place was thrown into a regular ferment and uproar by their proceedings.

Just previous to the ignominious flight of the "cream of the British navy,"—which, by the way, possessed an extraordinary sympathy for another sort of cream peculiar to the Shanghae rum mills—I happened to become personally acquainted with some of their piratical outrages, while visiting Shanghae for medical advice, and other reasons which will transpire by-and-by.

General Burgevine, successor to Ward in command of the disciplined Chinese contingent, having been badly treated and cashiered by his

Manchoo masters, had joined the Ti-pings at Soo-chow. At the time of my visit to Shanghai, Burgevine was supposed to be there also; and, using this as their pretext, the "Vampyres" made a descent upon the house of my friend, Mr. Tarrant (Editor of the *Friend of China*), where we were passing the evening with a social party. The dwelling was situated in a compound, also containing the house of the American Marshal; and, while walking round the grounds with my friend and another gentleman, we were suddenly pounced upon in the dark by a party of "the cream of the British navy," hitherto concealed in the shrubbery. At the same moment other detachments rushed into the adjoining houses with a zeal and alacrity tending to prove what capital burglars they were becoming, and, making prisoners of all the men they could find, marched them up to the position we had already been conducted to, in the broad colonnade extending along the front of the American Marshal's house. It was very fortunate neither myself nor any of our company were armed, otherwise, from the suspicious and sudden circumstances under which they had made their appearance, we might very naturally have mistaken the men who sprang upon us for the assassins, or robbers, whom they so strongly resembled. The "Vampyres" were commanded by a Lieutenant Ridge, the most ungentlemanly and discourteous British officer it has ever fallen to my lot to meet.

When our friends were all assembled under the guns of his men, he turned to the latter and distinctly gave them this order, at least in substance: "Now then, men, allow none of these gentlemen to leave this place; *if they attempt to do so, shoot them down!*" This spirited British officer then led off a party bristling with rifle, bayonet, cutlass, and revolver, himself with sword in hand and a huge "Deane and Adams" slung round his neck, and proceeded to tear up the flooring of Mr. Tarrant's printing-office, in order to search for arms destined for the dreaded Ti-ping! Of course none were found. The man and his men then proceeded to the sanctum of the editor, and ransacked this and the adjoining rooms, emptying and breaking open

boxes of letters, papers, and other editorial correspondence, leaving the whole scattered about the floor in a state of inextricable confusion, after their fruitless search for some trace of Burgevine or his doings.

When this gallant exploit had been brought to a termination by the fact that no private place under lock and key remained to be broken into, the leader of the outrage turned his attention to the neighbouring mansion. Having rummaged every nook and corner from top to bottom with a fruitless result, excepting indeed a spoil of two old muskets, a fowling-piece in good order, and another without any barrels, which they carried off in triumph, the "Vampyres" released us from the unpleasantness of their presence and took themselves off, visibly disappointed at their want of success.

Mrs. Pindar, the wife of the American Marshal, told us that Lieutenant Ridge had even penetrated into her bed-room and ransacked the drawers of her toilet table, &c. That Yankee lady accompanied him during his impertinent and unwarrantable intrusion, and assisted him by suggesting that he had better explore the chimney pots, have the carpets lifted to see whether Burgevine was hidden there, or perhaps he would like to search her pockets, &c. The "Vampyre" officer wore a uniform of unknown nationality, consisting of simple anchor buttons and a British naval badge with the crown cut off! When asked by Mr. Tarrant for his authority, he produced an informal warrant from the British consul, which could only have been legally used by a consular constable. When this was explained to him, he agreed to the justice of the fact and pleaded orders from his commanding officer. He was thereupon asked for his commission, and he naïvely admitted he had none. He was next asked upon what authority his commanding officer was acting, and his reply was, upon Captain Sherrard Osborne's commission from the Emperor of China (this in ludicrously pompous language and manner). He was then asked whether he was aware that Captain Osborne did *not* possess any such commission, and confessed

that, although he believed the reverse, he thought the Commander-in-chief might have gone to Pekin to obtain it! The judicial proceedings that would have been instituted against the "Vampyres" but for their fortunate retreat from China, would almost certainly have found them guilty of unqualified piracy, not only in the case I have just described, but in several others equally outrageous.

About this time, and while it was fully expected that the flotilla would shortly proceed to attack Nankin, the following squib appeared as an advertisement in the *Friend of China*:—

"WANTED:

"Several first-class ships, to convey several thousand rebels from Nankin to Labuan.

"Apply to

"LAE, HORSEBORN, & Co."

Many foreign merchant vessels were in the habit of flying long pennants from the main truck, a practice indulged in by some of the shipping at Shanghae. This proved offensive to the "Vampyre" officers, who chose to consider that it was an infringement of their *quasi* right to the man-of-war emblem. They consequently amused themselves by boarding sundry easy-going Dutchmen, who, alarmed by their brass-bound appearance and peremptory orders to strike the obnoxious pennant, generally complied very quietly. Upon one occasion, however, while I was at Shanghae, the would-be Tartar martinet caught a Tartar of the implied characteristics, if not literal nationality.

An American vessel with a particularly extensive pennant, which it was afterwards rumoured had been rigged up on purpose, happened to attract the "fe fi fo fum" sense of a "Vampyre" commander. Instantly a cutter was

despatched with a lieutenant to humble the offending parties. The officer proceeded on board and ordered the chief mate to haul down the pennant. Mr. Mate immediately sang out, "Cook, bring a bucket of hot water aft," but before this could be brought, the "Vampyre" was over the gangway "like a streak of greased lightning," as the Yankee mate afterwards related to an admiring audience on shore, and shouting with might and main to his boat's crew: "Give way, men!" in order to escape the warm reception preparing for him.

By such acts the "cream of the British navy" made few friends and many enemies, and the lament of few indeed accompanied their ignominious departure. During their stay some of the gallant tars deserted and went over to the enemy, and I cannot forget a very characteristic fact related by a friend of mine who was present. While passing a certain rum shop in the "model settlement" of Shanghae, my friend, with several companions, became mixed with a crowd of the tars, who were on leave, and had just issued from the shop. Willing to see a little of the sort of men represented as the *élite* of the finest navy in the world, my friend got into conversation with a warrant officer, although the man and his companions had evidently been indulging their creamy propensities. The result was that when questioned as to their feelings for the service they had engaged in, the leader of the party made this exposition of principle: "D'ye see, my hearty, so long as we gets the dollars and can make a haul, d—— my toplights if we cares who we fights for, the himperor of Chiny or his hinemies the t'other longshore Chinymen."

Organized upon principles of wrong and injustice, the Anglo-Chinese flotilla came to an unregretted, disreputable, and premature end. In the words of the same friend who communicated the above incident we will dismiss the subject: "Captain Sherrard Osborne, like Cæsar, may exclaim, 'I came, I saw;' unlike Cæsar, 'I did *not* conquer.' The fleet was equipped, set sail, arrived, and—was not wanted."

We must now turn to survey events far more disastrous to the Ti-ping cause than the advent of the foreign vessels of war we have just finished with, although the fact of their arrival, connected with what we are about to notice, helped to produce the misfortunes.

Soon after the Chung-wang had recaptured all the places formerly taken by the allies, and had returned to Nankin with the greater proportion of his troops, General Staveley, having received the desirable reinforcements of British troops from Tien-tsin and Hong-kong, resumed hostilities.

Although Admiral Hope had respect enough for the usages of civilized nations to invent a *casus belli* for the raids he first initiated, General Staveley proved himself to be above such petty considerations when they could be ignored with impunity, and therefore, upon commencing a fresh war against the Ti-pings, did not trouble himself to pretend that they might, could, would, or should do anything inimical to British interests. However much scrupulous people may think that an English general should have paid *some* regard to the rules of civilized warfare, the gallant officer in question cannot at all events be charged with hypocrisy.

During the month of August, 1862, the filibuster, General Ward, assisted by detachments of British and French troops, succeeded in taking several fortified villages from the Ti-pings and recapturing the city of Tsing-poo; the success of the operations being attributable to the large park of artillery always employed. After the fall of Tsing-poo, Ward moved off with the principal portion of his force into the Ningpo district, and joined a column already operating there. Since the atrocious expulsion of the Ti-pings from Ningpo by Captain R. Dew, R.N., and his pirate ally, Apak, the advance of filibustering and piracy had made wonderful progress. Several contingents of disciplined Chinese were raised, the most important being an officially-authorized British legion and a similar French one, both entirely officered by foreigners, including English, American, French, and representatives of other nations. At first, these organizations consisted of

about 1,500 men each, besides artillery-men to work the numerous heavy guns they were supplied with. In addition to these, and other bodies of foreign disciplined and officered mercenaries, Captain Dew devoted the entire service of the squadron under his command to their assistance and support, perfectly oblivious of the fact that he was a British officer, and that the ships prostituted by him to an infamous alliance with pirates and freebooters were the property of British tax-payers, who maintained them solely for the protection of their own interests.

The British men-of-war, the Manchoo gunboats, the French vessels, the American, English, and French drilled filibusters, the Cantonese pirates, and Imperialist troops, all leagued themselves together in the war to exterminate the unfortunate Ti-pings, and *loot* their cities. In spite of their numbers, their boundless supplies of every munition of war, their irresistible shell and artillery, and the co-operation of the friendly legions swarming from the grand dépôt, Shanghae, these heterogeneous marauders found the "broken force" able to give them many hard knocks and many a severe repulse, although the *Times* happened to think that "the people of China" had somehow converted the Ti-ping revolution into a crowd of fugitives running away from their mythical "terrible reprisals." This statement might do very well to excite the horror of pious people in England ready to believe anything dreadful; but the mercenaries banded together against the would-be freemen and Christians found that to break the force of the latter many a deadly encounter, and many a cunningly contrived Moorsom or shrapnel shell, was required. During a period of nearly twelve months, extending from August, 1862, to the middle of the summer, 1863, the horrors of Chinese warfare fluctuated backwards and forwards over what would otherwise have been one of the fairest parts of God's earth. The Ningpo and neighbouring districts possess a beauty and variety of scenery, added to a surpassing richness of production (tea, silk, cotton, &c.), second to none in the world. Yet a few experimental warriors

and politicians have been permitted to create misery and ruin throughout this smiling land, and strew its plains with mouldering skeletons.

The war conducted by Captain Dew and his colleagues raged furiously for many months. The cities of Tse-kie, Yu-yaou, Fung-wha, Shou-shing, &c., were each taken, retaken, lost, and won, several times over, by the Allies and by their Ti-ping enemies, and were at last finally held by the former.

To give any detailed account of the numerous actions fought within the Ningpo province would be impossible. With one exception they resembled those in the first campaign of Admiral Hope and General Staveley. The same great slaughter of the Ti-pings with the deadly artillery, to which they could make no reply; the same gallant efforts to repel the stormers, who rushed forward after the defenders had been thoroughly shelled for many hours; the exception being that few of the cities were carried by assault. It is, I believe, due to the fact that a great proportion of the Ti-ping soldiery about the Ningpo districts were Cantonese, or Kwang-si men, that nearly every attempt to storm the cities they held was repulsed. They were ultimately driven out of the province, and the cities were, almost without exception, evacuated, although the besiegers had been severely repulsed, being rendered untenable by the severance of their lines of supply and communication.

There are two important episodes of Captain Dew's war which, from their influence upon future events, it is necessary to notice. The first is the death of General Ward; the second, the attack upon Shou-shing, in consequence of which Captain Dew was reprimanded by his superior officer and the British Government, and was thereby compelled to desist from actually participating in the further hostilities.

General Ward, whatever his failings might have been, was a brave and determined man. He served his Manchoo employers only too well, and at the last, by closing a career of peril and fidelity with the sacrifice of his life,

he sealed all faults with his death, and left those who cherished his memory to regret that he had not fallen in a worthier cause. While directing the second attack upon the small town of Tse-kie, some ten miles inland from Ningpo, on the 21st of September, 1862, Ward, the American filibuster, and the first foreigner to take military service under the Manchoo, was mortally wounded by a Ti-ping musket ball. This adventurer originated the force that finally was the principal instrument in driving the Ti-pings from the dominions they had established as "Ti-ping tien kwoh." By such apparently insignificant means does the Great Ruler of the Universe overthrow the efforts and establish the destinies of man! The death of Ward placed *Colonel* Burgevine, his immediate subordinate, in command of the force. Burgevine could not agree with the mandarins, was badly treated by them, resented their treatment, was dismissed from the command, and the old Ward force became transformed from a rowdy, filibustering, hired legion, into a regular contingent of British mercenaries.

The disgrace of Dew, the Ti-ping slayer, came about in this wise:—The city of Shou-shing, distant more than *one hundred miles* from Ningpo, was attacked by an Imperialist army, to which the Anglo-Chinese and Franco-Chinese contingents were attached. These forces were defeated with severe loss, including their French general, Le Brethon, who was killed before the city. A French captain of artillery, by name Tardife, succeeded to the command; Captain Dew joined forces with him, and together they proceeded to besiege the place, and to avenge the disgrace of their former defeat.

Besides several field-pieces landed from the British men-of-war at Ningpo and a large park of howitzers and mortars belonging to the disciplined forces, Captain Dew provided them with a large 68-pounder lent to him for the occasion by General Staveley. Lieutenant Tinling, of the *Encounter*, with a party of seamen, had charge of this gun. On their march, the allies entered a large town, which the men thoroughly pillaged during

two days; the consequence being, as it is written by one who was present, "that it was only after much trouble they could be got to move forward against Shou-shing. When they did so, at least 500 boats followed, each soldier having his own private *san-pan*, containing, and ready for more, *loot*. Many of the officers were almost as bad as the men, drinking and smoking, and taking hardly any care to maintain discipline." Here is a pretty description of the doings of those who were supposed to be protecting the country people from the "ruthless marauders!" The town referred to was not in Ti-ping possession, and all the looting was from the unfortunate inhabitants. Facts, that can be multiplied *ad infinitum*, exist to prove that the foreign intervention, and the manner and details thereof, seriously increased the anarchy, desolation, and loss of life, caused by the civil war previous to that event. The unavoidable devastations had passed away, peace had become established by the supremacy of the Ti-ping, when, alas! mercenary-minded Europeans wickedly deluged the peaceful districts with the blood of fresh victims, and causelessly maintained and prolonged the unmitigated ravages of war.

Upon reaching the devoted city of Shou-shing—which, in expectation, General Tardife had promised his freebooter following the pleasure of "forty-eight hours" to loot—Captain Dew placed his big gun in position, and proceeded to make a hole in the wall, by which the respectable allies might get at the prizes within. Now it so happened that the Ti-pings were determined neither to part with their city, nor their private valuables. A great breach was made, a battalion of European ruffians, and the nondescript disciplined and Imperialist troops, rushed forward to take possession; but the defenders—who, to use the language of an eye-witness, "fought with admirable pluck in the breach, and exposed themselves freely"—drove them back with a loss of half the European brigade of Shanghai *rowdies*, half the officers of the disciplined contingents, and

many men *hors de combat*. Almost at the same moment General Tardife was killed, and Lieutenant Tinling mortally wounded.

The death of the last-mentioned gallant young officer, by drawing the attention of Admiral Kuper (on the station), and that of Parliament at home, to the subject, led to the disapproval of Captain Dew's disgraceful proceedings, and his removal from a part of China that he had contaminated by his presence. When brought to task for his participation in hostilities more than 100 miles from a treaty port, his shuffling excuse was "that I had gone to watch the proceedings, and prevent, if possible, any false step being taken by the Chinese disciplined force, which would at once have imperilled Ningpo." Well, it is an old saying that, if the blind lead the blind, both fall into the ditch; and this was undoubtedly realized by Captain Dew. The untrue statement about "any false step" being certain to imperil Ningpo, distant 100 miles, and protected by several strong cities directly on the way, is perfectly absurd; the crafty device was to avoid the censure he dreaded and deserved by frightening his superiors about the safety of Ningpo, which he pretended rested upon his exploits at Shou-shing. Admiral Kuper, however, states in a despatch to the Admiralty, "I have informed Captain Dew that... I consider he exceeded his instructions," and the Admiralty declares "that my Lords have desired the Rear-Admiral to inform Captain Dew that he exceeded his instructions." No wonder that the Chinese papers stated:—

"How Captain Dew, and all his crew, are allowed to do just what they have a mind to, is more than we can tell. Clearly all the people he slays he murders. He is violating every law, human and divine, to an extent which cannot be overlooked."<sup>35</sup>

It is a well-known fact that vast quantities of *loot*, and a money bonus from the Imperial authorities, almost invariably attended the capture of every Ti-ping city; and I have under my hand many apparently authentic statements in the press, accusing Captain Dew particularly, and others

generally, of having been induced to carry on hostilities against the Ti-pings for "private aggrandisement," and from "far less disinterested motives than 'the love of glory.'" As for the effect the Dew war had upon trade, the following extract from a communication dated "Ningpo, March 28, 1863," and forwarded to H.B.M. Consul by a number of influential firms, will show:—"So great a panic exists among the natives on account of the lawless proceedings, that our trade is in a worse condition than when the rebels were in the neighbourhood!"

Captain Dew attempted to shirk the responsibility of Lieutenant Tinling's death at a place where duty did not call him, although his commanding officer's orders did, by declaring that he (the Captain) was there as an "amateur!" Killing one's fellow man, even when conscience-bound by the plea of duty, is bad enough; but roving about, seeking whom to destroy, and slaughtering innocent men for pleasure, is somewhat different. We have seen that even the Government, which has approved every other proceeding, completely repudiated the unpardonable conduct of Captain Dew; we therefore say adieu to that officer, trusting there are few like him in the British service.

It is now necessary to notice the last of the events referred to at the beginning of this chapter. Since the death of the lamented filibuster, various members of General Staveley's staff and command had been in a perfect state of ferment, intriguing for the command of the Ward force, which it was determined should be converted into a British contingent. A battalion of Chinese, wearing shoulder-straps with the badge "67," drilled and officered by members of the British regiment of that number, and popularly known as Captain "Kingsley's force," was organized and raised to a strength of 1,000 men. Other corps, and some of Chinese artillery, were formed, while British officers were induced to accept various commands pertaining to the Ward force and its head quarters at the city of Soong-kong.

After a series of preliminary operations, General Staveley effected the recapture of Kah-ding on the 24th of October, 1862. After a desperate defence, the Ti-pings were driven from the city with heavy loss. According to the safe *modus operandi* acquired by experience, General Staveley shelled the defenders for some hours from 40 pieces of heavy artillery and mortars. The besieging army consisted of 5,500 disciplined troops, including about 3,000 British and French, and a large co-operating force of Imperialist *braves* and soldiers. The Ti-pings, out of a garrison less than 5,000 strong, lost upwards of 1,500 men; while the allied loss amounted to 4 killed and 20 wounded. Soon after the capture of this city, the Ting-wang from Hang-chow, the Mo-wang from Soo-chow, and the Tow-wang from Hoo-chow, each commanding about 5,000 men, were ordered by the Shi-wang (chief in authority over their districts) to attempt its recovery, and also that of Tsing-poo. This army was attacked by *General* Burgevine's force, a column of 500 British troops, some 10,000 Imperialists, and an artillery detachment with 20 guns. The Ti-pings had just intrenched themselves by the light field works usual among the Chinese, when they were engaged by the enemy. Unable to reply to the murderous artillery of the British and disciplined troops, they still held the position, although the shot and shell committed fearful havoc in their close ranks. At last, when the enemy had become tired of their shell practice, and imagined the Ti-pings were sufficiently decimated, a general assault was given. An episode in this transaction is worthy of notice.

A division of the attacking army was led by one "Wong-e-poo," a young Chinese officer who had been promoted to a captaincy at the request of Admiral Hope, who had also presented him with a sword for conspicuous bravery during the raids he had lately conducted against the Ti-pings, and in which the officer had served as a sergeant of Ward's force. This gallant young Chinaman was the first to cross the line of intrenchments, and almost instantly fell mortally wounded; he then gave the sword to General

Burgevine, whom he begged to keep it, and to give his young wife a few dollars to keep her from want—this was his last request. The Ti-pings, when driven from their slight defences, made a stand at a village just in the rear, and were three times brought back to the charge by a fine-spirited young chief, who was the Mo-wang's brother, and whose gallant bearing and handsome trappings attracted universal attention. At the last charge, Vincente, the late *General* Ward's *aide-de-camp*, spurred his horse into the Ti-ping ranks. Misled by the fact that he had separated himself from the enemy, and believing he came over as a friend, the chief unsuspiciously advanced towards him and held out his hand; the Manilla-man replied to his friendly gesture by shooting him dead, and then, singular to relate, managed to gallop back to the enemy in safety.

After two hours' fighting, during which the artillery mowed them down by hundreds, the Ti-pings were driven out of the village, and, being then hemmed in against a wide creek, which they had only one small pontoon bridge to cross by, suffered terribly from the deadly fire of grape and canister shot during their retreat. Their loss in this disastrous action was 2,300 killed (600 bodies were counted in one portion of the intrenchments) and 700 prisoners, the latter being barbarously put to death by their captors.

The frightful atrocities perpetrated upon the unfortunate Ti-pings by those into whose power they had fallen, even excelled the cruelties of the cruel Chinese and still more cruel Tartars. "How the Ti-pings were driven out of the Provinces of Kiangnan and Chekiang," from notes kept by an officer under Ward, Burgevine, Holland, and Gordon, is a lengthy narrative published in the *Friend of China*. The portion contained in the columns of that journal of April 25, 1865, describing the engagement just noticed, states:—"General Burgevine darkened the victory with a foul deed. The poor rebels who had been captured *were cruelly blown away from the guns*, to the delight of a few we will not mention, but to the disgust of the greater part of the officers." Who, after this, shall talk of *Ti-ping* cruelties? The

revolutionists had neither made war upon, injured, nor even insulted foreigners; yet the foreign officers, supported by the help of British troops, actually massacred their unoffending and helpless prisoners of war in cold blood! Perhaps *General* Burgevine thought he was paying a graceful compliment to his British allies by imitating their deeds in India. No doubt some war-Christians think these latter proceedings exceedingly worthy and proper; however, the Ti-pings have never yet reached such a state of Christian civilization as to copy them.

The allied loss was 5 killed and 15 wounded, including three Europeans! And this may be taken as a fair sample of all the succeeding battles with the British, French, and other disciplined and artillery-supplied forces. The Ti-pings have always done all that men of flesh and blood were capable of doing, but, without artillery to resist or reply to that overwhelming arm of the enemy (supplied freely from the British arsenals), their bravest and best fell to the iron storm, and the rest fled before it.

Very shortly after the above action, *General* Burgevine became the victim of the scheming carried on between the mandarins and those British officials who desired to establish the Ward force as an English contingent. Having taken a large amount of specie from the house of Ta-kee (the banker to the force, and in the service of the Imperial Government), which he had been compelled to seize, *nolens volens*, in order to satisfy his men, who were in an open state of mutiny for their arrears of pay—pay, too, that seems to have been purposely kept lying idle at Ta-kee's house, probably with the cunning idea it would act (as in reality it did) upon the force, and produce some outbreak that could be taken advantage of to disgrace Burgevine and replace him by a British officer—he was dismissed from his command and a reward offered for his head by the Manchoo governor, or Fu-tai, of the province. The excuse given by the Mandarins for this transaction was that Burgevine had disobeyed orders, resisted lawful authority, and seized the money. Some measure of this is very probably

true; but whatever offence had been committed by him, the mandarins had themselves been the cause of it by their peculation, withholding the wages of the troops, and underhand intriguing. Probably the fact that Captain Holland, R.M., was installed as Burgevine's successor, may account for the events leading to the latter's dismissal.

The Imperialist Mandarins were only too eager to fall into the views of those who assisted them; the command of the once despised filibustiers' force by Englishmen meant taking all the danger and responsibility of repelling the Ti-pings out of their own hands; consequently, availing themselves of the subserviency of British officers and authorities, they accepted Captain Holland as the commander of their disciplined troops, and the services of any others who were willing, and did not feel dishonoured by hiring themselves out to support such a cruel and corrupt cause. From this moment the active operations by British troops ceased, but Ward's old legion became a British contingent, and has continued one ever since. Backed up in all their operations against the Ti-pings by the presence of British troops to support them in case of reverse, and supplied with every munition of war, artillery, ships, &c. they required, the various mercenary legions infesting the neighbourhood of Shanghae and Ningpo have managed (with the assistance of the ordinary Chinese and Manchoo soldiers, who alone outnumbered those of Ti-ping tien kwoh) to terminate the allied operations by driving the revolutionists from their once happy territory.

Soon after the command of the force had been assumed by Captain Holland, it met with the most severe defeat the Ti-pings have ever given it, and he resigned the appointment in disgust. The Order in Council permitting British officers to take military service with the Emperor of China having just reached Shanghae, Major Gordon, R.E., took command of the disciplined Chinese, and many other officers joined in the questionable service. From this time forth the British Government became

committed to the success and responsibilities of the force; and for every atrocity perpetrated by the Imperialists, and for every life destroyed, are equally as much accountable as they were for the previous conduct of their own troops. Under such auspices, and with boundless supplies of all the material of war, similar necessities being successfully prevented from reaching their antagonists, it is easy to appreciate the consequent course of events—continued triumph of the Anglo-Franco-Manchoo mercenaries, and repeated defeat of the Ti-pings, already much weakened by the loss of many of their best troops, and diminished in their prestige from the result of the raids headed by Admiral Hope and General Staveley.

The worst feature attending the conversion of the mercenary legions into British auxiliaries, is the fact that Sir F. Bruce, the English Minister at Pekin, distinctly repudiated any such action; and yet his Government saw fit to sanction the arrangement when it was reported to them by Generals Staveley and Brown, who seem to have been foremost among the Shanghae local advocates of the system. *General* Burgevine having proceeded to the Manchoo court at Pekin, stated his case, and was by them reinstated in his former command; receiving, also, the full approval of Sir F. Bruce. Upon his return to Shanghae, with an Imperial Commissioner to place him in position, the British generals and their colleagues in collusion with the Imperial authorities, disregarding the direct instructions of Sir F. Bruce, successfully opposed his reappointment, and managed to retain Major Gordon in command; by what means being best known to themselves.

We will conclude our notice of the establishment of the Anglo-Manchoo contingent with a few facts proving the singular, if not sinister, circumstance, that Sir F. Bruce, although a virulent enemy of the Ti-pings, has always carefully avoided authorizing the employment of British officers against the insurgents; and, in fact, has invariably disapproved such measures, as well as the movement of British troops to support and succour the contingents when in difficulty.

In a despatch to General Staveley, dated "Pekin, March 12, 1863,"<sup>36</sup> Sir F. Bruce, referring to the liberty granted to officers to enter the Chinese Imperial service, states:—"I should prefer that the military men employed by the Chinese Government should *not* belong to the great treaty Powers;" and, with regard to British officers choosing to enter what the Press in China has termed "the disgusting service," he expresses the opinion that "they will then bear a Chinese, and not a British character." How *literally* this belief has been fulfilled, the torture of Ti-ping prisoners captured by the Imperialists, the treacherous massacre of the prisoners at Soo-chow, and the great loss of life which occurred, after cities were captured, sufficiently prove.

In a despatch dated "April 10,"<sup>37</sup> Sir F. Bruce expresses his wish to the same officer that Burgevine should be reinstated to the command of the Ward force, and, speaking "of the charges brought against him," states: "I took occasion to examine them at length, and I am perfectly satisfied that General Burgevine acted from a regard to the interests confided to him, that he was sacrificed to an intrigue of some Chinese subordinate officers, and to the jealousy entertained by the Governor towards the Chinese drilled force." If the Minister had added the names of a few foreigners as being privy to the "intrigue," he would have hit upon the whole truth. The Governor was jealous of the force as a Chinese one managed by foreigners, and successfully plotted, with no little ingenuity and shrewdness, to make it a foreign force officered by Englishmen, and countenanced by British authorities, who accepted all the responsibility entailed.

Upon the subject of Major Gordon's appointment to the coveted generalship of mercenaries, Sir F. Bruce, in a despatch to General Brown, dated "June 11," states:<sup>38</sup> "It is not expedient that British officers should command Chinese troops in the field against the insurgents, beyond the limits of the radius deemed necessary for the security of the ports where they are stationed.... I am further of opinion that, unless the force be

properly constituted, and relieved from the necessity of obeying the orders of the local Government, it will do no real and permanent good; and that the officer who commands it will speedily find himself in a position which is neither compatible with his professional reputation, nor what is due to the character of a British officer. Under these circumstances, I must *decline* accepting the responsibility of authorizing the employment of British officers beyond Shanghae.... I have informed the Chinese Government of my objections to the employment of British officers in the field." Singularly enough, every word prophesied by Sir F. Bruce came to pass; the force became an instrument of evil in the hands of local Mandarins, to be used for their individual purposes, and then got rid of; the officers found their honour tarnished by complicity in deeds of blood and treachery; some were disgusted, but the Commander retained his position until he was *compelled* to break up the force by orders from his Government. In a despatch to Earl Russell, dated "October 13," Sir F. Bruce declares:<sup>39</sup> "It was reluctantly, and in deference to the naval and military authorities, that I consented to our assuming the responsibility of defending the thirty-mile radius round Shanghae, and I spared no effort to bring about an arrangement of Burgevine's dispute, so as to avoid the necessity of having to place an English officer at the head of the force destined to operate beyond the radius." Yet members of Lord Palmerston's Government have had the hardihood to declare that the operations against the Ti-pings *were approved* by Sir F. Bruce.

When Major Gordon's force was in danger, General Brown moved detachments of British troops to support him, and to garrison the captured towns and hold them against the Ti-pings. Sir F. Bruce, in a despatch upon the subject, dated "October 6,"<sup>40</sup> clearly condemns his conduct in these words:—"If officers go into the Chinese service, we are not entitled to facilitate their operations by moving men, or placing garrisons in towns beyond the radius for their support, further than we should be if the corps

assisted were commanded by a Chinese general. We are *not* entitled to lend them artillery, or men to work their guns *on any pretext!*" In the very teeth of these distinct instructions, General Brown persisted in every measure they condemn. It was the favourite *modus operandi* over again—the military or naval authorities acting in direct violation of orders, the disobedience being ultimately endorsed by the Government, and the apparently disobedient receiving praise and C.B.'s by way of punishment.

## FOOTNOTES:

29. With the schemes of the Bruce, Wade, Lay, &c., politicians.

30. This is a startling contrast to what Mr. Bruce declared would be the "worst" course to pursue.

31. To completely prove the error of Lord Russell's assumption, and the slightness of its foundation, we will read the following extract from "A Memorandum, dated October 15, 1862, addressed to Rear-Admiral Kuper, by Vice-Admiral Sir J. Hope, on resigning the Command of the Station." [Blue Book, June, 1862, to February, 1863, p. 111.]

*"The only question of real importance on which we are at variance with the rebels,* arose from their desire to possess themselves of Shanghai, and their capture of Ningpo, since retaken.

*"On my first visit to Nanking,... I effected an agreement with them, but limited to the year, that they should not approach it within 100 li (thirty miles), on the whole tolerably WELL KEPT during that time,* but which they refused to renew on the occasion of my last visit."

32. Mr. Roberts, an American Baptist missionary already referred to in this work, joined the Ti-pings at Nankin about the end of October, 1860. Of all missionaries in China he was the least qualified for such a position. Intolerant and bigoted to the Baptist dogmas, irritable, peevish, inconsistent, and vacillating—a man singularly illiterate, without stability of character or pleasantness of manner—his presence at Nankin did far more harm than good. His objections to every other Church, and to every other denomination of dissent except his own, went far to give the Ti-pings a dread of that diversity of doctrine among the British and Americans which they had always looked upon with surprise, thinking, as they did, that God could not be well served by those who were always quarrelling about it. The circumstances attending the advent and career of Mr. Roberts among the Ti-pings I have avoided as a worthless episode, but, as the facts of his indecorous flight from Nankin have been misrepresented, I think it necessary to notice the subject. Mr. Roberts accepted temporal rank under the Ti-pings, and by his unwise dogmatical obstinacy frequently provoked unpleasant discussion. During a dispute with the Kan-wang, who had entertained him since his arrival, that chief had particular occasion to chastise a boy of the household. Mr. Roberts was so blinded by passion, the idea that Europeans would never know the reverse of his statement,

or some other reason, that, in a paroxysm of rage, he fled from the city, and sought refuge on board H.M. gunboat *Renard*, which happened to be lying in the port. By some obliquity of vision best known to himself, Mr. Roberts mistook the stick used by the Kan-wang for a sword, and declared that his boy *had been* brutally murdered. Not satisfied with this, although on the previous night he had retired to rest fully believing the surrounding people saints, the very next day, after his quarrel with the Kan-wang, he awoke to find them howling sinners. The many years that he had praised the Ti-pings as holy men were, by a moment of passion, forgotten, and within one day Mr. Roberts not only declared himself to have been deceived so long, but, for the act of one man, gave up the hundreds of thousands in the Ti-ping cause to fire and sword. We will just contrast the different statements of Mr. Roberts, one with the other, and then dismiss the subject.

This is an extract from the first, made on board the *Renard*:—

"Kan-wang, moved by his coolie elder brother—literally a coolie at Hong-kong—and the devil, without fear of God before his eyes, did on Monday, the 13th instant (January, 1862), come into the house in which I was living, *and with malice aforethought murder one of my servants with a large sword in his own hand, in my presence*, without a moment's warning or any just cause. *And after having slain my poor, harmless, helpless boy, he jumped on his head most fiend-like, and stamped it with his foot.*"

Now, at Canton, on the 3rd of April, 1862, when it was generally known that the above charge of murder was incorrect, Mr. Roberts retracted these words [Blue Book, 1862, p. 5], having reference to the Kan-wang's form of baptism:—

"A miserable apostate, (?) polygamist, *and murderer, too*, to wish to administer an ordinance held sacred by those who practise it. What a sacrilege! But as to that boy, *I have since been told that he evinced indications of life after he was dragged out*, by one who saw him. But I think it would have been less cruel in Kan-wang to have smoothly cut off his head than to send him out even half killed, destitute, and naked, to freeze and starve to death. *Whether the boy was killed directly or not, I cannot esteem Kan-wang, and his elder brother, who prompted him to the wicked deed, less than murderers; and hence, in my judgment, they ought both to be treated as such.*"

In the pamphlet, "A Letter to the Bishop of Victoria, regarding the Religion of the Ti-ping Rebels," the author states, "Of course you now know that the story of that person's boy being murdered by the Kan-wang is a fabrication. 'The Kan-wang called on me,' said Mr. Roberts, when I asked him about the matter, 'and desired me to punish the boy. I told him I would first remonstrate with him; and then he, the Kan-wang's brother, dissatisfied with my answer, beat him, *as I thought*, to death.'"

33. This affair happened on the 25th of August, was reported to the Shanghai *Daily Shipping and Commercial News* of the next day, and was widely known in China. A certain Mr. CHALONER ALABASTER, of the British consular service, is mentioned in connection with it.

34. From the success of the Ti-pings.

35. *China Overland Trade Report*, February 20, 1863.

36. Blue Book, China, No. 3, 1864, p. 68.

37. *Id.*, p. 80.

38. Blue Book, No. 3, 1864, p. 96.

39. *Id.*, p. 162.

40. Blue Book, No. 3, 1864, p. 163.

## CHAPTER XXI.

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When at last I became convalescent and able to leave my house in Nankin, for several reasons I determined to take a trip to Shanghae. My wife wished to see her relations there; I was anxious to ascertain the political and practical position of affairs; and, besides, there were many things to be done toward assisting the Ti-ping cause. The principal inducement for the trip was, however, the fact that my friends, D. and Captain P., had, upon their last voyage, brought me some letters from Chin-kiang (to where they had been forwarded by my agent at Shanghae), stating that the Rev. W. Lobschied, a distinguished missionary, was anxious to visit the Ti-ping capital. I at once decided to proceed to Shanghae and afford him every assistance by placing one of our vessels at his service for the journey to and from Nankin.

During the last few months of my illness messengers had continually arrived from the head-quarters of the I- and Chung-wang's armies, reporting the uninterrupted successes of both. But at the same time intelligence was received of the second capture of Kah-ding and Tsing-poo, the capture of Fu-shan by the allies, and the treachery of the chief in command at the city

of Chang-zu, who had accepted the large bribes offered by the enemy, and surrendered the city. Orders were consequently despatched to the I-wang's victorious army, already beyond the Po-yang lake, and that chief detached a considerable portion of it to return and protect the threatened districts. This force, at the time I left Nankin (early spring of 1863), was already besieging Chang-zu, having closely invested the city upon every side.

Having embarked with my wife on board our lorchha, the *Anglo-Ti-ping*, we proceeded under sail to Chin-kiang, and then took passage in a steamer to Shanghae. A month after our arrival, every motive for the visit being accomplished, and the Rev. W. Lobschied having arranged to accompany me, we returned to Chin-kiang together, and then, getting on board the lorchha, made sail for Nankin. When half-way there I engaged a small steamer to tow us up to the forts, in order to oblige the missionary, who was averse to the delay the calm weather seemed likely to occasion.

In a couple of days we were cast off at our destination, and I proceeded on shore with Mr. Lobschied, introducing him to the Sz-wang, who received him very kindly, and immediately sent word of his arrival to the Government inside the city. The next morning horses and attendants were in waiting to escort us to the Kan-wang's presence. Upon reaching the palace, Mr. Lobschied met with so warm and friendly a reception from the Kan-wang and many other chiefs, that I am quite sure he can never cease to remember it with pleasure, and at the same time with regret that he has not been more energetic or useful to what he knew full well was the cause of Christianity and righteousness. Many of the Ti-pings had known him at Canton in former days, when they had studied the wondrous truths of Scripture, and some, I believe, had been his own converts and pupils. These men were most anxious that he should stay among them, and earnestly entreated him to do so; but the Rev. W. Lobschied, as he informed me, had to attend to some appointment at Canton, and the wishes or whims of a young wife. Thus the last opportunity for a teacher of the Gospel to support the cause of Christianity in China was thrown away; my trouble lost (not that I cared for

ought but the fact that it was not used to advantage when every opportunity was offered); and the visit of the last missionary who came to the Ti-ping capital, rendered utterly fruitless. Something did result from the visit in the shape of the following letter:—

"THE TAEPIINGS.

"*A Visit to Nanking, and an Interview with the Kan-Wong.*

"(To the Editor of the *Daily Press*, Hong Kong.)

"SIR.—The dreadful accounts given of the condition and character of the rebels had long made me anxious to visit their capital, and see for myself how far all that has been said of them be true. There is a brisk trade carried on outside the city of Nanking. The fields within the ancient wall were well cultivated, as well as the country around; and wheat, barley, and large beans, appeared to be there in abundance. The people within the city *were certainly looking better than in any town along the Yang-tse-kiang.* New shops and fine buildings were in course of erection, and the people were in general well dressed. The women moved about performing their daily work as they do here in the South; aged persons were playing with their grandchildren, and wheresoever I came I was treated with respect and kindness. The kings, and particularly Kan-Wong, received me with great kindness, and I felt that I was as safe in Nanking as in any Chinese town I have ever visited. They were anxious to know why England was so hostile against them. 'Have we ever broken faith with foreigners? Have we ever retaliated the enmity of England and France?' said Kan-Wong. 'If they force us to the conclusion that we are to be treated as outlaws, then the day of retribution will come! We are fighting in our own country, and to rid ourselves of a foreign power, and woe to the stranger who falls into our hands after the first shot

has been fired against Nanking.<sup>41</sup> We need not then take cities and hold them, or allow foreigners to assist the Imperial imps in surrounding us; we shall then move in one compact body, ravaging the country and destroying trade.<sup>42</sup> We have not as yet sent men into the foreign settlements to burn and destroy, but have strictly prohibited such acts. Who can prevent us from committing such acts, if we choose? And why should we not make the sojourn of foreigners here intolerable, if they come to destroy us who *would* and *have* opened to them every port we hold, and tried to be friends with them? We will spare neither Hankow nor any other place held by foreigners, who will then see the difference between forbearance and determined hostility.' They told me that they had *repeatedly* applied to the foreign consuls, in order to come to some arrangements, but all their communications had been returned *unopened*, and no reply given. I was present at their religious meetings, which are regularly held every morning and evening, but would not join them until I knew what they were doing. They sang a hymn; and having previously placed three cups of tea on the table,<sup>43</sup> they knelt down, one of them<sup>44</sup> reading or saying an appropriate prayer. There was *no worship of Taiping-Wong*. Whilst sitting in the palace, there came frequent orders for books on religious subjects, and, so far as the Chinese care for religion, *these men sang and prayed with a will and with apparent devotion*. As the Imperialists are going to *restrict* the development of trade on the Yang-tze-Kiang as soon as Osborn's fleet has come out, and as the rebels *are willing to open the whole country to foreigners*, if they will stretch out a friendly hand to them, everybody may judge for himself which party will serve him best. China was conquered by the help of Roman Catholic missionaries, and the Imperial House has for 150 years been under their influence. So

long as the Emperors made use of them they prospered; and the moment they expelled them from Pekin, misrule and effeminacy became the order of the day. Sir Frederick Bruce will one day be recalled to give an account of the *ruinous course of policy he has advised his Government to adopt*, and foreign influence will at last prevail in the council of the rebels. But whether that will be upon the ruins of the silk and tea plantations, or upon the graveyards of thousands of British subjects, we shall soon have an opportunity of witnessing. As almost all the officers now in the service of the Imperialists are on half-pay, *and receive besides an enormous salary from the Chinese*, nobody need feel any surprise at the strange doings of men worthy a more honourable death.<sup>45</sup> And if General Gordon does receive 1,200 taels per month from the Imperialists, and his half-pay as an officer of the British army, where then is British neutrality? The proclamation of the Queen is dust thrown into the eyes of Europe and America. But more on this subject for the second mail of this month.

"Yours respectfully,  
"W. L.

"Hong Kong, 10th June, 1863."

The Rev. W. Lobschied, by his departure from Nankin and return to the south of China, sacrificed a glorious opportunity of serving the cause of the Master whose word he came abroad to teach. Had he installed himself at the Ti-ping capital and proclaimed that fact, and then reported the favourable points of their sincere Christianity, friendliness to foreigners, desire for unrestricted commerce and intercourse with Europeans, and general moral and physical superiority, in *all* the particulars for which the Chinese are condemned, he would most likely have been the means of arresting the

interference of England, and purifying the religious errors of the only voluntary native worshippers of Jesus in Asia.

Had Mr. Lobschied so acted, every mission society and ordained member of the Church of England would necessarily have supported him; this would simply have been their duty to God. Popular opinion, when fixed by the voice of a well-known divine, speaking the *truth* from Nankin, and with all the authority of his presence among the revolutionists, and undoubted personal knowledge of them, would almost certainly have compelled the British Government to remain neutral.

Unfortunately Mr. Lobschied had private business which possessed greater charms for him than this, although success was certain if the effort were made. The Manchoo-Imperialists, unassisted by foreign mercenaries, would have fled before the progress of Ti-ping tien kwoh like fine chaff before a gale of wind. The ultimate results would have been the sure establishment of Christianity, freedom, and modern civilization, throughout the vast Chinese empire.

Private affairs overpowered all other considerations, and so, after a few days spent at Nankin, I placed the rev. gentleman on board a passing steamer and bid him adieu.

Soon after my return to Nankin, reports of disaster to the Ti-ping forces in the Shanghae district were received; but previous to noticing these I must describe the complete defeat the Anglo-Manchoo legion experienced before the city of Tait-san.

Shortly after being placed in command of the drilled force, Captain Holland was ordered by the Fu-tai, Le, Governor of the province, to advance upon Tait-san and wrest it from the Ti-pings. Burning to distinguish himself, and probably not averse to the *bonus* it is believed the Fu-tai offered for the capture of the city, besides the prospect of much *loot*, the newly-fledged *general* led forward his men.

This expedition was accompanied by British volunteers, and the British officers belonging to the force, besides which General Staveley lent several

large howitzers, the property of the English nation, to the commanding officer. Attached to *General* Holland, as body-guard, was a motley brigade of European mercenaries, consisting of almost every nationality. The whole strength of the disciplined division inclusive was considerably over 3,000 men, with 22 pieces of heavy artillery, field-pieces, and mortars, supported by an army of 10,000 Imperialists. The legionaries, and a great proportion of the irregular troops, were well armed with English rifles and muskets, well equipped in every way, and supplied with abundance of ammunition.

After driving the Ti-pings from several small outworks and tearing from a neighbouring village all its "doors, windows, tables, &c.," as one account states, the Imperialist forces took up a position under the walls of Tait-san. Of course the Ti-ping maligners, who followed upon the track of the allies, raven-like croaked forth from the destroyed village about the "ruthless devastation" of those "bloodthirsty monsters." They should have seen the village, or rather those who have been misled by their howling should have done so, *before* the gallant Anglo-Manchoo forces stripped it of furniture and partially pulled down the houses. Undoubtedly many who have accused the Ti-pings of wanton devastation have unintentionally mistaken the ravages of their own friends for that of the people they condemned, though it is hard to believe that any one could credit such opinions, when, in every account of the Imperialist operations, the destruction of some Ti-ping city, village, or store of grain, is prominently set forth.

Rows of stakes had been driven into the creeks by the Ti-pings, and the boats carrying the siege train of the enemy were delayed in their advance upon Tait-san until they could be pulled up. In spite of obstructions and a strong sortie made by the garrison, which was not repulsed without a sharp fight, the guns were landed during the night of the 13th of February, 1863, and placed in position.

Early on the following morning the garrison received strong reinforcements from the Ti-ping army investing Chang-zu, distant less than

twenty-five miles, which were welcomed with immense cheering. Shortly afterwards the besiegers opened fire from their numerous artillery.

In about five hours a large and practicable breach was made in the city wall, and Captain, or rather *General*, Holland ordered the assault. Now it so happened that the defenders had wisely sheltered themselves from the deadly artillery fire to which they had only one or two small 6-pounders to reply, and instead of recklessly exposing themselves in the usual Ti-ping style, had remained perfectly silent behind their defences.

Led by a party of the body-guard and their European officers, the trained troops rushed gallantly forward to storm the city. At this moment the defenders suddenly manned the breach, and although fearfully thinned by the enfilading artillery fire, kept up a fusillade which told with terrible effect upon the dense masses of the enemy. A few crossed the moat by their bridges, only however to be shot down, and the whole division of stormers wavered and hesitated on the brink. A sergeant-major of the disciplined rifle regiment here performed an act of bravery that no European could have outdone. Seizing the colours of the regiment, Ward's old flag, he rushed to the front with it, and calling on the men to advance, stood there alone, a mark for the fire of the besieged. It is remarkable that, though six bullets pierced his clothes, not one injured him, or even cut his skin.

Unable to advance against the shower of missiles directed from the breach and city walls, where even the little boys were stationed with heaps of bricks to throw upon them, the Imperialists fell back on their guns in confusion. *General* Holland then ordered the artillery to the rear, and a rapid retreat commenced. This, however, they were not allowed to effect so easily, for the Ti-pings dragged a 6-pounder into the breach, where it was worked by some Europeans, and directed upon the men endeavouring to remove the siege guns, with deadly effect. At the same time the garrison sallied forth from two gates, while others rushed through the breach and attacked the enemy with vigour.

For some time the rifles and 1st regiment of the British contingent, together with the European company, fought desperately to save the guns. Meanwhile the main Imperialist army was routed with much slaughter, and, with all the other regiments of disciplined troops, fled in every direction from the field. The troops who so gallantly protected the retreat of their comrades, managed also to save all the artillery, except two heavy 32-pounders and several light howitzers. Upon these guns the Ti-pings incessantly charged, and both sides lost heavily in killed and wounded. *General* Holland had left the field, and it was entirely due to *Colonel* Barclay and *Major* Cooke, who jointly conducted the retreat, and well animated and kept their men together, that only a few pieces of artillery, instead of the whole park, were captured by the Ti-pings.

Seeing that his men were falling thickly, and that they were in danger of being surrounded, Colonel Barclay abandoned the guns and made a pretty orderly retreat. The Ti-pings marked those guns for their especial prey, and concentrated on them such a hail of shot that no one could approach them from the hostile ranks and live. The enemy found that it would be impossible even to spike them without a terrible loss of life, and so left them uninjured as trophies for the victorious garrison of Tait-san.

The day following their defeat only 1,500 of the British contingent mustered at their head-quarters, but stragglers shortly came dropping in. The same force lost 5 officers killed and 16 wounded. The co-operating Imperialist army was totally dispersed, and lost more than 2,000 men *hors de combat*. The Ti-ping casualties were also very heavy, for the men had rushed gallantly into the breach under withering volleys from the disciplined and well-armed assailants, and at least 1,000 were killed and wounded during the defence and subsequent fighting.

*General* Holland, upon reaching Shanghae, resigned his command in disgust, and was superseded by one Major Gordon, of the Royal Engineers, a cold, calculating man, who possessed qualities far more conducive to successful operations against the Ti-pings than even brilliant and dashing

generalship. His tactics were to destroy them from a distance by his long-range artillery, which was a thing to be done generally with perfect impunity, because the Ti-pings were almost entirely without cannon.

The aim of the revolutionists is to get at close quarters with the enemy, and wherever they have been able to accomplish this, even the disciplined and foreign-officered troops have been beaten. Unfortunately they have seldom been able to effect their favourite manœuvre against the latter, the overwhelming artillery and regular volleys of musketry sweeping away every attempted formation of the Ti-ping troops long before it could be completed.

*General* Gordon having assumed command of the once despised mercenaries, that is to say, despised before the despisers were able to handle the loaves and fishes, he very wisely spent several months in thoroughly reorganizing his troops and raising his artillery to a strength and state of efficiency perfectly irresistible by the Ti-pings. During this period, besides the officers of the force, numerous drill-instructors were supplied by the British general at Shanghae, so that Gordon's, Kingsley's, Cooke's, and other legions, soon became formidable both as to numbers, armament, and discipline, *à l'Anglais*.

The first operations directed by Gordon were against Fu-shan and the beleaguered city of Chang-zu, the former of which was captured and the latter relieved, the Ti-pings losing some 1,200 men; Gordon's force, 2 killed and 3 wounded! These relative casualties afford a fair sample of the usual result of nearly every engagement. The immense loss of life upon the Ti-ping side during the years 1862–3-4, and part of the present, may easily be imagined, and will be found stated in detail in the approximate table at the end of this volume,<sup>46</sup> which has been compiled principally from official sources. Gordon, in his own report of the operations above referred to, states: "The number of guns was terrific, and although after every shot the rebels would fire from one or two loop-holes, it was evident they had no

chance." The position exposed to this "terrific" fire was simply a few open stockades, undefended by artillery.

At this time Gordon's force mustered, all told, about 5,000 men; Kingsley's, 1,000; Cooke's, 1,500; and the Franco-Manchoo contingents, commanded respectively by *Generals* D'Aguibelle, Giquel, and Bonnefoi, from 3,000 to 4,000. Subsequently other legions and artillery corps attached to the irregular Imperial troops, about 2,500 in all, were formed and commanded by *Colonels* Bailey, Howard, Rhode, &c., while the total force of trained Chinese generally maintained the relative strength here given, viz., 14,000.

The disaster to the Ti-pings in the vicinity of Shanghae, the report of which, as mentioned before their victory at Tait-san, reached Nankin shortly after my return, consisted in their loss of the former city, and the still more important one of Quin-san, after a desperate and gallant defence at each.

General Brown, Commander-in-Chief of H. B. Majesty's forces in China, having, by every description of help and assistance, placed Gordon's troops in a state of complete effectiveness, the latter once more moved upon the devoted city of Tait-san.

Upon this occasion Gordon was supplied with a heavy siege train, including 8-inch howitzers and large mortars, *all belonging to the British army*; while General Brown sent a force of 550 men (including detachments of Royal Artillery, H. M. 31st regiment, Belooches, and B. N. I.) to look after his guns and take care that his *protégé* should not suffer a similar defeat to that experienced by *General* Holland. In fact, General Brown maintained a large force at Shanghae for the express purpose of assisting the Imperialists, supplying them with artillery and men to garrison the cities they captured.

The capture of Tait-san is one of the most desperate encounters on the records of the Anglo-Manchoo forces.

In addition to the trained troops, Sing, a Manchoo general, joined in the attack with 5,000 to 7,000 men. The strength of the garrison was not less

than 4,000, including little boys, who, according to the usual custom, were stationed with heaps of stones to throw upon the assailants.

After shelling the Ti-pings from their outworks, Gordon arrived under the walls of Tait-san on the 2nd of May, 1863. In his report to *General Brown*, Gordon states:—"About noon fire was opened from two guns, and by degrees more guns were brought into action, till at 2 p.m. every gun and mortar was in action, *the troops being under cover*. As the defences got dilapidated the guns were advanced, and at 4.30 p.m. the boats were moved up and the assault commenced. The rebels swarmed to the breach, and for ten to twelve minutes a hand-to-hand contest took place, canister being fired into the breach from this side of the ditch, and a heavy musketry fire kept up."

From this statement we find that after crumbling the ancient city walls to dust, and pouring in the tremendous fire of his numerous artillery for four hours and a half, his own men being in perfect safety, while the unfortunate defenders were torn to pieces by the storm of shot and shell to which they could make no reply, *General Gordon* at last ordered the assault. This, however, was gallantly repulsed by the brave garrison, who, though almost decimated by the murderous artillery, despite the hail of "canister" from enfilading batteries and the "heavy musketry fire" poured upon them by the adverse covering parties, rushed into the wide-spread ruins of the breach and drove the assailants back in a desperate hand-to-hand encounter.

Rallied by their officers, the division of stormers again returned to the assault, only, however, to be met with equal determination by the Ti-pings, who again successfully repulsed them.

*General Gordon* now placed his men under cover, inflicting heavy loss upon the defenders of the breach by pouring continual discharges of grape and canister shot into their dense ranks. For some time this artillery practice was resumed; a fresh storming party was then told off, and the breach again attacked with much bravery, and again defended with equal courage. The trained troops wavered and were nearly driven back a third time, but being

reinforced by fresh men, rallied, and finally carried the breach. This, however, was not effected until the commandant of the city had been severely wounded, and a great proportion of his officers killed or disabled. The Ti-pings then gave way and escaped, carrying off many of their wounded, with their wives and children, through the gates at the other side of the town. The snake flags of Tsah, the commandant, remained in the breach until the summit was in possession of the enemy, when they were carried off in safety.

The Imperialists were assisted by the steamer *Hyson* in their attack upon Tait-san, which vessel caused no little alarm to the garrison by steaming along the creeks encircling the city, and throwing heavy shell among them, besides seriously menacing their line of retreat. Another great help to the besiegers consisted in the presence of the British *corps de réserve*, stationed at the village of Wy-con-sin close by, and which the Ti-pings fully expected would attack them should the disciplined Chinese be defeated.

The loss of the Anglo-Manchoo force upon this occasion was about two hundred; the Ti-pings, soldiery and civilians, killed in action, or afterwards caught by the Imperialists and cruelly put to death, cannot have been less than two thousand.

At Tait-san, as at Kah-ding, Tsing-poo, and every other city wrested from the Ti-pings either before or subsequently, the capture was followed by the perpetration of most revolting barbarities by the Imperial troops and Mandarins, whenever the attention of the British officers who assisted them to capture the places was withdrawn. *General Gordon* and the commanding officers of other contingents saved some of the Ti-ping prisoners who had been captured; but for the destruction of many thousands of innocent men, including country people, non-combatant inhabitants of the cities, and women and children, they are criminally responsible.

Upon the first capture of Kah-ding by the British forces, when General Staveley's *humane* disposition led him to station the Imperialist troops so as to intercept the flight of the garrison from his artillery fire, the following

scenes were enacted, as appears by a letter from the Rev. Mr. Lobschied, published in the *Hong Kong Daily Press* of June 28th:—

"A small gate being the only issue through which the women and children could escape from their *deliverers*, they rushed upon the wall, and threw themselves down a great height, rather than fall into the hands of the combined forces. Those that were immediately killed were lucky enough; for they were saved from the sufferings that awaited the survivors. Whilst looting and killing was going on within the walls, until darkness threw her veil over the scenes of horror, several hundreds of men, women, and children, whose only crime was that of being citizens of Kah-ding when taken by the rebels, were lying outside the city walls with broken limbs, helpless, and parched with thirst. When morning arrived, a few gentlemen passed outside the wall through the narrow gate, in order to take a retrospect of the field of action. What did they see? The Imperialists, having become aware of the large number of sufferers outside the wall, had resorted thither long before the rising of the sun, were just stripping the poor people, and cutting off their heads, which they would take with them as trophies of their victory, when the two gentlemen (one of whom was an officer) happened to disturb them."

The unfortunate people above referred to were a portion of those massacred by the troops of the Chinese general Le, the same worthy who, when reporting to General Staveley his execution of the duties assigned him, offered to produce the left ears of 1,300 rebels.

At Tait-san similar atrocities were committed by the forces of Sing, the Manchoo commander. Hundreds of civilians were killed for the sake of their heads, and some prisoners were actually taken to the camp of the British *corps de réserve*, formed in conjunction with an Imperialist one, and there cruelly tortured to death. The execution of seven victims in particular is fully attested by Dr. Murtagh,<sup>47</sup> 22nd B. N. I.; other "eye-witnesses," including the Bishop of Victoria, have personally assured me of their positive knowledge as to this and other atrocities more revolting, and upon a more

extensive scale, that have been inflicted upon Ti-pings captured by means of the British alliance with the Manchoo. The following is an extract from a letter published in most of the Shanghae papers, and vouched for as being true by Dr. Murtagh:—

EXTRACT FROM THE "NORTH CHINA HERALD" OF  
JUNE 13, 1863.

*Treatment of Ti-ping Prisoners.*

(To the Editor of the *Daily Shipping and Commercial News.*)

"... About 11 o'clock a.m. on the day following the capture of Tait-san (*Sunday, May 3rd*), seven prisoners were brought into the Imperialist camp near Wy-con-sin; being stripped perfectly nude, they were each tied to a stake, and tortured with the most refined cruelty. Arrows appeared to have been forcibly driven into various parts of their bodies, from whence issued copious streams of blood. This mode of torture falling short of satiating the demoniacal spirit of their tormentors, recourse was had to other means. Strips of flesh were cut, or rather hacked (judging from the appearance presented, the instrument seemed too blunt to cut), from different parts of their bodies, which, hanging by a small portion of skin, presented an appearance truly horrible....

"For hours these wretched beings writhed in agony. About sunset they were led forth more dead than alive by a brutal executioner, who, sword in hand, thirsting to imbrue his hand in blood, seemed the very incarnation of a fiend. Seizing his unfortunate victims, he exultingly dragged them forth, mocking and insulting them, and then, by hewing, hacking, and using a sawing motion, he succeeded eventually in putting an end to their sufferings by partially severing the head from the body.

Such are the bare facts, which can, if necessary, be fully substantiated by other eye-witnesses....

"(Signed) A N EYE-WITNESS."

As further evidence of the atrocities which were committed in these fearful times, the following letter will speak emphatically. It was written at the time, and addressed to the editor of the *Shanghae Recorder*, by Mr. J. C. Sillar, a merchant of high position, by whose permission it is now published:

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"NO MORE MURDERS.  
(To the Editor of the *Shanghae Recorder*.)

"SIR—A gentleman who was present at the capture of Tsingpo informed me that he held the heads of fourteen women with his own hands while their throats, which had been cut by the English or French soldiers (perhaps both) were being sewn up. There were many more, but he held the heads of fourteen with his own hands.

"I trust that, in the event of the capture of Kading, steps may be taken to prevent such atrocities either by our own men or the 'disciplined Chinese.'

"Your obedient servant,  
"J. C. SILLAR.

"Shanghae, October 18, 1862."

"The women stated that their throats had been cut by the English soldiers; but, upon being asked to identify them, pointed to the French.

"J. C. S."

Placing the Manchoo, Sing, in charge of Tait-san, *General* Gordon moved forward to reconnoitre Quin-san, the next Ti-ping city in the direction of Soo-chow, the provincial capital. After establishing a large Imperialist army in a stockaded position close to its walls, he returned with his own force to Soong-kong, the head-quarters, for the purpose of obtaining from General Brown, at Shanghae, further supplies of H. B. Majesty's shot and shell, preparatory to bombarding the city. When all the necessary munitions of war had been received from the British arsenals, Gordon returned to his allies outside the east gate of Quin-san.

The garrison, upon the arrival of Gordon's troops, sallied forth upon them in strong force, but after a desperate attempt to come to close quarters were driven back by the artillery with much loss. Now, unfortunately for the Ti-pings, the scientific knowledge of their enemy led him to investigate the strategic and defensive position of Quin-san with unmistakable perception of its weak points. He quickly discovered that the place was so situated as to possess but one line of retreat or supply, in consequence of the numerous small lakes, Imperialist outposts, and broad creeks in every other direction. Consequently, instead of directly attacking the city, Gordon moved his army, supported by the steamer *Hyson* and a large fleet of well-armed gunboats, against its only line of communication, a road constructed along the bank of a wide creek leading to Soo-chow. This movement was no sooner perceived by the garrison of Quin-san, than, finding their position rendered perfectly untenable, they commenced to evacuate the city as fast as possible. Refugees from Tait-san and the surrounding country had increased the number of inhabitants considerably, and, as at many places their only line of retreat was but a few feet broad, with deep creeks on either side, and continual narrow bridges spanning the numerous canals intersecting the country with a perfect maze of water, their escape from the city occupied the entire day, and their long thin line stretched for miles along this narrow road. The rush of the

panic-stricken people was so great that the Ti-ping troops became inextricably mingled with and confused among them.

A few miles from Quin-san the *Hyson* and the gunboats came upon the fugitives where their line of retreat was intersected by the creek, up which the vessels were advancing; their progress, however, was for some time arrested by a couple of stockades, into which a few soldiers managed to throw themselves, and by an obstruction presented by a strong row of stakes driven firmly across the creek. During the delay, the *Hyson's* European officers amused themselves by an incessant fire of grape and canister poured among the helpless people seeking to escape almost in front of the muzzle of her 32-pounder bow gun. Gordon, in his report to General Brown,<sup>48</sup> after noticing the "well-cultivated" appearance of the country, states that the *Hyson* continued this murderous work for "over three hours," at the expiration of which time he arrived with his troops and drove the defenders from their stockades. Immediately upon this, the *Hyson*, as Gordon states, "overhauled the rebels and followed them slowly up. The creek was positively jammed up with their boats, and at the bridge at Edin the crush was awful." Now, how those who directed the fire of shell and *mitraille* from the *Hyson* managed to avoid injuring the women and children, who constituted a great proportion of the people contained in the boats, does not appear.

When the unfortunates had been leisurely followed up and ceaselessly attacked until they reached the vicinity of Soo-chow, and the protection afforded by its garrison, the steamer turned about and slowly ran back. The report, continuing from this point, states:—

"All this time rebel stragglers had been dropping into the Soochow road from all parts, and the *Hyson* had to *continue her work* all the way back, sometimes being so close on masses of rebels that she had to resort to some measure to get clear of them, and so adopted the novel expedient of using her steam whistle, which, singular as it may appear, had the desired effect.... Mounted men would try and gallop by the steamer not six yards from her;

others positively rode or tried to ride past when she was alongside the road. *The grape and canister must have told fearfully, owing to their numbers....* We had not ceased shelling until 2.30 a.m."

At least nine-tenths of the wretched people who thus perished under the orders of *General Gordon*—who, by the way, seems to have become very quickly imbued with the "Chinese character" prophesied by the British minister at Pekin—were non-combatants. The manner in which British officers dealt destruction to their victims during *twenty hours*, with absolute impunity to themselves, would be too revolting to be credible, but for its plain avowal by Major Gordon, R.E., himself. This almost unparalleled proceeding is merely the prototype of many other atrocities perpetrated by the Anglo-Manchou legion and its Imperialist allies. During all the operations against the Ti-pings, and all the terrible consequences following the fall of their cities, can Major Gordon say how many were peaceful inhabitants, whose only fault was the fact that they were inmates of a town captured and held by the revolutionists? Fully nine-tenths of the Ti-ping killed and wounded, so vain-gloriously, were only guilty of submission to the *de facto* Power; the remainder were *bonâ fide* Ti-ping soldiers, whose only crime was their endeavour to expel the foreign and oppressive dynasty, and to establish the Christian faith, the persecution of the first converts to which caused their revolution.

Thousands of the people who fled before the ceaseless shelling from the *Hyson* had never seen a steamer before; even the few who had, like all Chinese, were greatly awed by the supposed qualities of the "fiery dragon ship;" thus, the shrieking of the steam whistle, the dashing noise of her paddles, the flaming appearance of her funnel, and the fearful effect of her artillery fire, must have thrown them into the wildest consternation. Other steam gunboats, similar to the *Hyson*, were shortly added to the flotilla attached to Gordon's force, and ever afterwards their appearance threw the Ti-pings into confusion, and proved more effective than a great army in the field. The dread inspired by the steamers was always fatal to every Ti-ping

position they attacked, and not without cause. They were each protected by iron mantlets, proof against musketry fire, which was all they had to resist, and carried a heavy bow gun and another at the stern. If the garrison of any stockade attempted to resist them, their artillery soon battered down the defences or shelled the defenders, and then came a massacre similar to that attending the evacuation of Quin-san. The whole country between Shanghae and Soo-chow is low, marshy, and cut up by innumerable creeks, canals, dykes, and lakes, the only roads being a few narrow causeways built along the sides of the principal creeks; therefore, whenever the garrison of a stockade was driven out, their only line of retreat was along the bank of a creek, up which a steamer could follow them for miles, and pour in deadly discharges of grape and canister at a distance of only a few feet.

It has been estimated that the Ti-ping loss during the evacuation of Quin-san and the subsequent route was not less than 3,000. Gordon's force lost 2 killed and 5 drowned!

Having noticed the particulars of the disastrous loss of Tait-san and Quin-san, we must now come to the still more unfortunate effect caused by the receipt of the intelligence at Nankin, and the further report that the ships of the Anglo-Chinese or "Vampyre" flotilla were arriving at Shanghae.

These events took place in the month of May, 1863, and immediately the Ti-ping Government heard of them, couriers were despatched in hot haste after the Chung-wang, recalling his army to the capital. At this time the Commander-in-Chief had advanced about four hundred miles in the direction of Pekin, having captured many cities from the enemy, and completely defeated several large Manchoo armies, one led by the Imperialist Prince Sung-wang, or San-ko-lin-sin, as he is known to Europeans. Upon receipt of the orders from Nankin, the Chung-wang was compelled to forsake all the important advantages he had gained, and derive no benefit from the series of victories he had achieved, by abandoning every captured position and precipitately returning to the capital.

The Ti-ping forces had quite lately reached a fertile part of the country, where they were recruiting and gradually recovering from the hardships endured throughout the previous march. From the edge of the river Yang-tze, in the vicinity where the army first crossed from Nankin, throughout a naturally sterile country, for a distance of more than three hundred miles, the retreating Imperialists had devastated everything far and near, so as to stay the advance of the Ti-pings by the deadly medium of famine. Every rice-field, farm, and plantation were destroyed and made a desert waste, so that not the smallest article of food could be obtained. Fortunately the Chung-wang's commissariat was well supplied, so his troops were able to traverse the desolated regions without very much suffering, and by quick movements to limit the devastation to an extent of three hundred miles.

At the time, however, when the Chung-wang received his orders to return to Nankin, the supplies of his army had become well nigh exhausted, and the urgent tone of the despatches made an immediate retreat so imperative, that no delay to gather in the standing crops or otherwise collect a sufficient quantity of provisions was possible.

Besides the fall of Tait-san, Quin-san, &c., and the presence of several "Vampyre" ships at Shanghae, where others were momentarily arriving, other dangers menaced the Ti-pings; namely, either the destruction of their best army by starvation, or the prevention of its retreat to Nankin, by the immense fleet of Imperialist gunboats threatening the city.

Since the fall of Ngan-king (towards the close of the year 1861), the Imperialists had gradually approached along both banks of the river, until at last they managed to capture every place up to the walls of Nankin. This result was accomplished entirely by the presence of the well-equipped and innumerable flotilla of row-galleys, just at the period the Ti-ping Government was alarmed by the loss of Tait-san and Quin-san. But though the revolutionists were unable to dispute the supremacy on the great river, simply because they were entirely destitute of war vessels, they held the

country within five miles of the water for a considerable distance above Nankin on the south bank of the Yang-tze.

The army commanded by the Chung-wang consisted principally of veteran troops, natives of the south of China, who originally joined the movement, and was by far the best in the Ti-ping service. Its strength of fighting men was not less than 50,000, while numberless refugees, prisoners, coolies, and others, far more than doubled those figures.

From the intelligence conveyed in his despatches, the General knew at once that only one course—an instant retreat by forced marches—was possible, either to save his army from destruction, or succour the hardly-pressed garrisons of the cities of the silk district. Gathering all the rice at hand, though it was quite unripe, and foraging everything that could be used as food, though a full treasury could have supplied them with suitable provisions had such been available in sufficient quantity, the army broke ground and commenced its disastrous return to Nankin. The supplies soon proved inadequate to last one half the distance to be traversed; consequently, this retreat proved more terribly destructive to the army than a dozen bad defeats would have been. The latter part of the forced marches these starving men had to perform led through desert places and low marshy ground; and, to add to the horrors of their situation, the Yang-tze having considerably overflowed its banks, the low country for a great distance inland was completely flooded. Through this, and many a weary mile of bamboo swamp, had the exhausted and starving Ti-pings to force their way.

Whenever a piece of firmer ground was reached, it could only be passed after defeating the Manchoo troops in occupation, who, well supplied with food, clothing, and boats, swarmed around the perishing and retreating army in thousands, now that it could be done with impunity. As the unfortunate Ti-pings approached nearer and nearer to the bank of the river, their sufferings (if possible) became increased. Frequently they came to places totally impassable except by swimming, and at such they had to cross exposed to the attacks of numerous squadrons of Imperialist gunboats, stationed at

every available position to cut off or harass their retreat. Can anything more dreadful than the state of these unhappy patriots be imagined? For nearly a month they had subsisted entirely upon the grass of the fields, the green tops of bamboo, and the bodies of the dead!—while their march lay through the mazes of dense bamboo jungle, and swamps of mud and water—frequently of a depth which prevented fording. During the whole of this fearful retreat, their rear, front, and flanks were incessantly harassed by the attacks of the cowardly and bloodthirsty enemy, who cruelly murdered hundreds of exhausted men, whom they were quite unable to withstand in fair fight. Thousands perished in this manner, and thousands more were horribly suffocated in the morasses, or drowned among the swamps. Who is responsible for all this misery and loss of life? It was *caused* entirely through British intervention, and the material aid given to the Manchoo. At last the leading division of the army made its appearance opposite Nankin, and then arose the difficulty of transporting it across the river.

During several days preceding the arrival of the remnant of the Chung-wang's troops, the enemy had maintained an incessant attack upon the batteries and forts commanding the passage of the river, and had particularly concentrated their efforts against a large fort on the opposite side, the capture of which would have placed the whole north bank in their hands, and would also have cut off all retreat. About a week previous, the *Anglo-Ti-ping*, with my old craft and three junks, had run the Imperial blockade and safely arrived at the Nankin creek, each heavily laden with rice and other provisions. My friend D—— had caught a passing steamer, and proceeded on to Shanghae upon business. P—— remained with the lorcha, and I joined him on board, taking my wife with me, as the Sz-wang and principal chiefs in the city had requested me to assist in the defence of the river forts. Directly the Imperialists became aware of the near approach of the Chung-wang's army, they began their attacks upon the fort on the other side of the river. This work, Kew-fu-chew, as the Ti-pings named it, was directly opposite the batteries (at the entrance of the creek) which extended along the

edge of the river, on the narrow strip of land forming the outer bank of the creek until it turned inland towards the city. These batteries mounted a number of heavy guns; though, as nearly all were of Chinese make—huge, unwieldy masses of iron, bigger than an English 68, but with the bore of only a 4 or 6-pounder—few were moveable or manageable. As a rule, until taught by Europeans, the Chinese are wretched artillerists, their guns being usually lashed firm in one position, from which they can neither be moved by the muzzle radius, nor breech-elevating principle; so that, be the object far or near, the guns are fired at the same range in every case. Among the many useless guns, the appearance of which had far more to do with frightening away the enemy than their effectiveness, I at last found five or six that were really serviceable—including an English naval 32-pounder, one 18-pounder, a large French cannon, and several fine brass Chinese guns. As there happened to be nearly thirty European and American trading vessels at the port, I managed to raise a corps of about twenty-five volunteers to work the artillery. My own lorchā carried two beautiful pivot-guns amidships, which proved of no little use during the different actions.

Regularly at daylight every morning the enemy would commence their attack upon Kew-fu-chew, and the smaller forts above the Sz-wang's position. Their plan of battle was well formed and very picturesque in appearance; successive squadrons of gunboats would sail down and engage the fort, delivering their fire; and then, filling away before a fair wind, returning to their position up the river. These vessels were assisted by others co-operating from below the Ti-ping lines; all being profusely decorated with gaudy flags, and propelled by numerous oars on either side.

The whole scene of battle formed a never-to-be-forgotten spectacle. The gallant appearance of the innumerable gunboats tacking down stream, and opening fire, one after the other, in regular order; some crossing in every direction, and others running back dead before the wind, with their broad and prettily-cut lateen sails stretching out on either side like a pair of snowy wings; the incessant roar of the cannonade; the flash of the guns; the curling

smoke, at first dense and impenetrable, and then dissolving into thin wreaths, gracefully circling round the rigging and the white sails; the steady reply from the flag-covered forts, now enveloped in clouds of sulphurous vapour, anon standing forth clear and sharply defined against the dark background formed by the waving bamboo; the peaceful current of the noble Yang-tze river—here narrowed to a point less than 1,800 yards across, though stretching far and wide immediately beyond on either side; the grim embattled walls of Nankin, towering over the plain a few miles distant; mountains of fantastic shape on every side—some near, impending and majestic; others, cloud-capped and dimly visible in the distance; the cheer and cry of battle mingling with the echo of artillery—all combined, produced an effect truly grand and imposing.

At last the garrison of Kew-fu-chew reported that the leading columns of the Chung-wang's army were in sight; upon which further reinforcements were instantly thrown into all the forts, while every boat was made ready for the purpose of transporting the approaching troops across the river. Even when they had arrived within sight of their capital, the sufferings of the unfortunate people were not completed until they had endured much more loss by the assaults of the enemy. Upon the arrival of the famished and emaciated troops at the brink of the river, they were saluted with one continuous cannonade from the gunboats that now found ample opportunities of slaughtering them as they crowded the bank for a distance of nearly two miles. With incredible fortitude they maintained their position, and did not flinch backward by the least perceptible movement; and, in the face of the terrible fire poured into their dense masses at point-blank range (mostly from *English* guns), proceeded to the work of embarkation as steadily as their weakened condition would permit.

Directly the first detachment appeared on the beach, I sailed over to help them with all my vessels, and getting a dozen Europeans on board the lorcha, worked her against the enemy with considerable effect. The fearful sights that met my gaze upon every part of the shore I shall never forget.

Very many of the weakest men, totally unable to assist themselves further, were left to die within sight of the goal for which they had striven so hard and suffered so greatly, their number being so large that their comrades were not sufficient to help, or get them over the river in the presence of the enemy. The horrible "thud" of the cannon shot crashing continuously among the living skeletons, so densely packed at places that they were swept off by the river, into which they were forced by the pressure from behind; the perfect immobility with which they confronted the death hurled upon them from more than a thousand gunboats; and the slow effort the exhausted survivors made to extricate themselves from the mangled bodies of their stricken comrades, were scenes awful to contemplate. It was dreadful to watch day after day during the time occupied in getting the remnant of that once splendid army across the river, with but little means to succour them, the lanes cut through the helpless multitude on the beach by the merciless fire of the enemy; all so passively endured. The gaunt, starved forms, and wild staring eyes of those who had laid themselves down to die, haunted me for many a future night.

Frequently during the passage of the river, some small boat, with its scarcely living freight, would be drifted away from the protection of the Nankin batteries by the strength of the tide, the overcrowded boat being too heavily laden to be moved quickly enough by the weakened arms of the rowers. Whenever such an event took place, the mandarin boats would dart upon their defenceless prey, and immediately chop off the heads of all on board in the most brutal manner, throwing the bodies of the victims into the river within sight of their comrades, who were totally unable to assist them. In these cases the poor fellows struggled and fought against their murderers with the energy of despair, as desperately as their enfeebled condition would permit; but this was of little avail, for nearly all their fire-arms were rendered useless, the powder being saturated with water, while they were far too weak to wield other weapons effectively.

I received the Chung-wang on board my vessel, and carried him to the Nankin side, when he had seen the greater part of his surviving troops safely across the river. My comrade, L——, was with him, also the Sardinian officer of the late Ling-ho's regiment; but I never saw my brave lieutenant, Phillip Bosse, again: he had fallen at the head of the Chung-wang's guards, while gallantly protecting the retreat of the main body.

Upon the twelfth day all who could be saved were across the Yang-tze, and under the friendly shadow of the Nankin walls, whilst, on the other side of the river, none remained but the garrison of the fort and the numerous bodies of those who had perished of hunger or had been slaughtered by the enemy. At last all seemed laid in the sleep of death, until some poor wretch would suddenly crawl to the brink of the desired water, and then fall into the swift current either to quench his burning thirst or terminate his agony.

Even now the bleached skeletons of many thousands of these unfortunate victims to British intervention may be seen in the positions in which they fell, waiting for the hand of decay to obliterate the last sad trace of their existence.

The Chung-wang's army had formed the best and bravest part of the whole Ti-ping forces; in fact, his troops were the *élite* of the whole military organization, being principally composed of veterans who had joined the cause from its infancy, and to whom defeat was really unknown. A great proportion of the original nucleus of the revolution was included in its ranks, consisting of the men from Kwang-tung, Kwang-si, and the Miau-tze, who, inspired with the religious enthusiasm so conducive to the wonderful success which attended the earlier stages of the Ti-ping movement, and imbued with that spirit of chivalry which defied all obstacles, dreaded no dangers, and endured cruel torture, became the true champions of the great religious and political Chinese revolution. Unless Christendom chooses to deny the theory that Asia is to be Christianized by a process similar to the manner in which it was itself converted from Heathenism, it is impossible to dispute the fact that Hung-sui-tshuen and his followers have commenced a work that shall

never perish nor be forgotten. The very fact that the leaders of the Ti-ping movement, from the first day of its existence, forced their tenets upon the sage contempt of the literati, the general repugnance of the people, and the well-known hatred of the innumerable Manchoo employés, proves most convincingly that it was a holy element which animated those chiefs and their followers, and which induced them to forsake the theories of their ancient and deeply venerated sages, to rely upon the help and attributes of an Eternal Judge.

Unfortunately, by the disastrous retreat to Nankin, the Ti-pings lost the greater proportion of those adherents whose religious fervour has induced me to compare them to the heroes and champions of the early Christian Church. There are doubtless those who, from their self-erected pinnacle of righteousness, will prove sceptics as to the reality of Ti-ping Christianity; but I trust all who have had the patience to accompany me through this history will consider that point effectually proved in favour of the revolutionists.

The remnant of the Chung-wang's army scarcely amounted to 15,000 effective men, and from this number reinforcements had to be thrown into Nankin, Soo-chow, Chang-chow, Wu-sie, and other cities menaced by the enemy; consequently, when the General-in-Chief proceeded to the districts invaded by the Anglo-Franco-Manchoo mercenaries in the neighbourhood of Soo-chow, he was not accompanied by more than 7,000 troops; yet with this small force he managed to keep the overwhelming numbers of the enemy for some time at bay, to control and reassure many garrisons wavering in loyalty, and to protect a great extent of frontier. Had his once splendid army been intact and serviceable, the Imperialists and their allies would have to tell a very different tale to that of the expulsion of the Ti-pings from their former territory.

On the day succeeding the passage of the last surviving troops across the river, the enemy seemed determined to vent his wrath at their escape by a general attack upon all the fortifications. From early morning the assailants

had swarmed down in countless gunboats, covering the whole expanse of the Yang-tze, and completely hiding the fort of Kew-fu-chew from our view by the dense clouds of smoke proceeding from their ceaseless bombardment. The adverse flotilla in the neighbourhood of Nankin was closely estimated at a strength of 3,000 gunboats of all sizes, some carrying only one light gun in the bow, others mounting four or five rather heavy cannon.

The Imperialists maintained their attack with much vigour and determination until late at night. Throughout the day we were unable to do much harm to them, their vessels being nearly always perfectly concealed by smoke, so that our guns could only be pointed at chance range. The roar from nearly 2,000 pieces of artillery was terrific and deafening beyond description. As night closed in we were enabled to make much better practice from our batteries by noticing the flashes of the enemy's guns, and aiming in the direction indicated. At about 10 p.m. our fire proved so effective that the whole fleet relinquished the attack and retreated both up and down the river. Owing to the vast number of gunboats which were crowded together in the comparatively small space between the Nankin batteries and the fort opposite, our fire must have inflicted severe loss, yet they persisted in the engagement with a courage I have never before or afterwards seen equalled by troops of the Manchoo Government.

In spite of this resolute attack, the Ti-pings garrisoning the fortifications were singularly indifferent, and laughed to scorn the idea that the *Ya-mun-qui* (Mandarin-palace devils, as they delighted to call them) could ever capture any outwork of Nankin. When I remonstrated with the old Kung-wang about the negligent guard at night, he replied: "I have held these forts for twelve years, and, unless Tien-voo deserts me, shall hold them twelve years more, so far as the 'Imps' are concerned." That very night, or rather morning, he found occasion to regret his overweening confidence.

The lurid glare of battle during the early night, the thunder of artillery, the crashing of shot, the fiery track of the arrow-headed rockets, followed by the occasional explosion of a gunboat, the whole din and prospect of tumult,

had died away, and been replaced by the deathlike calm of a beautiful summer's night. Dirty, begrimed with powder, and fatigued with labour and excitement, my party of European volunteers, L—— (who had remained on board our lorcha), Captain P——, and myself, took advantage of the quiet interval and retired to rest. Unfortunately for us, the deceitful calm proved doubly treacherous.

Tap, tap, went the bamboo signals of the solitary sentinels around the forts under whose shadow our vessel rode silently at anchor; tum, tum, sounded the drums of the guards ensconced in the little look-out houses perched along the walls; and at last these monotonous echoes, sharply distinguished from out the surrounding stillness, proved irresistibly somniferous; gradually they became fainter and less frequent, and then ceased altogether.

How long our sleep lasted I do not know, but suddenly I was aroused by the crashing roar of artillery seemingly right alongside our vessel. At the same moment I heard my friends start up in the adjoining cabin, and together we rushed on deck.

Daylight was just dawning, but it was not required to enlighten the scenes taking place around. The water, neighbouring shore, and forts, were illuminated by the red glare of war. Above and below on the river; outside the batteries; on the broad arm of the Yang-tze, running past the Nankin creek and forming Tasohea Island; everywhere, in fact, the gunboats of the enemy were upon us in countless numbers; while the vivid and repeated flashes of their artillery made the air alive with bright coruscations. Early on the morning of June 28, 1863, the Imperialists made their daring and partially successful *coup de main*. In dense lines, completely covering the broad expanse of the river, they had pulled rapidly down stream; running the gauntlet of the stronger forts held by the Sze and Kung Wangs, and making the weaker ones just beyond the entrance of the Nankin creek the object of their attack. Each gunboat maintained a very quick fire of cannon, heavy gingals, rockets, fire-arrows, and every description of missile known in

China, many of which took effect among the light-built houses inside the larger forts. On the other hand, the Ti-pings were entirely taken by surprise; the guns of the river forts were not loaded, and, being heavy, could not be quickly enough worked, or sufficiently depressed to obtain more than a couple of rounds before the last division of the enemy had swept past, the first having run by, and entered the channel between Tasohea Island and the mainland, almost before the alarm was given. The few shots that were delivered inflicted great havoc among the closely-packed gunboats right under the muzzles of the heavy artillery in the Kung-wang's fort; and the yellow waters of the mighty Yang-tze engulfed many a shattered man and vessel, while pieces of wreck were strewed upon the surface, and swiftly borne away to excite the wonder of distant villagers on the banks of the rapid river.



DAY & SON (LIMITED) LITH.  
IMPERIALIST ATTACK ON THE RIVER FORTS AT NANKIN

When off Theodolite Point, hundreds of the war-boats pulled inside the island, and made a dash upon the small forts on the mainland, and the foreign trading vessels anchored in the channel; while many soldiers, landing from others, captured the works on the end of the island, killing man, woman, and child, as the affrighted people rushed from their houses

and attempted to escape. The small forts, being surrounded by overwhelming numbers, were quickly taken and then set on fire. Three large war-junks defending the mouth of the Nankin creek were also fired by the enemy, before their crews were fairly awake or had time to deliver a second broadside. At this moment I rushed on deck with my comrades. Our lorchha was lying close astern of the last *Ti-mung*, or war-junk, and many European craft were at anchor closer to Tasohea Island, and nearer to the main river; some of these I saw boarded by the Imperialists, who instantly murdered the few Europeans, plundered the vessels, and then set them on fire.

I saw at a glance that nothing but instant flight could save our lives, if it were not already too late. The gunboats were everywhere around, firing away indiscriminately in all directions. Fortunately our old junk was fast alongside the lorchha, which was far too heavy to escape from smaller craft; so abandoning the latter, containing all our property and nearly everything we had in the world, with my wife and friends I went on board the lighter vessel. We then cut her adrift and tried to escape down the channel. The land on each side being occupied by hostile troops, and the upper part of the channel leading into the river being crowded with their war-boats, it was the only course open.

At the moment we shoved off and left the *Anglo-Ti-ping* to her fate, several gunboats boarded her from the opposite side, while others poured a terrible fire into our old junk, whose decks were covered with grape-shot, which had fallen harmless, from the hurried loading of our assailants.

While all around seemed a mass of fire and flame, the daylight obscured by the dense pall of smoke above, the earth shaken by the ceaseless cannonade below, and while the fiery track of rockets, accompanied by their hissing sound, and the "wheep" of the shot whistling everywhere about, kept up the jubilee of war and destruction, we had drifted with the tide a few cables' length away from the lorchha, and made sail to the light though freshening breeze that offered our only chance of escape.

A squall of wind was parting the heavy volume of smoke and fire, and coming towards us, when a number of gunboats appeared in full chase, keeping up a very heavy fire, the crew of the nearest throwing stink-pots, with which they managed to ignite our mainsail. I was just turning to my dear wife to hurry her below, when a volley of musketry was poured in by the troops on board the attacking vessels. I saw my faithful friend and companion, L——, fall to the deck, but almost at the same moment, struck by a spent ball, I became senseless.

I know not what period may have elapsed, but when at length I was restored to consciousness, it was but to realize the exquisite bitterness of my loss. Close to where my best and long-proved friend had fallen, lay the lifeless form of my well-loved wife, pierced by a flight of bullets.

## FOOTNOTES:

41. Alluding to Admiral Sherrard Osborne's 'Vampyre' fleet.

42. Since the loss of Nankin, and all their former cities, through British hostility, this has resulted to a certain extent only; for still, with wonderful forbearance, the Ti-pings have not begun to ravage the country, their moderation in the neighbourhood of Amoy, where they now are in force, being well known.

43. In honour of the Holy Trinity.

44. The officiating priest.

45. It is hardly to be understood how dishonourable men are "worthy a more honourable death."

46. Table of Ti-ping loss of life.

47. *Vide* pp. 126 and 108, Blue Book on China, No. 3, 1864, for Dr. Murtagh's letter, and the attestation by Bishop Boone and the Bishop of Victoria of the statements of two other eye-witnesses.

48. *Vide* Blue Book on China, No. 3, 1864 p. 111.

## CHAPTER XXII.

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On the Wong-poo River.—Ningpo Sam.—The *China*.—Her passengers.—The Ta-hoo Lake.—Its Scenery.—The Canals of Central China.—General Burgevine.—Soo-chow.—Deserters.—Burgevine suspected.—The Americo-Ti-ping Legions.—Burgevine's policy.—Colonel Morton.—The Mo-wang.—Arrival of the Chung-wang.—The Loyal and Faithful Auxiliary Legion.—How regulated.—Affair at Wo-kong.—Recruiting.—Plan of Operations.—A *coup de main*.—Arrangement.—Interruptions.—Postponed.

Towards the close of a fine October day in 1863, an ordinary Shanghae *san-pan*, or passage-boat, might have been seen slowly sculling up-stream against the ebbing tide of the Wong-poo river, and carefully hugging the bank opposite to the foreign settlements. Besides the hardy Chinese owner (working away with a big oar over the stern, and rejoicing in the euphonical cognomen "Ningpo Sam"), the boat was occupied by two foreigners, seated under the arched mat cover. One seemed to be of Anglo-Saxon race; the other, by his dusky skin, long moustache, and jet-black hair, a native of the East Indies.

To a close observer there was something suspicious in the management of the *san-pan* and the movements of the people on board. All passing craft were carefully avoided, and whenever a European ship on the river, or European dwelling on the shore, was approached, down came the outside mat from the cover, screening the front of the boat, and completely hiding the two passengers inside. If the observer had been near enough, he might have been further edified by hearing sundry energetic expressions addressed by the irritable foreigners to "Ningpo Sam," whenever that stolid individual did not sheer his boat sufficiently far from strange vessels to preserve their incognito.

As the shades of evening fell upon the shipping on the river and the trees on the shore, the strength of the tide gradually relaxed, and the *san-pan* proceeded much more rapidly on her course. The see-saw rocking from side to side became less vigorous and unpleasant as the arms of the sculler were tired, and at last, when a point nearly three miles above Shanghae had been reached, "Ningpo Sam" ran his boat into the bank, threw down the heavy *yulo*, or oar, and emphatically declared his determination not to proceed any further until he had satisfied the cravings of his inner man with the *chow-chow* (to "che fan"—eat rice—as he said), bubbling over a little cooking stove in the stern-sheets.

The Chinese are an obstinate people; some are essentially mulish, and "Ningpo Sam" seemed to be of the latter order; consequently his passengers very wisely produced a large hamper, and hauling bottles of beer, with a cold fowl, *et cæteras*, from its innermost depths, were soon busily engaged eating and drinking. By the time the hamper had been repacked night had closed in, but still the boatman's capacious jaws went "munch, munch." Meanwhile the dark-hued passenger, having lighted a cigar, was taking a fisherman's quarter-deck walk—that is to the extent of two steps and overboard—on the small fore-part of the *san-pan*. The second traveller reclined on the thwartship seat, and seemed absorbed with his own reflections, plainly not of the most happy tenor. He was far from being displeased when his companion aroused him by exclaiming:

"Jump up, sir; jump up; the steamer is coming!" and then shouting to the Chinaman, still feeding in the stern, "Yulo, yulo, Sam!"

Sam, however, did not seem at all inclined to obey the summons; upon the contrary, he jerked the rice into his mouth and handled his chopsticks more vigorously than ever, spluttering out at intervals "Hi-ya!—how can?—my—wantchee chow-chow—no can yulo—just—now; by-em-by—finish chow-chow—can—do."

Upon the termination of this cool reply, the European passenger passed to the after-part of the boat, and with the assistance of a stout cane,

succeeded in making "Ningpo Sam" forsake gorging and resume his oar, much to that worthy's disgust, who, for some time, gave vent to his outraged feelings by a low-toned muttering of choice Ningpo "Billingsgate," which, however, excited not the smallest attention from the abused parties, who were intent upon the approaching steamer.

When the steamer had arrived quite near, the Indian produced a bright bull's-eye lantern and displayed it for a few moments. This was answered by a light shown over the vessel's side, and by the stoppage of her engines. The *san-pan* was then sculled alongside, and her passengers taken on board. Directly the baggage had been received, the ship went on ahead at full speed, while "Ningpo Sam" and his boat disappeared in the distance, his gratified expectations finding vent in the following adieu: "Chin-chin, ga-la! *Numbah one*, massa; mi too much thankee you."

Soon the loud protestations of gratitude died away in the distance, and the only sound which disturbed the stillness of the cool night air was the regular beat of the screw propeller, as the small steamer steadily proceeded on her course.

The little steamer was named the *China*, belonged to Messrs. H—— & Co., of Shanghae, and was employed in the silk trade. This valuable branch of commerce was wholly in the hands of the Ti-pings, and unrestricted until their expulsion from the producing districts, when the Imperial Manchoo mandarins closed the interior to foreigners, and the trading of steamers or other vessels was entirely prohibited.<sup>49</sup>

The passengers who so mysteriously embarked themselves were on their way to Soo-chow. One was General Burgevine's *aide-de-camp*, the other being myself. Burgevine had quite lately put into execution his plan to join the revolutionists, and was established at the large city of Soo-chow in command of ninety to one hundred Europeans, and a batallion of 1,000 Ti-pings, placed under his orders to be drilled according to foreign tactics, and officered by their instructors. Burgevine's *aide* was proceeding to join his master. I was anxious to ascertain the principles and practical worth of the

newly-formed Americo-Ti-ping contingent, and also to rejoin the Chung-wang.

The voyage of the *China* terminated at the town of Nan-zing, situated almost in the centre of the silk district; and here she remained while the Chinese supercargo went into the country with many thousands of dollars to purchase silk; the regions under Ti-ping rule being so safe to travel, that all the vast amount of specie (from 8 to 10 millions sterling per annum) used during each season was carried about the country simply under the protection of the Chinese *shroff*, employed by the firm to whom the money belonged.

Having obtained a fine large boat from the Governor of Nan-zing—a most friendly and courteous chief—I proceeded with my companion on our way to Soo-chow. Although the direct distance was not much over fifty miles, in consequence of the capture of Quin-san, and another city named Wo-kong, by the enemy, the approaches to Soo-chow from the east and south were not available; so that we were obliged to cross the great Ta-hoo Lake, and reach the provincial capital by making a considerable *détour* to the west. The Ta-hoo, though so extensive that from its centre no land but the highest mountains can be seen, has nowhere more than an average depth of twelve feet; and in many parts its waters are so encumbered with floating weeds and interwoven stems of tough aquatic plants growing from the bottom, that navigation is impossible. The lake, similar to every piece of water in China, swarms with fish; thereby affording constant employment to numerous congregations of fishermen. These men, like their brethren of the sea-coast, clan together, and are by no means averse to a little piracy upon a favourable occasion; we were consequently compelled to keep a sharp look-out while passing through the lake; and, when at anchor during the second night, at least fifty miles from land, we were under the necessity of firing into a number of boats that bore right down upon us in a very suspicious manner. My Indian comrade had three cases of rifles, and one of revolvers, which he was taking to Soo-chow for his master's force, and of these we had

loaded a sufficient number to repel any attack, unless made by overwhelming numbers; therefore, when the advancing boats were suddenly received by thirty or forty shots fired within as many seconds, they quickly "topped their booms" and sheered off.

The scenery of the Ta-hoo is inconceivably grand and varied. Mountains rise to a wondrous height; limestone rocks—worn into the most grotesque shapes—project into the clear waters of the lake; valleys of great beauty intersect the densely wooded hills and jagged sterile mountains; while murmuring rivulets sweep past secluded villages, on their journey to the broad, though shallow, waters of the lake. One of the most beautiful and romantic regions in all China is that extent of country situated to the north-east, north, and north-west of the Ta-hoo. Being of a mountainous nature, it is termed by the Chinese "Tung-shan," or the Eastern Hills. After sailing past the three largest islands on the lake, famous for producing the finest silk in the empire, we reached the most easterly part of the Tung-ting district. This had long been celebrated for the splendour of its mandarin palaces and heathen temples; but, when I visited the once-admired locality, its glories had departed, for the grand edifices of Tartar magnate and Pagan god were alike levelled with the dust; the Ti-ping was the dominant power, and its iconoclasm and hatred of the Manchoo had been practically manifested by the destruction of the monumental buildings, alike degrading to the patriotism and the religion of the nation. The villages and isolated cottages which studded the picturesque valleys still remained; and, by their life and prosperity, offered a striking contrast to the desolation of palace and temple.



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VIEW FROM THE SUMMIT OF A MOUNTAIN IN THE WESTERN TUNG-SHAN  
DISTRICT ON  
THE NORTHERN SHORE OF THE TA-HOO LAKE, PROVINCE OF KEANG-SU

Passing on to the Western Tung-shan district, we reached the wildest and most imposing region I have seen, either in China or any other part of the world. Far removed from the noisy haunts of men, and peopled with but a few solitary hamlets, it reposed in its romantic beauty, undisturbed save by

the voice of Nature, and undefiled by the hand of man. Drawing our boat on to a long sandy beach, I wandered through the wild and lonely region for some hours with my dark companion, who I found could appreciate Nature's beauties more truly than many with a whiter skin. I rambled through the silent valleys and almost impenetrable forests of the Tung-shan, impressed with the solemn feeling that I trod where mortal foot had not fallen before. The landscape was most varied in its nature: massive mountains, peaceful valleys; wild and desolate cliffs; foaming cataracts, and then the calm and shaded waters of the lake; while the waving of the thick forest, the verdant and feathery bamboos; the water-lilies stretching wide on the surface of the lake; the wild orange-trees, and sweetly-perfumed shrubs and flowers blooming around, completed an almost unrivalled picture. After leaving this exquisite scenery, and just before entering the creek by which we were to reach Soo-chow, we passed underneath a great natural arch of rock, projecting some 90 feet into the lake, with a height of nearly 150, and joined to a second small arch on the outside.

This singular formation of rock lies on the border of the Ta-hoo, about forty miles to the north-west of Soo-chow, and is an object particularly noticed in the legendary lore of the superstitious natives.

After leaving the lake, our journey lay through a complete network of those interminable creeks, lagoons, and canals intersecting the whole of south and central China. Some were broad and river-like, spanned by handsome, many-arched bridges, the banks covered with fine houses and regular pathways; others were narrow, tortuous, almost hidden by rank vegetation and long drooping osiers, and crossed by bridges composed of a rough slab of granite laid horizontally upon the ends of two upright blocks, and elevated scarcely six feet from the water. Wherever we passed, the country people complained bitterly of the foreign soldiers (meaning Gordon's, D'Aguibelle's, and other mercenary legions) coming to fight the Ti-pings; they were all long-haired and happy under the new *régime*; they were naturally averse to lose their heads because the British Government

chose to support the oppressive and merciless Manchoo; and many of the finest grain-producing districts having been captured by the allied Anglo-Franco-Manchoo forces, together with a number of the principal Ti-ping granaries, a vast influx of destitute refugees added considerably to the daily increasing distress caused by the scarcity and exorbitant price of food.

When at last, after threading miles of creek and canal, I reached Soo-chow, I found that I had arrived at the moment of an important crisis—no less an event, indeed, than the dissolution of the short-lived Americo-Ti-ping contingent. This, however, was a matter of no surprise to me, as I had never placed the slightest faith in the composition and motives of the force, nor felt the least hope from its formation. Burgevine, its originator and commander, like Gordon, the uncommissioned *General* of the Anglo-Manchoo force, was essentially a mercenary and filibuster; the only principle of either seems to have been an absorbing selfishness and care for personal interest, doubtless a very natural sentiment upon the part of the cosmopolitan adventurer, but not a trait to be admired in the character of the British officer. Such a principle, when supported by the material power of the British Government, succeeded very well with those who allied themselves with the Manchoo, simply because the latter were treacherous, thoroughly mercenary, hated foreigners with a bitter intensity, and would naturally enough have suspected any *apparently* disinterested assistance, as a means of rendering any of them liable to distasteful obligations. The British authorities took particular care to prevent any mistake with regard to their motives, for they always stated that they were solely interfering in their own interest, so the Manchoo rejoicingly obtained a large revenue from the foreign merchants, and then handed back a portion to pay the British indemnity, which has proved the salvation of their dynasty, by in a great measure causing the alliance against the Ti-ping.

Upon reaching the west gate of Soo-chow, we were very kindly welcomed by the guard, and were furnished with an escort to the commandant's palace. The city I found to be strongly garrisoned by veteran troops; new flanking stone works were being built against the outer face of

the high walls; handsome buildings were being erected inside; provisions were very plentiful; the soldiery and civilians seemed in high spirits, and quite ridiculed the idea of losing their city; in fact, excepting the distant report of artillery, Soo-chow had no more the aspect of a besieged place than London has at the present moment, neither did its capture by the enemy thundering at its defences seem even probable.

When we arrived at the commandant Mo-wang's palace, a number of wounded Europeans belonging to Burgevine's contingent were being carried inside. These men proved to be the survivors of a series of accidents that had occurred two days previously, when the whole force, accompanied by a division of Ti-pings under the Chung-wang, and the little steamer *Ka-joor*, which Burgevine had seized from the Imperialists and carried off to Soo-chow, had attacked a position of the enemy established about twenty miles to the east of the city. The expedition was at first successful, having turned the flank of the Imperialist stockades and captured a flotilla of twenty-six large gunboats; but, almost immediately afterwards, by the carelessness—some say drunkenness—of the Europeans working the *Ka-joor*'s pivot-gun, her magazine was ignited, the explosion blowing the fore part of the vessel to pieces, and badly wounding several of the crew.

Soon after this catastrophe, *General* Burgevine landed a battery from the gunboats accompanying him (the principal way of communication being by water), and opened fire on the stockades, held by a force of disciplined Anglo-Manchoo mercenaries commanded by *Colonel* Rhode,<sup>50</sup> and a number of Imperialist *braves*. The enemy were just being driven out of their intrenchments, and a storming party advancing to take them, when the largest of the prizes—a gunboat, full of powder, shells, &c., and mounting six cannon, and in which the wounded from the steamer had been placed—blew up; the fire from her explosion communicating with four more of the captured vessels, they were also blown to pieces, killing outright twelve, and dangerously wounding seventeen of the sixty or seventy Europeans present. These disasters were caused by the free use of the liquors taken from the

wreck of the *Ka-joor*—officers and men alike indulging, and the whole affair forcibly illustrating the *rowdy*, disorderly nature of the Americo-Tiping legion. It is stated, and not without strong reason, that Burgevine himself was in a state of intoxication; still he has this excuse—the pain and debilitating effect produced by an old and terrible wound (received in the service of the ungrateful Manchoo), rendered the use of stimulants necessary.

After the accidents we have just noticed, the attack upon the Imperialist position was abandoned, and the force retired upon Soo-chow, carrying off the wounded and the remainder of the prizes.

As the Mo-wang was outside the city, and Burgevine had not returned with the wounded men, I proceeded to one of the gates with a party of the latter's officers, in order to go to the front of the Ti-ping outworks, where it was expected they would be found. When we had arrived at the gate, however, we were not allowed to pass by the soldiers on guard. This was the first intimation I received that affairs were going wrong with the auxiliary force, and that the Ti-pings were suspicious of their foreign allies. At night, it appeared, they were not without reason for their want of confidence, for, after Burgevine and the Mo-wang had returned, *Colonel* Morton, the second in command of the contingent, was reported absent against orders, with all the Europeans outside the city. When this fact was ascertained, Burgevine and the officers with him seemed certain that the absentees had gone over to the enemy; in fact, I soon understood that the intention for the whole force to desert had been on the *tapis* for some little time, only Morton and his companions had, however, taken the opportunity to get clear themselves and leave their co-adjudors in the lurch.

Previous to this report I had obtained an interview with the Mo-wang, and then dined with him. He informed me that the Chung-wang was encamped with an army outside the city; he also gave me to understand the nature of his suspicions against Burgevine, in all of which I entirely agreed with him. After explaining the caution rendered necessary in all dealings

with foreigners, because of the treachery and bad faith with which they had always acted towards the Ti-pings—as particularly exemplified by the English breaches of guaranteed neutrality, non-observance of the pledge to prevent Manchoo expeditions equipping at Shanghae, capture of Ningpo by the British, French, and piratical flotilla, &c.—he proceeded to specify his reasons for dissatisfaction with the foreign contingent.

In the first place, he spoke about the extraordinary conduct of Burgevine himself, who, he declared, had made numerous promises, none of which had been fulfilled. That officer had guaranteed to obtain men, arms, and co-operation from Shanghae; large sums of money had been supplied for the purpose, but the only return had been many cases of brandy, brought by him after several visits to that city, and with which both officers and men were made incapable. All the money had been squandered or mysteriously lost, and not a single musket had been shown for the large expenditure. Then it appeared that Burgevine and many of his officers continued to wear the uniform of the Ward force, which they had only left shortly before joining the Ti-pings; while, to place themselves in a still more suspicious position, they made a practice of visiting at night their old friends in the hostile lines occupied by Gordon's troops. This conduct made the chiefs distrust the loyalty of their auxiliaries and fear some organized treachery. Another ground of suspicion was the fact that Burgevine kept his men aloof and distinct from the people he came to serve, at the same time striving to induce the chiefs to sanction his formation of an independent force. This was certainly a bad way to gain the confidence of men so often deceived by foreigners, so accustomed to community of interests, and so much imbued with the religious and patriotic enthusiasm of their cause. Moreover, the Ti-ping leaders had quickly penetrated the selfish and mercenary motives of their unsatisfactory allies, and naturally felt but little faith in their services; neither were they mean enough to desire the support of such ignoble assistance, nor pander to it after the style of their more unscrupulous antagonists.

Regardless of all principles of honour and chivalry, directly the Americo-Ti-ping legionaries found that they could not reckon upon external support, large pay, and much booty, they were not a little disappointed; having no heart in the service they had suddenly adopted, they became discontented and anxious to desert a failing cause for some more congenial and *profitable* employment. *They* were certainly not Quixotic enough to fight for honour, glory, or the freedom and religious liberty of a vast empire without some substantial pecuniary recompense.

Out of a strength of 125 Europeans, not more than twenty were of any use to the revolutionists; these few comprised men who were able to drill and organize a disciplined force, and others who were good artillerists; the remainder being sailors and vagrants, totally unacquainted with the smell of powder, and not so useful in the field as the worst coolie spearmen of the Ti-ping army; these facts were also inimical to the existence of the force.

When, added to the circumstances just reviewed, the paroxysms of temporary insanity (during an attack of which he wounded one of his best officers), or the natural extravagance and obliquity of character of the commanding officer himself, and the dissensions among his subordinates, are considered, the failure of Burgevine's enterprise is fully accounted for.<sup>51</sup>

In the evening, after Morton's absence had been reported, the Mo-wang, accompanied by several of his chiefs, proceeded to Burgevine's quarters and spent several hours in conversation with him. I was present during this interview, and was favourably impressed by the magnanimous and friendly temper of the commandant, who, despite the ample provocation he had received from the suspicious and unsatisfactory conduct of the auxiliaries, declared his intention to supply them with money on the succeeding day, and to make any arrangements which would tend to harmonize, gratify, or prosper the future welfare of the force. That these promises would have been faithfully executed by the Mo-wang, Burgevine has himself testified.

After the departure of the commandant, Burgevine, with some of his favourite officers, talked over their proposed desertion from the Ti-pings, as

a long-arranged and premeditated affair, their motive for this determination being the fact that their present service did not seem likely to prove so easy and advantageous as they had expected. In the course of conversation the *General* personally informed me that his intention had been to raise a large body of disciplined and well-armed Ti-pings, and then to convert them into an independent force, acting upon his private account; that is to say, he joined the revolution with the intention of ultimately deserting it, and proceeding upon a career of filibustering through China. This wild scheme he also mentioned to *General* Gordon, of the Imperialist mercenaries, proposing that they should mutually desert their colours, join forces, and commence a system of independent conquest. Whether this and other equally extravagant notions were caused by mental derangement, consequent upon the effects of his wound and the stimulants he used, or may be attributed to his natural character, seems doubtful; but whatever may have been the cause of *General* Burgevine's reckless conduct, it is quite certain that he sacrificed a splendid opportunity to insure the success of the Ti-ping revolution. Had he at first heartily espoused the movement, and unreservedly amalgamated his men with its members, he would infallibly have obtained the confidence of the chiefs. He could then have organized a disciplined and foreign-officered force far superior in material to the Imperialist auxiliary legions, and these latter were the only forces of the enemy that the Ti-pings had the slightest occasion to dread.

On the morning of the day succeeding my arrival at Soo-chow, intelligence came into the city to the effect that, at about 4.30 a.m., *Colonel* Morton had deserted with the detachment of Europeans under his command, and gone over to the enemy, Morton shooting two soldiers of an outlying picket who came to warn him of his vicinity to the Imperialist lines. By this act of cowardly treachery, deserting his own colleagues and the wounded in the city, he placed them in much jeopardy, and caused the Mo-wang to feel very great exasperation, and strongly to suspect further treachery from the remainder of the contingent. However, he proved himself to be a more

noble-minded and merciful man than any of the traitors left behind imagined, by offering free passes and boats to any and all who might wish to leave the city; at the same time he expressed great disgust and contempt at the mean, dastardly conduct of Morton and his followers, because he had always made the fact public, that any foreigner wishing to leave Soo-chow had simply to express the desire, when everything necessary in the way of boats, passes, &c., would be furnished to the confines of the Ti-ping territory.

When the fact of *Colonel* Morton's desertion became established, I must confess that, well as I thought I understood the noble character of the Ti-ping chiefs, I feared the remainder of the traitors might meet with condign punishment. In consequence, I at once sought an audience with the Mo-wang, and having obtained it, requested that he would not wreak any vengeance upon Burgevine and his companions. To my surprise, although the inferior chiefs and officers were greatly excited about the treachery of their foreign allies, the commandant instantly gave me to understand that my fear was groundless. "Puh pa! puh pa!" (do not fear, do not fear), he said. "These men joined me willingly and with clean faces" (*i.e.* honour); "they can leave if they wish to do so, in like manner; but if they sneak away to the Imps, they will lose face, and so shall I."

Just at this moment Burgevine's interpreter came into the hall and informed the Mo-wang that he was commissioned to ask liberty for the remainder of the force to depart from the city and return to Shanghae. The chief readily professed his compliance with this request, but said that he could not definitively settle anything until the arrival of his superior, the Chung-wang, whom he expected in the city towards evening to consult upon the affair.

Meanwhile, with the exception of a dozen who were old adherents of the Ti-ping king, the foreigners were in a great state of ferment, for they fully expected the momentary appearance of executioners to cut off their heads. Some were drinking *samshoo* to encourage themselves; others proposed

fortifying their quarters; while a few of the boldest advocated sallying forth and attempting to force their way out of the city. The groans of more than twenty wounded men, some horribly burnt by the late explosion of the steamer and the gunboats, rendered pathetic an otherwise ridiculous scene.

Early in the evening the Chung-wang arrived, escorted by 1,000 men of his body-guard, and at once proceeded to a council with the Mo-wang and other chiefs. When their deliberations were concluded, I presented myself to the Chung-wang, who, together with the Sze, Le, and Foo-wangs (they having accompanied him from Nankin), received me with great manifestations of pleasure, having all concluded that I had been killed at the disastrous loss of the outer Nankin forts. I have hitherto forgotten to mention that my faithful interpreter, A-ling, was still with me. He also met with a very kind reception from the chiefs, for they appreciated his services, and knew that he was warmly attached to their cause.

Immediately upon my arrival at Soo-chow, I had determined, if possible, to raise another body of Europeans, with whom to form a disciplined Ti-ping force, for I saw that the dissolution of Burgevine's legion was near at hand. Still, after the irritation the chiefs must have felt at the treachery of their present foreign auxiliaries, I could not think the time appropriate to submit the subject to them. I was pleasantly surprised when, during the course of the evening, the Chung-wang proposed that I should undertake the very work I was myself anxious to perform. He stated that his confidence had never been placed in Burgevine, and he expressed much satisfaction at the prospect of the early departure of that leader of mercenaries with his men.

About this period the small steamers attached to *General* Gordon's force were being used with great success in the daily attacks upon the Ti-ping stockades outside Soo-chow; consequently, the Chung-wang proposed that I should not only endeavour to raise a contingent of disciplined troops, but a flotilla of two or three steamers to operate with them. He also expressed a great desire to capture Gordon's vessels, upon which I told A-ling to obtain a separate commission to cut out any of them I might find an opportunity to

seize. The Chung-wang made a practice never to sleep inside the walls of any beleaguered city, his tactics being to relieve them by an army of co-operation under his own command. It may be that he pursued such a plan as a safeguard against treachery; but whatever the cause, he was always to be found encamped outside. As the night advanced, he therefore made ready to leave Soo-chow, after passing an edict and signing a special commission written for me by his own secretary.<sup>52</sup> As I was well known to four or five of the Wangs present, they were much pleased when I accepted the authority to raise a new force; and before we separated, they became quite enthusiastic about the anticipated results.

The designation of the proposed contingent was decided by the Commander-in-Chief to be "the Loyal and Faithful Auxiliary Legion," a title closely assimilating to his own, Chung-sin-wang, which may be translated as the "Middle Heart Prince," *i.e.* the loyal or faithful prince. The terms of organization agreed upon were: the force to be commanded by myself, or any European I might see fit to appoint, and subject only to the orders of the Chung-wang. The Europeans engaged to be solely officers, two hundred in number, each captain of a company to receive 200 taels per mensem (nearly £70), others to be paid proportionately, and lodging found for all. Myself and principal officers to receive no pay, but serve as commissioned volunteers, a position which I had always maintained for myself. Two steam gunboats to be obtained, similar to the *Hyson*, in the service of the enemy; these to be attached to the land force, not to be used for any other purpose. The governorship of the first city recaptured from the enemy to be placed in my hands, while the revenue of the place would constitute a reserve fund for the legion (including pension to disabled men, expenses for sick and wounded, &c.), my own head to be pledged for the loyalty of the Europeans engaged, each of whom were to become "Ti-ping brethren," and be entitled to every consideration as citizens.<sup>53</sup> The rules of European warfare to be strictly those of the legion, and, moreover, to be observed by any Ti-ping force acting in

conjunction with it. Many other regulations were drawn up, but these are some of the principal.

Upon the conclusion of the agreement to raise the Loyal and Faithful Auxiliary Legion, the Chung-wang left Soo-chow and proceeded to his intrenched camp nine miles distant. On the following day passes and boats were provided for Burgevine and the remainder of his men. Among the Europeans were twelve who had served in the Ti-ping army some time previous to the advent of Burgevine, but had been placed under his orders upon his arrival at Soo-chow. These men, and fifteen others, who were not quite so mercenary as their fugitive comrades, and felt more attachment to the cause, refused to desert their colours, and volunteered to remain under command of one *Captain* Smith, formerly a brave non-commissioned officer of the British Marine Artillery. He was almost the only unwounded man on board Admiral Hope's flag-ship at the disastrous attack on the Peiho forts. The volunteers were all attached to the Mo-wang's command, but the Chung-wang promised that, upon the formation of the legion, they should, if required, become members, some of them being good artillery-men or drill-instructors.

All these arrangements were carefully concealed from every European except myself, few of those in Soo-chow being at all trustworthy, and the few exceptions not being particularly attractive as objects of confidential communication. In consequence of the daily increasing strength of the forces besieging Soo-chow, time was precious and not to be wasted in commencing my undertaking; I therefore departed from the city on the third evening after my arrival, and proceeded to Shanghae as fast as possible, going part of the way in company with some of the late Americo-Ti-ping legion.

We were enabled to travel by a much shorter route than that by which I had reached the city, in consequence of a great victory achieved within the last few days by a Ti-ping army before the walled town Wo-kong, which freed from the presence of the enemy a more direct road. The battle was fought against Imperialists unassisted by foreign artillery and disciplined

troops, who were, therefore, according to the almost infallible rule in such cases, utterly defeated, and Wo-kong would have been recaptured in a very short time had not Gordon moved from Soo-chow to its defence, when artillery decided the unfair fortune of war against the Ti-pings. The force engaged had been brought up from Kar-sing-foo by the Chung-wang's orders, and should have formed a junction with another body of troops advancing from the city of Hoo-chow-foo, the combined forces being destined to operate against the left flank of the Soo-chow besiegers, while the Chung-wang himself acted against their right. Unfortunately, the impetuosity of the leader of the first division (the Yoong-wang) led him to commence hostilities before effecting a junction with his allies from Hoo-chow, and, although at first eminently successful, his rashness led to his subsequent defeat by Gordon's disciplined troops and artillery, and also to the repulse of the second division, each corps being compelled to fall back upon the cities from which they had advanced, and of which they constituted the garrisons.

The heroic determination with which the Ti-pings disputed the irresistible odds the enemy possessed by their artillery may be seen by the following extract from "How the Taipings were driven out of the Provinces of Kiang-nan and Che-kiang. From Notes kept by an Officer under Ward, Burgevine, Holland, and Gordon."

"The rebels again attempted, from Kar-sing-foo and Ping-bong, to capture Wo-kong. Again, therefore, a detachment was sent down there, and they were driven back, while the artillery made terrible havoc amongst them. But we must give them their due. They fought this day like demons, advancing up to the muzzles of the guns, where they of course met with death."—*Friend of China*, June 27, 1865.

Immediately upon reaching Shanghae I commenced engaging men for my force, and within a few days obtained about a dozen. These were all of good character and particularly promising for drill-instructors. Among them were seven non-commissioned officers, formerly of the French army: Major

Moreno, of the Sardinian army, who had seen much service in Asia, Italy, and the Crimea; a Frenchman named Lavery or Labourais (once first sergeant of the 3rd Chasseurs d'Afrique), who had served the Ti-pings for more than a year, but had been carried off against his will by the deserters under *Colonel* Morton; and my friend George White, who had lately been introduced to me as a Ti-ping well-wisher, though formerly a captain in the Franco-Chinese contingent at Ningpo, a service he had resigned in disgust. Besides these, I obtained the services of several men who had served their time in a British regiment and had received their discharges; while many others promised to join me as soon as they were able. This, for a beginning, was not so bad; and, to favour my object still more, Major Moreno obtained the guarantee of certain European ordnance officials to supply me with any quantity of war material. Their sudden desire to assist the Ti-pings was caused, I believe, entirely through jealousy of the British operations conducted by General Brown, *General* Gordon, &c.; at all events, their aid would have proved substantial, for a sample case of French rifles and bayonets was escorted through Shanghae by French soldiers, and safely deposited with my colleague.

Within two weeks I was enabled to send fourteen good men—all soldiers—under the command of Labourais, to Soo-chow, one of the number being a bugler of the French regiment stationed at Shanghae. Unfortunately, the last seven recruits left just one day too soon, thereby causing me no little trouble during the execution of an enterprise within twenty-four hours after their departure, and for which I was obliged to engage half a dozen strangers, who subsequently proved to be of worthless and disreputable character.

Besides A-ling, who held a Ti-ping commission, I was accompanied from Soo-chow by two officers who had shaved their heads and assumed the Imperialist; their object being to assist me in capturing one of the enemy's steamers, if a chance offered, and to pilot us into the Ti-ping territory, while their presence would incontestably prove the belligerent nature of the act,

should we be fortunate enough to cut out a vessel. These officers were provided with a special commission for the purpose.

On the morning of the day following the departure of the last batch of the Loyal and Faithful Auxiliary Legion, an Imperialist war-steamer arrived from before Soo-chow, and anchored abreast of a training camp some two miles above Shanghae. A-ling had engaged two Canton men, members of the Triad Association, one of whom was always kept on the watch for such an arrival; consequently the steamer was scarcely anchored before I received information to that effect. I at once decided to attempt her capture. Major Moreno was to remain at Shanghae, where he was acquainted with many French officers who were willing to serve the revolutionists, and, as he spoke Hindooostanee perfectly well, he had managed to ingratiate himself with native officers of the 22nd B. N. I. and Beloochee regiment, some of whom had promised to join him; it was, therefore, agreed that he should continue his present work, and await the result of the capture of the steamer and the receipt of instructions from myself. I decided to take W—— as my comrade and lieutenant during the proposed operations. I had soon ascertained the firmness of his principles and the sincerity of his attachment to the Ti-ping cause, and therefore gave him a document, somewhat similar to my own special commission, which I had obtained from the Chung-wang for the purpose of duly authorizing whomever I might choose as my deputy and assistant. Major Moreno, who had held field rank in several armies, I wished to place in supreme military command of the legion (when raised), because his education as a soldier was complete, and it would have been difficult, if not impossible, to find a man so thoroughly qualified in China. Both W—— and Moreno were men of honour—far different from Gordon, D'Aguibelle, Cook, and the other mercenaries hired by the Manchoo—and willingly, as I did, tendered their gratuitous services in the Ti-ping cause. This coincided very agreeably with my intentions, and caused me to reflect how superior would have been a force so organized to the Imperialist legions constituted upon a basis of blood-money! We had sufficient means to live;

we would not increase them by taking wages to kill our fellow-men, even though the British Government had given an example, by authorizing its naval and military officers to fight in the ranks of a barbarous Asiatic despot, and to take reward for so doing.

As the Imperialist steamer was under orders to return to the front on the same day of her arrival at Shanghae, I had but little time to make my plans. One of the Canton men who had joined me was formerly employed on board our destined prize. I now sent him off in a boat with the view to ascertain the strength of her crew, whether steam was kept up ready for a start, how many Europeans were on board, &c. In a short time he returned with the favourable announcement that only two foreign officers were in charge, the others having gone ashore; also, that two of the quartermasters (Manilla-men) were absent, besides some of the Chinese soldiers.

My followers were only six in number—W—— and the five Cantonese. It was my only chance to seize the vessel. Yet success seemed doubtful; but I knew full well that the boldness of a sudden enterprise would prove more effective than numbers, and felt sure that a well-managed surprise would give us an easy victory. The people of the steamer being at Shanghae, in the very heart of the Manchoo power, surrounded and protected by their British and French allies, would, I imagined, be too much astounded at the sudden attack by Ti-ping partisans to offer much resistance.

Myself and comrade were soon ready for the attempt, our baggage being confined to a tooth-brush each, our revolvers, and a good-sized piece of soap; the Canton men took little besides their formidable short Chinese swords, and a supply of those huge double-barrelled pistols in which their countrymen delight.

Proceeding to one of the Shanghae wharves, I engaged a boat, embarked with my men, and in a moment we were proceeding as fast as possible towards the vessel of the enemy.

We started in broad daylight; in fact, but a short time after noon. About one o'clock we were close up to the steamer. Sculling against the ebb tide,

our boat was slowly worked past the enemy, while, having observed all that could be seen from outside, I made arrangements to board. My plan was to drop alongside the steamer's bow, get on board with W——, and then engage the Europeans in conversation, until I decided upon the instant for our *coup de main*, which would be signalled to A-ling (who was to hold fast the boat and watch every movement) by a wave of my arm, who was then to rush on board with the other Cantonese. Myself, W——, and one man, were to seize and secure the two European officers; the other three, under A-ling's orders, were to overpower any resistance from the Chinese soldiers and crew, and then cut the vessel adrift; while their leader, who had been brought up as an engineer, and understood the duties of one, took charge of the engines and set them going ahead at full speed.

Three of our men now hid themselves behind the mat cover of the boat. When we got alongside, A-ling and another held fast to the steamer in such a position that they could observe the movements of myself and W—— in the after part of the vessel. Proceeding from bow to stern, and looking fore and aft the deck, we were able to notice that the crew on board consisted of twelve or fourteen soldiers, one Manilla-man, six or eight Chinese—employed as firemen, &c.—and two Europeans. With my comrade I walked right up to the officers of the ship, and engaged in conversation with regard to my taking a passage to Quin-san with them. Their positions were respectively those of gunner and chief mate. They informed me that their trip to Shanghae was for the purpose of obtaining stores, and to deliver over to the Manchoo Governor several unfortunate Ti-ping chiefs, captured by them on the Ta-hoo Lake. This statement, given with a would-be air of conviction as to the glory and heroism of their achievement, made me quite determined to attempt the capture of the steamer at every risk, rather than lose a chance to prevent future acts of such cold-blooded atrocity. The flotilla, with which she had acted on the Ta-hoo, was commanded by one Macartney, formerly surgeon of Her Majesty's 99th regiment, but who left his honourable profession to take service under Li, the Manchoo Governor of the province.

This man, having made prisoners of the chiefs, set off in the steamer for Shanghae, where he quickly sought the presence of his Asiatic master, delivering up to him the miserable Ti-pings, who suffered merciless torture and a cruel death, while this noble-minded Englishman felt no compunction at becoming the recipient of Manchoo patronage. A more dastardly act than thus giving over vanquished enemies to certain death I never heard of, though it was the ordinary practice of the Europeans in Imperialist pay. The case in question decided the fate of the steamer, and made the Imps pay dear enough for the satisfaction of torturing to death one or two helpless patriots.

The narrators had just finished the history of their gallant exploit against unarmed boats, peaceable villages, and powerless captives, when I decided to make my attempt. I stood close to the mate, while W—— was ready at the side of the gunner; I had just waved my arm to A-ling, and turned to seize my man, when, fortunately casting a glance astern, I observed two boats making for the steamer, and scarcely fifty yards distant. Quickly giving A-ling the signal to retreat, I managed to avoid giving any alarm, or even to excite the least suspicion in the minds of our two interlocutors, who believed that I intended to proceed up country with them as correspondent for a certain paper. The nearest boat contained seven Manilla-men, including two quartermasters belonging to the vessel, and their friends; the other, the engineer, captain, and another European, who was engaged to take command upon reaching the lines before Soo-chow. It was, indeed, fortunate that I happened to notice the approaching boats before commencing operations; otherwise we would certainly have succumbed to numbers within a few minutes. When the captain arrived on board, I requested a passage to Quin-san. This was arranged, and I then took my departure.

Having ascertained that the steamer would not leave until late at night, I fully determined to make another effort to capture her for the Ti-pings. I found that it was imperative, however, before making the attempt, to have some addition to the number of my followers. Besides the complement of four European officers, three Manilla-men quartermasters, twenty soldiers,

and eight or nine other Chinese, it was expected that *General* Doctor Macartney, with an *aide-de-camp*, and the intended future captain, would be present. Consequently, directly we reached the shore, W—— and myself proceeded to find a few Europeans whom we could engage for the service. Late in the evening we met at my house, and found that we could muster five recruits. The character of these men was far more than questionable; their social position was among the genus *rowdy*. However, we had not time to pick and choose; a reinforcement was essential to afford any prospect of a favourable issue to our enterprise; the *rowdies* were therefore engaged on the spot, simply to assist in the capture of an Imperialist vessel, for which service myself and lieutenant guaranteed to pay them well. We would not have had them in our young legion.



A VIEW ON THE JOURNEY TO SOO-CHOW, OF A PORTION OF  
COUNTRY NEAR THE CITY OF WU-SEE, LATELY DESOLATED BY  
IMPERIALISTS.

See p. 638.

## FOOTNOTES:

49. In the *Friend of China*, March 10, 1865, and subsequent numbers, the following advertisement appears:—

"The Steamer *Donnington*.—The undersigned" (H. Evans), "in consequence of the determination of the provincial authorities not to permit the navigation of inner waters for tradal purposes by

vessels of the above class, being thus disappointed in the purpose for which he had her constructed, is desirous of disposing of her."

This direct violation of the last treaty is one effect of the Manchoo restoration to power, by British means, in the Kiang-su province.

50. Now in the service of the Ti-pings.

51. In the mutual recriminations between the leaders of the force, upon their arrival at Shanghae, Captain Jones states (referring to Burgevine):—

"He further accuses us of trying to make out a good case against him, thinking he would never return to Shanghae. To this I answer, that he and I were the instigators of the defection from the Ti-ping cause, for I confess I at once fell into his plans, glad of the opportunity to escape from what appeared likely to turn out *unprofitable*, and having, besides, for some time before lost confidence in his capacity to command."—*Vide Blue Book on China, No. 3 (1864)*, p. 179.

52. See Frontispiece.

53. The want of some such clause in Burgevine's arrangements originally excited the suspicion of the Ti-ping chiefs.

## CHAPTER XXIII.

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Renewed Attempt.—Its Success.—Narrow Escape.—British Interference.—How explained.—Its Failure.—The *Coup de Main* succeeds.—Groundless Alarm.—Route to Soo-chow.—Its Difficulties.—Generous Conduct.—Arrival at Wu-see.—Prize-Money.—Treachery.—Preparations for an Attack.—Manœuvring.—The Attack.—Warm Reception.—The Enemy repulsed.—The Result.—Wu-see evacuated.—Return to Shanghae.—Last Interview with the Chung-wang.—Manchoo Cruelty.—Result of British Interference.—Evidence thereof.—Newspaper Extracts.—Further Extracts.—England's Policy.—Its Consequences.—Its Inconsistency.—Her Policy in Japan.—Religious Character of the Ti-pings.—Their Christianity.

As the steamer was expected to get under weigh about 1 a.m., I started with my men a little before midnight. Upon this occasion the very elements seemed to favour our design. The tide ran slack; the moon, after shrouding herself within a bank of silvery-edged clouds, retired below the horizon to rest; while even the never-setting stars were partially hidden by the volume of damp, misty vapour hanging over the surface of the river, and almost concealing our two small boats.

In little more than half an hour from the time we left the shore, we were right alongside our destined prize. With the exception of a sentry at each gangway, everything on board seemed silent and unprepared for an attack, although by the symptoms from the funnel and steam-pipe it was evident that the engines were in readiness. I decided to attempt cutting the vessel out immediately, as it seemed to me that her crew were probably turned in, and if so, not a moment should be lost in taking advantage of the opportunity, or they might be roused out to get under weigh, in which case we would hardly be able to effect the capture without loss of life.

Dividing my followers equally between the two boats, one being under my lieutenant's charge, and assigning to each man his duty in the attack, I gave the word to pull alongside, my own party to board on the starboard bow, the others on the port.

Another second and we were grappling at the sides of the steamer, and scrambling over her bulwarks, sword or pistol in hand. The Chinese sentinels on guard, and a Manilla-man who appeared on deck, were secured without either resistance or alarming those below. In fact, the Chinamen, directly they perceived the danger, seemed suddenly inspired with a strong determination to take no notice, but to be very diligent in marching up and down, and carefully employing themselves by intently gazing somewhere else. The calmness and attentive inattention with which they acted throughout the capture were really charming to behold. They betrayed neither surprise, fear, sympathy, *esprit de corps*, nor any other feeling. I then placed a guard over the hatches, set a party to slip the cable, and sent A-ling into the engine-room to get steam up; while, with four Europeans, I proceeded into the cabin and secured the officers. These comprised the intended captain, the mate, and the gunner, the others being still on shore. They submitted very quietly, gave up their arms, and were altogether too much confounded to attempt any resistance. Just as the vessel was entirely in our possession and I had given the order to go ahead full speed (the cable being slipped), the engineer came alongside in a *san-pan*, only to find himself a prisoner when he got on board. Directly the capture was accomplished, I produced the commission the Chung-wang had given for the purpose, and showed it to the senior officer of the steamer, informing him that we were Ti-ping partisans, and that we would endeavour to pass himself and brother captives from Soo-chow into Gordon's lines as prisoners of war.

Meanwhile, steam had been got up by A-ling, and we were carried along in the direction of the Ti-ping territory as fast as possible. During the capture, one of the Manilla quartermasters had jumped overboard and swam towards the shore. Fearing that this man would raise the alarm and bring a

swarm of Impish Manchoos down upon us, I was compelled to lose no time in making good our escape, otherwise I might have managed to capture something more than the one steamer. A few days afterwards I was much vexed by ascertaining that I might have taken Macartney prisoner, and with him a large sum of sycee destined to pay Gordon's mercenaries. It appeared, from the information given by the former officers of the steamer, when too late to take advantage of it, that the redoubtable *General* was to come off in a boat with the dollars and be picked up abreast of the Fu-tai's camp. If I had known this on the same night, I could easily have taken measures to effect his capture. Aggravated by the infamous manner in which Macartney carried on hostilities against my friends, I would most assuredly have given him up to the Ti-pings, and he would have been justly punished for his cruelty to his unfortunate prisoners, if they had treated him by the strictest law of retaliation; but of this he would have been in little danger, the mad forbearance of the Ti-pings causing them to suicidally avoid the only means by which they might have saved themselves from slaughter by British means, viz., by proclaiming, and by *executing* the promise, that if any British help were given the Manchoo, either directly or indirectly, they would retaliate by destroying the silk and tea trade (totally in their power), and by generally making war upon British interests. As for the soundness of such policy upon the part of the revolutionists, it could not possibly have done them any injury, and it offered the only chance of arresting foreign hostility.

Some hours after the capture of the steamer, the Manilla-man, as I expected at the time, made his way to the Fu-tai's camp and reported the circumstance. The Manchoo official had no sooner received the information than he sent off couriers to his very good servants and allies, the British authorities. Those devoted personages immediately made ready one of their national gunboats, and, placing a number of English soldiers on board, despatched her to overhaul and bring back the missing vessel to Shanghae.

Naturally enough my readers may be inclined to wonder what business the British officials had to interfere with the capture of an Imperialist craft

by the Ti-pings, they must therefore have an explanation.

All the English admirals, generals, consuls, and others, who were fighting upon the side of the Manchoo, chose, with an amazing amount of injustice and arrogance, to assume that they and their disreputable allies were alone entitled to belligerent rights and privileges. Every act of their enemy was very indignantly branded as either atrociously piratical or a form of bloodthirsty brigandage. They alone were virtuous; they alone had any right to kill, burn, and otherwise destroy! In consequence of this very comfortable state of self-conceit, and in order to succour the dearly beloved Manchoo, some experimental warrior or statesman among the British officials, according to their enlightened *ex parte* diplomacy, did me the honour to designate my humble exploit a piratical outrage. This of course justified their praiseworthy efforts to capture the scoundrel who dared to differ from their immaculate selves, by presuming to prefer and assist the rebels instead of the Imperialists. Besides, is not the vile pirate an enemy of all mankind? And who would be so oblivious of merit as not to do them reverence when they caught him? Unfortunately for their visionary laurels, though fortunately for the pirate, they did not succeed in catching him.

Now, as even at the period referred to, the Ti-ping revolution included a population and a territory, the former at least equal in number, and the latter in extent, to the people and soil of England; and as they were not only recognised as a belligerent power, but as constituting the Government *de facto* throughout the large tract of country under their control, I cannot understand how the military service of such a Power, with an army of several hundred thousand men in the field, and an organized administration ruling their possessions, was termed piracy and brigandage.

I was not only duly commissioned by the Chung-wang, the proper Ti-ping authority, but also acted upon a special commission issued against the vessels of the enemy. If, therefore, the capture of the steamer could be termed an act of piracy, what should be the language used to express the raids and seizure of Ti-ping craft by Admiral Hope, Generals Staveley,

Brown, Michel, &c.? when it is remembered that they performed such acts entirely without authority from their own Government or any one else. Some pirates might feel flattered by finding themselves in the same boat with such worthy people; but the author of this work begs most respectfully to decline the doubtful honour. There is another point connected with this employment of defamatory epithets. If I, holding authority direct from the Ti-ping Commander-in-Chief (whose acts were authorized by his king), were a pirate, then what can have been the *status* of Major Gordon, R.E., the commander of the Anglo-Manchoo contingent, who held no commission whatever from Imperial authority, but was simply employed by a *local* Chinese mandarin?

The British gunboat did not overtake my party, though, if she had been handled a little smarter, it would have been an easy matter, for we lost our way several times among the labyrinth of creeks in the interior. If it had not been prevented by the delay from taking wrong courses (thereby affording time for the seizure of the vessel to be made known to the enemy before Soo-chow), and from the fact that only one of the men I had engaged at Shanghae could be depended upon, I should have proceeded straight through the Imperialist lines and made an attempt to seize one of their two other steamers. However, I was obliged to be contented with my single prize. She mounted a capital pivot 32-pounder in the bow, a good 12-pounder howitzer in the stern, was well provided with the best description of ammunition, and she would probably prove very serviceable in the defence of Soo-chow.

In consequence of the impossibility of forcing a passage through the enemy's lines, it became necessary to follow some such route as that by which I had last reached Soo-chow, however difficult it might be to find a channel large enough to carry the steamer so great a distance.

After losing our course for the last time, and very nearly steaming into Gordon's head-quarters at Quin-san, we managed to reach the first Ti-ping position at San-le-jow. Directly we appeared, or rather, directly the funnel became visible above the dense growth of rush and bamboo lining the banks

of the creek, the garrison of the fort rushed to arms and made ready to defend themselves against the supposed and dreaded enemy. The terror inspired by the appearance of the small steam-vessels acting with the Imperialist mercenaries was at all times excessive. From a distance the helpless Ti-pings were generally mowed down with perfect impunity, and heavy artillery carried destruction throughout their ranks, while the ships, white painted and low in the water, were almost invisible, and were able to maintain their advantage by retreating or advancing whenever it was desirable, at the same time retaining a position from which shrapnel, Moorsom, and other infernally destructive, though ingeniously contrived shell, could be thrown with deadly accuracy.

It was no wonder that as we suddenly hove in sight, with a volume of thick smoke puffing up from our high-pressure engines, the soldiers and civilians about San-le-jow were dreadfully alarmed. They were well aware that small mercy was ever shown by the "foreign brethren" in charge of the irresistible "hoo-lung paou-chwan," for, fighting or harmless, they were shot down whenever a gun could be brought to bear, and so long as the missiles could be made to reach them. The rowdy bravoes of the Imperialist flotilla being unacquainted with the principles of military honour, seemed to believe that their sole mission was to kill, burn, and destroy; as for extending mercy to those who were unable to resist their appliances of modern warfare, or treating the vanquished with magnanimity, they never entertained such ideas.

Fortunately for the people we came upon so suddenly, the steamer was under Ti-ping colours; therefore, their alarm presented only the most ludicrous character, unaccompanied by the tragic and heretofore inseparable consequences of such an event. From their isolated cottages the poor villagers rushed forth, carrying the most valued of their homely effects; men, women, and children ran frantically in the direction of the fort; some were laden with agricultural implements (for even these were often destroyed by the victorious Imperialists); others with household goods; while here and there a few noble labourers were observed trudging along with their aged

fathers or mothers on their backs. Whenever the edge of a canal was reached, without a moment's hesitation, the fugitives would plunge right into the water, and give cause for merriment by the wild efforts they made to regain dry land, often rolling back, and floundering helplessly through the soft mud.

When I perceived the alarm our appearance had created, and that the soldiers were making ready to fire upon us with a few heavy gingalls mounted on their fort, I stopped our vessel's way and brought up alongside the bank, and then going ashore with A-ling, proceeded to the fort to satisfy the commandant as to our friendly character. When it was made known that we were in the Ti-ping service, the soldiers and people loudly professed their gratification. The chief was a bronzed and hardy veteran; and although his garrison did not muster nearly 100 men, he was quite determined to defend his post to the last, had we proved to be enemies. The answer he made when I asked him whether he would not have acted with discretion by retreating from the steamer if she had been still in Manchoo interest, closely resembled that given by a brave Ti-ping officer (who had charge of a most dangerous and exposed position near Ningpo) to a friend of mine, when the latter inquired why he did not abandon so precarious an outpost, which was nearly surrounded by the enemy; he replied, "Puh pa! laou Tien-ping tung shao" (No fear! an old Ti-ping soldier knows how to die).

Passing through San-le-jow, we soon reached the small town of Pimbong, barely twenty-five miles distant from Soo-chow, and also situated on the Grand Canal. At this place we were very kindly received by the chief, who, after seeing my commission, supplied me with provisions, coals, firewood, and other necessaries. Pimbong was almost the last Ti-ping position in the neighbourhood, as immediately beyond came the lines of the enemy besieging Soo-chow. Here our pilots ceased to be of service, and the chief sent on board a man well acquainted with the country, to guide us through the largest creeks. After trying every channel branching off from the Grand Canal, and finding them all too small for the passage of the steamer,

we were compelled to proceed on to Kar-sing-foo, a city nearly twenty miles from Pimbong. Had the creeks we explored been available, we could have reached Soo-chow by a *détour* of not more than forty miles, but by going to Kar-sing the distance would be doubled at least.

After a short run down the splendid Grand Canal, we came to off the city, and sent messengers to apprise the governor of our arrival. In a little while that functionary, who proved to be the Yoong-wang, visited the steamer in great state; he met me with much friendliness, and declared himself delighted with the acquisition of the vessel so well known and dreaded. Two Europeans were with the chief; they had formerly belonged to the Franco-Manchoo contingent; and as my lieutenant had known them to be of good character—one had been a captain in the force—I expressed my wish that they should join me, and the Yoong-wang very kindly consented.

As time was precious for the success of my plans, we only remained a few hours at Kar-sing-foo, and then started away with a new pilot on board, who was instructed to take us to the largest creeks leading to the Ta-hoo Lake, which it would be necessary to cross in order to reach Soo-chow.

From Pimbong everywhere we traversed a most beautiful country; and although, from the rumours of approaching war, the influx of fugitives, and the scarcity of provisions, no little distress was prevalent, the people were far more happy, prosperous, and improved than Imperialists ever have been, or seem likely to be.

Directly we steamed away from Kar-sing our troubles began. Every creek we attempted to navigate proved either too small, or the bridges were too narrow and low for the steamer to pass them. After getting, perhaps, fifteen miles up a creek, and destroying several bridges by the way, the water would suddenly shallow to less than our draught, or the channel would narrow to less than our beam; of course, in such cases our only plan was to get back stern foremost and try some other canal. Fortunately the vessel was built of iron, so that her progress overland—for often we were obliged to

pass a place not more than four feet deep, while the steamer drew five—did no further injury than bending or indenting her pliant sides.

At last, after spending a week exploring the principal water communication of what seemed in every respect a free and Christian country, we approached the sea, and it was only when within fourteen miles of Hang-chow that we managed to find an available creek. Even to take advantage of it we were compelled to destroy many bridges; and, upon several occasions, clear the bottom of the channel, while the work of removing stakes and barriers was incessant. Had it not been for the willing assistance we received from the Ti-pings, we should never have been able to get through.

Eventually, after a passage no one would ever have believed the steamer could have effected against so many obstacles, we arrived at the great city of Hoo-chow-foo, situated just at the southern end of the Ta-hoo. At this place the commandant, Tow-wang, and the Luk-wang—whose nephew, the Mo-wang, was commandant of Soo-chow—came out and received us in state. Upon leaving them, after having dined with the chiefs in the city, I managed to reach the Ta-hoo after knocking down an obstructive bridge with a few Moorsom shells. Before proceeding to cross the lake, I obtained a dozen good men from the chiefs, and put the paddle-wheels (which had become much dilapidated during the passage of the creeks) in good repair; for I knew that if *General* Gordon, of the Manchoo mercenary service, had sufficient sense, he could easily intercept me with two, or even three, of the steamers attached to his force. However, fortunately for me, Gordon did not send his ships until too late; for had they overhauled their former consort, she would have fallen an easy prize, as I had not more than two or three Europeans and half a dozen Chinese on whom I could depend.

As I understood there were only two channels by which Soo-chow could be reached from the lake by a vessel drawing so much water as the steamer, and as one of these—*viâ* the Tung-shan hills and city of Wo-kong—was already in Impish hands, I adopted the only remaining course—a creek

leading from the northern end of the Ta-hoo to the city of Wu-see; from whence, to Soo-chow, the Grand Canal afforded an easy passage.

While stopping at a small Ti-ping position on the west side of the lake, I was much pleased by witnessing the kind behaviour of the soldiers to a number of destitute country people, who had fled from the advance of the Imperialists down the Yang-tze-kiang towards Nankin. There were not more than 150 soldiers at the station, and from their *own rations*, which consisted solely of rice and dried fish, they charitably relieved more than 500 starving people. This is no idle assertion, for the whole of my confederates were present, and saw the distribution of rice. I went over the five gunboats belonging to the troops, and found that their stores of food were nearly exhausted. The chief told me that, when all was used, he would be obliged to abandon the place, and leave the unfortunate people to starve. I supplied him with a couple of bags of rice, and then bade him farewell; although I have never seen him since, I have not forgotten his praiseworthy conduct. Who has ever seen an Imperialist official do the like?

At length we found the creek leading to Wu-see, and on the same afternoon arrived at the city, greatly to the delight of the garrison, who were much harassed by a formidable flotilla operating against their lines of communication. Soon after our arrival, the commandant, Saou-wang, returned to the city with his army, having beaten the enemy after a sharp fight in the morning. The troops had marched upwards of forty miles to and from the battle-field, and directly they came to the creek encircling Wu-see, they threw down their arms on the bank, and plunged into the cooling water in dense masses, clothes and all; so that in a few minutes the surface was literally covered with them.

The Saou-wang having informed me that the Commander-in-Chief was encamped at a place named Ma-tang-chiao—on the shore of the Ta-hoo, and a place of strategic importance—equidistant from Wu-see and Soo-chow, I at once requested him to despatch messengers to inform his superior of my arrival. While awaiting their return, the commandant set a number of men to

work pulling down a very heavy stone bridge, which it was necessary to remove before the steamer could be taken into the Grand Canal. At this city I saw upwards of 6,000 poor people, who were supported by the garrison. They had been driven from their homes by the progress of the Anglo-Manchoos in the neighbourhood, and were perfectly destitute. Every day one of the principal officers of the city came to superintend the distribution of rice, and the ravenous manner in which the people struggled for their food was something fearful to contemplate, especially when it was considered that such great misery was caused entirely by the unjustifiable intervention of my countrymen.

Upon this occasion I had not much time to notice the distress caused by the approach of the allied English and Manchoo devastators, messengers from the Chung-wang on the following morning bringing orders for me to proceed back into the Ta-hoo Lake, and take the steamer to Ma-tang-chiao. When I reached this place, the Chung-wang, attended by the Sz, Le, and several other Wangs, came on board, and appeared to be overjoyed with my successful enterprise and the appearance of the steamer. A-ling, the two Ti-ping officers, and the two Cantonese were instantly promoted; and the chiefs took off their own pearl ornaments to decorate them. The Chung-wang then took me ashore with him, and, upon reaching his head-quarters, confirmed my lieutenant's appointment, and declared that he would give 20,000 dollars prize-money for the capture of the steamer. This I considered amply sufficient for so small a service, and I determined to divide it equally among all who had assisted at the seizure—including the five rowdies who only came for money—besides giving a portion to some of the former crew, who had kept to their work and assisted me since the capture.

The encampment was formed around a large straggling village; and the people, like those of the neighbouring hamlets, appeared more happy, better fed, and less depressed than those of more distant parts of Ti-pingdom. This was always the result of the Chung-wang's presence in any locality, for he

was not only the most able general, but also the most talented organizer and pacifier among the chiefs.

At Ma-tang-chiao the Chung-wang was concentrating an army of relief for Soo-chow; and, with the object of enabling the steamer to participate in the same movement, men were employed to remove several bridges and other obstructions on a creek by which she could reach the Grand Canal. This work was hardly commenced, when two or three fugitives, shortly followed by many others, from the suburbs of Soo-chow, arrived with the disastrous intelligence that the city was in the hands of the enemy. How it had fallen they could not say, further than by stating that it had not been captured by fighting, but by some treachery. The Chung-wang seemed much affected by the report, for Soo-chow was not only the most important and best fortified city, the most abundantly supplied and strongest garrisoned, but the commandant, Mo-wang, was his oldest and bravest brother in arms.

Orders were at once given to break camp and march upon Wu-see; and while the troops were so engaged, I returned with the steamer to the same city. On the following day the bad news became confirmed by the arrival of some hundreds of the garrison of Soo-chow. These men stated that the second in command, Nar-wang, with several other principal chiefs, had assassinated the commandant and then surrendered the city to the enemy. A great number of the Mo-wang's men were massacred by the followers of the other leaders, who commanded about 20,000 troops, while the Cantonese portion of the garrison—some 5,000 strong, and unconnected with the treachery—were compelled to fight their way out of the city. These latter, having placed their wives and children in the centre, proceeded to force the west gate. Unable, however, to effect the narrow passage with their helpless families against the incessant attack by overwhelming numbers of Imperialist and renegade soldiery, they were driven to the horrible extreme of killing their own women and children to save them from the worse fate of degradation and torture, if captured by the enemy. Scarcely a third of the men succeeded in cutting their way through, and of these many were

wounded, many were covered with the blood of their wives and little ones, while others had become raving maniacs.

The Chinese nature, although apparently so apathetic, is yet capable of the wildest frenzy of passion; in fact, no people have a more paradoxical and anomalous character. It is a well-known fact that Chinese non-combatants will commit wholesale suicide upon the approach of enemies; but few Europeans would credit the fearful acts which the Soo-chow fugitives were driven in desperation to commit, or the frantic excitement leading to such deeds, and to the insanity of many of the perpetrators. I shall never forget the terrible appearance of the madmen stained with the blood of their own dearest relatives, whom they had themselves killed. They rushed into Wu-see at an immense speed, passed the city, and came to the encampment outside, and then, yelling, shouting, and crying, threw themselves, in paroxysms of grief and frenzy, on the ground before the Chung-wang. Several attempted to drown themselves in a neighbouring creek; and one, a young chief, stabbed himself to death before he could be prevented. The unfortunate men were at last secured and taken into the city.

With the remnant of the Soo-chow garrison came seven Europeans. These men had been sent from the city to join my legion, by order of the Chung-wang, and having proceeded to Ma-tang-chiao, when they changed their route for Wu-see, they were overtaken by the fugitives, and came on with them. These seven men were not a portion of those whom I had sent from Shanghae; all the latter (with the exception of the brave Labourais, who was killed during a night attack on some stockades by the enemy only a few days previously) being within Soo-chow when that city was betrayed, and many of them there perishing. Three of the Europeans had straggled, and did not arrive for some days. Among the four who joined me were *Captain Smith*, and an engineer (for the steamer) who had hitherto been employed casting shell, guns, and executing other important work at Soo-chow.

As it was absolutely necessary for the increase and establishment of my legion that I should return to Shanghae, I wished to leave as soon as the

Chung-wang reached Wu-see, particularly as both I and my lieutenant were in a very bad state of health, and urgently required medical assistance; but the Chung-wang having requested that I would join him in an attack upon the Imperialist force threatening Wu-see and Chang-chow-foo, I was obliged to defer leaving until after the battle. The enemy were intrenched in great strength within fifteen miles of Wu-see, and were assisted by a powerful flotilla of gunboats, which gave them entire command of the water communications of the city. It was to drive away or destroy this fleet that an attack was decided upon.

At last all obstructions in the way of enabling the steamer—now named the *Ti-ping*, and flying the Chung-wang's standard—to participate in the engagement were removed; and I joined the Commander-in-Chief's consultation held before commencing operations on the following morning. One thousand men, composing the *élite* of the Chung-wang's guards, and the first division of the Loyal and Faithful Auxiliary Legion, were placed under my orders, together with fifteen gunboats, which were to co-operate with the steamer. With this force I was ordered to attack the hostile flotilla, the Chung-wang himself disposing of his troops so as to prevent a junction between the enemy and their vessels. About midnight the army marched to take up its position, and at daylight I advanced with the steamer and gunboats, the men of my legion accompanying me in two divisions, one on each bank of the canal.

The morning was thick and foggy, so that we were enabled to take up a position within cannon-range of the enemy without either attracting their attention or discerning them ourselves. The place I chose for a halt until the fog cleared away was at a large stone bridge, parallel to the Grand Canal, up which we were proceeding, and over a creek leading direct into a small lake, about a mile and a half distant, on which the enemy's flotilla was stationed.

My plan of action was soon formed. I sent the gunboats in advance beyond the bridge, with orders to attack the enemy at the entrance of the lake, and then to retreat in confusion. By this manœuvre I hoped to draw the

hostile gunboats into the creek, when I should be able to attack them with the steamer to an advantage. On the creek not more than a dozen boats could form abreast and work their guns, but on the lake the whole number, estimated at 60 to 70, would be able to open a concentrated fire on our advance; and one well-aimed shot could sink the lightly-built *Ti-ping*, or pierce her boilers.

Taking on board fifty picked men from the Cantonese musketeers of my legion, and making everything ready for action, I had the steamer moved close to the side of the bridge, where she lay perfectly concealed.

Towards noon the weather began to clear, and our small squadron immediately pulled forward and opened fire on their opponents. The Imperialists, encouraged by their great superiority of numbers, soon advanced into the creek and gave chase as our gunboats retreated. By the time that they had reached half-way to the bridge, however, the day became quite clear, and observing our troops spread out in line of battle, they gave up any further pursuit.

This was the moment for which I had been waiting. Sending forward my men on the shore at a run, I moved the steamer from her hidden position, passed under the bridge, and advanced upon the enemy at full speed, firing upon them with our 32-pounder, and warmly answered by their stern guns as they turned and pulled back to reach the lake, which they managed to do before we could close with them. As we approached the termination of the creek, we were saluted with a tremendous cannonade. The gunboats had formed in three divisions, one directly fronting the mouth of the creek, the others upon either flank, so that they were enabled to maintain a most powerful cross fire. I counted twenty-two vessels in the centre squadron, and twenty in each of the others. They were all fully manned with about 30 men in every boat, and each carried a bow-gun, from 6 to 18-pounder; a large swivel on either side, and a stern gun, a little smaller than that in the fore-part.

Of course, my land force could be of no assistance on the lake, all their use being to accompany the steamer on either side of a creek, and prevent the enemy's troops closing upon her in such an indefensible position. Our fifteen gunboats were armed with such inferior artillery that they were altogether unable to cope with the hostile vessels, every one of which carried good English guns supplied by the British at Shanghae. I therefore ordered them to remain in the creek, but to advance and take charge of any boats we might capture.

Directly we emerged from the creek, the enemy gallantly pulled towards us, decorated with innumerable flags, maintaining a very heavy fire, yelling terrifically, and deafening us with a tremendous beating of gongs and blowing of war-horns. Seeing that their only way of retreat was by a creek in the rear of their starboard squadron, I immediately attacked the centre, because, if successful, we should not only succeed in capturing two-thirds of the flotilla, but would render them unable to fire upon the steamer through danger of injuring themselves. While steaming up to obtain this position—necessarily at slow speed, because the lake was very shallow—showers of grape, roundshot, and every species of Chinese rocket and missile, came rushing all around and about our heads. Fortunately the *mitraille* was fired too loosely, and the solid shot too badly aimed, to cause us much damage, while every discharge from our heavy gun, worked by *Captain* Smith, proved very effective among the mass of boats, men, and flags. In a short time the central squadron gave way, and the crews, pulling close to the shore, began to desert their vessels. The port squadron, in danger of being cut off, took to flight and became mingled with the centre. Meanwhile, the starboard division pulled up the creek in its rear, and took up a position, from which it maintained a sharp fire over the low land, nearly every shot passing close to the steamer or striking her. Several times I turned away from the discomfited vessels to follow their consorts up the creek, but on each occasion, with obstinate courage, the enemy rallied, remanned their guns, and stuck to them until our return to the attack drove them ashore again.



DAY & SON, (LIMITED) LITH.  
NAVAL ENGAGEMENT AND CAPTURE OF IMPERIALIST GUNBOATS AT WU-SEE.

Thrice did the crews of the gunboats resume the conflict. On their last attempt to turn the fortune of the day, they actually advanced upon us, loading and firing as fast as they could, keeping up a fearful yelling and beating of gongs, and evincing every determination to board. Had they only possessed sufficient confidence to persist in this attempt, they might easily

have succeeded in overpowering us by numbers and capturing the steamer. Fortunately, however, directly the heavy discharges from our pivot gun—double-shotted with grape and canister—and the incessant musketry fire from the small-arm men stationed on our upper deck began to take effect upon them, they gave way and retreated to the shore. After the last repulse, my squadron of gunboats having arrived on the scene of conflict, their crews took charge of the deserted vessels of the enemy and began to tow them away.

From their position on the creek, the starboard division of the Imperialist flotilla still maintained the action; so, abandoning the two others to our allies, we steamed after the still defiant squadron. In a few minutes a well-aimed shot from our 32-pounder sunk two of the gunboats, and eight others were captured. The remaining ten, after a short chase, were abandoned by their men, who escaped ashore, carrying with them, however, their small arms. At this moment I perceived that the creek was lined on either side by a cunningly-contrived breast-work, from behind which the gunboat *braves* began to fire heavily upon us. At the same time large columns of Imperialist troops became visible, as, by sheer force of numbers, they pressed back the Chung-wang's divisions, and threatened to occupy the bank of the creek by which I had advanced the steamer, and which formed the only line of retreat to Wu-see.

Before we could secure the last abandoned gunboats, a large number of musket-armed skirmishers were thrown into the intrenchments in our immediate vicinity. So heavy and effective became their volleys—every bullet striking some part of the steamer, riddling her light upper works through and through, and wounding many men, while we could neither reply with our heavy guns nor bring a rifle to bear upon the hidden foe—that we were compelled to save ourselves by precipitate flight, leaving the last captured vessels behind, and hurrying to the other creek at full speed, in order to avoid being intercepted by the advancing troops. Owing to the gallantry with which my land division held the enemy in check, we were

able to effect our retreat, carrying off fifty-one gunboats as the substantial trophy of our victory, and capturing more than fifty of the Sung-wang's<sup>54</sup> flags.

Upon reaching the bridge we were warmly congratulated by the Chung-wang, who at once declared he would give 200 dols. prize-money for each gunboat, which promise he scrupulously fulfilled. As the enemy continued to advance in line of battle, orders were given for a general attack, and I was despatched with the steamer to the city of Chang-chow-foo, to join in the co-operating movements being executed therefrom. We were too late to participate in them, for, upon reaching some outworks, about twelve miles from the city, our orders were countermanded, the Imperialists being defeated at every point, and the stockades from which they had menaced the two cities being in the hands of the Ti-pings.

Our escape from the ambush into which we had fallen while pursuing the remnant of the Imperialist flotilla was something miraculous, for, although our casualties were only two Chinese killed, three Europeans slightly, my interpreter A-ling dangerously, and a dozen Chinese wounded, the steamer was pierced about her upper-works with countless bullets; so much so, indeed, that it was difficult to understand how every person on board had not been killed.

Some days after our victory, a large Imperial force advanced from Soo-chow and proceeded to invest Wu-see. Upon one occasion they advanced close up to the walls, but were driven back by the shell we threw among them from the steamer. As the city was rendered untenable by the loss of Soo-chow and other places, the Chung-wang decided to evacuate it and retire upon Chang-chow-foo. Before executing this arrangement the Commander-in-Chief, in his capacity of Vicegerent to the Ti-ping king, TIEN-WANG, commissioned me to promulgate among foreigners the objects of the revolution; the wishes and opinions of its leaders; the treatment they had received from England; and all subjects relative thereto upon which I might

be able to write. This event has been the sole origin, besides my own feelings in the cause, of the present work—"Tai Ping Tien Kwoh."

My arrangements to return to Shanghae were soon made. *Captain* Smith, together with the Ke-wang (one of the Commander-in Chief's high officers), I left in command of my legion so far as it was organized, including the steamer and captured gunboats. My lieutenant, who was too ill to remain on duty, the five rowdies, A-ling and his two Cantonese friends, were to accompany me. Those who remained were given their prize-money, but I refused to receive the share for the others until we should reach the city of Kar-sing-foo, because this place was on the limit of the Ti-ping territory in the direction of Shanghae, and I felt confident that, if they had time, the rowdies would quarrel over their money, and, probably, injure one another. It will be seen that my anticipations were not groundless.

Thinking that the horrible Soo-chow treachery and massacre (the chiefs and their men who surrendered upon *General* Gordon's *guarantee of conditions* were put to death by the Manchoo colleague of the British officer) would surely occasion the British Government to withdraw its help from those whose sanguinary atrocities were not only dishonouring them by their participation as allies, but actually making them morally, if not materially, responsible; I set out for Shanghae under the impression that the Anglo-Manchoo alliance would cease, and the time prove favourable for advocating the Ti-ping cause and its claims upon all foreign, but especially British, sympathy.

Having taken leave of the noble Chung-wang and his son Maou-lin, I left Wu-see with an escort of fifteen gunboats; at the same time the city was evacuated, and the Commander-in-Chief started with his troops for Chang-chow-foo, carrying with him the four Europeans captured on board the steamer, whom he promised to retain as prisoners of mine until the return of myself or my lieutenant. It has since been reported that the bodies of these four men were found some time afterwards near Wu-see, and Major Gordon of the R. E., in his notorious capacity of uncommissioned general to

Manchoo Governor Le, took upon himself to report that the Chung-wang had roasted them to death, his only authority being the testimony of a demented "old woman," who declared that "Cantonese rebels" had killed them! If the Ti-pings did kill the four prisoners, the act was not only the first instance in which they have retaliated upon foreigners,<sup>55</sup> but was also the result of Major Gordon's treacherous capture of Soo-chow, for I should have sent the men over to his lines as exchanged prisoners of war if I had reached that city. It is, however, believed by all in China who are acquainted with the facts of the case, that the men fell into the hands of the Imperialists, and were put to death by them; and this seems to me a very likely affair (if they have been killed, for it is by no means certain), because the rear of the forces that retreated from Wu-see were closely pursued by the troops of Le, Futai. But my strongest reason for believing that the Ti-pings had no hand in killing them, if murdered they were, is the fact that the Chung-wang was personally pledged (to me) to keep them unharmed and properly cared for; and even Major Gordon cannot state that this celebrated chief ever broke his word, or *sanctioned a violation of his guarantees by associates*. Moreover, I particularly gave the Chung-wang to understand that my future services would depend very much upon finding my prisoners safe and sound at my return; besides, he could not possibly have had any motive to injure them, and thereby lose what he expected might prove valuable aid; and certainly, to judge by the kind treatment they received within Wu-see, he had no intention of doing so.

At my last interview with the Chung-wang I shall never forget the speaking expression of his fine eyes, as I shook his hand for the last time and stepped back to take my final departure. His look seemed to express friendship and gratitude for what I had already done, doubt for the future, and a mutely pathetic request, imploring that I, too, would not desert him in his hour of need. This well-remembered glance created another bond between us which only death can obliterate, and which would alone have bound me to help the Chung-wang to the utmost of my ability. No wonder he

seemed doubtful as to my future course, for the Ti-pings had never trusted a foreigner without being deceived, and they never experienced anything but insult or unprovoked injury from European officials!

From Wu-see to Kar-sing-foo, *viâ* the Ta-hoo Lake and Hoo-chow-foo, I was accompanied by the Shi-wang, a cousin of the Chung-wang, who had received instructions to facilitate my movements and make arrangements for my return, besides being commissioned to divert to the city of Hoo-chow the reinforcements on their way to Ma-tang-chiao. A few days after commencing our journey we fell in with a body of troops belonging to the Ting-wang's command at the provincial capital Hang-chow, who were proceeding to the appointed rendezvous; but the Shi-wang ordered them to Hoo-chow, where they afterwards proved very useful in maintaining communications with Nankin along the west shore of the Ta-hoo, *viâ* Chang-chow, Kin-tang, Li-yang, &c.

After the evacuation of Wu-see by the Ti-ping troops, the city, of course, fell into Imperialist hands; when the wretches, in their usual style, commenced a general massacre of the unfortunate inhabitants, it being estimated that 6,000, at least, were put to death, their crime being the fact that they were found in a city which had been held by rebels! The poor people who had been daily supplied with food from the Ti-ping granaries were now starved to death, for charity is a virtue unknown to Manchoo mandarins. I was at Wu-see for several weeks, and during that period I went over the country for miles in every direction, finding everywhere the same frightful results of British intervention—in the devastation of the country by the allies, and the starvation of the unfortunate Ti-ping country people. During my return to Shanghae, every place I saw exhibited more or less misery; a painful contrast to the prosperity universally prevailing only a few months before, when the power and rule of the Tien-wang was unshaken. Upon leaving the Ti-ping territory, or rather upon passing the few strong cities they still occupied in proximity to the frontier, the desolation of the country was perfectly appalling. Even throughout those portions of the silk

districts still untouched by the enemy, everything was in a state of turmoil, inactivity, and distress. The mulberry-trees and the silkworms, which require constant care, were but partially tended; in many parts they were neglected altogether; so that these facts, coupled to the wholesale massacre of the people by the Imperialists, fully account for the great decrease of silk *since* the Ti-pings have been driven from the producing districts.

My readers have already been shown the prosperous condition of the country entirely under Ti-ping control during the years 1860–1–2–3. We will now notice for the last time the effect of British support of the barbarous Manchoo.

The change for the worse may be considered to have fairly commenced directly after the capture of the city of Quin-san by the Anglo-Manchoo forces. Since that event, entirely caused by British means, death and destruction have swept throughout the once free, Christian, and smiling land. I have wandered over mile after mile of the once happy Ti-ping districts (during the latter part of 1863 and beginning of 1864); I have passed through twenty and thirty villages in a day, and, horrible to relate, in almost every room of each house have found the unfortunate people starved, starving, or barely maintaining the embers of life by a fearful state of cannibalism, feeding on the dead bodies lying thick around them! I have seen this sight of unparalleled horror in large unwalled towns containing many hundred houses, and I frequently found as many as fifteen to twenty bodies in one dwelling, the great number being occasioned by refugees from places already occupied or threatened by Anglo-Imperialists. I have had the fearful consolation of resuscitating many of the miserable people for a short time by giving them all the rice I could obtain, though I was convinced it would only give them strength to undergo the pangs of starvation a second time. Some insensate patriots may accuse me of un-English feeling for my expressions against the policy of the *present* British ministry; but would not any Englishman feel and write strongly upon witnessing such scenes as those I am describing, and which have been solely caused by the wicked use of

England's strength? I denounce the policy pursued against the Ti-pings as being not only egregiously stupid and suicidal in theory and practice, but absolutely iniquitous in every result. Nothing could work greater harm on living mankind.

From the few poor wretches I found able to speak, in most cases I gathered their expression of opinion "that it was through foreign soldiers coming to fight the Tien-ping (Ti-ping troops) that their distress had been occasioned." Some said that "they had come from places taken by the Kwan-ping (Imperialist troops), and reaching where I found them, could get nothing to eat, were unable to travel farther, and so had lain them down to die." Whenever I came to villages where the people were not yet reduced to the last stage of famine, mothers were offering their daughters to any one who would take them; but even this was unavailing! Although in other parts of China the young women would have been taken for evil purposes, in Tippingdom the laws strictly prohibited everything that was condemned as immoral, so they were left to starve if provisions were not supplied from better motives. These fearful scenes are so vividly impressed upon my memory that I am sorry I ever had the misfortune to witness them.

The desolating sword of Asiatic warfare has been ruthlessly carried into provinces for years in the most flourishing condition under Ti-ping rule. Hundreds of once happy villages have been obliterated from the face of the earth they once adorned, while the decaying skeletons of their industrious and inoffensive people are thickly scattered throughout the surrounding country, changing into a vast Golgotha and desert what would otherwise have remained an earthly paradise.

As many people would probably feel inclined to deny that the Anglo-Manchoo forces created the desolation I have described, because it has frequently been misrepresented by interested persons that the Ti-pings were the devastators, I have selected two or three statements which entirely corroborate my own.

The following narrative was given by a gentleman who has comparatively lately traversed the silk districts in search of mulberry-trees and silkworms, in order to estimate the probable extent of the next silk crop, and the causes of the present great fall-off. It appeared in the *Friend of China*, Shanghae paper, of January 13, 1865, from which I quote:—

"When Burgevine went to Nankin, that time the country between it and Soo-chow was a garden for loveliness. For eighteen *le* (Chinese miles) along the canal, on either side, the banks were lined with houses—the inhabitants busy as bees, and as thriving as they had reason to expect to be. With the reversion of Soo-chow to the Imperialists, these houses and numerous bridges disappeared. For the whole eighteen *le* there is not a roof—the country around, as far as the eye can reach, is a desert. The people have fled from the Imperialists as though they dreaded them like wolves and tigers; nor man, nor woman, nor child, nor beast of any description to be seen. Fowls, ducks, pigs, buffaloes—no such thing to be got for love or money.

"Twenty-seven *le* from Soo-chow brought me to Soo-za-qua, formerly a custom-house station, now the abode of part of the residue of Gordon's force....

"The place is an oasis in the desert. For miles after leaving it, indeed, all the way thence to Wu-see, the same barren, weed-overgrown appearance meets the sight. Pheasants, partridges, and a wild deer now and then, gave me plenty of amusement for my fowling-piece. But the number of bleached skeletons, skulls, or partially decayed dead bodies, is awful to look at—to count them would be impossible—they literally cover the ground for miles. As for traffic in boats, there was none; trade is all gone. Wu-see is in ruins. Where they were going I could not make out,

perhaps the boatmen themselves did not know beyond their next stage, but the number of soldiers passing up in boats was legion, the contrast between them in their fat, saucy appearance, and that of the meagre, starved-looking wretches in the streets, being very striking. Before reaching Wu-see I passed a camp of from 20,000 to 30,000 soldiers—impudent rascals, shouting after me, 'Yang-qui-tsze, Yang-qui-tsze' (Foreign devil),<sup>56</sup> till I was tired of hearing them; beckoning me to come on shore; waving spears and dashing them out to show what they would do if they could. They have evidently no love for Westerns, these Imperial Imps....

"On to Chang-chow-foo, for 95 *le*, still the same howling desert, not a working soul to be seen. The depth and strength of the weeds now are prodigious. Alack, for my search for mulberry-trees! I could not see one. All are cut down, and if wood at all were seen, it was borne by hungry-looking people, propelled by soldiers who had impressed them into the wood-cutting line. It was for such a state of things as this, was it, that Gordon gave his talents? His reward would be a sorry heart (?), could he only view the misery he has made. They are perfectly rabid after firewood, these same Mandarin soldiers, and cut down green wood and everything they meet. I should say there must be from eight to twelve thousand men at Tan-yang, which I next got to—Loo-tszeur, a village between Chang-chow-foo and it, having disappeared to a brick; not a soul to be seen, though they have established a custom-house station about five *le* from it.

"Tan-yang, a small city on the left bank of the canal, is almost entirely deserted. Soldiers presenting here, as at the other places, the same fat, saucy appearance I before noticed, some of them

wearing bangles, earrings, and jewels of value, while the people around are clotheless and miserable, and how the poor wretches live at all is a mystery. All that I saw them grubbing at was a species of porridge, consisting of the *husks* of paddy, a mess one would not give a horse. Oh, the skulls again! From Chang-chow-foo to Tan-yang the ground is literally white, like snow, with skulls and bones. The massacre of the unfortunate Taipings (inoffensive villagers, most likely) must have been awful! Between Chang-chow-foo and Wu-see stands a dilapidated pagoda, said to be 4,000 years old, and I went to look at it. What was my surprise to find it crammed with dead bodies, from which slices had been cut to eat as food!... I went on for 45 *li* beyond Tan-yang; the farther I went, the country getting worse and worse, if it were possible for there to be a difference when one description of 'bad' does for all, and I began to think that my search for a mulberry-tree, *in what, under the Taipings, was a splendid silk-producing country*, was useless, and I had better turn back."

Here we have the testimony of an impartial mercantile gentleman. Comment is needless. We will now turn to the evidence given by two of Gordon's own officers, men who were present during the operations against the Ti-pings, but who were ultimately honest enough to admit the truth. The following extracts are from a letter which appeared in the *Friend of China*, April 28, 1864:—

"TO THE EDITOR OF THE 'FRIEND OF CHINA.'

"SIR—I read in the *North China Herald* a letter from Gordon's head-quarters, in which the writer says that the slaughter among the rebels, after the capture of Hwa-soo, was terrible. Upwards of 9,000 were taken prisoners, and of these it was estimated

6,000 were killed or drowned, principally by the Imperialists. Further, that there is no doubt they would have killed ten times that number if they had the chance to do so. Now, Sir, I do hope there will be a stop put to such massacres, though I can but believe that the writer of that article must be, what they call in Australia, a *new chum*, for he cannot know much about the treachery of the Imps, or he would not dwell so much on it. Why, did not the Imperialists take rice, beans, wheat, and all other kinds of grain out of Wu-see, even while those around were starving; and as the old people came up to the gate to go outside the city with their few catties of rice, were they not stopped and their food taken from them, while, if they spoke against it, they were bamboozled? There was rice sufficient in Soo-chow and Wu-see to keep the poor in the districts around for many months; why, then, could not the Futai and other Mandarins be made to relieve the poor in the surrounding country?

"At Chang-chow, again, in place of bamboozling the poor when begging for a few grains of that which was taken from them, why were they left to die outside by starvation? I saw this, for I was one of the officers engaged in the capture of Wu-see, and other cities. From Wu-see we advanced towards Chang-chow, where, at first, there were but few poor to be seen. After we had been there a short time, however, there was a great number of them. Why?—*Because the Imperialists had gained so much of the country, and the poor had been robbed by them.* As for the much-lauded Gordon's troops, do they not rob the country people on the march? And if the disciplined troops do this with impunity, what can you think if the non-disciplined do it? I have seen beggars beheaded by these wretches in sheer wantonness.

"The *Herald*'s correspondent writes within sight of the walls of Chang-chow, and says, the starvation and cannibalism which prevail are unrelieved by the fiends who have been the cause of so much misery! The writer of that article little thinks the Imperialists are the fiends, or he would not have written so. On the other hand, parties who have travelled in the rebel districts have seen the Taepings relieve their poor."

Besides the above letter, the following appears in the issue of the same paper on the 31st of January, 1865:—

"TO THE EDITOR OF THE 'FRIEND OF CHINA.'

"Shanghae, 26th January, 1865.

"SIR—I see you say in your 'apology' for rebels that the destruction of the city of Quin-san was caused by the Taepings on their evacuation of it. Such was not the case. The idol temples and official quarters were destroyed or ransacked by them; but the destruction of the dwelling-houses of the inhabitants was the work of the Imperialists. I was one of the first in the city after its evacuation by the Taepings, and what I now state I saw with my own eyes. Indeed, it was, as you have stated repeatedly, a practice with the Imperialists to burn all which the Taepings left. Why they did so I can hardly tell, further than that the men were encouraged to do it by their native officers.

"I am, dear Sir, yours truly,  
"LATE OF GORDON'S FORCE.

"P.S.—Ching and Le<sup>57</sup> were the grand devastators, and have to be thanked for the bulk of the misery now so rampant all over

the country."

As the Liberal Government has such a *penchant* for interfering in the internal affairs of other nations, why has it not devoted its meddlesome talents to killing some one either in Denmark, America, Italy, Poland, or Mexico? Cynical people may well say that the Premier and his colleagues dared not more than bluster in these cases; that in the centre of China, in Japan, Ashantee, New Zealand, &c., they became very brave and officious because they could be so with impunity, and that such disgraceful, unprofitable, and inconsistent, if not imbecile policy, is either the expiring flashes of their administration or the greatness of England.

Although it may be perfectly true that the Chancellor of the Exchequer and his *confrères* in office have saved the opium trade and the China indemnity (probably also their places in office, by covering the expenses of the last China war, which would otherwise have made a serious cause of opposition), at the immaterial responsibility of the destruction of a few millions of Chinese and the devastation of some districts of China three or four times the size of England, of what benefit has the meddling policy proved to general commercial or mercenary interests? The silk trade, the most valuable with China, has fallen off exactly one half at the present date,<sup>58</sup> since the due effect of driving the Ti-pings from their dominions has transpired. The interior, free and open under the revolutionists, who earnestly desired the friendship of Europeans, has now been closed to freedom of trade or travel by the very Mandarins who have been reinstated to tyrannize over regions their oppression had otherwise lost to them for ever; while the old hatred of foreigners, persistent determination to evade treaty obligations, and the haughty, exclusive policy of the Manchoo has been resumed, since the hypocritical pretence of adopting a more friendly line of conduct, in order to obtain foreign assistance, has become no longer necessary, by the recoil of the Ti-ping revolt before British arms. Besides this, having broken the political power of the only movement in China which

afforded a prospect of improving, pacifying, or Christianizing that vast empire, England has been the means of creating a general state of anarchy. The Ti-pings have simply retreated to the interior and the sea-coast province of Fu-keen, while in every other part of the empire the people, no longer able to look upon the great revolution as likely to overthrow the Manchoo, and being more than ever oppressed by their foreign rulers, are not only driven to discontent but open rebellion. Besides the Ti-ping revolution, there are at the present time three or four powerfully organized rebellions. The "Nien-fei," in the north; the "Honan Filchers," towards the west; and the so-called "Mohammedan rebels," in the central provinces. Elsewhere, the innumerable local insurrections have settled into a regular system of brigandism, because the discontented have no longer the opportunity or confidence to join the diminished forces of Ti-pingdom. These circumstances, added to the fact that the Imperialist Mandarins are now systematically enforcing at least five times the treaty-legalized transit duties upon merchandise, are not only greatly enhancing the price of foreign goods to the natives, but, of course, considerably limiting their consumption. The only staple article of trade which has not at present decreased in quantity is tea. Still the price has become higher in China, and the non-diminution of export is due to the fact that the Ti-pings evacuated their former tea districts and captured the famous Vu-e, or Bohea districts, which they held for some time, without much fighting. It would be impossible to say that, since the result of British hostilities against the revolutionists has transpired, our commerce with China was ever in a more stagnant, unprofitable, and generally unsatisfactory condition. So much for the mercenary interests, to aid which England has been unscrupulously dragged into a clandestine and grossly criminal war!

Bad as the preceding effects of the foreign policy of the Palmerston Government undoubtedly are, there is yet another and a far worse consequence to be noticed. Before advertizing to the most serious fact it is as well to epitomize the political action which has created it. It has been fondly imagined and fatally supposed by the Liberal ministers themselves, that they,

*par excellence*, are the enlightened men of England, the only framers of philanthropical and progressive measures; and, in fact, that their glorious and never-to-be-forgotten place-holding is a Government of "peace, retrenchment, and reform." The doctrine of non-intervention having even been especially professed, and having been carried so far as to make a certain noble lord sacrifice his publicly and officially declared determination that "Denmark should not stand alone" in the event of certain contingencies, by leaving her to stand alone when those contingencies did come to pass, and then framing another set of probabilities, about the chivalrous deeds he would initiate if the King of Denmark were to be made a prisoner. Doubtless the admirers of that noble lord—who once made the astounding and statesmanlike discovery that "all children are born innocent," especially those of his constituents, whose chubby "olive branches" were also discovered to be the best and most beautiful in England—considered their representative a marvellously proper man, and his bragging to fight and then retracting a very creditable proceeding, quite in accordance with the useful policy of non-intervention: yet, on the other hand, there are people who have the obstinacy to review this and similar affairs, and deduct therefrom, and observe the fact that in other parts of the world a very different policy has been enacted where it could be done with impunity, all of which affords sufficient evidence that the pretended adoption of a non-interfering policy is neither more nor less than an unprincipled truckling to strong powers, and an aggressive bullying of the weak.

It is quite certain that, whether the rulers of China be Manchoo or Tipping, the vast industrial population would still produce tea, silk, and other commodities. Now, the professed motive for British intercourse with China is commercial—that is to say, to buy the above-mentioned articles, and sell the manufactures of the English markets—but not political; for meddlesome interference with the internal affairs of China would prove disadvantageous to both nations, and would certainly be well calculated to bring the Imperial authority into contempt, injure the Chinese organizations in an abortive

attempt to substitute those for which they are not yet qualified, and simply foment the troubles already existing, by the natural consequences of injudicious and unnecessary meddling.

But the British ministers, who would justify their broken pledges in Europe by an appeal to the doctrine of non-intervention, act upon a very different system towards China and Japan. They seem to make it their business, not only to advance trade in the Celestial Empire, but to concern themselves with its private and political disturbances, to judge between the Ti-ping and Manchoo, and then to settle the affair by destroying the one and bullying the other.

In Japan they have attacked feudal chieftains as though no central Government existed in that country; and then, after degrading the Imperial authority in the eyes of the people, force has been used to compel the opening of ports to trade. Thus have British statesmen pursued the best course to increase the animosities already existing, to produce general anarchy, and to establish the violation of all principles of international law, which they are *compelled* to observe in Europe. The most convincing fact with regard to the folly of interfering in China, is, that *until* such idiotic, or rather wicked policy was commenced, the exports were largely on the increase, having risen from £9,014,310 in 1859, to £14,186,310 in 1863; while the consumption of British imports has decreased up to the same period—about which time the operations against the Ti-pings were exercising due effect—by more than half a million—£567,646. In 1863, the total value of British exports to China was £3,889,927—a sum less than the value of the exports to Brazil; yet for this comparatively paltry amount an enormous military expenditure has been maintained, whilst it is palpable, by the falling off of trade, that the policy has signally failed, and the number of persons who have perished through the mistake would make at least one life destroyed for every pound sterling.

We now come to the most serious point with regard to the war against the Ti-pings. It is well known, and has never been denied, that throughout

the country, under their control, the Bible was circulated not only with freedom, but gratuitously, by the Government established at Nankin. Besides this *unparalleled* practice, the fact that they accepted the Word of God in its full integrity is also incontrovertible; and He has declared, "My Word shall not return unto me void." Furthermore, it is well known by all who have visited the Ti-pings in their cities and camps, that (so strict an interpretation have they placed upon the Commandments, &c.) they effectually prohibit not only the inveterate vices of the Chinese, and their heathen practices, but the evil indulgences which find full sway even in the most moral State of Europe. Their abolition of opium smoking; prostitution; the hitherto universal Chinese slave trade; the degraded Asiatic status of the women; the use of torture and bribery in courts of justice; the deformed small feet; the tail-wearing slave-badge of the men—these, and other facts proving their complete superiority to the hopelessly corrupt state of public and private life under the foreign rule of the Manchoo dynasty, we have already noticed. Let us ask, whence these great and glorious changes? Are they, as Lords Palmerston and Russell, and their correspondents upon anti-Ti-ping Chinese affairs, have repeatedly declared (when obliged to defend their un-English policy) the conduct of the Ti-pings to be, the natural acts of "bloodthirsty marauders," "locusts," "merciless brigands," "revolting impostors," "ferocious hordes of banditti," &c.? Or are they not rather the blessings bestowed by God upon people who, to the utmost of their power, and the sacrifice of their lives, have striven to follow His Word and Law? Man may change the public and outward forms of existence necessary for the body, but only God can alter the private and moral character necessary for the soul. There is a doctrine of original and natural sin; therefore it does appear presumptuous, if not profane, when people combine together against any vast movement in which the hand of God is visible—either in the supernatural or the presence of the Bible; especially as they believe that Divine interposition is necessary to convert and save the souls of all men,

and as they have neither political nor national interest in the movement to even justify the worldly motives of their interference.

Present ministers<sup>59</sup> and their followers may possibly ridicule the idea, in order to justify their policy towards China, that whatever the Ti-pings might or might not have been—even setting apart the fact of their Christianity—if they have been killed for the sake of British commerce (especially the vile opium trade, which they prohibited), every bale of silk and chest of tea brought into this land bears with it an endless curse; and that these, together with every article of British manufacture forced upon China, are defiled with the blood of the victims who have been slaughtered to prosper, forsooth! "our commercial institutions!" Man cannot serve both God and Mammon. The efforts of the British Government to worship the latter have failed most signally; but even had they succeeded in creating the most stupendous trade the world ever contained, do they believe that a righteous and eternal God has not witnessed the *means*, and that He who notes the fall of a small sparrow hath not recorded the murder of every human being, during their unholy crusade against the unfortunate Ti-pings?

Throughout a vast extent of China the Bible became established; but now, through the assistance given by the British Government to the Manchoo, the people—even including the little lisping children—have been slaughtered, while the idols of Budha are re-erected, dominating for a season over the desecrated ashes of *our* Bible.

Nankin, the Ti-ping capital, has fallen, through British intervention, since my arrival in this country; the printing and circulation of the Holy Scriptures have therefore ceased, and the Ti-pings have become wanderers over the face of the earth they would otherwise have adorned. It is idle and unworthy to cavil at this dogma or that article of the Ti-ping creed: the revolutionists did their utmost to enter into the pale and brotherhood of Christendom. Truly and candidly speaking, the nation solely responsible for preventing so glorious a consummation, is—England.

## FOOTNOTES:

54. The late famous San-ko-lin-sin.

55. Some people have thought that the four men were executed as a retaliation for the murder of the Wangs at Soo-chow, because, naturally enough, the Ti-pings considered the Europeans present were responsible for the atrocities. The four prisoners were members of Gordon's force, and it is just possible that they may have been put to death by some of the Soo-chow refugees.

56. My reader will contrast this with the treatment Europeans received when these districts were in Ti-ping possession.

57. Ching and Le were the principal Imperialist generals; they were acting in co-operation with Gordon.

58. June 1865. See Appendix B.

59. Palmerston's Government.

## CHAPTER XXIV

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Kar-sing-foo.—Christmas in Ti-pingdom.—Works of Art.—Dangerous Companions.—Narrow Escape.—Retribution.—Adieu to Ti-pingdom.—Mr. White's Case.—The Neutrality Ordnance.—Order of July 9th, 1864.—Intended Return to England.—Particulars of the Siege of Soo-chow.—Strength of the Garrison.—The Assault Described.—The Nar-wang's Treachery.—Its Cause.—Major Gordon's Report.—*The Friend of China*.—Gordon's Report Continued.—Narrative by an Eye-Witness.—The Soo-chow Tragedy.—Major Gordon.—His Conduct.—Gordon's Letter to Sir F. Bruce.—Analysis thereof.—Newspaper Extract.—Gordon's "Reasons" Refuted.—Analysis Continued.—Gordon's "Personal Consideration."—His Motives explained.—Newspaper Extracts.—Sir F. Bruce's Despatch.—Its Analysis.—Falsity of Gordon's Statements.—How Proved.—Extract from the *Times*.

Upon reaching the city of Kar-sing-foo, I was kindly received by the governor, Yoong-wang, who gave us all quarters in the Wei-wang's palace. This latter chief had gallantly assisted in defeating the Anglo-Manchoo forces on their first attack upon Tait-san; he had been promoted for his services, and was celebrated as a brave leader; yet, singular to relate, he had gone over to the enemy with the city (Haining), to which he had been appointed governor only a few days before my arrival.

Previous to the year 1860, treachery was a thing unknown among the Ti-pings. The baneful effect of British meddling had not been felt; they were successful, therefore the mercenary-minded did not find occasion to desert; neither was the number of chiefs so great as since the successes of 1860–61, nor the Tien-wang's appointment of them so imprudent. Latterly, however, the great extent of country and population included within the

limits of Ti-pingdom rendered necessary the employment of a large number of civil and military officers; unfortunately, the king, having much secluded himself from the affairs of state to study religious matters, and being influenced by two or three of his non-military ministers, did not exercise sufficient care in selecting or controlling them. Thus, it came to pass that sometimes not only incompetent, but untrustworthy men were placed in high and important commands; and many of these new officials were neither animated by the patriotism, nor inspired with the religious fervour of the older chiefs. Self-aggrandizement was the motive of such men; and although some of them were brave soldiers, directly they found British hostility was making their cause a failing one, they did not scruple to change sides when they could obtain reward for doing so.

At Kar-sing-foo the Shi-wang left me, after having made arrangements for my return either to that city or Hoo-chow-foo (where I had left the engineer and another man from Soo-chow for the purpose of making shell, casting guns, &c.), and then proceeded on his way to other places, in order to collect men and money with which to rejoin the Chung-wang at Chang-chow-foo.

I found the country under the Yoong-wang's administration in a far better state than the desolate regions through which I had passed on my journey to his city, because the Imperialists and their allies had not yet attacked and ravaged the neighbourhood; although, before I started for Shanghae, they made their appearance.

Christmas Day I spent at Kar-sing-foo. The Ti-pings keep the festival two days before we do; and, if possible, venerate it still more. I made the Yoong-wang a present upon the occasion, and passed the day very happily at his palace, where a grand dinner was given to all the chiefs in the city, after special services had been held in the Heavenly Hall. My friend W—— was present with me, and we mutually declared that we had never enjoyed a better Christmas in our lives. Upon the 25th the Yoong-wang sent his own

cooks, attendants, plate, &c., and spread a magnificent dinner at my quarters for all the European and Chinese followers I had in the city.

I found much to admire during my stay with the Yoong-wang. He was one of the best veteran Ti-ping leaders, and all his officers were stanch, trustworthy adherents of the cause. Of one Yu, who was a general of brigade, I became the particular friend, and dined with him nearly every day. This officer had charge of the artillery, and I gave him all the instruction I could in casting shell (which he had just commenced to do), making fusees, and sighting his guns. The organization within the city was so perfect that everything went like clockwork. Bars and bolts were not to be found; for thieves, beggars, or robbers were unknown in Kar-sing-foo. I felt a real happiness in living there, and was quite sorry when I took my departure. Here I found the most splendid building I have ever seen in China. It was a new palace, not quite finished, for the Ting-wang, governor-general of the province; and was a standing proof of the fact that the Tipings (had they been allowed to succeed by England) would have restored the arts of China, and especially the public works—all of which have fallen into decay since the era of the Manchoo. In general outline the palace resembled those I have already described as existing at Nankin, but every particle was far more beautiful and costly. Neither in China nor elsewhere have I ever seen such a magnificent work of complicated stone and wood carving. The gorgeous gilding and painting was, of course, in Chinese style; and though very effective and varied, too gaudy for European taste. The carved work was exquisite; I have stood for hours watching either the grotesque or the life-like representations. Many hundreds of sculptors, painters, and artisans were employed, at a very high rate of wages, upon the building; and I found that some of the former were the most celebrated professors of the two arts in China, and had been induced to come to Kar-sing from the most distant parts of the empire. From what I have seen of

China, I do not believe such a building has been commenced for many hundred years.

At last the Imperialists came to overthrow all Ti-ping improvement, they having succeeded in capturing Pimbong, the nearest town, with the help of one Major Bailey and a powerful artillery corps, a few days before I left the city.

Previous to setting out for Shanghae, I gave the rowdies their share of prize-money; and although I fully expected that they might cut each other's throats over the coin, I hardly expected the attack they made upon myself and lieutenant, whereby our lives were placed in danger. It seemed that they were aware that we were taking funds to use at Shanghae; and to three of them the temptation to possess themselves of the same became irresistible. Upon receiving their prize-money, furnished with passes I obtained for them, they set forth from the city; but, on reaching the suburbs, the aforementioned trio made a halt for the purpose of planning our murder, and mustering up courage to commit the deed by indulging in a copious supply of that ardent spirit—*samshoo*. At length, having cunningly waited until the Yoong-wang had gone outside the city with nearly all his men, in the direction of Pimbong, they returned upon their murderous mission. Fortunately for myself and W——, they went in on the way for another dose of *samshoo*, which made one of them helplessly intoxicated, but the other two had become brave enough to proceed on their errand without him. After obtaining admittance at one of the city gates, they came straight to the Yoong-wang's palace, where we were engaged with an interpreter and one of the chief's secretaries making up a communication I wished to send to the Chung-wang.

A-ling, my own faithful interpreter and companion, was quite incapacitated by the injury he had received at Wu-see. Although standing directly between him and the enemy's fire when he was struck, the ball passed me and inflicted a severe wound on his left shoulder, passing round

the back and lodging on the right shoulder blade. The poor fellow was carried with me to Kar-sing-foo, and suffered much torture from the Chinese doctors, who treated him by thrusting long strips of twisted paper into the wound, and screwing them round until the ball was reached. At last, however, a better doctor was found in the person of the Yoong-wang's own medical attendant, who cut down to the ball and extracted it, much to the patient's relief. A-ling was not sufficiently recovered to accompany me to Shanghae; he therefore remained at Kar-sing-foo, and from that day to the present I have never seen him again, nor probably ever shall, for I believe he was killed when the city subsequently fell into Imperialist hands.

Directly our friends, the rowdies, came into the ante-room in which we were seated, they began to insult myself and lieutenant, knowing that the Yoong-wang was absent and could not arrest them, and that I could not do so either, as my few men were at the Wei-wang's palace in another part of the city. As they were no longer under my command, it was useless ordering them out of the place; I therefore sent an attendant to request the officer left in charge of the city to send a guard to remove them.

At this moment the most forward of the two suddenly drew a revolver and fired it at W——'s head, immediately afterwards turning towards me. Through the smoke I could not see whether my lieutenant had been killed or not; but before the scoundrel could shoot me, I had lodged a bullet in his carcase. Almost at the same instant I heard another shot fired—as it afterwards proved to be, by W——, and saw that my assailant was unable to discharge his revolver, though evidently tugging at the trigger. The other rowdy was now advancing; and as his companion still endeavoured to fire at me, I was compelled to again use my own revolver in self-defence. The would-be murderer now fell dead, while his cowardly friend ran up presenting his pistol by the barrel, and crying, "Don't shoot, don't shoot!"

I really did feel very much inclined to take vengeance upon the fellow, and my Cantonese (who now came up) would certainly have put him to

death, had it not been for my lieutenant's request to leave him unharmed. As it was, the wretch seemed nearly frightened out of life, and it was singular how such a coward could have mustered up desperation enough to attempt murder; evidently, he depended upon the determination of his comrade; for, had he been at all resolute, we would assuredly have been killed. Upon examining the dead man's revolver, we found that although the powder had exploded, the bullet had never left the barrel, but had stuck just between it and the revolving chambers, thereby disabling the weapon, and probably saving our lives. We accounted for this singular circumstance by supposing the pistol must have been loaded a long time, and that the powder had consequently lost its strength.

Upon the Yoong-wang's return, I fully intended to give up the surviving ruffian to be dealt with according to the law. Again my brave lieutenant begged him off, blindly and suicidally, as it afterwards appeared, for ultimately he lost his own life through the treacherous act of the wretch he spared. The name of the man who was killed was Hart, an Englishman; his dastardly companion was an American named William Thompson.

I would here give a piece of advice to those who may have the misfortune to fall into the disreputable company of Yankee and cosmopolitan rowdies abroad. Act with quickness and decision, and you will defeat men who are mostly cowards at heart; but if you hesitate or endeavour to temporize, you are a dead man; for these murderous wretches will butcher a fellow-creature with less compunction than people generally feel at killing a fly. I have heard that the man Hart had murdered and robbed several Europeans in the silk districts, and I believe his Yankee confederate is now serving a long term of imprisonment for highway robbery. I engaged the five rowdies in the dark, and it has given me a caution against their *genus* that will never be forgotten.

The Yoong-wang having supplied me with a boat and guide, accompanied by W——, I bid adieu to Ti-pingdom and set out for the

Imperialist territory and Shanghae. Between the outposts of the two belligerents I found a considerable tract of country entirely occupied by large bodies of banditti, who preyed alike upon Ti-ping or Imperialist. At one place we had a very narrow escape from falling into their hands, having to run the gauntlet of a large camp along the two banks of a narrow creek, which we successfully did amid a storm of bullets, not one, however, taking effect. These robbers were the wildest and most ferocious looking men I have ever seen, and it was said that they spared neither man, woman, nor child. Since my departure from China this sort of brigandage has become frequent in the country wrested from the Ti-pings.

At last we reached Shanghae, after running past all the Imperialist stations at night, when our small canoe-like boat was not easily discerned. We at once placed ourselves under medical attendance, and for a few days remained perfectly quiet. Within a week, however, I was grieved to hear that my lieutenant had been seized and thrown into prison by the *British Consul* for being in the service of the Ti-pings and having captured a Manchoo vessel, the ungrateful blackguard, Thompson, having given the information which led to his arrest.

Englishmen should be aware of the gross injustice exercised by their authorities in all affairs connected with the Ti-pings, and no more striking example is to be found than in the case of Mr. White, who was sentenced to three years' imprisonment by the Consular Court for doing upon the side of the Ti-pings exactly what Admiral Hope, Generals Staveley, Michael, and Brown, and Major Gordon, Captain Stack, Dr. Macartney, &c., had done, and were doing, on the side of the Manchoo! He was actually condemned upon the ordinance of *neutrality* of Sir John Bowring, the said ordinance being instituted in 1855, at Hong-kong, to compel British subjects to observe neutrality towards *both* parties to the Chinese internecine war. This neutrality regulation had long been annulled by the acts of the above-mentioned gallant officers on behalf of the Manchoo, yet the Englishman

who assisted the Ti-pings, and who was no more guilty of breaking the law than they were, was condemned by this broken and obsolete ordinance, and died (or rather, shall we say, was murdered; for confining a man dangerously ill in such a loathsome den was nothing else) a few days afterwards in his damp and comfortless dungeon! Is this British justice? How long have Englishmen understood "neutrality" to mean all help and military assistance to one belligerent, but open hostilities towards the other, and punishment of its allies? Had England remained neutral, or had she regularly declared war against the Ti-pings, there might be some grounds for prosecuting those who have assisted the latter; but as neither the one policy nor the other has been followed, it is no more right and just to punish those who have assisted the Ti-pings, than those who have assisted the Manchoo. The whole course of the hostilities against the Ti-pings was irregular and illegal, and certainly no one can deny that the British officers already referred to have committed a breach of neutrality quite as much as Mr. White did, even taking Sir John Bowring's ordinance as being in full force. The proof that this argument is correct may be gathered from the fact that when Colonel Sykes, M.P., and the Hon. Mr. Liddel, M.P., brought forward Mr. White's case in the House of Commons, the Government, in order to protect its agents from prosecution, *then* passed an Order in Council<sup>60</sup> *condoning the offences* against neutrality of all those who had assisted the Imperialists, but not extending the same favour to those who had assisted the Ti-pings. A piece of more iniquitous and unfair legislature, or more opposed to English feeling, it would be impossible to find. Incredible as it may seem, the present state of the law by which British subjects are governed in China, viz., Sir John Bowring's ordinance of neutrality, is re-established, but *one half is declared null and void*, while the other is made executive by the Order in Council above mentioned, which acts both retrospectively and anticipatory! So that a law which can only exist, or be created, for application towards two belligerents, is here made

*ex parte*, and exactly the reverse of what its denomination implies. The wording of this fraudulent document runs thus:—

"1. Nothing in the said ordinance, made and passed on the 17th day January, 1855, shall extend or apply, or be deemed to have extended or to have been applicable, to any British subject, who, *at any time heretofore*, may have assisted, *or may hereafter assist*, the Government of the Emperor of China....

"2. If any subject of Her Majesty... shall... levy war, or take part in any operations of war against the Emperor of China... such person shall be liable to the several penalties mentioned in the said ordinance of the 17th day of January, 1855."

It is thus perfectly evident that the ostensible neutrality ordinance is literally an alliance with one of the two belligerents. The style and title are maintained to satisfy and hoodwink the House of Commons, to deceive them into believing that the Government is pursuing a neutral policy in China, while the clauses tacked to the old ordinance entirely change its every intention, and exclude the least particle of neutrality from its meaning.

If Lords Palmerston and Russell are so destitute of allies in Europe that they cannot restrain themselves from rushing into alliance with the Manchoo Emperor of China (who certainly does not reciprocate their extraordinary ebullition of feeling, and who would take infinite delight in making mincemeat of his officious friends and all their countrymen), why do they not proclaim the stupendous and ever-memorable fact openly? Why do they seek the most opposite and roundabout way of effecting their object by employing chicanery and double dealing to convert an ordinance of neutrality into an importunate treaty of alliance; instead of raising themselves from their slough of shuffling and fraudulent means, by

repudiating the false ordinance and duly announcing the barbarous Manchoo despot as their very good ally? Surely the noble lords have not been deterred from giving to the world their wonderful act of statesmanship, by doubting that the contented British public would accept the affair as an agreeable compensation for their questionable European policy? Perhaps, however, it is as well that they have preserved a discreet reticence, because the Emperor of China is no party to the alliance they have thrust upon him, and is particularly liable to issue an edict for the extermination of all foreign devils, the noble lords included, at any moment that may appear auspicious.

The shameful Order in Council of July 9, 1864, is quite sufficient proof that the trial and condemnation of my unfortunate lieutenant was illegal; every British officer who committed a breach of neutrality by assisting the Imperialists was equally liable to prosecution. If the Cabinet Council had not, with oily complacency, justified the acts of their military subordinates in China *after* they were committed to the policy (in fact, when the operations resulting from their illegal intervention had terminated), and *after* Mr. White's death, the friends of the latter would undoubtedly have obtained heavy compensation.

Besides the fact that my medical adviser ordered a change of climate, directly I became aware of my lieutenant's fate I determined to take a trip to England.

Major Gordon, R.E., had retired with his whole force from active co-operation with the Imperialists since the Soo-chow treachery and massacre for which he was responsible. I therefore naturally concluded that he would not resume the position of tool to the sanguinary, faithless Mandarins, who had so completely dishonoured him. As a Christian, an Englishman, and a British officer, I did not think it possible he could himself wish to continue a participator in deeds of revolting barbarity, and I concluded that his Government would immediately recall him, and cease all active support of

the bloodthirsty Manchoo. Although my latter supposition proved correct, the former was quite mistaken, as I found after my return to England. In consequence of these circumstances, and the fact that at Shanghae I was altogether unable to execute any of my projects for the service of the Ti-pings, I decided to abandon the sword for the pen, and to fulfil my instructions from the Ti-ping authorities by writing the present work, trusting that I should serve their cause by appealing to the sympathies of the British people, and hoping that foreign hostility would cease, in which case their ultimate success would be a certainty.

The emissaries of the Manchoo, and the hirelings of the slaves of the Manchoo, were not either intelligent or energetic enough to effect the capture of their humble servant, although they amused themselves by attempting to do so not only before but after his departure from China, by one of the overland mail steamers.

Having brought the history of the Ti-ping revolution and my own adventures down to this period, all that now remains to be noticed are the events which have transpired since I sailed away from the Chinese land. Before, however, proceeding with them, it will be necessary to return to the fall of Soo-chow, and resume our chronicle from the occurrence of that tragedy.

There is but little doubt that the Ti-pings would have been able to hold their own against the enemy, even taking into consideration all the foreign support the latter received, had the betrayal of Soo-chow never taken place. Although Nankin, as the capital and seat of the Tien-wang's Government, occupied the first political place, Soo-chow, in consequence of the extraordinary measures taken to strengthen it, and its central situation in the Ti-ping dominions, became the principal military position. The capital, though surrounded by the highest and most massive walls in China, and defended by some commanding fortifications, was situated on the extreme verge of the Ti-ping territory, and was the most assailable point, while its

resources were far inferior to those of Soo-chow. Moreover, directly the latter city became invested by the Anglo-Manchoo forces, a powerful army was moved within its spacious walls, while the Chung-wang, with his own division, co-operated from the outside. These troops constituted the only Ti-ping army in the field at that time, all the remainder of the forces being employed, according to a mistaken defensive policy, in garrisoning the numerous walled cities throughout their kingdom—tactics ordered by the Tien-wang in opposition to the wishes of the Commander-in-Chief, and which ultimately led to the destruction of the greater number of the garrisons in detail, and the loss not only of Nankin, but all the former possessions of Ti-ping-tien-kwo.

The siege of Soo-chow was prosecuted by an Imperialist army of from 50,000 to 70,000 men, including *General* Gordon's and other foreign contingents, altogether about 6,000 strong. At least 12,000 of the Imperial troops, under General Ching, were well armed with foreign muskets and rifles; they were partly disciplined, and constituted a very effective force, far superior to the usual class of Chinese soldiers. Attached both to the Anglo-Manchoo legions and ordinary troops, were many British officers, and, what was still more useful, a very large supply of every description of artillery. Three or four heavily armed and shallow steamers, together with a great fleet of Mandarin gunboats, were possessed by the besiegers. Besides all this array of strength in a bad cause, several detachments of *British troops* were moved up from Shanghae, for the ostensible purpose of giving 'moral support' to the murderous intentions of the Manchoo, but, in reality, to afford succour in case the Ti-pings might defeat their assailants—a contingency far from improbable. The troops so fraudulently prostituted (fraudulent, because they were solely organized for the interests of the British taxpayer and not the Manchoo; prostituted, because yellow gold and mercenary motives caused their disgraceful employment) consisted of some companies of the Beloochee Regiment, sent to garrison Quin-san (about 14

miles from Soo-chow), and a force of H. M. 67th Regiment, Royal Artillery, and 22nd B. N. I., commanded by Captain Murray, R.A. Not only were these troops sent to participate in Manchoo atrocities, but the British General (Brown) in command actually took upon himself *to lend* the Imperialists every available piece of artillery on the station, as though the same were his private property and did not belong to the British nation, whose trust he was abusing.

To defend Soo-chow, the Ti-pings had a force of about 40,000 fighting men, including some 8,000 attached to the Chung-wang outside the city. About one third of these troops were the *élite* of the service, while all the others were brave and veteran soldiers. Besides Mo-wang, who was commandant of the city, four or five other Wangs were present; the principal among them was the Nar-wang, who commanded more than half the troops in garrison, his military power being greater than that of the commandant, although he was placed under the orders of the latter.

The Mo and Nar Wangs were the Commander-in-Chief's two principal and favourite generals. The former was a Kwang-si man, and had been the Chung-wang's companion in arms from the commencement of the revolution; the latter chief was a native of Hu-peh, and had joined the Ti-ping cause in the year 1854, since which he had been trained to military tactics by the Chung-wang. Both leaders were associated together in equal rank and command for nearly ten years, and it was always understood among the Ti-pings that they were not only bound together by the strongest ties of adopted brotherhood and friendship, but that they were equally attached to their renowned superior. Yet it will be seen that, in spite of the good influences and kindly associations by which the three were supposed to be governed, the Nar-wang was a man of evil nature, and small, treacherous mind.

After very severe fighting, General Gordon managed to effect the capture of all the stockades outside the walls of Soo-chow. This, however,

was only accomplished after many a disastrous repulse, and a great loss of men and officers.

The following account of the last assaults upon the fortifications outside the East Gate, which were defended by a few pieces of artillery, is copied from "How the Taepings were driven out of the Provinces of Kiang-nan and Che-kiang," and will be found to illustrate the bravery with which the garrison of Soo-chow struggled against irresistible odds:—

"On 27th November, after Major Gordon had all infantry (except 1st Regiment) and artillery assembled at Waiquedong, an order was issued that a night attack should be made on the Low-mun stockade, which formed the key to all other stockades on the east side of Soo-chow.

"White turbans were served out to all soldiers, so as to be able to distinguish them from the rebels, in case it should come to a hand-to-hand fight. About one o'clock Major Gordon himself, accompanied by Majors Howard and Williams, started with about two companies of men towards the stockade, leaving the remainder of the force behind already fallen in, so as to advance at a given signal. Everything seemed quiet, and in fact all thought the plan would succeed. After Gordon and his followers had been advancing close to the stockade, they found everything quiet, and no signs of the guards being aware of an attack. The remainder of the force, therefore, received orders to advance, while the advance guard had succeeded in climbing inside the breast-work. Scarcely were all troops up to the front and a portion of them crossing to reinforce Major Gordon, when the rebels began to direct a fire of grape, canister, and musketry on the force, which made every one shiver. The Quin-san artillery responded vigorously, and it was a fine

spectacle to see fiery rockets and red-hot mortar shells going into the rebel works. But the rebels stood it gallantly, and did not retreat an inch. The whole line of stockade which the rebels held seemed one line of fire, and here Major Gordon perceived that Chinese are not fit to fight at night time, for all the begging and encouraging of the European officers could not make the troops try another attack; they seemed afraid of their own shadows. The only chance left therefore was to try and shell the rebels out of their position, and this was done till dawn of day, when Major Gordon, seeing the rebels still resisting desperately, and receiving thousands of reinforcements from the city, made good his retreat, leaving numbers of killed and wounded on the field. This was one of the most bloody fights the force encountered; and, judging by what the Quin-san force lost this night, the rebels must have lost tremendously. Still, the gallant fellows, encouraged by their brave chiefs, held their position manfully against a fire of about 20 guns, flying on them for about three hours. The loss of the Quin-san force was as follows:—Captains Wylie, 2nd Regt.; Christie, 4th Regt.; and Maule, 2nd Regt.; Lieut. King, 2nd Regt., killed. Major Kirkham severely wounded on the head; Lieut. Miok, 4th Regt., wounded in the shoulder; Major Tapp, wounded in the leg; and several more slightly, with about two hundred men killed and wounded. Major Gordon seeing this night attack frustrated, determined to pay the rebels off for it; and shortly after, on the 28th November, at night, all guns, about 46 in number, were brought in position within about 700 yards of this formidable stockade, and the infantry was to fall in near the guns at daylight on 29th of November, to make another attack. The rebels were quite prepared for it, for no sooner did

they perceive all the artillery and infantry so near their works, than they hoisted their red flag as a sign that they meant to fight, and not give up this position so easy. Precisely at eight o'clock the signal rocket went up, and at once all guns sent forth their different missiles, some directing their fire on the Low-mun stockade, others directing their fire on the stockades lying to the right and left.

"The rebels seemed to preserve their ammunition, for but very little fire was encountered at first. The 8-inch mortars were playing havoc in the stockades, for every now and then houses, boats, etc., would be blown up in the air, under the cheers of the Imperialist soldiers, of whom thousands, under command of General Ching, were present, to support Gordon's force. Le Futai himself had taken up a place in rear, in one of the Imperial stockades, so as to witness the spectacle. About eleven o'clock the fire from both sides was furious, even the siege artillery had advanced within about one hundred yards of the rebel works, pouring forth grape at the rebels, who, however, inspirited by their noble leader, the Mo-wang, in person, stood it like European soldiers. The 5th Regiment, under Major Brennon, was now ordered up, to storm the stockade on the extreme right, near the Soo-chow creek, the most favourable point to cross the ditch; but although this brave regiment advanced with cheers, and some of the officers succeeded in crossing and trying to climb up the breast-works, the rebels defended this point desperately, and poured volley after volley of musketry into the ranks, so that after about ten minutes' struggle the 5th Regiment was obliged to retire, having lost several officers and men. This attack having failed, the bombardment was renewed with vigour, and orders given to the

3rd Regiment, under Major Morton, to go to the extreme left, to make feint of attack, so as to draw the attention of the rebels on that side. Gordon here succeeded beautifully, for scarcely had Morton and his regiment begun to engage the rebels on the left, when the Mo-wang, of course anticipating a real attack on that place, ordered his best men to defend it. Scarcely, however, had the Mo-wang's men moved on, than Major Williams, of the 2nd Regiment, made a dash at the place where Brennon had met with defeat, and not waiting for bridges, but swimming the moat, followed by several officers and men, succeeded in getting inside the breast-work, which no sooner had the rebels perceived than the whole fled in confusion into the Low-mun evacuating all the stockades along the east side of the city, and leaving a good number killed and wounded on the field. The stockades were soon occupied by Imperial troops, and thus Gordon's force was within one hundred yards of the city wall. The Quin-san force, however, paid dearly for this victory, their loss being Lieutenant Jones (Artillery), Lieutenant Williams, 5th Regiment; Captain Acgar, 4th Regiment, killed. Captain Shaml'sffel lost both eyes; and several more officers slightly wounded, with about 100 or 150 soldiers killed and wounded. The ground around the stockades was as if it had been ploughed by the shell, and no doubt the rebels deserve credit for having defended the place so long against such enormous artillery."

Previous to the capture of the last outwork (the Low-mun stockade), and the day after the Anglo-Manchoos had experienced the severe defeat, in attempting to surprise the position at night, the Nar-wang secretly sent messengers into the besiegers' camp, and declared his wish to betray the

city into their hands, requesting their co-operation to dispose of the Mo-wang, whose loyalty would be likely to defeat the proposed treachery.

The motive for this defection at a time when the Imperialist successes had come to a stand-still, and when Gordon himself doubted his ability to capture Soo-chow, seems to have been caused by jealousy the Nar-wang entertained against his old friend and companion, the commandant of the city. Besides this, it is probable that the previous treachery of the Americo-Ti-ping, or Burgevine, force had affected the leading traitor and his evilly disposed associates, by giving them the idea that they might arrange terms with the enemy, by which they would not only be able to obtain security for their lives and property (and retire from the now ceaseless hostilities, if not desperate straits, to which the Ti-ping cause was driven), but also receive substantial rewards from the Manchoo.

The Nar-wang's jealousy probably arose from the fact that the Mo-wang was placed over him, as governor of Soo-chow and its dependencies. That he entertained the most bitter animosity against his former friend and comrade is quite certain, for, in order to succeed with his treachery, he went to the dastardly extreme of assassinating him.

We have now to notice the death of the gallant and noble Mo-wang, the fall of Soo-chow into Manchoo hands, and the various events connected therewith. These cannot be more effectually described than in the words of Major Gordon, R. E., and in a review of his report by the *Friend of China*—about the oldest and most independent paper in the foreign settlements in that country.

"MEMO. (BY MAJOR GORDON, R.E.) ON THE EVENTS  
OCCURRING BETWEEN  
THE 29TH NOVEMBER AND 7TH DECEMBER, 1863."  
PUBLISHED IN THE  
"FRIEND OF CHINA," SATURDAY, 12TH DECEMBER,  
1863.

"The morning after the failure of the attack by night on the Low-mun stockades, General Ching came to me, and informed me that Nar-wang, Ling-wang, Kong-wang, and Pe-wang, with thirty-five Tien-chwangs<sup>61</sup> and their followers, had opened negotiations with him for the coming over of their troops; that these men composed their quarter of the garrison, and had possession of four out of the six gates of Soo-chow, viz., She-mun, Tcha-mun, Tche-mun, and Low-mun; and that he had entertained their views, and had already seen Kong-wang. He said that they would have difficulty in disposing of Mo-wang, who was averse to a surrender; but that, if we resumed our attack on the Low-mun stockades, they would endeavour to shut him out of the city. *I consented to the defection with a good deed of pleasure,*<sup>62</sup> as I considered that, if the rebels fought, we should lose heavily.

"On the night of the 28th November, Chung-wang arrived in the city from Wusieh, and was present at the combat of the 29th. His arrival made a change in the state of affairs, and the disaffected were unable to carry out their intention of closing the gates on Mo-wang. They, however, sent over three Tien-chwangs on the night of the 30th November, and proposed to remain neutral if we attacked the city, and would trust us not to touch their men or horses; their men to be distinguished by white turbans. These Tien-chwangs told us that Chung-wang, on his return to the city after his defeat, had proposed to vacate Nankin and Soo-chow, and for the whole Taeping force to go down to Kwang-si; and, in fact, give up the cause.<sup>63</sup> The Mo-wang was averse to this, and proposed to remain and fight it out. I have since learned that he was most anxious to see me, and I think to see what could be done. This I learnt from two

Frenchmen who came out after his death, of whom more hereafter. The other Wangs did not meet the Chung-wang's views, as they intended coming over. Chung-wang then left the city, and proceeded to Wusieh. General Ching came to me on the 1st December, and asked me if I would like to see Nar-wang. I said no, unless it was necessary, and told Ching at the same time that, if the Futai did not grant the Wangs sufficiently good terms as to induce them to come over, *I thought our attack on the city might be foiled*,<sup>64</sup> as we had lost heavily in officers and men on the attack of 27th and 29th November; and a little hitch with the bridge, which had to be seventy yards long, might cause a repulse. I told Ching on the same day that I could not see the necessity of my seeing Nar-wang. He, however, pressed it, and I consented to meet him at the north gate that evening. I accordingly went, and met Nar-wang in General Ching's boat. His first words were 'that he wanted to obtain help from me.' I answered that I was most happy to help him, and then I told him that this proposal to remain neutral would be of no avail, and that I could not accept it, as I should be only deceiving him and his chief if I did so, inasmuch as, if the city fell by assault, I could not, with an undisciplined force such as the one I command, restrain them from looting every one; and that, therefore, unless they could give a gate, it would be better for them to fight, or else vacate the city. I then told the Nar-wang what I thought of the Taeping prospects, and the little chance of success. I said that I wanted to make the Imperialists and rebels good friends (?); that, since the rise of the rebellion, the Imperialists had much changed; and did not dare, from fear of foreign Governments, to perpetrate cruelties as heretofore (?). He said he would see with General Ching

what he could do about the city, and that he had no fear of Mo-wang knowing of his having seen me, or of Chung-wang either; that he had enough troops to keep both in check. I then left, and General Ching told me the next day that Nar-wang had decided to see the other Wangs, and to consult on the course of proceeding. The next day, the 3rd December, General Ching told me that Mo-wang had some idea of Nar-wang's negotiations, and wanted to decapitate him, but that Nar-wang was prepared. Nar-wang also sent out to tell General Ching that the other Wangs agreed to come over, that he personally wanted no command, but merely permission to retire to his home with his property; but that some of the other Wangs wanted to get commands of different sorts. He told me further that Nar-wang had some difficulty in seizing Mo-wang. On the morning of the 4th December, General Ching came to me, and told me that Nar-wang had determined and agreed with him to get Mo-wang on the wall of the city, and to throw him down and hand him over to us as a prisoner. I went to General Ching, and told him I must have Mo-wang given over to me; to which he acceded willingly, and in fact joyfully, as he had known him in former days. I then went to the Futai, who was out, but I saw a very high Civil Mandarin named Pow, who undertook to tell the Futai that Mo-wang must be my prisoner. I told him to tell the Futai that I would secure his not giving any more trouble to China. I had not come back five minutes before General Ching sent me over two Frenchmen, who had just come into the lines. They told me that that afternoon, at 2 p.m., all the chiefs had been assembled in Mo-wang's palace, and after a dinner, they had offered up prayers and adjourned to the great court, and having put on their robes, crowns, &c., Mo-wang mounted his

throne and began an address, in which he stated their difficulties, and expatiated on the fidelity of the Kwang-si and Canton men. The other Wangs answered him; the discussion got higher and higher, till Kong-wang got up and took off his robe. Mo-wang asked him what he was doing, when Kong-wang drew a dagger and stabbed Mo-wang in the neck.<sup>65</sup> The Mo-wang fell over the table in front of the throne, and the other Wangs seized him, and decapitated him in the entrance. They then mounted their horses and rode off to their troops; Mo-wang's head being sent to General Ching. Mo-wang's men and the other troops looted the palace. There was no fighting in the city till the morning of the 5th, when the Nar-wang's men had some trouble with the Cantonese, and drove them out of the city, killing some 50 or 60 of them. General Ching's men advanced, and with a small body, took charge of the Low-mun, my men being kept fallen in, as they were under stricter discipline than the Imperialist soldiers are. On the night of the 4th December the rebels all shaved their heads. I went to the Futai, and telling him that it would not do to let my men remain idle, proposed to him to march on Wusieh, if he would give the men compensation of two months' pay, as they had received no reward since I had taken the command. He objected to it, and I told him if he could only promise, the matter could be settled well. He still objected, and I then told him I should leave *his service*,<sup>66</sup> and went myself to the city. The Imperialists had some men straying about, but not many. I went straight to Nar-wang's house, and saw him and all the Wangs. I asked him if all was right. He said that everything was satisfactory, and appeared quite secure. He had not seen Ching at the time. I went to Mo-wang's palace, and the body was where it had

fallen. I then went out of the city, and arrived in time to see General Ching, who came to me on the part of the *Futai* to arrange matters. It was now 4 p.m. I told General Ching that I was helpless in the matter. The colonels of regiments and the officers had little authority over them unless they used the harshest means, which they would not do in this question. General Ching offered one month's pay, and the officers refused it. I told Ching that it was not my intention to accept anything; but that I felt that after the length of time the force had been fighting it was only right the men who wished to leave should have the means of doing so. Matters began to look bad, and I at last determined to make the men accept the one month's pay, which I did with difficulty, the men having made an attempt to march down on the *Futai*. I then, at the *Futai's* request,<sup>67</sup> gave orders for the march to Quin-san. Ching told me at this time that the *Futai* had written to Pekin, and said that he had extended mercy to the Wangs and the rebels. Next morning, after the troops had left, I started for the city, sending the two steamers to Wu-lung-chiao to meet me, as I expected to be able to retake the *Fire Fly* easily from information I had received from the letters in Mo-wang's house, and from some Europeans who were with Mo-wang, and who had escaped. I went to the Low-mun, and there learnt that Nar-wang and the other Wangs and chiefs were to come out and see the *Futai* at 12, noon, and that the city would then be given over. I thought I had better see Nar-wang before I went out, so I called at his palace, and took him aside and asked him if everything was all right, and if he wanted me to do anything. He said no; that everything was proper. I told him I was going to the Tai-hu; and he said, 'Why not wait? I am coming to see you.' I said it

was important business, and that unless he particularly wished it, or thought it necessary, I would not stay. He said very good, and I left. He passed me on his way to the Low-mun very soon after on horseback, with all the Wangs, going, as I supposed, to the Futai. I went then to Mo-wang's palace, and then to the east, or Low-mun, to while away the time, till the steamers could get round from Wai-quai-dung to Wu-lung-chow. From the top of the Low-mun I saw a large crowd of people near Ching's stockades, and thought it was the ceremony of submission going on. A few minutes after, perhaps 12.30 p.m., a large body of Imperial soldiers came up, and passing the gate, rushed cheering into the city, as they generally do into vacated stockades. I thought little of it, more than expressing my disapprobation to some of them. They, however, went on pouring in and firing off their muskets in the air and yelling. Ching then came up, and looked rather pale. I asked him if the interview was over, and if it had been satisfactory. He said that Nar-wang had not been to the Futai at all. I said I had seen him going with the others. He said no; that he could not say for certain; but that he thought he had run away. I said I could not make out what for, as I had just seen Nar-wang, and he said everything was all right. I asked Ching if there was any trouble. He said that Nar-wang had demanded the command of 2,000 men, and of half the city of Soo-chow, the division to be a wall, and that the Futai had refused it, and also that he had let some of Chung-wang's men in. *The latter part I knew to be false, but, strange to say, I believed the former portion.* I asked him where Nar-wang could go to. He said that he would not go back to the rebels, but that he would go to some village and settle there I thought the thing so strange that I asked Dr. Macartney, who

was by me, to go to Nar-wang's house, and to see him, and tell him not to fear anything.<sup>68</sup> Ching then told me that his men alone would be allowed in, and that there would be no looting; and as I knew before that he had his men in good discipline, I had no fear, and therefore rode round the wall with him. He kept on firing volleys in the air, which I remonstrated at, and could not make out the object. He said it was merely to prevent Kwang-si men from doing anything to his men while they were taking possession of the city. I became uneasy about Nar-wang; and at the south, or Pou-mun, I left General Ching and rode off to Nar-wang's palace. I got there at dark, and found it had been gutted. I was then met by Nar-wang's uncle, who asked me to come to his house. Being only with my interpreter, I had no one to send for General Ching, or for my troops; but the entreaties of this Tien-chwang being so great I agreed to do so, and therefore went with Nar-wang's family to his house. When I got there his men were all fallen in, and the streets barricaded. I wanted to send my interpreter for assistance, but they would not let him go. I therefore remained till 2 a.m., keeping away the Imperial looting parties. At 2 a.m. I sent my interpreter and an Imperial soldier, who was with my horse, to get the steamers round to Wai-quai-dung to make the Futai answerable, and also sent for my body guard. After he had started, the man who went with him came back and said he had been beheaded by the Imperialists. I remained till 4 a.m., and then went out to send orders to the steamers myself. *I was taken by the Imperialists and detained an hour.* At last I got to the Low-mun, and sent the body guard to the Nar-wang's house, but it was too late, the Imperialists had entered and gutted it. I then went to the Low-mun, and met there General Ching, to whom I

gave my opinion. He was most anxious to excuse himself, but I did not listen to him. At this time I did not know that the Wangs had been beheaded. I then went down to Ching's stockades, and met Major Baily, commanding Ching's artillery there. He said that General Ching was very much put out; that the Futai had ordered him to execute the Wangs, and had given orders to the troops to enter the city, that he had lost face, &c. Baily then told me that he had Nar-wang's son, and brought him to me. I refused any communication with General Ching, Nar-wang's son came to my boat, and, pointing to the other side, said it was there that the Wangs had been executed. I went over, and recognised Kong-wang's, Nar-wang's, Sieh-wang's, and Sung-wang's heads, but the body of Nar-wang was not to be seen, having been buried. I took, at the son's request, Nar-wang's head. *The bodies had been cut down the chest, and the wounds on the head were most horrible, showing the brutality of the executioners.* I then was waiting for the steamers, as I had heard that there were some high persons still in custody, and I thought that I could frighten the Futai into giving them up. He, however, heard of my arrival, and went off to the city. *I left him a note telling him my opinion, and then moved off with the steamers to Quin-san.*<sup>69</sup> I received, just before leaving, a letter from Futzu-quai, telling me that a chief had come over with 3,000 men to my officer in command; and that he, the officer in command, had received them. I sent orders to him to inform the chief of the treachery, and to let him go with his men and arms, if he liked, or else to bring his troops to Quin-san.

"This is a brief summary of the late events, which will prove to the Imperial Government a most fatal blow. I imagine that the

Futai and General Ching arranged this matter, and know that it is viewed by the mass of Mandarins with disgust.

"Nar-wang's son tells me that Chung-wang was willing to come over; and that all the people in the silk districts are the same; but how to come they know not. Is not this a time for foreign governments to come forward and arrange the terms? The power is in this force, if the authority from Pekin is given to it to act under some *honest* Chinaman. What is now to be feared is that foreigners will join the rebels, and will thus cause the war to linger on to the extermination of the unfortunate people on whom the burden falls, and to the detriment of trade of every sort. That the rebels really do not possess the qualities of government cannot be doubted. They merely hold cities, and let the villages govern themselves. The head chief may know something of the Christian religion, but I will answer for it that nine-tenths of the rebels have no real ideas on the subject. It is sincerely to be hoped that the Government will interfere at this time.<sup>70</sup>

"C. E. GORDON, Major Commanding.

"P.S. Prince F. de Wittgenstein was present at most of the above occurrences, and can vouch for the correctness of the same."

"THE FRIEND OF CHINA,' SATURDAY, OCT. 12, 1863.

"We publish to-day a document which we consider one of the most remarkable that it has been our good or evil fortune to peruse for many a day. Emanating as it does from a man of Gordon's ability and position, we have been much more than disappointed. How we have been so, let our readers judge.

"The exact position of the major is, it would appear, that of Adjutant of Quin-san, though possessing less power than General Ching, whose faculty of lying seems to have the wonderful power (by attraction we suppose) of giving credence; though the major tells us that he knew the rogue was lying. We give the major's own words, 'the latter part I knew to be *false*; but, strange to say, I believed the former portion.'

"This General Ching, this cowardly liar, it was who voted as the right-hand man on all occasions concerning the conduct of negotiating with the rebels. The major tells us that the Taeping Wangs had opened negotiations with Ching for the surrender of at least four gates of the city. We suppose this was before the 29th of November. On the 4th of December we learn of Ching's being *joyful* at the prospect of the Mo-wang falling into the hands of Major Gordon, and on the same day we hear of his reception of the unhappy Wang's head.

"Ching next appears as Envoy of the Futai 'to arrange matters,' we suppose, for the surrender of the city. Here the major slips out of the 'matter' by declaring himself 'helpless,' and this, after he had assured the Nar-wang that he wanted to make the Imperialists and Taepings friends, and only wanted possession of 'a gate' to prevent looting everybody.

"Major Gordon does not tell us *why*, at the 'supreme' moment of the taking of Soo-chow, he was so anxious to get possession of the *Fire Fly*. We beg to call our readers' attention to the following statement:—'I thought I had better see Nar-wang before I went out, so I called at his palace, and took him aside, and asked him if everything was all right, and if he wanted me

to do anything. He said no; that everything was proper. I told him I was going to the Tai-hu; and he said, "Why not wait? I am coming to see you at the meeting of the Wangs," as he *supposed*, at the Futai's.' Why was Major Gordon absent? Why did he not make it his business to see that the assurances which he had given to the Nar-wang were carried out?

"The major tells us that he got 'uneasy' when he found that Nar-wang's palace had been gutted; however, his remaining till 4 o'clock next morning where he was (though why he did not go himself for his body-guard instead of sending his servant he has not told us) hardly seems to prove this assertion; but the affair of his steamers being of so great a consequence, he sends an assistant 'to send orders to them,' when he is taken and detained by the Imperialists for an hour. (General Ching was, of course, busy just at that moment, and Major Gordon's detention was most opportune.) The screaming farce of General Ching's losing face, and Major Gordon's refusal to have anything to do with him, here opportunely follows the tragedy —(one likes to laugh after the heavy business!). The idea of frightening the Futai is nicely got over. The latter gentleman —*goes into the city*, where, of course, he *couldn't* be frightened! The major takes a steamer and goes off to Quin-san.

"*Leaving a note* for the Futai.

"Our readers have the major's letter before them, and they can judge for themselves whether our analysis be correct or not. Our own opinion is that the major—owing to his recent losses, fearing a repulse if the city of Soo-chow had then been

attacked, and finding occasion of taking it himself by treachery, and yet desiring to shield himself from the infamy of such a transaction—would have acted precisely as he declares he *has* done.

"Though a considerable reader of history, our recollection does not supply a parallel to the infamous treachery practised upon the unsuspecting Taeping chiefs. The conduct of Pizarro, in Peru, was nothing in comparison. One Inca, and a room full of treasure, is a small affair when compared with the confiding Princes of Soo-chow. Now, we ask all right-minded men to take Major Gordon's statement to Nar-wang, which we quote literally:—'I said that I wanted to make the Imperialists and rebels good friends. That since the rise of the rebellion the Imperialists had been much changed; and did not dare, from fear of the foreign Governments, to perpetrate cruelties as heretofore.' And compare his account of the atrocities committed upon the Princes of Kong, Nar, Seih, and Sung.

"Our review of these facts is based upon Major Gordon's own statements; and if he does not find means of extrication, we have placed him upon a pinnacle of infamy whence he shall not readily descend. From the moment Major Gordon first became *particeps* in the affair of the surrender with General Ching (the very ideal of a Manchoo liar), he should have stood between the Manchoo butcher of a Futai and his confiding victims, and, as a true soldier (the soul of honour), yielding his life rather than have exposed himself to the execration of all society as a traitor of the deepest dye.

"Major Gordon will, no doubt, think us severe upon himself; but we assure him that what we have said is by no means meant as a personal attack. We are simply commenting upon his own statement of what has lately occurred at Soo-chow. It may possibly be true that he has been victimized by the liar, Ching, and the Futai. We are half inclined to think such to be the case, considering his simplicity in telling us, on the authority of the Nar-wang's son, that 'Chung-wang was willing to come over, and that all the people in the silk districts are the same.' He also tells us that the 'rebels do not possess the qualities of government.' That they actually allow 'villages to govern themselves;' and that while the 'head chief *may* know *something* of the Christian religion, nine-tenths of the rebels have no real ideas on the subject.'

"We are rather astonished at Major Gordon's information as to this point. We have been for many years in China. We have seen the way in which the cherished temples and idols of the Manchoos have been treated by the Taepings; and it is rather late in the day to tell us what rebel 'ideas' are on the subject of the Christian religion.

"In conclusion, Major Gordon hopes for the interference of the 'Government.' He means, of course, the *English* Government. If there were anything wanting to make Major Gordon contemptible in the eyes of all Europe and America, it was this last phrase. What! the English Government interfere to prop up the Manchoos after the statement of what Major Gordon says has occurred at Soo-chow! Major Gordon! We thought you not only an English officer in Chinese employ, but we considered you an honourable subject of our Sovereign, yet it seems you

penned this sentence after the atrocious perfidy of Soo-chow —'It is sincerely to be hoped that the Government [English] will interfere at this time.'

"If he had not added this last sentence we could have pardoned Major Gordon everything. What! the Government of Englishmen to sustain a Government which, by Major Gordon's own showing, is so perfidious that we can make no possible comparison! There is no Englishman in this or any other part of the world who will not blush for Gordon, or the era in which it was found that an Englishman advocated assistance for a Government which has violated every treaty, and even the most sacred obligations recognised among men.

"As for ourselves, we are not military adventurers, and, perhaps, cannot understand how *any stratagem* may be fair 'in war as in love,' but we do hereby protest against a violation of a solemn word of honour given. Major Gordon must clear himself, or he will go down to posterity not only 'unhonoured and unsung,' but as a wretch who sold blood to General Ching and the present Futai of Kiang-nan.

"Major Gordon, in telling us that, or, in fact, asking the question, viz., 'Is this not the time for foreign Governments to come forward and arrange terms?' looks as though he fancied foreign Governments *could* entertain the idea of an honest Chinaman under authority from Pekin. But in spite of the testimony of the Prince Wittgenstein, or any other potentate, we are inclined to believe that unfortunate Taepingdom has little to learn from Manchoo morality, and still less from mercenary soldiers, whose honour is bought and sold!"

Some people may consider the article last quoted as too severe upon Gordon—perhaps they may change their opinion after perusing the following extracts from a narrative of a journey to Soo-chow, by the sub-editor of the *Friend of China*, soon after the great treachery. I prefer giving this authenticated description by an eye-witness, to narrating the facts myself, because I did not enter Soo-chow after its betrayal, and cannot, therefore, vouch for the subsequent massacre (and other disputed points) from my own personal observations, although otherwise I have the strongest proof that the reported atrocities were perpetrated:—

#### "TO SOO-CHOW AND BACK, VIA QUIN-SAN.

"After leaving Shanghae, our route (or creek) lay through a low, flat country, intersected by canals innumerable in all directions; the richest land in China, stretching away to the very horizon, unbroken to view, except by countless graves, commemorative arches, and heaps of ruins. The weather, though superb, seemed oppressive, from the utter abandonment of the country; not a soul was to be seen as far as the eye could reach, and the endless fields of neglected and fallow ground (once the garden of China) deepened that air of sadness which winter always seems to wear in the country. Though ashore the desolation is complete, not so on the water; Mandarin squeeze stations have sprung up in all directions.

"At Wong-doo we were actually stopped, and 400 cash demanded from our Louda. Our indignation getting the better of us, we did then and there write our protest against thievery upon the rogue's ribs; and in round, legible characters, too, we did all we could to teach *this* Manchoo robber that the higher the squeeze, the less commerce, and the less commerce will

certainly produce less revenue. When will all Manchoos, Morrill tariff men, &c., learn this lesson?

"There were, besides, a few wretches fishing by means of cormorants (so often described that I will say nothing about it), making up the sum total of population. At last, Quin-san pagoda became visible; and after a short run over the country (our boat following), we reached the city.

"Of course, we went to see the 'lion' of the place. He seemed to be in a consumedly bad humour; but, nevertheless, granted us passes for Soo-chow. Dropping metaphor, Major Gordon impressed us as a very young man (say thirty) *without* an 'old head on his shoulders.' We suppose coolness is a quality which he constantly displays on the field; he certainly displayed it in his own house when we called upon him.

"On the 18th December, after a run of fifteen miles from Quin-san, we reached the stockades outside the city of Soo-chow. They had evidently been the scene of a fierce encounter. Innumerable shot (solid) in their interiors told the tale of carnage; and numerous unburied corpses were lying about in all directions, in spite of the number which had been disposed of in the creeks. As we drank our tea that evening, we studiously avoided any remark on *this* subject. Four or five miles more brought us to the lofty walls of Soo-chow. Inside the gate (Lo-mun) an immense stone wall and water-gate (as protecting the outer bastion) will ever stand a monument of Taeping energy. Of course, our first move was to see the 'lion' of Soo-chow, the *in*-famous Futai. The palace of this magnate

(the former Ya-mun of the Chung-wang) really 'impressed' us as something worthy of the 'Mings,' in which style it is erected.

"We have visited hundreds of such structures, but the Soo-chow pagoda is certainly the finest we have ever seen. In ascending we counted 220 steps, and judged the height to be from 150 to 170 feet from base to summit. It is nine stories high (as usual, an odd number); but when we reached the top, the view there presented well repaid our trouble. The vast city lay at our feet—the Venice of China—intersected with hundreds of canals, pagodas, and temples (in the tent-like style of the Chinese), relieving the otherwise monotonous view of infinite tiled roofs.

"In many places the city was obscured by the burning of houses, set on fire by the Imperialist soldiers.

"On the 19th December, having sent our cards before us, we called upon General Ching. While waiting for his appearance, we had time to examine a magnificent English clock (looted from Mo-wang's palace), which formed the main ornament of the 'reception-hall.'

"Over the dial was a fountain of water (in glass), and under it a pastoral scene, with moving figures of impossible shepherds and shepherdesses, worthy of Arcadia—all moved by the mechanical contrivances provided in the clock itself. At last Ching entered, and at first took us for a second edition of General Brown, for he immediately entered upon a defence of Le Futai. After telling him who we really were, he suddenly became so reserved that we beat a polite retreat (for the fate of the Taeping-wangs had by no means faded from our memory).

"As it was still noon, we determined on a visit to the residence of Chung-wang's secretary in the neighbourhood.

"On our arrival we found that the house had not only been looted, but that the valuable furniture it contained had been literally smashed to atoms by the Imperialist soldiery.

"In the rear we discovered a large hall, over the entrance of which a rebel tablet still remained—'Teen-foo-dong'—'Hall of the Heavenly Father.' But what really astonished us was to find on the walls a complete set of elegant lithograph engravings, which Roman Catholics are accustomed to call the 'stations,' a series of pictures representing the sad journey of Jesus from the house of Pilate to His place of execution.

"One of the pictures we became possessed of, and we shall ever keep it as the most precious souvenir of our trip to Soo-chow; for we think that the affecting story of Jesus' passion and death was *appreciated* by these *Missionary-forsaken* patriots.

"It certainly shows that a high Taeping official loved to contemplate the various scenes of that awful tragedy (for principle's sake) over which the world, till the end of time, shall weep the bitter tears of violated right and triumphant wrong.

"20th Dec.—The day being fine, we determined to have a look at the steamers *Feillong* and *Sycee*. A smart walk to the Padi-cho gate brought us to the 'fifty-two arched bridge,' where we saw the heavy artillery just outside.

"We looked with regret upon those splendid 'peace-makers,' that *they* should have been *loaned* to the butcher of Soo-chow

—that *they* should be the property of the British Government—were thoughts upon which we need make no comment.

"Captain Baily in charge, and very creditably too! His hospitality is the last pleasant impression we had of Soo-chow, if we omit the feeling of relief we experienced when once outside of its walls on our way to Shanghae.

"21st Dec.—On learning (to our surprise) that the *locale* of the 'execution ground' was neither more nor less than the court-yard of the '*Shing-s-tah*,' 'twin pagodas,' where the unhappy rebels had paid with the forfeit of their lives for trusting in the word of honour of their unprincipled assailants, we determined on a trip thither. On our arrival, we examined several most ancient tablets of stone, whence we gathered that these pagodas were erected long anterior to the Ming dynasty (*i.e.* reign of Tai Ching, dynasty of Sung); but we will not detain our readers with antiquarian trifles. On entering the court-yard (about half an acre) we found the ground *soaked* with HUMAN BLOOD! the creek forming its drain was still (after twenty days of slaughter) reddish with blood, as the officers of Dr. Macartney's force can testify. The ground for three feet deep stunk with blood (and the best blood of China); though the weather, except at noonday, did not favour the corruption of animal particles, Soo-chow being situated in lat.  $31^{\circ} 23' 25''$  N., and long.  $120^{\circ} 25'$  E.; consequently of rather a warm climate even in winter.

"Our Chinese informants told us that 30,000 rebels had been led to these shambles, and executed. We had proofs enough to know that the number was enormous; we have it on authority of an European *eye-witness* that this creek was so full of

decapitated rebels that the Mandarins employed boatmen to clean it, by pushing the bodies with boat-hooks outside of the city into the principal stream.

"We quitted the 'execution ground' (travellers will know it by the 'twin towers'), faint at these horrible proofs of *human* butchery which had met our view, and overcome with emotion. Was it for *this* that Englishmen fought? Was it for this that English guns had been loaned by the representatives of the British people? Was it for *this* that the 'first nation of the world' and the two *Scotchmen*, Gordon and Dr. Macartney, had fought?

"Let the spirit of Robert Bruce forbid it! Let the noble sons of Scotia contemn it; and all Christendom, in the name of... liberty, protest against the unspeakable perfidy, the horrible treachery, and brutal butchery of Soo-chow!

"22nd Dec.—Though the experiences of yesterday made us long to leave Soo-chow, we determined to visit the ruins of Mo-wang's palace; though completely burned, it had evidently covered an immense area of several acres; huge bronzes half melted obstructed the passage, and only a solitary drum stood sentinel at the entrance.

"It was with a melancholy satisfaction that we gazed at the wreck of his palace.

"Among so many traitors (his brother Wangs) he had been *true* to his flag. He knew what Manchoo honour meant, and his death by the hands of Taeping traitors is his eulogium. If his spirit *can* visit this world of ours, we must rejoice that the

Manchoos have not profited (even in money) by his destruction.

"If the infamous barbarity of the Futai *can* be excused; if his atrocious violation of justice and right can be pardoned; if there is any possible Jesuitical ground of justification for his immeasurable atrocities, it is this—he betrayed the betrayers of their own cause: he was a traitor to traitors, and has broken faith with the recreant Wangs.

"Depressed in spirit, we hurried from the ruins of Mo-wang's palace to our boat, and instantly gave orders to our crew to get under weigh for Shanghae.

"Hardly had we quitted the gate, when a letter was placed in our hands by a trusty agent from Chung-wang, dated Kia-ching-foo; what were our feelings in perusing it and finding these words:—'You foreigners are like the Manchoos; you have no honour! you have deceived us!' We, as a foreigner, felt all the bitterness herein contained. We, a personal friend of his, blushed for our nationality in being compared to perfidious Manchoos!

"We candidly avow it, if we thought that the sword was really stronger than the pen, we would have girded it on, and be one more 'witness' to the glorious cause of liberty! We should like to prove to the Taepings that European nations are not *all* unprincipled liars, devoid of every virtue recognised by men, and that sacred volume which teaches a morality of which one would think they were ignorant. So much for our trip to Soo-choo and back.

"S. E. F. O. C."

The dreadful Soo-chow tragedy may be considered the terminating point of that unrighteous period of British policy commencing with the organization of the Anglo-Manchoo flotilla; the hiring out of Major Gordon and other officers; and the making of those infamous Orders in Council authorizing military and naval support of the Manchoo, while it has since been declared that an ordinance of neutrality was in force all the time! That the terrible result of their policy would have so far influenced the supposed Christian and civilized principles of those members of Lord Palmerston's Government who originated it, as to make them admit their mistake with worthy humility, and seek to rectify the wrong already done by an essay towards the much easier path of right, is very doubtful. However, the spirit of Englishmen could no longer be restrained, and the Government were driven to rescind their former Orders in Council (placing the forces of England at the evil disposal of the Manchoo) by the unanimous voice of the Parliamentary representatives of the people.

Englishmen may thus flatter themselves that they have repudiated the atrocities which they had occasioned; but the very fact that their mistaken policy entirely caused such deplorable results, makes them morally responsible for the same. Still the national complicity *may* be glossed over. The participation of the agents on the spot, and especially the principal, Gordon, cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be excused.

If Major Gordon had resigned his employment in the service of the local servant of the Manchoo Government, he might, by thus immediately forsaking his brother generals when he became involved in their deeds of blood and treachery, have saved his honour from suspicion and his name from everlasting infamy. If he had possessed the least particle of self-respect, humanity, or Christian feeling, he could not possibly have followed any other course. Incredible as the fact must ever seem to right-minded Englishmen, Major Gordon, after craftily passing two months at Quin-san,

still in command of the Anglo-Manchoo contingent, and still receiving his pay from his employer, resumed active service with those sanguinary monsters and consummate betrayers, General Ching and the Futai Le.

Men judge by actions, but despise words. Gordon has *said* that his disgust was something stupendous at the revolting barbarities perpetrated by his friends; yet the sentiment did not make him refuse their pay, neither did it prevent his return to participate in fresh atrocities within two months, nor shock him sufficiently to stay his early reconciliation with the blood-stained wretches who had smeared him with the same unfading and polluting mark. Of course, before returning to active service, the British officer induced his Manchoo master to indite a cunningly worded Chinese despatch, setting forth that he was not actually concerned in the massacre of the confiding Soo-chow victims. Naturally enough, to retain the services of Major Gordon (and the consequent assistance of the British Government), without which they would still have been powerless before the Ti-pings, the Manchoos, through Futai Le, verbosely declared all that was required. Shortly afterwards, besides resuming his employment, the major responded by writing an official letter, in which he forgot his former disgust, and had the singular audacity not only to exonerate the Futai from blame for his unparalleled atrocities, but to request Sir F. Bruce not to make any further complaint about the same<sup>71</sup>—events that had seriously stained the honour of Great Britain, and which only the most prompt and unqualified repudiation, together with entire cessation of further countenance and help to the Manchoo, could either erase from her scutcheon, or clear her policy from the imputation of complicity.

Unfortunately for the reputation of Major Gordon, since his elevation to the position of General of Futai Le's Anglo mercenaries, he had been too much accustomed to intrigue and encouragement of treachery to have felt a proper indignation at the Soo-chow affair; and it is possible he might have had some knowledge of the planned perfidy before it was put into

execution, and so was not sufficiently horrified to throw up his 1,200 taels (£400) per month. Gordon's behaviour in the treachery of the Burgevine-Ti-ping legion is one specimen, and a very strong one too, of the conduct referred to. He induced the Europeans who went over to him to desert the Ti-ping cause by his promises of office, bribes, and safe conduct to Shanghai for such as were tired of fighting. Some mistaken individuals have ascribed this proceeding to the humane disposition of the man who condoned the ruthless massacre of his paroled prisoners, who assisted as a principal agent in the vast destruction of life and desolation of country during the unjustifiable British hostilities against the Ti-pings, and who never put himself to the trouble of saving the lives of those he assisted to vanquish. It must be a rather lax code of military honour which could reflect any *credit* on Gordon for rewarding many of the traitors (mostly low American rowdies), by bestowing upon them various commands in his own force; and he—supposed to be an English officer and gentleman—with open arms receiving them as his messmates and brother officers: even less creditable is the fact that he obtained pecuniary reward for those whom he did not make his *friends*.

The letter written to Sir F. Bruce by Gordon as a justification for his fresh alliance with the Futai Le, appears in the Parliamentary Papers, as noticed by the foot-note on the preceding page. This document is so important, as showing the character of Gordon's connection with the Imperialists, that I quote it in full, and then subject it to a close analysis.

"INCLOSURE 1 in No. 9.  
"Major Gordon, R.E., to Sir F. Bruce.

"Soo-chow, February 6, 1864.

"My dear Sir Frederick Bruce—

Par. 1.—"In consequence of the danger which will arise by my delaying inaction with the force any longer in a state of uncertainty, I have arranged with the Footae to issue a proclamation (which he will send to you), clearing me of any participation in the late execution of the Wangs, and have determined to act immediately."

Par. 2.—"The reasons which actuate me are as follows:—I know of a certainty that Burgevine meditates a return to the rebels; that there are upwards of 300 Europeans ready to join them, of no character; and that the Footae will not accept another British officer if I leave the service, and therefore the Government may have some foreigner put in, or else the force put under men of Ward's and Burgevine's stamp, of whose action at times we should never feel certain."

Par. 3.—"I am aware that I am open to very grave censure for the course I am about to pursue; but in the absence of advice, and knowing as I do that the Peking authorities will support the Footae in what he has done, I have made up my mind to run the risk. If I followed my own desire I should leave now, as I have escaped unscathed and been wonderfully successful. But the rabble, called the Quin-san force, is a dangerous body, and it will be my duty to see that it is dissolved as quietly as possible, and that, while in course of dissolution, it should serve to benefit the Imperial Government."

Par. 4.—"I do not apprehend the rebellion will last six months longer if I take the field. It may take six years if I leave, and the Government does not support the Imperialists. I propose to cut

through the heart of the rebellion, and to divide it into two parts by the capture of Ye-sing and Liyang."

Par. 5.—"If the course I am about to pursue meets your approbation, I shall be glad to hear; but, if not, shall expect to be well rebuked. However, *I know that I am not actuated by personal considerations, but merely as I think will be most conducive to the interests of our Government.*

"The Footae does not want the force to move against Nankin I imagine, as Tseng-kwo-fan has the wish to capture it himself."

Par. 6.—"*The Footae, if he is to be believed, has some extenuating circumstances in his favour, for his action;* and although I feel deeply on the subject, I think that we can scarcely expect the same discernment that we should from an European governor.

"This letter will relieve you from any responsibility on this matter, and thanking you very much for your kind letter, which I will answer shortly, I am, &c.,

(Signed) "C. G. GORDON."

Par. 7.—"*P.S. If you would let the matter drop, and make me responsible for my action in the matter, I think it would be more conducive to our good relations with the Pekin Government than pressing them to punish or degrade the Footae.*

"C. G. G."

NOTE.—The parts of the letter in italics are those subjected to review.

## Analysis of Major Gordon's Letter.

Par. 1. Now, with regard to this first premise, what right had Major Gordon to make a prospect of danger to the Imperialists a pretext to resume *friendship* and *alliance* with the faithless and barbarous wretches who had already implicated him in their revolting atrocities? Major Gordon's duty as a British officer, specially executing the policy of his Government, and leaving it responsible for his conduct, was simple and palpable. To avoid the deathless guilt of participation in the Soo-chow treachery and massacre, he should have repudiated both. What course did he pursue? He wrote and talked a great deal about disgust, indignation, horror, &c., but never took any *action* to fulfil his otherwise worthless protestations. By the only part we find he really performed and did not merely talk, it appears that he actually had the unparalleled audacity, folly, or knavishness, to *arrange* terms with the Futai, although any intercourse, arrangement, or communication whatever, upon a friendly basis constituted a direct condonation and approval of the atrocities which would have made an unqualified separation from *all* interests and future connection imperative to any man of honour, humanity, or Christian principle.

Par. 2. The assertion that Gordon *knew for a certainty* that Burgevine intended to rejoin the Ti-pings, is best controverted by the following extract from the *Friend of China*, Shanghae newspaper (issue of September 29, 1864), which, being one of the principal organs among a population of Europeans and Americans, scarcely numbering 2,000 souls, may be credited for being well informed upon affairs in their midst; moreover, the editor was personally acquainted with Burgevine, and was aware, equally with myself, that he entertained no enthusiasm for the Ti-ping cause.

The article referred to states:—

"As for Gordon's assertion to Sir F. Bruce that he knew for a certainty Burgevine meditated a return to the rebels, and that upwards of 300 Europeans—[This estimate is supremely absurd. During the whole time

Burgevine was with the Ti-pings, and when everything seemed to favour his enterprise, he could never obtain more than one-third of 300 Europeans]—of no character, intended to join him. This being written in February last, we know for a greater certainty that, at that time, neither did Burgevine meditate anything of the kind, nor were there thirty—the tenth of 300—Europeans in this quarter available for any such game. And though Gordon may have been under an impression that he was writing truth when he made this assertion, his common sense might have told him the thing was as improbable as it has eventually proved incorrect. We say he *may* have been under an impression that he was writing truth. We may not refrain, however, from saying we doubt it. Why, Gordon knew as well as we did that the rebels never sought the assistance of foreigners, did not care to see them in their ranks, and were always jealous of them. Gordon knew right well, moreover, that when Burgevine left Soo-chow he left the rebel service for ever; that he was sick and disgusted with it; and if ever he meditated anything afterwards, it was operation rather as an independent buccaneer than as a Ti-ping general. The assertion—yarn, wilful lie, or whatever it shall be called—did very well, however, in the place it was intended for, viz. Pekin, a place so far away from the scene of action, that there was no possibility of contravening it at the time."

Besides the facts—incontrovertible to those acquainted with the case—in the above refutation of Gordon's "reasons" for his fresh blood-alliance with that cold-blooded murderer, the Futai, another strong argument may be proved against his veracity:—

1. We may be quite sure that the Ti-pings would never have accepted a second time the services of the man who had once betrayed them. From my own knowledge of the opinions entertained by the Chung-wang, I am quite assured on this point.
2. Then with respect to the probable action of Burgevine himself. Having deserted the Ti-ping cause before Soo-chow had fallen, and while its prospects were in vastly more favourable condition

than at the period of Gordon's statement, he would, consequently, never be disposed to join when its circumstances had become desperate. 3. As for the "300 of no character," mercenaries would certainly not espouse a failing movement, which, in fact, had become still more "unprofitable" than when the Burgevine-Ti-ping legionaries ran away because, even at that time, they found no sufficient inducement to remain. These propositions cannot fail to damage the "reasons" given by Gordon, because they show that all common sense and reason points to an exactly opposite conclusion. Thus we find that logic reverses Gordon's "reasons," while facts entirely prove the falseness of his statements. The principal argument is the fact that Burgevine *did not* join the Ti-ping, and the mythical "300" were never more heard about.

Par. 3. This paragraph of Gordon's letter seems to contain about the most severe condemnation of his "reasons" that it would be possible to imagine. He states that "he is open to very grave censure for the course he was about to pursue," and that, "knowing the Pekin authorities will support the Futai in what he has done," he had made up his mind to "run the risk;" that is to say, he knew that the Manchoo Government would approve the treachery and massacre in which the Futai had involved him; yet such was his obliquity of principle that he actually used as a reason to resume the sanguinary alliance the very fact which should have made his separation from the Manchoo still more imperative.

With regard to the ungenerous, if not treacherous, manner in which Gordon, behind their backs, termed his comrades "the rabble," it is well noticed in the quotation from the *Hong-Kong Daily Press*, at the end of this analysis.

Par. 4. This section of the letter exhibits a very pretty ebullition of overweening self-conceit. If the writer takes the field again, the rebellion cannot last "six months;" without that mighty warrior's hostility, it would last "six years." Well, Bombastes did take the field, but the "rebellion" still flourishes. It will be seen that the blower of his own trumpet modestly puffs

his value at only twelve times that of any other officer who might conduct the operations against the Ti-ping.

Par. 5. Concerning this protestation of disinterested motives—"I know that I am not actuated by personal considerations"—I beg to refer my readers to the concluding paragraph of the analysis, when they will find that this statement is no less questionable than others by the same author. With regard to Gordon's excessive care of the "interests of our Government," and his declaration (in paragraph 2 of the letter), "that the Futai will not accept another British officer if I leave the service," the article in the *Friend of China*, already quoted, continues from where we left off:—"And just as likely to be true was the statement that the Futai would not accept another *British* officer if he, Gordon, left the Chinese service. How did Gordon learn that fact, or that story? What can there be in *British* officers that they should be so repugnant to the Deputy Viceroy? What Gordon really meant was:—If I leave, 'the Government' will not find such a faithful tool in any one else as they have found in me."

Par. 6. In this part of the precious letter it is shamelessly declared that "the Futai has extenuating circumstances in his favour" for breaking faith and cruelly butchering the defenceless prisoners at Soo-chow, who solely surrendered upon the terms guaranteed by Gordon himself.

Par. 7. This postscript makes a fitting conclusion to the bad principle and illogical reasoning of the letter we have reviewed. Gordon has the audacity to request that the "matter"—affecting not only his own character, for that is immaterial, but the honour of the British army and the fair fame of England herself—may be "let drop," and to opine that "good relations" should be maintained with the Pekin Government, by no longer expressing any indignation at the immeasurable disgrace reflected upon England by the revolting barbarities perpetrated by her very good Manchoo allies, through the aid, and in the actual presence, of British officers.

Before concluding the analysis of Gordon's apology for resuming active operations with the Futai, it is necessary to make a few further observations. In the first place, it is quite impossible to deduce a sufficient cause from the three "reasons" by which he declares himself to have been actuated (paragraph No. 2). Even suppose we admit the allegations that Burgevine meditated a return to the rebels; that 300 Europeans were ready to join him; and that the Futai would not have accepted another *British* officer, to what conclusion do they lead us? Simply, that *if* these suppositions became realized, the event might prove disastrous to the Manchoo. Now, as Gordon chose to make this his excuse for comfortably passing over the Soo-chow affair, and resuming active service, it is perfectly clear that (whether he intends to convey this meaning or not) he pursued such conduct in the interest of his Imperialist friends; and this reduces the three "reasons" into a plea of duty to the Manchoo. Moreover, from the independent action claimed throughout the letter, the writer does not attempt to justify himself by any pretence of duty to his own Government. British officers, and, indeed, all their countrymen, may well feel astonished and disgusted at the extraordinary reasoning of Gordon, who, though merely the hired mercenary of a *local* Mandarin (Le Futai), and being totally without *status* in the Imperialist service,<sup>72</sup> made his duty to the Manchoo, forsooth, a reason for condoning the atrocities in which they had already involved him, and justifying his future participation in deeds equally abhorrent to every civilized and Christian sentiment.

We now come to the question as to the worth of this plea of duty. Either Gordon was the servant of the Manchoo Government or the British Government. When the English Commons compelled ministers to revoke the Order in Council authorizing the employment of British officers by the Manchoo, and to recall all so employed, *in consequence of the Soo-chow massacre*, Gordon, eventually, was withdrawn from service with the Futai. Now this proves that he was *bonâ fide* the servant of the British

Government, and not only destroys his implied plea of duty to the Government of China, but virtually disclaims any countenance or indorsement of his act in joining the Futai and resuming active operations subsequent to the Soo-chow tragedy. Thus it is palpable beyond any manner of doubt that the course Gordon pursued was *entirely* according to "personal considerations;" was at his own responsibility; and was neither in consonance with duty to his own Government nor that of the Manchoo.

There are but three other motives which might be held to account for Gordon's conduct. The first would be, duty to his God—but this never has been attributed to him, and it would be gross blasphemy to do so; the second, philanthropy, has been professed both by himself and friends; the third, which is pecuniary, has been more frequently ascribed to him. The philanthropical motive will be controverted shortly when we come to a case in which it is attributed to him. With one exception (the *China Mail*), the whole European press of China lamented Gordon's connection with the Futai at Soo-chow; still more indignant were the channels of public opinion when they found that he quietly ignored the treacherous massacre by remaining at his post; and then rumours were not wanting with regard to the mercenary motives believed by many people to be the real cause of his return to active service. Major Gordon has not only brought himself into evil repute, but also the service of which he is so questionable a specimen. Take, for instance, the following extract from the *Friend of China* (issue February 20, 1864):—"If it be true that Major Gordon has again coalesced with Le Futai, he must not blame us if we judge of his motives according to the old maxim, 'actions speak louder than words.' It would seem that his late rejection of rewards from the hand of Kung was simply because of its having been too little for his acceptance, not too vile. His retirement to Quin-san was a safe dodge to quiet public opinion in regard to the Soo-chow massacre.... We hope that he has stipulated for tens of lacs of rupees. Why should a soldier of fortune not make a fortune? When the major

returns to Scotland, will any of his 'canny' countrymen ask impertinent questions as to the source of the 'siller'? To be sure, military men who wear Queen Victoria's uniform may hem and haw, cough and look doubtful; but we assure the major that if one British officer can sell his sword, the others have no right to complain about the price.... Dollars cover every defect, and a wealthy soldier can afford to buy the respect which he cannot exact. Let the trade of murder flourish, as it always has done, and may Major Gordon fully enjoy all the wealth that the Manchoos can give, and that mental satisfaction which faithful servitude never fails to bring to those of integrity! Is not faithfulness bought and sold in 'Vanity Fair,' and should that not be looked for in the conduct of a—British soldier?"

If this article were to be literally intended, it would probably indicate the principles of Gordon. It appears very unfair to judge him by the code of honour, civilized morality, and Christian doctrine, when he does not seem either to appreciate such restraints or conform to them; therefore it is possible that the press has been too severe when condemning acts that, in this case, may, perhaps, be rather virtuous than otherwise.

We now bring the analysis of Gordon's "reasons" to a close by the following extract from the *Hong-kong Daily Press* (October, 1864), which refers to paragraphs 2, 3, and 5 of the letter, and finishes by making a direct accusation of mercenary motives for his coalescence with the Futai:—

"We believe it is well known that had Gordon left, Macartney would have succeeded. Certain it is that Macartney was an applicant for the post when Gordon was nominated, and as he had subsequently completely won the Futai's confidence, there can be little doubt about the matter.

"It will be seen, therefore, that Gordon's pretexts are shallow subterfuges, which will not stand the test of truth for one moment. He admits he is open to grave censure, but he says,

'knowing as I do that the Pekin authorities will support the Futai in what he has done, I have made up my mind to run the risk.' That is a nice process of reasoning, certainly!

"He then turns round on his comrades—calls them a dangerous rabble, 'which he will make it his duty to see dissolved as quietly as possible, and that while in course of dissolution it should serve to benefit the Imperial Government.'

"Apart from Gordon's unprincipled conduct with respect to the perfidy of the Futai, and to the murder of the Wangs—conduct which must heap disgrace on his name, and for ever prevent him from looking an honest man in the face again—we doubt whether, in the whole page of history, a parallel is to be found of a victorious fortunate commander turning on his comrades in the disgraceful, and we will add treacherous, manner in which Gordon turns on the Quin-san force in the letter before us. Let the reader remember the number of times Gordon had led the Quin-san force to victory—how splendidly they behaved in the campaign which Gordon was about to lead them through when he thus treacherously denounced them! Whatever they were, they had made him what he was; and bad as they might have been, we doubt whether any one of them ever departed more directly from the code of honour laid down by himself than Gordon did in rejoining the Futai, or even whether any one of them so far betrayed his comrades as Gordon does in the letter before us.

"A letter from Sir F. Bruce to Earl Russell, dated Pekin, 21st March, encloses a letter from Mr. Hart, the Inspector of Customs, to Sir Frederic, communicating the important fact

that, at the interview which Colonel Gordon had had with the Futai at Soo-chow, about the beginning of February, he, Mr. Hart, acted as interpreter between the two. The ostensible reason for Mr. Hart thus acting was to enable the Futai to exculpate himself, which, according to Mr. Hart, he most completely did. Why did not Gordon mention this important circumstance in his letter to Sir Frederic advising His Excellency that he had again taken the field?<sup>73</sup> How came it that Mr. Acting-Consul Markham in his letter to Sir Frederic announcing the reconciliation, was silent on the point? How came it that General Brown was either ignorant of, or suppressed the fact? How did the fact come to be kept so secret from the public? Not a whisper nor a hint of Mr. Hart's presence is to be detected in the despatches of these officers, let alone the complete vindication of the Futai which that gentleman avers was effected at the interview?

"The answer is plain. Mr. Hart is a man of good repute, of high standing, and is a true and faithful servant. The Mandarins have great faith in him, and his word goes a long way. If they sent him to Gordon with an offer of 50,000 *taels*, the colonel might be assured not only that the money would be placed to his credit in any bank in London he might name, but that the transaction would be kept an inviolable secret.

"There, reader, you have the clue to Gordon's sacrifice of principle, and Mr. Hart's visit to Soo-chow."

Before narrating the events subsequent to Gordon's return to active operations, and bringing the history of the Ti-ping revolution down to a close, it is necessary to review a despatch written by Sir F. Bruce, the

British Minister in China. The document constitutes the only authority, or rather the only official approval, Gordon ever received for rejoining the Futai. It is necessary to notice the same, because, as it was an entirely conditional approval, and the conditions were *never* observed, it naturally became null and void. It is, therefore, our duty to prove these facts, and thereby elucidate what might otherwise be held to remove the responsibility from Gordon, and, in fact, justify his conduct. The following despatch is the one in question, and it will be seen that it is the reply to Gordon's letter:—

"Pekin, March 12, 1864.

"Sir—I have received your letter of the 6th of February, stating the reasons that have led to your continuing operations in concert with the Governor of Kiang-soo. I informed the Chinese Government that I did not feel called upon to interfere with the course you have taken, *but that my acquiescence was founded on the passage in their despatch to me, which states,* that in any future operations in which a foreign officer is concerned the rules of warfare as practised among foreign nations are to be observed, and that I should enclose you the extract of that despatch for your guidance, and as containing the arrangements agreed upon for the future. [1.]

"I have received the strongest assurance that it will be strictly adhered to, and that the Governor Le is to be instructed to that effect. I need not impress upon you how essential it is that there should be no repetition of the occurrence at Soo-chow.

"I fully appreciate the motives that led you, after the correspondence that has taken place, to resume operations at once, and to expose yourself thereby to hostile criticism. You might have limited yourself to a statement of the reasons which

rendered the step expedient, and have thrown upon others the onus of decision before committing yourself to any action.

"But you appear to have felt, as commander of a Chinese force, and as the only person thoroughly acquainted with its composition and with the dangers to which this force, if indiscreetly handled, might give rise that the decision must be based on your representations, and you therefore assumed its responsibility.

"This honourable and manly conduct on your part entitles you to a frank expression of my opinion on the subject.

"I think it due to you to state that my concurrence in the step you have taken is founded in no small measure on my knowledge of the high motives that have guided you while in command of the Chinese force, *of the disinterested conduct you have observed in pecuniary questions, and of the influence in favour of humanity you exercised in rescuing Burgevine and his misguided associates from Soo-chow.* [2.]

"I am aware of the perseverance with which, in the face of serious obstacles and much discouragement, you have steadily pursued the *pacification of the province of Kiang-soo. In relieving it from being the battle-field of the insurrection, and in restoring to its suffering inhabitants the enjoyment of their homes and the uninterrupted exercise of their industry, you may console yourself with the assurance that you are rendering a service to true humanity as well as to great material interest.*  
[3.]

"It would be a serious calamity and addition to our embarrassments in China were you compelled to leave your work incomplete, and were a sudden dissolution or dispersion of the Chinese force to lead to the recurrence of that state of danger and anxiety from which, during the last two years, Shanghae has suffered.

"Her Majesty's Government cannot be expected to garrison Shanghae indefinitely, and tranquillity cannot be relied on until a civil administration suited to Chinese ideas and habits is firmly established in the province, and until the disorderly and brigand elements which form the force of the Taeping insurrection are either put down or so thoroughly repelled from its frontiers as to leave that unfortunate province in peace.

"To the force under your command we must look for that result, and to its efficiency and discipline your presence is indispensable. In a body so composed a state of inactivity is full of danger, and I approve your not awaiting the result of the inquiry into the Futai's proceedings at Soo-chow, *provided you take care that your efforts in favour of humanity are not in future defeated by the Chinese authorities.*<sup>74</sup> [4.]

"I am, Sir, your obedient Servant,  
"FREDERIC W. A. BRUCE.

"Major Gordon, R.E., &c."

[1.] Now, here we have the *condition* upon which Sir F. Bruce agreed to Gordon's action. Let us see how the condition has been observed. If my readers will take the trouble to turn back to the preceding chapter, they will find that the capture of Hwa-soo and Wu-see (as corroborated by the letter

dated "April 28, 1864," from one of Gordon's own officers) was followed with a complete violation of Sir F. Bruce's conditional "acquiescence" by the wholesale massacre of the unfortunate Ti-pings. Furthermore, the following chapter will prove that at every city captured by Gordon and the Imperialists "the rules of warfare as practised among foreign nations" were *not* observed, nor even pretended to be fulfilled according to the terms of the condition upon which Gordon's action was approved: the principal cases referred to will be found to be the capture of Kar-sing-foo, Hwa-soo, Chang-chow-foo, and Nankin.

[2.] The preceding quotation from the *Hong-kong Daily Press*, and the description of Burgevine's hegira in Chapter XXII., sadly differ from Sir F. Bruce's "pecuniary" and "influence in favour of humanity" theories formed at Pekin upon evidence supplied by Gordon himself. Burgevine had actually *left* Soo-chow before Gordon interfered.

[3.] Readers of this history will at once perceive the falseness of these statements, Major Gordon having, in fact, not only *prevented* the "pacification of the province of Kiang-soo" by the Ti-pings, but *made* it "the battle-field of insurrection" by his "steadily pursued" *invasions* of the otherwise peaceful and settled Ti-ping territories. As for the hypocritical cant about "a service to true humanity," &c., I need only refer to the narrative of the journey to Soo-chow by the sub-editor of the *Friend of China*; the travels of the silk-merchant through the *pacified* country; the letters from two of Gordon's own officers, &c.

[4 and 1.] Combining the first and last paragraphs selected from the precious letter for review, we will briefly notice the facts proving in what manner Gordon fulfilled the proviso of Sir F. Bruce—"I approve your not awaiting the result of the inquiry into the Futai's proceedings at Soo-chow, PROVIDED you take care that *your efforts in favour of humanity* are not in future defeated by the Chinese authorities." In Chapter XXIII., the letter from one of Gordon's officers contains the following statement relative to

the capture of the village of Hwa-soo, subsequent to the reconciliation between the official Manchoo murderer and the British bravo, and also subsequent to the establishment of the conditions by Sir F. Bruce's despatch:—"The slaughter among the rebels *after* the capture of Hwa-soo was terrible. Upwards of 9,000 were *taken prisoners*, and of *these* it was estimated 6,000 were killed or drowned, principally by the Imperialists." Now, Gordon himself commanded on this occasion, but he did not "take care" that "the rules of warfare as practised among foreign nations should be observed." This distinct violation of the British Minister's conditional sanction is alone sufficient to illustrate the fact that his *protégé*'s conduct was contrary to his wish or intention, and, also, to withdraw his stipulated justification. Moreover, we shall find that, at every succeeding capture of a Ti-ping city the same barbarities were perpetrated, and the same indifference to his superior's instructions exhibited by Gordon, who stuck to his dear Imperialist friends with extraordinary devotion and tenacity, considering their sanguinary deeds and treacherous nature.

The *Shanghae Recorder* (a paper supporting the policy of the British Government in China, and their very good Manchoo allies), in its issue of March 31, 1864, thus narrates the capture of Kar-sing-foo by the Imperialist General Ching and Major Baily, one of Gordon's subordinates:—"As we expected, the usual horrible and revolting cruelty was exercised, after the *surrender* of Kar-sing-foo, by Ching's troops. On entering the city they encountered no resistance, when the unfortunates (*all non-combatants*) found remaining were laden with loot, obliged to carry it out to the Imperial lines, and forthwith beheaded, as payment in full! Truly it is the cold-blooded butcheries which disgrace the Imperialist cause, and deaden every feeling except unmitigated disgust at their mode of warfare." The city had been evacuated by the troops.

The *China Mail* (describing the capture of the city of Chang-chow-foo) by Gordon's Anglo-Manchoo force and an army of his Imperial friends, in

its issue of May 30, 1864, states:—"The two breaches were carried in a rush, and quarter was given to *only a few hundred men* who had offered to surrender some weeks before." The families of the garrison and the other inhabitants of this large city numbered many thousand; but all, excepting the "few hundred men," were cruelly butchered in cold blood during several days.

The *Times*, in its issue of September 28, 1864, in a leading article upon the fall of Nankin, states:—"What the cost of human life has been on this occasion we cannot yet calculate. It is plain that no mercy was extended, and although the treacherous deeds at Soo-chow must have acted as a warning to the European officers, the account of the European eye-witnesses makes it evident that the carnage was very great." According to my own private advices, the *Friend of China* and other journals, the Ti-ping capital was evacuated; therefore, the unfortunates butchered by the Imperialists were, probably, the sick, wounded, and poor inhabitants who were unable to fly, or had not sufficient inducement to do so.

With regard to Gordon's "influence in favour of humanity," can any man of ordinary mind understand these results as philanthropical: viz., the slaughter of thousands in the field; the cold-blooded massacre of thousands of helpless prisoners; and the death of even hundreds of thousands by starvation; the destruction of Christianity and free circulation of the Bible, as practised among the Ti-pings; and the re-establishment of Buddhism? Those who ascribe philanthropical motives to Gordon must entertain curious ideas as to the love of mankind, when they illustrate it by ravaging Ti-pingdom with fire and sword!

Having now terminated the narrative of Gordon's reconciliation with the Futai, the next chapter will describe the subsequent events.

## FOOTNOTES:

60. This Order in Council was passed on the 9th July, 1864. See "Copy of all Ordinances relating to Neutrality in China," issued in return to an address of the House of Commons, dated May 30, 1864. (Colonel Sykes' motion.)

61. Tien-chwangs, colonels of regiments.

62. Italics are by the Author.

63. This the Chung-wang proposed, if the Tien-wang would authorise such policy. As for his having even thought of "giving up the cause," the assertion is equally false and absurd, which subsequent events have proved.

64. Here we have Gordon's reasons for approving the treachery.

65. It was a follower of the Nar-wang who first attacked the Mo-wang.

66. It will be seen that Gordon here admits he was not an Imperialist officer, but a *local* Mandarin's.

67. This sinister statement, when combined with the fact that Gordon soon afterwards returned to companionship and active co-operation with General Ching and the Futai, regardless of his responsibility for the Soo-chow treachery and massacre, certainly affords some ground for the belief that the whole tragedy was previously arranged; that Gordon retired only while compelled to do so by the unanimous expression of indignation among all Europeans (General Brown and other authorities included); and that his future course he originally intended to follow whenever the universal excitement became somewhat abated, and public attention less directed towards himself. Whether this conclusion be correct or otherwise, Major Gordon and his Manchoo friends alone can say; but in either case the Englishman fully deserves the imputation. His first conduct occasioned and made him *particeps* in the treachery; his last act condoned the atrocities at which he had pretended to be disgusted.

68. This statement is quite sufficient to make Gordon entirely responsible for every circumstance connected with the surrender of Soo-chow. He made all the assurances and guarantees, it appears, but never troubled himself to insure their observance, although he had complete power to do so.

69. Here is another extraordinary admission; for, though Gordon's honour was pledged to preserve the lives and property of the deceived traitors, he very coolly took himself off to Quin-san, without making the slightest exertion to save the unfortunate people who had trusted to his word as a British officer. Subsequent to this event hundreds and thousands of the betrayed garrison were cruelly put to death. Who is responsible for the massacre—the Manchoos, who followed their natural instincts and barbarous laws, or the British officer, who obtained the surrender, guaranteed the terms, and then quietly permitted the violation of his pledges?

70. This concluding paragraph is simply a tissue of mendacity and absurdity. Does the dishonoured officer intend to qualify the treacherous destruction of *his* prisoners, by introducing the totally irrelevant opinion that they have no Government, or "real ideas" of Christianity?

71. See Inclosure 1 in No. 9, "Return to an Address of the Honourable House of Commons," dated July 1, 1864:—for "Copies of Communications which have passed between Sir F. Bruce and

Colonel Gordon."

72. See "Our Interests in China," by H. Lay, C.B., late Inspector-General of Chinese Customs, pp. 37–41. This *exposé* of British policy in China fully proves, together with Blue Book information, that Gordon never held any commission from the Emperor of China; that neither did he hold any commission from the local authorities, but, by serving without, was in reality a "filibuster."

73. It will be seen that Gordon's letter is dated from Soo-chow.

74. Italics by the Author.

## CHAPTER XXV.

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Operations Resumed.—Attack on Kin-tang.—The Battle of the Brickbats.—Ti-ping Success.—Active Operations.—Manceuvring.—Hang-chow Invested.—Fall of Kar-sing-foo.—Gordon's Proceedings.—Chang-chow-foo.—Narrative of the Siege.—Fall of Chang-chow.—The Foo-wang.—Manchoo Cruelty.—Debate on the Chinese War.—Lord Palmerston's Policy.—Its Errors.—Mr. Cobden's Policy.—Mr. Layard.—His Inaccuracy.—Extracts from the Debate.—Result of Lord Palmerston's Policy.—Fall of Nankin.—"Imperialist" Account.—The Chung-wang's Capture.—Other Reports.—Digest of Events.—The Chung-wang.—His Position in Nankin.—Events in the City.—Newspaper Reports.—Doubts as to the Chung-wang's Fate.—The Retreat from Nankin.—Newspaper Extracts.—The Shi-wang's Proclamations.—Lee-Shai-Yin's Address.

Late in the month of February, 1864, the Futai's *General*, Gordon, resumed operations against the Ti-pings. Upon this occasion it appears that he acted entirely on his own responsibility, neither under the orders of his hitherto controller, General Brown (commanding H.B. Majesty's forces at Shanghae), nor the Futai. Consequently, the campaign to be noticed partook more strongly of filibustering than any of the preceding raids already described.

The first movement the Anglo-Manchoo force made was directed against the walled city of Yih-sing, on the western shore of the Ta-hoo Lake, and about forty miles south-west of Wu-see. After a short engagement, the usual result of such operations occurred. The garrison, unable to resist the overwhelming artillery employed by Gordon, an arm newly replenished from the British arsenal at Shanghae before taking the field, was driven from the city with much loss; those who managed to

escape retreating to Li-yang, the nearest walled town. Soon, however, they were followed up to this place, but the commandant having received orders to retire to another city, it was evacuated upon the appearance of the disciplined troops and their irresistible guns.

The appearance of the country lately wrested from the Ti-pings is given as follows by one of Gordon's own officers (who was present during all operations) in his notes, "How the Taepings were driven out of the provinces of Kiang-nan and Che-kiang." Describing the march to Yih-sing, he states:—

"Some commissariat boats also went astray, causing the infantry a few days' hunger, as scarcely any food could be obtained, the country being all deserted and devastated. Seemingly it had not been cultivated easily *after the Taepings lost possession*. Hundreds of dead bodies were strewn along the roads, people who died from starvation; and even the few who were yet alive, watched one of their comrades dying, so as to obtain some food off his dead body."<sup>75</sup>

Sleep calmly and sweetly, ye China-rebel-subduing English politicians, and speak authoritatively as to the benefit of your intervention in the Chinese civil war, after reading this testimony from the hand of one of your mercenary tools! Is there a man so ill-"liberal" as to consider Lord Palmerston and colleagues are responsible for the results of their policy of interference towards the outlandish Chinamen? What do the starving Chinamen above mentioned say?

Their easy successes seem to have made the victorious enemy too confident in their own prowess, and less cautious than heretofore. Leaving a garrison at Li-yang, and also a considerable portion of his artillery, Gordon next advanced upon Kin-tang, a small city to the north-west. Elated by his former triumphs, and believing that his appearance alone would cause the submission of all Ti-ping cities in the district, and place their long-haired people under the barber's razor, Gordon expected no resistance at Kin-tang,

and was induced to think that the place would open its gates to receive him as a sort of "conquering hero" whenever he might choose to enter. It will be seen that he became the victim of misplaced confidence.

Although, since my departure from China, and since the Ti-pings have been driven far inland, all information has been received from Chinese sources—false, exaggerated, and figurative—it seems pretty certain that the Chung-wang, after parting with me at Wu-see, placed the Shi and Foo Wangs in charge of the military position, while he proceeded to Nankin in order to confer with his king, the Tien-wang. Chang-chow-foo became the head-quarters of the Foo-wang, and it so happened that Kin-tang was similarly occupied by the Shi-wang (a general second only to the Commander-in-Chief in talent and capability), when Gordon arrived before its walls. Both cities were situated on the southern road from Nankin, and their retention was absolutely necessary to maintain either the communications of the capital, or insure the retreat of the garrison, should they be obliged to abandon their charge. In consequence of this the Chung-wang divided about 10,000 of the best Ti-ping troops between his two lieutenants for the express purpose of holding Kin-tang and Chang-chow, while another force was organized to co-operate in the field.

The two Wangs had concentrated all their strength at Chang-chow when intelligence of Gordon's advance upon Kin-tang reached them. The Shi-wang, with a division of several thousand men, by forced marches, managed to throw himself into the city just before the enemy appeared.

When the Anglo-Manchoo contingent arrived under the walls on the 20th of March, they summoned the place to surrender, but no reply was made, for the battlements were silent and deserted, neither soldier nor spear, nor sign of living occupation being visible. The gates were all fast closed, and although Gordon had been looking forward to enter peaceably, and when he had arrived could see neither trace of man nor prospect of opposition, something there must have been ominous and suspicious in the

stillness reigning over the city, for he preferred battering the walls down to knocking at the gates and demanding admission. The heavy guns were moved up to within a few hundred yards; the boats, containing supplies, followed them by the creeks; and batteries were soon thrown up, still amidst the same profound and mysterious silence upon the part of the garrison. During the bombardment all the noise was on one side; nor flag, nor face, nor living thing could be observed about the encompassed battlements. After several hours' constant firing, a large and practicable breach was effected, and the 1st regiment of Anglo-Chinese ordered to storm the silent ramparts. The enemy came forward with a loud cheer, bearing with them bamboo bridges to throw across the moat, while the stormers were closely supported by portions of the 2nd and 5th regiments, who were allowed to enter the city ditch in their boats and cross unopposed. The short space between the moat and the foot of the breach was soon passed, and the storming column began to ascend. At this moment the hitherto invisible garrison appeared and broke their previous silence in a manner fatal to the assailants. Manning every available position, they threw such incessant showers of brickbats that the Imperialists, despite the gallant behaviour of their foreign officers, were unable to advance. The Ti-pings then rushed into the breach, and charging with their spears, drove them back in confusion. Three times the enemy turned to renew the struggle, but on each occasion were hurled back with loss, being quite unable to cope with the Ti-ping soldiers in a hand-to-hand combat. The breach was now played upon by the artillery, and the defenders driven back with great loss of life from the canister, grape, and shell. Gordon then ordered his Adjutant-General, Kirkham, to bring up fresh companies of the 2nd and 5th regiments, and himself to lead them forward to a second assault. Scarcely, however, had he given the order, when a jingall ball reached him at his almost secure distance and wounded him in the leg. *Colonel* Kirkham, with great bravery, led his men into the deadly breach, but when half-way up, fell severely

wounded. Still, with courage worthy of a better cause, his men followed their officers only to be again charged by the valiant garrison and completely routed after a desperate conflict at close quarters. Again the murderous artillery swept away the defenders of the breach, and *Major* Brown, Gordon's *aide-de-camp*, leading forward fresh columns, made a last desperate attempt to storm the yawning chasm. Again the disciplined Chinese and their foreign officers rushed upon the blood-stained ruins; but with dauntless and undiminished courage the Ti-pings again met them—spear to bayonet and firelock, and man to man. After a terrible struggle the assailants were finally driven off, and retreated upon Li-yang, with *Major* Brown and all their commanding officers *hors-de-combat*. This action has been called "the Battle of the Brickbats," such missiles being the principal means of defence used by the garrison.

The attack upon Kin-tang was the most severely contested action that the Anglo-Manchoo troops had ever fought. Their defeat is to be attributed to the fact that they were not assisted by an overwhelming park of artillery, which usually did all the fighting. If the Imperialists had not been supplied with British guns, men, and munitions of war, *ad libitum*, the Ti-pings would have been quite able to manage the disciplined legions. Gordon, in this assault, lost fourteen European officers and nearly one-seventh of the men engaged. The destruction amongst the defenders of Kin-tang must have been equally severe, not less than 600 having fallen.

At this period the Ti-pings seem to have made a desperate effort to defeat the overwhelming numbers of the enemy encircling them on every quarter. At Nankin, Chang-chow-foo, and Kin-tang they managed to defeat the Imperialist forces almost on the same day at each place. The garrison of the capital having sallied forth in strength, defeated a portion of the great beleaguered army under Tseng-kwo-fan (Imperialist Commissioner and Governor-General of the two Kiang provinces) with much slaughter. Upon reaching Li-yang, after narrowly escaping being surrounded by the troops

pursuing from Kin-tang, Gordon received intelligence the same evening that the garrison of Chang-chow had sallied out, completely routing the large investing force commanded by the Futai's brother, and following up the success by moving between Soo-chow and Shanghae, thereby threatening not only to recapture all the country lately wrested from Ti-ping rule, but isolate his division and more than counteract its operations by a powerful diversion upon Shanghae or Soo-chow.

Leaving a strong detachment to garrison Li-yang, Gordon at once proceeded with the remainder of his force, and all the artillery, to operate against the Ti-pings from Chang-chow. On the 29th of March he came upon them at Hwa-soo, in the neighbourhood of the city of Chang-zu, about 35 miles north-east of Soo-chow. On the morning of the 30th, finding that the Ti-pings did not number more than 3,000, he ordered about 1,500 infantry to attack them, while he followed in the boats with the artillery, to give assistance if required. Again, as at Kin-tang, the Royal Engineer was completely out-generalled. The Foo and Shi Wangs were both consummate strategists, and at irregular warfare, when artillery was not employed against them, would easily have foiled Major Gordon.

The Ti-pings continually gave way as the disciplined troops advanced; but they were manœuvred so as to draw their pursuers into a position from which for a time they were themselves invisible, while a masked breast-work, ingeniously stretched across the end of the slight hollow, helped to conceal them. Barely had the retreating forces disappeared behind their slight intrenchment and the inequalities of the ground, when they were doubled back upon each flank so as to almost completely envelop the enemy. The Ti-pings were allowed to execute their manœuvre thus easily through the incautious advance of their antagonists, for the latter halted in the very hollow to which they had been enticed, directly they lost sight of those whom they were pursuing. When next the Imperialists saw their opponents, it was in the form of a serried line, surrounding them upon every

side except a small space in their rear, and charging them on front and both flanks. After a feeble resistance, during which they lost seven English officers and more than 200 men, the ranks of Gordon's force were broken, and the whole mercenary contingent fled from the field with precipitation.

According to the published accounts of this engagement, the Ti-pings were commanded by the Foo-wang, "numbered about 3,000," and were "badly armed." It will thus be seen that, without artillery being brought to bear against them, they were quite able to cope hand to hand with the disciplined troops, officered by foreigners and well armed with musket and bayonet as the latter were, although poorly equipped with a small supply of jingalls, a few bad European firearms, and a majority of bamboo spears.

During the spring of the year 1864, the Ti-pings struggled with desperate bravery against the odds opposed to them; and for some time it seemed very doubtful whether they would succeed or not. While Gordon and the Imperialist troops were being defeated in the northern districts of the Ti-ping territory, the Franco-Manchoo contingent and co-operating forces were meeting a similar fate in the south. Late in February the Imperialists besieging Hang-chow, the provincial capital of Che-kiang, were totally defeated by a sortie of the whole garrison. About the same time another large army was routed by a Ti-ping force in the neighbourhood of Fo-yang, a city not far from Hang-chow. Having recovered from their former repulse and obtained fresh supplies of British mercenaries and munitions of war, the Mandarins again proceeded to invest the provincial capital. On the 2nd of March the Franco-Chinese, commanded by *Generals* D'Aiguebelle and Schodelana, attacked the above city, and after several hours' hard fighting, succeeded in capturing three forts on the south side; only, however, to be driven out by a desperate charge the Ti-pings made during the afternoon, with a loss of fourteen Europeans and more than a hundred men. On the 29th of the same month, the besiegers recommenced active operations. Supported by a strong body of Imperialists, the Franco-

Chinese attacked and carried the outworks of the city a second time, the garrisons retiring within the walls after some hard fighting. The next day fire was opened upon the city from numerous siege artillery, and a practicable breach was soon effected. Again the Franco-Chinese, or more correctly speaking, Manchoos, led the assault, but met with such gallant resistance that they were driven back to their supports in confusion. Twice they bravely rallied, and twice they endeavoured to storm the breach, rendered impregnable by the brave hearts and ready hands defending it, and each time they were repulsed with great slaughter. At the close of the day the assault was given up, after a heavy loss of life, and a vast expenditure of British shot and shell without other result.

Although Hang-chow could not be wrested from the Ti-pings by force of arms, a few days later it fell from external influences, having been rendered untenable through the capture of Kar-sing-foo by the enemy, whereby its supplies and lines of communication were cut off.

About the same time that Gordon commenced his raid upon Yih-sing, Li-yang, and Kin-tang, Manchoo General Ching proceeded with a large army and an auxiliary force composed of detachments from the English contingent, to beleaguer the city of Kar-sing-foo, situated about midway between Soo-chow and Hang-chow, on the Grand Canal. Ching was the bravest native general engaged against the Ti-pings; he was a renegade from their cause, and we all know that such people make the most bitter enemies. He had already been defeated before the city, shortly after I had left it on my last return to Shanghae. Gordon's subordinate, *Colonel* Bailey, had charge of the large siege train accompanying the army, and in a few hours after establishing his batteries, managed to effectively breach the walls of the doomed city. On rushed Ching's men and their allies, but their efforts were useless, for every assault failed; and Ching himself received a wound which, more than a month later, proved mortal. Some few days subsequent to this repulse, large reinforcements were received by the enemy, fresh

breaches were made, and the small but devoted garrison was compelled to evacuate the place at night, having lost their gallant commander, Yoong-wang, and nearly two-thirds of their number. When the Imperialists at last entered, they put to the sword all the unfortunate non-combatants who had not fled the city,<sup>76</sup> sparing neither man, woman, nor child, during their cruel butchery of the unoffending inhabitants. Does Colonel Gordon, R.E., call this "observing the rules of warfare as practised among foreign nations," according to the proviso of Sir F. Bruce? Does Sir F. Bruce, after the massacres at Wu-see, Kar-sing, &c., still term Gordon's conduct "a service in favour of humanity"?

After the loss of Kar-sing, Hang-chow was also evacuated, and the two garrisons retreated to the large city of Hoo-chow-foo. The fortune of war now set strongly against the Christian patriots. With a few memorable exceptions, they were everywhere defeated, through the British influence so cruelly brought to bear against them, for which they were always unprepared, and equally unable to resist.

Having retired to Quin-san (the head-quarters of the Anglo-Manchoo contingent), after his defeat at Hwa-soo, Gordon was shortly joined by an Imperialist army of 15,000 men. A body of troops, commanded by officers of H.B. Majesty's 67th regiment, was also moved from Shanghae to support them. The Imperialists and the whole disciplined force, together with the latter's large park of artillery, now took the field again and moved upon the Foo-wang's position. The Ti-pings were still lightly intrenched at the village of Hwa-soo; they had been strongly reinforced by the Shi-wang, but were considerably hampered by a large number of country people who had fled from the enemy.

On the 11th of April the Imperialists commenced their attack, but, warned by former defeats, they entirely depended upon their artillery, to which the Ti-pings had not a single gun to reply with. The over-matched defenders were at last shelled out of their open breast-works with great

slaughter, and being outflanked by the disciplined and undisciplined enemy, were much cut up during their retreat, while a great number were made prisoners and savagely put to death, as described in Chapter XXIII. by the letter of an officer present, under the eyes of *General Gordon*. The loss of the Ti-pings on this occasion was very heavy. Although the Shi and Foo Wangs succeeded in cutting their way through the enemy with their best troops, at least 8,000 unfortunates, principally country people, were killed.

Following up his success, Gordon pursued the retreating force to Chang-chow-foo. Meanwhile troops were being concentrated upon the same point from every quarter, so that within a few days the city was surrounded by an immense Imperialist army, which was estimated to exceed 100,000 men. The Shi-wang having proceeded to Kin-tang, the garrison commanded by the Foo-wang cannot have consisted of more than 7,000 to 8,000 effective soldiers, but at least 10,000 civilians, including all persons of any standing in the Chang-chow district, and who were Ti-ping subjects, or held civil office under the Tien-wang's Government, had sought refuge within the city walls, carrying with them their movable property and their families, whereby the number of non-combatants was more than doubled.

Three times already had the Imperialists been completely routed before the city, and the siege raised by the gallant resistance of the garrison, although on two occasions the enemy were assisted by detachments of foreign artillery and disciplined troops. After much hard fighting the defenders were driven from all their outworks and strictly confined to the city walls, when the besiegers at once proceeded to effect several breaches. The following account of the subsequent efforts of Gordon and the Futai to storm the place is partly transcribed from the narrative of an officer engaged, and which was published in the *Shanghae Recorder* of May 2, 1864.

The Ti-pings having been driven from all their stockades and intrenchments to the west of the city, and these being occupied by a strong

force of Imperial troops, Gordon moved round opposite the south-east angle, and commenced forming his siege batteries, while the Imperialists placed their guns on his left, facing the south of the city. A combined attack was arranged for the 27th of April, but as the Imperialist batteries were ready on the 24th, and the troops who had so often been defeated were eager to storm, and averse to relinquish their hope of taking the city, the Futai gave orders to open fire, and by three o'clock in the afternoon a capital breach was effected. The advance was sounded and the stormers pushed on steadily to the city ditch, but were there thrown into confusion by some defect in the bridges. At last, however, they scrambled across, and advancing through the stakes got to the foot of the breach, where they maintained themselves for a considerable time; but the defenders, notwithstanding a most destructive covering fire from the Imperialist guns and from a battery of Gordon's enfilading the *terre plein*, manned the breach and wall with great courage, regardless of life, and compelled the assailants to fall back with heavy loss. This ended the first day's assault.

Gordon's guns having been put in position during the night, and a pontoon bridge laid down over the city ditch (the garrison was too weak to prevent the same by a sortie, and had not a single cannon to oppose its construction), at daybreak he opened fire, while the Imperialists' batteries did the same to knock away the barricades thrown up in their breach. Bang, bang, went the heavy guns, as quickly followed by the boom of bursting shell tearing up ponderous masses of the wall, and burying beneath them many of the defenders, while the smaller guns laid along the parapet right and left operated with deadly effect wherever the garrison appeared, or opened fire with their jingalls or musketry. By half-past twelve o'clock the new breach was rendered practicable, and the signal was given to the Imperialists to storm at the old one. On rushed the 4th Regiment of Anglo-Manchoo mercenaries, bravely led by *Colonel* Howard, and forward came the Ti-pings to the breach, determined and daring, to be mowed down in

heaps by the terrible covering fire of the artillery; but no sooner down than their place was filled by their followers rushing with unabated courage to the defence. In the words of the officer whose narrative we are making contribute to this history:—The edge of the city ditch was gained, and over went the 4th Regiment's colours, accompanied by Colonel Howard, Captain Cane (R.A.), and Lieutenant Stackpole, and up the breach through a shower of missiles and fire-balls. Then came that deadly pause, the colours waving on the breach, defended by a few brave men. The defenders and assailants hesitated. They stood at bay for a moment. The "celestial" nature shrank from the dread conflict hand to hand. The officers attempted to break the spell: they pushed their men, they pulled them, they beat them with their swords, but in vain. The Ti-pings, fighting for life, sooner recovered their presence of mind, and every man discharged his missile on the heads of the assailants. The colours and their defenders were pushed off the wall down the breach, and had to retire over the bridge on their column. A murderous fire was poured from every loop-hole, men were falling fast, yet the attacking force stood its ground, but hesitated to advance to where it would have been comparatively safe, being too low for the aim of the besieged. The retire was now sounded, and the stormers fell back to cover.

The Ti-pings suffered terribly from the superior arms of their assailants, and now that they had succeeded in repulsing them a second time, they were swept from the shattered walls by the artillery, which still continued to fire on them. At half-past two o'clock in the afternoon the enemy were ready at both points of attack for a simultaneous movement. Up went their signal rockets, a yell burst from the ranks of Gordon's force, which was taken up and carried along the Imperialist lines, and on came both storming parties at a rapid pace. The 3rd Regiment of the English contingent now made the assault, and their colours were borne up the breach by Captain Winstanley (H.M.'s 67th Regiment), and other officers rallying around them and fighting hand to hand with the defenders. The Imperialists crossed their

bridges, crowded at the foot of the other breach, and waved their flags about, but hesitated to mount it. With their bamboo spears, and undiminished courage, the brave garrison rushed to meet their well-armed enemy, while all who possessed firearms plied them diligently from the walls, and others kept up an incessant volley of brickbats from the heaps piled ready for use around the rampart, and which formed a principal means of defence. Still Gordon's troops maintained their position on the walls, and, if possible, began to increase the extent of their lodgment, whilst the Tipings were falling fast from the musketry of the enemy, which they had but small means to answer. At this critical moment the Foo-wang headed a last desperate charge in person. Leading forward all his unwounded men, this gallant chief inspired them with fresh ardour, while the efforts of the assailants began to flag. As one present stated: The contest every moment became more close, and was prolonged for at least twenty minutes. At length the stormers were driven from the ground they had gained, and hurled to the bottom of the breach. Several times they struggled to mount again, but every attempt was futile. The rear ranks of the enemy being under the fire from the wall, lost heavily in killed and wounded, while the front ranks, so desperately opposed, could not advance. The order to retire was now given, and the assaulting forces were withdrawn to cover, while their artillery again swept the breach with canister, shell, and grape, inflicting fearful havoc among the dauntless garrison of Chang-chow. During all this time the Imperialists had hurried on column after column to assault by their own breach, but none were able to effect a lodgment within the well-defended walls of the city. Every attack was repulsed with great slaughter upon both sides, and at last the bravest of the late General Ching's—he had died from the effects of a wound in the head received at Kar-sing—Mandarins advanced with his men, but though he passed the sticking point and got his colours partly into the breach, yet he too was brought to a stand and obliged to retire. The assault was now abandoned, and the

besiegers carried off their killed and wounded, including 27 European officers, 400 of the English contingent, and about 1,500 Imperialists.

Although the Ti-pings were victorious, and had succeeded in defeating every attack upon the city, their triumph was only purchased by an awful sacrifice of life. When the stormers mounted the wall a fearful sight was before them. "Far as the eye could see, heaps upon heaps lay dead and mangled." During the different assaults at least one half the garrison were placed *hors-de-combat*, principally by the murderous fire of the enemy's artillery, which they were totally unable to countervail, having none to reply with. Chang-chow being completely surrounded by the vast Imperialist army, its fall, either by famine or the sword, was certain.

Having established fresh batteries at a different part of the city, on the 11th of May the enemy succeeded in capturing it. Upon this occasion two immense breaches were made, while the incessant artillery fire, and the overwhelming rush of the enormously superior assailing force over the wide-spread ruins of the wall, quickly overpowered the last gallant resistance offered by the remnant of the garrison. A comparison of the casualties of the English contingent at each attack affords the best proof that the terrible results of the first had almost exterminated the defenders. At the first attack the contingent lost 27 officers and 400 men; at the second, only 2 killed and 5 wounded! When the Imperialists poured through the two fresh breaches, the best and bravest of the remaining Ti-ping soldiers sacrificed themselves in the futile effort to repulse them, while their comrades, although fighting desperately to the last, were driven from the walls, and then through the streets of the city, still disputing the ground step by step. At last the few survivors were brought to bay in the commandant's palace. Throughout all the fighting the brave Foo-wang had been foremost in leading and encouraging his troops, and now, still unwounded, with several officers and a score or two of men, he made a last desperate stand in his own house. One by one his few followers—unable to conquer, but

determined to die with their faces to the foe and their hands raised to the last in defence of their noble cause—fell around him, and then for a moment he fought alone against a host of assailants. Still he was not killed, for a price was fixed upon his capture alive. At length this dauntless chief, whose acquaintance I have valued, and whose elegist I am proud though grieved to have become, was overpowered by numbers and beaten to the ground, though not until many an enemy had fallen under his heavy sword. Even when disarmed and helpless in the grasp of the foe, he still struggled against a fate that would never have befallen him but for the unexpected, irresistible, and unrighteous military interference of England. One report of the capture of Chang-chow (*China Mail*, May 30) states:—"The chief (Foo-wang) of those who were in command of the city, fought in his palace to the last, and required ten men to bind his hands and secure him; and, when brought into the presence of the Futai, refused submission or to pay any respect to him, saying, 'Ah! were it not for the aid of the disciplined troops (under Gordon) he defied all the Futai's hosts to take the city from him.'" If the British army, arsenals, and navy had been thrown open to supply the young and vigorous revolution, instead of *wasting* their help upon the corrupt and hopeless Manchoo, how great would the success and future results have been! With all the British assistance the Imperialists have barely been able to drive the Ti-pings from their cities and possessions in the provinces of Che-kiang and Kiang-nan, much less to suppress the great Christian and patriotic movement, or insure its final extinguishment.

The Foo-wang was cruelly put to death by his merciless captors. "The two breaches were carried in a rush, and quarter was given to *only a few hundred men*;" so says the report above quoted from. How many days the triumphant Mandarins were engaged butchering the unfortunate inhabitants does not transpire; but, with the exception of the small number mentioned, the whole 12,000, besides the garrison, with their families, were massacred. Two years' provisions were found in the city, and this being stored in the Ti-

ping granaries, was the entire produce of the district, and was the sole means destined to support the people during the ensuing season. The whole supply was seized by the Imperialists; and though previous to their success much misery had been caused by the general effect of the war, after their capture of the departmental city the entire department was starved; such being the usual result of Manchoo re-establishment in any locality, and particularly so at Chang-chow-foo, as proved by the letter of the first English-contingent officer in Chapter XXIII.

We have now noticed four authenticated instances (the captures of Wu-see, Kar-sing-foo, Hwa-soo, and Chang-chow-foo), subsequent to Gordon's return to service, when the conditions upon which Sir F. Bruce gave his approval to that officer's action were violated by the wholesale massacre of the vanquished and prisoners. We may, therefore, while expressing boundless disgust at Colonel Gordon's persistent continuance in the Futai's service after each and every one of these atrocities, fairly presume that the astounding assertion as to his influence in favour of humanity—in spite of the eulogy by Mr. Montgomery Martin at a late "China dinner" in London, wherein he stated that the officer in question had done more *for* the "civil cause" in China than all the bishops, merchants, and military put together—is not only negatived, but quite reversed.

Soon after the capture of Chang-chow-foo, Colonel Gordon was compelled to withdraw from active military operations by the Order in Council, prohibiting further aid to the Manchoo. He managed, however, to continue acting contrary to the ordinance, by organizing camps of instruction and proceeding to Nankin in person, there to advise the besieging forces commanded by Tseng-kwo-fan.

About the time the events noticed in this chapter were taking place in China, in England the energetic opposition of such men as Lord Naas, Colonel Sykes, Hon. Mr. Liddell, Mr. White, Messrs. Bright, Cobden, &c., from their places in the House of Commons, drew attention to the subject,

and will ever stand as a memorable protest against the criminal policy of the Government.

During the second debate of the session on "British relations with China" (May 20, 1864), Mr. Baxter, M.P., very happily termed the policy of the Government "not a comedy of errors, but a tragedy of errors." Lord Palmerston, in this case, defended his policy by a very extraordinary argument, which it is singular that his opponents did not use to his confusion. Coming out as the advocate of intervention in foreign affairs, he stated, as a justification of his war against the Ti-pings:—

"We have interfered in other countries, and with great benefit to those countries.... We interfered in the case of Greece, and established the independence of the Greek state. We interfered in the affairs of Belgium, and established it as an independent state. We interfered in the case of Portugal, and enabled the people of that country to obtain a free and parliamentary constitution. (Hear, hear.) We interfered in the affairs of Spain with equal success, and a similar result.... We interfered in a great measure in those events which led to the Crimean war.... We interfered in the affairs of China; and why? Because our treaty rights *were* endangered, and our national interests *were* at stake."

Now, the noble Premier here cites a number of precedent cases; unfortunately, however, for his argument and acumen, on each occasion referred to, England, as worthily became her, interfered in the cause of an oppressed people; whereas, in the present case, he had been the active originator of an intervention diametrically the very opposite—a military interference *against* the oppressed natives of China, who were striving to liberate *and Christianize* their unfortunate country. If Lord Palmerston had interfered in the spirit of the cases which came so glibly to his voluble tongue, he would have interfered to support the Ti-pings—not to slaughter them.

After striving to justify his policy by precedents which should have entirely reversed it, Lord Palmerston was equally unhappy in his faulty explanation of the reasons "why" he interfered in China. As the Hon. Mr. Liddell, M.P., well said in his speech after the Premier, "The noble Viscount said that the Government interfered because the treaty rights were in danger. He wanted to know in what single instance had our treaty rights or our trade been in danger? He had asked that question before, and he now repeated it. (Hear, hear.) He wished to know any instance in which either the property or the life of a British subject had been placed in danger?"

Every member of the British Parliament, who questioned the China policy of the Government, has asked the same question. It has never been answered, because there is really not a single fact on which to base an answer. Colonel Sykes, M.P., has frequently defied and challenged the Government to cite one act ever committed by the Ti-pings prejudicial to British interests, and they have been quite unable to do so; for none are upon record.

Those who have been interested enough to wade through the compiled portion of this work will, no doubt, at once perceive the truthlessness of Lord Palmerston's charge against the Ti-pings, viz., that they endangered the treaty rights and national interests of England. No particle of truth mingles with the unfounded charge; no tittle of proof has ever been produced to justify the undeclared hostilities perpetrated against a friendly people which were consequent on it.

Besides this, the venerable Premier was no less unfortunate with each proposition he chose to base his arguments upon. To prove the cruelty of the Ti-pings, he stated:—

"A steamer, called the *Firefly*, was carried off, and four or five men, who were upon the vessel, were roasted to death.

"Colonel Sykes.—'By whom?'

"Lord Palmerston.—'The Taepings.'

"Colonel Sykes.-'No, no!'"

Now, by the above extract from the *Standard's* report of the debate, we find that the Prime Minister's vivid imagination positively roasted the men whose fate has never yet been ascertained even in China. They are referred to in Chapter XXIV. of this work, but whether they are living or dead, and, if dead, how they were killed, are questions which have never yet been satisfactorily answered; and, from the mystery in which the fate of the unfortunate men is involved, probably never will be.

Again, in a feeble effort to vaunt the duration and existence of the Manchoo dynasty, and, consequently, to make it appear that the Ti-pings were not striving to expel a foreign rule of comparatively modern establishment (which has never been entirely acknowledged nor submitted to, which has always been rebelled against, and which is still foreign to and hated by the Chinese), but, on the contrary, were simply rebels against an ancient and legitimate throne, Lord Palmerston made another very singular and important *mistake*. He tried to be satirical in commenting upon the excellent speech made by Mr. Baxter, M.P., who brought on the debate, by stating:—

"My hon. friend says he has studied the Blue Books, but I apprehend that he has not equally studied the history of China. He talks of the Imperial dynasty as having been recently established over a conquered country; and, if I am not misinformed, I think it has existed for nearly 500 years."

Well, the noble Premier was misinformed, and very much so, too. The Manchoo Tartars invaded China A.D. 1644; they had not established themselves as its masters before the year 1683. It was, doubtless, very funny and gratifying to chaff a troublesome member out of countenance, but still there must be some people who expect the Chief Minister of the

British Government to be pretty accurate in the statements he makes from his place in the House of Parliament.

We will now notice a few incidents of the next, and last, debate on China; when the late Mr. Cobden, on the evening of May 31, 1864, rose to move in the House of Commons:—

"That, in the opinion of this House, the policy of non-intervention, by force of arms, in the internal political affairs of foreign countries, which we profess to observe in our relations with the states of Europe and America, should be observed in our intercourse with the Empire of China."

Mr. Cobden, after making a truly magnificent and exhaustive speech, was replied to by Mr. Layard, the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Out of the many distinguished Members who followed, only one, Mr. Gregson, supported the policy of the Government; and he, by faintest praise and three minutes' unmeaning talk, proved but a poor champion, if he did not make a worse case for his superiors.

At the termination of the debate, Mr. Cobden withdrew his motion because Lord Palmerston distinctly avowed the failure and abandonment of his policy of intervention in China, and declared his intention to preserve an entirely neutral, defensive attitude in future.

The faithlessness and falsehood induced by the evil course adopted by the British Government in persistently endeavouring to carry out Lord Palmerston's pertinacious, crotchety, unrighteous policy to force British trade upon China (which involved the necessity of crushing the Imperial power, and then that of the Ti-ping revolution which would have succeeded it, so that, in fact, the British Government could dictate its whims without fear of refusal or opposition) were singularly exemplified during the debate referred to.

We have seen that in the preceding debate Lord Palmerston plainly and frankly declared:—

"We interfered in the affairs of China; and why?"

Now, Mr. Layard, when replying to Mr. Cobden's speech, stated:— "Her Majesty's Government had been accused of supporting the Chinese" (Manchoo) "government against the Taipings. [Cries of hear, hear!] *He had pointed out that such was not the case.*"—He then qualified this sentence by saying—"Beyond our preventing the Taepings entering the treaty ports FOR THE PURPOSE OF DESTROYING THEM, a course which we were compelled to take."

First, Mr. Layard denies the interference declared by Lord Palmerston, and then he admits it, attempting to justify the policy by the sweeping assertion in capitals. Now, if the ministers were "compelled" to prevent the Ti-pings entering the treaty ports, how is it that they were allowed to capture and occupy the treaty port of Ningpo? And now, to impugn Mr. Layard's veracity, if the Ti-pings endeavoured to enter the treaty ports "FOR THE PURPOSE OF DESTROYING THEM," how is it that they held the city of Ningpo for many months and did not destroy the least particle of property within its walls?

Mr. Layard's fault is a common one, only in an uncommon position. He knew that the policy of the Government was wrong, he knew that he was wrong himself, and besides occupying the pugnacious position of buffer or breakwater to the Foreign Office, he did not like to admit it. Poor Mr. Layard's situation must be an unpleasant one sometimes. He has unpleasant work to do. Undoubtedly he has an irritable temper and a sharp tongue, but it is rather unfortunate that he has a bad memory. After stating that her Majesty's Government had not been interfering, "such was not the case," beyond preventing the destruction of the treaty ports, and affirming, "the hon. gentleman the member for Montrose (Mr. Baxter), the other evening, after condemning the policy of the Government, concluded by expressing a wish, that the Government would continue to defend the treaty ports and protect British interests in China. *That was what the Government had been doing all along.*" After thus expressing himself, Mr. Layard declared, "His

hon. friend had really condemned a state of things in China *which no longer existed.*" That is to say, Mr. Layard firstly stated that the hostilities waged against the Ti-pings were only to protect British interests; in fact, simply a defensive policy; and, secondly, he stated that such policy "no longer existed." Therefore, the natural deduction is that the British Government ceased to protect British interests at the treaty ports; such, however, was not and is not the case. The change that took place was the abandonment of the policy "of supporting the Chinese (Manchoo) Government against the Taepings," and the cessation of further aggressive military and naval operations against them. This was satisfactorily proved by the Premier's speech, who sadly contradicted his subordinate's defensive theory, as the following extracts from it will show:—

"Now, it is almost unnecessary, I think, for them" (the members who had spoken against his policy) "to have expressed their opinion with regard to the expedition of Captain Osborn, and the employment of Major Gordon and others, because we have stated on former occasions that those Orders in Council under which those officers *were employed*" (by the Manchoo Government; how about Mr. Layard's "such was not the case"?) "have been revoked.... Therefore that policy is at an end." (Now the following is a plain avowal of what Mr. Cobden brought his motion against.) "I think that we were perfectly justified in the steps we took, because it is evident that the more we can contribute to the *internal classification* of China, the more the trade, which everybody agrees is the main and principal object of our going to China, the more that trade would flourish....

"If, by allowing a British subject to *enter into the service of the Emperor of China*,<sup>77</sup> we have been the means of strengthening

the hands of the Chinese Government, and enabling them to put down in any degree or diminish the scope of that rebellion, I say we should have been rendering not only a service to China, but promoting those objects to which alone our intercourse with China ought to be confined.<sup>78</sup> THOSE MEASURES HAVE FAILED, and I am sorry for it."

After this expression of opinion it is by no means surprising to find the Premier declaring a little further on, in the same speech: "I say it is the duty of this country to endeavour by *all the means* in her power to extend her commerce." Under *these* circumstances it is not difficult to account for the intervention in China, and while Englishmen, who have any respect for the principles of right and justice, may regret their late lamented statesman did not say, "by all the" righteous or legitimate "means in her power," they cannot fail to feel gratified that "those measures have failed," even though the originator of the measures, their late popular and jaunty minister, was "sorry for it."

Those measures have failed! it is true. They have failed miserably; they have failed to work good, but not to do harm. England has derived no benefit from them, China has received much evil. The schemes to Anglicise the Chinese army, navy, and civil service have failed; the efforts to extinguish rebellion against the Manchoo allies of the British Government (after the last war had rendered them quite powerless and docile *for the time being*) have likewise signally failed, for rebellion is more rife than ever: but "those measures" have been famously successful in causing an enormous sacrifice of life, in injuring the cause of Christianity and civilization, and obstructing its progress in China for the present.

The failure of Lord Palmerston's policy came all too late for rectifying the evil already perpetrated. Within two months of his public announcement that the measures of his administration had failed, Nankin, the capital and the political strength of the Ti-pings, fell into the hands of the Imperialists.

Assisted, as we have described, by the powerful, though underhanded, British alliance, the Manchoo forces were enabled to capture or isolate every city beyond the capital. When Chang-chow-foo was taken by the Englishman Gordon, the neighbouring cities of Tan-yang, Kin-tang, &c., became untenable, and were consequently evacuated by their garrisons. Under command of Le-shih-seen, the Shi-wang (the Chung-wang's cousin, sometimes figuratively referred to as his "brother"), were also the troops from Hang-chow (capital of Che-kiang), Kar-sing-foo, Yih-shing, Li-yang, and many smaller places. Between these forces and Nankin the vast army commanded by the Imperialist Le-Futai now intervened, but their communication with the great city of Hoo-chow-foo, at the south of the Ta-hoo lake, and strongly garrisoned by several wangs, was still intact.

Unable to advance against the superior forces of the enemy, much less to reach Nankin and endeavour to rescue it from the besieging army of Imperialists under Tseng-kwo-fan, at least 80,000 to 100,000 strong, the Shi-wang commenced what seems to have been a preconcerted retreat to the south. This occurred during the month of June.

Shortly afterwards, on the 19th of July, 1864, Nankin reverted to Manchoo authority. Thus the city which had been the capital of the great Ti-ping revolution and the head-quarters of its Government during more than eleven years, and which throughout that period had defied the strongest efforts of the rulers of the greatest and most populous empire in the world, succumbed at last through the unjustifiable hostilities and crotchety, bullying, meddlesomeness of the British Government or some of its members.

Again, soon after this overwhelming disaster, the Ti-ping forces at Hoo-chow-foo, after soundly beating their immediate adversaries, evacuated that city, and followed in the rear of the Shi-wang's army, if they did not join it during the nearly simultaneous retrograde movement. During the months of

May, June, July, and August, 1864, the remnants of Ti-pingdom continued retreating to the southern provinces.

We must now consider for a moment the loss of Nankin. Of the two other events—the retreat of the Shi-wang's army and the retreat from Hoo-chow—it is needless to say much, as these fugitives are well known to be safe, and at present advantageously disputing the enemy in the south of China.

The only records of the fall of the Ti-ping capital are those of Imperialist origin, and the lying proclivities of the whole body of Manchoo officials are too well known to need comment.

The following particulars are condensed from the Mandarin reports; they cannot be depended upon except to a very limited extent, and are, therefore, succeeded by a version I have deduced from almost every source of European information in China, comprising the Shanghae and Hong-kong press, and intelligence gathered for me by friends on the spot. Besides this, I have carefully traced the progress of events since the fall of Nankin till the present moment, and have found my former experience of much value in disentangling contradictory and confused statements.

The Imperialist accounts of the capture of Nankin are to the following effect:—

On the 17th of August news reached the besieging army that the Tien-wang had committed suicide by swallowing gold-leaf. The Imperialists now pushed on their works more rapidly than before, and on the 19th of the same month, having run an enormous mine under the north-east gate, they fired it, and completely destroyed a portion of the wall, about one hundred and twenty feet in length. It is also reported that 68,000 pounds of powder were used in the explosion.

The Imperialists stated that they lost 5,000 killed and wounded in the breach, but, as the *North China Market Report* observed, "for this assertion there is not the slightest foundation, as on the day following the assault

there remained no trace of a struggle." In similar style they declared that their losses while storming the Tien-wang's palace were immense, but, as the European journals say, "This assertion is in like manner utterly false. The gate must have been forced with little or no difficulty, or quietly given up, and the very citadel of Taepingdom was in the hands of the enemy."

Now, after having poisoned the Ti-ping king with gold-leaf, the enemy very curiously burned him to death.

Immediately after the capture of Nankin, Mr. Adkins, H.M. Consul at Chin-kiang, proceeded to the city on board M.M.S. *Slaney*, in order, as he expresses himself in his despatch to Earl Russell on the subject, "to congratulate the Chinese (Manchoo) Commander-in-Chief on the auspicious termination of his two years' siege." Well, the commander, or some of his followers, told the officious Mr. Adkins that when they made good their entrance into the city, "they found that the palace of the Tien-wang *had been burnt to the ground*."

What about the "immense loss" of the other version, in which they do such heroic deeds to capture the palace?

Mr. Adkins goes on to say "that the impostor (?) and his immediate attendants lie buried in its ruins."

The victors also reported that they captured the Chung-wang a few days later, and also the Kan-wang when they entered the city, finding him in the Tien-wang's palace. Chung-wang, they say, managed to leave the city with a number of followers, but was captured three days later by a body of cavalry sent in pursuit: this was the account given to Mr. Adkins. Another Imperialist version states that the Ti-ping Commander-in-Chief was captured by *some villagers* a few miles from the city, through having given up his own white horse (celebrated for great strength and fleetness) to his young prince, the Tien-wang's son, and having compelled him to mount it and escape when he saw that at least a portion of his party must be captured. Certainly this seems very characteristic of the Chung-wang's

brave, loyal, and generous nature, but then it is the only incident in the whole narrative which bears the appearance of truth and probability. Besides the above two stories of his capture, when the enemy obtained possession of Hoo-chow-foo, they reported that they had caught the Chung-wang *there*, and from that place a head, stated to be the great rebel general's, was sent over the country as a warning to the people.

As for the story of the Kan-wang's capture, there are several contradictory and apparently authentic statements: one by a certain Patrick Nellis, who personally saw the chief and talked with him at Hoo-chow (subsequent to the fall of Nankin), where it seems that he proceeded with an escort to communicate the loss or abandonment of the capital, and concert measures for the evacuation of Hoo-chow-foo as well.<sup>79</sup>

Besides the above reports, others were promulgated by the Mandarins, in which they defeated different Ti-ping armies *en route* for the south, killing thousands and tens of thousands of rebels and capturing many chiefs, among them the Shi-wang, who, singularly enough, still managed to be in command of the Ti-pings near Amoy, until within the last few months, when he retired to join other leaders farther inland. Confessions were produced which professed to be written by the penitent rebel leaders in their dungeons, while awaiting their turn to be disembowelled, or "cut into a thousand pieces"—a pleasing prospect, of course likely to make the destined victims suddenly feel inspired with love and respect for the benevolent Manchoos, whom they had so vigorously opposed all their lives! Among these seemingly fabricated confessions only one is worthy of any attention, and that is a lengthy composition, entitled, "The autographic deposition of Chung-wang, the faithful king, at his trial after the capture of Nankin." Were it not for the known mendacity of the Mandarins, and their particular addiction to forging documents of this sort in order to lessen the prestige of the revolution by representing its principal leaders as in their merciless power, there would be little doubt but that the one in question was

genuine. In 1852, previous to the capture of Nankin by the Ti-pings, the Imperial authorities concocted an article they named the "Confession of Tien-teh," pretending that it was the deposition of the leader of the rebellion, whom they falsely declared was their prisoner. It is quite probable that the "Chung-wang's deposition" is of similar truthlessness, and was made up by some prisoner of note (who may have been pardoned in consequence), and the cunning writers attached to the Governor-General of the two Kiang, Tseng-kwo-fan. Still it must be admitted that many portions of the alleged deposition bear not only the impress of truth (in so far as historical events, data, &c., are concerned), but expressions closely resembling the well known sentiments of the great Ti-ping general; so that if, as we trust, he was not the author, some one pretty intimately acquainted with him must have been. However, some facts tending to support the theory (for there is no direct proof in any case except the Shi-wang's movements subsequent to the fall of Nankin) of the Chung-wang's escape, will be given in the course of our narrative.

Having noticed the Imperialist reports, it is now necessary to give the following digest of the events referred to, and which may be depended upon as the only possible version to be derived from the existing and attainable sources of information:—

It is known that when the Chung-wang became convinced England was determined to persist in prosecuting hostilities against his people, and likewise felt their inability to cope with the foreign power, he at once decided upon the best military movement under the circumstances—namely, an entire abandonment of all accessible possessions, and a retreat into the interior, where British hostility could not reach them, and where no Manchoo forces could either prevent their operations, restrain their consequent reinforcement, or impede their future progress.

Before parting with the Chung-wang, I was myself present at several councils when the above plan was discussed, and unanimously agreed to by

every chief present. But one impediment prevented the Commander-in-Chief from acting with his usual brilliancy of conception and wonderfully successful rapidity of execution; it was the Tien-wang, who refused even to listen to any proposal to abandon his capital.

Different people will view this ruinous obstinacy of the Ti-ping king in various ways. Some will look upon it as sheer, downright folly; others, as the useless, fanatical sacrifice of a bigot; while some may consider that that great, heroic, noble-minded man, having once established the capital of his dominions and the centre of his religio-political movement at Nankin, did right and gloriously in meeting death rather than turning backwards on the grand path. If we ascribe to the Tien-wang motives partaking equally of the three traits—nobleness, fanaticism, and rashness—we shall probably be pretty near the truth.

At all events, the Tien-wang passionately refused to entertain the only plan by which the existence of the Ti-ping power, and the perpetuation of his dynasty, seemed possible. All the court officers, cabinet ministers, and other high authorities of Nankin, were blindly subservient to the will of their king, and equally infatuated with his religious and temporal command. Besides, many of those about him were of the Hung family, and, being nearly related to their chief, not only followed implicitly his wishes, but jealously formed themselves into a clique about him, to the prejudice and exclusion of other more capable and independent officers. All the fighting Wangs were outside the capital, and incessantly engaged with the enemy; few troops were in garrison, while many thousands of helpless non-combatants daily diminished the stores of the failing granaries; and if the multitudinous besieging army, encamped and fortified all round the devoted city, had been animated with the slightest particle of courage or military spirit, they might easily have captured it many months before it eventually fell through starvation, or was evacuated by the troops.

The Chung-wang, after his separation from myself at Wu-see, proceeded direct to Nankin via Chang-chow-foo. His only object was to save the king and his own family (living with his aged mother, whom he loved with excessive filial tenderness), by inducing them to leave the untenable city. He, alone, proposed the unpalatable manœuvre to the Tien-wang, whose severe displeasure he had already incurred, being punished in various ways—by deprivation of titles, refusal of audience, accusation of disloyalty, &c. How the time (December, 1863, to 19th July, 1864) was passed, from the arrival of the Chung-wang to the fall of the capital, unless the professed "autographic deposition" be true, or the garrison really abandoned the city and escaped, will probably never be known to history. Either, as the "deposition" states, the whole city petitioned against the departure of the renowned commander, or he personally elected to remain, rather than desert his king in the hour of death and darkness, even though such calamity might have been avoided but for the fatal perverseness of the monarch; perhaps both causes operated to confine him to useless inactivity within the walls of the doomed city—inevitably doomed, and encircled by the numberless siege works of the enemy as with a band of impenetrable steel.

How the poor people, fated by the passive stubbornness of their rulers, must have gathered together round their great warrior, as men will rally about a tower of strength; how the unnumbered thousands of helpless non-combatants must have rejoiced at the presence of him whose very name was an army, a bulwark to his people, and a terror to the enemy; how bitterly must the brave, energetic soldier have grieved and chafed at the unnecessarily-incurred annihilation, and growing horrors of the siege, which should have been avoided; but, alas! how could one great man, without means, save a people, a sacred cause, and a city invested by 100,000 savage foemen?

Loyalty and filial duty brought the "faithful prince" to Nankin; the same motives bound him there to await destruction, when his presence in the field—at the head of his own army, left under command of his cousin, the Shi-wang—would have proved invaluable, and would surely have placed the Ti-pings in a much better position than they occupied at the close of the year 1865.

Nankin fell at last. All that is *positively* known by Europeans—apart from false, garbled, and exaggerated Mandarin sources—may be summed up in few words:—Frightful privations were endured before the enemy took possession; and when the city was entered by Mr. Consul Adkins, and other gentlemen, the streets and houses were literally blocked up with the bodies of the dead, by far the greater portion having the appearance of death from starvation; and many being very far advanced in decomposition, proved that, long before the Imperialists found courage enough to blow an opening through the undefended walls, the unfortunate people had succumbed to famine faster than the living could bury the dead—in fact, it was evident that no such effort could have been successful from the numbers who had daily perished.

Mr. Adkins, in his despatch to Earl Russell, places the number of people slaughtered by the Imperialists on their entry at 10,000; but other visitors state as many as 30,000, which is probably nearer the truth.

It is also certain that many chiefs with their followers left Nankin in safety. A successor to the Mo-wang, assassinated at Soo-chow, having afterwards appeared at Hong-kong; the Yu and Hsieh Wangs (the latter being one of the Tien-wang's brothers, and always attached to the court) being heard of in Kiang-si at the head of an army; while the following extract from the narrative of one Patrick Nellis, already referred to, and which was made on affidavit before the British Consul at Shanghae, seems to prove that the Ti-ping prime minister escaped from Nankin, and such being the case, undoubtedly there are strong grounds to believe the military

leaders did likewise. In the evidence sworn to, Nellis, after describing an engagement with the Imperialists, states:—

"On our return to Hoo-chow-foo, Kang-wang arrived from Nankin with an escort. Great ceremonies were shown at his reception; he did not look as if he had suffered any hardship...."

In speaking of the evacuation of the city, Nellis makes the following statement:—

"Kan-wang spoke to me in English very slowly. He asked me what I was. I said, 'an Englishman.' He said he had never met a good foreigner, and asked me if I would go with him to Kiang-si. I said I should be very glad if Tow-wang (Commandant of Hoo-chow) would let me."

This conversation took place more than a month after the fall of Nankin, and a few days before the abandonment of Hoo-chow-foo on the 28th August, 1864. Upon the strength of such facts the *Friend of China* has steadily maintained that Nankin was abandoned by all but the poorest civilians when the Imperialists made their breach and marched through without opposition.

Another circumstance damaging to the veracity of the Imperialist reports, is a statement (contained in one of the Mandarin's inspired "confessions,") purporting to be that of the Tien-wang's son (the heir to the throne). The young prince is made to state that his father "succumbed to sickness on the 24th of May, 1864;" but of this all-important event the "Chung-wang's deposition" makes no mention. Here is an inconsistency which at once proves either one or both the "confessions" false; because, if the Tien-wang had really died, the Chung-wang would have been at liberty to carry out his own views and abandon Nankin; whereas his professed "deposition" states that, to the day the city fell, he was unable to do so in consequence of the Tien-wang's opposition.

The *Friend of China* also states that a Mr. Butler, of Shanghae, actually witnessed the withdrawal of the garrison. Moreover, adding together the

few spared by the enemy, those slain and those destroyed by famine, we should even then scarcely have the number of destitute people—labourers, coolies, and friendless non-combatants—who were relieved by the Chung-wang alone during the early part of the year 1864, when he kept a list of about 80,000 dependent upon his resources and charity. In 1863 rations were daily issued to upwards of 400,000 people. At the period now referred to, when the Chung-wang shut himself up in the beleaguered city, the population, inclusive, was certainly not less than a fifth of a million, and, probably, far exceeded that number; therefore, even supposing that one-half (which is a large estimate) perished, were slain, or made prisoners, during and at the termination of the siege, how can we account for the 100,000 remaining, unless we believe that they had previously managed to effect their retreat from the city?

In the *Friend of China*, August 16, 1864, appears the following:—

"We are still assured by parties who have means of knowing, that our first story of the evacuation of Nankin by its soldiery, before the Imperialists sprung their mine and rushed in, was the correct story; all those 30,000 massacred individuals told of by the *Recorder* (but *not* mentioned at the Asiatic Society with the "flushing of a pheasant") being inoffensive men, women, and children.

"The Chung-wang, it is said, is not dead. He is at Hoo-chow-foo, while the Tien-wang is still in the body."

The strongest support of the Imperialist statement of the death of the Tien-wang, and the capture and subsequent execution of the Chung-wang, is the fact that, since the fall of Nankin, nothing whatever has been heard of them elsewhere. On the other hand, however, it was supposed that one or the other was commanding the forces in the interior, acting in Fu-keen in

concert with the Shi-wang when he occupied the city of Chang-chow, near Amoy, from October, 1864, to May, 1865: and what seems to lend force to this supposition is that he appeared to be acting under the orders of some superior farther inland; the only chiefs of higher rank being the King and his son, the Chung, Kan, I (several years absent in Sz-chuen), and Si Wangs —the latter being a young man (son of the original Western King) attached to the court at Nankin, and totally without authority in military affairs. Upon the whole, it is quite possible that the Ti-ping King, his son and heir, Prime Minister, and General-in-Chief, may have met with the fate ascribed to them by the enemy; still there is no positive proof, and there are good grounds for supposing that some, if not all, are yet living and directing the Ti-ping movements.

The siege of Hoo-chow-foo by the Imperialists was merely nominal, for, up to the abandonment of that city by the Ti-pings, they were never allowed within range of its walls, and were compelled to act almost entirely on the defensive, so repeated and vigorous were the attacks by the garrison and a corps of observation they had encamped outside the place on a neighbouring range of hills. Only a few days before the evacuation took place, the garrison succeeded in capturing a number of Imperialist stockades, several hundred gunboats, and three or four thousand men, besides inflicting heavy loss in killed and wounded; the Franco-Manchoo disciplined auxiliaries alone losing 6 officers and 800 men. Very soon after this victory, the evacuation was effected with consummate skill, the enemy not discovering that the Ti-pings had flown until the day after. The number of troops forming the garrison and encampment was very considerable, 50,000 being the lowest estimate,<sup>80</sup> their line of retreat was either through the province of Fu-keen or Kiang-si, and their destination is even yet unknown, none of the chiefs from Hoo-chow having been recognised anywhere since. It is, however, pretty certain that they acted in concert with

the forces led by the Shi-wang, though keeping an inland position, while the latter advanced to the sea-board at Amoy.

The *Friend of China*, Sept. 8, 1864, under the heading—"Another of the parties despatched by us a short time ago, to learn the real state of affairs about Hoo-chow-foo, has just returned,"—reports as follows:—

"The Chung-wang was in command up to the last.... Hoo-chow was evacuated.... Three days afterwards—we repeat—three days afterwards, Le Futai gallantly marched into the city with a thundering noise; and then what did he? The gates were closed, and then commenced a general sack, and the usual massacre of innocent individuals.... A laughable story is told of the *second* capture of the Chung-wang here, at Hoo-chow; his head—the veritable caput—with loud clamour of gongs, being sent round to all the villages, that people might behold the head of the arch traitor! Our reporter, wicked sceptic! loudly declares that the head *said to be* the Chung-wang's, truly sat on the shoulders, a week ago, of a man whose highest grade in life was that of a coolie!"

In the month of October, 1864, the residents of Amoy were suddenly surprised to hear that a body of Ti-pings, about 10,000 strong, had surprised and captured the city of Chang-chow, barely twenty miles inland, and situated on a river emptying itself into the sea at the Treaty Port.

From this reappearance of the Ti-pings close to a Treaty Port, we are enabled again to obtain some authentic records—many Europeans, including the British Consul, having visited them at Chang-chow. One English gentleman wrote the following account (which may be relied on as authentic) of his experiences to the *Daily Press*, and the same was reproduced in *The Overland China Trade Report*, 1st January, 1865:—

"A VISIT TO CHANG-CHOW.  
*"To the Editor of the 'Daily Press,' Hong-kong.*

"Sir—As you appear desirous to obtain information regarding the insurgents in this neighbourhood, I take leave to furnish you with the following result of my personal observations, which were derived in the course of a visit amongst them.

"The city and suburbs of Chang-chow are still occupied by the Taeping insurgents. About three-fifths of the whole city is burnt, and in the ruins may be seen the dead bodies of the late inhabitants, uninjured except by fire; not a wound could I see on any, which plainly shows, and as the rebels themselves affirm, that the inhabitants set fire to their dwellings themselves, and perished in them; having previously drugged themselves with opium rather than fall into the hands of the insurgents.

"Those portions of the city unburnt are occupied by the rebels, but there are many streets of Hongs, the doors of which are sealed up, uninhabited, and apparently full of merchandise. The rebels appear to be very numerous; I should estimate them at about 12,000; but they affirm themselves that they number 15,000. There are a great number of boys and youths among them, but I saw no women. They are much sunburnt, thin, and haggard in their appearance, and evidently have undergone much hardship before they took this city. I was told by many of them that they underwent extreme privations during their retreat from the north; that food of any kind, at many places, could not be obtained, on account of the country people being extremely hostile, and destroying everything as soon as they heard that the rebels were nearing them. That at several small towns on the borders of the Provinces of Che-kiang and Fokien human flesh was used for food; and that a peasant's body was

retailed out at 80 cash per catty by the fortunate rebel who had killed him!

"The chief in command at Chau-chow is Tszle-wang,<sup>81</sup> brother to Chung-wang. He was at Ningpo during its occupation by the insurgents in 1862, and he commanded in the defence of that city when he was attacked and driven out by the British naval force, under Captain Dew. But he says he bears no animosity towards the British on account of it, as he is aware that Captain Dew was subsidized by the Chinese Government to retake Ningpo from the rebels. He professes the profoundest respect for the British nation for their bravery and power; and what he most ardently wishes is to be on friendly terms with her; and all that he requests is for her to act fairly up to her *professed neutrality* to both contending parties. He says that, should they not succeed in conquering the Imperialists, he would be most happy to see the country under British rule. He promised he would not venture nearer to Amoy than Chang-chow (which is about twenty miles distant), provided the Mandarins at Chau-bay, a town situated on the river, about half way between Amoy and Chau-chow, did not blockade the river, and cut off all native trade and communication with them. That, in case they did, he should be compelled to take Chau-bay. That he should on no account attack Amoy, as he did not wish to have any rupture with foreigners. That he was very sorry the trade of Amoy suffered on account of their occupation of Chau-chow. That he would be only too happy to open trade reciprocally with foreigners; and that he would grant them every privilege and protection. That he was willing to trade with them for any description of European goods and native produce in return. Opium was not interdicted. He has made a law to protect all

native farmers and tradespeople, and this has been already felt by the country people who have opened a day market in one of the main streets of the south suburb; and, from daylight to dark, until the gates are shut, every description of native 'Chow-chow' is to be obtained. Tszle-wang told me that the establishing of this market, though doing a great deal of good to both parties, had led to many executions of both rebels and country people—the former on account of taking goods and not paying for them, and natives found in the city setting fire to houses and plundering; who, when caught, are taken before a rebel Mandarin, and, if found guilty, executed; as no rebel, under penalty of death, can take the life of any person, except in action. The rebels appear to be well armed with rifles, revolvers, and muskets. The Imperial soldiers in this respect are not to be compared to them, as their arms consist entirely of native matchlocks, gingalls, and spears, and not one in ten has even a matchlock; and they are a wretched lot of ragged rabble. On the other side, the rebels are very neatly dressed, more cleanly, and are drilled after European tactics. There are some Europeans amongst them, but I had no communication with them. They have entirely routed the Imperialists in every engagement they have had with them; and on the 2nd instant they came down on the Imperial lines 2,500 strong, the Imperial troops numbering 11,000; who have advanced to within about five miles of the city, to endeavour to protect the farmers, to gather in the standing crops of rice, which are in great abundance for many miles around the city, and which the rebels have gathered in and secured. The Imperials were encamped on both sides of the Rim, but their greatest force was on the right bank, behind a rugged hill, the inner extremity of

which was crossed at right angles by a valley, which could have been easily protected by throwing up a few earthworks and mounting a few guns in them. Their weak point they could not see; and the rebels, taking advantage of the hilly ground in the neighbourhood to advance under cover during daylight, and, coming down the valley at dark, entered the Imperial camp about eleven p.m., without any warning being given. The Imperials were completely panic-struck; and having no retreat but by river, rushed to their boats in such numbers that many of them were swamped, and hundreds of soldiers drowned. Many of them ran and hid themselves wherever they could, and among the latter was the chief Mandarin in command. They offered little or no resistance; and the rebels, after killing 1,000 and taking 450 prisoners, destroying the camp equipage, returned to the city at daylight. Tszle-wang told me that his plan of campaign would be next to take the large and populous town of Tong-wah, and from thence march upon the district city of Chin-chew in the spring. That the amount of the whole rebel force in the province of Fokien under his command fell little short of 50,000 men; and hoping to increase it to 80,000 after the capture of Chin-chew, he should then endeavour to open communication with the British authorities, and arrange to take Foo-chow-foo.

"Tszle-wang appears to be a man of considerable calibre. He appears, for a Chinaman, to be well up in foreign politics, and conversant on many subjects that you generally find the Chinese most ignorant on. He is affable and engaging in his manner, and appears to treat those about him with kindness. He is thirty-one years of age; short, stout, and well-made; his face is much sunburnt, and complexion, say dark; any person might

think he was of Malay origin, as he has both the features and colour of a Malay. That he is some strategist and has considerable military tact must be acknowledged by the manner he took the city of Chang-chow, before a rumour was even circulated of the rebels being anywhere near the place, or intending to capture it; and from the defeats the Imperial force has sustained in every engagement they have had with him, although in numerical strength the Imperial force has always been 3 or 4 to 1. I should like to pay another visit to the insurgents, but all foreigners are interdicted from visiting them, both by the Consuls and Mandarin authorities; in fact, we are now not even allowed to enter the river, which is only a mile and a half, and nearly twenty miles from Chang-chow, on the usual shooting excursions, wild fowl being very plentiful in the river, and which is our only amusement at this season of the year. The whole foreign community feel this to be very hard indeed, and consider it to be very arbitrary on the part of the Consul, as this place is extremely dull—no amusements whatever, our only recreation being in a picnic or shooting excursion up the river—but Mr. Pedder tries to make himself as unpopular as he possibly can, and he has told the Mandarins that they can arrest any foreigner they can find on the river under any circumstances whatever, and the Mandarins have threatened to decapitate any boatmen who may hire their boats to or take foreigners up the river. I also hear that the British Consul some few days ago issued a *warrant* to search the private dwelling of an English resident here for arms and munitions of war; and, if any were found, to bring him prisoner to the Consulate; but, happily, his suspicions were wrongly placed, as they found nothing of the kind in the gentleman's

house whatever. Has a British Consul authority to search a gentleman's private dwelling whenever he may please, and set spies to watch the movements of a person to please the Chinese Mandarins? Really this is cringing or holding the candle to the Celestials, and taking away the liberty of the subject entirely; and if it goes any further, I cannot say how it may end.

"Your obedient servant,  
"VERITAS.

"Amoy, 14th December, 1864."

In a subsequent letter, describing another visit to Chang-chew, the same writer states:—

"The rebel campaign is about to be carried on with vigour in this quarter; of the 30,000 men collected in Chang-chow, not one-fifth are required to garrison the city. I heard from Tszle-wang myself that he should immediately detach 7,000, under Tsi-wang, to assist in the capture of Tong-san, and another force would be despatched simultaneously to attack Tong-wak and Chin-chew. The rebels (Ti-pings) are in possession of six cities in this part of the province of Fu-keen, and within a few days' march. *The rebels told me that Tien-wang's son was at one of the cities.*"

The violation of the Queen's Order in Council (commanding neutrality to be observed after the Soo-chow massacre) by the British Consuls in China, is well shown by the previous letter of "Veritas." Besides the partisan acts therein complained of, six or seven English steamers were hired to the Mandarins at Shanghae to carry Imperialist troops to Amoy. They did so, and were well paid for the affair; but is this neutrality? Moreover, every kind of war material was freely supplied to them, and British officers were allowed to command some of the Imperialist troops (*Colonel* Kirkham, formerly with Gordon, and one *Captain* Macdonald being particularly noticed), while all supplies for, or communication with, the Ti-pings were

forbidden and attempted to be cut off; but, notwithstanding, munitions of war, and some Europeans (including *Colonel* Rhode, Gordon's late Adjutant-General, and *Colonel* Williams, who had commanded one of the Anglo-Manchoo regiments) managed to reach the revolutionists.

Shortly after the capture of Chang-chew, the Shi-wang issued the following proclamations:—

#### "NOTIFICATION FROM THE TAIPING CHIEF AT CHANG-CHOW.

"Notification from His Royal Highness Lee, Shee-king and Protector General, ordering the people to submit willingly and to continue their occupations.

"Whereas agriculture is the chief of the occupations of mankind, upon which people necessarily subsist, and whereas, since I rule this city I have always informed the people everywhere that they may continue their duties and occupations as usual—be it therefore known that those who submit to this government are called good people. Strict orders have been given to my officers and soldiers not to make any disturbance among the inhabitants, which orders you must have heard.

"But how is it that at present the fields are left uncultivated and all agricultural business seems to be entirely neglected? The plantations of sugar-cane are nearly ready for harvest, but will spoil if not cut, and the grains and paddy are nearly rotten, the reason of which we cannot comprehend. Probably the raising of arms is the cause of it, of which the people stand in awe, consequently they moved to their countries; or is the cause that at the time of fighting they are afraid that they may be implicated, that on this account they fled to other places? But

the benevolent and just army will not destroy the good people; while they exterminate the wicked, they will not punish the innocent.

"Now two villages on the south and north have already submitted, they are settled as usual. You people should be diligent at all times in trade and agriculture.

"Further, in the four villages of that place, the sugar-canies may be converted into sugar and the grains be collected: if you do not immediately return and resume your occupations, then how will the people get their subsistence? Furthermore, the people who fled away have not paid their taxes due, being thus ignorant of the plan of seeking peace.

"I treat others with great liberality, and therefore again and again issue these notifications, intimating to you that all those who have fled away may quietly return to cut the sugar-canies and collect the grains, and those who have not paid their taxes must, with submissive mind, come and pay their taxes. You must not cherish any doubt or hesitation, nor have a different heart, otherwise you will too late repent what you have done. I protect the people as children, and look upon them as wounded; therefore, for more than a month since I have taken possession of the place, I have never allowed a single soldier or officer to go to any village to give trouble. Now all the regulations have been arranged and the laws rectified, and strict orders have also repeatedly been given to the army thus treating you people bountifully and kindly. When the superior is so affectionate, you inferiors should readily come and pay tributes.

"After this notification has been issued, if those who have not paid their taxes and still insist on their obstinacy by disregarding it, troops will be raised to punish them in order to warn those who are perverse and stubborn, without lenity. Every one of you must obey this command and not disappoint me of my affection to you.

"LEE-SHAI-YIN,  
Shee-king, and Protector General of the Celestial Dynasty.

"Taiping Celestial Kingdom, 14th year, 19th moon, 30th day."  
—*Daily Press.*

#### "ADDRESS FROM THE TAIPING CHIEF AT CHANG- CHOW TO THE TREATY POWERS.

"His Royal Highness Lee-Shai-yin, Shee-king and Imperial Protector General of the Celestial Dynasty, to their Excellencies the Plenipotentiaries of England, France, United States, and the people of their respective countries.

"Since creation our Chinese Empire was first governed by Shinnung, then by the Emperors Yaw and Shun, who afterwards resigned their throne. Again the Emperors Tang and Mo attained to their throne by force of arms; then Dynasties Chun, Han, Ngai, and Tsien transmitted their thrones to their respective posterity, and were succeeded by the Dynasties Tang, Sung, Yune, and Ming. It would be a matter of considerable difficulty, when referring to the distant generations, to repeat them all, but as a nation it had hitherto been in amity with all your various nations, no distinct border having been marked out. I was born late, and have not had the

fortune to view these good prospects, and to enjoy the administration of the benevolent Government, but I have examined maps of the world, and studied the histories, and I am happy to possess a thorough knowledge of them, and the contents of which are as before me. For a man to guard a place, the watchword is to remember the fact that when the lips are cut off, the teeth will be endangered. To be in amity with adjacent countries, and for one to keep intercourse with neighbouring countries, it is essential not to forget the maxim of one large nation serving another small one. Of the history of China in counting back from the Dynasties of Ming and Yune, there have been innumerable successive revolutions of kingdoms who invariably paid tributes and presented precious stones to each other when due, and who never encroached upon other's territory. But the Tartars were of a different species, remarkable for their ravenous disposition, and for this reason, the central kingdom with the eastern provinces, in order to prevent their invasion, built the great wall. Unfortunately, during the latter part of the Ming Dynasty they were allowed to invade the interior, we became their victim, and have since been disgraced by them for these two centuries or more. Who then with common sense and natural patriotism would not strike his breast and weep? Even your various nations, in a practical point of view, are countries and in relation as lip to teeth, would not fail, I think, to hate them.

"Long had it been designed to raise the just standard, but in consequence of their being few in China who would support the movement, the design had for a time to be abandoned. Happily our Heavenly Father the Almighty God did not desert the descendants of Han (China), and hated the Tartars, and sent

down my Lord who settled at Kinling<sup>82</sup> as a basis of operations for more than ten years, and during that period exterminated thousands and ten thousands of Tartars. My Lord had always been in friendship with the heroes and enterprising men of your various nations who carried on their respective trades as usual. Further, the provinces of Kwang, Cheh, Yu, and others have been opened, and the ministers and people of various nations have travelled and rambled, and trade has been carried on uninterruptedly as usual. Is this not excellent? In obedience to my Lord's command I have been ordered to extirpate and root out the Tartars. Recently I attacked and took Chang-chow, where I encamped my soldiers. Whilst there I was glad to hear that you were close by, and I would ere this have sent a despatch to you, but various difficulties were thrown in the way. I now write this and tell the people of Tai-po-tsz of Chachow to present it for your perusal, earnestly hoping that after reading, you will consider the importance of lip-lost-and-teeth-endangered phrase, and perceive the advantage of a large nation serving a small one; that you will support our just movement by combining together to put an end to the Tsing Dynasty, in order that the people may live in happiness, and your various natives enjoy peace. The doctrine of our Heavenly Father, the Almighty God, and of Jesus Christ, teaches us that He is merciful, saving us, answering to prayers and unselfish—all mankind should look to future and believe in Christianity.

"Therefore, more than ten years before my Lord's accession to the throne, he believed in Christianity, as his conduct would show.

"He also received the Rev. Mr. Roberts, who preached the Gospel to the Chinese who believed and praised with him to God. We have welcomed your doctors, who cured many Chinese, and healed their diseases. We all feel grateful for their merciful kindness, and are under obligation for their favours. From this you will see that your nations and our Chinese in a universal point of view are as one. But the Tartars believe in Buddhism, despise Christianity, and turn a dead ear to its doctrine. It may be argued that belief or disbelief rests with them, and they will afterwards reap the fruit of their conduct. Well, why then do they persecute Christian converts so that their lives are in jeopardy? Therefore my Lord reluctantly took up arms, raised an army, and coped with them. This has been going on for these more than ten years, and through the mercy of our Heavenly Father, the Almighty God, and Jesus Christ, and through the assistance of your various nations, my Lord has taken many cities and provinces, and killed many Tsing devils. Still to conquer and subdue an empire of eighteen provinces, combined with a strong army of Mongols and Chinese, who have ample munitions of war and provisions, must be extremely difficult.

"Let us learn from the ancients as well as the moderns that to lead an army to battle it is indispensable to have reinforcements; and to establish a kingdom it is essential to get assistance from the neighbouring countries. Your various nations and China are at present like lip to teeth, and similar to a large country serving a small one. Let me ask you that before my Lord settled at Kiang-nan, could you get admittance into the interior? Now you can ride from east to west and from north to south, and the provinces of Hupeh and Ngan-hoin have

been opened to trade. If your various nations do not ally with me to exterminate the Tsing Dynasty, and in case our force being unable to cope with the Tartars, as we are deficient in naval power, we shall be conquered, then the result of lip-lost and teeth-endangered will soon follow. Therefore it is desirable that your various nations should embrace this opportunity as presented.

"If, on the other hand, your various nations, relying on the omnipotence of our Heavenly Father and Jesus Christ, and acting upon the doctrine of Christianity, will come to terms with us for destroying the Tsing Dynasty, if you command your naval armies and attack those places near the water, and whatever cities, districts, ports, and passes you will have taken and conquered by your force, you will be at liberty without the least hinderance on my part to keep them, and whatever treasures and food found therein, you will be at liberty to appropriate them. And so I will attack on land, and whatever cities, districts, and passes I conquer, and whatever treasures and food I find, I will divide, giving one half to you, and all the distant cities, ports, and marts will be surrendered to you.

"Thus having your naval armies, we can cross the ocean and bestride the rivers without obstacle or hinderance. Our army, I must confess, in its beginning is weak, and food is not plentiful; and unless your various nations lend a hand to assist me, the Tartars will be more ravenous and their ferociousness will be greater, *and if once our army is subdued, they will as a matter of course come upon your various nations*, when, it is clear, you will be precluded from trading and travelling in the provinces of Kiang, Kwang, Cheh, and Yu. I earnestly pray that

you will despatch your soldiers and co-operate with me to exterminate the evil posterities, and that we all may obtain advantages. Hoping you will comply with my views is my earnest prayer.

"The statements I have made, though they are vulgar, I undertake to swear before heaven that I will keep them. Let us write in benevolence to accomplish our undertakings, then we shall make peace with each other, trade with each other from generation to generation, and enjoy together universal peace. Is this not the best plan? The city of Chang has been and is a rich place, at present both the soldiers and inhabitants are happy, trade is flourishing, and treasures are plentiful. I also earnestly request that you will convey merchandise and vessels containing all kinds of foreign cargo, and the caps, powder, &c., which will be sold immediately here. You have no occasion to fear that some of my men will take them without paying for them. I will make up the damages should they do so, and surely I will not break my promise!

"On the day of this epistle reaching you, you will favour me with a reply.

"With my best compliments to your gentlemen of your various nations,

"I am your obedient servant,  
LEE-SHAI-YIN,

"Shee-king, and Imperial Protector General of the Celestial Dynasty

"Taiping Celestial Kingdom, 14th year, 10th moon, 1st day."  
—*Daily Press.*

## FOOTNOTES:

75. See *Friend of China*, July 11, 1865.

76. See the account from *Shanghae Recorder*, at the end of the preceding chapter.

77. Referring to Colonel Gordon, Captain Osborn, R.N., and their subordinates.

78. Meaning the noble occupation of buying and selling; and that, too, at the point of the bayonet.

79. *Times*, January 12, 1865. *China Overland Trade Report*, 30th November, 1864.

80. The *Times*, October 26, 1864, in its China intelligence (under date, "Shanghae, September 4"), describing the evacuation of Hoo-chow, makes the following statement, which is a further proof of the total or partial escape of the Nankin garrison:—"The rebel force had been so greatly swollen by fugitives *from Nankin* and other places, that it constituted quite a formidable army."

81. The writer of the letter has evidently made a confusion of the name, Le, and title, Shi, of the chief, for the following proclamations prove him to be the Shi or Shee Wang.

82. This must mean Nankin.

## CHAPTER XXVI.

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Results of British Policy.—Its Effect on Trade.—The Inspectorate System.—The Tien-tsin Treaty.—Present State of China.—Rebellion in the Ascendant.—Proposed Remedy.—The Mandarin Policy.—The Extradition Treaty.—The Mo-wang's Case.—Its Injustice.—Its Illegality.—Burgevine's Case.—Our Treatment by the Manchoos.—Russia's Policy in China.—Contrasted with that of England.—Russian Progress.—Statistics.—Acquisition of Territory by Russia.—Her Approach to British India.—Russia's Advantages.—Her Future Policy.—"Peking and the Pekingese."—Its Author's Misstatements.—Misquotations.—Examples thereof.—"Chinese Miscellanies."—Ti-ping Movements.—The Future of the Ti-pings Doubtful.—Latest Movements.—The Kan-wang.—Nien-fie Victories.—Future Prospects.—Finis.

Since Whig Ministers took it into their heads to become Manchoo Mandarins, the result may soon be told.

The wars have all been undertaken for the purpose either of forcing trade—principally, if not wholly, that in opium—upon the Chinese, or else to chastise that people for endeavouring to put their own laws against opium smuggling into force, from the time of the *fracas* with Commissioner Lin to the lorcha Arrow pretext for the last war.

The results of the late British policy in China are summed up generally in the following sectional review:—

1. As for the vaunted treaty of Tien-tsin, forced from unwilling Manchoos by the results of the "Arrow war," it has greatly restricted trade along the coast of China, closed ports (such as Wan-chew, Tai-chew, Lam-quan, Hoc-kau, Chin-chew, &c.), which were virtually open to foreign trade, and by confining commerce to a few Treaty Ports, played exactly into

the hands of the anti-foreign Mandarins. Upon this subject a capital article appears, from an old resident of many years' standing in China, in the *Overland Trade Report*, September 11, 1865, which, as the editor says, "contains the most able exposition of the defects of the treaty of Tien-tsin, of the pernicious results of the foreign inspectorate, and of the crusade carried on against foreign shipping visiting non-treaty ports, that we ever read." The article is long, but some of its salient points are to the following effect: Until the signing of the treaty of Tien-tsin, the whole coast-line, from Canton to Woo-sung, with all its intermediate ports, was virtually open to foreign trade! Foreign vessels of all nations were allowed and even encouraged by the local authorities to enter any port they chose, and were permitted to trade in any article, either native or foreign, without hindrance or molestation, provided they paid the lawful duties.

The disadvantages to which British (and all foreign) trade is subjected by the treaty of Tien-tsin, and the establishment of the foreign inspectorate of Chinese Customs, are these:—

1st. To pay nearly double as much duty on both imports and exports as native vessels or junks are charged.

2nd. Heavy tonnage dues are enforced, consisting of 4 mace or 4·10 of a tael (6s. 8d.) per ton, every four months, instead of every six months as previous to the war; junks paying no tonnage dues!

3rd. Interdicted from carrying or trading in *salt*, one of the principal articles of trade in all parts of China and Formosa. Likewise saltpetre, sulphur, alum, and some other articles of general commerce, on pain of confiscation of vessel. Junks allowed to carry or trade in any article either native or foreign!

4th. Interdicted from entering any port on the coast of China, except those specified "open port" by the treaty, on pain of *confiscation* of vessels and cargo. Junks free to enter any port or harbour either in China or foreign countries. What a contrast of advantages and disadvantages! Whereas,

before the concoction of the Tien-tsin treaty, foreign vessels enjoyed equal privileges with native craft, they have since been placed at a discount by the execution of the retrogressive measures of that treaty so inimical to British interests. No doubt the astute Manchoo statesmen who acted for China during the negotiations gained many advantages over the representatives of England. They succeeded in obtaining terms which restricted trade, and limited foreign intercourse to a few ports; their latest act has been to follow this up (now that the dread of the Ti-ping is over and the Ta-ku forts in their hands again) by interdicting the employment of foreign vessels to carry goods on Chinese account even between treaty ports!

2. The foreign inspectorate of Chinese Maritime Customs was a scheme effected by officials of Lord Elgin's embassy to China; its aim was to make sure of the indemnity by placing Englishmen in charge of the Imperial revenue, and to enable the squeezed Government to suppress rebellion by handing it over the remainder. Beautifully has the Pekin Cabinet responded by taking advantage of every opportunity to limit the rights of Englishmen, and resuming step by step its habits of repellance and exclusiveness!

A very significant event has lately taken place, being the elevation of Tseng-kwo-fan, leader of the anti-foreign party, and sometime besieger of Nankin, to a position of unprecedented magnitude. This Mandarin has been appointed to the absolute civil and military control of all the officials and troops, whether Tartar or Chinese, in the three provinces of Chili, Shangtung, and Honan. Speaking of this appointment, the *China Overland Trade Report*, 12th August, 1865, states:—

"Lest it may be hoped by some that Tseng-kwo-fan is a man adapted to the times, and likely to carry into effect salutary reforms, it should be mentioned that he is the quintessence of a Mandarin in the full acceptation of the term—corrupt and venal to a degree, and perfectly indifferent to the welfare of the country or the people. His anti-foreign tendencies form the leading feature of his political creed, and there is good reason to suppose

that Prince Kung fully agrees with him.... The influence he obtains in the empire will be irresistible, and must insure success in whatever line of policy he may feel inclined to pursue."

Tseng-kwo-fan's rank is that of Commander-in-Chief and General Viceroy of the empire.

The inspectorate system has placed a set of cosmopolitan mercenaries in a position not only to govern but to prey upon the whole foreign trade with China. They are ever upon the *qui vive* to seize and confiscate the merchandise of their own countrymen, and have caused the effectual closing of every port on the coast of China, except those opened by treaty. Property that may be unprotected by every legal right, or may be placed (through the owner's ignorance of inspectorate forms) in such a position as to incur some of the vexatious penalties attaching to every infraction of rules almost daily issued by the European Commissioners of Customs, or their Mandarin colleagues, *ad libitum*, is eagerly pounced upon and appropriated. In fact, it may safely be said that, instead of benefiting foreigners and their trade, the scheme acts directly against their interests; that it places a number of European and American adventurers in a position to assist the Mandarins in taking every advantage of each flaw in the treaty, while at the same time constituting a capital shield behind which the still repulsive Manchoos can execute their anti-foreign plotting in safety.

3. The hostilities against the Ti-pings were caused through the unrighteous policy established by the treaty of Tien-tsin, the foreign inspectorate of Customs, the extortion of indemnity for the war, and the protection of the vile opium trade. This policy has been a great success, in so far as arresting and beating backward the only portion of the multitudinous Chinese whose progress afforded a prospect of change for the better. It has, with still greater iniquity, warred against and prevented the spread of Christianity; destroyed many thousands and tens of thousands of those who professed that faith, and has stopped the circulation and printing

of the Bible in its full integrity by the Ti-ping Government, besides having caused the re-establishment of idolatry on the ashes of the destroyed Book, and the wholesale slaughter of those who only begged for our friendship and instruction. Through the wicked intervention of England, the former territory of the Ti-pings has been wrested from them, and the bleached bones of the victims mark the country thick and close for hundreds of miles. The starvation, the horrors, have been fully described; and now it is reported from China that many of the solitudes created where once happy villages of Ti-pings were found, have become infested with beasts of prey —wolves, panthers, and tigers.

As for having effected the slightest improvement in British relations with China, made the Manchoo authorities less unfriendly and illiberal, or rendered the least service to the general welfare of humanity, the past policy of the British Government has proved a lamentable failure.

By unjustifiable meddling, England has thrown China into a state of general anarchy. The cruelty and excessive corruption of the Manchoo officials throughout the country have always been sufficiently great to cause local insurrections and different regular systems of rebellion; but it was only to the great Ti-ping revolution (which proved its power so superior to that of the Imperial Government as to threaten the rapid extermination of the latter, and compel the assistance of England to save it) that people could look for success, and eventual pacification of the empire. Well, these urgently required results have been prevented by the policy in question.

Unable to depend upon the success of the Ti-ping movement, the disaffected Chinese have joined other rebellions, and at this day there are many desolating the country. In the north, a great amalgamation of the Yellow River rebels (an old organization, sometimes under allegiance to the Ti-ping king) or Nien-fie, with a force of Ti-pings, and a large body of Mohammedan rebels, has taken place. The army of this league is estimated at over 300,000 men; in the summer of 1865 they defeated the Tartar

Generalissimo (of Pekin campaign memory) San-ko-lin-sin, who was afterwards killed by some country people with whom he sought a refuge—thus showing the state of feeling amongst the population. The northern rebels then seriously menaced Pekin itself, and at one time it was reported that they had captured the city; lately they seem to have moved more to the westward—probably to effect a junction with other revolutionists; but it is quite certain that the Imperialists are unable to subdue them.

Besides the league, there are two other formidable rebellions raging in the north of China—the Mohammedan rebels, who defy the power of the Government in Shen-si, Shan-se, Kan-su, and other parts of the empire. To the south of these come the "Honan filchers," a horde of more than 100,000 banditti, who maintain, as they have done for years, an independent existence in the Honan Province. Away to the west, the large Tartar province of E-li, four times as large as Great Britain, has been wrested from the Imperialists by a rising of Mahomedans.

Along the western boundary general anarchy prevails: it would almost seem that as Russia advances into central Asia, the Mohammedans were moving towards China.

In the great province of Sze-chuan, the Ti-pings under Shih-ta-kae, the I-wang, or his successor, are still in power. At Hankow (treaty port) in Hu-peh, and at Kew-kiang in Kiang-si, the Imperialist troops lately revolted and set up the standard of rebellion. In Ngan-whui serious disturbances have arisen. Farther south, in Kwei-chow, Yun-nan, and Kwang-si, the Miau-tze, or independent mountaineers, are steadily increasing in strength; in fact, every province of China is more or less the scene of formidable revolution or local revolt.

The Ti-pings, in strong force, under the Shi-wang and other leaders, are making rapid progress on the borders of the provinces of Kwang-tung, Kiang-si, and Fu-keen, and the Imperialist troops seem totally unable to interfere with them.

Referring to the distracted state of China, the *Overland China Mail*, June 29, 1865, truly states that "there must be something in the conduct of the Imperial Government, and of the local Mandarins, which provokes a strong feeling of resentment against their authority in all parts of the empire." Singularly enough, the same journal has always opposed the revolutionists who tried to alter a Government the people hate.

The *Times*, in its Chinese intelligence of June 21, 1865, referring to the successes of the Nien-fie League, states:—

"So far as we can at present see, the Nien-fie insurrection is likely to prove quite as formidable as was that of the Taepings. Their leaders have substantial wrongs to avenge, and the people themselves have been subjected to so many hardships at the hands of the local Mandarins that the slightest spark is sufficient to set the whole north of China in a blaze of rebellion."

Those who have advocated interfering against such a movement as that of the Ti-pings, and supporting such a dynasty as that of the Manchoos, must have very curious reasons to plead for a justification—they have generally admitted the necessity for a change of government, and then amused themselves by resisting the change when offered.



MAP OF CHINA Showing the locality of the different rebellions in that Empire, the line of retreat taken by the Ti-pings from their settled territory, and their present position Spring of the year 1866.

The only policy which could have benefited China would have been, either an energetic protectorate established by England, and maintained with energy until the evil Government had been thoroughly and radically reformed in every branch; or, what would have been far better, the Chinese should have been left to themselves and allowed to choose their own rulers.

If England had simply preserved her honour and remained neutral, China would have had a native, progressionist, and powerful Government at the present day. That huge empire has lasted more than 2,000 years, and the only deterioration its constitution has suffered has been caused by the Tartar conquest. The resources of China are as great, the capacities of her people as vigorous, and the elements of her ancient civilization as durable as ever: once let the incubus of Manchoo maladministration be removed, that vast and intelligent people will rapidly establish a native Government which will inaugurate an era of progression and improvement. For some time the usurping dynasty has been tottering towards its fall; England would have done well to have avoided supporting the decayed and hopelessly corrupt fabric. She has served a dying despotism, too far gone to feel even gratitude for her assistance, and has repelled a young successor who wished ardently to become of the same brotherhood as herself!

4. By her aggressive, meddling policy, England has alarmed the naturally suspicious and treacherous Manchoos. Making them feel towards the "outer barbarians" the passion of fear as well as hate, has, of course, only tended to make them more exclusive and repellent than ever. Every mail from China brings successive proof of the fact. Those who receive advices from the East cannot fail to notice such passages as the following:

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The *Overland China Trade Report*, in its issue September 11, 1865, states:—

"Each succeeding mail takes some instance of Mandarin repellant towards foreigners. There can be no doubt that this feeling is the policy decided on by the Pekin Cabinet.... As bearing upon this point, reference is called to a notification... issued by the Shanghae authorities, forbidding Chinese to hire foreign vessels.... The hand of Tseng-kwo-fan, the leader of the anti-foreign party, becoming visible in the present foreign policy pursued.... "

The article then proceeds to notice the fact that the Mandarin policy of preventing the employment of foreign shipping, and encouraging that of native craft, simply tends to increase piracy by providing prey; and is further reprehensible because the Mandarins will not assist to suppress an evil which, were it not for the presence of British men-of-war, would destroy their entire maritime commerce. Mr. Hart, the Inspector General of Customs, endeavoured to induce the Imperial Government to allow Chinese to own vessels constructed after the foreign mode, but the hatred of foreign innovation, however beneficial, prevailed, and the authorities refused the much-desired boon.

Another instance of Manchoo repellance is the withdrawal of the concession formerly granted to foreign vessels to visit the ports of the Island of Formosa.

And again: the port of Wan-chew was open to foreign trade before the treaty of Tien-tsin, and became a place of much importance. Why it was not included in the list of open ports it is difficult to understand. The foreign representatives and merchants lately endeavoured to obtain the concession of having it opened to foreign trade, and for a time were encouraged by Prince Kung to believe that their request would be complied with. But since Tseng-kwo-fan has come to the front, the concession is rejected, and the idea abandoned.

The notification referred to as prohibiting the employment of foreign vessels was issued by Lin, Imperial Commissioner, and acting Viceroy of Kiang-su, in which province Shanghae is situated. It seems to have proved very effectual, and very injurious to British shipping interest.

The last mail from China brought the *Overland Trade Report*, dated "Hong-kong, October 15, 1865." It contains these lines:—"The repellance and anti-foreign tendencies of the Mandarins are becoming more broadly marked as each month advances."

The *North China Market Report* states "that the Chinese are rapidly learning to disregard the most important of the treaty stipulations." In fact, all sources of information are unanimous as to the hostile feelings of the Manchoo Government England has done so much to bolster up.

Just six months have elapsed since the Colonial Government of Hong-kong perverted its powers by giving up an unfortunate refugee from Nankin to the sanguinary Imperialist Mandarins. After noticing the facts of the case, we will observe how the Manchoos responded to the officious and unwarrantable efforts of the Hong-kong rulers to execute the exterritoriality clause of the notorious treaty of Tien-tsin, the twenty-first article of which stipulates that, "if *criminal* subjects of China shall take refuge in Hong-kong, or on board of British ships there, they shall, upon due requisition by the Chinese authorities, be searched for; and, *on proof of their guilt*, be delivered up."

Acting upon the above clause, the Canton Mandarins, in the month of April, 1865, demanded from the Colonial Government the rendition of a certain Chinaman residing at the latter place, on the plea of his having been a pirate. The man demanded had been residing in Hong-kong since September, 1864, and the following facts transpired during the inquiry instituted. He had been a Ti-ping chief, known as the Mo-wang (probably a successor to the rank of the assassinated Commandant of Soo-chow); and, upon the evacuation of Nankin, had escaped and made his way to Hong-kong, with a considerable sum of money. As this became known to members of some secret societies established amongst the Chinese there, he was subjected to much extortion from people who threatened to denounce him to the Mandarins as a rebel unless he satisfied their demands. At last the persecution drove him to seek legal advice from some English lawyer, who told him that he was perfectly safe on British soil. Consequently, he defied his persecutors; and they, doubtless, to obtain reward from the Mandarins, fulfilled their threats. The principal Manchoo official at Canton,

who was certain of promotion should he succeed in catching a rebel of such rank, forthwith demanded his rendition *as a pirate*.

The man was seized and tried before the magistrates' court, where the above evidence was obtained. The proof of his piracy (although consisting of the testimony of only *one* Chinese witness, *sent down specially by the Mandarins*) was considered sufficient; and, notwithstanding the protest of the counsel retained for the prisoner, the magistrate, under the direction of the law officers of the Crown, made out the requisite order for his rendition.

The valuable account from which the facts of this case are taken<sup>83</sup> states:—

"On this being communicated to the Mo-wang, he made up his mind to commit suicide, if possible, by jumping overboard on his passage to Canton, knowing, as he did too well, the horrid fate that there awaited him. When *handed over* to the Chinese officials, he begged to be released from the handcuffs; but one of our civil officials (the man's name should be made public), not in the police, would not permit this; and he was therefore conveyed to Canton in the manacles of the Hong-kong police. On his arrival there he was taken to prison, the next day brought before the Mandarin, where he refused to plead, acknowledging himself a Ti-ping chief: he was taken back to prison, and the next day was executed in the way reserved for *political offenders*, viz., he was tied to a cross, his cheeks then sliced off, then the insides of his arms, thighs, &c., and finally disembowelled while yet alive. This put beyond a doubt the real cause of the demand for this man, and the real offence for which he was wanted."

Now, in this cruel case of rendition the Government of Hong-kong committed an act repugnant alike to humanity and the Christian principles of their countrymen, and which was not only entirely illegal, but grossly unjust.

The Mo-wang was demanded and given up as a pirate. The only evidence against him was given by *one* Chinaman, and tended to prove that

the chief had once stopped a Chinese vessel, on board of which was the witness, endeavouring to run past the Ti-ping Custom House established at Nankin. The junk was confiscated by the Ti-ping authorities. Here we have the main point of the case. This was the only act charged against the Mo-wang. The only question is whether it was piracy. The Colonial authorities, true to the Mandarin-worshipping-and-Ti-ping-destroying policy, answered in the affirmative. Let us examine their decision.

First. The Ti-pings had been recognised as belligerents; and, moreover, as an established power, by repeated acts upon the part of representatives of Great Britain (and other countries); how then could the seizure of a vessel of the enemy by the Mo-wang—a regularly commissioned officer of the Ti-ping Government—be construed into an act of piracy? Why, the United States of America would have stronger (though none the less unreasonable) grounds to demand from England the rendition of every ex-Confederate officer, as a pirate, who might be found within her jurisdiction! The decision of the Hong-kong authorities is clearly against the rights of the case and the law by which it was tried. But what conclusively proves this is the fact that the Mandarins demanded the Mo-wang as a pirate, but executed him as a *political offender*, and nothing else.

Thus, it cannot fail to be seen that the unfortunate victim was not a pirate—the Hong-kong Solons gave him up as one.

Secondly. The extradition treaty with China specially declares "*criminal*" offenders as those who may be given up, upon "*proof of guilt*." The Mo-wang was not a criminal, therefore the Hong-kong authorities violated the law by giving him up as such.

Thirdly. The treaty of Tien-tsin was not the law of Hong-kong, therefore the authorities had no legal right to render up even a criminal subject of China—how much less the innocent Mo-wang! As the Hong-kong *China Overland Trade Report*, May 30, 1865, truly states, in reviewing this atrocious affair:—"It would appear that the local authorities have not only

read the treaty erroneously, but that they have no power whatever to meddle in the matter, no ordinance ever having been passed to enable them to take cognizance of offences under the Tien-tsin treaty....

"The case of the St. Alban's raiders has elicited the fact that a treaty is not a statute, and cannot be adopted by a court of law without a statutory enactment. The Ashburton treaty was not the law of Canada, because the Government had neglected to legalize it by statute. So the Tien-tsin treaty is not the law in Hong-kong, because no ordinance has been passed to legalize it."

The above three objections to the rendition of the Mo-wang pretty strongly prove that his death was a judicial murder by those who unlawfully gave him up to so frightful a doom. Another example of British malversation in China, and a further instance of persecution of the Ti-pings!

It might at least have been expected when British officials exceeded their authority and so misapplied the extritoriality clause of the treaty in order to oblige the Mandarins, that the latter would have responded. We will observe how they did so.

Within *one month* of the rendition of the Mo-wang, the Imperialists in the neighbourhood of Amoy captured the mercenary soldier, Burgevine (already noticed in these pages), an Englishman named Green, and a British East Indian subject, whilst endeavouring to join the Ti-pings at Chang-chew. These men had committed no crime, and were caught *before* having committed any political offence (any previous episode of Burgevine's life constituting another case, which did not concern the Englishman, Green). Even if they had succeeded in joining the revolutionists, and had afterwards been caught levying war against the Imperialists, their only offence would have been a political one, viz., breach of neutrality, punishable by deportation from China or three months' imprisonment.

The American Consul at Amoy, hearing of the seizure, demanded, as in this case he had a perfect right to do, the rendition of Burgevine, according

to the terms of the extritoriality clause of the treaty. The Mandarins refused to fulfil their obligations and give up the men. They carried them into the interior and murdered them by heavily ironing, and then drowning them, afterwards pretending that the three unfortunate prisoners had met their death by the capsizing of a boat in which they were being conveyed across a river!

Thus we see that immediately after a Chinese *political* offender was illegally given up to the Manchoo Government by the authorities of Hong-kong, the Mandarins deliberately violated the extritoriality stipulations of the treaty, by refusing to give up the three men whom they had seized before offence, on suspicion only, and by cruelly putting them to death.

The last mail from China brings intelligence of the murder of three Europeans at the treaty port of Chin-kiang. Two (Messrs. Filleul and Pickernel) were Englishmen, and old friends of mine; the third, a Mr. Lewis, was an American. These men were set upon by Imperialist soldiers in the dead of the night, while sleeping, and cruelly murdered, without having given any offence, although another European had struck a Chinaman on the previous day. The murderers belonged to a disciplined contingent, commanded by a Mandarin named Kwo, a force which had been raised, officered, and equipped by British means!

Besides the continual violation of the extritoriality clause of the treaty, the Manchoos have lately displayed their growing disregard for their obligations and their increasing repugnance to foreigners in a variety of illiberal measures. To those which we have already noticed may be added the late blunt refusal of the Pekin Cabinet to allow the construction of a proposed Russian line of telegraph from Siberia to that city.

Another very serious blow to British and Chinese interests has been the fruitless mission of Sir M. Stephenson. The Manchoo Government has pointedly refused to grant permission for the introduction or construction of railways, and the local authorities have obstructively prevented the

formation of proposed experimental lines at Canton, and between Shanghae and Woo-sung, a distance of about fourteen miles.

There is another case in point, which effectually proves the thorough impracticability of the Manchoos. A few months ago an enterprising Shanghae merchant, Mr. E. A. Reynolds, was public-spirited enough to erect a line of telegraph from Shanghae to the sea-coast. He made all arrangements, compensated various native landowners, and erected his posts, only to find them all chopped down again one fine morning. The Mandarins, when appealed to, insulted the British Consul, and refused to allow the erection of the telegraph, the alleged reason being that it interfered with Fung-shui—the spirit of geomancy, the air, or something else.

Shortly before the above outrage, the Mandarins showed their gratitude for the assistance England had given them, by closing the whole of the silk districts and interior to steam communication or transit by foreigners, the same having been free and open under the rule of the Ti-pings, who encouraged the employment of steamers.

Many other instances of Manchoo repugnance and hostility could be mentioned, but those noticed are sufficient for all purposes, and so we will close our review of *some* of the results of British policy in China.

After having examined the conduct of England, it may not be out of place to follow with a short sketch of Russian policy, which is daily becoming so closely connected with China, whilst the frontier of the great Muscovite Power is rapidly extending towards the Chinese and Indian empires in one direction, is peacefully established against Chinese territory in another, and is gradually annexing to herself vast portions of Chinese territory in the north.

Although the Manchoos have always been hostile to British intercourse, "there is a system of European policy which they can and do appreciate," as the *Standard*, August 28, 1865, well said. The substance of the article

referred to so thoroughly expresses what I would say, that I cannot refrain from using it:—

The Manchoos comprehend the spirit of Russia, and dwell at peace with that empire on her borders. Instead of a great wall, they are divided from their powerful neighbour by a wooden paling, and there has not been a shot fired between Russia and China, contiguous though they are, during the last fifty years. But what has been the course pursued by Russia with regard to that which is loosely and inaccurately termed the Ti-ping revolt? One of complete neutrality. We, however, from the coast, hoisted our flag in the war. We have taken an active and open part, declared against a tremendous national movement, and been virtually beaten off the Chinese soil and waters. Looking for results, it is impossible to find any, except that our name is hated by millions of people who desired to live and trade upon friendly terms with us. Our representative diplomacy at Pekin is a nullity, and there is every chance that, a change of dynasties intervening, we shall have to undo our Manchoo statesmanship, and comply with a very different set of political necessities in the East. Your Chinese are very intelligent fatalists; they rarely quarrel with facts; they are convinced, it may be, of the English fighting quality; but they can feel little respect for our wisdom when they see us standing in a baffled attitude between both their great parties, blundering and bewildered, with an enormous trade to foster, with prodigious future interests to foresee, and yet with a diplomacy which means neither peace nor war, which binds us to no intelligible line of conduct, and which has brought us to a condition wherein, through any accident, whether of Imperial or insurrectionary success, we may be called upon to defend our rights by force of arms.

It is a fact no less singular than true, that the Russians, in contradistinction to all other Europeans, show a strong tendency to amalgamate with the higher races of Asia. In consequence of this, her rapid progress on the continent referred to partakes of the nature of absorption

and not of conquest. The policy of Russia seems inseparable from continual increase of her already vast dominions. In every direction her frontier is determinately advanced, while thousands of strange people are submitting to her sway. In Europe she uses force to obtain any desirable locality; and although it is true that occasionally some obstinate or patriotic chief of Central Asia may dispute her advance, such obstructions would seem to form the exception to the general progress she is enabled to make rather by conciliation and clever seizure than by force of arms.

If people have the audacity to use their eyes, and the unparalleled hardihood to discover the extraordinary increase of the Russian empire, there is a clique of venerable wiseacres who always think to annihilate them by the crushing denunciation, Russophobia! Now, these old gentlemen—it is presumed that they are rather decrepit—may call the knowledge of modern geography and the continual increase of Russia whatever gives them a little innocent amusement; but all the calling in the world cannot alter the fact.

There are two questions which particularly concern England: is she content to halt on the forward path of nations, while Russia, by reclaiming the people of Asia, bids fair to rival her in every duty assumed by great civilized Powers? Is the meeting of the frontier lines of Russia and India, which, according to the regular increase of the Russian possessions in Central Asia, might be calculated almost to the day, likely to prove disastrous to British empire in the latter country?

Other European Powers can afford to look on without being interested, for only England has so precious a jewel as Hindoostan. The first question may be passed over as merely bearing upon the advancement of abstract principles, or the propagation of Christian doctrine, philanthropy, and civilization; but the second is very different, relating as it does exclusively to the material and commercial interests of Great Britain. Before explaining how these may be affected by the future movements of Russia, or

describing the present position of that Power in Central Asia, it will not be out of place to give a short sketch of Russian progress.

At page 410, vol. ii., "MacGregor's Commercial Statistics," the following interesting calculations are given:—

"Russia contained—

At the accession of Peter I. in 1689 15,000,000 inhabitants.

At the accession of Catherine II. in 1762 25,000,000 "

At her death in 1796 36,000,000 "

At the death of Alexander in 1825 58,000,000 "

"Her acquisitions from Sweden are greater than what remains of that kingdom.

"Her acquisitions from Poland are nearly equal to the Austrian empire.

"Her acquisitions from Turkey in Europe are of greater extent than the Prussian dominions, exclusive of the Rhenish provinces.

"Her acquisitions from Turkey in Asia are nearly equal in dimensions to the whole of the smaller states of Germany.

"Her acquisitions from Persia are equal in extent to England.

"Her acquisitions in Tartary have an area not inferior to that of Turkey in Europe, Greece, Italy, and Spain."

The valuable work quoted from was published in the year 1844. It proceeds to state:—

"The acquisitions she has made within the last sixty-four years are equal in extent and importance to the whole empire she had in Europe before that time.

"The Russian frontier has been advanced towards—

Berlin, Dresden, Munich, Vienna, and Paris about 700 miles.

Constantinople	"	500	"
Stockholm	"	630	"
Teheran	"	1,000	"

"It is to be borne in mind that the Russian tariff *of exclusion* has been extended to all those acquisitions where formerly British merchandise was freely sent."

To the above may be added the Russian acquisitions in North America, which are nearly five times the extent of the British Isles.

Her acquisitions from the Chinese empire, the river Amoor territory in Manchuria, are about equal in dimensions to England.

Her acquisitions from independent Tartary since 1844 are more than four times greater in extent than the British Isles. The advance of the Russian frontier from Orenburg to Samarkand is about 800 miles.

Every mail from India brings intelligence of further Russian progress or conquest. The position at which we have placed her is within 200 miles of Cabul, and 400 of Jellalabad and Cashmere. Nothing but the mountains of Cashmere and Cabul separate the Russians from British India. Foiled and driven back by the results of the Crimean war, Russia changed her line of aggression from facing directly through Turkey, Persia, and so to Hindoostan; but, by concentrating her forces upon and crushing poor Circassia (which might have been protected with almost more reason than Turkey was), she opened a direct passage to Persia upon the west of the Caspian Sea, whilst at the same time other legions were carrying her

frontier line at a quick march through Tartary to the eastward. The command of the Bosphorus would have made the Black Sea a Russian lake, and the only assailable flank of a march into Persia would have been protected against the great naval Powers. That position has been *par force* abandoned, but Russia has succeeded in obtaining another almost equally good. By her extraordinary efforts against Circassia she has at length managed to obtain the long-coveted Caucasian Mountains. These, in the hands of a comparatively small force, constitute an effectual barrier to any foreign offensive movement against her operations on, and to the eastward of, the Caspian Sea. Thus it is palpable that no European Power could in Europe, upon equal terms, or with a chance of success, oppose her designs on the southern and eastern portions of Asia. Meanwhile she is steadily possessing herself of the territory yet independent on the frontiers of India and Thibet. During the last few years she has successfully absorbed Khiva, the territories of the Kirghiz and Kalpak Tartars, the provinces of Turkestan, and the principal points of Kokan. The great cities of Tashkend and Samarkand are in Russian hands, and the last mail from India (December, 1865) announces that war has commenced between them and Bokhara—the last independent kingdom of Tartary. There is an old Muscovite prediction, which declares: "When the Russians shall have conquered Samarkand, and shall have returned to the cradle of their Tartar ancestors, there shall be but one rule in Asia, and the Mongols and Tartars united shall brave the whole world." Certainly this prophecy is in progress; it remains to be seen whether it will be accomplished.

The last telegrams report that the Russians are within six miles of Bokhara, the capital of the country of that name, and that many thousands of workmen are engaged constructing their military roads through that kingdom. And where are these roads leading? In a direct line for the nearest portion of British India! Perhaps the Russians only wish to build summer-houses on the northern slopes of the mountains of Cashmere, though it is

strange military roads and large bodies of troops are required for such a purpose. Perhaps they wish to get on the other side of these mountains—time will show.

Such is the present (December, 1865) position of Russia in Asia; but already there are signs indicative of a much farther progress. Already the people a little beyond her advancing frontier are in turmoil and confusion. Kashgar, Yarkend, and other portions of eastern Thibet, together with Cabul, being in anarchy, and waiting for the arrival of the pacifying, absorbing invader, whilst the great Mongolian province of I-li has thrown off its allegiance to the Emperor of China. Already the next nations are breaking up like fallow earth before the resistless ploughshare.

The *Bombay Mail* of December 13th states:—

"Many reports are current of commotions in the Affghan states and along the Punjab frontier.... The internal commotions in Cabul continue.... An envoy from Kotan has arrived at Cashmere.... The object of his visit is said to be to offer the Empress of India the allegiance of Kotan, in return for an assurance of protection from the Russians.... The inhabitants of Soket, in the hills north of Jullunder, lately made an attack on Mundi.... The country near Yarkand is reported to be in a state of insurrection. It is conjectured that this manifestation of revolt is an indication of *some greater power having instigated it*, having for its object the creation of universal revolt, and thus breaking the influence of China in these parts.

"An affray recently took place between the sepoys of the Jeypore Rajah and the Rajah of Khetra, in which several lives were lost. Government have called upon the former chief for explanations.

"Advices from the north-western frontier indicate the necessity for being more than ever on the alert against the increasing raids by various sects. Letters recently received report that the Wahabee Moulvies at Sittana have been purchasing the favour of the Akhoond of Swat, who was to stir up the tribes to a united effort against the British.

"It is reported from Peshawur that the Afreedies are very restless, and inclined to give trouble. This tribe occupies the hills all along the western side of the Peshawur Valley, and their territory interposes between the Peshawur and Kohat districts. They can muster some 20,000 fighting men, all of them as good soldiers as can be found on the frontier."

It is quite plain to those who have studied the question, that Russian progress towards India and China is seriously affecting the material and commercial interests of Great Britain. For some years the Russians have successfully competed with British merchants in China. Although their trade has been carried on through a vast extent of territory, still the import of Russian woollen and other manufactured goods, *via* Irkoutsk, Kiachta, and Mongolia, has been sufficient to suit and satisfy the market of Western, Northern, and Central China, besides Mongolia and Thibet. Every day increases this commerce, and makes it less expensive. Russia brings into the contest with England (whether it be commercial or military) overwhelming natural advantages. She is rapidly extending her railway and telegraphic lines throughout her Asiatic dominions; and these, besides serving to introduce the sciences, arts, and mechanical inventions of modern civilization, are being constructed for the conveyance of armies to the utmost limits of her empire. It is quite possible that, by the time the Russian frontier joins that of India, railway communication will be extended to the same point, and afford the opportunity of conveying large bodies of troops.

Russia undoubtedly has a great future in Asia, and it is difficult to see how England can ultimately avoid yielding before the natural advantages that will be brought into the field against her—for that they will be so employed one cannot doubt; unless, indeed, there be some charm by which British interests are made sacred to her rival, and certainly the Russians are not likely to prefer a barren steppe of Tartary to a rich slice of India. As for the principle of the thing, the less said about that the better. Considering the manner in which England obtained her dominions in Hindoostan, the Russians have quite as much right to take them, if they can; and why should we flatter ourselves that they will not try when they become our neighbours, when we see them indiscriminately seizing all territories which lie in their way?

It may be that we should rather rejoice at the position Russia is taking up against India and China; it may be that, even should the result prove injurious to us, it will not be felt till something like the lapse of another century; but these are grave questions, and it is quite within the bounds of probability that another few months may find us either defending our Indian possessions, or crushing internal dissension created by Russian intrigue amongst our coloured subjects.

It is scarcely to be expected (except in the event of European war) that Russia will make any direct attack upon British India, but the very contrast of her method of conquest with ours will create disaffection amongst the excitable, fanatical, treacherous natives. Why this result should ensue is explained by the well-known fact that (probably from the admixture of Tartar blood) the Russians can amalgamate with Asiatics, while the English cannot. Englishmen may flatter themselves that British rule is adored in India, but all the flattery in the world cannot obliterate the remembrance of the terrible mutiny, which, considering the numbers that joined it who were not sepoys, might more appropriately be termed a rebellion. Unless we have thoroughly established our rule in the hearts of the people, we may be sure

that the vicinity of Russian dependencies will cause trouble, because Asiatics will become Russianized far sooner than we can Anglicise them, and Russian influences are already at work in Affghanistan, if not also in Cashmere—whence disturbances were lately reported. In conclusion, on this subject, it may fairly be said that Russia is performing a great work, no doubt to the benefit of thousands of uncivilized nomades, and that her course is very likely to lead her into collision with British India. England cannot stop her if she would; but England *might have had* a powerful friend and ally in the shape of a great Asiatic Power if she had not destroyed the Ti-pings who would have established it. By the wilful, unjustifiable, short-sighted policy of her Government, England has lost the glorious opportunity of helping to establish a vast Christian empire in Asia—a course the more impolitic because its reverse would not only have tended to raise a balance against the incessant encroachment of Russia in the East, but to create a strong friendly Power on the frontier of her own Indian possessions.

One object for which the author has steadily laboured, and which has had no small share in causing the production of this work, is to counteract the gross amount of ignorant prejudice which has been excited against the Tipings through the medium of false reports in England. Persons either individually implicated, or credulous enough to believe the interested statements of those who have been concerned in slaughtering the Ti-pings, have been gratified at the diffusion of their opinions by sundry publications, journals, and magazines—patriotic, very, no doubt, but nevertheless either unscrupulous or gullible.

Just to prove the utter worthlessness of the reports referred to, the following statements are selected from two new books ("Peking and the Pekingese," by Dr. Rennie; "Chinese Miscellanies," by Sir J. F. Davis); whilst it is also unhesitatingly affirmed that every similar effusion, having for its basis defamation of the Ti-pings, is equally untrustworthy, and as easily, if not more so, refuted.

In the Dedication of the former of the two works to Sir F. Bruce, Dr. Rennie has sufficient power of imagination to term that official's vacillating and inane diplomacy—

"A policy auguring so *favourably*<sup>84</sup>[1] for the future of China."

With a further combination of inaccuracy, adulation, and prejudice, Dr. Rennie proceeds to state:—

"And which, *having been mainly conducive to the extinction of the Taeping rebellion*,[2] has already been attended with results of the highest importance to the *cause of humanity*."<sup>[3]</sup>

[1] It is for those who peruse this work, and all who have other opportunities than such as Dr. Rennie gives to enlighten them, to judge whether the "policy" in question has proved "*favourable*" or the reverse.

[2] As for the second passage, if Dr. Rennie means that the shuffling, spiritless, and vacillating conduct of Sir F. Bruce, marked by total want of energy and impartiality, conduced to a certain result, by means of having established no policy or principle of statesmanship whatever, he is right; but if he means that his patron advocated, advised, or countenanced the massacre of Ti-pings, he is labouring under some extraordinary delusion, and the words of him he tries to praise, but clearly misrepresents, prove it. Not only has the weather-vane of the political fancies of Sir F. Bruce never been blown to within many points of recommending direct intervention, but on the other hand he has *violently* deprecated any such operation, as may be seen by referring to page 280, Chapter X., and many other parts of this work. The finishing blow, however, is given to Dr. Rennie's illusory though amusing panegyric, and his unfortunate premises are proved to be without foundation; by the well-known fact that the "extinction of the Taeping rebellion" has neither taken place, nor even seems likely to be, as appears by a telegram in the London papers (November 24, 1865), viz.:—

"Shanghae, October 9, 1865. The Taepings are reported to be again appearing in large bodies."

[3] With regard to Dr. Rennie's rodomontade about "*the cause of humanity*," as the Ti-pings are not yet *exterminated*, it is simply unmeaning; and all that can be said in its favour is, that it is correctly copied from the Blue Book (see p. 738, Chap. XXIV.).

At the 89th page of "Peking and the Pekingese," Dr. Rennie endorses the following misrepresentations:—

"The Taepings who, Mr. Parkes states, endeavour to copy the most objectionable traits in the Imperialist character (?), in addition to which a sort of 'High life below stairs' farce is enacted, embracing the most absurd assumptions of dignity, with general licentiousness, blasphemy, and obscenity...."

Then Dr. Rennie's ire becomes aroused at the thought of such wickedness, and the consciousness of moral rectitude filling him with a strange *cacoethes scribendi*, he abuses the Ti-ping Wang very cruelly, by declaring:—

"This lunatic monarch (for such he would really seem to be) is waited on only by women, no males being allowed to approach him; bigamy (?), with general immorality, is said to be the prevailing institution of the Court of Nankin."

Now the above statement is no less incorrect than absurd. The Tien-wang regularly held council with his ministers and chiefs. The insertion of the word "bigamy" suggests motives on the part of the writer, who, we may suppose, means polygamy. He not only forgets to blame his Imperialist friends for conforming to *the same custom of China*, but he must be ignorant of the fact that "bigamy" means the crime of marrying more than one woman *only* in countries where the civil law makes such connection illegal. Not satisfied with thus abusing those he had never seen, Dr. Rennie proceeds to *misquote* from Blue Books. He says, at the same page:—

"The following rhapsody has lately appeared, in the form of a proclamation, from the Teen-wang."

He then quotes a decree, issued on the 7th of March, 1861, to establish certain regulations in the civil department of the Ti-ping Government—a translation of the same being given at page 44 (Inclosure 6, in Number 11) of the Blue Book on China, presented to the British Parliament, "in pursuance of their address, dated April 8, 1862."

The clause which either Dr. Rennie or his authority has altered, in the original and official translation, is as follows:—

"Thus, in addition to the perfect regulations, we have added six more, making nine altogether. Do not go and turn your backs on the Father, Brother, myself, and my son, who illuminate all places, benevolently harmonizing them for a myriad myriad generations.... "

The words "Father—Brother" are, in the Chinese text, *raised* the usual number of spaces above "myself and my son," which at once properly represents the Divinity. Any unprejudiced mind would certainly understand the sentence as meaning that—"the Father, Brother, Myself, and my Son," in our respective spheres, benevolently harmonize all things. Dr. Rennie, however, tries to prove the blasphemous nature of the Ti-pings in the following manner:—At page 90, first volume of his work, he misquotes the clause of the proclamation referred to in this way:—

"Now do not in the least turn away your back upon Ya-ko-chum and Yan (?) —God, Christ, myself, and son—who illuminate all places AS ONE BODY POLITIC, benevolently harmonizing them for ten thousand times ten thousand generations."

Where does Dr. Rennie get the interpolation from? It is a totally un-Chinese expression, but a favourite term *with English diplomatists*. It appears a clever attempt to alter the sense of the proclamation, and brand the Ti-pings with the crime of blasphemy. There are other cases in which the author of "Peking and the Pekingese" goes out of his way to endorse second-hand opinions inimical to the Ti-pings; but as he does not attempt to corroborate them by any mention of his own experience, it is unnecessary to

further notice such valueless statements; the misquotation exposed above, not only evidences how little reliance is to be placed on the clique of Ti-ping maligners, but forms a fitting conclusion to our acquaintance with a book which would have been more valuable had the author refrained from aspersing a political cause of which he knows literally nothing.

The misrepresentation contained in "Chinese Miscellanies," though merely consisting of one sentence and a foot-note, is important and worthy of contradiction, because it is promulgated by Sir J. F. Davis. Speaking, in the preface, of the Governments of China and Japan, he states:—

"With all their faults they are, in their integral characteristics, better than the *mock Christian*<sup>85</sup> Taepings of China...."

As for the mockery of Christianity, perhaps the readers of "Ti-ping Tien Kwoh" may agree with its author in believing that it has been altogether upon the part of those who, like Sir J. Davis, have scoffed at, abused, and ridiculed the faith of the Ti-pings. Many millions of men do not establish a great revolution, and sacrifice their lives for a *mock* purpose, whatever Sir J. Davis may think to the contrary. If "it has been *plain from the first*" that the Ti-pings were no more like Christians than Mahomet was like a Jew, will the clever discoverer kindly explain the meaning of the statements of the Bishop of Victoria, Revs. Edkins, John, Medhurst, Muirhead, &c., referred to and quoted in this work?

All that now remains to be noticed are the movements of the Ti-pings since capturing the city of Chang-chew, near Amoy, their present circumstances and position.

After holding a large portion of the province of Fu-keen for about eight months, on the 16th of May, 1865, the Ti-pings evacuated the city of Chang-chew, and moved off to the westward.

This proceeding took both Europeans and Imperialists completely by surprise; for, up to the day before the Shi-wang left Chang-chew, his outposts were five miles from the city, and the Manchoo forces had not

ventured to attack them for a long time. The place was also strongly fortified and well-provisioned—so much so, indeed, that large stores of grain, &c., were left behind—while the country to the west and south was entirely under the control of the Ti-pings.

The explanation of the Shi-wang's sudden movement is due to the fact that eleven days afterwards he joined his forces with Hung-jin, the Kan-wang, at a distance of eighty or ninety miles inland.

Of course, as usual, frightful accounts of Ti-ping atrocities on the march were concocted to harrow the feelings of those simple enough to believe them. It is fortunate that trustworthy evidence exists to prove that the Ti-pings have not yet become the "horde of banditti" England's policy has worked so hard to make them. The Rev. W. McGregor, English Presbyterian Missionary at Amoy (about fourteen miles from Chang-chew), in a letter dated 10th April, 1865, declares that, whilst conquering neighbouring parts of the province by expeditions issuing from Chang-chew,<sup>86</sup> "the Ti-pings had been guilty of no wanton destruction of property or slaughter of the people." Again, in another letter, dated 26th May, 1865, after the revolutionists had retreated inland, he states:—

"Of course many stories are being put in circulation about the cruelties of the Taepings when in possession of Chang-chew; but it must be remembered that these come from Mandarin sources, and thence through the foreign custom-house pass into circulation in the foreign community, while a little investigation often shows them to be quite unfounded. For example, it was reported that the Taepings left Chang-chew a perfect shambles, having massacred all the people that were of no use to take with them, and in corroboration of this some of the foreign community were taken up, and shown the city burning in several places, with numbers of dead bodies lying about; but it has to be kept in mind that, before this the Mandarin troops had been some days in the city, and the remembrance of Soo-chow ought to teach Englishmen, at least, how these days would be

spent. The Chinese have a technical term for a proclamation issued ordering soldiers to desist from *indiscriminate* slaughter and plunder, and I casually got the information from my teacher (who has the means of getting all news circulating in the Yamens), that Chang-chew was in the hands of the Imperialists four or five days before this proclamation was issued. The fact is, that, immediately on the Taepings leaving, the people whom they left (they took a large number with them as baggage-bearers, &c.), endeavoured to escape from it as fast as possible; and we have information from some who have escaped that, before the departure of the rebels no slaughter took place. How the Imperialists have acted in Chang-chew and the surrounding villages will be apparent from the single fact that, since they entered the city, the soldiers have been selling women at four dollars each. No evidence has yet been produced that the Taepings have been guilty of such atrocities as are implied in this statement. A short time ago, in consequence of some disturbances in the Tung-au region, a body of soldiers were detached from the Mandarin force, near Chang-chew, who by their own account burnt over twenty villages and massacred over 2,000 women and children, without meeting with any resistance. They ultimately returned, in consequence of the villagers, farther north, forming a combination for mutual protection, and threatening to join the rebels. We have not heard of an instance of the Taepings acting in such a manner."

It is impossible to tell, at present, whether the Ti-pings may become a scourge to their country, or whether they will again rise into power and importance, and occupy their old position. But the fact must be carefully recorded that, in event of the former deplorable contingency, it is British interference which has made them what they are, and that it must be regarded as the original and responsible cause of all that is or may be objectionable. It is now placed beyond doubt that the Kan-wang is at the head of a great body of Ti-pings, although it is equally certain that other divisions not under his command exist in various directions; but, so long as

he remains in authority, there need be little fear as to the deterioration of the movement. One fact in connection with the retreat from Chang-chew speaks volumes. It seems that when some missionaries visited the place immediately after the Ti-pings had fled, they made the interesting discovery described by Dr. Carnegie (medical missionary) in the following words:—

<sup>87</sup> "Only some two or three of the Christians have been heard of.... A native preacher is amongst the missing. An interesting fact, however, remains to be told in connection with the rebels, and it is this:—That whilst they gutted the heathen temples and utterly demolished the many hundreds of idols with which these temples were stored, they respected the Christian places of worship, and in one of the chapels, where there is a scroll bearing these words, 'The pure religion of Jesus,' some of them added underneath, 'MAY IT SPREAD OVER THE WHOLE EARTH!'"

As Colonel Sykes, M.P., truly observes in a letter upon the above subject, published in the *Star*, December 28th, 1865:—

"These two testimonies, standing unscathed in a desolated city, will fall gratingly upon the memories of those who, with British bayonets and British shot and shell, in violation of good faith and in violation of a commanded neutrality, have aided a Government, which has been characterized for its constant perfidy and cruelty, to defeat a national party, in which, as we see, was not only a germ of Christianity, of probable development into a rich harvest, but which party also constantly had manifested a desire to cultivate friendly relations with foreigners, with a view to the introduction of Western science and art, as contra-distinguished from the Imperial Government, which stupidly and doggedly opposes itself to every proposition for the establishment of railways, telegraphs, the steam navigation of internal waters, and other useful objects."

Since the evacuation of Chang-chew, but little information has been received regarding the movements and whereabouts of the Ti-pings. From the depositions of two foreigners (Mansfield and Baffey), it has been

ascertained that the Kan-wang is in supreme command, nothing whatever being heard of the Tien or Chung Wangs. Besides the force from Chang-chew, and the main body with which it effected a junction, another division seems to have arrived from the city of Kia-ying-chow, in the province of Kiang-si, but it is not stated under what leader. The concentration of these troops was probably caused by the orders of the Kan-wang, who, it would seem, has since led them northward into Kiang-si. Whither they are marching is as yet unknown. It is quite possible that their intention is to join the Nien-fie in the northern provinces, who have again defeated the Imperialists under Tseng-kwo-fan, and seem to be moving in every direction in overwhelming numbers, while one body is especially reported as making a diversion to the south-west.

The men, Mansfield and Baffey, were present at the junction of the Ti-ping forces. The latter, in his deposition, states: "The Kan-wang is about 35 years of age. He is the principal rebel-chief at the present moment.... When I left, the rebels were talking of retreating towards Kiang-si. They have great confidence in the Kan-wang. The latter is an exceedingly clever man, very fond of European ideas, but very distrustful of foreigners"—as well he may be.

Between the Nien-fie league in the north and the Ti-pings in the south, it seems very probable the Manchoo dynasty will ultimately be overthrown. If the Imperialist forces are concentrated in the north, in all other quarters insurrection breaks out, and the Ti-pings rapidly increase their strength and conquests; and so, upon the other hand, when they move against the Ti-pings in the south, the Nien-fie, Mohamedan rebels, &c., gain numberless adherents, and capture city after city with impunity. Every mail brings some dim tidings of disaster to the Tartar cause England has been so wantonly led to support. It is extraordinary that while internal dangers are rapidly increasing, the Manchoos should be fulfilling their anti-foreign intentions

when foreign help alone can save them. A late number of the *China Overland Trade Report*, dated Hong-kong, 31st December, 1865, states:- "Since the late evacuation of the Taku forts much labour and outlay have been expended in strengthening the fortifications; in fact, it is said that when the plan adopted shall be carried out, these forts will be impregnable except to iron-clads. The proceeding is significant when taken in connection with the anti-foreign policy known to be cherished."

Intelligence from China, bearing date February 1st, 1866, announces a Ti-ping victory in the province of Fu-keen, the Imperialists losing their leader, Kwo-sun-liang. The Ti-pings have also recaptured the important city of Kia-ying-chow, which had been evacuated by the third division of the army, at present combined under the Kan-wang's command, before the junction was effected.

At the same time further victorious progress of the Nien-fie is reported, and a large rebel force (supposed to be of that movement) has appeared within 30 miles of Hankow, the great commercial city and treaty port situated some 700 miles up the river Yang-tze-kiang. It would thus seem that a considerable division of the Nien-fie army has been detached on a rapid march to the south-west; at the same time the Ti-pings have moved to the north-west, and captured Kia-ying-chow, so that it is plain, if each force continues its advance, they will shortly meet, which is very likely their intention.

What the consequences will be if the Ti-pings are fortunate and wise enough to effect a junction with the Nien-fie can scarcely admit of a doubt. Without foreign assistance the Imperialists are unable to cope with either of the great rebellions, how much less would they be able to resist the two combined! It only requires such an amalgamation of the two great parties in opposition to the Manchoo rule to cause the native population to rise *en masse*. Each mail brings tidings of fresh outbreaks in every part of the distracted empire, and it is ominous for the present dynasty that the literary

class, the highest in China, are beginning to raise and lead local insurrection, as was the case in December, 1865, at the town of Chin-shan, only 65 miles from Shanghae, a part of the country just pacified by British swords!

"The unfortunate have always been deserted and betrayed," and how much more by those who have guiltily made them unfortunate in the first place! It is therefore easy to understand the nature of the hostility which has been excited in England against the Ti-pings—against the only section of the people of China whom righteous men can look to as affording a prospect of forwarding the true interests and improvement of that vast and beautiful and incalculably rich country.

It is bad to go to war at all; it is highly criminal to make war upon an unoffending neighbour; and it is enormous guilt to use hostilities for the purpose of subduing a free and happy people because they *might* interfere with our profits; but in what words can the double crime of waging war upon mercenary grounds against the cause of liberty and Christianity be expressed? Yet such, unfortunately, is the course which England has pursued by taking part against the Ti-pings.

It is true there is yet some hope that the policy of the Cabinet of her late lamented statesman, Lord Palmerston, may prove a failure. The Chinese Christian patriots have still a chance of successfully defending themselves, and they have strong hope, for their chiefs have repeatedly said, "The Mings took a hundred years to found their dynasty, and possibly so may we, but most assuredly, sooner or later, we shall expel the Tartars and succeed, for the Heavenly Father is with us, and who can triumph against Him?"

Let Englishmen therefore trust that their rulers will in future observe the neutrality they have once more professed, and not again wage an unrighteous war without even declaring it, and in violation of their official pledges. All men whose minds have a spark of philanthropy, civilization, or Christian faith, will wish their Chinese brothers God speed.

Let us trust that, phoenix-like, the Ti-pings may rise from the ashes of their former glory and yet succeed in their great religio-political movement, that they may again print and widely circulate the Holy Bible, which, throughout all their former territory, British bayonets and Manchoo torches have for a time destroyed, and that England will not have to answer for the sin of crushing the first Christian movement in modern Asia, and the last apparent opportunity of Christianizing and liberating China.

While looking forward hopefully to the future of the Ti-pings, because the cause of liberty is theirs, and the cause of the Gospel is theirs also, let it be remembered (as applying to the former phase) that a great man has said:

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"For freedom's battle once begun,  
Bequeathed by bleeding sire to son,  
Though baffled oft, is ever won."

And let it be remembered (as applying to the latter phase) that the Ti-ping movement was originated through acceptance of the Gospel, and that to comfort those who are persecuted for Its sake, it is therein declared:—

"We are troubled on every side, yet not distressed; we are perplexed, but not in despair.

"Persecuted, but not forsaken; cast down, but not destroyed."

## FOOTNOTES:

83. Published in the *Daily News*, August 8, 1865.

84. The italics are ours.

85. "It has been plain from the first, that they were no more like Christians than Mahomet was like a Jew" (p. iv).

86. Published in *The English Presbyterian Messenger*, July 1st and August 1, 1865.

87. See p. 13, "Occasional Paper," No. 10, dated July, 1865, issued with the Tenth Annual Report of the China Mission at Amoy and Swatow, 1864-5.

## APPENDIX A.

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RELIGIOUS PUBLICATIONS WRITTEN BY THE TIEN-WANG  
HUNG-SIU-TSHUEN, AND USED BY THE TI-PINGS.

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### DECALOGUE.

THE TEN CELESTIAL COMMANDS WHICH ARE TO BE  
CONSTANTLY OBSERVED.

#### THE FIRST COMMAND.

THOU SHALT HONOUR AND WORSHIP THE GREAT GOD.

*Remark.*—The great God is the universal Father of all men, in every nation under heaven. Every man is produced and nourished by him: every man is also protected by him: every man ought, therefore, morning and evening, to honour and worship him, with acknowledgments of his goodness. It is a common saying, that Heaven produces, nourishes, and protects men. Also, that being provided with food we must not deceive Heaven. Therefore, whoever does not worship the great God breaks the commands of Heaven.

*The Hymn says:—*

Imperial Heaven, the Supreme God is the true Spirit (God):  
Worship him every morning and evening, and you will be taken up;  
You ought deeply to consider the ten celestial commands,  
And not by your foolishness obscure the right principles of nature.

#### THE SECOND COMMAND.

## THOU SHALT NOT WORSHIP CORRUPT SPIRITS (GODS).

*Remark.*—The great God says, Thou shalt have no other spirits (gods) beside me. Therefore all besides the great God are corrupt spirits (gods), deceiving and destroying mankind; they must on no account be worshipped: whoever worships the whole class of corrupt spirits (gods) offends against the commands of Heaven.

*The Hymn says:*—

Corrupt devils very easily delude the souls of men.  
If you perversely believe in them, you will at last go down to hell.  
We exhort you all, brave people, to awake from your lethargy,  
And early make your peace with your exalted Heavenly Father.

## THE THIRD COMMAND.

### THOU SHALT NOT TAKE THE NAME OF THE GREAT GOD IN VAIN.

*Remark.*—The name of the great God is Jehovah, which men must not take in vain. Whoever takes God's name in vain, and rails against Heaven, offends against this command.

*The Hymn says:*—

Our exalted Heavenly Father is infinitely honourable;  
Those who disobey and profane his name, seldom come to a good end.  
If unacquainted with the true doctrine, you should be on your guard,  
For those who wantonly blaspheme involve themselves in endless crime.

## THE FOURTH COMMAND.

**ON THE SEVENTH DAY, THE DAY OF WORSHIP, YOU SHOULD  
PRAISE THE GREAT GOD FOR HIS GOODNESS.**

*Remark.*—In the beginning the great God made heaven and earth, land and sea, men and things, in six days; and having finished his works on the seventh day, he called it the day of rest (or Sabbath): therefore all the men of the world, who enjoy the blessing of the great God, should on every seventh day especially reverence and worship the great God, and praise him for his goodness.

*The Hymn says:*—

All the happiness enjoyed in the world comes from Heaven;  
It is therefore reasonable that men should give thanks and sing;  
At the daily morning and evening meal there should be  
thanksgiving,  
But on the seventh day, the worship should be more intense.

**THE FIFTH COMMAND.**

**THOU SHALT HONOUR THY FATHER AND THY MOTHER, THAT  
THY DAYS MAY BE PROLONGED.**

*Remark.*—Whoever disobeys his parents breaks this command.

*The Hymn says:*—

History records that Shun honoured his parents to the end of his days,  
Causing them to experience the intensest pleasure and delight:  
August Heaven will abundantly reward all who act thus,  
And do not disappoint the expectation of the authors of their being.

**THE SIXTH COMMAND.**

## THOU SHALT NOT KILL OR INJURE MEN.

*Remark.*—He who kills another kills himself, and he who injures another injures himself. Whoever does either of these breaks the above command.

*The Hymn says:*—

The whole world is one family, and all men are brethren,  
How can they be permitted to kill and destroy one another?  
The outward form and the inward principle are both conferred by  
Heaven:  
Allow every one, then, to enjoy the ease and comfort which he  
desires.

## THE SEVENTH COMMAND.

### THOU SHALT NOT COMMIT ADULTERY OR ANYTHING UNCLEAN.

*Remark.*—All the men in the world are brethren, and all the women in the world are sisters. Among the sons and daughters of the celestial hall the males are on one side and the females on the other, and are not allowed to intermix. Should either men or women practise lewdness they are considered outcasts, as having offended against one of the chief commands of Heaven. The casting of amorous glances, the harbouring of lustful imaginations, the smoking of foreign tobacco (opium), or the singing of libidinous songs must all be considered as breaches of this command.

*The Hymn says:*—

Lust and lewdness constitute the chief transgression,  
Those who practise it become outcasts, and are the objects of pity.

If you wish to enjoy the substantial happiness of heaven,  
It is necessary to deny yourself and earnestly cultivate virtue.

## **THE EIGHTH COMMAND.**

**THOU SHALT NOT ROB OR STEAL.**

*Remark.*—Riches and poverty are determined by the great God; but whosoever robs or plunders the property of others transgresses this command.

*The Hymn says:*—

Rest contented with your station, however poor, and do not steal.  
Robbery and violence are low and abandoned practices.  
Those who injure others really injure themselves.  
Let the noble-minded among you immediately reform.

## **THE NINTH COMMAND.**

**THOU SHALT NOT UTTER FALSEHOOD.**

*Remark.*—All those who tell lies, and indulge in devilish deceits, with every kind of coarse and abandoned talk, offend against this command.

*The Hymn says:*—

Lying discourse and unfounded stories must all be abandoned.  
Deceitful and wicked words are offences against Heaven.  
Much talk will, in the end, bring evil on the speakers.  
It is then much better to be cautious, and regulate one's own mind.

## **THE TENTH COMMAND.**

**THOU SHALT NOT CONCEIVE A COVETOUS DESIRE.**

*Remark.*—When a man looks upon the beauty of another's wife and daughters with covetous desires, or when he regards the elegance of another man's possessions with covetous desires, or when he engages in gambling, he offends against this command.

*The Hymn says:*—

In your daily conduct do not harbour covetous desires.  
When involved in the sea of lust the consequences are very serious.  
The above injunctions were handed down on Mount Sinai;  
And to this day the celestial commands retain all their force.

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"NOTE.—The expression 'corrupt spirits' in the remarks upon the second commandment, rendered by the translator 'gods,' refers probably to the numerous malevolent spirits whom all uneducated Chinese believe to have power over all things noxious to the human race. The gods of thunder, lightning, wind, &c., are the principal of these, but there are also hundreds of inferior spirits whom poor householders believe to be abroad at night, with power, if they so will, to spread pestilence, disaster, and fire, and who consequently receive daily and nightly offerings of prayer and incense from the timid and trembling poor, who dread the exercise of their malevolence."—(*The Taepings in China.*)

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## THE TRIMETRICAL CLASSIC.

EACH LINE IN THE ORIGINAL CONTAINING THREE WORDS,  
AND EACH VERSE FOUR LINES.

The Great God  
Made heaven and earth,  
Both land and sea,

And all things therein.

In six days  
He made the whole;  
Man, the lord of all,  
Was endowed with glory and honour.

Every seventh day worship,  
In acknowledgment of Heaven's favour;  
Let all under Heaven  
Keep their hearts in reverence.

It is said that in former times  
A foreign nation was commanded  
To honour God;  
The nation's name was Israel.

Their twelve tribes  
Removed into Egypt;  
Where God favoured them,  
And their posterity increased.

Then a king arose  
Into whose heart the devil entered;  
He envied their prosperity,  
And inflicted pain and misery.

Ordering the daughters to be preserved,  
But not allowing the sons to live;  
Their bondage was severe

And very difficult to bear.

The Great God  
Viewed them with pity,  
And commanded Moses  
To return to his family.

He commanded Aaron  
To go and meet Moses;  
When both addressed the king,  
And wrought divers miracles.

The king hardened his heart  
And would not let them go;  
Wherefore God was angry  
And sent lice and locusts.

He also sent flies,  
Together with frogs,  
Which entered their palaces  
And crept into their ovens.

When the king still refused,  
The river was turned into blood!  
And the water became bitter  
Throughout all Egypt.

God sent boils and blains,  
With pestilence and murrain;  
He also sent hail,

Which was very grievous.

The king still refusing,  
He slew their first-born;  
When the King of Egypt  
Had no resource,

But let them go  
Out of his land;  
The Great God  
Upheld and sustained them.

By day in a cloud,  
By night in a pillar of fire;  
The Great God  
Himself saved them.

The king hardened his heart,  
And led his armies in pursuit;  
But God was angry  
And displayed his majesty.

Arrived at the Red Sea,  
The waters were spread abroad;  
The people of Israel  
Were very much afraid.

The pursuers overtook them,  
But God stayed their course;  
He himself fought for them,

And the people had no trouble.

He caused the Red Sea  
With its waters to divide;  
To stand up as a wall,  
That they might pass between.

The people of Israel  
Marched with a steady step  
As though on dry ground,  
And thus saved their lives.

The pursuers attempting to cross,  
Their wheels were taken off,  
When the waters closed upon them,  
And they were all drowned.

The Great God  
Displayed his power,  
And the people of Israel  
Were all preserved.

When they came to the desert  
They had nothing to eat;  
But the Great God  
Bade them not be afraid.

He sent down manna,  
For each man a pint;  
It was as sweet as honey,

And satisfied their appetites.

The people lusted much,  
And wished to eat flesh,  
When quails were sent  
By the millions of bushels.

At the Mount Sinai  
Miracles were displayed,  
And Moses was commanded  
To make tables of stone.

The Great God  
Gave his celestial commands,  
Amounting to ten precepts,  
The breach of which would not be forgiven.

He himself wrote them,  
And gave them to Moses;  
The celestial law  
Cannot be altered.

In after ages  
It was sometimes disobeyed,  
Through the devil's temptations  
When men fell into misery.

But the Great God,  
Out of pity to mankind,  
Sent his first-born Son

To come down into the world.

His name is Jesus,  
The Lord and Saviour of men,  
Who redeems them from sin  
By the endurance of extreme misery.

Upon the cross  
They nailed his body,  
Where he shed his precious blood  
To save all mankind.

Three days after his death  
He rose from the dead,  
And during forty days  
He discoursed on heavenly things.

When he was about to ascend,  
He commanded his disciples  
To communicate his gospel  
And proclaim his revealed will.

Those who believe will be saved  
And ascend to heaven;  
But those who do not believe  
Will be the first to be condemned.

Throughout the whole world  
There is only one God,

The Great Lord and Ruler  
Without a second.

---

The Chinese in early ages  
Were regarded by God;  
Together with the foreign states  
They walked in one way.

From the time of Pwan-koo,<sup>88</sup>  
Down to the three dynasties,<sup>89</sup>  
They honoured God,  
As history records.

T'hang of the Shang dynasty,<sup>90</sup>  
And Wan of the Chow,<sup>91</sup>  
Honoured God  
With the intensest feeling.

The inscription on T'hang's bathing-tub  
Inculcated daily renovation of mind;  
And God commanded him  
To assume the government of the empire.

Wan was very respectful  
And intelligently served God;  
So that the people who submitted to him  
Were two out of every three.

When Tsin obtained the empire<sup>92</sup>  
He was infatuated with the genii,

And the nation has been deluded by the devil  
For the last two thousand years.

Suen and Woo of the Han dynasty<sup>93</sup>  
Both followed this bad example,  
So that the mad rebellion increased  
In imitation of Tsin's misrule.

When Woo arrived at old age,  
He repented of his folly,  
And lamented that from his youth up  
He had always followed the wrong road.

Ming of the Han dynasty<sup>94</sup>  
Welcomed the institutions of Buddha,  
And set up temples and monasteries  
To the great injury of the country.

But Hwang of the Sung dynasty  
Was still more mad and infatuated,  
For he changed the name of Shang-te (God)  
Into that of Yuh-hwang (the pearly emperor).<sup>95</sup>

But the Great God  
Is the supreme Lord  
Over all the world,  
The Great Father in heaven.

His name is most honourable,  
To be handed down through distant ages;

Who was this Hwuy,  
That he dared to alter it?

It was meet that this same Hwuy  
Should be taken by the Tartars,  
And together with his son  
Perish in the northern desert.

From Hwuy of the Sung dynasty  
Up to the present day,  
For these seven hundred years  
Men have sunk deeper and deeper in error.

With the doctrine of God  
They have not been acquainted,  
While the king of Hades  
Has deluded them to the utmost.

---

The Great God displays  
Liberality deep as the sea;  
But the devil has injured man  
In a most outrageous manner.

God is therefore displeased  
And has sent his Son<sup>96</sup>  
With orders to come down into the world  
Having first studied the classics.

In the Ting-yeu year (1837)  
He was received up into Heaven,

Where the affairs of Heaven  
Were clearly pointed out to him.

The great God  
Personally instructed him,  
Gave him odes and documents,  
And communicated to him the true doctrine.

God also gave him a seal,  
And conferred upon him a sword  
Connected with authority  
And majesty irresistible.

He bade him, together with the elder brother,  
Namely Jesus,  
To drive away impish fiends  
With the co-operation of angels.

There was one who looked on with envy,  
Namely, the king of Hades,  
Who displayed much malignity  
And acted like a devilish serpent.

But the great God,  
With a high hand,  
Instructed his Son  
To subdue this fiend,

And having conquered him,  
To show him no favour;  
And in spite of his envious eye

He damped all his courage.

Having overcome the fiend,  
He returned to Heaven,  
Where the great God  
Gave him great authority.

The celestial mother was kind  
And exceedingly gracious,  
Beautiful and noble in the extreme,  
Far beyond all compare.

The celestial elder brother's wife  
Was virtuous and very considerate,  
Constantly exhorting the elder brother  
To do things deliberately.

The great God,  
Out of love to mankind,  
Again commissioned his Son  
To come down into the world.

And when he sent him down,  
He charged him not to be afraid;  
I am with you, said he,  
To superintend everything.

In the Mow-shin year (1848)  
The Son was troubled and distressed,  
When the great God

Appeared on his behalf.

Bringing Jesus with him,  
They both came down into the world,  
Where he instructed his Son  
How to sustain the weight of government.

God has set up his Son  
To endure for ever,  
To defeat corrupt machinations  
And to display majesty and authority.

Also to judge the world,  
To divide the righteous from the wicked,  
And consign them to the misery of hell,  
Or bestow on them the joys of heaven.

Heaven manages everything,  
Heaven sustains the whole;  
Let all beneath the sky  
Come and acknowledge the new monarch.

Little children,  
Worship God,  
Keep his commandments,  
And do not disobey.

Let your minds be refined,  
And be not depraved,  
The great God

Constantly surveys you.

You must refine yourselves well,  
And not be depraved:  
Vice willingly practised  
Is the first step to misery.

To insure a good end,  
You must make a good beginning:  
An error of a hair's breadth  
May lead to a discrepancy of a thousand li.

Be careful about little things,  
And watch the minute springs of action:  
The great God  
Is not to be deceived.

Little children,  
Arouse your energies:  
The laws of high heaven  
Admit not of infraction.

Upon the good blessings descend,  
And miseries on the wicked;  
Those who obey Heaven are preserved,  
And those who disobey perish.

The great God  
Is a spiritual Father;  
All things whatever

Depend on him.

The great God  
Is the Father of our spirits:  
Those who devoutly serve him  
Will obtain blessings.

Those who obey the fathers of their flesh  
Will enjoy longevity;  
Those who requite their parents  
Will certainly obtain happiness.

Do not practise lewdness,  
Nor any uncleanness;  
Do not tell lies,  
Do not kill and slay.

Do not steal,  
Do not covet:  
The great God  
Will strictly carry out his laws.

Those who obey Heaven's commands  
Will enjoy celestial happiness;  
Those who are grateful for divine favours  
Will receive divine support.

Heaven blesses the good  
And curses the bad:  
Little children!  
Maintain correct conduct.

The correct are men,  
The corrupt are imps:  
Little children!  
Seek to avoid disgrace.

God loves the upright,  
And he hates the vicious:  
Little children!  
Be careful to avoid error.

The great God  
Sees everything;  
If you wish to enjoy happiness,  
Refine and correct yourselves.

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### **ODE FOR YOUTH.**

EACH LINE IN THE ORIGINAL CONTAINING FIVE WORDS,  
AND EACH VERSE FOUR LINES.

#### **ON THE WORSHIP OF GOD.**

Let the true Spirit, the great God,  
Be honoured and adored by all nations;  
Let all the inhabitants of the world  
Unite in his worship, morning and evening.

Above and below, look where you may,  
All things are imbued with the Divine favour.

At the beginning, in six days,  
All things were created, perfect and complete.

Whether circumcised or uncircumcised,  
Who is not produced by God?  
Reverently praise the Divine favour  
And you will obtain eternal glory.

#### ON REVERENCE FOR JESUS.

Jesus, his first-born Son,  
Was in former times sent by God:  
He willingly gave his life to redeem us from sin;  
Of a truth his merits are pre-eminent.

His cross was hard to bear;  
The sorrowing clouds obscured the sun.  
The adorable Son, the honoured of heaven,  
Died for you, the children of men.  
Died for you, the children of men.

After his resurrection he ascended to heaven;  
Resplendent in glory, he wields authority supreme.  
In him we know that we may trust  
To secure salvation and ascend to Heaven.

#### ON THE HONOUR DUE TO PARENTS.

As grain is stored against a day of need,  
So men bring up children to tend their old age;  
A filial son begets filial children—  
The recompense here is truly wonderful.

Do you ask how this our body  
Is to attain to length of years?  
Keep the fifth command, we say,  
And honour and emolument will descend upon you.

#### ON THE COURT.

The imperial court is an awe-inspiring spot,  
Let those about it dread celestial majesty;  
Life and death emanate from Heaven's son,  
Let every officer avoid disobedience.

#### ON THE DUTIES OF THE SOVEREIGN.

When one man presides over the government,  
All nations become settled and tranquillized:  
When the sovereign grasps the sceptre of power,  
Calumny and corruption sink and disappear.

#### ON THE DUTIES OF MINISTERS.

When the prince is upright, ministers are true;  
When the sovereign is intelligent, ministers will be honest.

E and Chow are models worthy of imitation:  
They acted uprightly and aided the government.

#### ON THE DUTIES OF FAMILIES.

The members of one family being intimately related,  
They should live in joy and harmony;  
When the feeling of concord unites the whole,  
Blessings will descend upon them from above.

#### ON THE DUTIES OF A FATHER.

When the main beam is straight, the joists will be regular;  
When a father is strict, his duty will be fulfilled:  
Let him not provoke his children to wrath,  
And a delightful harmony will pervade the dwelling.

#### ON THE DUTIES OF A MOTHER.

Ye mothers, beware of partiality,  
But tenderly instruct your children in virtue;  
When you are a fit example to your daughters,  
The happy feeling will reach to the clouds.

#### ON THE DUTIES OF SONS.

Sons, be patterns to your wives;  
Consider obedience to parents the chief duty;  
Do not listen to the tattle of women,  
And you will not be estranged from your own flesh.

#### ON THE DUTIES OF DAUGHTERS-IN-LAW.

Ye that are espoused into other families,  
Be gentle and yielding, and your duty is fulfilled;  
Do not quarrel with your sisters-in-law,  
And thereby vex the old father and mother.

#### ON THE DUTIES OF ELDER BROTHERS.

Elder brothers, instruct your juniors;  
Remember well your common parentage;  
Should they commit a trifling fault,  
Bear with it and treat them indulgently.

#### ON THE DUTIES OF YOUNGER BROTHERS.

Disparity in years is ordered by Heaven;  
Duty to seniors consists in respect.  
When younger brothers obey Heaven's dictates,  
Happiness and honour will be their portion.

#### ON THE DUTIES OF ELDER SISTERS.

Elder sisters, instruct your younger sisters,  
Study improvement and fit yourselves for Heaven.  
Should you occasionally visit your former homes,  
Get the little ones around you and tell them what is right.

#### ON THE DUTIES OF YOUNGER SISTERS.

Girls, obey your elder brothers and sisters,  
Be obliging and avoid arrogance,  
Carefully give yourselves to self-improvement,  
And mind and keep the Ten Commandments.

#### ON THE DUTIES OF HUSBANDS.

Unbending firmness is natural to the man,  
Love for a wife should be qualified by prudence;  
And should the lioness roar,  
Let not terror fill the mind.

#### ON THE DUTIES OF WIVES.

Women, be obedient to your three male relatives,  
And do not disobey your lords:  
When hens crow in the morning,  
Sorrow may be expected in the family.

#### ON THE DUTIES OF ELDER BROTHERS' WIVES.

What is the duty of an elder brother's wife,  
And what her most appropriate deportment?  
Let her cheerfully harmonize with younger brothers' wives,  
And she will never do amiss.

#### ON THE DUTIES OF YOUNGER BROTHERS' WIVES.

Younger brothers' wives should respect their elder brothers' wives,  
In humility honouring their elder brothers;  
In all things yielding to their senior sisters-in-law,  
Which will result in harmony superior to music.

#### ON THE DUTIES OF THE MALE SEX.

Let every man have his own partner  
And maintain the duties of the human relations  
Firm and unbending; his duties lie from home,  
But he should avoid such things as cause suspicion.

#### ON THE DUTIES OF THE FEMALE SEX.

The duty of woman is to maintain chastity;  
She should shun proximity to the other sex;  
Sober and decorous, she should keep at home:  
Thus she can secure happiness and felicity.

#### ON CONTRACTING MARRIAGES.

Marriages are the result of some relation in a former state  
The disposal of which rests with Heaven.  
When contracted, affection should flow in a continued stream,  
And the association should be uninterrupted.

#### ON MANAGING THE HEART.

For the purpose of controlling the whole body,  
God has given to man an intelligent mind;  
When the heart is correct, it becomes the true regulator  
To which the senses and members are all obedient.

#### ON MANAGING THE EYES.

The various corruptions first delude the eye;  
But if the eye be correct, all evil will be avoided:  
Let the pupil of the eye be sternly fixed,  
And the light of the body will shine up to heaven.

#### ON MANAGING THE EAR.

Whatever sounds assail my ear,  
Let me listen to all in silence:  
Deaf to the entrance of evil,  
Previous to good, in order to be eminently intelligent.

#### ON MANAGING THE MOUTH.

The tongue is a prolific source of strife,  
And a multitude of words leads to mischief;  
Let me not be defiled by lying and corrupt discourse,  
Careful and cautious, let reason be my guide.

#### ON MANAGING THE HAND.

To cut off the hand whereby we are dragged to evil  
Appears a determination worthy of high praise;  
The duty of the hand is to manifest respect,  
But for improper objects move not a finger.

#### ON MANAGING THE FEET.

Let the feet walk in the path of rectitude,  
And ever follow it, without treading awry;  
For the countless by-paths of life  
Lead only to mischief in the end.

#### THE WAY TO GET TO HEAVEN.

Honour and disgrace come from a man's self;  
But men should exert themselves  
To keep the Ten Commandments,  
And they will enjoy bliss in Heaven.

## FOOTNOTES:

88. Pwan-koo, the first man, was, according to Chinese mythology, the offspring of Chaos, and the creator of the earth, sun, moon, and stars.

89. The period of the three dynasties began B.C. 2207, and ended B.C. 247.

90. B.C. 1766.

91. B.C. 1121. Both these emperors (T'hang and Wan) are stated by Du Halde to have worshipped Heaven.

92. B.C. 247.

93. B.C. 74—A.D. 25.

94. A.D. 58. The emperor Ming, having heard that the true religion was to be found in the west, despatched (A.D. 66) ambassadors into Northern India, who, finding the majority of the people in that region to be worshippers of Fo, brought back with them several Bonzes in order to spread the faith; and thus Buddhism was introduced into China.

95. This emperor (Hwuy) was a firm believer in the superstitions of the Taouists. A.D. 1101—1126.

96. Hung-siu-tsuen.

## APPENDIX B.

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### EXPORT OF TEA AND SILK FROM CHINA,

*Showing the State of the Trade before, during, and after the Occupation of the producing Districts by the Ti-pings.*

[From the following Figures the Effect of their Presence upon Commerce may be judged.]

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TOTAL EXPORTS during the Five Years immediately preceding the Outbreak of the Ti-ping Revolution.

	DATE OF EXPORT.	TEA.	RAW SILK.
	Pounds.	Bales.	
Year	1845–1846	57,580,000	18,600
"	1846–1847	53,360,000	19,000
"	1847–1848	47,690,000	21,377
"	1848–1849	47,240,000	17,228
"	1849–1850	53,960,000	16,134

*Remarks.* These returns are quoted by Col. Sykes, M.P., in his pamphlet on "The Progress of Trade with China, 1833–1860," and are copied from the *Friend of China*, which journal, then established at Canton, published a

tabular form, showing the total exports (exclusive of Ningpo) from all Treaty Ports, 1843 to 1858.

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TOTAL EXPORTS during the First Three Years of the Revolution, while the Ti-pings were steadily progressing northward.

	DATE OF EXPORT.	TEA.	RAW SILK.
		Pounds.	Bales.
Year	1850–1851	64,020,000	22,143
"	1851–1852	65,130,000	23,040
"	1852–1853	72,900,000	25,571

*Remarks.* It will be seen that the progress of the rebellion did not interfere with trade, which continued steadily increasing.

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TOTAL EXPORTS from date of Capture of Nankin, and many producing Districts, by the Ti-pings, to 1859.

	DATE OF EXPORT.	TEA.	RAW SILK.
		Pounds.	Bales.
Year	1853–1854	77,210,000	61,984
"	1854–1855	86,500,000	51,486
"	1855–1856	91,930,000	50,489
"	1856–1857	61,460,000	74,215
"	1857–1858	76,740,000	60,736

*Remarks.* It will be seen that the exports, although to a certain extent coming from, or passing through, Ti-ping territory, continued regularly

increasing, especially in the case of the silk trade.

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TOTAL EXPORTS during the Two Years preceding the Capture, of the entire Silk, and about half of the Tea, Districts.

	DATE OF EXPORT.	TEA.	RAW SILK.
		Pounds.	Bales.
Year	1858–1859	65,789,792	81,136
"	1859–1860	85,938,493	69,137

*Remarks.* These returns are carefully copied from the bi-monthly issues of *The China Overland Trade Report*.

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TOTAL EXPORTS during the entire Occupation of the Silk Districts.

	DATE OF EXPORT.	TEA.	RAW SILK.
		Pounds.	Bales.
Year	1860–1861	87,220,754	88,754
"	1861–1862	107,351,649	73,322
"	1862–1863	118,692,138	83,264

*Remarks.* The Ti-pings captured Soo-chow, the capital of the silk districts (and shortly after the *whole* of that valuable country), in the month of May, 1860. It will be seen that, instead of injuring the silk trade, at the termination of the next business year season 1860–61, commencing June 1, 1860, and ending 31st May, 1861 they had *increased* it to 88,754 bales, the greatest number ever exported from China in one year; to 73,322, season 1861–62; and 83,264, season 1862–63; whilst the export of tea, mostly from regions in their possession, was raised from 66,000,000 pounds in

1860, to 119,000,000 in 1863! These figures cover the period of entire occupation of the silk districts by the Ti-pings, and their occupation of the tea districts of Fy-chow, Taeping-hien, and others in the provinces of Ngan-whui, Che-kiang, Kiang-si, and Kiang-su, and extend to the end of May, 1863.

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TOTAL EXPORTS *since* the Ti-pings have been driven from the Silk Districts.

	DATE OF EXPORT.	TEA.	RAW SILK.
		Pounds.	Bales.
Year	1863–1864	119,689,238	46,863
"	1864–1865	121,236,870	41,128

*Remarks.* These returns prove, better than any history or argument, who were the devastators of the former Ti-ping territory. While the revolutionists held and governed the valuable silk districts, that article was produced and exported in larger quantities than had ever been known before. After the British had made the producing districts the theatre of the war, and finally succeeded in driving the Ti-pings out, the supply of silk at once fell to half the export during the Ti-ping dominion, and the second year after to still less.

## APPENDIX C.

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### MEMORANDUM OF TI-PINGS KILLED DURING THE BRITISH HOSTILITIES AGAINST THEM.

Where Killed.	Date.	By what Forces.	Number Killed.	British, or Allied, Casualties.
Before Shanghae,	August, 1860.	British and French.	300	Nil.
while striving to peaceably negotiate.				
Near the city of	December, 1861.	Ward's disciplined	2,000	100 killed and wounded.
Soong-kong (twenty miles from Shanghae).		Contingent.		
At the capture of the	21st February, 1862.	British and French.	150	1 killed by a stray shot.
village Kao-kiau.				

Where Killed.	Date.	By what Forces.	Number Killed.	British, or Allied, Casualties.
During the capture of stockades at Ming-hong.	1st March, 1862.	Ditto.	1,300	Nil.
At capture of Wong-ka-dzu stockades.	4th April, 1862.	Ditto.	600	1 killed, 1 wounded.
Capture of the village of Lu-ka-kong.	5th April, 1862.	Admiral Hope's and Ward's forces.	300	Nil.
At the village of Che-poo.	17th April, 1862.	British, French,	900	Nil.
		and Ward's forces.		
At the capture of the city of Kah-ding.	1st May, 1862.	Allied British, French, and Imperialists.	3,500	5 or 6 wounded.
At the capture of the city of Tsing-poo.	12th May, 1862.	Ditto.	2,500	2 killed, 10 wounded.

Where Killed.	Date.	By what Forces.	Number Killed.	British, or Allied, Casualties.
At the capture of the village of Na-joor.	17th May, 1862.	British and French.	500	French admiral killed, 16 men wounded.
At the capture of the town of Cho-lin.	20th May, 1862.	Ditto.	3,000	1 killed, 4 wounded.
During an engagement near Kah-ding.	31st May, 1862.	British naval & military forces.	300	1 killed, 4 wounded.
Upon the expulsion of the Ti-pings from Ningpo.	10th May 1862.	British, French, and piratical flotilla.	150	3 killed, 23 wounded.
During the recapture of Kah-ding, Tsing-poo,	June, July & August, 1862.	British, French and Imperialists.	5,000	About 100, all told.
Cho-lin, Chee-poo, &c.,				
by the Ti-pings.				
During the operations	August, 1862,	Force under	20,000	About 2,000 or 3,000.

Where Killed.	Date.	By what Forces.	Number Killed.	British, or Allied, Casualties.
in the Ningpo district,	to the end of 1863.	Capt. R. Dew, R.N.,		
leading to the capture of		Anglo-Manchoo,		
Tse-kie, Yu-yaon, Fung-wha,		Franco-Manchoo,		
Shou-sing, and other cities.		and Imperialist troops.		
At the second capture	24th October, 1862.	British, French,	1,500	4 killed, 20 wounded.
of Kah-ding.		and Imperialists.		
Engagement during	November, 1862.	British, Ward's	3,000	5 killed, 15 wounded.
Ti-ping attempt to		force, and Imperialists.		
recapture Kah-ding.				
During the repulse of	14th February, 1863.	Anglo-Manchoo	1,000	2,500 killed & wounded.
the attack on Tait-san.		Contingent		
		and Imperial troops.		

Where Killed.	Date.	By what Forces.	Number Killed.	British, or Allied, Casualties.
Capture of Fu-shan village, and relief of Chang-zu.	6th April, 1863.	Filibuster <i>General</i>	1,200	2 killed, 3 wounded.
Capture of the city of Tait-san.	2nd May, 1863.	British, Gordon's force.	2,000	200 <i>hors de combat.</i>
Massacre of Ti-pings	30th May, 1863.	The Anglo-Manchoo	3,000	Gordon's force, 2 killed
during their evacuation of the city of Quin-san.		disciplined and foreign-officered		and 5 drowned; Imperialist loss, about 300.
		Contingent, and		
		an Imperialist arm.		
During the retreat of the Chung-wang's army from the	June, 1863.	Died of starvation, made prisoners and	40,000	Loss of Imperialist troops, 2,000 to 3,000.

Where Killed.	Date.	By what Forces.	Number Killed.	British, or Allied, Casualties.
northern provinces; caused by		executed by Imperialists,		
the British hostilities in the		and killed in action.		
neighbourhood of				
Shanghae and Ningpo.				
At the capture of	29th July, 1863.	Anglo-Manchoo	150	1 killed, 15 wounded.
Wo-kong city		Contingent and		
		Imperialists.		
Engagements at	5th, 6th, & 7th	Ditto.	1,000	50 to 100.
Kah-poo.	Aug. 1863.			
Engagements in the	October, 1863.	Ditto.	3,500	About 200.
neighbourhood of Wo-kong.				
Engagements before	September,	English, French,	6,000	About 2,000.
Soo-chow, and capture	October,	and other disciplined		

Where Killed.	Date.	By what Forces.	Number Killed.	British, or Allied, Casualties.
of stockades outside	November,	Contingents, assisted by a		
the city.	and December.	large Imperialist army.		
The Soo-chow massacre	3rd December,	Imperialists. Estimated	30,000	Nil.
upon capture of the city.	and subsequent days.	by both Imps. &		
		Ti-Pings at this No.		
Engagements around	November &	Ditto.	4,000	5,000.
Wu-see and Chang-chow-foo.	December.			
Upon occupation of Wu-see	12th December.	Contingents and	6,000	Nil.
(civilians put to death).		Imperialists		
Capture of Yih-sing.	3rd or 4th	English	500	About a dozen casualties.
	March, 1864.	Contingent.		

Where Killed.	Date.	By what Forces.	Number Killed.	British, or Allied, Casualties.
Defeat of Gordon's	20th March, 1864.	Ditto.	600	About 150.
force before Kin-tang.				
Defeat of Gordon's	30th March, 1864.	Ditto.	100	About 207.
force at Hwa-soo.				
Assaults upon Hang-chow	Jan., Feb.; and	English & French	5,000	Loss of Contingents, 600;
(capital of Che-kiang),	Mar. 2nd, and 29th;	Contingents, and several		Imperialists, 3,000.
capture of Fo-yang, and other	April and May, 1864.	large Imperialist armies.		
cities in the same district.				
Massacre of non-combatants	End of March, 1864.	Imperialists and	7,000	Loss of Imperilists and
after capture of Kar-sing-foo.		detachments of English		detachment under Col.

Where Killed.	Date.	By what Forces.	Number Killed.	British, or Allied, Casualties.
		Contingent.		Bailey during the siege, 1000.
Defeat of Tipings,	11th April, 1864.	Imperialists and	8,000	Loss of Allies, 100.
and massacre of prisoners,		English Contingent		
at the village of Hwa-soo.		under Gordon.		
Repulse of Imperialist	24th and 25th	Ditto.	3,500	427 of Contingent,
assaults upon Chang-chow-foo.	April, 1864.			1,500 Imperialists.
Capture of Chang-chow,	11th May, 1864.	Ditto.	About 20,000	7 of Contingent,
massacre of garrison				300 Imperialists.
and inhabitants.				
During the capture of	May to September,	Principally Imperialists,	About 10,000	2,000 or 3,000.
Tan-yang, Kin-tang, Ly-hong,	1864.	assisted by all		
and all other Ti-ping towns,		foreign Contingents		

Where Killed.	Date.	By what Forces.	Number Killed.	British, or Allied, Casualties.
besides the districts		except Gordon's.		
in which they are situated,				
subsequent to the fall				
of Chang-chow-foo.				
During the siege of	Ditto.	Imperialists	70,000	Nil.
Nankin about 70,000		advised by Gordon,		
people perished from famine within its walls.		assisted by French officers.		
Killed during the siege.	Ditto.	Ditto.	10,000	5,000 to 10,000.
Massacred after the	18th & 19th July,		30,000	Very small.
capture of the city.	and subsequent days.			
Killed during the siege	January to	Imperialists and	15,000	9,000 to 10,000.

Where Killed.	Date.	By what Forces.	Number Killed.	British, or Allied, Casualties.
and fall of Hoo-chow-foo.	September, 1864.	French Contingents.		
A rough estimate of the number	August, 1860,	Imperialists, English,	50,000	Much less.
of people killed during all the	to September, 1864.	& French.		
actions not recorded, captures				
of villages, skirmishes, &c.,				
which were innumerable.				
To the above may be added			2,500,000	
<i>at least</i> 2,000,000 to 3,000,000				
people who perished from the				
terrible famine occasioned,				

Where Killed.	Date.	By what Forces.	Number Killed.	British, or Allied, Casualties.
during the years 1863 and 4,				
by the allied operations, whilst				
the Ti-pings were being driven				
from their territories, and the				
whole country so utterly				
desolated as to be covered				
with the bodies of the starved				
and dying.				
TOTAL NUMBER OF TI-PINGS KILLED AND DESTROYED BY THE BRITISH INTERVENTION	2,872,550			



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