Exercises 7

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Problem 1

a)

The derivative of x, y are zero at equilibrium/fixed point:

$$0 = x(a - by) \tag{1}$$

$$0 = y(-c + dx) \tag{2}$$

It's easy to see that: (0,0) and $(\frac{c}{d},\frac{a}{b})$ are the fixed points.

b)

The Jacobian of the RHS:

$$J = \begin{bmatrix} a - by & -bx \\ dy & -c + dx \end{bmatrix}$$
 (3)

For the non-trivial fixed points:

$$J = \begin{bmatrix} a - b\frac{a}{b} & -b\frac{c}{d} \\ d\frac{a}{b} & -c + d\frac{c}{d} \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} 0 & \frac{-bc}{d} \\ \frac{ad}{b} & 0 \end{bmatrix}$$
 (4)

Eigenvalues can be calculated easily: $\lambda_1 = i\sqrt{ac}$, $\lambda_2 = -i\sqrt{ac}$. As shown by the eigenvalues which both have a zero real part. This indicates that the equiblirum is not attriactive and is not repulsive.

Due to the fact that the eigenvalues have a non-zero imaginary part, the system will now oscillate a with a period of \sqrt{ac}

c)

When solving this question, we consulted this lecture note as well as some other books.

Consider the replicator equation in n variables:

$$\dot{x_i} = x_i \left(r_i + \sum_j a_{ij} x_j \right), \quad i = 1, \dots, n+1$$
 (5)

This can be re-written into:

$$\dot{x}_i = x_i \left((\mathbf{A} \mathbf{x})_i - \mathbf{x} \cdot \mathbf{A} \mathbf{x} \right), \quad i = 1, \dots, n+1$$
 (6)

We have x_i denoting the density of *i*-th species and r_i denoting the *i*-th species growth rate. Let a_{ij} denote the interaction between *i*-th and *j*-th and the matrix \boldsymbol{A} with entry a_{ij} be the interaction matrix. With the last row of \boldsymbol{A} being zeros.

Define $y_{n+1} = 1$ and define a mapping from \boldsymbol{y} to \boldsymbol{x} given by:

$$y_i = \frac{y_i}{\sum_{j=1}^n y_j}, \quad i = 1, \dots, n+1$$
 (7)

The inverse mapping from x to y given by:

$$x_i = \frac{x_i}{x_n}, \quad i = 1, \dots, n+1$$
 (8)

Since $(\mathbf{A}\mathbf{x})_n = 0$ and the ODE systems on x_i above. we have:

$$\dot{y}_i = \left(\frac{x_i}{x_n}\right) \cdot ((\mathbf{A}\mathbf{x})_i - (\mathbf{A}\mathbf{x})_n) \tag{9}$$

$$=y_i\left(\sum a_{ij}x_j\right) \tag{10}$$

$$= y_i \left(\sum_{j=1}^{n+1} a_{ij} y_i \right) x_n \quad \text{Since } x_j = y_j \cdot x_n \tag{11}$$

$$= y_i(a_{in} + \sum_{j=1}^n a_{ij}y_j) \quad x_n \text{removed}$$
(12)

Problem 2

a)

A matrix is called a stochastics matrix if

- 1. it is a square matrix
- $2. \ 0 \leq A_{ij} \leq 1, \quad \forall i, j$
- 3. $\sum_{j} A_{ij} = 1$, $\forall i, j$
- (1) and (2) is trivial since transition can be made from any state to another and hence the square matrix. As $p, q, 1-p, 1-p \in [0, 1]$, (2) is also fulfilled.

By simple calculation, it is not hard to see that the row of matrix M equals to 1.

b)

To find the stationary distribution of the transition, let x_t be the distribution after t transition.

If x stated in the question were the stationary distribution,

$$\lim_{t \to \infty} x_t \cdot M = x \tag{13}$$

To verify (just the first component of x_t for simplicity, denoted by x_t^1) Provided that $x_t = (s_1s_2, s_1(1 - s_2), (1 - s_1)s_2, (1 - s_1)(1 - s_2))$

$$x_{t+1}^1 = x_t^1 \cdot M (14)$$

$$= s_1 s_2 \cdot p_1 p_2 + s_1 (1 - s_2) \cdot q_1 p_2 + (1 - s_1) s_2 \cdot p_1 q_2 + (1 - s_1) (1 - s_2) \cdot q_1 q_2 \tag{15}$$

$$= s_1 s_2 \left(p_1 p_2 - q_1 p_2 + p_1 q_2 + q_1 q_2 \right) s_1 q_1 p_2 + s_2 p_1 q_2 - (s_1 + s_2) q_1 q_2 + q_1 q_2 \tag{16}$$

$$= s_1 s_2 r_1 r_2 + s_1 q_1 r_2 + s_2 q_2 r_1 + q_1 q_2 \tag{17}$$

$$= \left| \left((q_2 r_1 + q_1)(q_1 r_2 + q_2) r_1 r_2 \right) + \left((q_2 r_1 + q_1) r_2 q_1 (1 - r_1 r_2) \right) \right|$$

$$\tag{18}$$

$$+\left((q_1r_2+q_2)r_1q_2(1-r_1r_2)\right)+\left((1-r_1r_2)^2q_1q_2\right)\right]\cdot\frac{1}{(1-r_1r_2)^2}$$
(19)

$$= \left[\left(q_2^2 r_1^2 r_2^2 + q_2^2 r_1^2 r_2 + q_1 q_2 r_2^2 r_1 + q_1 q_2 r_1 r_2 \right) + \left(q_1 q_2 r_1 r_2 + q_1^2 r_2 - q_1 q_2 r_1^2 r_2^2 \right) \right]$$

$$(20)$$

$$+\left(q_1q_2r_1r_2+q_2^2r_1-q_1q_2r_1^2r_2^2-q_2^2r_1^2r_2\right)+\left(q_1q_2-2q_1q_2r_1r_2+q_1q_2r_1^2r_2^2\right)\right]\cdot\frac{1}{(1-r_1r_2)^2}\tag{21}$$

$$=\frac{q_1q_2r_1r_2+q_1^2r_2+q_1q_2+q_2^2r_1}{(1-r_1r_2)^2} \tag{22}$$

$$=s_1s_2\tag{23}$$

c)

It is easy to see this strategy is tit-for-tat. From the results from (b), we can show the expected payoffs for both players with the help of s_1, s_2

In the setting of strategy $S_1(1,0)$,

$$p_1 = 1 \tag{24}$$

$$q_1 = 0 (25)$$

$$s_1 = \frac{q_2}{1 + q_2 - p_2} \tag{26}$$

$$s_2 = \frac{q_2}{1 + q_2 - p_2} \tag{27}$$

It is easy to see that $s_1 = s_2$ and hence the expected payoff at the stationary distribution of the correspounding Markov chain is the same for both players.

d)

To calculate the expected payoff for S_1 against S_2 , calculate s_1 and s_2 ,

$$s_1 = \frac{\frac{1}{4}(1-0) + 0}{1 - (1-0)(1-\frac{1}{4})} = 1$$
 (28)

$$s_2 = \frac{0(1 - \frac{1}{4}) + \frac{1}{4}}{1 - (1 - 0)(1 - \frac{1}{4})} = 1 \tag{29}$$

The expected paoff at the stationary distribution:

$$E(S_1, S_2) = Rs_1s_2 + Ss_1(1 - s_2) + T(1 - s_1)s_2 + P(1 - s_1)(1 - s_2) = 3$$

The expected payoff for this game with S_1, S_2 is 3.

Code is available on github repo: (https://github.com/wyq977/evolutionary-dynamics-2019)