

Skill-Biased Reallocation^{*}

Fergal Hanks

[Click for most recent version](#)

Abstract

Workers displaced by the reallocation of labour demand across industries suffer persistent earnings losses, in a large part due to higher unemployment risk. This paper quantifies the aggregate unemployment implications of a reallocation of labour demand. I develop a search and matching model with multiple industries and industry specific skill that is calibrated to the US economy. In the model a reallocation shock leads to up to a 0.8 percentage points rise in unemployment. The combination of industry specific skill and the substitutability between workers of different skill levels are key to this result. A policy of subsidies for vacancy posting can reduce this rise but only when targeted by skill level.

^{*}I am indebted to Matthias Doepke, Matthew Rognlie, George-Marios Angeletos, and Guido Lorenzoni for their support and guidance. I would also like to thank Matias Bayas-Erazo, Kirill Borusyak, Diego Cid, Kwok Yan Chiu, Masao Fukui, John Grigsby, Joao Guerrerio, Jonathon Hazell, Joao Monteiro, Laura Murphy, Ethan Ilzetzki for comments

1 Introduction

Many economic shocks, such as automation and trade, cause the reallocation of labor demand across industries. In response, displaced workers move to industries with increasing labor demand in search of higher wages and better employment prospects. Recent papers in macroeconomics [Huckfeldt \(2022\)](#) and trade [Traiberman \(2019\)](#) have emphasized the importance of human capital in explaining the income losses of displaced workers. However, it has not been so prominent in the case of aggregate unemployment effects of reallocation. This is despite the aggregate skill destruction that occurs when there is industry specific skills. Furthermore the impact of reallocation may vary with the degree of skills specificity. When reallocation occurs across industries with a highly specific skills the magnitude of destruction of aggregate human capital will be greater.

In this paper, I show that skills indeed matter, but a second essential factor is the degree of substitutability between workers with different levels of industry-specific skills. If the inputs of skilled workers are complementary to the inputs of unskilled workers, then reallocation will increase unemployment. This is because the entry of workers into the industry increases the supply of unskilled workers. Then the marginal product of the entering workers declines due to their complementarity with skilled workers and slows the rate at which these workers are hired. In contrast, if skilled workers and unskilled workers are close substitutes the industry can absorb new workers quickly.

Thus the effect of reallocation on unemployment will be small.

To assess the quantitative importance of this mechanism I build a quantitative search and matching model with multiple industries. Workers accumulate industry-specific skill while employed in a stochastic manner. If a worker switches industries, they lose their accumulated skill. This acts as a mobility friction as workers who have accumulated skill are less likely to move as they would lose the wage premium associated with their accumulated skill. Then, instead of assuming perfect substitutability, I assume the industry-level production function that has constant elasticity of substitution over workers of different skill levels. A low elasticity of substitution corresponds with the case where skilled workers are doing different and complementary work to that of unskilled workers.

In the model, I allow for four industries, two of which have highly specific skills and two of which have less specific skills. To calibrate the model, I use heterogeneity in the observed returns to industry tenure and transition probabilities across industries. I target the industries I label high skill specificity to have higher returns to tenure and lower transition probabilities. The calibration results in the high-skill specificity industries having a higher wage differential between skilled and unskilled workers. It, however, has a lower wage for unskilled workers to offset the higher returns to tenure.

I use the quantitative model to assess the impact of reallocation on aggregate unemployment. I formally model this as a shock that raises productivity in some industries and lowers it in others. These changes are such that, in

the long run, aggregate employment is unchanged. The magnitude of the productivity shocks is set to match the average decadal dispersion in industry share growth rates. I find the shock leads to a rise in unemployment of up to 0.8 percentage points. Unemployment primarily occurs for skilled workers in the shrinking industry and unskilled workers in the growing industries. Skilled workers in the declining sector experience reduced marginal product and thus unemployment. This decline is due to the productivity shock and the outflows of unskilled workers. They stay, however, as switching to the growing industry would mean a loss of skill and the associated wage premium. Unskilled workers in the growing industry have a declining marginal product due to an influx of workers from other industries. Despite the possibility of unemployment, workers are attracted by the potential for high wages if they can acquire skill.

The elasticity of substitution between workers of different skill levels in production is a key determinant of the magnitude. Taking this elasticity to infinity which is the case of perfect substitutability, the effect of reallocation on unemployment becomes negligible. As the elasticity of substitution increases, the marginal product of workers of different skill levels is less dependent on the relative employment of workers of different skill levels. Thus when unskilled workers move to the growing industry the firm is willing to hire more of them as their marginal product declines only a little. Taking the elasticity of substitution from 0.5 to 2 leads to over a 50% reduction in the level of transitory unemployment induced by the shock.

[Şahin et al. \(2014\)](#) propose a measure of the degree of unemployment that occurs due to a mismatch between unemployed workers and vacancies. Replicating their measure in the model, it attributes only 1% of the peak of unemployment to mismatch. This is because unemployed workers are not mismatched in the sense that they are not searching for jobs in the wrong industry. Instead, they don't have the skills that firms are posting vacancies for. Extending the measure of mismatch to include skill increases the share of unemployment due to mismatch to 17.5% at the peak. Here mismatch is occurring within industry rather than across industries.

I then analyze the extent to which policy can alleviate unemployment caused by reallocation. There is an externality separate from the usual search externalities, as firms fail to fully internalize the social benefit of hiring unskilled workers. If a match breaks up after a worker has accumulated skill they retain their skill and so take it into their next match. This skill is valuable to the new firm but this future benefit is not internalized by the old firm. So in the decentralised steady state firms post inefficiently few vacancies for unskilled workers leading to inefficiently high unemployment.

A planner with the ability to subsidize vacancy posting funded by lump-sum taxes can achieve higher welfare than the decentralized equilibrium. It does this by incentivizing firms to post more vacancies for unskilled workers and taxing vacancies for skilled workers. The planner's steady state has 15% lower unemployment and more skilled workers than the decentralized equilibrium. This also affects the response to a reallocation shock, through

the increased posting of vacancies for unskilled workers. This speeds up the speed of aggregate skill accumulation as there are more unskilled workers employed who have the potential to gain skill. This both speeds up the recovery but also reduces the peak level of unemployment in transition by up to a third. The planner, however, can only achieve this if they are able to condition the subsidy on the skill targeted by the vacancy.

Literature Review The finding of reallocation causing aggregate unemployment builds upon the literature on the worker level costs of reallocation. [Neal \(1995\)](#) showed that among workers who switched industries those with higher tenure suffered larger earnings losses. [Walker \(2013\)](#) showed workers exposed to increases in production costs due to the clean air act experienced persistent earnings losses over time which in part driven by increased nonemployment. [Davis and Von Wachter \(2011\)](#) and [Jarosch \(2023\)](#) find large persistent earnings losses for workers displaced from their jobs. [Huckfeldt \(2022\)](#) argues that hiring becoming more selective in recessions can explain the increase in earnings losses from displacement during recessions. This paper takes elements such as specific skills and directed search but shows that reallocation can have aggregate unemployment effects.

Many papers starting with [Lilien \(1982\)](#) and [Rogerson \(1987\)](#) but also including [Dvorkin \(2014\)](#), [Pilossoph \(2012\)](#), [Chodorow-Reich and Wieland \(2020\)](#) and [Carrillo-Tudela and Visschers \(2023\)](#) studying the aggregate effects of reallocation. These papers all use search and matching models with

multiple sectors to study the impact of reallocation on unemployment. I contribute to this literature in two ways, the first contribution concerns the substitutability between workers of different skill levels. While the previous literature has assumed perfect substitutability, in this paper I allow for imperfect substitutability. [Kambourov and Manovskii \(2009\)](#) contains a model with occupational-specific skill and a CES sectoral production function but does not consider the impact of reallocation on unemployment. Instead, it focuses on the link between occupational mobility and wage inequality. I show that relaxing this assumption has a large impact. For estimates of this substitutability in the range of the empirical literature, the effect of reallocation on unemployment is quantitatively sizable. This is unlike the null results found in [Pilossoph \(2012\)](#), [Carrillo-Tudela and Visschers \(2023\)](#) and [Chodorow-Reich and Wieland \(2020\)](#)¹.

[Mercan, Schoefer and Sedláček \(forthcoming\)](#) make a related assumption that newly hired workers are imperfectly substitutable with incumbent workers in the initial period they are hired. There are two major differences. First, workers take longer to become skilled than in their model in which it takes a quarter. Secondly, in this paper workers retain their skill if they remain within the industry. Thus a separation shock would not have a large effect as the skilled workers would be quickly rehired. However, if the separations

¹[Chodorow-Reich and Wieland \(2020\)](#) argue that reallocation only causes a rise in unemployment during recessions. This is because reallocation exacerbates the binding of nominal wage rigidity. They find however no effect outside of a recession when nominal wage rigidity isn't binding.

shocks they identify are driven by shocks that also cause reallocation then there would be a slow recovery of employment in the model from this paper.

The second contribution is I allow for heterogeneity in the importance of industry-specific skill across industries. Both [Carrillo-Tudela and Visschers \(2023\)](#) and [Kambourov \(2009\)](#) allow for occupational-specific skills but don't allow the accumulation process to differ across sectors. [Wiczer \(2015\)](#) allows the skill level that workers who have just entered an occupation have relative to higher tenure workers to differ across occupations. The speed of accumulation is fixed, however, at one model period limiting the degree of heterogeneity. By allowing for heterogeneity in the importance of industry-specific skill I find reallocations of the same magnitude can have very different effects on unemployment depending on the industries affected.

This paper is also related to the literature on mismatch unemployment. [Shimer \(2007\)](#) and [Şahin et al. \(2014\)](#) study how mismatch between workers and the industry they are searching in can lead to unemployment. This paper highlights how there can be mismatch between skills demanded and supplied within an industry not just across industries.

This paper also relates to the literature on the impact of trade shocks when there are costs to switching sectors of which [Artuç, Chaudhuri and McLaren \(2010\)](#) is a seminal paper. The contribution of this paper is to show that trade shocks can lead to transitory unemployment as the economy adjusts [Traiberman \(2019\)](#) highlights the importance of specific skills for explaining the distribution of income responses to a trade shock, however,

they don't consider the impact on unemployment. [Caliendo, Dvorkin and Parro \(2019\)](#) was among the first papers to study the dynamic unemployment response in a general equilibrium model with frictions to switching sector. However, they model unemployment as a choice in a Roy style model and so it is efficient and dampens the welfare impact of the trade shock. [Kim and Vogel \(2020\)](#) and [Galle, Rodríguez-Clare and Yi \(2023\)](#) study unemployment due to downward nominal wage rigidities using comparative statics. [Dix-Carneiro et al. \(2023\)](#) allows for frictional unemployment and studies the dynamics of unemployment due to trade shocks. In their model, frictions to switching sector slow the adjustment of the economy but do not lead to transitory unemployment².

Another place the analysis in the paper applies to is the case of automation. [Eden and Gaggl \(2018\)](#) and [Vom Lehn \(2020\)](#) study the effects of automation with substitutability between routine and non-routine workers but don't allow for unemployment. [Jaimovich et al. \(2021\)](#) extends these analyses to allow for unemployment but only as a form of occupational choice. [Restrepo \(2015\)](#) studied unemployment due to automation in a search model with frictional unemployment with skilled and unskilled workers. The driving force of unemployment in his model is search being undirected. When

²The changes in unemployment are driven by two forces. First, unemployment falls to the overall gains from trade. Second, they calibrate different industries to have different unemployment rates so as the relative size of industries fluctuates the unemployment rate changes. Unemployment in the US rises initially as production shifts towards manufacturing temporarily. In the appendix they show that frictions to mobility actually lessens this rise by reducing the movement towards manufacturing in the short.

there are more unskilled workers firms post fewer vacancies as an expected match is less productive. In this paper instead the search is directed but the marginal product of unskilled workers is lower when there are a large number of them.

2 Quantitative Model

I build a search and matching model in which workers can switch industries if separated. Following [Artuç, Chaudhuri and McLaren \(2010\)](#) I model this switching decision as a discrete choice subject to taste shocks. The main contrast of this model from the literature is allowing for the marginal product of a worker to depend on the distribution of skill within the industry.

2.1 Labour Market

There is a separate labour market for each skill level - industry pair. Firms can post vacancies $v(k, s)$ in the market of their choosing. There is also a pool of unemployed workers $u(k, s)$ for each worker skill - industry pair. The market tightness for a given labour market is defined as usual as vacancies divided by unemployed workers $\theta(k, g) = \frac{v(k, g)}{u(k, g)}$. The labour markets have a matching friction in the form of the standard cobb-douglas matching function

$$m(u, v) = \mu u^\eta v^{1-\eta}$$

Where η is the elasticity of matching and μ is a matching efficiency parameter. The cobb-douglas matching function can produce more matches than either the number of unemployed workers or vacancies. In these cases, I truncate the number of matches to the minimum of the number of unemployed workers or vacancies. Given this matching function and the definition of labour market tightness, the job finding rate can be written $f(\theta(k, g)) = \frac{m(u(k, g), v(k, g))}{u(k, g)} = \theta(k, g)^{1-\eta}$. The vacancy fill rate can similarly be written as $q(\theta(k, g)) = \theta^{-\eta}$

2.2 Workers

There is a unit mass of workers, who are risk neutral and discount at rate β . They can either be employed or unemployed and are at all times attached to an industry. Workers employed in an industry at the start of a period keep their job with a fixed probability $(1 - \delta)$ and lose it with probability δ . This timing is based on [Christiano, Eichenbaum and Trabandt \(2016\)](#). It allows for the possibility of workers switching jobs without a period of unemployment consistent with the large numbers of job-to-job transitions observed in the data. Those that lose their job at the beginning of the period or who were unemployed at the start of the period face a choice over whether to change industries. I model this as a discrete choice where workers choose the sector k' that maximises their utility

$$S_t(k, s, \zeta) = \max\{U_t(k, s) + \zeta_{i,0}, \max_{k' \neq k} U_t(k', 0) - \alpha_{k,k'} + \zeta_{i,k'}\}$$

Where $U(k', 0)$ is the expected utility from being in sector k' with no industry-specific skill, $\alpha_{k,k'}$ is a utility cost of switching from sector k, k' and $\zeta_{i,k'}$ is the type 1 extreme value taste shock for sector k' which is iid across sectors and time and has variance σ_ζ . The type 1 extreme value taste shocks generate a motive for gross moves. Some workers in industry k will draw a high taste shock for industry k' and so will want to switch to that industry and vice versa. Additionally the shocks mean that the probability of switching from k to k' can be written tractably as

$$P(k \rightarrow k' | s) = \frac{e^{(U_t(k', 0) - \alpha_{k,k'})/\sigma_\zeta}}{e^{U_t(k, s)/\sigma_\zeta} \sum_{\hat{k} \neq k} e^{(U_t(\hat{k}, 0) - \alpha_{k,\hat{k}})/\sigma_\zeta}}$$

The expected value function when making the choice has the following form

$$S_t(k, s) = E_\zeta[S_t(k, s, \zeta)] = \sigma_\zeta(\gamma + \log(e^{U_t(k, s)/\sigma_\zeta} \sum_{\hat{k} \neq k} e^{(U_t(\hat{k}, 0) - \alpha_{k,\hat{k}})/\sigma_\zeta}))$$

I add a search cost of $\sigma_\zeta\gamma + \sigma_\zeta \log(n_k)$ to eliminate most of the gains in utility from search due to the type 1 extreme value shocks. The first part $\sigma_\zeta\gamma$

reflects the mean type I extreme value while $\sigma_\zeta \log(n_k)$ eliminates the gains due to more alternatives which increase the expected value of the maximum shock. This ensures workers don't prefer to be unemployed in order to be exposed to the taste shocks.

Once industry switching decisions are made, unemployed workers search for a job in the job market associated with their current industry and level of skill human capital. They thus find a job with probability $f(\theta(k, s))$ and remain unemployed with probability $1 - f(\theta(k, s))$. After this production occurs, the employed receive a wage $w(k, s)$ and the unemployed receive unemployment benefits b . Finally, at the end of the period, two events can occur. First employed workers potentially gain human capital in their current industry with probability ψ_k . On the other hand, unemployed workers lose their industry-specific human capital with probability ρ . The second event is that a proportion d of workers die and are replaced by unemployed workers in the same industry with no industry-specific skill. I add death to the model as I will target wage growth in calibrating the human capital parameters. As workers experience wage growth over the lifecycle, not adding death will lead to too many workers with human capital in the steady state distribution. Given this the values of employment V and unemployment U are

$$\begin{aligned}
V_t(k, s) &= \delta S_t(k) + (1 - \delta)(w_t(k) \\
&\quad + m_t(1 - d)((1 - \psi(k))V_{t+1}(k, s) + \psi(k)V_{t+1}(k, s + 1))) \\
U_t(k, s) &= f(\theta_t(k))(w_t(k) + m_t(1 - d)((1 - \psi(k))V_{t+1}(k, s) + \psi(k)V_{t+1}(k, s + 1))) \\
&\quad + (1 - f(\theta_t(k)))(b + m_t(1 - d)((1 - \rho(k))S_{t+1}(k, s) + \rho(k)S_{t+1}(k, s - 1)))
\end{aligned}$$

2.3 Firms

There is a continuum of firms in each industry which each employs one worker. A firm must post a vacancy in order to hire a worker. The cost of posting a vacancy for a worker of skill s is denoted $\kappa(k, s)$ and there is free entry into the market for vacancies. This implies the free entry condition for firms

$$\kappa = q(\theta)E[J_t(k, s)]$$

Where $J_t(k, s)$ is the value of a filled vacancy, which solves the following Bellman equation.

$$J_t(k, s) = (y(k, s) - w(k, s)) + \beta(1 - d)(1 - \delta)[(1 - \psi(k))J_{t+1}(k, s) + \psi(k)J_{t+1}(k, s + 1)]$$

Where $y(k, s)$ is the revenue generated by a match of worker with skill s in industry k . The interpretation of κ is of effective vacancy posting cost as the productivity of the matching function will not be separately pinned down in the calibration.

I assume wages are set by Nash bargaining between the firm and worker with equal bargaining weights. So in steady-state the wage can be calculated using the equation

$$\begin{aligned} J(k, s) &= w(k, s) - b + \beta * (1 - d)((1 - \psi(k))V(k, s) + \psi(k)V(k, s + 1)) \\ &\quad - [(1 - \rho)S(k, s) + \rho S(k, s - 1)] \\ w(k, s) &= J(k, s) + b - \beta * (1 - d)((1 - \psi(k))V(k, s) + \psi(k)V(k, s + 1)) \\ &\quad - [(1 - \rho)S(k, s) + \rho S(k, s - 1)] \end{aligned}$$

I assume for each industry there is a Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) aggregator of the output of different skill types with each worker employed in an industry producing one unit of industry-skill-specific output.

$$Y_k = A_k \left(\sum_s \tau_{k,s} e[k, s]^{\frac{\eta-1}{\eta}} \right)^{\frac{\eta}{\eta-1}}$$

I assume the production function is constant returns to scale implying $\sum_s \tau_{k,s} = 1$. The industry-skill CES parameters $\tau_{k,s}$ determine the relative

marginal product of different skill levels in each industry and thus influence the relative wages. This combined with the probability of gaining skill $\phi(k)$ determines the expected returns to staying in a given industry for a long time. The industrial productivity A_k affects the relative wage across industries and therefore the relative size of different industries. Later in the quantitative exercise I will shock these productivities to induce reallocation of workers across industries. The elasticity of substitution across skills η is an important parameter governing the response of unemployment in the model to reallocation as controls how the relative marginal products of workers of different skill levels respond to changes in the relative supply of workers of different skill levels within an industry. So if workers move into an industry this will increase the relative supply of unskilled workers and thus decrease the marginal product of unskilled workers. If η is large the change in marginal product will be small but if η is close to 0 then the change in marginal product will be large and thus the value to firms of posting vacancies for these workers will fall greatly.

2.4 Household

All workers are members of the representative household. The household's preferences over the output of each industry are given by a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) aggregator over industry output.

$$U(\{c_k\}_{k \in \{1, \dots, n_k\}}) = \left(\sum_k \omega_k^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} c_k^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \right)^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}}$$

Where the ω_k are the CES weights and σ is the elasticity of substitution over industry output. The profits of the firms are paid out as dividends to the household as well as the wages of the workers.

3 Calibration

I take the model period to be a month. This allows for a reasonable frequency of churn across jobs, skill levels, employment and industries while not being so divorced from some of the data which is only available at the annual level. I set the number of industries to 4 and the number of skill levels to 2 which I label skilled and unskilled. Of the four industries, I label two high skill specificity and two low skill specificity, which will differ in their productivity A_k , CES production weights $\tau_{k,s}$ and skilling rate $\psi(k)$. As I will discuss later in the calibration I will use heterogeneity in the returns to industry tenure and industry mobility to differentiate between the two types of industry. High-specificity industries will feature higher returns to tenure and lower mobility than low-specificity industries. In essence, I will use industry returns as a proxy for the unobserved skill specificity of the industry. I set the number of skill levels to 2 as for each skill level I need a moment of

returns to industry tenure and longer periods of tenure are more noisy due to the smaller sample size of people with long tenure. Despite allowing for only two types of industries, I still require more than two industries, as the steady state in the two-industry economy implies absolute flows from and to each industry must be equal. This would imply that the heterogeneity in flows across industries would determine the relative size of the industries. Thus in order to be able to compare the impact of a shock to same-sized industries with differential mobility I allow for two industries for each type. Thus one type of industry can be observed to have higher mobility in steady state than the other because more workers flow between the two industries of that type than between the two industries of the other type.

I first start by fixing some parameters to values that are standard in the literature. I set the discount factor β to 0.996 which implies an annual discount rate of approximately 5%. The parameter for the probability of losing skill while unemployed ρ I take from [Carrillo-Tudela and Visschers \(2023\)](#) as 0.02. The model in this paper doesn't have the idiosyncratic heterogeneity in productivity which enables [Carrillo-Tudela and Visschers \(2023\)](#) to explain duration dependence of unemployment which they use to calibrate this parameter. However, for the aggregates of interest in this paper, the results will not be sensitive to reasonable choices of this parameter. This is because only a small percentage of workers are unemployed each period and reasonable estimates of ρ are of a similar magnitude so the changes in skill driven by skill loss while unemployed are small compared to other sources of skill change.

I set the probability of death d to $\frac{1}{480}$ which implies an average working life of 40 years. I set the elasticity of substitution across industry output in the household's utility function to 4 which is within the range estimated by [Broda and Weinstein \(2006\)](#). I set the productivity of the matching function μ to be 0.1. As I will calibrate the vacancy posting cost κ to match the unemployment rate, this is essentially a normalisation. If I increase μ then the calibration will increase κ such that $\frac{\kappa}{\mu} = q(\theta_{k,s})J(k,s)$ is unchanged. This is only not the case if either $q(\theta)$ or $f(\theta)$ are truncated which a low value of μ helps avoid.

I then calibrate the rest of the parameters. For the cost of vacancy posting κ I assume it to be constant across industries and skill levels. I then calibrate it to match an aggregate unemployment rate of 4%. Then for the flow benefit of unemployment b I calibrate it to match the estimates from [Chodorow-Reich and Karabarbounis \(2016\)](#) that the flow benefits of unemployment are 55% of wages. The rest of the parameters fall into one of two categories. First are the parameters relating to skill and production A_k $\tau_{k,s}$ and $\psi(k)$. Second are the parameters relating to industry choice σ_ζ and α . To calibrate them I will use moments of returns to career tenure, differential mobility across industries, a normalisation of average wages to 2 and an assumption that in the initial steady state, all industries have the same number of workers attached. I estimate the returns to career tenure using the NLSY79 data following [Pavan \(2011\)](#). I make two major changes to the specification, first I use OLS estimates rather than IV. This is because the

selection effect that biases OLS occurs in the model and is informative about industry choice parameters. Secondly, I allow the returns to vary depending on 1 digit industry and I take the 25th and 75th percentiles of the estimated returns as my targets I take the estimates of industry mobility from [Dvorkin \(2021\)](#). I again take the 25th and 7th percentiles of the industry transition probabilities as my targets. To do this I consider the data for each industry from each period for which [Dvorkin \(2021\)](#) estimates a transition probability as an independent data point. The normalisation of the average wage of the employed to 2 rather than 1 is done for numerical reasons to avoid wages going negative for some guesses causing discontinuities in the returns to career tenure moments. Finally, I assume that in the initial steady state all industries have the same number of workers attached so that in the quantitative exercise I can compare how the impact of the shock varies depending on the type of industry hit.

Table 1:

<i>Calibrated parameters</i>		
	Parameter	Value
Sectoral Productivity	A_k	[12.5, 15.3]
CES Production Weights	$\tau_{k,0}$	[0.09,0.24]
Skilling Rate	$\psi(k)$	[0.024, 0.022]
Utility Cost of Switching	α	3.1
Variance of Taste Shocks	σ_ζ	6.4
Vacancy Posting Cost	κ	0.003

While intuitively one might think that the returns to career tenure will primarily inform the skill parameters and the industry mobility data will

primarily inform the industry choice parameters, these parameters and moments are heavily interrelated. In the case of industry returns to tenure, the OLS estimates in the data are contaminated by selection bias as workers who experience lower returns may be more likely to leave the industry. The model also has this selection bias as workers who have accumulated skill in an industry are less likely to leave. The degree to which mobility is selective is partially determined by σ_ζ the variance of the taste shocks. If σ_ζ is low, the staying probability will be more sensitive to the value of staying. Thus skilled workers will be much less likely to move than unskilled workers, so selection bias will be high. Similarly, fixing mobility parameters, the skill and production parameters will affect the degree of mobility. The CES production weights $\tau_{k,s}$ determine the wage premium to skill and therefore the returns to staying in an industry relative to moving. The skilling rate $\psi(k)$ will play two roles, first it changes the proportion of workers who are skilled for a given mobility rate and skilled workers will move less. Secondly, it lowers the cost of moving to a new industry as workers will accumulate skill faster and so the earnings loss from moving is lower.

Another subtlety of the identification of the parameters is in the relative magnitude of $\psi(k)$, the probability of gaining skill, between the high and low skill specificity industries. A higher $\psi(k)$, all else held equal, will lead to higher returns to tenure as workers will gain skill faster and therefore it might be expected that the high-skill specific industry will have a higher ψ . This need not be the case, however, as in order the calibration must also

match the lower mobility in the high-specificity industry. In steady state net flows must be zero and thus in-migration must be lower. A low initial wage plus slow skill accumulation would make the industry unattractive to workers who would enter as unskilled. Also too high a $\psi(k)$ would lead to many workers being skilled in the high specificity industry and given the high returns these workers would be unlikely to leave leading to excessively low outmigration.

3.1 Calibrated Parameters

Table 2:

<i>Model and Data Moments</i>		
Moment	Model	Data
2 year returns to industry tenure high specificity	9.0%	8.6 %
2 year returns to industry tenure low specificity	3.5%	3.3 %
5 year returns to industry tenure high specificity	14.9%	16.4 %
5 year returns to industry tenure low specificity	6.4%	7.2 %
Average wage	2.17	2
Transition probability away high specificity	5.3%	10.3%
Transition probability away low specificity	5.4%	11.2%
Unemployment rate	4.1%	4%

As can be seen in [Table 2](#) the model in general does a good job matching the moments of the data. The tension that stops the model from completely matching the moments is that for the returns to tenure to be high the wage premium must be high. However, this reduces the transition probabilities of workers due to the high opportunity cost of losing skill. Raising σ_ζ the variance of the type 1 extreme value shocks is limited by the fact this reduces

the gains from being employed. Increasing sectoral productivity would lead to an increase in the wage which is attempting to be normalised.

The estimated rates of skill accumulation of 2.4% and 2.2% per month are in line with the values assumed in [Carrillo-Tudela and Visschers \(2023\)](#) of 1.7% per month. The low value of the κ , the vacancy posting cost can only be understood when taking into account the productivity of the matching function which I take to be 0.1. Given the steady state vacancy fill rates cost per match ranges between 0.11 and 0.73. Compared with a marginal product of a match ranging between 1.9 and 2.26.

In order to compare the estimates of the variance of the taste shocks σ_ζ and utility costs of moving to those from [Artuç, Chaudhuri and McLaren \(2010\)](#) (ACM) and [Dix-Carneiro et al. \(2023\)](#) (DCPRHT) respectively, a couple adjustments must be made. First an adjustment must be made for the timing of the model as ACM is estimated at the annual level. DCPRHT propose a conversion from annual to quarterly of $\frac{\beta^4}{1-\beta^4} \frac{\beta}{1-\beta}$. Using the same formula but to go from annual to monthly would be $\frac{\beta^4}{1-\beta^4} \frac{\beta}{1-\beta}$ which equals 4.6 when using the value of β used by ACM. Additionally as I the average wage is 2.17 rather than 1 this implies that the taste shocks should be twice as large. Combining these two adjustments with the estimate of σ_ζ from ACM of 1.61 gives an equivalent estimate of 16.0. This is almost three times as large as the estimate in this paper. On the other hand the utility cost of moving relative to the variance of the taste shocks and the wage is $\frac{3.1}{6.4 \times 2.17} = 0.22$. This is low compared to the costs estimated in DCPRHT who allows the cost

to vary for every source-destination pair and finds values ranging between 0 and 3.43 .

A potential driver of this difference is the presence of industry-specific skill. This acts as an incentive to stay within an industry that is absent from ACM and DCPRHT. Thus it is unsurprising that the mobility cost estimate is lower and thus a smaller variance in the taste shock is required. Secondly in ACM the estimates of σ_ζ vary depending on the value chose of β with lower β implying a lower value. Since the β I chose is lower this may be driving some of the difference in this parameter.

3.2 Earnings Losses from Displacement

In order to validate the model, I compare the earnings losses from displacement in the model to the data by industry stayers and leavers. This is the moment that [Huckfeldt \(2022\)](#) targets in the calibration of his model. As I target instead the industry returns to tenure this is a useful check in two senses. First, it alleviates concerns that the results might be driven by specific features of the industry tenure moments. One potential concern is that the selection in the model may not be of a similar magnitude to the selection in the data and thus the calibration may over or understate the underlying returns to tenure. Secondly, this is a moment informative about the micro costs of reallocation. For the results of the model for the macro costs of reallocation to be credible, the micro costs must be realistic.

To calculate the earnings losses from displacement I need to take a stand


on what displacement is in the model. In the data, workers are considered displaced if they lose their job for reasons of slack work, plant closings, and abolished jobs which are considered exogenous to the worker. In the model all job destruction is considered exogenous to the worker, however the level of job destruction is high to allow for ‘job-to-job’ transitions in the model without directly modeling them. For this reason, a large number of workers who lose their job in a period will find a new job in the same period. So if I were to label all workers who separate at the beginning of a period as displaced, the earnings losses of stayers would be small as it would be dominated by these ‘job-to-job’ transitions. Therefore I define displacement as a worker who separates from their job and is unemployed for at least one period. I then define an industry stayer as a worker who is next employed in the same industry as the job from which they are displaced and an industry leaver as a worker who is next employed in a different industry.

To construct the comparison group I use workers who are not separated from their job in the period. I start with the steady state distribution of workers across industries and skill levels. I then iterate forward the distributions of workers who are both displaced and not displaced. This gives me the full time path of these distributions without simulation error. I then use this distribution and the wages to calculate the average monthly earnings of all three groups. Then to compare to the data I aggregate up to an annual frequency.

I plot the results in [Figure 1](#). Comparing this to the data on earnings

losses from [Huckfeldt \(2022\)](#) the model does a good job of matching the earnings losses of industry stayers. The losses on impact are very close to those of the data, with around 20% for stayers and 40% for leavers. Additionally, the model also does a good job of matching the dynamics of earnings losses over time. The earnings jump up in the first year after the displacement and then slowly recover over time. Given both the initial impact and the dynamics are untargeted in the calibration, this is a strong validation of the model's ability to capture the micro level costs to workers of reallocation.

Figure 1: Comparison of Employment Depending Industries Shocked



4 Quantitative Experiment

In order to understand the effect of reallocation on aggregate unemployment in the model I study the response to a shock to the productivity of two industries in the economy. One industry receives a positive productivity shock and the other a negative productivity shock. The shock takes the form of an unanticipated MIT shock which takes effect in a linear manner over a decade. I determine the shock size by finding the negative shock to a high-skill specific industry and positive shock to the other high-skill specific industry that leads to the same steady state employment as the initial steady state and a change in industry shares in line with decadal changes in industry shares. I then take the same sized negative shock and solve for the positive shock that leads to the same steady state employment for all other combinations of industry types getting shocks.


I plot the results for unemployment in [Figure 2](#). There are two main takeaways from this figure. First, is that the reallocation shock can lead to a substantial increase in unemployment in this model. The lowest trough in unemployment is 0.8 percentage points below steady state, which is a 17% increase from steady state unemployment. Additionally, the unemployment response is highly persistent, with the recovery taking a decade to complete. It is important to note that unlike [Chodorow-Reich and Wieland \(2020\)](#) this effect does not require a coinciding negative aggregate demand shock nor downward nominal wage rigidity.

Secondly, the impact of the reallocation shock is heterogeneous in both magnitude as well as dynamics with reallocation involving high skill specificity industries having larger effects. In particular if the growing industry is high specificity this leads to an persistent rise in unemployment. This is because skill accumulation is slower in the high specificity industry and so it takes a long time to reach the new steady state level of skilled workers in that industry. The size of the shock in the very short run is larger if the shrinking industry is high skill specificity. This is due to the skilled workers in the high specificity industry being less willing to move and therefore exposed to the negative shock to their industry.

These effects are driven by the dynamics of marginal productivity of different workers. To show this I plot in [Figure 3](#) the dynamics of workers' marginal product to the shock that reallocates between the high skill specificity industries. The marginal products of the skilled workers in the shrinking industry and the unskilled workers in the growing industry both fall in response to the shock before slowly recovering. This happens to the skilled workers in the shrinking industry due to both the decline in productivity but also the exit of unskilled workers from the industry. This drives down the marginal product of skilled workers as the relative supply of skilled workers increases. While for the unskilled workers in the growing industry, the productivity shock is positive for their marginal product however this is dominated by the negative effect entry of workers into the industry. For unskilled workers in the shrinking industry and skilled in the growing their


marginal product increases driven primarily by their relative share of industry employment falling.

Figure 2: Comparison of Employment Depending Industries Shocked



All lines are in response to productivity shock to the two industries. One hit positively and one negatively. The shocks are chosen to match decadal changes in industry shares and such that the new steady state features the same level of employment as the initial steady state.

Figure 3: Dynamics of Workers' Marginal Products



The shock is to the two high-specificity industries. One hit positively and one negatively. The shocks are chosen to match decadal changes in industry shares and such that the new steady state features the same level of employment as the initial steady state.

4.1 The Dynamics of Industry Transitions

An important feature of the model is that workers move across industries. In [Figure 4](#) I plot how the absolute flows of workers out of industries evolves in response to the shock discussed above which reallocates from a high skill specificity industry to the other one. In order to illustrate the change from the

initial steady state the graph begins the month before the shock is realised. I label this month as month -1 . The first thing to notice is that the absolute flows of unskilled workers is always higher than the flows of skilled workers. This is because skilled workers face a larger opportunity cost of leaving in the form of losing their accumulated skill.

In the first panel are the dynamics of moves out of the industry receiving the positive shock. For both skilled and unskilled workers the number of flows drops on impact as the wages of this industry respond to the shock. For unskilled workers this quickly reverses as wages decline due to the entry of unskilled workers and the substitutability across skills in production as described previously. The flows of skilled workers declines due to the rise in the opportunity cost driven by the increase in the wages paid to skilled workers in this industry. In the longer run the number of flows of skilled workers increases as the skill premium declines and number of workers in the industry rise.

In the middle panel are the dynamics for the industry receiving the negative shock. In the short run the results are exactly the opposite of the case of the growing industry. The number of flows of both skilled and unskilled rise due to the direct effect of the shock on wages. The outflow of skilled workers then slowly declines as the skilled to unskilled ratio in the industry returns to steady state and the absolute size of industry declines. The outflows of unskilled workers similar to before quickly jumps back due to the change in the skill ratio. After this it begins to rise again as the value of


the being a unskilled in any industry falls due to the increased number of unskilled workers as skilled workers leave the shrinking industry. Thus it begins falling again as the ratio converges to the new steady state. These dynamics are a consequence of modelling industry choice as a discrete choice subject to idiosyncratic type I extreme value taste shocks. When the value of all options falls, the taste shocks become more important pushing towards increased moves across industries. For the low skill specificity industries the outflows of unskilled workers rises and then falls along with the general rise and fall of being unskilled in any sector. The outflows of skilled workers moves little.

[Carrillo-Tudela and Visschers \(2023\)](#) argue that this increase in gross moves is inconsistent with the data. They proposed an alternative formulation of search across industries in which search is costly. Thus when the values of being unskilled fall moves gross moves fall.

4.2 The Role of Substitutability Between Skills

The importance of changing relative supplies of different skills to the effects points to η the elasticity of substitution between workers of different skill levels as a key parameter in the model to generate unemployment in response to reallocation. In this subsection, I illustrate the impact of this parameter on the results of the model as well as the mechanism through which it operates. I rerun the counterfactual experiment with different values of η and plot the results in [Figure 5](#).


Figure 4: Comparison of Employment depending of η



All lines are in response to productivity shock to the two high-specificity industries. One hit positively and one negatively. I resolve the steady state for each η . The shocks are chosen to match decadal changes in industry shares and such that the new steady state features the same level of employment as the initial steady state.

As can be seen in the figure, the impact of the demand shock on employment is decreasing in η and the effect is substantial. Going from an η of 0.5 to an η of 10 reduces the size of the unemployment response by over 50%. The higher the elasticity of substitution the less responsive the relative marginal products of different skill levels are to changes in the ratio of workers of different skill levels. So when unskilled workers leave the industry with the

Figure 5: Comparison of Employment depending of η



All lines are in response to productivity shock to the two high-specificity industries. One hit positively and one negatively. I resolve the steady state for each η . The shocks are chosen to match decadal changes in industry shares and such that the new steady state features the same level of employment as the initial steady state.

negative productivity shock, the relative marginal product of skilled workers falls by less the higher η . Similarly the relative marginal product of unskilled workers in the industry with the positive productivity shock fall by less the higher η as workers enter the industry. As these are the locations where most of the unemployment occurs, the more their marginal products fall the more unemployment there is.

This is the important difference from [Carrillo-Tudela and Visschers \(2023\)](#). In their model workers have idiosyncratic productivity for the sector they are in which accumulates as well as having stochastic variation. However, in their model workers with different productivities are perfect substitutes so when there is a demand shock to a sector the marginal product of workers of all skills will rise no matter the skill distribution. Thus the value to a firm of

the low productivity workers still increases when workers without industry specific skill enter. So firms post enough vacancies to absorb these incoming workers. So despite their model having specific skill, reallocation does not increase unemployment.

4.3 Mismatch Unemployment

[Şahin et al. \(2014\)](#) proposed an index of mismatch \mathcal{M}_t defined as below.

$$\mathcal{M}_t = 1 - \sum_k \left(\frac{\phi_{k,t}}{\bar{\phi}_t} \right) \left(\frac{v_{k,t}}{v_t} \right)^\eta \left(\frac{u_{k,t}}{u_t} \right)^{1-\eta} \quad (1)$$

Where $\phi_{k,t}$ is the industry-level matching efficiency, which in this paper is constant μ . $\bar{\phi}_t$ is the economy-wide matching efficiency, which is also constant at μ . v_t and u_t are the aggregate number of vacancies and unemployed workers.

[Şahin et al. \(2014\)](#) found that this index could explain only one-third of the rise in unemployment during the great recession. I calculate this index for the model economy in response to reallocation between the two high-skill specificity industries and plot it in [Figure 6](#). In the left hand side figure is the dynamics of the [Şahin et al. \(2014\)](#) index. It does rise in response to the shock however it remains small peaking at just over 1% of total unemployment being ascribed to mismatch. As the shock generates additional unemployment of around 17% the index correctly shows that the

unemployment generated is not due to mismatch across industries.

The mismatch in this model is between workers of different skill levels within an industry. Thus the correct index to use is one that accounts for mismatch across skills.


$$\mathcal{M}_t = 1 - \sum_k \sum_s \left(\frac{\phi_{k,s,t}}{\phi_t} \right) \left(\frac{v_{k,s,t}}{v_t} \right)^\eta \left(\frac{u_{k,s,t}}{u_t} \right)^{1-\eta} \quad (2)$$

I plot the dynamics of this index in response to the shock in the right hand side of [Figure 6](#). Here the measure increases by much more than in the previous case, peaking at almost 18% of total unemployment. However given it starts from a much higher level of 14% this rise still doesn't fully explain the rise in unemployment.

5 Inefficiency and Optimal Policy

The model features an externality different from the usual search externalities of thick markets and congestion. Firms fail to fully internalise the value of the human capital that a worker will accumulate during a match when they post a vacancy for a unskilled worker. This is because if the worker gains skill while matched to a firm and then the match breaks up, the firm will not gain the additional surplus that the firm that next matches with that worker will receive due to the higher skill of the worker. This can't be contracted

Figure 6: Comparison of Employment depending of η



All lines are in response to productivity shock to the two high-specificity industries. One hit positively and one negatively. The mismatch indexes are as described in the text

on as the next firm that hires a worker is not a party to the negotiations between the original firm and the worker. Thus they cannot be bound to compensate the original firm for the value of the skill.

I restrict the planner to only be able to subsidise vacancy posting funded by lump sum taxes on the household. I impose this restriction as the fully unrestricted planner who sets both vacancies and wages can set wages infinitely high or low. This is because the profits or losses of the firm from those wages will cancel out in the budget constraint on the household. As the planner raises wages this raises the income of the representative house-

hold but the increase in wages is funded by lump sum taxation which reduces the available income of the household. I assume the subsidy is paid to the firm upon a match but not conditional on bargaining being successful as this avoids the complication of a wage premium in the first period of a match as in [Mortensen and Pissarides \(2003\)](#). This changes the free entry condition to

$$\kappa_{k,s} = q(\theta_{k,s})(J(k,s) + \lambda(k,s))$$

Where $\lambda(k,s)$ is the subsidy for a vacancy in industry k for a worker of skill s . This allows the planner to pick the $\theta_{k,s}$ but maintains Nash bargaining as the wage-setting mechanism.

Given these restrictions, the planner's problem is to choose subsidy levels $\lambda(k,s)$ to maximise the utility of the economy.

$$\max_{\{\lambda(k,s)\}} \text{Consumption} + \text{Flow Utility from Unemployment} + \text{Utility from Discrete Choice}$$

Where consumption is total output minus the costs of vacancy posting. The total flow utility of unemployment is b the amount of utility each unemployed worker gets, times the number of unemployed workers. The utility from discrete choice comes from the taste shocks plus the utility costs of switching industries incurred.

I then consider four forms of subsidies. A subsidy that varies across

both industries and skill levels, a subsidy that varies only across skills, a subsidy that varies only across industries and a subsidy that is constant across industries and skill levels. The motivation for considering the more restricted subsidies is that they may be more feasible to implement in practise. For instance, the skill level of a worker is not easily observable and firms and workers could potentially collude in reporting the wrong skill level to obtain a higher subsidy. On the other hand, firms often don't belong to a single clear industry and so may manipulate their assigned industry label in order to qualify for subsidies.

In Table 3 I list the optimal subsidies and the steady state unemployment rate for each subsidy. I list the unemployment rate rather than welfare as this is more representative of the size of the gains. In the model going from no unemployment to the decentralised steady state leads to a welfare gain of less than 100% which is implausibly low. As such utility gains from different subsidy regimes are small compared to the unemployment changes. Unsurprisingly the most flexible subsidy has the lowest unemployment rate which at 3.34% is 15% lower than without a subsidy. Allowing the subsidy to vary only across skill groups achieves a very similar level of unemployment, though the difference is more noticeable in utility terms. On the other hand, allowing the subsidy to vary across industries does not lead to lower unemployment compared to a completely flat subsidy. The reason can be seen by looking at the subsidy levels of the fully flexible subsidy. The subsidy is positive for the unskilled vacancies and negative for the skilled vacancies. Due


to the externality, the planner wants to subsidise the vacancies for unskilled workers to increase the amount of skill being acquired in the economy. The vacancies for skilled workers are taxed as the externality is much smaller for these vacancies. Posting additional vacancies for skilled workers reduces the proportion of skilled workers who lose their skills while unemployed. However, as the chance of skill loss in unemployment is low the planner only wants to subsidise the vacancies for unskilled workers by a small amount. But subsidising the vacancies for unskilled workers already acts as a subsidy due to the complementarity in production. Therefore the planner finds it optimal to tax the vacancies for skilled workers to offset this implicit subsidy.

Table 3:

<i>Optimal Subsidies and Unemployment Rates</i>		
Subsidy	$\lambda(k, s)$	Unemployment Rate
Fully Flexible	$\begin{bmatrix} \lambda_{h,0} & \lambda_{h,1} \\ \lambda_{l,0} & \lambda_{l,1} \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} 0.085 & 0.013 \\ 0.72 & -0.087 \end{bmatrix}$	3.49%
Skill Varying	$[\lambda_0, \lambda_1] = [0.078, -0.040]$	3.49%
Industry Varying	$[\lambda_h, \lambda_l] = [0.049, 0.0037]$	3.78%
Flat	$\lambda = 0.024$	3.78%
No Subsidy	N/A	4.12%

I then consider the impact of the subsidy on the response of unemployment to the reallocation shock. I compare the response to the same shock as in the previous section but starting from the steady state with the respective subsidy. Despite it being the same shock, the long-run employment impact is not necessarily 0 as the subsidy will change both the initial and long run steady state.

Figure 7: Dynamics Unemployment With Different Subsidies



All lines are in response to productivity shock to the two high-specificity industries. One hit positively and one negatively. I resolve the steady state for each subsidy. The shocks are chosen to match decadal changes in industry shares and such that the new steady state features the same level of employment as the initial steady state for the no subsidy case. For comparison I use the same shock in each case.

What can be seen from the Figure 7 is that the fully flexible subsidy leads to a smaller transitory rise in unemployment, This is despite the shock leading to a long run rise in unemployment when fully flexible subsidies are in place. The reason for this is that the flexible subsidy leads to greater

posting of vacancies for unskilled workers. Since a large proportion of the transitory unemployment is unskilled workers, this mitigates the rise. There is also an indirect effect from as greater hiring of unskilled workers causes the absolute number of workers gaining skill in the growing industry to be higher. So the transition is quicker so the decline in the marginal product of unskilled workers smaller and recovers earlier further promoting vacancy posting in this submarket.

For the same reasons, the subsidy that varies by skill achieves a sizable reduction in transitory unemployment. It does slightly better in unemployment terms than the flexible subsidy due to the subsidy on unskilled vacancies in the low specificity industries being higher so they absorb more of the workers leaving the shrinking industry along the transition. A fully flexible subsidy that responds to the shock would likely be able to further reduce the transitory unemployment. On the other hand, the flat and industry varying subsidies lead to only a small reduction in the transitory rise in unemployment. This is because of the small size of the subsidy which means it incentivises little additional vacancy posting for unskilled workers. So the path of marginal products of these workers is similar to case without a subsidy leading to similar unemployment dynamics.

6 Conclusion

This paper argues that the reallocation of labour demand can have consequences for aggregate unemployment. This result comes from allowing for a realistic structure of substitutability between workers of different skill levels. When different skill levels are not perfect substitutes the demand for unskilled workers will be lower in the transition than in steady state. As this is also where there is a greater supply of workers during the transition this can lead to transitory unemployment.

That substitutability between workers is important for the response to shocks may also apply to other cases. Many modern macro models assume the marginal product of a match is independent of the distribution of matches in the economy for tractability. So there is a need to better understand when this powerful assumption is a good approximation to the real world.

References

- Artuç, Erhan, Shubham Chaudhuri, and John McLaren.** 2010. “Trade shocks and labor adjustment: A structural empirical approach.” *American economic review*, 100(3): 1008–1045.
- Broda, Christian, and David E Weinstein.** 2006. “Globalization and the Gains from Variety.” *The Quarterly journal of economics*, 121(2): 541–585.
- Caliendo, Lorenzo, Maximiliano Dvorkin, and Fernando Parro.** 2019. “Trade and labor market dynamics: General equilibrium analysis of the china trade shock.” *Econometrica*, 87(3): 741–835.
- Carrillo-Tudela, Carlos, and Ludo Visschers.** 2023. “Unemployment and endogenous reallocation over the business cycle.” *Econometrica*, 91(3): 1119–1153.
- Chodorow-Reich, Gabriel, and Johannes Wieland.** 2020. “Secular Labor Reallocation and Business Cycles.” *Journal of Political Economy*, 128(6): 2245–2287.
- Chodorow-Reich, Gabriel, and Loukas Karabarbounis.** 2016. “The cyclicalities of the opportunity cost of employment.” *Journal of Political Economy*, 124(6): 1563–1618.

- Christiano, Lawrence J, Martin S Eichenbaum, and Mathias Trabandt.** 2016. “Unemployment and business cycles.” *Econometrica*, 84(4): 1523–1569.
- Davis, Steven J, and Till Von Wachter.** 2011. “Recessions and the Costs of Job Loss.” *Brookings papers on economic activity*, 2011(2): 1.
- Dix-Carneiro, Rafael, João Paulo Pessoa, Ricardo Reyes-Heroles, and Sharon Traiberman.** 2023. “Globalization, trade imbalances, and labor market adjustment.” *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 138(2): 1109–1171.
- Dvorkin, Maximiliano.** 2014. “Sectoral shocks, reallocation and unemployment in competitive labor markets.” *Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis*.
- Dvorkin, Maximiliano.** 2021. “International trade and labor reallocation: misclassification errors, mobility, and switching costs.” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Working Papers 2021-014.
- Eden, Maya, and Paul Gaggl.** 2018. “On the welfare implications of automation.” *Review of Economic Dynamics*, 29: 15–43.
- Galle, Simon, Andrés Rodríguez-Clare, and Moises Yi.** 2023. “Slicing the pie: Quantifying the aggregate and distributional effects of trade.” *The Review of Economic Studies*, 90(1): 331–375.
- Huckfeldt, Christopher.** 2022. “Understanding the scarring effect of recessions.” *American Economic Review*, 112(4): 1273–1310.

- Jaimovich, Nir, Itay Saporta-Eksten, Henry Siu, and Yaniv Yedid-Levi.** 2021. “The macroeconomics of automation: Data, theory, and policy analysis.” *Journal of Monetary Economics*, 122: 1–16.
- Jarosch, Gregor.** 2023. “Searching for job security and the consequences of job loss.” *Econometrica*, 91(3): 903–942.
- Kambourov, Gueorgui.** 2009. “Labour market regulations and the sectoral reallocation of workers: The case of trade reforms.” *The Review of Economic Studies*, 76(4): 1321–1358.
- Kambourov, Gueorgui, and Iourii Manovskii.** 2009. “Occupational Mobility and Wage Inequality.” *Review of Economic Studies*, 76(2): 731–759.
- Kim, Ryan, and Jonathan Vogel.** 2020. “Trade and welfare (across local labor markets).” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Papers.
- Lilien, David M.** 1982. “Sectoral Shifts and Cyclical Unemployment.” *Journal of Political Economy*, 90(4): 777–793.
- Mercan, Yusuf, Benjamin Schoefer, and Petr Sedláček.** forthcoming. “A Congestion Theory of Unemployment Fluctuations.”
- Mortensen, Dale T., and Christopher A. Pissarides.** 2003. “Taxes, subsidies and equilibrium labor market outcomes.” *Designing Inclusion: Tools to Raise Low-end Pay and Employment in Private Enterprise*, , ed. Edmund S. Phelps, 44–73. Cambridge University Press.

- Neal, Derek.** 1995. “Industry-specific human capital: Evidence from displaced workers.” *Journal of Labor Economics*, 13(4): 653–677.
- Pavan, Ronni.** 2011. “Career choice and wage growth.” *Journal of Labor Economics*, 29(3): 549–587.
- Pilossof, Laura.** 2012. “A Multisector Equilibrium Search Model of Labor Reallocation.” *SSRN Electronic Journal*.
- Restrepo, Pascual.** 2015. “Skill mismatch and structural unemployment.” Working Papers.
- Rogerson, Richard.** 1987. “An equilibrium model of sectoral reallocation.” *Journal of Political Economy*, 95(4): 824–834.
- Şahin, Aysegül, Joseph Song, Giorgio Topa, and Giovanni L. Violante.** 2014. “Mismatch Unemployment.” *American Economic Review*, 104(11): 3529–3564.
- Shimer, Robert.** 2007. “Mismatch.” *American Economic Review*, 97(4): 1074–1101.
- Traiberman, Sharon.** 2019. “Occupations and import competition: Evidence from Denmark.” *American Economic Review*, 109(12): 4260–4301.
- Vom Lehn, Christian.** 2020. “Labor market polarization, the decline of routine work, and technological change: A quantitative analysis.” *Journal of Monetary Economics*, 110: 62–80.

- Walker, W Reed.** 2013. “The transitional costs of sectoral reallocation: Evidence from the clean air act and the workforce.” *The Quarterly journal of economics*, 128(4): 1787–1835.
- Wiczer, David G.** 2015. “Long-term unemployment: Attached and mismatched?”