Infrastructure and Economic Growth: Evidence from Central Asia

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Abstract

This study surveys the role of infrastructure development in Central Asia's economic growth using a theoretical formulation based on an exogenous growth model that includes infrastructure. With a panel dataset of six Central Asian countries, the empirical work compares the long-run relationships estimated using the "first-generation" methods with the cross-sectional independence assumption and the "second generation" methods allowing for cross-sectional dependency. When the cross-sectional dependency is not considered, the results show a significant impact of infrastructure on economic growth, although the magnitude varies across countries and sectors. However, an overall non-significant effect is observed once cross-sectional dependency is taken into account, possibly due to an international externality and spillover effects. The panel causality test between infrastructure development and economic growth shows that while the causality is country- and sector-specific with no clear consensus on the direction, stronger economies tend to be associated with more sectoral causal relationships. This result confirms the critical role of infrastructure regarding economic performance.

Keywords: Belt and Road Initiative (BRI); Central Asia; China; Economic growth; Infrastructure; Panel data model.

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I. INTRODUCTION

A vast body of theoretical and empirical evidence underpins infrastructure services' role in productivity and growth, largely due to the reduction in production and transport costs and the facilities provided for new agents to enter the market. For instance, where the telecommunications infrastructure is weak, firms' transaction costs when gathering information and finding services tend to be high, whereas improving the quality of communication networks reduces the cost of doing business and increases firm profits. The impact of expanding the infrastructure goes beyond the effect of additional capital stock for three main reasons: economies of scale, network externalities, and enhanced competition owing to improved market access as a result of the infrastructure development (Égert *et al.*, 2009). On the other hand, longitudinal data have become the primary data structure used to determine the effect of infrastructure investment on growth. Such data make it possible to implement estimation methods that: (i) allow the capture of specific effects for countries that are invariant over time, and (ii) allow for the estimation or simulation of the average country's behavior.

Much of the existing literature focuses on assessing the impact of a specific type of infrastructure on growth because the high correlation that usually exists between the variables that measure different types of infrastructure negatively impacts the estimation methods used. On the other hand, cross-sectional independence is also widely assumed among existing studies because of the limitation of the "first-generation" methods. However, this has changed due to the development of econometric methodologies that have revolutionized empirical economic analyses. Regarding geographic region, Central Asia has been the economic and cultural corridor between the East and West on the Eurasian continent since ancient times. Currently, studies on the infrastructure of Central Asia are far from adequate and require in-depth quantitative analyses of the infrastructure network. This is especially true given China's recent Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which seeks to revitalize the ancient Silk Road by establishing an infrastructure and trade network in this region connecting East Asia with Europe and Africa.

This study aims to quantify the long-run impact of infrastructure stock on economic growth in six Central Asian countries (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan).¹ We use a set of infrastructure indicators from sectors including electricity, telecommunications, internet, and sanitation, covering the period from 1995 to 2016. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. After a brief literature review in Part II, Part III introduces the economic model, and Parts IV, V, and VI

¹ Azerbaijan may or may not fall into the category of Central Asian countries, depending on the definition. In this study, we refer to it as a Central Asian country for simplicity.

The causality between infrastructure development and economic growth is also investigated.

discuss the econometric methodologies, data, and empirical results, respectively.² In Part VII, we employ a set of "second-generation" methods to investigate the effect of the infrastructure on economic growth, given the existence of cross-sectional dependency. After confirming the cross-sectional dependency in Section 7.1, Sections 7.2 and 7.3 verify the existence of stable long-run relationships by testing for unit root and cointegration. Section 7.4 presents the estimation of the long-run relationship using the common correlated effects mean group estimator (CCEMG). Finally, in Section 7.5, we investigate the direction of the causality between infrastructure development and economic growth. Part VIII concludes the paper.

II. LITERATURE REVIEW

The role of infrastructure on economic growth has captured considerable attention in both the quantitative and qualitative literature. There are two main quantitative approaches used to model infrastructure. The first approach studies infrastructure through the lens of revised cost functions, under the neoclassical assumption that firms maximize their profits. Demetriades and Mamuneas (2000) find positive long-run effects of public capital on both the output supply and the input demand using an intertemporal optimization framework with a data sample of 12 OECD countries. Moreno *et al.* (2003) show that the regional and sectoral variability of the cost elasticity of infrastructure is far from negligible, based on a sample of Spanish regional economies from 1980 to 1991. Satya *et al.* (2004) find strong evidence of the critical role of public infrastructure in the productivity of Canadian manufacturing industries by estimating a flexible cost function that incorporates the public capital infrastructure. The second approach examines production functions that include infrastructure.

One of the earliest experiments to use this approach is that of Aschauer (1989), who incorporates infrastructure into the production function as an input factor in addition to capital and labor, and finds the nonmilitary public capital stock is more important in determining productivity than is either the flow of nonmilitary or military spending Ford and Poret (1991) find mixed results when studying public capital's influence on total factor productivity for 11 OECD economies. Calderón and Servén (2002) provide evidence of a strong empirical association between output and infrastructure using a panel data set with annual data covering the period 1960 to 1997 from 101 industrial and developing countries, although the results do not necessarily reflect the direction of causality. By developing and estimating a structural model of infrastructure and output growth for 75 countries, Esfahani and Ramirez (2003) find that the contribution

² Cross-sectional dependence is not considered in Parts IV to VI. There are two reasons for assuming cross-sectional independence at the beginning. First, the relationship between infrastructure and growth in the six Central Asian countries has not been extensively studied, even using the traditional "first-generation" methods. Second, a comparative analysis can potentially provide us with more information and economic insight, as we see later in this paper.

of infrastructure services to GDP is substantial and, in general, exceeds the cost of providing these services.³ Using a data sample of 24 OECD countries for the period 1960 to 2005, Égert *et al.* (2009) find a positive impact of infrastructure investment on growth, although this effect varies across countries and sectors and over time.

Several studies use the vector auto-regression (VAR) or vector error correction model (VECM) approach. Flores de Frutos *et al.* (1998) suggest there are long-term public investment effects on private sector variables in Spain. Wesselhöft (2013) estimates the dynamic effect of public capital on real GDP for 22 OECD countries using a vector auto-regression approach, and finds a positive effect of public capital on output in the short-medium and long run in most countries, although a negative effect is also found in some countries.⁴

Finally, comparative methodological studies have been conducted to assess the performance of different approaches. For instance, Torrisi (2010) performs a comparative analysis of the relationship between infrastructure and economic performance using four different approaches,⁵ finding a general robust economic enhancing effect of infrastructure even with different methodologies.

III. THE MODEL

This study's theoretical formulation is based on the exogenous growth model proposed by Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992).⁶ The MRW model is derived from a human capital augmented Cobb–Douglas production function, in which a human capital variable is added in addition to the production, capital, labor, and technology variables. The production function is expressed as $Y_t = K_t^{\alpha} H_t^{\beta} (A_t L_t)^{1-\alpha-\beta}$, where Y_t, K_t , H_t , A_t , and L_t represent GDP, total capital, human capital, the technology level, and the labor force, respectively. Furthermore, diminishing marginal returns (i.e., $\alpha + \beta < 1$) are assumed. The capital accumulation functions and the econometric specification are derived as follows:

$$\dot{k_t} = (s^K)y_t - (n+g+\delta)k_t$$

$$\dot{h_t} = (s^H) y_t - (n+g+\delta) h_t$$

³ The author also shows that institutional improvements are required to achieve better infrastructure outcomes on economic growth.

⁴ The author also analyzes the following possible explanations for the negative effect: different productivities of investments, crowding out, and high growth rates of government debt.

⁵ The four approaches studied are the production function approach, the cost function approach, growth models, and vector auto-regression models.

⁶ The abbreviation "MRW" is used.

$$\ln\left(\frac{Y_t}{L_t}\right) = \ln(a_0) + gt + \frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}\ln(k_t) + \frac{\beta}{1-\alpha}\ln(h_t) - \frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}\ln(n_t + g + \delta),$$
 [1]

where, $k_t = (K_t/A_tL_t)$, $h_t = (H_t/A_tL_t)$, n_t is the growth rate of the labor force, g is the growth rate of the technological level, and δ is the rate of depreciation.

One way to model infrastructure is to create a production function that includes an infrastructure variable. Under the assumption that the effect of infrastructure stock may differ from the average effect of total capital due to the characteristics of a natural monopoly or a public good, infrastructure can be singled out as an additional factor in the Cobb-Douglas production function and interpreted as the additional effect of infrastructure, which differs from the effects of other types of capital on GDP (Égert *et al.*, 2009). Let F_t be the stock of infrastructure at time t, and $f_t = (F_t/A_tL_t)$ be the infrastructure stock per effective unit of labor. A simple infrastructure augmented Cobb-Douglas production function can then be expressed as $Y_t = K_t {}^{\alpha}F_t {}^{\beta}(A_tL_t)^{1-\alpha-\beta}$, with the following specification:

$$\ln\left(\frac{Y_t}{L_t}\right) = \ln(a_0) + gt + \frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}\ln(k_t) + \frac{\beta}{1-\alpha}\ln(f_t) - \frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}\ln(n_t + g + \delta).$$
 [2]

Consider an infrastructure and human capital augmented Cobb-Douglas production function, $Y_t = K_t^{\alpha} H_t^{\beta} F_t^{\gamma} (A_t L_t)^{1-\alpha-\beta-\gamma}$, with the intensive form $y_t = k_t^{\alpha} h_t^{\beta} f_t^{\gamma}$. The diminishing marginal returns assumption is now defined as $\alpha + \beta + \gamma < 1$. Thus, the capital accumulation functions become:

$$\dot{k_t} = s_k y_t - (n+g+\delta)k_t = s_k k_t^{\alpha} h_t^{\beta} f_t^{\gamma} - (n+g+\delta)k_t$$

$$\dot{h_t} = s_h y_t - (n+g+\delta)h_t = s_h k_t^{\alpha} h_t^{\beta} f_t^{\gamma} - (n+g+\delta)h_t$$

$$\dot{f_t} = s_f y_t - (n+g+\delta)f_t = s_f k_t^{\alpha} h_t^{\beta} f_t^{\gamma} - (n+g+\delta)f_t.$$

Let $\dot{k_t} = 0$, $\dot{h_t} = 0$, and $\dot{f_t} = 0$, the economy then converges to the following steady state:

$$k^* = \left(\frac{s_f^{\gamma} \cdot s_k^{1-\beta-\gamma} \cdot s_h^{\frac{2\beta(\alpha-\gamma)}{\alpha}}}{n+g+\delta}\right)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha-\beta-\gamma}}$$

$$h^* = \left(\frac{s_k^{\alpha} \cdot s_f^{\gamma} \cdot s_h^{1-\alpha+\gamma}}{n+g+\delta}\right)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha-\beta-\gamma}}$$

$$f^* = \left(\frac{s_h^{\beta} \cdot s_k^{\alpha} s_f^{1-\alpha-\beta}}{n+g+\delta}\right)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha-\beta-\gamma}}.$$

⁷ Examples include economies of scale, externalities, spillover effects, improved market access, and enhanced competition.

Using the k^* , h^* , and f^* , rewrite the production function as follows:

$$\frac{Y_t}{L_t} = A_t \left(\frac{s_f^{\gamma} \cdot s_k^{1-\beta-\gamma} \cdot s_h^{\frac{2\beta(\alpha-\gamma)}{\alpha}}}{n+g+\delta} \right)^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha-\beta-\gamma}} \left(\frac{s_k^{\alpha} \cdot s_f^{\gamma} \cdot s_h^{1-\alpha+\gamma}}{n+g+\delta} \right)^{\frac{\beta}{1-\alpha-\beta-\gamma}} \left(\frac{s_h^{\beta} \cdot s_k^{\alpha} s_f^{1-\alpha-\beta}}{n+g+\delta} \right)^{\frac{\gamma}{1-\alpha-\beta-\gamma}}.$$

From the above equation, we obtain the following econometric specification by taking the natural logarithm of both sides:

$$\ln\left(\frac{Y_t}{L_t}\right) = b_0 + b_1 t + b_2 \ln(k_t) + b_3 \ln(h_t) + b_4 \ln(f_t) + b_5 \ln(n_t + g + \delta),$$
 [3]

where
$$b_2 = \frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha-\beta-\gamma}$$
, $b_3 = \frac{\beta(\alpha+1)}{1-\alpha-\beta-\gamma}$, $b_4 = \frac{\gamma}{1-\alpha-\beta-\gamma}$, and $b_5 = \frac{\alpha+\beta+\gamma}{\alpha+\beta+\gamma-1}$.

In this paper, we estimate both equation [2] and [3] for comparison.

IV. ECONOMETRIC METHODOLOGY 8

To determine the stationarity or the order of integration of the variables, we apply the unit root test in the heterogeneous panels of Im, Pesaran, and Shin (2003). Let N denote the number of cross-sections and T denote the number of periods, and suppose y_{it} is generated by the $(p_i + 1)$ -order autoregressive process.

Then,
$$y_{it} = u_i \phi_i(1) + \sum_{j=1}^{p_i+1} \phi_{ij} y_{it-j} + \varepsilon_{it}$$
, $i = 1, ..., N$, $t = 1, ..., T$, or, equivalently,

$$\Delta y_{it} = \alpha_i + \beta_i y_{it-1} + \sum_{i=1}^{p_i} \rho_{ij} \Delta y_{it-j} + \varepsilon_{it}, i = 1 \dots N, t = 1 \dots T,$$

where $\phi_i(1) = 1 - \sum_{j=1}^{p_i+1} \phi_{ij}$, $\alpha_i = u_i \phi_i(1)$, $\beta_i = -\phi_i(1)$, and $\rho_{ij} = -\sum_{h=j+1}^{p_i+1} \phi_{ih}$. The null and alternative hypotheses when testing for a unit root are H_0 : $\beta_i = 0$, for all i, and H_1 : $\beta_i < 0$, where i = 1, and i = 1, i = 1

Pedroni (1999) introduces a set of statistics to test the null hypothesis of no cointegration in heterogeneous panels with multiple regressors, analogous to the Engle–Granger test based on residuals, which verifies cointegration in the case of time series. These statistical tests are constructed from the residuals of the hypothetical cointegration regression in the following equation:

⁸ Cross-sectional dependency is not considered in this section.

⁹ For the statistical formulae, see Table 1 of Pedroni (1999).

$$y_{it} = \alpha_i + \beta_{1i} x_{1it} + \beta_{2i} x_{2it} + \dots + \beta_{Mi} x_{Mit} + e_{it},$$
 [4]

where N and T denote the number of cross-sections and periods, respectively. The slope coefficients β_1 , β_2 , ..., β_M can vary across the cross-sections, and α_i is the fixed-effects parameter.

Pedroni (2004) derives the asymptotic distribution and evaluates the performance of seven statistics in small samples. Of the seven statistics, four are grouped according to the within-dimension (constructed by adding the numerator and denominator terms separately along the *N*-dimension), and the remaining three are grouped according to the between-dimension (constructed by dividing the numerator and denominator terms and then adding over the *N*-dimension). With the estimated residuals \hat{e}_{it} from equation [4], the auxiliary regression $\hat{e}_{it} = \hat{\gamma}_i \hat{e}_{it-1} + \sum_{k=1}^{K_i} \hat{\gamma}_{ik} \Delta \hat{e}_{it-k} + \hat{u}_{it}^*$ is considered. For the within-dimension statistics, the null hypothesis of no cointegration and the alternative hypothesis are written as H_0 : $\gamma_i = 1$, for all i, and H_1 : $\gamma_i = \gamma < 1$, for all i, respectively. For the between-dimension statistics, the null hypothesis of no cointegration and the alternative hypothesis are H_0 : $\gamma_i = 1$, for all i, and H_1 : $\gamma_i < 1$, for all i, respectively. The alternative hypothesis in the between-dimension case is less restrictive because it allows for heterogeneity between the panels. We refer to the within-dimension statistics as panel cointegration statistics and the between-dimension statistics as group-mean panel cointegration statistics.

After testing for unit roots and cointegration, we estimate the long-run equilibrium relationships using the ordinary least squares method in a dynamic panel (group-mean PDOLS estimator) developed by Pedroni (2001), which is an extension of the individual time-series dynamic ordinary least squares (DOLS) method. Finally, to determine whether long-run relationships revert to the equilibrium in the presence of short-run disequilibria, the following error correction model is estimated:¹⁰

$$\Delta \ln(y_{it}) = \beta_{0i} + \sum_{j} \beta_{1it-j} \Delta \ln(s_{it-j}) + \sum_{j} \beta_{2it-j} \Delta \ln(h_{it-j}) + \sum_{j} \beta_{3it-j} \Delta n_{it-j} + \lambda_i ECM_{it-1}.$$

V. THE DATA

The data used in this study are panel data covering six countries for the 22 years from 1995 to 2016. The data are incomplete for some countries. Hence, these are unbalanced panels. The six countries considered in this study are Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. The infrastructure variables are taken from the following four categories:¹¹

i. Electricity

¹⁰ The error correction model without the human capital variable is also considered.

¹¹ In this paper, Infrastructure variables are estimated one-by-one to avoid error increases from multicollinearity.

- ii. Telecommunications
- iii. Internet
- iv. Sanitation

Transportation and water infrastructure are excluded from this study because of a lack of sufficient data for quantitative analysis. Furthermore, given the limited educational data available for these countries, we can only use the rate of secondary education completion as a rough, inefficient measurement of human capital.¹² Table 1 shows the definitions and sources of the variables and indicators.

Table 1
Economic Variables and Infrastructure Indicators

ID	Variables Definition	Source
gdp	GDP, PPP (constant 2011 international \$)	The World Bank
S	Gross fixed capital formation (proportion of GDP)	The World Bank
1	Labor Force total (Population ages 15-64)	The World Bank
n	Labor force growth rate	The World Bank
h	Lower secondary completion rate (% of relevant age group)	The World Bank
	Infrastructure Indicators (f)	
ey	Electricity - Gross Production (Million Kilowatt-hours)	United Nations Statistics Division
ecap	Installed capacity for electricity generation (Million Kw)	U.S. Energy Information Administration
tele	Fixed telephone subscriptions	The World Bank
it	Individuals using the Internet (% of population)	The World Bank
san	Improved sanitation facilities (% of population with access)	The World Bank

VI. EMPIRICAL RESULTS

Table 2 shows the results from the Im–Pesaran–Shin (IPS) test introduced in Part IV.¹³ The GDP per capita (gdp_t/l_t), gross fixed capital formation (s_t), labor force growth rate (n_t), gross electricity production (ey_t), installed capacity of electricity generation ($ecap_t$), and improvements in sanitary services (san_t) are all I(1) variables, which are stationary in their first differences at the 1% significance level. Human capital (h_t) and the percentage of the population using the internet (it_t) are stationary at the 5% significance level, but the null hypothesis of at least one unit root cannot be rejected at the 1% significance level. On the other hand, the variable that measures fixed telephone subscriptions ($tele_t$) is shown to have two unit roots. Therefore, the first difference is used to verify the long-run equilibrium relationships.

¹² Better measurements would be the average years of education or the rate of college completion. However, these data are not available for the six countries studied here.

¹³ The variables are measured in natural logarithm form, except for the labor force's growth rate (n_t) .

Table 2
Unit Roots Test in Heterogeneous Panels

			Null Hypot	hesis		
	I (1)		I (2)		I (3)	
Variables	Test Stat.	Prob.	Test Stat.	Prob.	Test Stat.	Prob.
$gdp_t/l_t \\$	4.315	1.000	-8.180 ***	0.000		
St	-0.873	0.191	-7.193 ***	0.000		
n_t	0.083	0.533	-2.714 ***	0.003		
h_t	-2.175 **	0.015	-5.028 ***	0.000		
ey_t	2.520	0.994	-7.668 ***	0.000		
$ecap_t$	0.881	0.811	-7.881 ***	0.000		
$tele_t$	4.768	1.000	-0.268	0.395	-13.262 ***	0.000
it_t	-2.147 **	0.016	-3.696 ***	0.000		
sant	0.301	0.618	-7.858 ***	0.000		

Note: The result is from Im-Pesaran-Shin (IPS) unit root test. (*), (**), and (***) denote the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels at which the null hypothesis of unit root can be rejected.

Table 3
Pedroni Cointegration Statistics

Cointegration Regression		Pane	el Statistics		(Group Statistics	1
gdp_t/l_t , s_t , n_t , (h_t) , f_t			t-stati	stic		t-statis	tic
	v-statistic	ρ-statistic	Non-parametric	Parametric	ρ-statistic	Non-parametric	Parametric
f_t			(With	out Human	Capital)		
eyt	-1.126	1.174	-0.243	1.275	1.967 **	-0.021	2.655 ***
ecapt	-0.691	0.868	-0.171	4.143 ***	1.921 **	0.389	5.798 ***
$\Delta tele_t$	-1.423 *	1.809 **	1.345 *	4.255 ***	2.536 ***	2.063 **	6.595 ***
it_t	-0.289	0.228	-0.974	-0.834	1.355 *	-0.545	0.858
san_t	0.771	0.035	-1.447 *	0.951	1.006	-1.358 *	2.032 **
			(Wit	h Human C	apital)		
eyt	-1.639 *	1.742 **	-0.059	1.318 *	2.404 ***	-0.055	1.265
ecapt	-1.311 *	1.543 *	0.227	2.567 ***	2.391 ***	0.556	3.328 ***
$\Delta tele_t$	-1.854 **	2.257 **	1.412 *	5.775 ***	3.090 ***	2.201 **	6.280 ***
it_t	-0.807	0.865	-0.761	0.274	1.831 **	-0.421	2.928 ***
sant	0.451	0.277	-2.169 **	4.182 ***	1.163	-2.154 **	5.121 ***

Note: (*), (**), and (***) denote the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels at which the null hypothesis of no cointegration can be rejected.

Table 4

			Ordinary L	Ordinary Least Squares in Dynamic Pane	s in Dynamie	c Panel				
		Elect	Electricity		Telecom	Telecommunication	Internet	rnet	Sanitation	ation
	е	eyt	se	ecapt	Δt_0	$\Delta tele_t$	itt	t	sant	lt
					Long Run (Mean Group)	an Group)				
Investment	0.087 **	** 099.0	0.373	1.894 **	0.206 **	0.310 **	0.262 **	0.169 **	0.139 **	0.226 **
Population Growth	16.890 **	5.010 **	-0.023 **	67.850 **	14.970 **	5.940 **	-3.832 **	-0.614 **	11.600 **	1.202 **
Human Capital	!	1.107 **	1	5.876 **	ŀ	0.954 **	!	0.275 **	;	0.048 **
Infrastructure	2.310 ** -2.254	-2.254 **	2.313 **	-9.370 **	1.714	7.014 **	0.131 **	0.044 **	0.375 **	22.770 **
				Country Sp	vecific Coeffici	Country Specific Coefficients for Infrastructure	ructure			
Azerbaijan	3.776 ** -12.120	-12.120 **	3.779 **	2.740 **	6.948 **	12.300 **	0.246 **	0.030 **	2.738 **	3.608 **
Kazakhstan	1.161 ** 0.674	0.674 **	4.677 **	3.756	-1.965 **	-3.433 **	0.146 **	0.010 *	-3.648 **	1
Kyrgyzstan	-0.063	-0.311 **	2.238 **	-56.470 **	3.915 **	25.330 **	0.032 **	0.272 **	6.762 **	-11.780
Tajikistan	4.047 *	0.943 **	3.167 **	3.466 **	-0.973 **	-0.870 **	0.082 **	-0.107 **	5.564 **	12.530 **
Turkmenistan	1.109 **	1	-8.512 **	1	0.780	1	0.191 **	1	-6.339 **	;
Uzbekistan	3.831 **	-0.458 **	8.530 **	-0.342 **	1.579 *	1.742 **	0.087 **	0.013	-2.827 **	4.213 **
					Short Run (Mean Group)	ean Group)				
Error Correction Term (-1) -0.026 *	-0.026 *	-0.028 *	-0.031 *	-0.006	-0.028 *	-0.029 *	-0.029 *	-0.026 *	-0.028 *	-0.026 *
Adjusted R ² Short Run	0.363	0.470	0.374	0.443	0.369	0.465	0.368	0.464	0.366	0.465
F-test	7.990	7.800	8.360	066.9	8.180	7.640	8.160	7.590	8.070	7.640
Observations	111	93	111	93	111	93	111	93	111	93

Note: (*) and (**) denote the 10% and 1% significance level. Some coefficients marked with (*) are also significant at 5% level. These include electricity production in internet with human capital (-0.026). The coefficient of the infrastructure stock should be interpreted as the effect in addition to the effect of pure productive capital stock increase. Thus, a positive (negative) coefficient implies that the total impact on output would be higher (lower). Tajikistan (ey=4.047) and internet in Kazakhstan (iti=0.010). For the error correction terms, all the coefficients marked with (*) are significant at 5% level except for

Table 3 presents the results of the Pedroni cointegration tests (1999, 2004). The specification of the cointegration regression is given by equation [2] and [3]. Because the variable $(n_t + g + \delta)$ is fundamentally determined by the labor force growth rate (n_t) , and the sum of technology growth rate and the depreciation rate $(g + \delta)$ is usually very small in samples from countries with similar or convergent economic conditions, we assume that the term $(n_t + g + \delta)$ is approximately equal to (n_t) .

Table 3 shows a greater frequency of rejection of the null hypothesis of no cointegration by the group-mean panel cointegration statistics (between-dimension), implying the acceptance of an alternative hypothesis that favors the existence of long-run equilibrium relationships that differ across countries. On the other hand, the null hypothesis of no cointegration for the variable that measures the percentage of the population using the internet (it_i) can only be rejected at the 10% significance level by the ρ -statistic in the model without human capital. However, stronger rejections are shown when including human capital in the regression of cointegration.

In general, the evidence provided by Table 3 suggests the existence of a stable long-run equilibrium relationship in all cointegration regressions. Next, we estimate the equilibrium relationships using the group-mean PDOLS estimator. The results are presented in Table 4.

At a global level, the estimation using the dynamic OLS of the investment coefficient is positively significant, as suggested by economic theory. Additionally, the estimated coefficients are in the interval (0.087, 1.894). The coefficient of investment is not statistically significant only in the long-run relationship that includes electricity generation capacity $(ecap_t)$ and excludes human capital (h_t) . However, when human capital is included in this same long-run relationship, the response of productivity to a 1% increase in total capital is more than proportional (1.89%). On the other hand, the lower response in the economy's productivity (0.087%) to a 1% increase in gross capital formation is associated with the long-run equilibrium relationship that includes gross electricity production (ey_t) . The growth rate of the labor force is significant in all specifications. However, the negative sign suggested by Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) is sustained only in long-run equilibrium relationships that include electricity capacity $(ecap_t)$ and internet (it_t) . This could reflect an insufficient labor force or a shrinking of the population in this region. ¹⁵

The country-specific coefficients of the infrastructure variables are mostly significant, providing evidence in favor of rejecting the hypothesis of a common effect of infrastructure on production. The following sectoral observations are made from the estimation results.

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 $^{^{14}\}left(n_{t}+g+\delta\right) \cong n_{t}.$

¹⁵ This result is aligned with recent economic and demographic reports of this region. See Cadavid *et al.* (2017).

6.1 Electricity

An increase in electricity production is associated with an increase in GDP for Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, but the association is negative for Kyrgyzstan. On the other hand, in the case of electricity generating capacity, the effects are positive and significant for Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan, but negative for Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. The negative effects may reflect an overinvestment in electricity generating capacity or a high cost of increasing the electricity generating capacity.

6.2 Telecommunication and the Internet

Internet subscriptions have a positive and significant effect on per capita output in all countries except Tajikistan, but the effect is relatively inelastic. Based on recent data, the population's access to the internet in countries such as Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan is 34.5% (2016), 20.5% (2016), and 12.2% (2014), respectively. Hence, the low impact could reflect a high cost of increasing installed capacity. On the other hand, fixed telephone subscribers have a positive and significant impact for Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan, but a negative impact for Kazakhstan and Tajikistan.

6.3 Sanitation

The expansion of sanitary services has a conclusive positive impact on growth in Azerbaijan and Tajikistan. In the other countries, the effect is ambiguous, taking a positive or negative sign depending on whether the long-run relationship includes human capital.

The estimated coefficient of the error-correction mechanism ECM_{it-1} has a negative sign in all cases, ensuring the reversion to the equilibrium of the long run relationships. The magnitudes of the coefficients are small, indicating that in the presence of a long-run disequilibrium, the reversion to the equilibrium of the long-run relationship is slow.

VII. CROSS-SECTIONAL DEPENDENCE

Thus far, we have not explicitly investigated the issue of cross-sectional dependency, which is highly possible given the geographical, cultural, and economic connections between these countries. Ignoring cross-sectional dependency can cause substantial size distortions in conventional unit root tests (O'Connell, 1998) and lead to misleading inferences (Phillips and Sul, 2003, 2007). Therefore, our

empirical analysis in this part begins with a set of cross-sectional dependency (CD) tests to investigate the contemporaneous correlation across countries in the panel.¹⁶

7.1 Cross-sectional Dependence

Intuitively, cross-sectional dependency occurs when a shock to one economy effects the other economies. Because testing for cross-sectional dependency is essentially equivalent to testing the contemporaneous correlations in the errors, we can use the Lagrange multiplier (LM) statistic developed by Breush and Pagan (1980) for this purpose. The test is based on the following test statistic: $CDLM_1 = T\sum_{i=1}^{N-1}\sum_{j=i+1}^{N}\hat{\rho}_{ij}^2$, where $\hat{\rho}_{ij}$ is the estimated correlation coefficient of the residuals obtained from individual OLS estimations. With N fixed and $T \to \infty$, the CDLM₁ is asymptotically distributed as chisquared with N(N-1)/2 degrees of freedom, under the null hypothesis of no cross-sectional dependency.

Pesaran (2004) proposes two alternative test statistics to overcome the drawbacks of not allowing a large N and the potential size distortion in the CDLM₁ test. The two proposed test statistics are formulated as follows:

$$CDLM_2 = \sqrt{\frac{1}{N(N-1)}} \sum_{i=1}^{N-1} \sum_{j=i+1}^{N} (T\hat{\rho}_{ij}^2 - 1), \qquad CD = \sqrt{\frac{2T}{N(N-1)}} \sum_{i=1}^{N-1} \sum_{j=i+1}^{N} \hat{\rho}_{ij}.$$

By allowing $T \to \infty$ and then $N \to \infty$, the CDLM₂ is asymptotically distributed as standard normal under the null hypothesis of no cross-sectional dependency. The CD test, being a solution to the possible size distortions in the CDLM₁ when N > T, is also asymptotically distributed as standard normal under the null hypothesis of no cross-sectional dependency when $T \to \infty$ and $N \to \infty$, in any order.

Finally, the bias-adjusted LM test of Pesaran *et al.* (2008) is also employed to test for cross-sectional dependency. Using the following formulation of the test statistic, the bias-adjusted LM test has the advantage of being consistent, even when the CD test is inconsistent, because the finite sample behavior of the test successfully controls for the size (Pesaran *et al.*, 2008).

$$LM_{adj} = \sqrt{\frac{2}{N(N-1)}} \sum_{i=1}^{N-1} \sum_{j=i+1}^{N} \frac{(T-k)\hat{\rho}_{ij}^2 - \mu_{Tij}}{v_{Tij}}.$$

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¹⁶ To obtain a balanced panel, our empirical work in this part uses data covering 21 years (1995–2015) instead of 22 years, with the year 2016 excluded.

Table 5 Cross-sectional Dependence Tests

Variables			CDLM-1	CDLM-2	CD	LM _{adj}
gdp _t /l _t	Intercept	Test Stat.	29.802 **	2.703 ***	-1.799 **	2.891 ***
Sapi i	in the second	Prob.	0.013	0.003	0.036	0.002
	Intercept and	Test Stat.	25.736 **	1.960 **	-1.950 **	3.210 ***
	Trend	Prob.	0.041	0.025	0.026	0.001
St	Intercept	Test Stat.	19.374	0.799	-1.246	5.222 ***
~1	1	Prob.	0.197	0.212	0.106	0.000
	Intercept and	Test Stat.	21.200	1.132	-0.946	4.722 ***
	Trend	Prob.	0.131	0.129	0.172	0.000
n _t	Intercept	Test Stat.	20.058	0.923	-2.031 **	11.885 ***
٠	1	Prob.	0.170	0.178	0.021	0.000
	Intercept and	Test Stat.	46.089 ***	5.676 ***	-2.115 **	10.951 ***
	Trend	Prob.	0.000	0.000	0.017	0.000
h _t	Intercept	Test Stat.	31.975 ***	3.099 ***	-1.589 *	1.645 *
		Prob.	0.006	0.001	0.056	0.050
	Intercept and	Test Stat.	41.573 ***	4.852 ***	-1.586 *	2.108 **
	Trend	Prob.	0.000	0.000	0.056	0.018
ey _t	Intercept	Test Stat.	37.145 ***	4.043 ***	-2.286 **	7.147 ***
		Prob.	0.001	0.000	0.011	0.000
	Intercept and	Test Stat.	21.514	1.189	-2.562 ***	6.604 ***
	Trend	Prob.	0.121	0.117	0.005	0.000
ecapt	Intercept	Test Stat.	28.673 **	2.496 ***	-2.498 ***	6.466 ***
		Prob.	0.018	0.006	0.006	0.000
	Intercept and	Test Stat.	24.902 *	1.808 **	-2.832 ***	6.638 ***
	Trend	Prob.	0.051	0.035	0.002	0.000
$tele_t$	Intercept	Test Stat.	38.145 ***	4.226 ***	-0.485	-0.077
		Prob.	0.001	0.000	0.314	0.531
	Intercept and	Test Stat.	34.871 ***	3.628 ***	-0.099	1.092
	Trend	Prob.	0.003	0.000	0.461	0.138
it_t	Intercept	Test Stat.	23.272 *	1.510 *	-0.937	7.315 ***
		Prob.	0.079	0.065	0.174	0.000
	Intercept and	Test Stat.	9.087	-1.080	0.021	1.608 *
	Trend	Prob.	0.873	0.140	0.492	0.054
san_t	Intercept	Test Stat.	37.676 ***	4.140 ***	-2.627 ***	5.990 ***
		Prob.	0.001	0.000	0.004	0.000
	Intercept and	Test Stat.	41.415 ***	4.823 ***	-2.323 **	4.820 ***
	Trend	Prob.	0.000	0.000	0.010	0.000

Note: (*), (**), and (***) denote the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels at which the null hypothesis of no cross-sectional dependence can be rejected.

As shown in Table 5, the bias-adjusted LM test rejects the null hypothesis of no cross-sectional dependency for all variables except for telephone subscriptions (*tele_t*) which shows strong cross-sectional

dependence at the 99% confidence level in both the CDLM₁ and CDLM₂ tests.¹⁷ Given the existence of cross-sectional dependency, the "first-generation" techniques used previously become inefficient. In the following sections, we use a set of "second-generation" tests and estimation methods to further investigate the effects of the infrastructure in the presence of cross-sectional dependence.

7.2 Integration

To determine the stationarity of the series in the presence of cross-sectional dependency, we employ the cross-sectionally augmented ADF (CADF) test of Pesaran (2007). The test is applicable for both N > T and N < T, and its critical values are obtained from Monte Carlo simulations. Based on the formation of the following regression:

$$\Delta y_{it} = a_i + b_i y_{i,t-1} + c_i \overline{y}_{t-1} + d_i \Delta \overline{y}_t + e_{it},$$

the CADF test has a null hypothesis of existing unit root in the panel data with cross-sectional dependence in the form of common factor dependence. The cross-sectionally augmented IPS (CIPS) test statistic is then calculated as the simple average of the individual CADF statistics.

Table 6
CIPS Unit Roots Test

	CII S CIIIC ROOES I CS	, ,
	Null Hyp	oothesis
	I (1)	I (2)
Variables	Test Stat.	Test Stat.
gdp_t/l_t	-1.647	-2.306 *
St	-1.848	-3.329 ***
$n_{\rm t}$	-1.882	-2.402 **
h_t	-2.347 **	-4.773 ***
eyt	-1.152	-3.329 ***
ecapt	-2.172	-3.480 ***
telet	-0.241	-0.497
it_t	-2.088	-3.094 ***
san_t	-1.624	-3.096 ***

Note: (*), (**), and (***) denote the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels. The null hypothesis of the test is unit root in panel data with cross-sectional dependence in the form of a common factor dependence. The tests are performed with intercept corresponding to the Case II of Pesaran (2007).

Table 6 shows the unit root test results with the CIPS statistics. ¹⁸ The tests are performed with an intercept, corresponding to Case II of Pesaran (2007). In general, the variables maintain similar patterns of

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¹⁷ This is true in both the model with the intercept only and in the model with the intercept and the trend.

¹⁸ Individual CADF test statistics are available from the author upon request.

stationarity to those in the "first-generation" IPS test. Gross fixed capital formation (s_t), human capital (h_t), electricity production (ey_t), installed capacity for electricity generation ($ecap_t$), individuals using the internet (it_t), and improved sanitation facilities (san_t) are all stationary in their first differences at the 1% significance level. The labor force growth rate (n_t) is stationary in the first difference only at the 5% significance level. The first difference of the variable GDP per capita (gdp_t/l_t) is stationary at the 10% significance level in the model with the intercept, but stationary at the 5% significance level when both the intercept and the trend are included. The fixed telephone subscription ($tele_t$) is still shown to be of I(2). Hence, its first difference is used in later tests and estimations.

7.3 Cointegration

Because the variables are I(1), 21 we now investigate the cointegration relationships between GDP per capita (gdp_i/l_i) and its potential determinants. The LM bootstrap panel cointegration test proposed by Westerlund and Edgerton (2007) is carried out for this purpose. In the scalar variate $y_{it} = \alpha_i + x'_{it}\beta_i + z_{it}$, where t = 1, ..., T, i = 1, ..., N, the disturbance z_{it} is assumed to be $z_{it} = u_{it} + v_{it}$, with $v_{it} = \sum_{j=1}^{t} \eta_{ij}$. The independent and identically distributed (i.i.d) process η_{ij} has a zero mean and variance σ_i^2 . Under this formulation, the LM bootstrap cointegration test has the null hypothesis H_0 : $\sigma_i^2 = 0$, for all i, and the alternative hypothesis H_1 : $\sigma_i^2 > 0$, for some i. Here, we test the null hypothesis of cointegration between GDP per capita (gdp_i/l_t) and its potential determinant series against the alternative of no cointegration relationships.

Table 7 provides strong evidence of cointegration relationships. The table reports both bootstrap p-values and asymptotic p-values for the purpose of comparison, although the latter are not of interest because they are computed under the assumption of cross-sectional independence. According to the bootstrap test results, the null hypothesis of cointegration is accepted in all cointegration regressions in the model with the intercept and the trend. When fixed telephone subscriptions ($\Delta tele_t$) is entered as the infrastructure variable (f_t), the null hypothesis is rejected at the 5% level of significance for the model with the intercept only, with a bootstrap p-value of 0.024. However, the null hypothesis is accepted at all levels of significance with a bootstrap p-value of 0.872 once the trend is allowed in the model. In all other cointegration regressions, the null hypothesis is accepted at all levels of significance in both models.

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¹⁹ Human capital (h_t) is non-stationary only at the 1% significance level, whereas the other variables are non-stationary at all significance levels. When further testing in the model with both the intercept and the trend, human capital (h_t) is non-stationary at all significance level with a CIPS test statistic of -2.613.

²⁰ The model with both the intercept and the trend corresponds to Case III of Pesaran (2007). In this case, when testing the stationarity of GDP per capita (gdp_t/l_t) at the first difference, the test statistic is -3.099, which is rejected at the 5% significance level.

With the fixed telephone subscription ($tele_t$) in its first difference ($\Delta tele_t$).

Table 7
LM Bootstrap Panel Cointegration Test

		With	nout Hur	nan Cap	oital				W	ith Hun	nan Capi	tal	
	1	ntercept		Inter	cept & T	Frend			Intercept	t	Interd	cept & T	rend
f_t	Stat.	Boot-p	Asy-p	Stat.	Boot-p	Asy-p	Sta	t.	Boot-p	Asy-p	Stat.	Boot-p	Asy-p
ey_t	2.362	0.917	0.009	5.058	0.905	0.000	5.51	3	0.885	0.000	11.698	0.492	0.000
$ecap_t$	2.527	0.921	0.006	4.206	0.993	0.000	4.66	55	0.965	0.000	11.963	0.504	0.000
$\Delta tele_t$	5.737 *	* 0.024	0.000	5.122	0.872	0.000	7.19	97	0.128	0.000	10.890	0.593	0.000
it_t	2.535	0.928	0.006	4.430	0.996	0.000	4.79)4	0.958	0.000	11.000	0.620	0.000
san_t	2.077	0.874	0.019	4.892	0.836	0.000	4.37	70	0.956	0.000	9.984	0.791	0.000

Note: The test is developed by Westerlund and Edgerton (2007). (*), (**), and (***) denote the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels at which the null hypothesis of cointegration can be rejected. The cointegration regression is formulated as follows: $gdpt/l_t$, s_t , n_t , (h_t), f_t .

7.4 The Estimation of Long-Run Relationships

Given the existence of panel cointegration, the long-run relationships of the model can be further estimated using estimation procedures that take into account cross-sectional dependence. The common correlated effects mean group (CCEMG) estimator of Pesaran (2006) provides a simple, but powerful solution for this type of estimation. By including the cross-sectional averages of both the dependent and the independent variables, the CCEMG estimator has the advantage of being computable by least squares applied to auxiliary regressions, and able to yield consistent estimates in situations such as serial correlation in errors, unit roots in the factors, and possible contemporaneous dependence of the observed regressors with unobserved factors (Pesaran, 2006; Pesaran and Tosetti, 2011; Coakley *et al.*, 2006; Kapetanios and Pesaran, 2006; Kapetanios *et al.*, 2011). Under the CCEMG formulation, the specification of our infrastructure-augmented growth model becomes

$$\ln(y_{it}) = a_i + b_i X_{it} + \mu_1 \overline{\ln(y_{it})} + \mu_2 \overline{X_t} + \varepsilon_{it},$$

where i = 1, ..., N and t = 1, ..., T. The coefficient μ_1 represents the estimated elasticity of the dependent variable $\ln(y_{it})$ with respect to its cross-sectional average. The variable X contains all the independent variables. Therefore, the coefficient μ_2 is the elasticity of $\ln(y_{it})$ with respect to the cross-sectional averages of the independent variables or the observed regressors. In this procedure, The CCEMG estimator is calculated as the simple average of the individual common correlated effects (CCE) estimators, expressed as follows:

$$\hat{b}_{CCEMG} = \sum_{I=1}^{N} \frac{CCE_{i}}{N}, \qquad SE(\hat{b}_{CCEMG}) = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{N} \sigma(\hat{b}_{CCE_{i}})}{\sqrt{N}}.$$

Table 8A

Estimation
(CCEMG) Est
n Group
s Mean
Effects
orrelated
Common Co
J

eyr ccapt Atelet 0.010 -0.004 0.054 0.053 0.015 0.015 (0.053) (0.048) (0.057) (0.075) (0.074) (0.094) (0.0 (1.482) -1.124 0.996 -1.208 1.1 (2.415) (2.135) (3.296) (1.955) (2.530) (3.2 1 0.040 -0.275 ** -0.167 *** (0.130) (0.133) (0.058) -0.058 0.044 0.027 0.098 -0.293 -0.002 -0.136 -0.1 0.0112) (0.025) (0.290) (0.534) (0.095) (0.177) (0.0 0.870 2.460 7.240 15.210 2.030 2.662.430 0. 1.26 1.05 1.05 1.06 1.00 1.00 0.			Ele	Electricity		Telecon	nmunication	II	nternet	Sa	Sanitation
-0.004 0.054 0.053 0.052 0.015 (0.048) (0.057) (0.075) (0.074) (0.094) 1.119 -1.482 -1.124 0.996 -1.208 (2.775) (2.135) (3.296) (1.955) (2.530) 0.040 -0.275 ** -0.167 *** (0.130) (0.133) (0.058) 0.027 0.098 -0.293 -0.002 -0.136 (0.025) (0.290) (0.534) (0.095) (0.177) 2.460 7.240 15.210 2.030 2662.430 105 126 126 120 100			eyt		ecapt		Δtelet		itt		sant
(0.048) (0.057) (0.075) (0.074) (0.094) 1.119 -1.482 -1.124 0.996 -1.208 (2.775) (2.135) (3.296) (1.955) (2.530) 0.040 -0.275 *** -0.167 **** (0.130) (0.133) (0.058) 0.027 0.098 -0.293 -0.002 -0.136 (0.025) (0.290) (0.534) (0.095) (0.177) 2.460 7.240 15.210 2.030 2662.430 105 126 126 120 100	Investment	0.010	-0.004	0.054	0.053	0.052	0.015	0.016	0.014	0.059	0.020
1.119 -1.482 -1.124 0.996 -1.208 (2.775) (2.135) (3.296) (1.955) (2.530) 0.040 -0.275 ** -0.167 *** (0.130) (0.133) (0.058) 0.027 0.098 -0.293 -0.002 -0.136 (0.025) (0.290) (0.534) (0.095) (0.177) 2.460 7.240 15.210 2.030 2662.430 105 126 105 100		(0.053)	(0.048)	(0.057)	(0.075)	(0.074)	(0.094)		(0.051)	(0.050)	(0.051)
(2.415) (2.775) (2.135) (3.296) (1.955) (2.530) 0.040 -0.275 ** -0.167 *** (0.130) (0.133) (0.058) 0.044 0.027 0.098 -0.293 -0.002 -0.136 (0.112) (0.025) (0.290) (0.534) (0.095) (0.177) 0.870 2.460 7.240 15.210 2.030 2662.430 126 105 106 100	Population Growth	0.027	1.119	-1.482	-1.124	0.996	-1.208		3.206	-0.518	-1.290
0.0400.275 **0.167 *** (0.130) (0.133) (0.058) 0.044 0.027 0.098 -0.293 -0.002 -0.136 (0.112) (0.025) (0.290) (0.534) (0.095) (0.177) 0.870 2.460 7.240 15.210 2.030 2662.430 126 105 105 106 100		(2.415)	(2.775)	(2.135)	(3.296)	(1.955)	(2.530)		(4.732)	(3.190)	(3.540)
(0.130) (0.133) (0.058) 0.044 0.027 0.098 -0.293 -0.002 -0.136 (0.112) (0.025) (0.290) (0.534) (0.095) (0.177) 0.870 2.460 7.240 15.210 2.030 2662.430 1.26 1.05 1.06 1.00	Human Capital	1	0.040	1	-0.275 **	1	-0.167 ***		0.091	ł	-0.075
0.044 0.027 0.098 -0.293 -0.002 -0.136 (0.112) (0.025) (0.290) (0.534) (0.095) (0.177) 0.870 2.460 7.240 15.210 2.030 2662.430 126 105 106 100		1	(0.130)	1	(0.133)	-	(0.058)		(0.233)	1	(0.052)
(0.112) (0.025) (0.290) (0.534) (0.095) (0.177) 0.870 2.460 7.240 15.210 2.030 2662.430 126 105 105 100	Infrastructure	0.044	0.027	0.098	-0.293	-0.002	-0.136		-0.005	10.959	13.223
0.870 2.460 7.240 15.210 2.030 2662.430 126 105 105 100		(0.112)	(0.025)	(0.290)	(0.534)	(0.095)	(0.177)	(0.015)	(0.004)	(8.738)	(16.758)
126 105 176 105 170 100	Wald-test	0.870	2.460	7.240	15.210	2.030	2662.430	0.290	6.160	8.070	331.360
	Observations	126	105	126	105	120	100	126	105	126	105

Note: (*), (**), and (***) denote the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels.

Table 8B Fixed-effects Model Estimation

		Electr	ricity		Telecommunicatio	Telecommunication	Int	Internet	Sanitation	ation
	e	eyt	Se ec	ecapt	Δτε	Δtelet		itt	sant	nt
Investment	-0.028	-0.077	0.248 ***	* 0.164 **	0.098	-0.037	-0.012	-0.118 *	0.309 ***	0.214 ***
	(0.083)	(0.098)	(0.085)	(0.066)	(0.116)	(0.129)	(0.059)	(0.067)	(0.069)	(0.068)
Population Growth 4.690	4.690	4.726	13.335 ***	13.335 *** 20.063 ***	6.082	10.404 **	-0.649	2.570	6.920 **	11.508 ***
	(3.520)	(3.982)	(3.674)	(2.565)	(5.230)	(5.088)	(2.582)	(2.683)	(2.961)	(2.584)
Human Capital	1	0.810 ***	;	0.212	-	1.283 ***	1	0.203	1	0.250
	1	(0.267)	1	(0.186)	1	(0.328)	1	(0.190)	1	(0.189)
Infrastructure	1.432 ***	1.432 *** 1.423 ***	2.834 ***	* 3.551 ***	0.287 **	0.391	0.113 ***	** 0.103 ***	4.937 ***	4.605 ***
	(0.133)	(0.197)	(0.286)	(0.230)	(0.139)	(0.748)	(0.000)	(0.007)	(0.342)	(0.307)
F-test	41.620	22.300	35.580	80.280	2.030	4.970	115.270	75.950	73.920	76.130
Observations	126	105	126	105	120	100	126	105	126	105

Note: (*), (**), and (***) denote the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels.

In Table 8A, we see that the CCEMG estimator provides seemingly different results from those of the "first-generation" methods. Almost all estimates become non-significant when the cross-sectional dependency is considered.²² For comparison purposes, a traditional "first-generation" fixed-effects model is also estimated and reported in Table 8B, where the infrastructure variables are mostly positive and significant at the 99% level of confidence. This dramatic change in the significance of the estimates could potentially be associated with the existence of international externality and spillover effects of the infrastructure and other variables between the six countries. This is because the CCE procedure eliminates the effects of all forms of spatial and temporal correlations, irrespective of whether these are due to spatial or unobserved common factors (Pesaran and Tosetti, 2011). Furthermore, eliminating the cross-sectional correlations can be especially effective for infrastructure variables when the coefficient of infrastructure (b_4) in equation [3] primarily measures externalities and other indirect effects of infrastructure development.²³ In the next section, we examine the causality between infrastructure and growth in order to gain insight from a different perspective.

7.5 Causality between Infrastructure and Economic Growth

Granger causality occurs when the forecasts of one variable (Y) are improved by the knowledge of past values of another variable (X). To test the direction of causality, a traditional approach is to estimate a panel vector error correction model (VECM) using the generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator. However, this approach considers neither heterogeneity nor cross-sectional dependency. Therefore, it may produce inconsistent and potentially highly misleading estimates unless the slope coefficients are in fact identical or homogeneous (Pesaran et al., 1999). Given the existence of cross-sectional dependency across individuals in the panel, estimating sets of equations using seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) becomes more efficient than using an equation-by-equation estimation with least-squares (Zellner, 1962). In light of this, Kónya (2006) proposes an SUR-based method that considers both the heterogeneity and the cross-sectional dependency across the individuals of a panel. The equation system in this approach contains two sets of equations:

$$y_{1,t} = \alpha_{1,1} + \sum_{i=1}^{ly_1} \beta_{1,1,i} \ y_{1,t-i} + \sum_{i=1}^{lx_1} \delta_{1,1,i} \ x_{k,1,t-i} + \varepsilon_{1,1,t}$$

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²² Although the coefficients of human capital are shown to be negative and significant at the 95% and 99% confidence levels in the models of electricity capacity and telecommunication, they do not provide meaningful economic insight because the definition of h_t (lower secondary completion rate) is an inefficient measurement of human capital.

The effect of a pure stock increase of infrastructure is included in the coefficient of the gross fixed capital formation (b_2) .

$$y_{2,t} = \alpha_{1,2} + \sum_{i=1}^{ly_1} \beta_{1,2,i} \ y_{2,t-i} + \sum_{i=1}^{lx_1} \delta_{1,2,i} \ x_{k,2,t-i} + \varepsilon_{1,2,t}$$

$$y_{N,t} = \alpha_{1,N} + \sum_{i=1}^{ly_1} \beta_{1,N,i} \ y_{N,t-i} + \sum_{i=1}^{lx_1} \delta_{1,N,i} \ x_{k,N,t-i} + \varepsilon_{1,N,t}$$

and

$$x_{k,1,t} = \alpha_{2,1} + \sum_{i=1}^{ly_2} \beta_{2,1,i} \ y_{1,t-i} + \sum_{i=1}^{lx_2} \delta_{2,1,i} \ x_{k,1,t-i} + \varepsilon_{2,1,t}$$

$$x_{k,2,t} = \alpha_{2,2} + \sum_{i=1}^{ly_2} \beta_{2,2,i} \ y_{2,t-i} + \sum_{i=1}^{lx_2} \delta_{2,1,i} \ x_{k,2,t-i} + \varepsilon_{2,2,t}$$

:

$$x_{k,N,t} = \alpha_{2,N} + \sum_{i=1}^{ly_2} \beta_{2,N,i} y_{N,t-i} + \sum_{i=1}^{lx_2} \delta_{2,N,i} x_{k,N,t-i} + \varepsilon_{2,N,t},$$

where i=1,...,N and t=1,...,T denote the number of countries and periods, respectively, y denotes the GDP per capita, and x_k represents the infrastructure indicator. Under this formulation, for any country j, there is no Granger causality between infrastructure (X) and GDP per capita (Y) if all $\delta_{1,j,i}$ and $\beta_{2,j,i}$ are zero. There is two-way Granger causality between X and Y if neither $\delta_{1,j,i}$ nor $\beta_{2,j,i}$ are zero. There is one-way Granger causality from X to Y if not all $\delta_{1,j,i}$ are zero, but all $\beta_{2,j,i}$ are zero. Lastly, there is one-way Granger causality from Y to X if all $\delta_{1,j,i}$ are zero, but not all $\beta_{2,j,i}$ are zero.

Table 9 provides a summary of the directions of causality.²⁴ The notation " \rightarrow " indicates causality from infrastructure development to economic growth (Panel A) and " \leftarrow " represents causality from economic growth to infrastructure development (Panel B). The table shows that economic growth is sensitive to at least one infrastructure sector in all countries except Kyrgyzstan, as shown in Panel A. For Azerbaijan, economic growth is sensitive to electricity infrastructure (ey_t , $ecap_t$) development only. Economic growth shows the most sensitivity to infrastructure development in the case of Kazakhstan, with four causalities found under three sectors (ey_t , $ecap_t$, $tele_t$, it_t). For Tajikistan, the evidence indicates that

²⁴ See Appendix A for the detailed results of the panel Granger causality tests. The maximum number of lags in these tests is allowed to be three, using the Schwarz Bayesian Criterion.

only an improvement in sanitation facilities (san_t) induces economic growth. In Turkmenistan, both electricity generation capacity $(ecap_t)$ and sanitation facilities (san_t) improvements cause economic growth. In Uzbekistan, economic growth is associated with the development of electricity gross production (ey_t) , internet use (it_t) , and improvements in sanitation facilities (san_t) . The reverse causality shown in Panel B indicates that infrastructure development is most sensitive to economic growth in Kazakhstan, with causalities found under three infrastructure indicators $(ey_t, ecap_t, tele_t)$. Economic growth can also lead to the development of the fixed telephone infrastructure $(tele_t)$ in Kyrgyzstan and an improvement in sanitation facilities (san_t) in Uzbekistan.

Table 9
Summary of the Direction of Causality

	,		ction of Cau	is ttilly	
	Electricity	Electricity	Fixed	Internet	Sanitation
f_t	Production	Capacity	Telephone		
Country	eyt	ecapt	telet	itt	sant
Panel A:	Infrastru	icture Deve	elopment →	Economic	Growth
Azerbaijan	\rightarrow	\rightarrow			
Kazakhstan	\rightarrow	\rightarrow	\rightarrow	\rightarrow	
Kyrgyzstan					
Tajikistan					\rightarrow
Turkmenistan		\rightarrow			\rightarrow
Uzbekistan	\rightarrow			\rightarrow	\rightarrow
Panel	\rightarrow	\rightarrow		\rightarrow	\rightarrow
Panel B:	Infrastri	icture Devi	elopment ←	Economic	Growth
Azerbaijan					
Kazakhstan	←	\leftarrow	\leftarrow		
Kyrgyzstan			\leftarrow		
Tajikistan					
Turkmenistan					
Uzbekistan					\leftarrow
Panel		\leftarrow	\leftarrow		

Given the non-uniform distribution of the frequency of causality across countries and sectors in Table 9,²⁵ we further investigate the relationship between the frequency of causality and each country's overall economic performance. In order to provide a brief overview, each country's frequency of causality is counted and plotted, along with the average annual GDP over the period of 21 years.²⁶ The results are shown in Figure 1, where Panels A and B correspond to Panels A and B in Table 9, respectively, and Panel

 $^{^{25}}$ For instance, Kazakhstan has the highest frequency of causality in both Panel A (frequency = 4) and Panel B (frequency = 3), whereas countries such as Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan show much lower frequencies of causality.

²⁶ The average annual GDPs are measured in natural logarithms.

C counts the total frequency of causality from both Panel A and Panel B. Panel A indicates a strong correlation between the frequency of causality and the average GDP, with a coefficient of correlation r = 0.94. In other words, in stronger economies, we tend to see more causal relationships from infrastructure to growth. A relatively weaker correlation is found in Panel B, with a coefficient of correlation r = 0.61, when the direction of causality considered in Panel A is reversed. This still implies that stronger economies show more causal relationships from economic growth to infrastructure development. When the total frequency of causalities from both Panels A and B are counted, the correlation relationship remains strong (r = 0.89), as shown in Panel C. This provides evidence supporting the hypothesis that when growth is sensitive to infrastructure development, the overall economic performance tends to be better. The results in Panel C further confirm that a well-established causal interactive relationship between infrastructure development and economic growth is pivotal to overall economic performance.

Panel A Panel B Panel C Infrastructure → Growth Infrastructure ← Growth Total r = 0.94r = 0.61r = 0.89----- Frequency of Causality ----- Frequency of Causality ----- Frequency of Causality Avg. Annual GDP - Avg. Annual GDP Avg. Annual GDP 30 30 30 25 25 25 20 20 20 15 15 15 10 10 10 5 5 5 O 0 Turknenistan Tuknenistan **Zaikistan** Turknenistan Kalakhstan **Tailkistan Taikistan** Kalakhstan KARAFTER

Figure 1 - Number of Causality and Average GDP

The above results reveal a potential institutional aspect of infrastructure development: an institution that helps establish a causal relationship between infrastructure and growth leads to a better-performing economy in general. Two steps can be employed to establish the causality. First, under the assumption of economies of scale, it is critical to increase the infrastructure stock level to the point where economies of scale can take effect. Second, once the infrastructure stock accumulates to a certain level, ensuring that the

infrastructure's externality and network effect efficiently prevail would further enhance the effectiveness and eventually lead to a well-established causal relationship and a faster-growing economy.²⁷

VIII. CONCLUSION

This study examined the relationship between infrastructure development and economic growth in six Central Asian countries (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) using the infrastructure-augmented production function approach. The empirical evidence from the "first-generation" econometric methods showed the significant role infrastructure plays in economic growth in the long run, although the magnitude varies across countries and sectors. However, the long-run relationships became non-significant once cross-sectional dependency was taken account using a set of "second-generation" estimation methods. This revealed the potential existence of international externality and spillover effects of the base model variables, although it requires further evaluation. The direction of causality between infrastructure development and economic growth was verified across countries and sectors, taking into account cross-sectional dependency. In more robust economies, we found that more sectoral causal relationships tend to occur between infrastructure development and economic growth in both directions. We briefly discussed the policy implications from an institutional perspective and proposed two steps to increase the effect of infrastructure and establish a causal relationship between infrastructure and growth.

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²⁷ Institutional factors such as government credibility and the level of corruption can potentially impact the effect of infrastructure on growth. Esfahani and Ramírez (2003) provide a relevant study on this topic.

Appendix A. Results From Bootstrap Panel Causality Test

Table A1 - Panel Causality Test for Electricity Gross Production

$f_t = e y_t$]	$H_0: f_t$ does	s not cause	$e g dp_t/l_t$		I	H_0 : gdp_t/l	t does not	t cause f_t
		_	Bootstra	p Critical	Values	•	_	Bootstra	p Critical	Values
Country	Wald Stat.	Boot-p	1%	5%	10%	Wald Stat.	Boot-p	1%	5%	10%
Azerbaijan	12.777 **	0.020	15.560	9.976	7.731	0.670	0.904	12.914	8.611	6.564
Kazakhstan	12.444 ***	0.001	5.828	3.301	2.520	54.090 ***	0.000	28.124	20.496	17.139
Kyrgyzstan	0.268	0.523	6.686	3.420	2.193	3.482	0.112	11.104	5.248	3.778
Tajikistan	0.060	0.823	6.903	4.216	2.916	8.705	0.342	27.277	16.666	14.202
Turkmenistan	1.844	0.957	30.359	20.830	15.376	1.016	0.991	28.178	19.748	16.616
Uzbekistan	3.840 *	0.050	7.842	3.813	2.647	9.262	0.771	39.667	29.368	23.918
Panel Fisher	29.405 ***	0.003		•		7.264	0.840		•	

Note: (*), (**), and (***) denote the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels at which the null hypothesis can be rejected.

Table A2 - Panel Causality Test for Electricity Capacity

$f_t = ecap_t$		H_0 : gdp_t/l_t does not cause f_t								
		Bootstrap Critical Values					_	Bootstra	p Critical	Values
Country	Wald Stat.	Boot-p	1%	5%	10%	Wald Stat.	Boot-p	1%	5%	10%
Azerbaijan	3.547 **	0.043	5.881	3.283	2.386	9.154	0.575	26.279	20.208	17.072
Kazakhstan	3.349 **	0.019	4.851	2.617	1.697	11.013 ***	0.005	8.135	5.361	4.225
Kyrgyzstan	1.405	0.233	6.293	3.486	2.410	5.490	0.149	12.397	8.249	6.546
Tajikistan	2.087	0.445	18.424	11.873	8.243	4.152	0.428	12.419	8.344	7.082
Turkmenistan	28.372 ***	0.000	3.699	2.008	1.429	0.568	0.301	4.777	2.580	1.783
Uzbekistan	0.844	0.468	14.406	6.391	4.392	8.310	0.291	23.299	15.984	12.704
Panel Fisher	20.271 *	0.062		•		22.078 **	0.037		•	

Note: (*), (**), and (***) denote the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels at which the null hypothesis can be rejected.

Table A3 - Panel Causality Test for Telecommunication

$f_t = \Delta tele_t$]	$H_0: f_t$ does	s not caus	$e g dp_t/l_t$	H_0 : gdp_t/l_t does not cause f_t					
	Bootstrap Critical Values						_	Bootstra	p Critical	Values	
Country	Wald Stat.	Boot-p	1%	5%	10%	Wald Stat.	Boot-p	1%	5%	10%	
Azerbaijan	0.389	0.497	6.791	3.576	2.346	1.868	0.152	7.441	3.949	2.511	
Kazakhstan	5.156 **	0.025	6.630	3.578	2.603	19.962 ***	0.003	15.119	8.961	5.888	
Kyrgyzstan	2.226	0.183	7.790	4.824	3.319	14.431 ***	0.001	12.165	6.871	5.356	
Tajikistan	3.123	0.709	39.585	22.129	16.139	0.310	0.643	10.595	5.172	3.913	
Turkmenistan	0.792	0.307	10.705	5.345	3.039	4.620	0.140	14.124	6.670	5.275	
Uzbekistan	1.346	0.501	19.727	10.173	7.384	2.027	0.248	12.089	5.539	3.893	
Panel Fisher	16.605	0.165				36.806 ***	0.000				

Note: (*), (**), and (***) denote the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels at which the null hypothesis can be rejected.

Table A4 - Panel Causality Test for Internet

$f_t = it_t$	7.11.C	H	$H_0: f_t \text{ does}$		$e gdp_t/l_t$		I	H_0 : gdp_t/l	, does not	cause f_{i}		
	. 11 0		Rootetra	~			H_0 : gdp_t/l_t does not cause f_t					
	7 11 0		Bootstrap Critical Values					Bootstrap Critical Val				
Country W	/ald Stat.	Boot-p	1%	5%	10%	Wald Stat.	Boot-p	1%	5%	10%		
Azerbaijan 7	.541	0.291	20.547	14.317	11.641	0.000	0.992	9.355	5.041	3.403		
Kazakhstan 12	.676 **	0.021	14.845	10.240	7.927	0.318	0.836	6.235	4.643	3.720		
Kyrgyzstan 0	.698	0.948	18.718	12.517	10.585	0.701	0.941	23.744	16.177	13.094		
Tajikistan 2	.067	0.997	36.416	24.912	20.757	0.305	0.998	27.692	20.748	17.015		
Turkmenistan 3	.845	0.567	16.963	11.387	9.498	0.405	0.986	31.067	20.124	16.555		
Uzbekistan 10	.578 ***	0.006	9.935	6.559	5.687	3.233	0.387	8.284	6.272	5.239		
Panel Fisher 21	.675 **	0.041				2.427	0.998					

Note: (*), (**), and (***) denote the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels at which the null hypothesis can be rejected.

Table A5 - Panel Causality Test for Sanitation

$f_t = san_t$	H_0 : f_t does not cause gdp_t/l_t					H_0 : gdp_t/l_t does not cause f_t					
		_	Bootstra	•	_	Bootstra	p Critical	Values			
Country	Wald Stat.	Boot-p	1%	5%	10%	Wald Stat.	Boot-p	1%	5%	10%	
Azerbaijan	0.379	0.895	14.623	9.562	7.072	0.822	0.574	6.464	4.217	3.328	
Kazakhstan	5.846	0.624	27.630	19.036	15.314	10.041	0.666	45.102	31.799	25.712	
Kyrgyzstan	29.113	0.242	63.782	47.589	39.126	0.445	0.590	11.217	6.116	4.526	
Tajikistan	91.160 ***	0.004	78.192	45.759	38.791	1.138	0.815	22.329	12.528	9.673	
Turkmenistan	11.408 *	0.098	19.992	13.743	11.310	0.078	0.954	10.240	6.670	5.285	
Uzbekistan	22.041 ***	0.000	13.970	10.578	8.425	28.471 ***	0.000	11.866	8.244	6.202	
Panel Fisher	19.691 *	0.073				3.482	0.991				

Note: (*), (**), and (***) denote the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels at which the null hypothesis can be rejected.

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