Hannes Titeca

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Education

University of Exeter. PhD candidate in Economics. 2016 - 2021
Thesis title: Factors influencing non-strategic prosocial and cooperative behaviour. Advisors:
Prof. Brit Grosskopf, Dr Sebastian Kripfganz & Prof. Rajiv Sarin.

University of Exeter. MSc Economics (Distinction). 2015 - 2016
School Commendation for Academic Performance.

Maastricht University. BSc Economics and Business Economics, 2012 - 2015
Economics specialisation. GPA: 8.61 / 10, Cum Laude.

University of California, Santa Barbara. Exchange semester. 2014
GPA: 3.75 / 4, Dean's Honors.

Research Fields

Behavioural Economics, Experimental Economics, Applied Microeconomics.

Research Papers (Each based on a PhD thesis chapter)

"Testing for exposure effects and guilt aversion in a public goods game" (Job Market Paper).

Exposure effects are related to knowing that one's choice will be observed by others or that you will observe the choice of others ex–post. For example, a "shame averse" individual would contribute more to a public good when they know that they will be observed. This is distinct from guilt aversion where an individual experiences disutility simply from failing to meet the expectations of others. The guilt aversion hypothesis therefore predicts a positive correlation between cooperative behaviour and second order beliefs (what one believes others expect one to do). A one–shot, two–player public goods game is used to test predictions using a 3 x 2 between–subjects design. The experiment is conducted online using a sample more representative of the general population than typical lab studies. To avoid any potentially confounding consensus effects in the analysis, beliefs are exogenously manipulated at the treatment level through either a low or high contribution norm signal presented to subjects at the point they make their choice. It is found that there are significantly fewer contributions at zero (free–riding) when it is known that one will be observed ex–post, i.e. "shame aversion". The level of contributions at an aggregate level is however relatively unaffected. Additionally, varying the norm signal does indeed shift beliefs and contributions in the direction of the signal, even when one's choice will not be observed. This providing strong and robust evidence in support of the guilt aversion hypothesis.

"Do I care what you think of me? Varying observability in a public goods experiment".

In social dilemmas the level of observability by others often differs, either by design or by coincidence, and it seems intuitive that this might affect prosocial behaviour. For example; the potential for negative emotions such as guilt or shame may be greater when behaviour is more easily observed by others. A lab-based experiment with a 3 x 1 between–subject design is used where the level of ex-post disclosure/feedback others receive is varied in an, anonymous, one–shot, two–player public goods game. Incentivised first order beliefs (what a subject believes their partner will contribute) and second order beliefs (what a subject believes their partner expects them to contribute) are directly elicited. A within–subjects analysis, mitigating any consensus effect concerns (people believing that others think and act like them), finds that at least some people are "shame averse"; when able to be observed ex–post, there is a stronger response to their second order belief of what they believe their partner expects. The same analysis also finds robust evidence for guilt aversion which is possible even when there is no observability by others. When available, receiving information on the average past behaviour of others has the effect of reinforcing any shift in the observed average behaviour.

"Bribing to queue jump: Experiments on negative time externalities and legal alternatives", with Lutfi Rahimi.

With petty corruption being widespread in many countries this paper uses simple experiments to explore some of the behavioural determinants of bribery. We look at a bribe that allows people to "jump the queue" and receive service delivery sooner. In the experiments this corresponds to participants receiving their payment today rather than waiting up to 22 days for payment. As in the real world, such as bribe may have a negative time externality in the sense that others are "pushed down the queue" and must wait even longer for service delivery. Two experiments are conducted online using a broad sample from countries with medium to low incomes and we find that both citizens and officials choose/accept a bribe less when there is a negative time externality. Citizens are also less likely to choose a bribe when a more costly (legal) "fast track fee" is available that delivers the service in the same time as when paying a bribe but has no negative time externality. In addition, incentivised beliefs are found to be strongly correlated with behaviour.

Work in Progress

"Nudging the charitable giving of earnings".
"Third party punishment and the ability to learn about prosocial motivations", with David Hugh-Jones and David Reinstein.

Pre-PhD Publication

"Healthcare Spending: The Role of Healthcare Institutions from an International Perspective," *MaRBLe*, *2*, 2016.

Awards and Recognitions

ESRC 1+3 studentship, University of Exeter, MSc and PhD fees/stipend.	2015 - 2019
School Commendation 2015/16 (for academic performance in MSc).	2016
MaRBLe journal inclusion, Maastricht University.	2016

Bachelor thesis selected as one of best research papers and published in the journal.

Honours and MaRBLe Programme, Maastricht University.	2014 - 2015

Host guest academic speakers as part of honours colloquium, take additional courses and extended thesis during final year.

Conference and Seminar Presentations

2020
Economic Science Association (ESA) Global Online Around-the-Clock Meeting.
Exeter Economics Postgraduate Research Conference.

2019
European ESA Meeting, Dijon, France.
19th Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET) Conference, Ischia, Italy (Invited presentation).
Exeter Economics Postgraduate Research Conference.
10th Southern Europe Experimental Team's Meeting (SEET), Ibiza, Spain.

2018
13th Nordic Conference on Behavioural and Experimental Economics, Odense, Denmark.
Exeter Economics Postgraduate Research Conference.
3rd Workshop on Psychological Game Theory, Soleto, Italy.
ESA World Meeting, Berlin, Germany.
9th SEET Meeting, Lecce, Italy.

2017
Changing Lives - Changing Worlds Graduate Conference, Bath, UK.
University of East Anglia (UEA) Summer School on Psychological Game Theory, Norwich, UK.
Exeter Economics Postgraduate Research conference.
Exeter Behaviour, Identity and Decisions Cluster Seminar.

Conferences and Workshops Attended

2019
South West Doctoral Training Partnership (SWDTP) student conference, Exeter.

2018
2nd Summer School on Psychological Game Theory, Soleto, Italy.
GW4 Collaborate and Communicate, Bristol, UK.
South West GRADSchool Residential Course, Wales, UK.
Experimetrics – PhD Summer School, Norwich, UK.
SWDTP student conference, Bristol, UK.

2017

Cultural Transmission and Social Norms 2, Norwich, UK.

Exeter Prize Workshop.

GW4 Creativity and Teamwork, Bristol, UK.

M2D 1st Annual Conference on Decision Making Under Uncertainty University, Exeter, UK.

2nd Workshop on Psychological Game Theory, Norwich, UK.

Mini Course on Behavioural Finance, Exeter, UK.

IMPACT Network Workshop on Urgent and Emergency Care, Exeter, UK.

Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) student conference, London, UK.

10th Maastricht Behavioral and Experimental Economics Symposium (M-BEES) and Maastricht Behavioral Economic Policy Symposium (M-BEPS), Netherlands.

SWDTP student conference, Bath, UK.

2nd Exeter Workshop on Macroeconomics and Banking.

Institutions and Cooperation Workshop, Exeter.

Royal Economics Society Symposium of Junior Researchers, Bristol, UK.

2016

South West Doctoral Training Centre (SWDTC) student conference, Exeter.

Exeter Prize Workshop.

Learning and Teaching in Higher Education (LTHE) Stage 1, Exeter.

Graduate teaching assistant training, Exeter.

Teaching Experience (As Postgraduate Teaching Assistant at the University of Exeter)

Microeconomics (BEEM101)   2021
Postgraduate (MSc). Lecturer: David Reinstein.

Financial Markets and Decisions I (BEE2027)   2021
Undergraduate Year 2. Lecturer: Joerg Weber.

Economics for Management (BEE1034)   2020
Undergraduate Year 1. Lecturer: Ben Zissimos.

Game Theory (BEE3018)   2020
Undergraduate Year 3. Lecturer: Todd Kaplan

Behavioural Insights for Business and Management (BEE3064)   2018 - 2020
Undergraduate Year 3. Lecturer: Jingnan (Cecilia) Chen.

Economics of Management Strategy (BEE3027)   2017 - 2018
Undergraduate Year 3. Lecturers: Jingnan (Cecilia) Chen & Luke Lindsay.

Behaviour, Decisions and Markets (BEE3049)   2017, 2020
Undergraduate Year 3. Lecturer: Miguel Fonseca.

Microeconomics I (BEE1030)   2017
Undergraduate Year 1. Lecturer: Luke Lindsay.

Microeconomics II (BEE2025)   2016 - 2018
Undergraduate Year 2. Lecturers: Surajeet Chakravarty & Simone Meraglia.

Other Employment and Relevant Experience

Outreach / Widening Participation Ambassador, University of Exeter.   2017 - 2019

Leading interactive taster sessions in Business and Economics with secondary school students, either on campus or at the students' school. This often involved developing new materials including a self-contained resource box on "Behavioural Economics and Strategic Interactions – The Commons Game" that is now also used by local school teachers to deliver the planned session themselves.

PhD Secondment, The Department for Work and Pensions, UK.   February - May 2019

Secondment to the "Claimant Behaviour & Insight Team" within the Counter Fraud and Compliance Directorate providing statistical support and applying the experimental and analytical (both quantitative and qualitative) techniques developed throughout my PhD to a new context; that of preventing fraud and error across the benefits system at system, staff and customer levels.

Refereeing

Homo Oeconomicus.

Proficiencies

Stata, R, Python, z-Tree, oTree, Latex, Microsoft Office.