Rectifying Administrated ERC20 Tokens

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

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

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

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

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

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

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Administrated ERC20 tokens are less safe than the traditional services they are designed to disrupt!

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Self-Destruction

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1 function kill() public onlyAdmin {
2   selfdestruct(payable(msg.sender));
3 }
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Fee address replacement is easily exploitable:

Ivanov et al. *"Targeting the Weakest Link: Social Engineering Attacks in Ethereum Smart Contracts"*, Asia CCS 2021

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

ERC20 Tokens vs Other Contracts



Percentage of Administrated ERC20 Tokens



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

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- If users disagree, they can safely quit the contract before the arrival of the maintenance timestamp.

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

https://seit.egr.msu.edu/