

# Intertemporal Pricing in the Presence of Consumer Behaviors

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YinzOR 2023  
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Max Shen, HKU

“Intertemporal Pricing via Nonparametric Estimation: Integrating Reference Effects and Consumer Heterogeneity”. *Manufacturing & Service Operations Management*. **H. Jiang**, Junyu Cao, Z.-J. Max Shen.

“Multi-Product Dynamic Pricing with Reference Effects Under Logit Demand”. Under 2nd-round review at *Operations Research*. Amy Guo, **H. Jiang**, Z.-J. Max Shen.

# Pricing for a Large Market

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
China's leading e-commerce platform

# Pricing for a Large Market

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China's leading e-commerce platform




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
## JD.com's Pricing Objective



# Pricing for a Large Market



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## JD.com's Pricing Objective


- Pricing strategies to boost revenue



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



## Difficulties

# Pricing for a Large Market



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
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- Data:** Heterogeneous consumers

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

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

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

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

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
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
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**JD.com has — lots of data!**

# Pricing for a Large Market



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

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- Data from thousands of consumers for one product

# Pricing for a Large Market



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## JD.com has — lots of data!

- Data from thousands of consumers for one product
- Exact timestamps of individual consumer activities

# JD.com's Pricing Challenge

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# JD.com's Pricing Challenge

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## Observation

# JD.com's Pricing Challenge

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## Observation

For frequently purchased products, consistently low prices might *not* boost demand after some time

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## Why?

# JD.com's Pricing Challenge

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Reference price effect!

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


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# Reference Price Effects

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Popescu I, Wu Y (2007) “Dynamic pricing strategies with reference effects”.  
Operations Research 55(3):413–429.

# Reference Price Effects

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Quaker Life Original Cereal,  
18oz

★★★★★ 2,282

\$5.99

Save 15% with coupon ▾

Snapshots of a cereal product  
from Amazon's website

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
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Reference price influences demand positively

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


Historical prices of this cereal product (source: camelcamelcamel.com)

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Reference price influences demand positively

Reference price influences demand negatively

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# Balancing Theory and Practice

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# Balancing Theory and Practice

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## Theory



# Balancing Theory and Practice

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## Theory

Homogeneous consumer



# Balancing Theory and Practice

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## Theory

Homogeneous consumer

Aggregate market data



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Homogeneous consumer

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Known deterministic demand



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Optimal price is a fixed point



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## Practice



# Balancing Theory and Practice

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Heterogeneous consumer



# Balancing Theory and Practice

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Homogeneous consumer

Aggregate market data


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## Practice

Heterogeneous consumer

Individual consumer data



# Balancing Theory and Practice

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Homogeneous consumer

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## Practice

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Individual consumer data

Unknown stochastic demand

# Balancing Theory and Practice

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## Theory

Homogeneous consumer

Aggregate market data

Known deterministic demand

Optimal price is a fixed point

## Practice

Heterogeneous consumer

Individual consumer data

Unknown stochastic demand

Optimal pricing policy is a sequence

# Balancing Theory and Practice

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## Theory

Homogeneous consumer

Aggregate market data

Known deterministic demand

Optimal price is a fixed point

## Practice

Heterogeneous consumer

Individual consumer data

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## Tractability

# Balancing Theory and Practice

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Theory	Practice
Homogeneous consumer	Heterogeneous consumer
Aggregate market data	Individual consumer data
Known deterministic demand	Unknown stochastic demand
Optimal price is a fixed point	Optimal pricing policy is a sequence
Tractability	Practicality

# Balancing Theory and Practice

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## Theory

Homogeneous consumer

Aggregate market data

Known deterministic demand

Optimal price is a fixed point

## Practice

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Individual consumer data

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# Contributions

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# Contributions

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Formulate the **heterogeneous** consumer reference effects  
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# Intertemporal Aspects of Pricing

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# Intertemporal Aspects of Pricing



How do consumer valuations depend on historical prices?

**Marketing: Empirics**

Reference prices are shaped by historical prices

# Intertemporal Aspects of Pricing




How do consumer valuations depend on historical prices?

## Marketing: Empirics

Reference prices are shaped by historical prices

## Economics: Prospect theory

Reference prices affect consumer valuations in an asymmetric way



Daniel Kahneman (Nobel Prize in Economics, 2002)

# Heterogeneous Consumer Model

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Time t

# Heterogeneous Consumer Model


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


$p_t$


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Before t



Time t




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
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Before t



Time t



$r_t$




$p_t$

# Heterogeneous Consumer Model

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Before t



Time t



$r_t$




$p_t$

$$\text{Utility } u_t = a - bp_t + c_+(r_t - p_t)_+ + c_-(r_t - p_t)_- + \epsilon_t$$

# Heterogeneous Consumer Model

Before t



Time t



$r_t$




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
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
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
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
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
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# Heterogeneous Consumer Model



$$\text{Utility } u_t = a - bp_t + c_+(\max(r_t - p_t, 0)) + c_-(\min(r_t - p_t, 0)) + \epsilon_t$$

Gain:  $\max(r_t - p_t, 0)$  Loss:  $\min(r_t - p_t, 0)$

Sensitivity to gain


Sensitivity to loss

Random iid Gumbel error

Price sensitivity

Sensitivity parameter  $\theta = (a, b, c_+, c_-)$

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
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
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Heterogeneous consumers  $\theta \sim G$

**Key:** No parametric assumption is imposed on  $G$ !

# Heterogeneous Consumer Model



Heterogeneous consumers  $\theta \sim G$

**Key:** No parametric assumption is imposed on  $G$ !

$$P^G(r_t, p_t) = \int_{\theta \in \Theta} \frac{\exp\{u_t(\theta)\}}{\exp\{u_t(\theta)\} + 1} dG(\theta)$$

# Reference Effects

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**“Diminishing sensitivity” property**





Illustration of reference effects ( $a = 2, b = 1, c_+ = c_- = 1$ )

# Reference Effects

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**“Diminishing sensitivity” property**



*“The first sip of a drink tastes the best,  
and the first dollar lost hurts the most.”*

Illustration of reference effects ( $a = 2, b = 1, c_+ = c_- = 1$ )

# Contributions

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
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


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


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


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
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
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
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
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


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
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
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Nonparametric model class

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


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
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


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
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


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
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


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
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## Our proposal

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


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## Our proposal

- Nonparametric maximum likelihood estimator (NPMLE)

# NPMLE of Consumer Distribution $G$

---

“A Nonparametric Maximum Likelihood Approach to Mixture of Regression.” R&R at  
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# Computation of NPMLE

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# Contributions

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Formulate the heterogeneous consumer reference effects model in the individual level

Propose a nonparametric statistical method for extracting consumer heterogeneity from transaction data

Provide computational algorithm for optimal pricing policies and establish the sub-optimality of constant policies

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# Related Literature

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
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
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
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Question: do similar pricing structures hold in our individual consumer model?

# Sub-optimality Results

**Theorem** (Sub-optimality of constant pricing policy, informal)

For sufficiently large  $c_-$ , the constant pricing policy is **not** optimal even if  $c_+ \leq c_-$   
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
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


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State  $r_t$

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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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- **Value function:** long-term discounted revenue

# Optimizing Long-Term Revenue

- View as dynamic programming



- **Value function:** long-term discounted revenue

**Theorem** (Discretization guarantee, informal) The difference of the optimal long-term discounted revenue and its counterpart under discretization is bounded by

$$0 \leq V^\star(r) - V_\epsilon^\star(r) \leq O(\epsilon).$$

# Computing Optimal Pricing Policy

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## Pricing Optimization

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$$V(r_0) = \max_{\{p_t\}_{t=1}^{\infty}} \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \beta^t p_t P^G(r_t, p_t)$$

# Computing Optimal Pricing Policy

---

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## Modified policy iteration algorithm

---

Initialize  $V^0 = 0, k = 1$

---

# Computing Optimal Pricing Policy

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## Modified policy iteration algorithm

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Initialize  $V^0 = 0, k = 1$

Repeat

# Computing Optimal Pricing Policy

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Generate new pricing policy  $\pi_k$  based on value function  $V^{k-1}$

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### Approximate policy evaluation

Calculate the value function  $V^k$  according to policy  $\pi_k$

---

# Computing Optimal Pricing Policy

---

## Pricing Optimization

$$V(r_0) = \max_{\{p_t\}_{t=1}^{\infty}} \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \beta^t p_t P^G(r_t, p_t)$$

$$\text{s.t. } r_t = (1 - \alpha)p_{t-1} + \alpha r_{t-1}$$

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Generate new pricing policy  $\pi_k$  based on value function  $V^{k-1}$

### Approximate policy evaluation

Calculate the value function  $V^k$  according to policy  $\pi_k$

$$k \leftarrow k + 1$$

Until convergence

---

# Example: Two Market Segments


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# Example: Two Market Segments

---

(a) Homogeneous, consumer A only


$$(a_A, b_A, c_{A+}, c_{A-}) = (2, 2, 0.2, 0.2)$$




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
(b) Homogeneous, consumer B only  
 $(a_B, b_B, c_{B+}, c_{B-}) = (-1, 0.2, 0, 0)$




# Example: Two Market Segments

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
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(b) Homogeneous, consumer B only  
 $(a_B, b_B, c_{B+}, c_{B-}) = (-1, 0.2, 0, 0)$




(c) Heterogeneous, 50% consumer A, 50% consumer B




# Example: Two Market Segments


(a) Homogeneous, consumer A only  
 $(a_A, b_A, c_{A+}, c_{A-}) = (2, 2, 0.2, 0.2)$




(b) Homogeneous, consumer B only  
 $(a_B, b_B, c_{B+}, c_{B-}) = (-1, 0.2, 0, 0)$



(c) Heterogeneous, 50% consumer A, 50% consumer B



(d) Per period revenue




# Example: Two Market Segments

Constant optimal pricing + constant optimal pricing  $\neq$  constant optimal pricing


(a) Homogeneous, consumer A only

$$(a_A, b_A, c_{A+}, c_{A-}) = (2, 2, 0.2, 0.2)$$




(b) Homogeneous, consumer B only


$$(a_B, b_B, c_{B+}, c_{B-}) = (-1, 0.2, 0, 0)$$



(c) Heterogeneous, 50% consumer A, 50% consumer B



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


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
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


(b) Homogeneous, consumer B only


$$(a_B, b_B, c_{B+}, c_{B-}) = (-1, 0.2, 0, 0)$$



(c) Heterogeneous, 50% consumer A, 50% consumer B



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


# Example: Two Market Segments

Constant optimal pricing + constant optimal pricing  $\neq$  constant optimal pricing


(a) Homogeneous, consumer A only

$$(a_A, b_A, c_{A+}, c_{A-}) = (2, 2, 0.2, 0.2)$$




(b) Homogeneous, consumer B only


$$(a_B, b_B, c_{B+}, c_{B-}) = (-1, 0.2, 0, 0)$$



(c) Heterogeneous, 50% consumer A, 50% consumer B



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
*Consumer A mainly purchasing*

# Example: Two Market Segments

Constant optimal pricing + constant optimal pricing  $\neq$  constant optimal pricing


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


(b) Homogeneous, consumer B only


$$(a_B, b_B, c_{B+}, c_{B-}) = (-1, 0.2, 0, 0)$$



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(d) Per period revenue




*Consumer A mainly purchasing*

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
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


(b) Homogeneous, consumer B only


$$(a_B, b_B, c_{B+}, c_{B-}) = (-1, 0.2, 0, 0)$$



(c) Heterogeneous, 50% consumer A, 50% consumer B



(d) Per period revenue



*Consumer A mainly purchasing*


*Consumer B mainly purchasing*

# Example: Two Market Segments

Constant optimal pricing + constant optimal pricing  $\neq$  constant optimal pricing


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


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
$$(a_B, b_B, c_{B+}, c_{B-}) = (-1, 0.2, 0, 0)$$



(c) Heterogeneous, 50% consumer A, 50% consumer B



(d) Per period revenue



**Key:** Consumer segmentation  
due to heterogeneous sensitivities  
to reference price!

# Contributions

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Formulate the heterogeneous consumer reference effects model in the individual level

Propose a nonparametric statistical method for extracting consumer heterogeneity from transaction data

Provide computational algorithm for optimal pricing policies and establish the sub-optimality of constant policies

Apply to **real-world data** from retailing platform JD.com and show that the proposed approach leads to **significant improvement in revenue**

# Case Study



# Case Study



Process  
Transaction Data

# Case Study



Process  
Transaction Data



Estimate  
Heterogeneous  
Reference Effects

# Case Study



Process  
Transaction Data




Estimate  
Heterogeneous  
Reference Effects




Compute Optimal  
Price Policies

# Case Study




# Case Study




- Transaction data of 30k SKUs (Stock Keeping Unit) from 2.5M consumers

# Case Study



- Transaction data of 30k SKUs (Stock Keeping Unit) from 2.5M consumers
- Entries of **clicks** and **orders** from individual consumers

# Case Study




- Transaction data of 30k SKUs (Stock Keeping Unit) from 2.5M consumers
- Entries of **clicks** and **orders** from individual consumers

SKU ID	User ID	Request Time
924eba6741	06102f7920	March 1 23:23

Sample click data in JD.com dataset

# Case Study




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
# Case Study





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
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
Sample click data in JD.com dataset

SKU ID	User ID	Order Time	Selling Price	Original Price
198cec62a	0abe9ef2c	March 1 17:14	79	89

Sample order data in JD.com dataset



# Case Study




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SKU ID	User ID	Request Time
924eba6741	06102f7920	March 1 23:23


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Sample order data in JD.com dataset



# Case Study





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# Optimal Price Paths and Implications

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- Focus on most frequently purchased SKUs

# Optimal Price Paths and Implications

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
- Focus on most frequently purchased SKUs

**Estimated  
Distribution**

# Optimal Price Paths and Implications

- Focus on most frequently purchased SKUs

## Estimated Distribution




\* Only components with mixing probability  $\geq 0.01$  are shown

# Optimal Price Paths and Implications

- Focus on most frequently purchased SKUs

## Estimated Distribution




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## Optimal Price Path


# Optimal Price Paths and Implications

- Focus on most frequently purchased SKUs

**Estimated  
Distribution**



**Optimal  
Price  
Path**



# Numerical Comparisons

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## Methods

**NPMLE:** Proposed approach

**EM:** Finite mixed logit model  
estimated by Expectation-  
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
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
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
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
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

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
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
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## Revenue



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
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


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## Revenue



Average  $\geq 30\%$  increase in revenue!

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
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

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## Demand Accuracy



## Revenue

*Less revenue increase  
when constant policy is optimal*



*Average  $\geq 30\%$  increase in revenue!*

# Summary

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## Takeaway Message

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  - Stochastic updating scheme and estimation

# Extension to Multi-Product Setting

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$$p_t^a \quad p_t^b \quad p_t^c \quad p_t^d$$

# Extension to Multi-Product Setting

---



$$\begin{array}{cccc} p_t^a & p_t^b & p_t^c & p_t^d \\ r_t^a & r_t^b & r_t^c & r_t^d \end{array}$$

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“Horizontal” reference effect  
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Suppose the reference effects of all products are gain-seeking, then the optimal pricing policy admits no steady state.

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## Theorem (informal)

The optimal steady state price, if exists, admits an explicit characterization depending on sensitivity parameters, memory parameter, and discount factor, and the steady state price can be computed efficiently.



Thanks for your attention! Questions?

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# **Supplementary slides**

# Explicit Characterization of Optimal Steady State

**Theorem** Consider loss-neutral case with  $N$  products. If the optimal pricing policy admits a steady state such that  $\mathbf{p}^*(\mathbf{p}^{**}) = \mathbf{p}^{**}$ , then  $\mathbf{p}^{**}$  satisfies

$$p_i^{**} = \Pi^{**} + \frac{1}{b_i + c_i \kappa}, \quad \forall i \in N,$$

where  $\kappa := (1 - \beta)/(1 - \alpha\beta)$ , and  $\Pi^{**}$  is the single-period revenue at the optimal steady state, which is the unique solution to the equation

$$\Pi = \sum_{i \in N} \frac{1}{b_i + c_i \kappa} \cdot \exp\left(a_i - b_i \Pi - \frac{b_i}{b_i + c_i \kappa}\right).$$

## Implications

- Optimal prices of different products differ based on  $b_i$  and  $c_i$
- Efficient computation of optimal prices by binary search

# Sub-optimality Results

**Theorem** (Sub-optimality of constant pricing policy, informal)

For sufficiently large  $c_-$ , the constant pricing policy is **not** optimal even if  $c_+ \leq c_-$   
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
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


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


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
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
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
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- Removes simplified assumption that memory parameter  $\alpha = 0$  [Z. Hu, J. Nasiry (2017)]
- Holds for individual level model with *arbitrary* number of segments rather than only two segments [N. Chen, J. Nasiry (2020)]

# Illustrations of Demand Model

$$x = r - p$$
$$R(x, p) = \text{Demand}(x + p, p) - \text{Demand}(p, p)$$

“Decreasing Curvature” Property



“Dimensioning Sensitivity” Property




Figure 1: Dependence of reference effects on price

Figure 2: Examples of regional reference effects

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## Computing NPMLE via Conditional Gradient Method

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Repeat

**Find new consumer segment via solving subproblem**

$$\mathbf{g}_k \cdot \nabla \ell(\mathbf{f}_k)$$

**Re-maximize objective over new segment**

$$\ell(\mathbf{f}), \text{ where } \mathbf{f} \in \text{conv}(\mathbf{g}_1, \dots, \mathbf{g}_{k-1})$$

$$k \leftarrow k + 1$$

Until convergence

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# Myopic Pricing Policy

$$p_m(r_t) = \arg \max_{p \in \mathcal{P}} \Pi(r_t, p)$$

- Likely sub-optimal but computationally efficient



**Proposition** For any initial reference price  $r$ ,

$$0 \leq V^*(r) - V_m(r) \leq \frac{\beta(1-\alpha)}{(1-\alpha\beta)(1-\beta)} \eta(G) p_H$$

where  $\eta(G) = \min \left( 1, \sup_{(a,b,c_+,c_-) \in \text{supp}(G)} \frac{\max(c_+, c_-)}{b + c_-} \right)$ .

# Reference Effects

- Reference discrepancy  $x$ : reference price  $r$  - current price  $p$
- Reference effect  $R(p)$ : incurred demand change
- Frequent consumers perceive **gains** if  $x > 0$  and **losses** if  $x < 0$
- Consumers respond differently under reference effects



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Myopic pricing policy maximizes single-period revenue

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When does the myopic pricing policy perform well?

- When memory parameter  $\alpha \rightarrow 1$ , reference prices are unchanged
- When discount factor  $\beta \rightarrow 0$ , less weights are allocated to future revenue