

CPSC 418 / MATH 318 — Introduction to Cryptography

ASSIGNMENT 1

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Problem 1 — Superencipherment for substitution ciphers, 12 marks

- (a) i. Single Cipher: $E_k(M) \equiv M + K \pmod{26}$
Double Cipher:

$$\begin{aligned} E_{K_1}(E_{K_2}(M)) &\equiv E_{K_1}(M + K_2 \pmod{26}) \\ &\equiv M + K_2 \pmod{26} + K_1 \pmod{26} \\ &\equiv M + K_3 \pmod{26} \end{aligned}$$

for $K_{1,2,3} \in \text{Keyspace}$

- ii. Assume: $E_k(m) \equiv m + k \pmod{26}$ For all $m \in \mathcal{M} \& k \in \mathcal{K}$
Base case: $E_{K_1}(E_{K_2}(M)) \equiv M + K_3 \pmod{26}$ (Proven at 1.(a).i)
Inductive Hypothesis: $E_{k_n}(E_{k_{n-1}} \dots E_{k_1}(m)) \equiv m + (k_n + k_{n-1} + \dots + k_1) \pmod{26}$ is true for $n > 2$
Inductive Step:
Want to show that: $E_{k_{n+1}}(E_{k_n} \dots E_{k_1}(m)) \equiv m + k_{(n+1)+n+\dots+1} \pmod{26}$
 $E_{k_{n+1}}(E_{k_n} \dots E_{k_1}(m)) = E_{k_{n+1}}(m + k_n + \dots + k_1 \pmod{26})$ (with Inductive Hypothesis)

$$\equiv m + k_{(n+1)+n+\dots+1} \pmod{26}$$

where $k_{(n+1)+n+\dots+1} = k_q$ for $q \in \mathbb{Z}$

Therefore, the induction holds true.

- (b) The length of new keyword w is least common multiple of the length two words m and n . Since Vigenere Cipher is a shift cipher to each character with the key as the characters in key word, $V_{k_1}(V_{k_2}(m)) = V_{k_1+k_2}(M)$. To find the new keyword w , use the shorter word between w_1 and w_2 as key for the other one and apply Vigenere Cipher to it.

Problem 2 — Key size versus password size, 21 marks]

(a) $2^7 * 2^7 * 2^7 * 2^7 * 2^7 * 2^7 * 2^7 * 2^7 = 2^{7*8} = 2^{56}$

(b) i. $98 * 98 * 98 * 98 * 98 * 98 * 98 * 98 = 98^8$

ii. $\frac{98^8}{2^{56}} * 100 = 11.81\%$

(c) $H(X) = \sum_{i=0}^n p(X_i) \log_2 \frac{1}{p(X_i)}$

In this case:

$$H(X) = 8 * \sum_{i=1}^n \frac{1}{n} \log_2 n \text{ (Since all characters have equal chance of appearing for each character and there are 8 characters in passwords)}$$

$$= 8 * \log_2 94$$

$$= 52.43$$

(d) Similar as above

$$H(X) = 8 * \sum_{i=1}^n \frac{1}{n} \log_2 n$$

$$= 8 * \log_2 26$$

$$= 37.60$$

(e) i. $128 = l * \log_2 94$ where l is length of the password

$$l = \frac{128}{\log_2 94}$$

$$l = 19.35$$

So, at least 20 characters

ii. $128 = l * \log_2 26$ where l is length of the password

$$l = \frac{128}{\log_2 26}$$

$$l = 27.23$$

So, at least 28 characters

Problem 3 — Equiprobability maximizes entropy for two outcomes, 12 marks

$$\begin{aligned} \text{(a)} \quad H(X) &= p(X_1) \log_2\left(\frac{1}{p(X_1)}\right) + p(X_2) \log_2\left(\frac{1}{p(X_2)}\right) \\ &= \frac{1}{4} \log_2 4 + \frac{3}{4} \log_2 \frac{4}{3} \\ &= \frac{1}{2} + 0.311 \\ &= 0.81 \end{aligned}$$

(b) To find maximum of a function, first, we need to find derivative of the function.

$$\begin{aligned} &\frac{d}{dy} - p \log_2(p) - (1-p) \log_2(1-p) \\ &= -\frac{d}{dy}(p) \frac{\ln p}{\ln 2} - (1-p) \frac{\ln(1-p)}{\ln 2} = \end{aligned}$$

(c) Find where the value of the derivative above is 0. Then find which point goes from negative to positive.

Problem 4 — Conditional entropy, 12 marks

- (a) To find $H(M|C)$, I have to compute:

$$\sum_{i=1}^4 p(C_i) \sum_{j=1}^4 p(C_i|M_j) \log_2\left(\frac{1}{p(C_i|M_j)}\right)$$

For $p(C_1)$, $\sum_{j=1}^4 p(C_1|M_j) \log_2\left(\frac{1}{p(C_1|M_j)}\right) = \frac{1}{2} \log_2 2 + \frac{1}{2} \log_2 2 + 0 + 0 = 1$ Assuming that M_1 and M_2 has equal chance of appearing when cipher text is C_1

Repeat this for $p(C_2), p(C_3), p(C_4)$

$$\text{For } p(C_2), \sum_{j=2}^4 p(C_2|M_j) \log_2\left(\frac{1}{p(C_2|M_j)}\right) = 0 + 0 + \frac{1}{2} \log_2 2 + \frac{1}{2} \log_2 2 = 1$$

This goes same for $p(C_3), p(C_4)$,

$$\text{So, } \sum_{i=1}^4 p(C_i) \sum_{j=1}^4 p(C_i|M_j) \log_2\left(\frac{1}{p(C_i|M_j)}\right) = 4$$

- (b) If cryptosystem is providing perfect secrecy implies that knowing the ciphertext \mathcal{C} gives no information about \mathcal{M} . Which could also mean that knowing message does not give information about ciphertext. This can be represented as $H(\mathcal{C}|\mathcal{M}) = H(\mathcal{C})$.

$$\text{Then, } H(C|M) = \frac{p(C)p(M|C)}{p(M)}$$

For $H(\mathcal{C}|\mathcal{M}) = H(\mathcal{C})$ to hold true, $H(\mathcal{M}|\mathcal{C}) = H(\mathcal{M})$ has to hold true.

Therefore, for cryptosystem to have perfect secrecy, $H(\mathcal{M}|\mathcal{C}) = H(\mathcal{M})$ has to hold true.

- (c) No, With the methods used above, we can find $H(C|M)$ and $H(C)$

$$H(C|M) = \sum_{i=1}^4 p(M_i) \sum_{j=1}^4 p(M_i|C_j) \log_2\left(\frac{1}{p(M_i|C_j)}\right)$$

Since all of the $M \in \mathcal{M}$ has equal possibility, I just have to compute one of them.

$$\text{For } p(M_1), \sum_{j=1}^4 p(M_1|C_j) \log_2\left(\frac{1}{p(M_1|C_j)}\right) = \frac{1}{2} \log_2 2 + 0 + 0 + \frac{1}{2} \log_2 2 = 1$$

So, $H(C|M) = 4$ and $H(C) = 8$

Since, $H(\mathcal{C}|\mathcal{M}) \neq H(\mathcal{C})$, example does not provide perfect secrecy.

Problem 7 — Mixed Vigenère cipher cryptanalysis, 10 marks

***** Remove the text for this problem if you don't attempt it. *****