
# Data Mining & Machine Learning

CS37300 Purdue University

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Decision making

#### Testing Hypothesis with Small Number of Observations



Hypothesis (Anchoring): Unrelated number biases wine price assessment Experiment: Expose pop A to \$1000 and pop B to \$10 Population size: ~7 in each group

# Answers from folks that saw \$1000 as the amount [50,10,37,650,400,80,130] ... average \$193

# Answers from folks that saw \$10 as the amount format [20,30,60,10,100,40] ... average \$43

How can we test if hypothesis is true?

#### Is the Anchoring Hypothesis True?

- Answers from folks that saw \$1000 as the format
  - [50,10,37,650,400,80,130] ... **empirical** average \$193
  - Assume these values are independent observations from a Poisson distribution with an unknown average  $\mu_{\$1000}$

$$X_{\$1000,i} \sim \operatorname{Poisson}(\mu_{\$1000})$$
 [the i-th observation in our vector]

- Is  $\mu_{$1000} = 193$  ?
  - No, 193 is just the empirical value. The true value of  $\mu_{\$1000}$  is unknown
- Answers from folks that saw \$10 as the format
  - [20,30,60,10,100,40] ... **empirical** average \$43


$$X_{\$10,i} \sim \text{Poisson}(\mu_{\$10})$$

- Note that  $\mu_{\$10} \neq 43$
- How can we decide if  $\mu_{$1000} > \mu_{$10}$ ?
  - Last class we saw that possible answers through simulations
  - But simulating by resampling the data alone (bootstrapping) is not good for small datasets... we need another approach...

# Bayesian Decision Making (assumptions)

Consider the assumptions

$$X_{\$1000,i} \sim \text{Poisson}(\mu_{\$1000})$$
  
 $X_{\$10,i} \sim \text{Poisson}(\mu_{\$10})$ 



0.40

What we want:

$$P[\mu_{\$1000} > \mu_{\$10} | X_{\$1000,1}, \dots, X_{\$1000,7}, X_{\$10,1}, \dots, X_{\$10,7}]$$

Let's start with trying to obtain

$$P[\mu_{\$1000}|X_{\$1000,1},\ldots,X_{\$1000,7}]$$

How can we get the above distribution?

# Bayesian Decision Making (Bayes Rule)

• Bayes rule:  $P[A|B] = \frac{P[B]}{P[A|B]}$ 

$$P[A|B] = \frac{P[B|A]P[A]}{P[B]}$$

Applying to our problem:

$$P[\mu_{\$1000}|X_{\$1000,1},\ldots,X_{\$1000,7}] = \frac{P[X_{\$1000,1},\ldots,X_{\$1000,7}|\mu_{\$1000}]P[\mu_{\$1000}]}{P[X_{\$1000,1},\ldots,X_{\$1000,7}]}$$

#### Where:

- 1.  $P[X_{\$1000,1},\ldots,X_{\$1000,7}|\mu_{\$1000}] \Rightarrow Joint probability of the observations given a true average$
- 2.  $P[\mu_{\$1000}] \Rightarrow \text{ Prior probability of a true average}$
- 3.  $P[X_{\$1000,1}, \dots, X_{\$1000,7}] \Rightarrow$  Probability of the data

# Bayesian Decision Making (Bayes Rule)

- How can we get  $P[X_{\$1000,1},\ldots,X_{\$1000,7}|\mu_{\$1000}]$  ?
  - Observations are independent

$$P[X_{\$1000,1}, \dots, X_{\$1000,7} | \mu_{\$1000}] = \prod_{i=1}^{7} P[X_{\$1000,i} = k_i | \mu_{\$1000}] = \prod_{i=1}^{7} \frac{(\mu_{\$1000})^{k_i}}{k_i!} e^{-\mu_{\$1000}}$$


Probability of Poisson distribution



- · This is prior knowledge... something we would "know" without seeing the data
- This is up to us... so, we make our lives easy by assuming a Gamma distribution

$$P[\mu_{\$1000}] = \text{Gamma}(\alpha, \beta) = \frac{\beta^{\alpha}}{\Gamma(\alpha)} \mu_{\$1000}^{\alpha - 1} e^{-\beta \mu_{\$1000}}$$

The choice of  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$  is subjective and not influenced by the data



#### Bayesian Decision Making (computing the posterior)

- How can we get  $P[X_{\$1000,1},\ldots,X_{\$1000,7}]$ ?
  - We can marginalize the joint probability

$$P[X_{\$1000,1}, \dots, X_{\$1000,7}] = \int_{\mu_{\$1000}} P[X_{\$1000,1}, \dots, X_{\$1000,7}, \mu_{\$1000}] d\mu_{\$1000}$$

$$= \prod_{i=1}^{7} \int_{\mu_{\$1000}} P[X_{\$1000,i} = k_i | \mu_{\$1000}] P[\mu_{\$1000}]$$

 Putting it all together with some little Calculus, we get the following posterior (see Notes conjugate.pdf)

$$P[\mu_{\$1000}|X_{\$1000,1},\dots,X_{\$1000,7}] = \operatorname{Gamma}\left(\alpha + \sum_{i=1}^{7} X_{\$1000,i}, \beta + 7\right)$$

#### Decision Making using Bayesian Monte Carlo Methods

Now we know how to get both:

$$P[\mu_{\$1000}|X_{\$1000,1},\ldots,X_{\$1000,7}] = \text{Gamma}\left(\alpha + \sum_{i=1}^{7} X_{\$1000,i}, \beta + 7\right)$$

and

$$P[\mu_{\$10}|X_{\$10,1},\ldots,X_{\$10,7}] = \text{Gamma}\left(\alpha + \sum_{i=1}^{7} X_{\$10,i}, \beta + 7\right)$$

- How can we obtain  $P[\mu_{\$1000}>\mu_{\$10}|X_{\$1000,1},\ldots,X_{\$1000,7},X_{\$10,1},\ldots,X_{\$10,7}]?$ 
  - We can just simulate from the two posteriors above and get an estimate!

# Python Code

```
In [1]: import numpy as np
In [2]: # Answers from folks that saw $1000 as the amount
        X1000 = np.array([50, 10, 37, 650, 400, 80, 130])
In [3]: # Answers from folks that saw $10 as the amount format
        X10 = np.array([20,30,60,10,100,40])
In [4]: # Sum of X1000
         sum X1000 = np.sum(X1000)
        # Number of observations
        n1000 = X1000.shape[0]
        # Sum of X10
        sum X10 = np.sum(X10)
        n1000 = X1000.shape[0]
        n10 = X10.shape[0]
In [5]: # Number of simulation runs
        N = 500
        # Prior parameters
        alpha = 10
        beta = 1
        # N samples of the posterior P[mu1000 | X1000]
        sampled mu1000 = np.random.gamma(shape=(alpha + sum X1000), scale=1./(beta + n1000), size=N)
         # N samples of the posterior P[mu10 | X10]
        sampled_mu10 = np.random.gamma(shape=(alpha + sum_X10), scale=1./(beta + n10), size=N)
In [6]: #Sum number of times sample j of mu1000 is greater than sample j of mu10
        total 1000 ge 10 = np.sum(sampled mu1000 > sampled mu10)
In [7]: print("Empirical probability P[mu 1000 > mu 10 | Data] =", float(total 1000 ge 10)/N)
        Empirical probability P[mu_1000 > mu_10 | Data] = 1.0
In [8]: #Visual inspection of posterior samples
        print("sampled mu1000 =", sampled mu1000,"\n")
        print("sampled mu10=", sampled mu10)
```

Decision Making as a Probability Problem

#### Psychological heuristics and biases


- Tversky & Kahneman, psychologists, propose that people often do not follow rules of probability when making decisions
- Instead, decision making may be based on heuristics
  - Lowers cognitive load but may lead to systematic errors and biases
- Examples:
  - Availability heuristic
  - Representativeness heuristic
  - Confirmation bias
  - Conjunction fallacy (we will not cover this)
  - Numerosity heuristic (we will not cover this)

# Neglecting base rates

- Taxi-cab problem (Tversky & Kahneman '72)
  - 85% of the cabs are Green
  - 15% of the cabs are Blue
  - An accident eyewitness reports a Blue cab
  - But she is wrong 20% of the time.
- What is the probability that the cab is Blue?
  - Participants tend to overestimate probability, most answer 80%
  - They ignore baseline prior probability of blue cabs.

# More on neglecting base rates


#### A priori (beforehand)



$$P(seeBlue|blue) = 0.80$$
  
 $P(seeBlue|green) = 0.20$ 

#### More on neglecting base rates

After accident (only cars reported as being blue)



# More on neglecting base rates

How to compute probability

$$\begin{split} P(blue|seeBlue) &= \frac{P(blue \cap seeBlue)}{P(seeBlue)} \\ &= \frac{P(seeBlue|blue)P(blue)}{P(seeBlue)} \\ &= \frac{P(seeBlue|blue)P(blue)}{P(seeBlue|blue)P(blue) + P(seeBlue|green)P(green)} \\ &= \frac{0.80 \cdot 0.15}{(0.80 \cdot 0.15) + (0.20 \cdot 0.85)} \\ &= 0.41 \end{split}$$

Most people answered 80%

# Arthritis study (Redelmeier & Tversky '96)

- Common belief:
  - Arthritis pain is associated with changes in weather
- Experiment:
  - Followed 18 arthritis patients for 15 months
  - 2 x per month assessed: (1) pain and joint tenderness, and (2) weather
- Results:
  - No correlation between pain/tenderness and weather
  - Patients saw correlation that did not exist... why?

# Arthritis study (cont)

- Patients noticed when bad weather and pain co-occurred, but failed to notice when they didn't.
  - Better memory for times that bad weather and pain co-occurred.
  - Worse memory for times when bad weather and pain did not co-occur
- Confirmation bias: People often seek information that confirms rather than disconfirms their original hypothesis

Extra Examples

# Estimating probabilities (Tversky & Kahneman '73/'74)

- Question: Is the letter R more likely to be the 1st or 3rd letter in English words?
- Results: Most said R more probable as 1st letter
- Reality: R appears much more often as the 3rd letter, but it's easier to think of words where R is the 1st letter

# Estimating probabilities (cont)

- Question: Which causes more deaths in developed countries?
   (a) traffic accidents or (b) stomach cancer
- Typical guess: traffic accident = 4X stomach cancer
- Actual: 45,000 traffic, 95,000 stomach cancer deaths in US
- Ratio of newspaper reports on each subject:
   137 (traffic fatality) to 1 (stomach cancer death)

 Availability heuristic: Tendency for people to make judgments of frequency on basis of how easily examples come to mind

# Gambler's fallacy

- Gambler's fallacy: belief that if deviations from expected behavior are observed in repeated independent trials, then future deviations in the opposite direction are then more likely
- T&K: this is an example of the representativeness heuristic—where the
  probability of an event is judged by its similarity to the population from which
  sample is drawn
- The sequence "H T H T T H" is seen as more representative of a prototypical coin sequence. Why?
  - When people are asked to make up random sequences, they tend to make the proportion of H and T closer to 50% than would be expected by random chance
  - T&K interpretation: people believe that short sequences should be representative of longer ones

# Interpretation of these findings

- People do not use proper statistical/probabilistic reasoning... instead people use heuristics which can bias decisions
- Heuristics can often be very effective (and efficient) for social inferences and decision-making
  - E.g., the book "Simple Heuristics That Make Us Smart" summarizes research by Gigerenzer and Todd
- ... but be aware that heuristics can bias results from exploratory data analysis and other modeling efforts