

Attacks on search-RLWE

Hao Chen

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Mentor: Kristin Lauter

Joint work with: Katherine Stange

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Part 1/4: Background

Minkowski embedding and the embedded lattice

Let K be a number field of degree n with ring of integers R and let $\sigma_1, \dots, \sigma_n$ be the embeddings of K into \mathbb{C} . Assume $\sigma_1, \dots, \sigma_{r_1}$ are the real embeddings.

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Definition

The *Minkowski embedding* of K is

$$\begin{aligned} \iota : K &\rightarrow \mathbb{R}^n \\ x &\mapsto (\sigma_1(x), \dots, \sigma_{r_1}(x), \operatorname{Re}(\sigma_{r_1+1})(x), \operatorname{Im}(\sigma_{r_1+1})(x), \dots, \\ &\quad \operatorname{Re}(\sigma_{r_1+r_2})(x), \operatorname{Im}(\sigma_{r_1+r_2})(x)) \end{aligned}$$

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It turns out that

$$\Lambda_R := \iota(R)$$

is a lattice in \mathbb{R}^n , we call it the *embedded lattice of K* .

Discrete Gaussian distribution on lattices

For $\sigma > 0$, define the Gaussian function ρ_σ as

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For a lattice $\Lambda \subset \mathbb{R}^n$ and $\sigma > 0$, the *discrete Gaussian distribution on Λ with parameter σ* is

$$D_{\Lambda,\sigma}(x) = \frac{\rho_\sigma(x)}{\sum_{y \in \Lambda} \rho_\sigma(y)}, \forall x \in \Lambda.$$

Equivalently, the probability of sampling any lattice point x is proportional to $\rho_\sigma(x)$.

RLWE instance

Definition

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Let $\mathcal{R} = (K, q, \sigma, s)$ be an RLWE instance and let R be the ring of integers of K . The *error distribution* of \mathcal{R} , denote by $D_{\mathcal{R}}$, is the discrete Gaussian on the embedded lattice $\iota(R)$ with parameter σ :

$$D_{\mathcal{R}} = D_{\iota(R), \sigma}.$$

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$$D_{\mathcal{R}} = D_{\iota(R), \sigma}.$$

Remark: let V denote the covolume of the lattice $\iota(R)$. It is convenient to define a relative standard deviation parameter: $\sigma_0 = \frac{\sigma}{V^{\frac{1}{n}}}$.

RLWE samples

Definition (RLWE distribution)

Let $\mathcal{R} = (K, q, \sigma, s)$ be an RLWE instance with error distribution $D_{\mathcal{R}}$, and let R_q denote the quotient ring R/qR . Then a sample from the *RLWE distribution* of \mathcal{R} is an ordered pair

$$(a, b = as + e \pmod{qR}) \in R_q \times R_q,$$

where the first coordinate a is chosen uniformly at random in R_q , and $e \leftarrow D_{\mathcal{R}}$.

Notation: $(a, b) \leftarrow \mathcal{R}$ means (a, b) is a sample from the RLWE distribution of \mathcal{R} .

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Definition (Decision)

Let \mathcal{R} be an RLWE instance. The *decision Ring-LWE* problem, denoted by $\text{DRLWE}(\mathcal{R})$, is to distinguish between the same number of independent samples in two distributions on $R_q \times R_q$. The first is the RLWE distribution of \mathcal{R} , and the second consists of uniformly random and independent samples from $R_q \times R_q$.

Part 2/4: The chi-square attack

Recap the [ELOS] attack

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It runs through possible guesses g of $\pi(s)$, and computes the “error”

$$“\pi(e)” = \pi(b) - \pi(a) \cdot g.$$

Then it marks the correct guess based on the assumption that the distribution $\pi(D_{\Lambda_R, \sigma})$ is distinguishable from the uniform distribution over the finite field $F := R/\mathfrak{q}R$.

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However, for Galois extensions, these examples are harder to find. So a new attack is needed.

Background on chi-square test

Let S be a finite set partitioned into r subsets: $S = \sqcup_{j=1}^r S_j$. Given M samples y_1, \dots, y_M in S .

Null hypothesis: the samples are from taken the uniform distribution on S . we compute the expected and the actual number of samples that lie in each subset. Then the χ^2 value is

$$\chi^2(S, y) = \sum_{j=1}^r \frac{(\text{actual}_j - \text{expect}_j)^2}{\text{expect}_j}.$$

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If the samples were drawn from the uniform distribution on S , then the χ^2 value follows the chi-square distribution with degree of freedom $d = r - 1$. Hence we may use this to test uniform distribution.

Idea of our attack

The goal of our chi-square attack is to recover $s \pmod{q}$ from a set of samples $(a, b) \leftarrow \mathcal{R}$.

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- 1 For each guess s' of $s \pmod{q}$:
 - compute the “errors” $e' = b \pmod{q} - a \pmod{q}s'$ for all samples (a, b) .
 - run the chi-square uniform test on the “errors” e' .
 - accept s' as a good guess if the test rejects the uniform hypothesis.

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The complexity of our attack is $O(q^f)$ in time and $O(q^f)$ in space.

the detailed attack

Algorithm 1 chi-square attack of $SRLWE(\mathcal{R}, q)$

Require: $\mathcal{R} = (K, q, \sigma, s)$ – an RLWE instance. q – a prime ideal in K above q . S – a collection of M ($M = \Omega(N)$) RLWE samples $(a, b) \sim \mathcal{R}$.

Ensure: a guess of the value $s \pmod{q}$, or **NON-RLWE**, or **INSUFFICIENT-SAMPLES**

- 1: $\alpha \leftarrow 1 - \frac{1}{10N}$, $\omega \leftarrow \Phi^{-1}((1 + \alpha)/2)$, $G = \emptyset$.
- 2: **for** s in F **do**
- 3: $E \leftarrow [b \pmod{q} - a \pmod{q}s \text{ for } a, b \text{ in } S]$.
- 4: **end for**
- 5: Run χ^2 test on E with B bins and obtain the value $\chi^2(E)$.
- 6: **if** $|\chi^2(E) - (B - 1)| > \omega\sqrt{2B - 2}$ **then**
- 7: add s to G
- 8: **end if**
- 9: **if** $G = \emptyset$ **then return** NOT RLWE
- 10: **else if** $G = \{g\}$ **then return** g
- 11: **else return** INSUFFICIENT-SAMPLES
- 12: **end if**

Part 3/4: Galois RLWE

Notations and properties

Recall: a number field K is Galois if $|Aut(K)| = [K : \mathbb{Q}]$.

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Theorem (Search-to-Decision)

Let $\mathcal{R} = (K, q, \sigma, s)$ be an RLWE instance, where K is Galois of degree n and q is unramified in K with residue degree f . Suppose there is an algorithm A which recovers $s \pmod{q}$ for some prime q above q using a set S of samples. Then the problem $SRLWE(\mathcal{R})$ can be solved using n/f calls to A and the same set S of samples.

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Theorem (Independence of q)

Keeping the above assumptions. Then the error distribution $D(\mathcal{R}, q) := D_{\mathcal{R}} \pmod{q}$ is independent of the choice of prime ideal q above q .

Vulnerable instances

We consider subfields of form $K_{m,H} = \mathbb{Q}(\zeta_m)^H$, where $H \leq (\mathbb{Z}/m\mathbb{Z})^*$.

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Notations: f – the residue degree of q ; M – the number of samples; σ_0 – the relative standard deviation parameter.

Table: Attacked sub-cyclotomic RLWE instances

m	gens of H	n	q	f	σ_0	M	runtime (in hours)
2805	[1684, 1618]	40	67	2	1	22445	3.49
15015	[12286, 2003, 11936]	60	43	2	1	11094	1.05
15015	[12286, 2003, 11936]	60	617	2	1.25	8000	228.41 (estimated)
90321	[90320, 18514, 43405]	80	67	2	1	26934	4.81
255255	[97943, 162436, 253826, 248711, 44318])	90	2003	2	1.25	15000	1114.44 (estimated)
285285	[181156, 210926, 87361]	96	521	2	1.1	5000	75.41 (estimated)
1468005Z	[312016, 978671, 956572, 400366]	100	683	2	1.1	5000	276.01 (estimated)
1468005	[198892, 978671, 431521, 1083139]	144	139	2	1	4000	5.72

Why are higher degree primes vulnerable?

Imagine the following (unlikely) scenario that Λ_R has an orthogonal basis v_1, \dots, v_n such that $\|v_i\|_2 \ll \|v_{i+1}\|_2$ for all i .

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One could optimise the attack based on this observation, reducing the space complexity to $O(q)$.

A detailed example

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- There are $g = n/f = 15$ prime ideals $\mathfrak{q}_1, \dots, \mathfrak{q}_{15}$ above q .

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- There are $g = n/f = 15$ prime ideals $\mathfrak{q}_1, \dots, \mathfrak{q}_{15}$ above q .
- We use LLL algorithm on a given basis and obtained a reduce basis v_1, \dots, v_n for R , ordered by length, out of which $v_1, \dots, v_{n/2} \pmod{\mathfrak{q}_i}$ lie in the smaller field \mathbb{F}_q (and the rest lie in $\mathbb{F}_{q^2} - \mathbb{F}_q$).

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Remark: the last step is parallelizable.

Part 4/4: Cyclotomics

Background on Fourier analysis

Suppose f is a real-valued function on \mathbb{F}_q . The *Fourier transform* of f is defined as

$$\hat{f}(y) = \sum_{a \in \mathbb{F}_q} f(a) e^{-2\pi i ay/q}.$$

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Let δ be the dirac delta function and $u \equiv 1/q$.

Fact (Properties of Fourier transform)

- 1 $\hat{\delta} = qu$, $\hat{u} = \delta$.
- 2 $\widehat{f * g} = \hat{f} \cdot \hat{g}$.
- 3 $f(a) = \frac{1}{q} \sum_{y \in \mathbb{F}_q} \hat{f}(y) e^{2\pi i ay/q}$.

A simplified error distribution

Definition

For any even integer $k \geq 2$, let \mathcal{V}_k denote the distribution over \mathbb{Z} such that

$$\text{Prob}(\mathcal{V}_k = t) = \begin{cases} \frac{\binom{k}{t+\frac{k}{2}}}{2^k} & \text{if } |t| \leq \frac{k}{2} \\ 0 & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$




Figure: Probability density function of \mathcal{V}_8

Modified error distribution

Definition (Modified error distribution $MD_{m,q,k}$)

Let m, q be integers such that $q \equiv 1 \pmod{m}$ and let $k \geq 2$ be even. Then a sample from the *modified error distribution* $MD_{m,q,k}$ is

$$e = \sum_{i=0}^{n-1} e_i \zeta_m^i \pmod{qR},$$

where the coefficients e_i are sampled i.i.d. from \mathcal{V}_k .

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Let α be a primitive m -th root of unity in \mathbb{F}_q , corresponding to a prime q . Then

$$\bar{e} = e \pmod{q} = \sum_i e_i \alpha^i.$$

Note that \bar{e} is a random variable with value in \mathbb{F}_q . We abuse notations and let \bar{e} denote its own probability density function.

Lemma

$$\widehat{e}(y) = \prod_{i=1}^n \cos \left(\frac{\alpha^i \pi y}{q} \right)^k.$$

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Theorem

For all $a \in \mathbb{F}_q$,

$$|\bar{e}(a) - 1/q| \leq \frac{1}{q} \sum_{y \in \mathbb{F}_q, y \neq 0} |\widehat{\bar{e}}(y)|. \quad (4.1)$$

Cyclotomics

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Corollary

Let $u \equiv 1/q$ denote the p.d.f. for the uniform distribution, then

$$d(\bar{e}, u) \leq \frac{1}{2} \sum_{y \in \mathbb{F}_q, y \neq 0} |\widehat{e}(y)| =: \epsilon(m, q, k, \alpha).$$

A table of ϵ values

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Punchline: the value $\epsilon(m, q, k)$ is usually negligibly small. As a consequence, the reduced error distribution \bar{e} is computationally indistinguishable from uniform distribution.

Hence these instances are secure against our chi-square attack.

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Table: Values of $\epsilon(m, q, 2)$

m	n	q	$-\lceil \log_2(\epsilon(m, q, 2)) \rceil$
244	120	1709	230
101	100	1213	177
256	128	3329	194
256	128	14081	208
55	40	10891	44
197	196	3547	337
96	32	4513	35
160	64	20641	61
145	112	19163	176
512	256	10753	431
512	256	19457	414

Ramified prime (is vulnerable)

We consider $K = \mathbb{Q}(\zeta_p)$ and $q = p$. Then there is a unique prime ideal $\mathfrak{p} = (1 - \zeta_p)$ above p , and the reduction map $\pi : R/pR \rightarrow \mathbb{F}_p$ satisfies

$$\pi(\zeta_p^i) = 1, \quad \forall i.$$

We will exploit this property for our attack.

PLWE on power basis

The error is $e = \sum_{i=0}^{p-2} e_i \zeta_p^i$, where $e_i \sim D_{\mathbb{Z}, \sigma}$ i.i.d.

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Remark: we actually want to attack RLWE examples. So I tried chi-square attack and RLWE errors generated by the sampling method in [GPV].

Attacked ramified prime for prime cyclotomic RLWE

Examples:

- $p = 251, \sigma = 0.55$.
- (ongoing)

Thank you to everyone for a great
summer!