RELATIONAL PUNISHMENT, DEFECTION, AND RESISTANCE DEMOBILIZATION IN REPRESSIVE REGIMES: EVIDENCE FROM TAIWAN'S 'WHITE TERROR' PERIOD

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Abstract. Why do governments severely punish some dissidents while showing mercy to others? This study argues that when constrained by limited information on dissent, states have incentives to cast the net of repression wider by killing not just key dissent actors but members closely connected to them to ensure demobilization. States also crave information, and showing clemency to defectors who bring in information helps improve intelligence. However, tips have different values and regimes are particularly interested in rewarding defectors who are close to key actors and thus possess high-value tips that can help the regime pursue key fugitives and dissolve resistance more efficiently. Using newly declassified data on political victims during Taiwan's "White Terror" authoritarian period, I find that the regime tends to execute both key actors (i.e., leaders and recruiters) and their closely connected members. Defectors who bring in information tend to receive mercy, but defectors closely connected to key actors are much less likely to die than those less connected defectors. These findings shed new insight into the toolkit dictators use to compensate for information deficit in repressing resistance movements.

Keywords: State repression, information, defection, underground resistance networks, authoritarian control

The first responsibility of state actors is building and maintaining order. It is particularly vital for autocracies as their survival hinges critically on order enforcement and political control. When studying authoritarian politics and state violence, we often assume that autocrats are better resourced to control the population and suppress oppositions due to the relative freedom in using violence and frequent deployment of surveillance technologies that help regimes penetrate society and preempt dissent. Yet, evidence presented by research suggests otherwise (Zhukov, 2014; Dimitrov and Sassoon, 2014; Greitens, 2016); dictators often find themselves operating in information-poor environments where they struggle to find resources they need to empower their control, and one of the main resources they struggle with is information and intelligence. Countries can rarely act like modern China or Russia where the state apparatus possesses tremendous information-gathering capacities in wielding state power, but we know little about what repression strategies regimes can leverage to offset their information disadvantage. Thus, some important questions remain unanswered: Under information-limited environments, why do regimes selectively repress certain dissidents while showing mercy to others? What strategies do they use to counter information deficit and maximize control?

This study proposes a network-based explanation for repression targeting and argues that regimes leverage network relationships to gather dissent information and punish political opponents. When operating with incomplete information, regimes tend to widen the net of repression by killing not just key actors but also their close connections to ensure that resistance is sufficiently demobilized. More importantly, regimes crave information, and this hunger drives them to extract information and enhance their intelligence. Violence can be substituted by clemency if dissidents can defect and share information 'tips' that aid in repression. Given that not all tips have equal value, regimes have particular interests in rewarding defectors who are closely connected to key dissent actors and thus possess high-value intelligence on who they are and their whereabouts, which allows the

regime to pursue key fugitives and dissolve resistance organizations more efficiently. Generally, tips from inside dissidents are cheaper and more effective than fetching information from external surveillance. Substituting between violence and clemency helps incentivize dissent defection and insider tipping, thus aiding the regime with extra power to combat resistance and destroy it from within.

I test this argument using unique data on Taiwanese political victims in the White Terror period (1949-1991) collected from the Injustice Compensation Foundation and the Transitional Justice Commission in Taiwan. This dataset provides a rare opportunity to empirically study relational punishment and dissident defection at the individual level, particularly in authoritarian contexts. Taiwan's authoritarian period features a highly repressive regime seeking to seize control of its remaining territory after a failed civil war against Mao's communist party, thereby offering a useful context to study how authoritarian regimes leverage repression to control society. The dataset details military trials and court verdicts for individuals targeted by Taiwan's security agencies. Back then, multiple secret police entities were created to monitor society in the name of fighting Chinese communist infiltration. The regime employed a wide variety of repressive tactics—ranging from surveillance technology and informant networks to physical arrests, torture, and expedited execution of political prisoners—against a broad set of regime challengers and would-be challengers that included doctors, military personnel, political officials, students, and many social elites who were believed to show interest or have connections with underground communist organizations and dissent movements. Taiwan's history of appalling violence against resistance movements makes the country a fruitful setting in which to test the expectations of my argument. The fine-grained nature of this data also allows me to inspect how regimes select repression targets and leverage relationships to flip regimes' enemies against each other.

Empirical results affirm the notion that dissident network position shapes the strategy of repression targeting. In the military trial, execution tends to target individuals

who lead or actively recruit new members into underground organizations, and individuals closely connected with leaders or active recruiters are more likely to be executed. I also find that regimes tend not to execute defectors who bring in information, but defectors closely connected to key actors are much less likely to die than less connected defectors, supporting the theoretical argument that information has different values and clemency is strategically rewarded to individuals who can provide high-value tips. In robustness tests, qualitative and quantitative evidence provides additional support to the information-gathering argument that information-clemency exchange is real and information gathered through defection or arrests contributes to more rapid crackdowns on the remaining organization members.

These findings contribute to the literature on state repression and authoritarian ruling in several important ways. First, previous literature on information and violence has put much emphasis on how information determines the deployment of violence. I direct research to consider how limiting the supply of violence, information-clemency exchange specifically, can encourage defection and increase information flow to the regime. Only focusing on violent repression misses an important part of the information-driven dynamic. Second, the bulk of existing scholarship on intelligence gathering in dictatorships largely focuses on external monitoring (through secret police or surveillance technology) and gives insufficient attention to internal monitoring (through insider defection and ratting behavior). This research provides insight into a desperately understudied topic on dissent defection and internal tipping in supplying dictators cheap but valuable intelligence that helps improve repression targeting and dissent demobilization. Lastly, using unique individual-level data on underground resistance networks and dissent defection/ratting behavior, this research provides a rare look at how regimes target relationships to maximize destruction and strategically use clemency to attract insider tips and flip dissidents to rat on one another.

Information and State Repression

State power and enforcement of political order remain the highest priority for autocracies and repressive regimes. Importantly, order construction by states relies on their ability to gather good information on dissent and suppress political challenges before they post significant threats to regime survival. Following this line of thoughts, repression studies develop two bodies of work analyzing how information shapes the deployment of violence. One body of work conceptualizes preventive and reactive repression as two distinct approaches to suppress dissent. Traditional threat-response theories argue that violence are used when threats have emerged (Moore, 1998; Davenport, 2007; Carey, 2010). Reactive repression responds to ongoing acts of dissent by targeting challengers to impose costs and limit their ability to deliver future actions (Liu and Sullivan, N.d.). By contrast, preventive repression attempts to curb mobilization before challenges can take to the street (Sullivan, 2016; Ritter and Conrad, 2016; De Jaegher and Hoyer, 2019). States prefer prevention to reaction as preventive measures mitigate the risk of being overthrown, but this preference depends on whether states have good enough information and capacity that enable them to anticipate challenges and root them out before they can take place.

The other body of research emphasizes the choice between targeted and indiscriminate violence and ties state's information capacity close to the use of different repression strategies. Primarily driven by discussions on state violence in civil war (Kalyvas, 2000; Lyall, 2009; Zhukov, 2014; Balcells, 2017; Rozenas and Zhukov, 2019), research suggests that targeted violence is typically used when governments have good intelligence on insurgents' identities and activities. By contrast, untargeted violence is used to indiscriminately repress all individuals within an area where regimes lack local intelligence (likely inhibited by insufficient local control) even though killing the innocent can push the masses to side with rebellion and eventually hurt the regime. Targeted violence is always preferred,

if information permits, than untargeted violence due to the considerable cost that can backfire efforts in controlling territories.

While the connection between information and typology of repression (timing or targeting) is well-presented in the existing literature, bifurcating governments into fully informed versus poorly informed regimes is not enough to explain the rich variation in state violence. Very few countries in reality are fully informed or completely uninformed in fighting domestic enemies. Most regimes have a certain level of information on dissent and start with what they have in the process of crafting repression tactics. It is also puzzling to see that states are often considered to have little agency in changing their information environment (or so-called information endowment). Information is theorized to condition state violence, but little attention is paid to study how supplying or limiting violence can be utilized to improve states' information capacity and facilitate information flow from dissent to the regime.

Nevertheless, a growing body of work emerges around the topic of surveillance and examines information enhancement efforts by states. The mainstream discussion focuses on the mechanism of *external* information gathering via surveillance technology (i.e., traditional wiretapping or modern digital surveillance on the Internet) and how it penetrates dissent movements that aids in repression targeting (Xu, 2020; Gohdes, 2020). It is widely discussed that dictators employ secret police to spy on citizens and surveil the population (Greitens, 2016). The Stasi, the notorious secret police agency in East Germany, is an iconic example. However, external monitoring via delegated agents can be economically costly and time-consuming since building a sophisticated surveillance system that actually works takes time and requires substantial infrastructure development (Xu, 2020), equipment and personnel (Scharpf and Gläßel, 2019), and resources to purchase civilian informants (Piotrowska, 2020). Thus, it is usually supplemented by the less expensive but more effective internal monitoring to gather dissent information (Heckathorn, 1988). Yet, existing research rarely examines the mechanism of *internal* information-gathering

through defection and insider tipping. A black-box-like process where information is revealed by disloyalists and defectors within dissent organizations remains largely unstudied. Some attempts have begun to probe this type of information flows despite the difficulty in data access. The rare documentation on dissent defection and ratting behavior has forced existing studies to rely on proxies for the information flows, such as measuring defection by repression intensity assuming defection will occur with repression (Condra and Shapiro, 2012) or studying reported willingness to inform via survey (Lyall, Shiraito and Imai, 2015) or collecting virtual tip counts online (Shaver and Shapiro, 2021). While very insightful, these approaches are very limited by their explanatory power since insider defection is not directly examined and tested. It is also unclear how governments incentivize defection through rewards and whom regimes target to flip that maximizes quality intelligence feeds. This study complements and refines previous arguments on authoritarian information-gathering with a new explanation and empirical evidence, showing that dictators target relationships to key actors in underground dissent movements and encourage their flipping behavior through reduced penalty or immunity.

Relational Punishment, Clemency for Defection, and Opposition Demobilization

States will amass all resources they have to maximize control over territory and deter political challenges, and it is particularly important for authoritarian regimes. One common misperception in understanding authoritarian politics and repression is that we assume autocrats are better resourced to control population due to the relative freedom in using violence and frequent deployment of surveillance technologies that help regimes penetrate society and enforce order. Yet, research has shown that dictators often struggle in their ability to extract sufficient information they need to empower their control over society. Thus, how states achieve control when they only have limited information on

dissent is an important question to answer. The aims of this study are twofold: to understand how states strategically use violence and clemency to destruct dissent organizations and why targeting certain individuals in dissent networks helps achieve that goal.

I conceptualize states as an order-seeking entity and violence plays a central role in authoritarian control (Davenport, 2007; Blaydes, 2018). When the information on dissent is abundant, states can easily target repression at groups or individuals who are responsible for mobilizing and eliminate them with minimal cost. Literature on counter-terrorism or counter-insurgency has shown that targeting top dissent officials with a surgical strike represents the most effective approach because it demobilizes resistance quickly while requiring less effort with limited casualties and collateral damage (Siegel, 2011; Shapiro, 2013; Zech and Gabbay, 2016). However, repression campaigns become complicated when information on dissent is constrained. It means that regimes are not confident that they have captured all key actors and unsure whether removing them can sufficiently demobilize the movements. This sense of insecurity motivates dictators to cast their net of repression a bit wider than they would have done with complete information to ensure network demise. But it does not necessarily mean that indiscriminate violence, the entire opposite of targeted violence, becomes the only viable option. Dictators understand the obvious cost of massive killing as it can push the masses to side with rebellion and eventually hurt the regime. Instead, regimes can choose a safer route by selectively targeting key actors and their close connections to maximize the utility of repression while keeping costs low. Both key actors and individuals closely connected to them (perhaps through direct recruitment or immediate command-and-control relationship) pose great threats to the regime because they tend to be more committed to group missions and ideologically more motivated than the rest of rank-and-file members. These close associates also have a high potential to revive resistance by taking up the empty leadership or recruitment role after leaders and recruiters are removed. Selectively executing central nodes and

the closely connected members in the dissent network strikes a delicate balance between costly massacres and the risk of targeting too narrowly.

While violence helps order enforcement, limiting violence can also boost regimes' order-preserving campaigns. The utility of clemency is vastly underestimated in the repression scholarship because attention is mostly drawn to violence itself while the opposite side of it is ignored. When regimes' information on dissent is rich, clemency may be unnecessary because regimes know who is culpable and who is not and have enough information in calculating appropriate punishment. However, the utility of clemency will be amplified when states' intelligence on dissent is lacking. When dissidents are afraid of being captured and repressed, regimes can use clemency to attract defectors who can offer high-value insider tips that aid in state repression. Tipping from inside dissent networks by defectors presents valuable internal intelligence because dissidents themselves generally know better about their peers' behavior than external monitoring agents, and getting information from insiders is much less laborious than fetching intelligence from the outside. When the threat of repression is intense and mercy is obtainable, dissidents are increasingly motivated to betray their organization and trade information for immunity.

If violence can be substituted by clemency to encourage dissent defection and informing, who would regimes target to offset information deficit and maximize control? Not all information is useful to the regime, and an overflow of low-quality information that is unuseful, untrue, or misleading can actually hurt repression campaigns. For the strategy of information-clemency exchange, regimes will want to reward high-value information tips that make repression on dissent more successful and more efficient. I characterize dissent organizations as networks of interconnected dissidents, and dissidents' network positions are linked to their roles and more importantly information access. I argue that network position of dissidents matters for regimes' strategy of using clemency to exchange high-value tips that can aid repression.

In combating underground resistance with little information, targeting whom to maximize the return in using violence and clemency determines the success of repression. Underground resistance networks usually adopt a centralized or hierarchical structure of command and control to maintain secrecy via limited horizontal connections and low density of ties, and their members can be typically characterized into three groups: key actors (i.e., leaders and recruiters), high-ranking members, and low-ranking members. Key actors are the most wanted because they lead operations and expand networks. They have valuable information about the network but are unlikely to defect and flip because they are ideologically extreme and have too many perks of power as core figures of the resistance. They are also hard to capture given their importance in the organization. Low-ranking members are cheap to sway since they have less ideological affinity and little to gain from staying with resistance; but, they also know the least in clandestine networks given the hierarchical structure and their low connections to the top. By contrast, high-ranking members who are closely connected to key actors represent high-value targets for regimes to flip because they are less ideologically extreme and more likely to defect when the incentives are in place. Most importantly, they harbor crucial pieces of information about the organization that regimes want to extract. Being close to key actors means that they know more than anyone else in the organization about who the leaders and active recruiters are and their whereabouts. Plus, they usually sit between the top and the bottom, serving as communication channels that pass insider intelligence regimes desire to know. If these high-ranks can not be swayed and refuse to defect, severely punishing them when they are captured helps eliminate highly committed members who have the potential to revive the organization after key actors are removed. Pledging increased violence if they do not defect also builds up pressure for high ranks to surrender and inform. However, if the high-ranking members can be swayed and defect, information-clemency exchange allows regimes to tap into valuable insider intelligence that helps the authority

to capture key actors as well as remaining fugitives more effectively, leading to quicker destruction of resistance movements.

Targeting high-ranking members for high-value information implies that regimes will review and verify tips submitted to ensure they are useful and truthful. Unconditionally offering mercy to all defectors can lure in opportunists attempting to exploit the clemency system, which regimes want to fend off by reviewing tips and evaluating usefulness. High-quality information may involve tips that help regimes capture key actors and dissent members faster and clues that result in a rapid crackdown on the entire organization. Low-quality information can be tips that are few, unuseful, and barely connects to the core dissent leaderships or leads that are false and intentionally point the regime in the wrong direction to buy time for others to run. High-ranking members closely connected to key actors are more likely to provide valuable information that regimes want, but we should also expect that regimes will establish procedures to review and verify the usefulness of tips before rewarding clemency to defectors and will punish insincere tippers so as to increase the quality of information feeds.

Information-clemency exchange can be tempting for dissidents when they are heavily repressed. Yet, the commitment problem may shadow the promise of mercy and dissuade potential defectors because defection remains a risky behavior and potential defectors are unsure if regimes will not renege on their promise and kill them after information is submitted. Recognizing this, regimes should provide credible assurance that defectors will not be punished (or punished less severely). The typical solution is to publicly advertise that defectors have received mercy. In East Germany for example, the government used radio and newspapers to advertise that surrendered defectors who gave information were pardoned from sentencing (Solbrig, 2017). It was also public knowledge that East German citizens who aided the Stasi with information on would-be dissidents were given better jobs, educational opportunities, and better pay in the troubled economy (Piotrowska, 2020). Institutionalizing information-clemency exchange in legislation to protect defectors

from harm can also alleviate the commitment problem and build credibility. In Taiwan for example, information-clemency exchange was formally stipulated into the martial law (the Betrayers Punishment Act specifically) to increase public trust.[1]

Two primary theoretical implications can be drawn from the above discussion. First, under limited information on underground dissent, regimes tend to cast their net of repression a bit wider by selectively killing both key actors and members closely connected to them to minimize the risk of regrouping while avoiding costly massacres that can incur backlashes and eventually hurt the regime. Therefore, I derive the following hypothesis:

H1: Regimes will execute not just key actors, such as operation leaders or active recruiters, but also members closely connected to them in the underground dissent network.

In addition to supplying violence, regimes can limit violence and reward clemency to individuals who defect and inform. But information value differs, and regimes tend to reward those who are in close connection to top actors in the organization and possess more valuable intelligence that can help capture the 'big fish' than those who are less connected and cannot provide such intelligence. Therefore, I derive the following hypotheses:

H2(a): Regimes are less likely to execute resistance members who defect.

H2(b): Regimes are less likely to kill defectors who are closely connected to key actors than defectors who are less connected.

Empirical Case: Taiwan's White Terror Period (1949-1991)

The period under investigation was an extremely repressive time in Taiwanese history. Historians commonly refer to it as "Taiwan's White Terror," when the Taiwanese government was ruled under a single-party regime of the Republic of China's Nationalist (or

[1]Article nine specifies that immunity or reduced penalty may be granted to defectors or criminals who supply useful information that aids in a successful crackdown.

Kuomintang, KMT, 國民黨). Chiang Kai-shek, the leader of KMT party, was defeated by Mao's communist party and retreated to Taiwan in 1949. In the same year, KMT announced the Martial Law Act (臺灣省戒嚴令) and introduced the Betrayers Punishment Act (懲治叛亂條例), aiming to immediately control Taiwanese society and avoid infiltration by mainland communists.

It was widely acknowledged that high-level violence supplied by Chiang's regime was linked to the poor quality of KMT's intelligence on the island that was newly returned from Japan's colonization (Greitens, 2016, p. 187). The 2-28 Incident in which Nationalists cracked down on anti-regime protests in 1947 caused almost ten thousand death of islanders. It was evident that Chiang lacked sufficient intelligence on indigenous dissent and control of the island, which resulted in a more heavy-handed approach when Chiang's regime retreated to Taiwan. Leaked documents from within the National Security Bureau also pointed to the need to reform national intelligence agencies when officials in the 1950s found that information tips provided by defectors can be several steps ahead of what is known by the government (Bureau, 1991). Information deficit prompted the regime to reform secret agencies and national police departments aiming to heighten social control and prevent communist infiltration. The enhanced surveillance and policing, persecution of political dissent, abusive arrest and interrogation, and over-repression against suspected civilians contributed to numerous political victims and a traumatic effect on Taiwanese society (Chen, 2008, 2014; Su, 2019).

Coercive Institutions in Taiwan. Taiwan's security apparatus was both professional and relatively unconstrained in its use of coercion. The main actors in the security apparatus were the Secrets Bureau (國防部保密局), Taiwan Garrison Command (臺灣警備總司令部/保安司令部), and the Investigative Bureau (內政部調查局). These organizations created complementary, overlapping, and coordinated layers of surveillance to facilitate thorough monitoring of Taiwanese society, and the entire intelligence network becomes

well established in the late 1960s after several waves of reform. These security agencies serve two main functions: intelligence collection and punishment execution. To collect intelligence on regime opponents, security agencies installed spies and informants in government offices and civil groups to monitor potential subversive activity. After intelligence was collected and the suspects were arrested, Taiwan Garrison Command took over to conduct interrogation, trials, and execution, which makes it a terrifying agency for political prisoners. Tortures or threats of torture were often used to extract information, and confessions were compared among prisoners who were interrogated separately to increase reliability. Arrested individuals were then sent to military tribunals and tried based on intelligence provided by secret agencies and information from Taiwan Garrison Command through interrogations.[2] The Betrayers Punishment Act was the main legal basis that judges used to justify and measure the degree of punishment. Executed communists and subversives can be advertised on newspapers or posters to create a terror atmosphere so as to deter participation. People released after imprisonment were also believed to be monitored by local police, and they struggled to find jobs since they were blacklisted by the regime.

Underground Dissent Movements. Underground communist movements represent the main dissent activity in early years seeking to overthrow Chiang's regime. After 1945 when the civil war between the Nationalist Party (KMT) and Mao's communist party heated up, mainland communists sent delegates to Taiwan to mobilize supporters. The iconic organization, the Taiwan Operation Committee (臺灣省工作委員會, 簡稱省工委), was then created by Chinese communists who were smuggled into Taiwan; four key members of the committee were sent to different counties in the island to build subordinate branches and expand membership.[3] Back then, Taiwan was newly returned to China after decades of Japanese colonization; however, the corrupt KMT administration

[2] http://nrch.culture.tw/twpedia.aspx?id=3864

[3] They are 蔡孝乾, 陳澤民, 張志忠, and 洪幼樵.

in Taiwan, exclusiveness in political power, and shattered economy frustrated Taiwanese islanders, fueling the sentiment to join Mao's communist China and overthrow Chiang's regime. Official documents show that more than 250 underground branches were established throughout the island by 1949 with over 2000 members joining organizations (Lin, 2009). The subversion activity ranges from armed activity that plans to steal, purchase, and make weapons or explosives, to unarmed activity that focuses on expanding membership, educating communist ideology, and training that prepares for the mainland Communist's control over military-industrial facilities when the Red Army marches ashore. The recruitment network of underground communists was highly hierarchical, strictly limiting cross-referencing and cross-ladder tie creation. Low density in the network protects the secrecy and increases operation efficiency through a clear command-and-control system. Figure 1 plots the network in one of the branches in southern Taiwan in two layouts. They show very little cross-referencing where subordinates recruited each other or multiple people recruited one person; cross-branch membership was also rare in the hierarchy.

As repression intensified, underground communists were largely eradicated and dissent forces waned over time. Chiang's control of the island was consolidated and state intelligence grows as both formal and informal policing infrastructure are well established (e.g., Baojia and hoko system). Oppositions after the mid-1960s were mostly underground dissidents seeking separation (independence movements by the Islanders) and democratization movements. These dissidents were labeled as subversives and the regime continuously repressed political dissidents. Activists were captured and sentenced in the name of plotting subversion or treason before they could launch any public activity.

(a) Hierarchical layout **(b)** Hub layout



Figure 1. Recruitment Network in Tainan's Operation Committee Sub-branch. *Note*: Nodes are members and directed edges indicate who recruited whom into the organization. Red nodes represent operation leaders whereas blue nodes are non-leaders. Red edges indicates direct recruits by leaders. *Source*: Author's Data.

Data and Measurement

The dataset of political victims is collected from the Injustice Compensation Foundation and the Taiwanese Transitional Justice Commission.[4] The original source of victim's data came from the Injustice Compensation Foundation and then I incorporated the Transitional Justice Commission database which has more complete trial information for victims. The Foundation accepted compensation claims from victims or their families, compiling a list of victims by investigating their claims via official trial documentations. More than ten thousand claims were filed and around 20 billion New Taiwan dollar (700 million USD) were compensated to confirmed cases from 1999 to 2014. This investigation process led to a series of trial document declassification which reveals important information on victim identity, charged crimes, case description, and the eventual sentencing.

[4]Foundation's victim data can be accessed via the Taiwan Holocaust database.

Figure 2 shows an example of declassified trial document with detailed case description. These documents are digitalized by the Foundation and the Commission. I read through these texts and extracted key information about individuals' roles in the dissent organization (e.g. leadership) and their recruitment network (who recruited whom in the organization), defected members, occupations, along with other basic biographic information. The dataset contains all the individuals that stood trial, and the trial outcomes can range from death penalty to life imprisonment, fixed-term imprisonment, and not guilty.

Since this study focuses on how regimes calibrate repression, I cleaned up the data to only include confirmed cases with complete trial documentation and excluded individuals not officially tried, such as killed in police pursuit or still at large and removed duplicated individuals who were releases and recaptured to avoid inflation of observations. This leaves the data to a total of 7,266 observations with complete trial description, court decisions, and relevant biographic information. I will show in the robustness test that the finding is unaffected by dropping cases with incomplete trial information. The temporal distribution of charges is displayed in Figure 3. Repression against underground communist organizations was concentrated in the 1950s and early 1960s, consistent with existing findings in the literature (Lin, 2009; Taiwan Truth Promotion Association, 2015). As underground communists were largely uprooted, repression from the mid-1960s to 1980s was mostly against sporadic political dissidents pursuing separation and independence.

While victims data from the Foundation and the Commission are by far the most comprehensive data collection of political repression in Taiwan, it is still possible that some individuals are missed, and the likely missingness ought to be pointed out. First, since the data collection started by receiving compensation and reputation restoration requests from victims or their families, individuals who do not have living relatives and do not share trial documents with other victims may be missed in the dataset. This likely includes a small number of victims who were foreign nationals (perhaps foreign students at the time) and who were potentially unaware of the compensation program, or



Figure 2. A Sample Military Trial Document. *Source*: Taiwan National Archives.



Figure 3. The Number of Individuals Being Charged Over Time

victims who have emigrated and do not intend to seek compensation. Second, this data only includes political victims going through military tribunals, excluding those who were tried in ordinary courts. They likely represent a small number of cases because Chiang's regime favored and prioritized the use of military courts for repression. Military tribunals were highly controlled by the regime, providing a necessary channel of legitimacy (under martial law) and efficiency in execution. Extra-judicial killing or disappearing was less

popular as the regime desired for publicity to showcase strength and deter participation. Over the years, officials have provided different estimates of victims; however, thanks to recent waves of declassification, it is believed that the most recent effort conducted by the Foundation and the Commission provides the most comprehensive picture of repression and political victims in Taiwan's authoritarian period.[5]

What makes the data unique is that when the Foundation and the Commission worked on victim compensation and reputation restoration, a large amount of official documents and trial records were declassified which security agencies believed would never become public, and they were released without the oversight of the regime responsible for the repression. More importantly, while other datasets have been forced to draw inferences about repression based on country and group-level targeting, this data allow direct observation of targeted repression under a secret police regime at a fine-grained individual level, allowing researchers to probe deeper into the logic of state violence against underground dissent movements that planned antigovernment activity.

Measurement. The outcome variable is the severity of state repression. I choose the most direct measure by examining whether a prisoner received capital punishment (1 if yes, 0 if not) as the result of the military trial. Death sentencing represents the harshest method of repression and guarantees that these convicts will not return to society and engage in any further subversive operations. Prisoners were often executed soon after the

[5]The first report given by the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) in 1988 suggested that overall there were up to 29,407 trial cases and approximately 140,000 victims. But in 2006 under President Cheng's request, the Ministry of Defense (MoD) revised the estimate, showing that around 16,132 individuals (after de-duplication) were tried by military tribunals during the martial law period. In 2014, the estimate was revised again by the Injustice Compensation Foundation, which reported 8,848 individuals and their military trial processes; this data is later incorporated by the Transitional Justice Commission and has since expanded victims to 10,097 individuals. The earlier estimates by MoJ and MoD are likely inaccurate because they mixed up political and non-political cases (i.e., treating all military trials as political trials) and conflated surveilled cases and tried cases without separating them, leading to over-estimation. The change in estimates reveals the importance of document declassification in helping clarify the source of errors and shows the value of democratization in facilitating transparency and transitional justice.

decision was made to ensure that no information or messages can be leaked back to the groups.

For independent variables, I leverage official trial verdicts for each individual to identify their roles in the organization. Personal connections and organizational leadership are frequently mentioned in the verdict text. *Operation leadership* is a variable indicating whether an individual leads the group or serves as the party secretary commanding a communist organization. Court verdicts also describe recruitment relationships frequently (e.g., who recruited whom into the group) and the directed ties are coded by the author reading through the text of verdicts. *Active recruiter* is thus operationalized by the degree centrality of the node in the recruitment network, in which higher out-degree means that more dissidents were brought in by this actor, suggesting that s/he played a key role in expanding the organization. *Defection* is coded when an individual turning themselves in was mentioned in the verdict.[6] Surrendering behavior was typically accompanied by trading in information tips that help the government capture more dissidents in exchange for clemency. These defectors still stood trial where judges weighed their 'contribution' and determined the level of clemency. The informing-clemency linkage can be buttressed by anecdotal and qualitative evidence.[7]

I leverage the recruitment data to measure the member's degree of closeness to key actors. The information on recruitment networks is particularly instrumental in understanding in-group connections as it not only specifies the command-and-control relationship but also helps infer dissident ranks within a hierarchical organization and information accessibility in relation to the central position. Clandestine networks typically feature a

[6]People who defect and who are captured differ mainly in the way that defectors voluntarily turned themselves in before capture while the arrested individuals didn't defect and were later captured by police. There is no difference procedure-wise because both of them were officially tried and received sentencing in the military tribunal.

[7]Some court documents clearly indicate the information-clemency exchange. In the appendix, cases in Table A.19 show clear evidence that a punishment waiver is given to a 'sincere' defector who helped government arrest other members. By contrast, Table A.20 shows that aggravated penalty is given because defection was found to be 'insincere'—he didn't spell out all the names connected to him, including people he has recruited.

hierarchical structure where little cross-ladder connections can be formed to protect secrecy. It means that lower-ranking members rarely know top leaders, and this information is only possessed by a few higher-ranking members closely connected to them to protect core members and organization secrecy. Closeness is operationalized by the network distance between nodes, and distance is calculated by the order of connections. The higher the order is between two nodes, the closer these two nodes are. Two measures *closeness to leader* and *closeness to recruiter*, are created. The calculation can be summarized as following:

$$\mathbf{W}k = \sum_{j}^{n} w_{i,j} \times k_j$$

where $w_{i,j}$ is an inversely-weighted network distance matrix which describes distance of each pair of actors i and j. Network distance is calculated by the shortest path between two nodes where one denotes one-step away between two nodes (directly connected) and two denotes two-step away (indirectly connected via an intermediate node) etc. Inversely-weighted distance matrices ensure that closeness decays as the distance grows. $w_{i,j}$ is then multiplied by the indicator variable k_j which denotes whether an actor j is a leader. In calculating *closeness to recruiters*, k then denotes the number of recruits j has (out-degree centrality) and it is multiplied by the inversely-weighted distance in the same way. This weighted distance to key actors provides an aggregated measure of individual's net closeness to leaderships or key recruiters in the network.

I also include a rich set of controls to account for confounders that may influence the likelihood of execution. A few prominent types of dissent activities that may shape the likelihood of the death penalty are included. *Leaking military intelligence* is a binary variable indicating whether a person provides, steals, or sells sensitive military intelligence to subversives. *Spreading rumors* indicates whether a person engages in spreading or promoting anti-government ideology and speech, while *Aiding subversion* indicates the

act of financial assistance to dissidents. *Joining membership* refers to a person who was recruited and joined a dissent group membership but did not engage in subversive activity. It often refers to individuals who merely participate in a study group and know nothing about subversion plotting. Additionally, the victim's demographic information is also considered, such as *Age* and *Gender*. Socio-economic background of victims is also taken into account to examine if the regime tends to target a specific social group and I included *Students*, *Doctors*, and *Police/Military personnel* to consider the targeting effect. *Inmate* is another background indicator showing if an individual was charged for his/her behavior in prison. Finally, ethnic identity may also influence the chance of death sentencing prisoners received, and I consider a variable indicating whether victims are Mainlanders (retreated from mainland China with KMT) or Islanders (born and grew up in Taiwan before KMT's retreat).

Table 1. Variable Statistics

variable	mean	min	max	sd
Death penalty	0.14	0.00	1.00	0.34
Operation leader	0.03	0.00	1.00	0.18
Active recruiter	0.30	0.00	22.00	1.24
Defection	0.03	0.00	1.00	0.18
Leaking military intelligence	0.02	0.00	1.00	0.13
Spreading rumors	0.06	0.00	1.00	0.24
Joining membership	0.25	0.00	1.00	0.43
Aiding subversion	0.01	0.00	1.00	0.10
gender	0.96	0.00	1.00	0.18
Student	0.06	0.00	1.00	0.23
Doctor	0.02	0.00	1.00	0.13
Police/Military	0.22	0.00	1.00	0.42
Inmate	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.05
Closeness to recruiters	0.42	0.00	2.67	0.65
Closeness to leaders	0.03	0.00	1.00	0.09

Table 2. The Effect of Network Relationships on Severity of Repression

	Dependent variable:					
	Death Sentence					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Operation leader	1.319***	1.462***	1.209***	1.362***	1.138***	1.306***
	(0.211)	(0.213)	(0.220)	(0.228)	(0.227)	(0.243)
Active recruiter	0.463***	0.461***	0.410***	0.408***	0.336***	0.333***
	(0.068)	(0.068)	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.057)	(0.059)
Defection	−1.377***	−1.520***	−1.409***	−1.557***	−1.687***	−1.866***
	(0.410)	(0.417)	(0.421)	(0.431)	(0.398)	(0.410)
Leaking military intel.	0.704*	0.545	0.714*	0.550	0.762*	0.551
	(0.381)	(0.436)	(0.388)	(0.442)	(0.393)	(0.459)
Spreading rumors	−3.716***	−3.188***	−3.603***	−3.112***	−3.411***	−2.945***
	(0.722)	(0.720)	(0.720)	(0.721)	(0.725)	(0.726)
Aiding subversion	−1.612**	−1.892**	−1.531**	−1.827**	−1.478*	−1.842**
	(0.767)	(0.786)	(0.778)	(0.804)	(0.824)	(0.870)
Joining organization	−3.717***	−3.855***	−4.244***	−4.415***	−4.539***	−4.739***
	(0.528)	(0.544)	(0.640)	(0.657)	(0.527)	(0.546)
Male	0.412*	0.499**	0.472*	0.569**	0.281	0.385
	(0.240)	(0.246)	(0.261)	(0.267)	(0.249)	(0.259)
Student	−0.545*	−0.633*	−0.585*	−0.682**	−0.672*	−0.802**
	(0.329)	(0.325)	(0.352)	(0.344)	(0.346)	(0.359)
Doctor	0.265	0.273	0.237	0.240	0.349	0.385
	(0.404)	(0.457)	(0.381)	(0.439)	(0.434)	(0.499)
Police/Military	−0.356	−0.399	−0.343	−0.388	−0.235	−0.291
	(0.256)	(0.331)	(0.257)	(0.327)	(0.247)	(0.306)
Inmate	1.157*	1.290**	1.236**	1.352**	1.476**	1.559***
	(0.630)	(0.580)	(0.615)	(0.566)	(0.605)	(0.557)
Islander	0.335**	0.155	0.157	−0.031	−0.050	−0.337**
	(0.146)	(0.162)	(0.149)	(0.163)	(0.150)	(0.168)
Closeness to leaders			5.351***	5.494***		
			(0.770)	(0.729)		
Closeness to recruiters					1.275***	1.338***
					(0.107)	(0.123)
Year FE	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	7266	7266	7266	7266	7266	7266

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Standard errors clustered at the trial case level

Empirical Analysis

Turning to statistical analysis, Table 2 shows the result estimated by logit regression given the binary nature of the outcome variable and standard errors are clustered at the trial case level as multiple people can be tried together. Model 1 shows that individuals who are operation leaders or active recruiters significantly increase their likelihood of

execution, and it is robust after accounting for the temporal trend in the observations using year fixed effects in Model 2. Model 3 to Model 6 add in individuals closely connected with leaders or recruiters and show a significant increase in the likelihood of death sentencing, providing empirical support to the hypothesis 1 that regimes tend to execute not just key actors but also high-ranking members who are closely connected to them. Defection, in contrast, shows a significant decrease in the probability of execution, supporting the hypothesis 2(a) on the information-clemency exchange that governments tend to grant mercy to individuals defecting and providing information to the authorities.

Figure 4 plots the marginal effects. It shows that leaders experience a three-fold increase (.075, .23) in the predicted probability of execution; recruiters also experience nearly a three-fold increase when the number of recruits goes from 0 to 5 and are almost guaranteed death when they recruited more than 15 people. Defection yields about a four-time decrease in the probability of death penalty. Closeness to leaders or recruiters also show substantial increases in the likelihood of execution.

The results on the conditional effects of defection are reported in Table 3. Model 1 and 2 show that network position matters in regimes' clemency reward. High-ranking defectors closely connected to leaders are less likely to receive the death penalty than low-ranking defectors who are less connected. Model 3 and 4 report a similar finding for connections to recruiters, supporting the hypothesis 2(b) that governments tend to reward people near key actors and can bring in high-value tips than those who do not. Figure 5 plots the marginal effects of the interaction term from Model 1 and 3, showing that the likelihood of execution drops much more significantly for defectors closely connected to key actors than those less connected defectors, supporting the hypothesis 2(b).

The results of the control variables reveal additional information on targeted repression. Committing more severe crimes like leaking military intelligence to Communists seems to increase the chance of capital punishment, but it is not statistically significant across all models. Prisoners tend to receive aggravated punishment. Less severer activities

Figure 4. Effect Plots



such as spreading anti-government speech and rumors, financially aiding subversion, and joining dissent groups are negatively correlated with capital punishment, conforming to the general impression that the regime imprisoned but did not kill individuals engaged in less severe crimes. Dissident's occupation does not play an important role in explaining penalty. Lastly, some politicians have argued that local Taiwanese people (Islanders) were the primary victims under Chiang's repressive regime, and this statement was widely used to foment ethnic confrontations and conflicts in Taiwan. My findings, largely consistent

Table 3. The Conditional Effects of Defection

	Dependent variable:			
	Death Sentence			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Operation leader	1.249***	1.419***	1.132***	1.302***
	(0.221)	(0.230)	(0.227)	(0.242)
Active recruiter	0.405***	0.401***	0.324***	0.320***
	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.055)	(0.057)
Defection	−0.970**	−1.083***	−0.575	−0.628
	(0.400)	(0.410)	(0.439)	(0.455)
Leaking Military Intel.	0.709*	0.550	0.754*	0.548
	(0.387)	(0.441)	(0.393)	(0.460)
Spreading rumors	−3.595***	−3.106***	−3.398***	−2.943***
	(0.720)	(0.721)	(0.726)	(0.726)
Aiding subversion	−1.527*	−1.825**	−1.482*	−1.851**
	(0.781)	(0.807)	(0.831)	(0.880)
Joining organization	−4.351***	−4.534***	−4.587***	−4.801***
	(0.683)	(0.704)	(0.529)	(0.549)
Male	0.474*	0.570**	0.252	0.351
	(0.263)	(0.269)	(0.245)	(0.256)
Student	−0.592*	−0.690**	−0.685**	−0.816**
	(0.355)	(0.349)	(0.349)	(0.362)
Doctor	0.214	0.210	0.319	0.348
	(0.383)	(0.441)	(0.435)	(0.500)
Police/Military	−0.340	−0.385	−0.226	−0.285
	(0.256)	(0.327)	(0.246)	(0.305)
Inmate	1.245**	1.365**	1.493**	1.570***
	(0.614)	(0.566)	(0.606)	(0.562)
Islander	0.147	−0.042	−0.057	−0.352**
	(0.149)	(0.164)	(0.150)	(0.169)
Closeness to leaders	5.784***	5.978***		
	(0.820)	(0.787)		
Defection x Closeness to leaders	−7.665***	−8.130***		
	(2.650)	(2.745)		
Closeness to recruiters			1.333***	1.411***
			(0.111)	(0.129)
Defection x Closeness to recruiters			−1.227***	−1.353***
			(0.351)	(0.367)
Year FE	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	7266	7266	7266	7266

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Standard errors clustered at the trial case level

with other existing research (Wu, 2002; Taiwan Truth Promotion Association, 2015), do not find support for the claim of ethnicity-based targeting, at least not at the level of the death penalty.

Figure 5. Interaction Effect Plots



Death penalty is used to measure punishment severity because this study seeks to understand whom the regime targets to kill in order to demobilize resistance. However, there are other forms of punishment that can be considered as a part of the punishment strategy. I therefore created an ordinal outcome variable that captures four main forms of penalty—innocence (14%), fixed-term imprisonment (70%), life imprisonment (2%), death penalty (14%)—and estimated it with ordered logit regression. Appendix Table A.9 and A.10 show that the finding are consistent.

Space may also play a part in shaping states' repression strategies (Christensen, 2018). For instance, regimes may have a strong incentive to kill more people when dissent movements cluster in an area. Repression may also be more severe when movements operate in regions closer to the capital, which poses a greater threat to the regime. Unfortunately, it is difficult to control for regional variation in the data because the place where dissidents were captured initially is not recorded in trial documents. Victims' residential address is also omitted intentionally in the declassified document to protect their privacy. However, it is possible to use victims' hometowns as a rough proxy for the locations they were

arrested given that cross-county relocation was relatively infrequent. The replication of the results with county fixed effect is reported as supporting evidence in Appendix Table A.11 and A.12, showing a consistent finding.[8]

Testing the Information-Gathering Mechanism. One may question the findings by saying that information-gathering or internal tipping may not be the mechanism at play that links defection with clemency. An alternative explanation can be that the government simply wants more surrenders because it facilitates dissent self-destruction. High-ranking members may tend to receive clemency because their defection causes more damages to the organization. Additionally, clemency may simply be a signaling strategy that shows regime's mercy and allures more surrenders and has nothing to do with information-gathering. To address these concerns, I present qualitative and quantitative evidence to further corroborate the information-clemency mechanism.

First, I combed through court documents and show evidence that the government rewarded clemency by weighing defector's information contribution. Although systemically coding information-clemency exchange is difficult because they are not always described in the court documents and can happen behind the scene, we still observe a good number of cases where the court documents described that the government granted clemency by weighing defectors' information values. Appendix Table A.19 describes two positive-reward cases where a defector's plea for mercy was accepted because clues they provided resulted in very successful crackdowns and a series of underground communists arrested. The verdict applauds that this informing behavior should be rewarded so more willing defectors will come forward to inform. Table A.20 then shows a negative-reward case where the defector's confession was found to be insincere because he did not give all the relationships he knows, including some individuals he recruited, which led to an increase

[8]Spatial fixed effect only includes islanders' hometowns because mainlanders' hometowns were in China and thus cannot be used as a proxy for their physical location when they were arrested in Taiwan.

in his punishment. These cases all point to the importance of informing and information quality in determining clemency reward.

Additionally, if governments do care about informational value in granting clemency and use these tips to capture more dissidents in the dissent network, we should expect that repression becomes more efficient in targeting and people who are close to defectors or previously arrested members will be captured faster than those less connected. This expectation implies that the state may be more capable of targeting their repression (particularly in the speed) when it is better informed. To test this expectation, I created an outcome variable measuring the time (number of years) before each individual gets arrested and see how an individual's network position to previously arrested members and defectors increases or decreases their risk of survival (escaping arrest).[9] Appendix Table A.15 and A.14 show estimated results from Cox Regression and time-corrected BCSTS logit model respectively, which are both commonly used in survival/duration analysis. They show that increased prior captures of any members, members close to the top, or members close to the defectors in the resistance network contribute to a greater risk of an individual in the same network being captured and shortened survival time in their escape. These findings land additional support to the informing mechanism and argument that information gathered by the government facilitates further pursuit and arrests of remaining fugitives.

Robustness Checks

Data Reliability and Additional Sources. One might worry that these victims were not real dissidents but simply 'made up' by the regime. Given that the government was notorious in using or threatening to use torture during interrogations, the extent to which we can believe that these identified leaders or recruiters are true rebels and not framed

[9]The years started from 1945 when resistance movements started. Some individuals did not experience capture, meaning they remained at large even by the end of the observation year 1991. They are called censored observations but can still be informative and analyzed in duration models.

by the regime is uncertain. It might be that these victims were easier to capture and thus convenient to frame into more severe crimes so the regime can use them to show strength and intimidate the public.

To address this concern, other sources of information are needed to validate victims' roles. However, this is not an easy task due to the secrecy of these underground movements and limited official documents available beyond the released court documents. To overcome these hurdles, I utilized three additional sources—a leaked document from with the National Security Bureau, interviews of surviving victims and families, and published case studies—to verify organization leadership. Although there is no single source of information recording all victims and their roles, combining these pieces of information can help replicate what was described in the trial documents and try to validate it. The leaked intelligence document from National Security Bureau provides a good source of reference because the Bureau at the time oversaw all security agencies in the country and the leaked files describe in detail how intelligence was gathered from informants and how it guided police in arresting key subversives and resolving their cases from 1949 to 1958.[10] Although it only covers ten years, this document substantially improves our understanding of how intelligence helped target leading actors before arrests, who were already captured and who were still at large, and how the information provided by informants and defectors enabled continuous captures of remaining fugitives. In addition to leaked documents, I also leverage several published interviews and oral histories to help identify their roles (Lu and Qiu, 1999; Jiang, 2002; Zhang et al., 2015; Shi, Chen and Cao, 2016). These interviews are parts of ongoing programs by various research institutions and local governments, covering a large number of victims and their recounts. While these recounts could still be biased by their personal perspective and limited by how much information

[10]This classified document(安全局機密文件–歷年辦理匪案彙編) described 162 cases in ten years and was leaked by a former intelligence agent named Gu Jeng Wen who intended to show that President's Lee at the time had previous associations with underground Communist organizations even though Lee later defected and rewarded with immunity.

victims know, they are very useful in reconstructing the history. Using these materials, I am able to confirm 176 leaders (out of the 214 officially tried leaders) who were most likely leading or taking a major role in commanding their organizations. Table A.1 and A.2 in Appendix replicate the analysis using these confirmed leaderships and produce broadly consistent results, showing that these leadership designations are less likely made up and reflect the state's intent to target leaders and eliminate them.

One might also worry about potentially made-up recruitment connections in trial documents and it would be helpful to replicate connections with other sources. Compared with verifying leadership, empirically replicating these connections is much harder even with the above new sources because the leaked document focuses more on describing leaders and their operations rather than their relationships. When relationships are mentioned, they are scattered around cases, making consistent identification difficult. Interviews provide only limited information as survivors know very few connections beyond themselves, given the secrecy of the network. Relatives of deceased victims know little about who recruited their husbands or wives and who was recruited by them. However, it is reasonable to believe that the identified recruiter/recruit connections in official trial documents to some extent reflect true relationships. Existing literature demonstrates that that police verified confessions through cross-interrogation and would increase punishment if they found out that confessed connections were insincere (Zhang et al., 2015; Shi, Chen and Cao, 2016), suggesting that the regime evaluated intelligence and disincentivized false information.Theoretically, if fabricated connections were systematically introduced and welcomed by the police, we should see a continuous growth of dissent movements because true subversives would remain at large and connections would keep expanding. Instead, what we see in reality is that the underground communist movements were largely uprooted after severe repression in the 1950s and early 1960s, as other existing literature has found (Lin, 2009; Greitens, 2016), suggesting that relationships revealed to the regime were instrumental in capturing real members and are less likely to be false connections.

Importantly, even though some charges and connections may have been fictitious, it would not jeopardize the inference of this study because the regime's incentive remains the same: it desires to eliminate as many subversives as possible within its knowledge and makes efforts to broaden its intelligence boundary. Nonetheless, future research is needed to further probe members' connections when more complete surveillance data and informant reports become declassified and available to the public.

Conclusion

This study shows how states' repression strategy against clandestine movements is shaped by network relationships in the dissent organization. Drawing from new data on state violence against underground resistance in Taiwan's authoritarian period, I show that when fighting resistance with limited information regimes tend to widen the scope of repression by executing key actors and their close connections to ensure network dismantling. More importantly, regimes crave information, and this hunger drives them to mercify individuals willing to defect and share intelligence. Given that not all information have an equal value to the regime, clemency tends to target defectors who are close to key actors and thus have high-value tips about who they are and their whereabouts, thereby enabling further crackdown of key fugitives and quicker destruction of resistance organizations. This claim is supported in my finding that regimes tend to execute not just key actors but also members closely connected to them when they are captured. However, regimes tend not to kill defectors, and the likelihood of execution drops significantly for defectors who are closely connected to key actors than those less connected.

Overall, these findings paint a potentially worrying picture from the perspective of scholars and policymakers interested in understanding state repression. By replacing the democratic constitution with wartime martial law, state actors and security agencies can be empowered to exercise extreme violence against civilians in the name of fighting subversion with minimal oversight. Maneuvering relational targeting that punishes ties

to disloyalists and rewards insider defection shows how creative and how terrifying the dictators can do to achieve political control. International intervention may be needed to protect human rights when regimes are likely to employ extreme violence in repressing underground resistance movements.

One broader implication of this study pertains to the way we conceive of state repression. Existing repression literature primarily focuses on how state violence (external to dissent) kills dissidence from the outside; however, this study shows that dissidence can be killed by both external coercion and internal defection. This finding echoes to the canonical work by Davenport (2015), advocating that social movement demobilization is better understood through the simultaneous intersection of external and internal explanations, where the external means state violence and the internal broadly includes the dynamic within dissent organizations such as momentum, ideology, and fragmentation. Insider defection and flipping behavior (some called 'ratting') represent a crucial repression mechanism that is largely overlooked in the repression scholarship. A closer look at external coercion and internal defection helps us understand how dictators dissolve opposition in a more integrated way.

The importance of dissent network position in shaping repression targeting also points to the need to revise our understanding of state coercion. Exiting research pays little attention to how social network shapes repression targeting. It is even rarer to see studies that discuss the use of violence and clemency to incentivize defection and inform behavior from high-ranking resistance members. While this study shows that targeting high-ranking members to flip and inform can be very effective in destructing centralized dissent networks with little cross-ladder ties, it may be less useful against leader-less networks (i.e., some anti-regime protests) or networks where in-group ties are less hierarchical and much denser, so insider information is easier to get and thus less valuable. More research is necessary to study the heterogeneous value of defection and insider tipping in different dissent network structures.

Finally, this study speaks to the broader literature on information and violence in conflict studies. My argument implies that bifurcating governments into fully informed versus poorly informed regimes is insufficient to explain the rich variation of state violence. Most regimes have some level of dissent information and try to enhance intelligence and sharpen their targeting. It is thus important to study these middle-level information regimes and understand how they diversify methods of violence and information-gathering mechanisms rather than see them as simply restrained by their information endowment. My findings also show the potential for future research to look beyond the broad demographic-based (i.e., ethnicity or identity) collective punishment by examining more micro-level relationship targeting to help us understand how governments carefully calibrate repression in the attempt to balance between the use of violence and civilian casualties.

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RELATIONAL PUNISHMENT, DEFECTION, AND UNDERGROUND RESISTANCE DEMOBILIZATION: EVIDENCE FROM TAIWAN'S 'WHITE TERROR' PERIOD
ONLINE APPENDIX

Robustness: Removed Cases in Data Cleaning Process

In the original data entries (13,206 individuals) collected from the Injustice Compensation Foundation, only 8,179 individuals have confirmed court verdicts, case descriptions, and sentencing decisions. Others entries merely have names and gender without any further information. They are unconfirmed cases as their court documents cannot be retrieved from the government. It is hard to know exactly what drives the missingness in court documents given very little information is provided. One may concern that the missingness might be driven by government's unwillingness to declassify some major cases with severely charged crimes. But it is unlikely because the majority of known leaders and recruiters that have been identified in oral histories and are largely included in the confirmed cases of Foundation's data. Results using these confirmed leaderships in Table A.1 and A.2 also show a consistent finding, suggesting that missingness in unconfirmed individuals is less likely to be systemically generated and more likely to be random.

Among these confirmed cases, I further cleaned the data with the following steps. First, because this paper studies how a regime calibrates its repression, I removed a few individuals who were killed in police pursuit and who are still at large (155 individuals). Some entries with unknown names are excluded (124 individuals). I also removed entries where the birth dates and ages on file are missing because that disallowed me to estimate their year of arrest (220 individuals). Lastly, I removed duplicated individuals who were released and re-captured because the calibration of punishment is likely to differ from the majority of victims who were only captured and tried once. The above steps boil down to a total of 7,608 individuals with multiple entries and 7,266 individuals after de-duplication. Appendix Table A.3 to A.6 use data that add back duplicated individuals and individuals without birth date and age (hence no capture year can be estimated). The results all remain consistent.

Table A.1. The Effect of Network Relationships on Severity of Repression (Confirmed Leadership)

	Dependent variable:					
	Death Sentence					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Operation leader	2.364***	2.326***	2.236***	2.218***	2.181***	2.166***
	(0.268)	(0.273)	(0.285)	(0.296)	(0.293)	(0.306)
Active recruiter	0.455***	0.462***	0.404***	0.409***	0.324***	0.329***
	(0.068)	(0.068)	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.056)	(0.058)
Defection	−1.548***	−1.671***	−1.574***	−1.700***	−1.843***	−1.996***
	(0.456)	(0.460)	(0.473)	(0.479)	(0.433)	(0.443)
Leaking military intel.	0.688*	0.534	0.698*	0.539	0.747*	0.541
	(0.376)	(0.431)	(0.381)	(0.436)	(0.389)	(0.455)
Spreading rumors	−3.673***	−3.185***	−3.574***	−3.111***	−3.371***	−2.945***
	(0.718)	(0.720)	(0.718)	(0.721)	(0.721)	(0.726)
Aiding subversion	−1.593**	−1.875**	−1.515*	−1.812**	−1.461*	−1.827**
	(0.768)	(0.787)	(0.779)	(0.805)	(0.824)	(0.870)
Joining organization	−3.650***	−3.782***	−4.151***	−4.325***	−4.497***	−4.695***
	(0.524)	(0.541)	(0.628)	(0.649)	(0.529)	(0.549)
Male	0.425*	0.509**	0.483*	0.579**	0.285	0.389
	(0.241)	(0.247)	(0.263)	(0.269)	(0.251)	(0.261)
Student	−0.549	−0.628*	−0.589	−0.673*	−0.677*	−0.794**
	(0.338)	(0.331)	(0.362)	(0.348)	(0.354)	(0.362)
Doctor	0.177	0.186	0.143	0.139	0.258	0.293
	(0.412)	(0.482)	(0.384)	(0.456)	(0.433)	(0.510)
Police/Military	−0.338	−0.378	−0.326	−0.368	−0.219	−0.271
	(0.256)	(0.326)	(0.256)	(0.323)	(0.245)	(0.302)
Inmate	1.162*	1.286**	1.239**	1.349**	1.477**	1.557***
	(0.631)	(0.586)	(0.615)	(0.570)	(0.607)	(0.561)
Islander	0.325**	0.154	0.154	−0.028	−0.057	−0.336**
	(0.146)	(0.162)	(0.149)	(0.163)	(0.150)	(0.168)
Closeness to leaders			5.225***	5.412***		
			(0.771)	(0.728)		
Closeness to recruiters					1.267***	1.333***
					(0.109)	(0.124)
Year FE	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	7266	7266	7266	7266	7266	7266

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Standard errors clustered at the trial case level

Table A.2. The Conditional Effects of Defection (Confirmed Leadership)

	Dependent variable:			
	Death Sentence			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Operation leader	2.339***	2.341***	2.173***	2.157***
	(0.300)	(0.314)	(0.290)	(0.300)
Active recruiter	0.399***	0.403***	0.313***	0.316***
	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.055)	(0.056)
Defection	−1.047**	−1.150***	−0.681	−0.710
	(0.433)	(0.438)	(0.487)	(0.493)
Leaking military intel.	0.692*	0.538	0.739*	0.539
	(0.381)	(0.436)	(0.388)	(0.456)
Spreading rumors	−3.564***	−3.103***	−3.359***	−2.943***
	(0.718)	(0.721)	(0.721)	(0.726)
Aiding subversion	−1.509*	−1.810**	−1.464*	−1.836**
	(0.781)	(0.809)	(0.831)	(0.880)
Joining organization	−4.262***	−4.448***	−4.544***	−4.757***
	(0.672)	(0.696)	(0.531)	(0.552)
Male	0.487*	0.582**	0.258	0.355
	(0.267)	(0.273)	(0.248)	(0.259)
Student	−0.598	−0.682*	−0.689*	−0.808**
	(0.367)	(0.354)	(0.357)	(0.366)
Doctor	0.106	0.096	0.219	0.248
	(0.390)	(0.464)	(0.440)	(0.516)
Police/Military	−0.323	−0.363	−0.210	−0.265
	(0.256)	(0.322)	(0.245)	(0.300)
Inmate	1.249**	1.362**	1.494**	1.567***
	(0.615)	(0.571)	(0.607)	(0.565)
Islander	0.143	−0.040	−0.065	−0.353**
	(0.149)	(0.163)	(0.151)	(0.169)
Closeness to leaders	5.686***	5.923***		
	(0.820)	(0.785)		
Defection x Closeness to leaders	−9.854***	−10.164***		
	(3.267)	(3.340)		
Closeness to recruiters			1.323***	1.404***
			(0.112)	(0.130)
Defection x Closeness to recruiters			−1.299***	−1.428***
			(0.400)	(0.413)
Year FE	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	7266	7266	7266	7266

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Standard errors clustered at the trial case level

Table A.3. The Effect of Network Relationships on Severity of Repression (Including the Released and Recaptured)

	Dependent variable:					
	Death Sentence					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Operation leader	1.104***	1.260***	1.012***	1.176***	0.971***	1.147***
	(0.201)	(0.199)	(0.205)	(0.209)	(0.207)	(0.218)
Active recruiter	0.435***	0.432***	0.393***	0.391***	0.326***	0.325***
	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.050)	(0.051)
Defection	−1.200***	−1.308***	−1.216***	−1.331***	−1.473***	−1.607***
	(0.361)	(0.369)	(0.366)	(0.377)	(0.361)	(0.370)
Leaking military intel.	0.768**	0.628	0.776**	0.634	0.823**	0.641
	(0.374)	(0.429)	(0.378)	(0.433)	(0.382)	(0.446)
Spreading rumors	−3.369***	−2.877***	−3.266***	−2.801***	−3.098***	−2.663***
	(0.589)	(0.593)	(0.587)	(0.590)	(0.588)	(0.590)
Aiding subversion	−1.375**	−1.642**	−1.277**	−1.556**	−1.171*	−1.495**
	(0.634)	(0.650)	(0.642)	(0.664)	(0.680)	(0.718)
Joining organization	−3.502***	−3.614***	−3.850***	−3.965***	−4.215***	−4.351***
	(0.437)	(0.450)	(0.485)	(0.494)	(0.441)	(0.454)
Male	0.412*	0.503**	0.457*	0.554**	0.265	0.360
	(0.235)	(0.241)	(0.246)	(0.253)	(0.239)	(0.247)
Student	−0.533*	−0.624**	−0.572*	−0.666**	−0.655**	−0.782**
	(0.317)	(0.313)	(0.334)	(0.324)	(0.328)	(0.336)
Doctor	0.284	0.288	0.269	0.270	0.372	0.388
	(0.389)	(0.438)	(0.368)	(0.421)	(0.413)	(0.471)
Police/Military	−0.372	−0.407	−0.363	−0.399	−0.257	−0.302
	(0.247)	(0.321)	(0.249)	(0.318)	(0.240)	(0.300)
Inmate	1.010**	0.869*	0.796	0.670	0.476	0.322
	(0.460)	(0.523)	(0.508)	(0.583)	(0.538)	(0.631)
Islander	0.332**	0.151	0.162	−0.026	−0.045	−0.310*
	(0.142)	(0.158)	(0.144)	(0.158)	(0.147)	(0.163)
Closeness to leaders			4.596***	4.603***		
			(0.612)	(0.574)		
Closeness to recruiters					1.163***	1.193***
					(0.097)	(0.109)
Year FE	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	7608	7608	7608	7608	7608	7608

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Standard errors clustered at the trial case level

Table A.4. The Conditional Effects of Defection (Including the Released and Recaptured)

	Dependent variable:			
	Death Sentence			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Operation leader	1.044***	1.224***	0.970***	1.150***
	(0.206)	(0.210)	(0.206)	(0.217)
Active recruiter	0.389***	0.386***	0.317***	0.315***
	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.049)	(0.050)
Defection	−0.857**	−0.928**	−0.528	−0.535
	(0.356)	(0.363)	(0.404)	(0.414)
Leaking military intel.	0.771**	0.633	0.815**	0.638
	(0.378)	(0.432)	(0.382)	(0.446)
Spreading rumors	−3.260***	−2.797***	−3.089***	−2.661***
	(0.587)	(0.590)	(0.588)	(0.590)
Aiding subversion	−1.270**	−1.550**	−1.167*	−1.494**
	(0.643)	(0.666)	(0.685)	(0.725)
Joining organization	−3.909***	−4.029***	−4.253***	−4.399***
	(0.502)	(0.512)	(0.442)	(0.456)
Male	0.460*	0.556**	0.240	0.334
	(0.248)	(0.255)	(0.235)	(0.244)
Student	−0.578*	−0.673**	−0.666**	−0.795**
	(0.336)	(0.327)	(0.329)	(0.339)
Doctor	0.252	0.247	0.347	0.355
	(0.368)	(0.422)	(0.414)	(0.472)
Police/Military	−0.361	−0.395	−0.249	−0.296
	(0.249)	(0.317)	(0.239)	(0.298)
Inmate	0.788	0.666	0.468	0.311
	(0.515)	(0.591)	(0.548)	(0.647)
Islander	0.153	−0.038	−0.054	−0.327**
	(0.144)	(0.158)	(0.147)	(0.163)
Closeness to leaders	4.922***	4.969***		
	(0.643)	(0.607)		
Defection x Closeness to leaders	−6.227***	−6.881***		
	(2.244)	(2.436)		
Closeness to recruiters			1.215***	1.256***
			(0.101)	(0.114)
Defection x Closeness to recruiters			−1.034***	−1.169***
			(0.313)	(0.338)
Year FE	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	7608	7608	7608	7608

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Standard errors clustered at the trial case level

Table A.5. The Effect of Network Relationships on Severity of Repression (Including the Released and Recaptured and No Captured Year)

	Dependent variable:		
	Death Sentence		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Operation leader	0.970^{***}	0.871^{***}	0.832^{***}
	(0.203)	(0.208)	(0.211)
Active recruiter	0.398^{***}	0.359^{***}	0.293^{***}
	(0.051)	(0.048)	(0.046)
Defection	-1.578^{***}	-1.606^{***}	-1.874^{***}
	(0.509)	(0.518)	(0.511)
Leaking military intel.	0.743^{**}	0.750^{**}	0.802^{**}
	(0.376)	(0.380)	(0.383)
Spreading rumors	-2.697^{***}	-2.601^{***}	-2.424^{***}
	(0.479)	(0.475)	(0.481)
Aiding subversion	-1.407^{**}	-1.312^{**}	-1.201^{*}
	(0.633)	(0.641)	(0.679)
Joining organization	-2.981^{***}	-3.317^{***}	-3.730^{***}
	(0.451)	(0.500)	(0.451)
Male	0.449^{*}	0.492^{**}	0.293
	(0.235)	(0.246)	(0.236)
Student	-0.547^{*}	-0.599^{*}	-0.683^{**}
	(0.310)	(0.328)	(0.323)
Doctor	0.307	0.284	0.389
	(0.378)	(0.359)	(0.404)
Police/Military	-0.414^{*}	-0.406	-0.299
	(0.247)	(0.248)	(0.239)
Inmate	1.108^{**}	0.903^{*}	0.590
	(0.448)	(0.495)	(0.533)
Islander	0.294^{**}	0.121	-0.089
	(0.144)	(0.145)	(0.150)
Closeness to leaders		4.565^{***}	
		(0.571)	
Closeness to recruiters			1.169^{***}
			(0.095)
Observations	7840	7840	7840

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Standard errors clustered at the trial case level

Table A.6. The Conditional Effects of Defection (Including the Released and Recaptured and No Captured Year)

	Dependent variable:	
	Death Sentence	
	(1)	(2)
Operation leader	0.907***	0.838***
	(0.207)	(0.208)
Active recruiter	0.356***	0.286***
	(0.048)	(0.045)
Defection	−1.247***	−0.853*
	(0.480)	(0.499)
Leaking military intel.	0.747**	0.797**
	(0.380)	(0.383)
Spreading rumors	−2.594***	−2.412***
	(0.475)	(0.481)
Aiding subversion	−1.305**	−1.196*
	(0.642)	(0.684)
Joining organization	−3.365***	−3.775***
	(0.516)	(0.453)
Male	0.495**	0.274
	(0.247)	(0.234)
Student	−0.606*	−0.695**
	(0.330)	(0.326)
Doctor	0.268	0.370
	(0.360)	(0.405)
Police/Military	−0.404	−0.291
	(0.249)	(0.239)
Inmate	0.894*	0.577
	(0.500)	(0.545)
Islander	0.111	−0.102
	(0.145)	(0.150)
Closeness to leaders	4.874***	
	(0.612)	
Defection x Closeness to leaders	−5.747**	
	(2.344)	
Closeness to recruiters		1.227***
		(0.099)
Defection x Closeness to recruiters		−1.072***
		(0.293)
Observations	7840	7840
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
		Standard errors clustered at the trial case level

Table A.7. The Effect of Network Relationships on Severity of Repression (Including the Released-and-Recaptured, No Captured Year, and No True Names)

	Dependent variable:		
	Death Sentence		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Operation leaders	1.024***	0.928***	0.886***
	(0.207)	(0.213)	(0.215)
Active recruiters	0.420***	0.382***	0.315***
	(0.054)	(0.051)	(0.048)
Defection	−1.660***	−1.684***	−1.931***
	(0.527)	(0.539)	(0.525)
Leaking military intel.	0.803**	0.809**	0.861**
	(0.376)	(0.380)	(0.382)
Spreading rumors	−3.365***	−3.265***	−3.085***
	(0.588)	(0.586)	(0.586)
Aiding subversion	−1.373**	−1.273**	−1.141*
	(0.634)	(0.641)	(0.674)
Joining organization	−3.481***	−3.818***	−4.191***
	(0.431)	(0.480)	(0.438)
Male	0.886***	0.929***	0.711**
	(0.332)	(0.336)	(0.325)
Student	−0.517	−0.568*	−0.661**
	(0.314)	(0.332)	(0.328)
Doctor	0.343	0.330	0.439
	(0.382)	(0.362)	(0.405)
Police/Military	−0.361	−0.352	−0.245
	(0.247)	(0.248)	(0.239)
Inmate	1.061**	0.860*	0.535
	(0.462)	(0.509)	(0.544)
Islander	0.370***	0.201	−0.006
	(0.143)	(0.145)	(0.147)
Closeness to leaders		4.569***	
		(0.629)	
Closeness to recruiters			1.173***
			(0.098)
Observations	7873	7873	7873

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Standard errors clustered at the trial case level

Table A.8. The Conditional Effects of Defection (Including the Released-and-Recaptured, No Captured Year, and No True Names)

	Dependent variable:	
	Death Sentence	
	(1)	(2)
Operation leaders	0.973***	0.891***
	(0.212)	(0.213)
Active recruiters	0.378***	0.307***
	(0.051)	(0.046)
Defection	−1.264***	−0.861*
	(0.486)	(0.507)
Leaking military intel.	0.806**	0.856**
	(0.380)	(0.382)
Spreading rumors	−3.257***	−3.073***
	(0.586)	(0.586)
Aiding subversion	−1.263**	−1.133*
	(0.642)	(0.678)
Joining organization	−3.884***	−4.236***
	(0.501)	(0.440)
Male	0.933***	0.692**
	(0.337)	(0.325)
Student	−0.576*	−0.675**
	(0.335)	(0.331)
Doctor	0.312	0.422
	(0.362)	(0.407)
Police/Military	−0.349	−0.234
	(0.248)	(0.239)
Inmate	0.848	0.521
	(0.516)	(0.556)
Islander	0.190	−0.020
	(0.145)	(0.147)
Closeness to leaders	4.939***	
	(0.681)	
Defection x Closeness to leaders	−7.255***	
	(2.775)	
Closeness to recruiters		1.234***
		(0.102)
Defection x Closeness to recruiters		−1.161***
		(0.313)
Observations	7873	7873
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
		Standard errors clustered at the trial case level

Table A.9. The Effect of Network Relationships on Severity of Repression (Ordered Logit)

	Dependent variable:					
	Punishment Severity (ordered outcome)					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Operation leader	1.522***	1.463***	1.449***	1.399***	1.371***	1.317***
	(0.217)	(0.217)	(0.220)	(0.220)	(0.215)	(0.214)
Active recruiter	0.524***	0.513***	0.491***	0.483***	0.432***	0.427***
	(0.064)	(0.063)	(0.062)	(0.060)	(0.057)	(0.056)
Defection	−2.366***	−2.164***	−2.385***	−2.182***	−2.684***	−2.463***
	(0.328)	(0.311)	(0.326)	(0.310)	(0.378)	(0.349)
Leaking military intel.	1.406***	1.384***	1.413***	1.394***	1.470***	1.444***
	(0.239)	(0.255)	(0.243)	(0.259)	(0.248)	(0.265)
Spreading rumors	0.191**	0.244***	0.232***	0.270***	0.340***	0.357***
	(0.085)	(0.078)	(0.085)	(0.078)	(0.085)	(0.080)
Aiding subversion	0.313*	0.382*	0.363**	0.439**	0.431**	0.523**
	(0.162)	(0.203)	(0.167)	(0.209)	(0.183)	(0.227)
Joining organization	0.088	0.003	−0.028	−0.109	−0.419***	−0.503***
	(0.097)	(0.110)	(0.098)	(0.108)	(0.111)	(0.115)
Male	0.431**	0.436**	0.454***	0.455***	0.422**	0.420**
	(0.170)	(0.172)	(0.171)	(0.174)	(0.182)	(0.184)
Student	−0.246	−0.425**	−0.282*	−0.452***	−0.265	−0.426**
	(0.166)	(0.172)	(0.165)	(0.171)	(0.176)	(0.180)
Doctor	−0.439	−0.534	−0.481	−0.578	−0.453	−0.562
	(0.452)	(0.452)	(0.442)	(0.441)	(0.495)	(0.494)
Police/Military	0.215**	0.209*	0.219**	0.218**	0.262**	0.257**
	(0.103)	(0.109)	(0.104)	(0.109)	(0.111)	(0.110)
Inmate	0.673	0.587	0.679	0.593	0.761	0.647
	(0.906)	(0.907)	(0.904)	(0.905)	(0.941)	(0.944)
Islander	0.408***	0.381***	0.290***	0.269**	0.184*	0.159
	(0.103)	(0.113)	(0.104)	(0.113)	(0.105)	(0.114)
Closeness to leaders			3.368***	3.371***		
			(0.441)	(0.441)		
Closeness to recruiters					0.859***	0.872***
					(0.076)	(0.080)
Year FE	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	7266	7266	7266	7266	7266	7266

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Standard errors clustered at the trial case level

Table A.10. The Conditional Effects of Defection (Ordered Logit)

	Dependent variable:			
	Punishment Severity (Ordered outcome)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Operation leader	1.458^{***}	1.412^{***}	1.366^{***}	1.315^{***}
	(0.219)	(0.218)	(0.217)	(0.216)
Active recruiter	0.491^{***}	0.483^{***}	0.426^{***}	0.421^{***}
	(0.062)	(0.061)	(0.057)	(0.055)
Defection	-2.193^{***}	-1.983^{***}	-2.064^{***}	-1.872^{***}
	(0.341)	(0.321)	(0.343)	(0.330)
Leaking military intel.	1.409^{***}	1.390^{***}	1.464^{***}	1.437^{***}
	(0.244)	(0.259)	(0.250)	(0.266)
Spreading rumors	0.235^{***}	0.271^{***}	0.349^{***}	0.359^{***}
	(0.085)	(0.078)	(0.085)	(0.079)
Aiding subversion	0.366^{**}	0.445^{**}	0.440^{**}	0.534^{**}
	(0.167)	(0.210)	(0.186)	(0.229)
Joining organization	-0.033	-0.114	-0.445^{***}	-0.527^{***}
	(0.098)	(0.108)	(0.111)	(0.115)
Male	0.450^{***}	0.452^{***}	0.408^{**}	0.408^{**}
	(0.170)	(0.172)	(0.175)	(0.177)
Student	-0.286^{*}	-0.456^{***}	-0.268	-0.427^{**}
	(0.165)	(0.171)	(0.177)	(0.180)
Doctor	-0.488	-0.585	-0.474	-0.580
	(0.440)	(0.439)	(0.491)	(0.489)
Police/Military	0.220^{**}	0.219^{**}	0.268^{**}	0.263^{**}
	(0.104)	(0.109)	(0.112)	(0.110)
Inmate	0.680	0.598	0.770	0.653
	(0.905)	(0.907)	(0.947)	(0.955)
Islander	0.289^{***}	0.267^{**}	0.181^{*}	0.158
	(0.104)	(0.113)	(0.105)	(0.113)
Closeness to leaders	3.563^{***}	3.576^{***}		
	(0.450)	(0.455)		
Defection x Closeness to leaders	-5.365^{**}	-5.408^{**}		
	(2.660)	(2.604)		
Closeness to recruiters			0.916^{***}	0.926^{***}
			(0.077)	(0.082)
Defection x Closeness to recruiters			-0.884^{***}	-0.844^{***}
			(0.302)	(0.290)
Year FE	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	7266	7266	7266	7266

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Standard errors clustered at the trial case level

Table A.11. The Effect of Network Relationships on Severity of Repression

	Dependent variable:					
	Death Sentence					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Operation leader	1.361***	1.485***	1.276***	1.405***	1.178***	1.328***
	(0.214)	(0.218)	(0.227)	(0.235)	(0.233)	(0.244)
Active recruiter	0.471***	0.474***	0.419***	0.421***	0.344***	0.346***
	(0.068)	(0.070)	(0.062)	(0.063)	(0.056)	(0.058)
Defection	−1.076***	−1.168***	−1.136***	−1.229***	−1.453***	−1.585***
	(0.369)	(0.379)	(0.381)	(0.391)	(0.398)	(0.414)
Leaking military intel.	0.744*	0.567	0.753*	0.570	0.791**	0.558
	(0.381)	(0.439)	(0.387)	(0.443)	(0.397)	(0.466)
Spreading rumors	−3.732***	−3.203***	−3.610***	−3.128***	−3.431***	−2.961***
	(0.733)	(0.723)	(0.727)	(0.724)	(0.737)	(0.730)
Aiding subversion	−1.760**	−2.036**	−1.684**	−1.962**	−1.582*	−1.941**
	(0.790)	(0.803)	(0.804)	(0.821)	(0.842)	(0.873)
Joining organization	−3.858***	−4.015***	−4.404***	−4.579***	−4.707***	−4.913***
	(0.548)	(0.567)	(0.663)	(0.672)	(0.544)	(0.562)
Male	0.467*	0.547**	0.532**	0.623**	0.352	0.443*
	(0.246)	(0.248)	(0.269)	(0.270)	(0.261)	(0.265)
Student	−0.540*	−0.660**	−0.591*	−0.716**	−0.675**	−0.845**
	(0.326)	(0.325)	(0.349)	(0.343)	(0.344)	(0.361)
Doctor	0.389	0.347	0.352	0.312	0.489	0.490
	(0.422)	(0.477)	(0.393)	(0.457)	(0.439)	(0.508)
Police/Military	−0.343	−0.400	−0.332	−0.393	−0.229	−0.306
	(0.258)	(0.334)	(0.259)	(0.332)	(0.248)	(0.312)
Inmate	1.205*	1.254**	1.281**	1.323**	1.497**	1.526***
	(0.664)	(0.606)	(0.651)	(0.588)	(0.639)	(0.576)
Islander	−1.528**	−1.509**	−1.750**	−1.717**	−1.661**	−1.779***
	(0.686)	(0.647)	(0.756)	(0.718)	(0.700)	(0.668)
Closeness to leaders			5.392***	5.523***		
			(0.767)	(0.717)		
Closeness to recruiters					1.295***	1.354***
					(0.104)	(0.119)
Year FE	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
County FE	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Observations	7266	7266	7266	7266	7266	7266

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Standard errors clustered at the trial case level

Table A.12. The Effect of Network Relationships on Severity of Repression

	Dependent variable:			
	Death Sentence			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Operation Leader	1.311***	1.450***	1.173***	1.319***
	(0.228)	(0.235)	(0.233)	(0.244)
Active Recruiter	0.413***	0.413***	0.333***	0.333***
	(0.061)	(0.062)	(0.054)	(0.056)
Defection	−0.713*	−0.770**	−0.358	−0.371
	(0.374)	(0.383)	(0.417)	(0.432)
Leaking Military Intel.	0.744*	0.566	0.780**	0.553
	(0.387)	(0.443)	(0.397)	(0.467)
Spreading Rumors	−3.604***	−3.125***	−3.419***	−2.959***
	(0.727)	(0.724)	(0.738)	(0.730)
Aiding Subversion	−1.682**	−1.958**	−1.592*	−1.951**
	(0.806)	(0.823)	(0.849)	(0.881)
Joining Organization	−4.501***	−4.685***	−4.754***	−4.974***
	(0.706)	(0.715)	(0.543)	(0.563)
Male	0.532**	0.621**	0.312	0.399
	(0.271)	(0.272)	(0.251)	(0.258)
Student	−0.598*	−0.724**	−0.689**	−0.859**
	(0.352)	(0.346)	(0.346)	(0.364)
Doctor	0.323	0.282	0.457	0.455
	(0.394)	(0.460)	(0.440)	(0.509)
Police/Military	−0.330	−0.391	−0.219	−0.302
	(0.258)	(0.331)	(0.248)	(0.310)
Inmate	1.291**	1.337**	1.517**	1.538***
	(0.651)	(0.587)	(0.639)	(0.580)
Islander	−1.559**	−1.559**	−1.505**	−1.612**
	(0.661)	(0.637)	(0.669)	(0.639)
Closeness to leaders	5.801***	5.976***		
	(0.845)	(0.796)		
Defection x Closeness to leaders	−7.774**	−8.359***		
	(3.115)	(3.071)		
Closeness to recruiters			1.358***	1.432***
			(0.108)	(0.124)
Defection x Closeness to recruiters			−1.251***	−1.371***
			(0.331)	(0.343)
Year FE	No	Yes	No	Yes
County FE	Yes	No	Yes	No
Observations	7266	7266	7266	7266

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Standard errors clustered at the trial case level



Figure A.1. Types of Sentencing



Figure A.2. Correlation Matrix

Table A.13. Who Defects (a preliminary analysis)

	Dependent variable:			
	Defection			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Operation leader	0.053	0.343	−0.108	0.167
	(0.313)	(0.319)	(0.331)	(0.339)
Active recruiter	0.075**	0.070**	0.037	0.037
	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.037)	(0.036)
Leaking military intel.	0.686	0.766	0.699	0.811
	(0.581)	(0.601)	(0.581)	(0.598)
Spreading rumors	−1.580***	−1.355**	−1.392**	−1.186**
	(0.595)	(0.596)	(0.593)	(0.589)
Aiding subversion	−14.715***	−16.957***	−14.585***	−16.805***
	(0.249)	(0.296)	(0.241)	(0.275)
Joining organization	−1.265***	−1.049***	−1.638***	−1.417***
	(0.286)	(0.287)	(0.332)	(0.322)
Male	−0.585	−0.555	−0.638*	−0.579*
	(0.389)	(0.346)	(0.366)	(0.321)
Student	−1.378***	−0.940*	−1.409***	−0.922*
	(0.516)	(0.529)	(0.521)	(0.531)
Doctor	0.585	1.190**	0.616	1.256***
	(0.456)	(0.466)	(0.461)	(0.463)
Police/Military	−0.916***	−0.873***	−0.861**	−0.839***
	(0.339)	(0.317)	(0.336)	(0.314)
Inmate	−13.788***	−15.533***	−13.655***	−15.422***
	(0.359)	(0.435)	(0.348)	(0.429)
Islander	0.960***	0.922***	0.768***	0.748***
	(0.223)	(0.233)	(0.209)	(0.219)
Closeness to leaders	0.095	0.014		
	(0.999)	(0.933)		
Closeness to recruiters			0.593***	0.551***
			(0.192)	(0.175)
Year FE	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	7266	7266	7266	7266

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Standard errors clustered at the trial case level



Figure A.3. Correlation Matrix

Table A.14. The Network Effect on Arrests of Remaining Dissent Members (BTSCS-logit)

	Dependent variable:			
	Individual being captured (binary)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Prior Captures	0.004^{***}			
	(0.001)			
Prior Captures (close to leaders)		3.405^{***}		
		(0.726)		
Prior Captures (close to recruiters)			0.468^{***}	
			(0.103)	
Prior Captures (close to defectors)				2.838^{***}
				(0.968)
Operation leader	0.221^{**}	0.200^{**}	0.206^{*}	0.244^{**}
	(0.105)	(0.102)	(0.105)	(0.108)
Active recruiter	0.054^{***}	0.053^{***}	0.050^{***}	0.061^{***}
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Defection	0.256^{***}	0.230^{***}	0.204^{**}	0.182^{*}
	(0.086)	(0.087)	(0.091)	(0.102)
Leaking military intel.	0.181	0.181	0.182	0.187
	(0.221)	(0.221)	(0.220)	(0.220)
Spreading rumors	-0.612^{***}	-0.609^{***}	-0.604^{***}	-0.614^{***}
	(0.095)	(0.095)	(0.095)	(0.095)
Aiding subversion	0.670^{***}	0.675^{***}	0.680^{***}	0.659^{***}
	(0.192)	(0.191)	(0.190)	(0.192)
Joining organization	0.268^{***}	0.253^{***}	0.235^{***}	0.280^{***}
	(0.087)	(0.085)	(0.086)	(0.087)
Male	-0.173	-0.174	-0.176	-0.177
	(0.113)	(0.113)	(0.113)	(0.113)
Student	0.251^{*}	0.254^{*}	0.263^{**}	0.243^{*}
	(0.136)	(0.135)	(0.134)	(0.136)
Doctor	-0.060	-0.066	-0.075	-0.069
	(0.203)	(0.200)	(0.195)	(0.204)
Police/Military	0.262^{*}	0.262^{*}	0.264^{*}	0.257^{*}
	(0.153)	(0.153)	(0.153)	(0.153)
Inmate	-0.212	-0.219	-0.208	-0.220
	(0.347)	(0.337)	(0.337)	(0.347)
Islander	0.363^{***}	0.348^{***}	0.331^{***}	0.377^{***}
	(0.085)	(0.084)	(0.085)	(0.085)
t	0.548^{***}	0.547^{***}	0.538^{***}	0.549^{***}
	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.031)
t^2	-0.035^{***}	-0.035^{***}	-0.035^{***}	-0.035^{***}
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
t^3	0.001^{***}	0.001^{***}	0.001^{***}	0.001^{***}
	(0.00005)	(0.00005)	(0.00005)	(0.00005)
Constant	-4.427^{***}	-4.417^{***}	-4.380^{***}	-4.412^{***}
	(0.185)	(0.185)	(0.181)	(0.184)
Observations	79031	79031	79031	79031

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Standard errors clustered at the trial case level

Table A.15. The Network Effect on Arrests of Remaining Dissent Members (Cox Model)

	Dependent variable:			
	t			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Prior Captures	0.001***			
	(0.0004)			
Prior Captures (close to leaders)		1.305***		
		(0.195)		
Prior Captures (close to recruiters)			0.226***	
			(0.024)	
Prior Captures (close to defectors)				1.651***
				(0.184)
Operation leader	0.246***	0.230***	0.229***	0.254***
	(0.079)	(0.079)	(0.079)	(0.079)
Active recruiter	0.052***	0.050***	0.046***	0.052***
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Defection	0.123*	0.113*	0.106	0.073
	(0.068)	(0.068)	(0.068)	(0.068)
Leaking military intel.	0.184*	0.184*	0.182*	0.187*
	(0.098)	(0.098)	(0.098)	(0.098)
Spreading rumors	−0.555***	−0.554***	−0.551***	−0.555***
	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.052)
Aiding subversion	0.482***	0.488***	0.495***	0.479***
	(0.122)	(0.122)	(0.122)	(0.122)
Joining organization	0.294***	0.284***	0.266***	0.293***
	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)
Male	−0.142**	−0.143**	−0.148**	−0.148**
	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.065)
Student	0.269***	0.273***	0.280***	0.269***
	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.053)
Doctor	−0.027	−0.027	−0.033	−0.036
	(0.095)	(0.095)	(0.095)	(0.095)
Police/Military	0.271***	0.272***	0.274***	0.271***
	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)
Inmate	−0.206	−0.206	−0.199	−0.206
	(0.259)	(0.259)	(0.259)	(0.259)
Islander	0.318***	0.307***	0.292***	0.316***
	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)
Observations	79,031	79,031	79,031	79,031
R^2	0.007	0.008	0.008	0.008
Max. Possible R^2	0.739	0.739	0.739	0.739
Log Likelihood	−52,847.960	−52,835.830	−52,817.220	−52,826.470
Wald Test (df = 14)	559.740***	597.240***	652.030***	640.320***
LR Test (df = 14)	571.522***	595.783***	633.013***	614.509***
Score (Logrank) Test (df = 14)	572.024***	613.186***	673.636***	676.800***

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A.16. Network Effect of Defection on Penalty

	Dependent variable:	
	Death Sentence	
	(1)	(2)
Defection	-2.813^{***}	-3.345^{***}
	(0.457)	(0.452)
Closeness to defectors	1.218^{*}	0.487
	(0.725)	(0.710)
Leaking military intel.	0.330	-1.148
	(0.962)	(1.064)
Spreading rumors	-14.612^{***}	-20.981^{***}
	(1.076)	(1.209)
Aiding subversion	-15.796^{***}	-20.855^{***}
	(0.742)	(0.820)
Joining organization	-5.863^{***}	-6.181^{***}
	(1.047)	(0.827)
Male	0.074	0.452
	(0.831)	(0.976)
Student	-0.501	-1.109^{**}
	(0.498)	(0.526)
Doctor	-0.447	-0.074
	(0.598)	(0.598)
Police/Military	-0.371	-0.559
	(0.374)	(0.483)
Inmate	14.149^{***}	15.592^{***}
	(1.043)	(1.198)
Islander	0.813^{**}	-0.484
	(0.322)	(0.426)
Year FE	No	Yes
Observations	751	751

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Standard errors clustered at the trial case level

Table A.17. The Effect of Network Relationships on Severity of Repression (After 1965)

	Dependent variable:					
	Death Sentence					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Operation leader	1.778	2.401**	1.823	2.496**	1.828	2.368**
	(1.139)	(1.099)	(1.138)	(1.123)	(1.131)	(1.050)
Active recruiter	0.248	0.541**	0.239	0.524**	0.219	0.501*
	(0.239)	(0.257)	(0.237)	(0.253)	(0.232)	(0.294)
Defection	−19.039***	−18.797***	−19.037***	−18.756***	−19.047***	−18.628***
	(0.991)	(0.991)	(0.988)	(0.985)	(1.003)	(1.052)
Leaking military intel.	1.851*	2.163**	1.909*	2.206**	1.974*	2.314**
	(1.029)	(0.936)	(1.022)	(0.936)	(1.014)	(0.920)
Spreading rumors	−18.341***	−18.484***	−18.314***	−18.465***	−18.191***	−18.352***
	(0.303)	(0.313)	(0.291)	(0.313)	(0.247)	(0.321)
Aiding subversion	−18.886***	−17.513***	−18.885***	−17.466***	−18.784***	−17.179***
	(0.880)	(1.382)	(0.882)	(1.387)	(0.922)	(1.506)
Joining organization	−18.826***	−18.944***	−18.829***	−18.977***	−19.059***	−19.077***
	(0.340)	(0.450)	(0.343)	(0.483)	(0.511)	(0.465)
Student	−18.151***	−18.068***	−18.266***	−18.253***	−18.150***	−18.210***
	(0.518)	(0.690)	(0.700)	(0.882)	(0.506)	(0.645)
Doctor	−17.754***	−18.052***	−17.721***	−18.025***	−17.609***	−17.916***
	(0.515)	(0.742)	(0.504)	(0.734)	(0.477)	(0.716)
Police/Military	−0.570	−0.676	−0.624	−0.728	−0.525	−0.635
	(0.577)	(0.572)	(0.596)	(0.596)	(0.610)	(0.580)
Inmate	−16.739***	−17.865***	−16.668***	−17.774***	−16.593***	−17.778***
	(0.941)	(1.056)	(0.951)	(1.057)	(0.967)	(1.070)
Islander	−2.048***	−1.897***	−2.086***	−1.954***	−2.052***	−1.887***
	(0.639)	(0.589)	(0.652)	(0.596)	(0.649)	(0.605)
Closeness to leaders			1.867	2.577		
			(1.681)	(1.897)		
Closeness to recruiters					0.599	0.734
					(0.585)	(0.618)
Year FE	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	1119	1119	1119	1119	1119	1119

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Standard errors clustered at the trial case level

Table A.18. The Conditional Effects of Defection (After 1965)

	Dependent variable:			
	Death Sentence			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Operation leader	1.875*	2.558**	1.877*	2.421**
	(1.130)	(1.112)	(1.125)	(1.047)
Active recruiter	0.232	0.535**	0.212	0.513*
	(0.234)	(0.252)	(0.229)	(0.292)
Defection	−18.309***	−19.122***	−18.271***	−18.990***
	(1.031)	(1.010)	(1.069)	(1.089)
Leaking Military Intel.	1.922*	2.239**	1.990*	2.347**
	(1.028)	(0.942)	(1.020)	(0.926)
Spreading rumors	−17.291***	−18.463***	−17.165***	−18.354***
	(0.291)	(0.314)	(0.248)	(0.322)
Aiding subversion	−17.849***	−17.415***	−17.747***	−17.135***
	(0.886)	(1.386)	(0.927)	(1.506)
Joining organization	−17.832***	−18.973***	−18.079***	−19.086***
	(0.345)	(0.474)	(0.521)	(0.458)
Student	−17.242***	−18.213***	−17.122***	−18.171***
	(0.715)	(0.889)	(0.512)	(0.644)
Doctor	−16.735***	−18.015***	−16.619***	−17.908***
	(0.496)	(0.732)	(0.470)	(0.721)
Police/Military	−0.592	−0.679	−0.491	−0.583
	(0.601)	(0.595)	(0.614)	(0.580)
Inmate	−15.641***	−17.753***	−15.564***	−17.762***
	(0.949)	(1.059)	(0.965)	(1.072)
Islander	−2.085***	−1.955***	−2.049***	−1.883***
	(0.652)	(0.592)	(0.649)	(0.597)
Closeness to leaders	1.919	2.619		
	(1.686)	(1.934)		
Defection x Closeness to leaders	20.621	215.087***		
	(14.622)	(25.176)		
Closeness to recruiters			0.622	0.728
			(0.585)	(0.619)
Defection x Closeness to recruiters			1.191	16.184***
			(1.217)	(2.250)
Year FE	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	1119	1119	1119	1119

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Standard errors clustered at the trial case level

Table A.19. Example Case of Defection: Information for Clemency

Source: Transitional Justice Committee	
Original text: 「被告柯五龍於政府號召匪諜自首赤誠來，并將武器及組織全部交出事後復全力協助肅奸對其過去罪行痛改前非，衡情不無可原自應依法免除其刑以示政府威信而勵來。」	Original text: 「被告蔡仲伯求學時，即思想偏激，曾於二二八事變時參加暴動....該被告等，於從新坦白時，曾供出線索數十起，對偵破叛徒謝雪紅在台殘餘組織，頗有參考價值，是其悔過向善，衡情尚堪憫恕。）」
Translation: "Under the call of the government, the defendant, Ke Wulong, turned himself in and surrendered sincerely, handing over all the weapons and helping government arrest fellow criminals under his full power in the hope to correct his wrongdoings. With the deep repentance, his case deserves sympathy and should be exempted from punishment according to the law, which will help establish prestige of regime and encourage more to come forward."	Translation: "When the defendant Cai Zhongbo was in school, he participated in the riots during the February 28th Incident... When the defendant surrendered and confessed, he gave in dozens of clues, which is quite a valuable reference to assist arresting the remaining members commended under traitor Xie Xuehong in Taiwan. His repentance is good and worthy of compassion and forgiveness."

Table A.20. Example Case of Defection: Insincere Surrender and Increased Punishment

Source: Taiwan Holocaust Dataset (Collected from the Injustice Compensation Foundation)
Original text: 「廖宏業於38年春間，經已決叛徒黃元雙介紹加入匪幫外圍組織之「農民團」，先後吸收廖紹崇、江秋元、林新盛及李成龍參加該「農民團」，並集會討論發展組織、吸收黨羽，又與叛徒黃榮貴在竹南車站張貼反動標語一次。廖君雖於40年12月間向苗栗縣警察局自首，但未將吸收林新盛、李成龍之關係交出，其自首不誠，應依意圖以非法之方法顛覆政府而著手實行罪論處。」
Translation: "In the spring of year 38 (year of the Republic Era), Liao Hongye was introduced by the determined traitor Huang Yuanshuang to join the "peasant group", an affiliated organization of underground resistance. Liao Shaocheng, Jiang Qiuyuan, Lin Xinsheng, and Li Chenglong joined the peasant group successively, and met to discuss the development of the organization, the absorption of party members, and posted a reactionary slogan with the traitor Huang Ronggui at Zhunan Station. Although Liao surrendered to the Miaoli County Police Station in December of year 40, he did not surrender the relationship with Lin Xinsheng and Li Chenglong. His surrender was insincere and should be punished accordingly based on his intention to subvert the government by illegal means."