

# American Comprehensive Exam Notes

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# 1 POS 530 American Politics

## 1.1 Week 1 Introduction

### 1.1.1 [Gilens \(2012\)](#) : Affluence and Influence (Book)

**Cite Key** Gilens2012

**Author** Martin Gilens

**Year** 2012

#### **Summary**

the association between government policy and public preferences could tell us something important about the responsiveness of our government to the public and the extent to which political influence is reserved for the affluent. Two questions: 1. under which conditions government is responsible 2. Who is among the governed that government respond to.

The author starts with the discussion of democracy and the citizen-government linkages. While Converse argue that American voters do not have coherent ideology and lacks political understandings, there are several ways that citizens can approach politics without sophisticated knowledge: 1. through cue-taking of the more-knowledgeable citizens. 2. Although democratic participation requires some minimal knowledge, citizens only need to be knowledgeable on some issues, not all of them.

#### **Main Findings**

Policy preference is measured by the actual policy outcomes. The main interest is the association between the policy outcomes and the degree of support expressed by the public/ or a subgroup.

Comparing education and income classes, policy congruence is more salient with the increasing levels of incomes; Interest group is interrelated with income classes. But income is still dominant factor: on economic and tax domain, interest group is closely related with rich people, on social welfare, interest group is evenly distributed across income classes. On gun control and environment, interest group is running against public wishes.

### 1.1.2 [Bartels \(2008\)](#) Unequal Democracy

**Cite Key:** Bartels2008

**Author:** Larry Bartels

**Year:** 2008

#### **Summary**

The major question of this book is to discuss political equality of a democracy. Economic growth, inequality and political accountability. How to explain the success of the Republican parties if Democrat party helps middle classes so dramatically over the past years? Increasing economic inequality has become a political issue.

## **Findings**

1. Partisan divisions, under R's control, the real income growth for lower and middle income classes has consistently lagged well behind D's administration, also lagged well behind the income growth rates of the rich. Lower unemployment rates under D, but almost identical inflation rates, according to Hibbs 1987
2. Class divisions: Democrats lose support from the middle class and high-income class. However, the general public is not becoming more conservative. Working classes do not value cultural issues more either. (probably race? a US-them division?); Nor did the religious practice a deciding factor.
3. How Rep. can win elections: voters are myopic and only focus on election year performance; 2. Election year income growth for affluent voters is much more consequential, even for low and middle income voters 3. voters are swayed by the balance of campaign spending between incumbents and challengers.

## **1.2 Week 2 Congress**

### **1.2.1 Sin (2014) Separation of Powers and Legislative Organization**

**Cite Key** Sin2014

**Author** Gisela Sin

**Year** 2014

#### **Summary**

The goal is to explain the house rule changes in the Congress. The House majority has to anticipate the actions of Senate and the president, as predetermined by the constitution. Also, the House includes fractions of different goals and interests. Intraparty groups are important for the changes of the House rules as well.

Gephardt rule abolishment (Rep)

Constitutional Constraints: any bills requires approval of both House and Senate as well as the president, or a supermajority of both House and Senate.

Intraparty conflicts: conservative Rep. and progressive Rep.

Constitutional Theory of Legislative Organization. Environment: by the Constitution, there are three players in determining the policy outcomes: House, Senate and the president.

Two stages of game: the power-sharing game and the legislative game. In the power-sharing game, house fractions choose rules and procedures that distribute power among themselves. In the legislative game, there are two steps, the bicameral agreement stage and the constitutional stage (require all agreements from House, Senate and the President).

## Findings

1. House rules changes as the set of constitutional actors changes. Even holding every House member's ideal point constant, a shift in the ideal point of the Senate or the president can change the constitutional set and the available policy choices of the House.
2. Constitutional set changes predict. Not the change of House median, the party homogeneity, the party polarization, party capacity nor the majority party size.
3. Centralization happens when the nonspeaker group now get closer to the speaker group, or has ally in Senate/president. Decentralization happens when the Senate and president closer to the speaker fraction/ or when House minority controls both Senate and the president.

### 1.2.2 **Schickler (2001): Disjointed Pluralism: Institutional Innovation and the Development of the US Congress**

**Cite Key** Schickler2001

**Author** Eric Schickler

**Year** 2011

#### Summary

What explains the institutional changes in Congress? Members have different interests, and different interests are effective at different time periods.

Pluralism: different coalitions promoting a wide range of collective interests drive processes of change. reelection interest, bolster the capacity, power and prestige of the chamber of Congress as a whole, interest of accessing to the institutional power bases, party-based interest, and policy-based interest.

Disjointed: the dynamics of institutional development derive from the interactions and tensions among competing coalitions promoting several different interests.

Predictions: 1. Electoral interests will matter more as member careerism increases (Mayhew 1974). 2. Congressional capacity and power will be more salient following episodes in which the president has gained influence at Congress's expense (Dodd 1977; Sundquist 1981). 3. Members' interest in institutional power bases will generate pressure for decentralization following an influx of junior members that substantially alters the seniority distribution (Dodd 1986; Diermeier 1995). 4. Majority party interests will be particularly important when the majority party is internally unified and has policy preferences that are

sharply different from those of the minority (Rohde 1991). 5. Policy-based interests will generate pressure for institutional changes when electoral shocks and other exogenous factors substantially shift the location of the median voter on the floor (Krehbiel 1998; Schickler 2000).

DV: Institutional changes, include leadership instruments, the committee system, and rules and procedures.

### **Findings**

1890 - 1910: the longest successful era of party government in congressional history, multiple collective interests shaped institutional development. Majority party interest, minority party interest, and concerns about congressional capacity also shaped House rules in 1891-95. 1909-1910 reforms even brought a cross-party coalitions for minority Democrats and insurgent Republicans that was united by a confluence of ideological, partisan, and power base concerns.

1919 - 1932: the House majority party was once again more successful than the Senate majority in promoting interests. GOP majority, the institutional changes initiated by Republicans were at least partly intended to improve the GOP's effectiveness. Cross-party coalitions rooted in ideological and sectoral interests also shaped institutional changes during this period, particularly in the Senate. Even in the House, cross-party coalitions enjoyed notable victories in 1924 and in 1931. In both cases, ideological concerns interacted with members' personal power interests to promote reforms that loosened majority leaders' agenda control.

1937 - 1952: majority party interest receded further in importance. The main collective interests were defending Congress from presidential aggrandizement and promoting the cross-party conservative coalition. e.g.: the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, which is due to the congressional-presidential rivalry.

In the 1970s-1980s, party interests returned to prominence, but they interacted with junior members' power base interests and with a renewed concern that Congress had lost too much ground to the executive branch. The result was an array of institutional changes that augmented majority party influence and helped coordinate spending decisions, but also facilitated entrepreneurship by junior members.

### **1.2.3 Palsby (1968) The Institutionalization of the U.S. House**

**Citekey** Palsby1968

**Author** Nelson Palsby

**Year** 1968

#### **Summary**

Institution: 1. it is relatively well-bounded, different from its environment. 2. The organization is relatively complex, its functions are internally separate on some regular and explicit

basis. 3. The organization tends to use universalistic rather than particularistic criteria, and automatic rather than discretionary methods for conducting its internal business. Precedents and rules are followed; merit systems replace favoritism and nepotism; and impersonal codes supplant personal preferences as prescriptions for behavior.

**Findings** 1. Harder to enter: increased years of members and speakers. 2. Increased complexity: in the growth in the autonomy and importance of committees, in the growth of specialized agencies of party leadership, and in the general increase in the provision of various emoluments and auxiliary aids to members in the form of office space, salaries, allowances, staff aid and committee staffs. 3. A seniority system is always used.

#### **1.2.4 Hibbing (1991) Contours of the Modern Congressional Career**

**Citekey** Hibbing1991

**Author** John Hibbing

**Year** 1991

**Summary** Study changes in four areas: the electoral career, the formal position career, the legislative activity career, and the constituency activity career. Changes are standardized. Senior members are more active in raising issues, but pay less attention to constituencies.

**Conclusion:** Post-war congressional career electoral support improves; positions within the institution expand to improve; legislative activity, specialization, and efficiency increase; and attention to district affairs diminishes. Specially, representatives used to do much better electorally as senior members than they were junior members, but now electoral performance is quite similar. Senior members used to acquire quality formal positions only after several terms of service, but now these positions are frequently obtained early in a career. Senior members used to do substantially less constituency service works, but now these differences are slight. Overall, the distinctiveness of particular career stages is much less than it used to be.

### **1.3 Week 3**

#### **1.3.1 Brooks (2013) He Runs She Runs**

**Citekey** Brooks2013

**Author** Deborah Jordan Brooks

**Year** 2013

**Summary**

Feminism, women and politics, performance of female politicians etc., are becoming increasingly important in modern democracies. Being systematically discriminated until

20th century, women's political voices are still weaker than males. Unlike Scandinavian countries where female MPs constitute a fairly large percentage (around 30 to 40%) in the parliaments, there are only about 20 percent females in the Congress. Outside the political arena, females' salaries are significantly lower than males, and there are few female business leaders. Media commentators and journalists keep reminding us that these facts reflect the longstanding gender stereotypes in the United States: females are regarded inferior to males, with respect to politics, female politicians are harder to achieve political success.

This conventional wisdom becomes the core question of Brooks' book. Gender stereotypes are so prevalently perceived in the public that it is not systematically examined in academia. Confirmation bias states that people tend to find evidence to support their intuition, which helps explain why few scholars asking the question: does gender stereotypes harm female politicians in the same as common females? This book however addresses this issue directly using experimental designs, which are considered more rigorous than non-experimental designs and easier to ensure internal validity.

Two confronting theories are examined in chapter 2. Double Standards Theory holds that female candidates will suffer from the descriptive stereotypes as being women; and they have to balance the potential conflicting identities as being women while acting as leaders; voters have higher standards for female politicians due to the prevailing gender discrimination. In other words, Double Standards Theory reflects the conventional wisdom. The author's argument leans towards the second theory: Leaders-Not-Ladies. This theory holds that being a political leader, female politicians do not suffer from the common gender stereotypes that common females will have. 'Female politicians will be evaluated by voters as 'politician' rather than female' (p. 29). Characteristics on 'good leadership' will outperform 'good femininity'. On the other hand, Brooks argues that female politicians have more information available to voters; and when voter receive more relevant information, stereotypical judgment goes down (p.41).

Brooks tests the two hypotheses with experimental methods. Fictional candidates are used rather than the actual political figures. Brooks argues that using fictional roles helps to isolate other confounding characteristics of that candidate which may interact with gender (p.47). On the other hand, experiments provide stronger control over the amount of information that voters will receive. Samples are drawn from YoGov subsample, as the author demonstrates that YoGov is more representative than commonly used student samples. Dependent variables are three questions: overall likeness; competence as a Senator; competence as the President ten years from now.

The core idea of the experimental design is to examine if voters form different opinions on the two fictional politicians with the same amount of information except for the gender difference. In the six experiments, respondents are required to read the articles with the same content of the candidates other than the gender. These articles are manipulated across 6 different dimensions: political experience (chapter 4), crying, anger, empathy, and knowledge gaffes (chapters 5 - 7). Analysis is done with ANOVA, which is common in experimental designs (although not widely used in political science). ANOVA outperforms regression in the way that less assumptions are employed and beta coefficients need not to

be constant.

The results support her argument of the Leaders-Not-Ladies. Overall, there is no statistically significant differences between male and female candidates. Instead, female candidates receive positive stereotypes in some aspects like being affirmative; and female politicians are in general regarded more intelligent when both candidates are inexperienced. Female candidates are not penalized particularly for being inexperienced; crying and showing anger; lack of empathy; and for knowledge gaffes. Overall, the results are consistent across different dimensions: female candidates do not suffer from gender stereotypes.

The experimental designs in this study dramatically enhance the interval validity. Not only in terms of causal inference, but the linkage between theory and experimentation as well. Brooks discusses the key concept of stereotypes in the beginning: 'stereotypes allow people to quickly and efficiently - if not always accurately make assumptions about the likely characteristics and behaviors of people' (p.~17). Although she does not emphasize a lot about its theoretical implications, all the later experimentations are based on this very concept. Stereotypes are not necessarily undesirable, people use stereotypes everyday and in most conditions they are useful. For instance, hardcore partisans can vote efficiently on partisan lines even without looking at candidates' proposals. Without enough information and the intention to absorb the information, stereotypes reduce decision-making costs.

Then the experimental design in the book becomes extremely useful in controlling the amount of information voters receive. Regarding stereotype as a mechanism of efficient opinion formation without sufficient information, there is enough reason to believe that, female politicians who have more exposed information to the public than a common unknown female, may suffer less from gender stereotype.

Also related to this question, since the information shared by voters will increase with the running campaign, it will be interesting to see if the gender stereotype will diminish when voters know more about the female candidates (or maybe it will be strengthened as perception bias exist before the information processing mechanism, so opinions will skew further with more information). These hypotheses cannot be tested in a one-time design which is performed in this book, but will be available with a panel-tracing survey or multiple experiments with increasing information.

Other than the strength of the book, there are a few points which makes the arguments weaker. The non-significant findings of gender stereotypes are very robust in different settings (with respect to emotion, experience, empathy, knowledge gaffe), but I am not sure about the effect of gender stimuli. Brooks did mention that about 85% respondents recognize the different names settings correctly, but does this mean the names trigger potential gender stereotypes effectively?

The other potential flaw comes from the leaders-not-ladies argument. Brooks argues that voters may have different subtypes for female politician as they are playing the leadership position instead of common females. However, on the other hand we see female politicians emphasizing their gender identity in the United States as well as in other countries. According to Hanna Pitkin's representation argument, female politicians



have the descriptive representation value of being females, and thus should be expected to interact and communicate with females a lot more. These suggest that albeit voters may regard female politicians differently from the typical gender stereotype, female politicians are still connected with women. Future may focus on the interaction between female politicians as a subtype and the general gender stereotypes.

Putting electoral contexts into her study, with the absence of partisanship, the experimental designs suffer somewhat from external validity. Partisanship is playing important roles in politics. Some comparative studies show that with stricter partisan disciplines, female MPs are marginalized and cannot form cross-party alliance on women's issues (e.g. Ayata and Tutuncu 2008, Lovenduski 2001). On the other hand, female candidates from Democrats and Republicans seem to have different winning probabilities. Empirical statistics shows more Democratic females in the Congress. Party ID and winning odds for female politicians are worth analyzing in the future.

Overall, this study uses simulated experimental design to examine the conventional wisdom that female politicians suffer from gender stereotypes. The non-significant results are robust in different experimental settings. The solid evidence from the book strongly challenges conventional wisdom. Also, this study shows how experimental design can help figure out the causal mechanism of opinion formation.

## **1.4 Week 4 Congress**

### **1.4.1 Burden, Jones and Kang (2014) Sore Loser Laws and Congressional Polarization**

**Author** Barry C. Burden and Bradley M. Jones and Michael S. Kang

**Year** 2014

**Summary** Sore loser law can explain the broadening ideology gaps. It is a constant effect that contribute an additional amount of polarization on top of more general trends.

Sore loser law: a candidate who fails to win a party primary cannot appear on the general election ballots as either an independent candidate or nominee of another party.

How: 1. by removing any subsequent reentry options for candidates, they place greater pressure on primary candidates to cater to the polarized preferences of party bases. 2. by preventing moderate candidates rejected by the party base from getting elected as sore losers.

Case: 2010 McCain Arizona Senate election: moving to right; 2006 Connecticut reelection, without sore loser law, Lieberman won based on his moderate positions.

#### **Findings**

Number of states with sore loser laws increased. Polarizing effects of sore loser laws using three sources: congressional candidate surveys, congressional roll-call records, and state

legislative measures based on both survey and roll calls. Coding sore loser law as the dummy variable, it is significant.

#### **1.4.2 Druckman, Kifer and Parkin (2009) Campaign Communications in U.S. Congressional Elections**

**Author** James N. Druckman and Martin J. Kifer and Michael Parkin

**Year** 2009

**Summary** Data is from candidate websites in the three election circles. Key idea is to identify the different campaign strategy adopted by incumbents and challengers. Their predictions: 1. challengers will employ significantly more negative rhetoric and provide more opportunities for voters to engage with campaign 2. challengers will put more emphasis on issues, personal features and party affiliations to distract voters from the incumbency to alternative criteria. 3. Incumbents will emphasize more on experience in public office, familiarity, and providing district or state benefits.

**Findings** Predictions confirmed. Also challengers are more opt to take risky actions.

#### **1.4.3 Branton, Cassese and Jones (2012) Race, Ethnicity, and U.S. House Incumbent Evaluations**

**Author** Regina P. Branton and Erin C. Cassese and Bradford S. Jones

**Year** 2012

**Summary** Consider evaluations of U.S. house incumbents under conditions of racial/ethnic congruence and incongruence. whether different racial groups have ordered preferences among nondescriptive alternatives.

Descriptive representation: representative possesses an essential attribute linking her to a group whose members also possess that attribute.

**Findings** No evidence of race-based judgment among African Americans, while Latinos and Whites demonstrates preferences based on race and ethnicity.

There is a “black-brown divide”: competition for political economic resources among minority groups has contributed to intergroup animosities. Black and latinos do not support each other in this study. African American MCs are not the “next best choice” for Latinos.

#### **1.4.4 Krehbiel (2000) Party Discipline and Partisanship**

**Author** Keith Krehbriel

**Year** 2000

## **Journal AJPS**

**Summary** This article discuss different measurements of partisanship. Current measurement is roll-call vote-based measurement. The author propose a new measurement considering both the preferences of each individual MCs and partisanship. Parties and individual level preferences are considered as exogenous variables, will be considered both in the behavioral stage.

A spatial cutpoint model: including parties, leadership positions, and minority/majority median voter positions.

Party-voting score is defined as the percenage of all roll calls in a Congress in which at least a majority of one party votes against at least a majority of the other party.

Still confused????

### **1.4.5 Krehbiel (1993) Where's the Party**

**Author** Keith Krehbiel

**Year** 1993

**Journal** BJPS

#### **Summary**

This article tries to find significant partisan behaviors in the U.S. congress. Question: how to define a significant partisan behavior: legialators of that party vote according to partisan lines in spite of personal disagreement. Test with data from the 99th Congress. Testing significant partisan behaviors independent of personal preferences with the formation of standing committee and the appointment of conferees. Partisan effects are rare. To sum, partisan influences in Congress diminishes.

### **1.4.6 Krehbiel (1999) Paradoxes of Parties in Congress**

**Author** Keith Krehbiel

**Year** 1999

**Journal** Legislative Studies Quarterly

#### **Summary**

This article introduces several paradoxes of parties in the congress. 1. Partisan strength: with introparty heterogeneity, partisan strength is not strong. Parties are said to be strong exactly when, viewed through a simple spatial model, they are superfluous. 2. Theories of lawmaking that differ greatly in their party assumptions are often observationally equivalent at the level of predicted outcomes. 3. Party voting occurs even when all legislators ignore completely their partisan identities. Futhermore, party-voting measures

are fundamentally incapable of distinguishing between utterly partisan roll-call voting behavior and utterly non-partisan roll-call voting.

#### **1.4.7 Hager and Talbert (2000) Party Influence on Voting in the House**

**Author** Gregory L. Hager and Jeffery C. Talbert

**Year** 2000

**Journal** LSQ

##### **Summary**

Using roll-call data from the House from the 1950s to 1990s, isolating the effects of parties, including members who switch parties. Regression analysis shows that party influence on voting has varied, but there is an effect, even controlling for ideology. DVs are different levels of party-important votes in Congress. Party shows an effect. On switchers, results show that voting behavior did change after members switched parties.

#### **1.4.8 Cooper and Brady (1981) Leadership Style**

**Author** Joseph Cooper and David W. Brady

**Year** 1981

**Journal** APSR

##### **Summary**

A change of leadership style in House. A switch from a hierarchical style to a bargaining pattern. They argue that it is the institutional context of the House that determine the leadership power and style. Style and effectiveness are contingent or situational, the impact of leadership style is conditioned on party strength. When strength is high, more hierarchical style, when strength is low, more bargaining style.

**Findings** A strong correlation between the percentage vote sharing of parties and the centralized leadership style. Leadership style is more determined by institutional context rather than personal traits.

#### **1.4.9 Binder, Lawrence and Maltzman (1999) Uncovering the Hidden Effect of Party**

**Author** Sarah A. Binder and Eric D. Lawrence and Forrest Maltzman

**Year** 1999

**Journal** JOP

**Summary** Reexamining the 1994 'A to Z' discharge petition campaign in the U.S. House of Representatives. a case in which preferences rather than partisanship are said to provide the superior account of legislative behavior. Using the same spatial model which Krehbiel 1995 used, they found significant partisan effect.

### **Findings**

Separating individuals' policy preferences from the partisan labels, they found clear divergence of partisan effects. E.G. NTU (National Taxpayer Union) score, Concord Coalition score, NOMINATE score...

#### **1.4.10 Snyder and Groseclose (2000) Estimating Party Influence of Roll-Call Voting**

**Author** James Snyder and Tim Groseclose

**Year** 2000

**Journal** AJPS

**Summary** Differentiate partisan votings into substantive voting and procedural votings, over the post-war period, party influence in the House occurs especially often on key procedural votes: the rule on a bill, motions to cut off debate, and motions to recommit. In terms of substantive issues, party influence appears most frequently on budget resolutions, tax policy, social security, social welfare policy, and national debt limit, while it is relatively rare on moral and religious issues and civil rights, and entirely absent on issues such as gun controls. On some issues, such as agriculture, public works, and nuclear energy, party influence has varied dramatically over the period (1871 - 1998).

Definition of a partisan influence: direct pressure applied by the party leader or caucus, including rewards and punishments.

**Findings** Evidence from two stage regressions based on monte carlo simulations. Party pressure is very high in close and very close roll-calls. No major difference between the House and Senate votings.

#### **1.4.11 Cox and McCubbins (1993) Legislative Leviathan**

**Author** Gary Cox and Matthew McCubbins

**Year** 1993

**Summary** This book addresses the role of parties and legislative committees, and the relations between them. Parties in the House, especially the majority parties, are a species of legislative cartel. These cartels seize the power, theoretically resident in the House, to make rules governing the structure and process of legislation. Possession of this rule-making power leads to two main consequences. First, the legislative process in general - and the committee system in particular - is stacked in favor of majority-party interests.

Second, because members of the majority party have all the structural advantages, the key players in most legislative deals are members of the majority party and the majority party's central agreements are facilitated by cartel rules and policed by the cartel's leadership. (p.2)

Conditional party government (Rohde 1991): The reforms in the House in the early 1970s and the growth of partisanship in the 1980s are systematically related. Both were the result of important electoral changes, specifically the realignment of democratic constituencies in the South that led to increased intraparty homogeneity. The reforms of the 1970s were proposed by liberal Democrats frustrated by the inability to pass legislation favored by a majority of the rank and file. The reforms created incentives for party leaders to push legislation that reflected the interests of a majority of House Democrats. Following the reforms, further changes in the electorate brought coalitions of representatives that were more similar within parties and more different between them. Both the rules and the intraparty homogeneity brought about by elections set the conditions for strong party government. This book lays out the theory of conditional party government, whereby intraparty homogeneity and interparty heterogeneity determine the extent of partisanship in the House of Representatives.

House committee is not autonomous. It also depends on institutional contexts.

Majority party has the power to set legislative agenda. Majority party caucus adds another layer of structure and process onto the committee structure studied by Sheplse-Weignast and Weingast-Marshall. The majority party in the House achieves stable policy outcomes by binding members to support a specific structure of agenda power represented by the speaker, the committee chairpersons, and the Rules Committees, a structure which then leads to committees choosing policies that, on average, benefit majority party members more than minority party members.

#### **1.4.12 Cox and McCubbins (1994) Bonding, Structure, and the Stability of Political Parties: Party Government in the House**

**Author** Gary Cox and Mathew McCubbins

**Year** 1994

**Journal** LSQ

**Summary** The inability of rational choice theory in explaining political parties: the ultimate political rewards are shared by the democratic process of the state. Thus party institutions can be unstable coalition. How to explain the stability of the party system? stability is enforced by extra-legislative organization and bond posting. If a subset of legislators were all bonded by membership in a valuable extralegislative group, such as a political party, and if the cost of giving up the bond were expected to exceed most realistically imaginable benefits from defection, then legislators' choices over structure and hence policy might therewith be stabilized.

Key structural matters: the election of speakers, the design and staffing of the committee system. Caucus members must obey the caucus rules, which include key votes on speaker election, agenda setting rules. Violation will cause an automatic expulsion from the caucus.

#### **1.4.13 Shepsle and Weingast (1984) Political Solutions to Market Problems**

**Author** Kenneth Shepsle and Barry Weingast

**Year** 1984

**Journal** APSR

**Summary** A cost-benefit analysis of the legislative political market. The geographic basis of representation encourages a truncated form of cost-benefit analysis in which the geographic calculation of policy looms large in the politician's calculus.

Didn't understand this article.

#### **1.4.14 Krehbiel (1995) Cosponsors and Wafflers from A to Z**

**Author** Keith Krehbiel

**Year** 1995

**Journal** AJPS

**Summary** Theory: A pre-voting, nonpartisan adaptation of Snyder(1991) 'vote-buying' and Groseclose(1995) 'favor-trading' theories implies that significant cosponsorship and discharge-petition behavior will be concentrated in the middle of the ideological spectrum, independent of legislators' partisan affiliations.

Hypotheses: Bill cosponsorship should be a primarily preference-based phenomenon. Waffling – defined as bill cosponsorship but refusal to sign a discharge petition for the bill – should be negatively associated with preference extremity and unaffected, at the margin, by majority party membership.

Findings: based on the 103rd House of the A to Z spending plan, results consistent with the Snyder/Groseclose hypothesis, cosponsorship and waffling are explained primarily by preferences, somewhat by membership and money committees, and only slightly by partisanship.

#### **1.4.15 Schiller (1995) Senators as political entrepreneurs**

**Author** Wendy J. Schiller

**Year** 1995

**Journal** AJPS

## Summary

Using regression analysis and interviews with Senate legislative staffs, results show that a senator's use of bill sponsorship is a function of institutional and political variables including seniority, proximity of reelection, size of state economy, staff size, committee membership and committee positions. This suggests that Senate is not a place that lacks structure and predictability.

DV is number of bills introduced, positive relations: size of state economy, staff, ideology, number of committee assignment, chair of committee, number of Senators' subcommittee chairs, member of finance committee. Negative: member of foreign relations committee. If differentiating between committee bills and noncommittee bills. Committee bills related to variables like chairmanship, subcommittee chairmanship, and membership on finance or Appropriations Committees exert influence over bills introduced to committees but not to outside committee. Committee bills are influenced by seniority, size of economy, staff, ideology, number of committee assignments, party committee membership etc.

### 1.4.16 **Sinclair (1992)** The Emergence of Strong Leadership in the 1980s House of Representatives

**Author** Barbara Sinclair

**Year** 1992

**Summary** Compared with the post-World War II leadership style, the 1980s style is more involved in and more decisive in organizing the party and chamber, setting the House agenda, and affecting legislative outcomes. The study finds that, both over time and cross sectionally, the likelihood of leadership involvement is greatest when the members most need help and when the costs of the leadership's providing such help are lowest for majority party members and for the leadership itself and that leadership involvement does increase the probability of legislative success.

### 1.4.17 **Patterson and Caldeira (1988)** Party Voting in the United States Congress

**Author** Samuel Patterson and Gregory Caldeira

**Year** 1988

**Journal** BJPS

**Summary** Partisan polarization in the House of Representatives responds very sharply to shifts in the magnitude of external party conflict. Party voting in the Senate, by contrast, does not increase with a widening of partisan cleavages in the external environment. The authors believe that it is the staggered terms of senators insulated them from electoral change in the short run and introduces considerable lags into the relationship between the debate within the party-in-government and the current set of controversies in the



party-in-the-electorate. Overall, party voting is much more powerful in the House rather than the Senate.

#### **1.4.18 Krehbiel (1990) Congressional Committee Preference Outliers**

**Author** Keith Krehbiel

**Year** 1990

**Journal** APSR

**Summary** The question is whether the standing committee is more extreme than the legislative as a whole. Data is from the 96th to 99th Congress. Measure is interest group ratings of members. Three types of preference outliers in the committee: 1. a classical homogenous high-demand outlier, a committee whose members have a common desire for high levels of benefits from policies within their committee's jurisdiction. e.g. representatives from farming districts dominate agriculture committees and oversee the provision of benefits to their farm constituents. 2. A bipolar outlier: a committee that has significant factions of members on both sides of its policy spectrum. 3. An intense or high-salience outlier is a committee whose members share a uniquely high level of intrinsic interest in the committee, perhaps because its policy domain is highly salient to members' constituents. Results show no significant differences between the standing committee and the legislative as a whole.

#### **1.4.19 Jackson and Kingdon (1992) Ideology, Interest Groups and Legislative Votes**

**Author** John Jackson and John Kingdon

**Year** 1992

**Journal** AJPS

**Summary** The importance of ideology in the government decision making. What explains the legislative decision making? local constituents' economic interest of the legislators' ideological preferences? They criticize the studies that support to show that legislative decisions are the expressions of the personal ideological orientation of the members. They pointed out that the measurement of the ideological preferences, the ADA score, is flawed and lead to an overestimation of statistical results. (ADA: Americans for Democratic Action, an interest group). Using these scores in explaining voting behaviors is a tautology. It is explaining votes with votes. The problem is that, the interest group score, the explanatory variable, and the votes being modeled, the dependent variable, are almost certain to be tapping the same or related dimensions.

#### 1.4.20 **Snyder (1992)** Committee-Power, Structure-Induced Equilibria, and Roll Call Votes

**Author** James M. Snyder

**Year** 1992

**Journal** AJPS

**Summary** Concept: structure-induced equilibrium model: equilibria in the model are thus a function not only of legislators' preferences but also of the gatekeeping and monopoly proposal powers possessed by committees. Discussions based on formal model: 1. if some committees are 'preference outliers' relative to the legislature as a whole— that is, if the median ideal point of the committee members is different from the median ideal point of the whole legislatur – the roll-call data are likely to be artificially unidimensional. It is because members will select roll calls on purpose. 2. The unidimensional bias generally persists even as the dimensionality of the policy space becomes large 3. Even if committees are preference outliers, it may be impossible to discover this fact by looking at only roll call votes. That is, the roll call data may indicate that committees are 'representative samples' even if they are not.

### 1.5 Public Opinion

#### 1.5.1 **Bafumi and Herron (2010)** Leapfrog Representation and Extremism

**Author** Joseph Bafumi and Michael Herron

**Year** 2010

**Journal** APSR

**Summary**

The research question is the congruence between voters and preferences of the U.S. legislators. Using an Internet-based, national opinion survey in conjunction with legislator voting records from 109th and 110th Congresses, we show that members of Congress are more extreme than their constituents. We also show that when a congressional legislator is replaced by a new member of the opposite party, one relative extremist is replaced by an opposing extremist (leapfrog representation). We see evidence of leapfrog representation in states and House districts in the aggregate as well: the median member of the 109th House was too conservative compared to the median American voter, yet the median member of the 110th Congress was way too liberal compared to the public. The Senate appears to be a more moderate institution whose median member does not move as abruptly as that of the House.

## 1.6 On Political Reasoning and Public Opinion

**Question** Do citizens have stable political reasoning? No: Zaller, Zaller and Feldman, Converse Yes: Page and Sahpiro, in a collective sense, public opinion is stable and meaningful, individual level errors will be mitigated by the large number theorem. Depends on measures: Achen 1975

Zaller's two models: 1. the political awareness-political predisposition model: predisposition is a readiness systematically to respond positively or negatively to a class of issue-objects. In this usage, attitudes are the preferences that respondents express about particular courses of public actions, whereas predispositions refer to underlying consistencies in response to political choices: opinions about an issue like job programs for blacks are attitudes, ideological sets are examples of predispositions. Political awareness functions as the intermediate channel. 2. The consideration model of attitude construction; predisposition → considerations ↔ situational cues → attitudes. Considerations are any reason that might induce an individual to decide a political issue one way or the other. The process is through ambivalence deduction. In this model, the situational and dispositional factors are at odds (long-term and short-term causes).

Sniderman, Tetlock and Elms: the situational factor and predispositional factor can be additive, rather than mutually exclusive. The flaw of the stop-and-thinking design of Zaller: it is different from an attitude on a position and the reasons for taking that position.

### 1.6.1 Chong and Druckman (2010) Dynamic Public Opinion

**Author** Dennis Chong and James Druckman

**Year** 2010

**Journal** APSR

#### **Summary**

Study the effect of competing messages during campaign. It showed by experiments that competing messages received at the same time will neutralize each other. However, if received at different time points. Most individuals will give disproportionate weights to the most recent messages.

Framing effect: (Druckman 2001, political behavior): when a communication changes people's attitudes toward an object by changing the relative weights that give to competing considerations about the object.

Online and memory-based approach: When processed online, individuals routinely integrate the various considerations contained in the message into an overall issue evaluation. Individuals then store all the summary evaluation in the memory. Possibly forgetting the original considerations that contributed to the tally. When asked subsequently for their attitude toward the issue, individuals retrieve and report their overall online tally rather

than reconstruct and evaluate the specific pieces of information that comprise this summary (Druckmand Lupia 2000). Individuals who use memory-based model, in contrast, store considerations about the issue in memory without necessarily forming an overall judgment, and subsequently, retrieve and evaluate accessible considerations when asked their opinions about this issue.

### 1.6.2 Zaller and Feldman (1992) A Simple Theory of the Survey Response

**Author** John Zaller and Stanley Feldman

**Year** 1981

**Journal** AJPS

**Summary** Questions: does the survey research reveals stable and true preferences rather than 'making up' answers?

People have many different, and inconsistent opinions in their minds, when asked, they call to mind a sample of these ideas, including an oversample of ideas made salient by the questionnaire and other recent events, and use them to choose among the options offered. But their choices do not, in most cases, reflect anything that can be described as true attitudes; rather, they reflect the thoughts that are most accessible in memory at the moment of response.

Three axioms;

1. Ambivalence. "Most people possess opposing considerations on most issues, that is, considerations that might lead them to decide the issue either way." (585)
2. Response. "Individuals answer survey questions by averaging across the considerations that happen to be salient at the moment of response, where salience is determined by the accessibility axiom."
3. Accessibility: "The accessibility of any given consideration depends on a stochastic sampling process, where considerations that have been recently thought about are somewhat more likely to be sampled." (586)

**Method:** The authors administered two types of survey, asking similar questions as in earlier studies. Instead of simply asking the closed-ended response items, though, respondents were asked either to "stop-and-think" (before answering) or reflect (after answering), telling the surveyor what thoughts crossed their mind when thinking about the question. Each thought ("consideration") was coded (number of considerations, number of considerations in each direction, number of explicit expressions of ambivalence, etc.).

### 1.6.3 Zaller (1992) The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion

**Author** John Zaller

**Year** 1992

## Summary

Opinion is a matter of information and predisposition. Political awareness, political predispositions are the important intervening variables. The model: 1. Reception axiom: the greater a person's level of cognitive engagement with an issue, the more likely he or she is to be exposed to and comprehend – in a word to receive political messages concerning that issue. 2. Resistance axiom: people tend to resist argument that are inconsistent with their political predispositions, but they do so only to the extent that they possess the contentual information necessary to perceive a relationship between the message and their predispositions (through cueing message). 3. accessibility axiom: the more recently a consideration has been called to mind or thought about, the less time it takes to retrieve that consideration or related considerations from memory and bring them to the top of the head for use. 4. Response axiom: individuals answer survey questions by averaging across considerations that are immediately salient or accessible to them.

### In General

Zaller begins by rejecting the view that individuals possess a "true attitude" or single opinion on an issue ("most of what gets measured as public opinion does not exist except in the presence of a pollster" page 265) and instead proposes a model of how individuals construct opinions in response to the particular stimuli that confront them. Zaller's model is constructed from four basic premises:

Individuals differ substantially in their attention to politics and therefore their exposure to elite sources of political information. People react critically to political communication only to the extent that they are knowledgeable about political affairs. People rarely have fixed attitudes on specific issues; rather they construct preference statements on the fly as they confront each issue raised. In constructing these statements, people make the greatest use of ideas that are the most immediately salient to them. Usually these are the ideas that have recently been called to mind or thought about since it takes less time to retrieve these or related considerations from memory and bring them to the top of the head for use. "Considerations": The 'Receive-Accept-Sample' (RAS) Model

For Zaller, the public forms "considerations" in response to elite discourse (political communications) in the mass media. Often, this discourse consists of multiple, frequently conflicting streams of persuasive messages. In general, the greater an individual's level of political awareness, the more likely she is to receive these messages. Also, the greater a person's level of awareness, the more likely she is to be able, under certain circumstances, to resist (or accept) information that is inconsistent with her basic values or partisanship. If internalized, political considerations become reasons for taking one side rather than the other on a political issue.

When asked their opinions in surveys, people will support or oppose a given policy depending on the mix of positive or negative considerations sampled from the top of the person's mind at the moment of answering a question. Zaller formalizes this in the following manner:  $\text{Prob}(\text{Liberal response}) = L/(L+C)$ , where L and C refer to the number of liberal and conservative considerations available in the person's mind. The balance between these considerations depends on society-level variables (such as the intensity and

balance of elite discourse) as well as individual-level variables (such as person's political awareness and values).

### RAS and Political Awareness

More aware persons will be exposed to more political communications (they 'receive' more), but will be more selective in deciding which communications to internalize as considerations (they 'accept' less). Thus politically aware citizens will tend to fill their minds with large numbers of considerations, and these considerations will tend to be relatively more consistent with one another and with the citizen's predispositions. Less aware citizens will internalize ('receive') fewer considerations and will be less consistent in rejecting ('accepting') them. As a result, more aware people will be more likely to be able to state opinions, and more likely to state opinions that are ideologically consistent with their predispositions.

### RAS and Attitude Change: Campaigns and Persuasion

Attitude change (understood as the a change in people's long term response probabilities) results from a change in the mix of ideas to which people are exposed. Changes in the flow of political communication cause attitude change not by producing a sudden conversion experience but by producing gradual changes in the balance of considerations that are present in people's minds and available for answering survey questions.

As has already been indicated, the effects political campaigns (or any elite discourse) vary depending on the relative intensity of the opposing messages and individual's prior stores of partisan information. The least aware are most susceptible to influence in situations in which the information flow is very intense, as in presidential elections (because they 'receive' lots of information but 'accept' almost everything). Moderately aware persons are most susceptible in situations in which messages are moderately intense and partisan orientations activated as in contested House elections, presidential popularity and the later stages of Vietnam. The most aware people are most open to influence when there is little partisan or ideological basis for resistance to persuasion, as in the early stages of a primary campaign, or when there is little access to countervailing information, as in the early stages of the Vietnam War.

### Final Comments

According to Zaller, the effects of values and awareness (knowledge) on political attitudes (opinions) are not automatic but depend on elite cues for motivation.

Zaller believes that only the most aware citizens will have a consistent ideology or belief system. According to Zaller, highly aware liberals and conservatives look to appropriate partisan elites to find out "what goes with what." Having acquired this information, they are able to become consistently liberal or consistently conservative across a range of issues. The less aware are less likely to acquire the attitude that is consistently appropriate to their partisan orientation, and hence less likely to develop "attitude constraint" across issues.

### Key Definitions

Consideration: Any reason that might induce an individual to decide a political issue one

way or another. Political awareness: An individual's reception and comprehension of communications from the political environment. According to Zaller, political awareness is best measured by simple tests of neutral factual information since factual information is critical for intellectual engagement with politics. Political predispositions: Stable, individual-level traits that regulate the acceptance or non-acceptance of the political communication the person receives. Predispositions are the critical intervening variable between the communications people encounter in the mass media, on the one side, and their statements of political preference, on the other (since they determine the 'accept' part of the RAS model). Values: General and enduring standards that hold a more central position than attitudes in individuals' belief systems.

#### 1.6.4 Converse (2006) The Nature of Belief System in Mass Publics

**Author** Philip E. Converse

**Year** 1964

**Summary** Most individuals know little about politics and are lack of coherent belief systems.

Belief systems: as a configuration of ideas and attitudes in which the elements are bound together by some form of constraint or functional interdependence. 'Constraint' may be defined as the success we would have in predicting, given initial knowledge that an individual holds a specified attitude, that he holds certain further ideas and attitudes.

The declining information for belief system: from elites to the mass public, belief system patterns change a lot: the contextual grasp of 'standard' political belief system fades out very quickly 2. moving from top to bottom of this information dimension, the character of the objects that are central in a belief system changes; from abstract generic to simple and concrete terms. Quite related to education.

Five different levels: Most people are in the lower levels.

1. Ideologues: These respondents relied on "a relatively abstract and far reaching conceptual dimension as a yardstick against which political objects and their shifting political significance over time were evaluated" (p.216).
2. Near Ideologues: These respondents mentioned the liberal-conservative dimension peripherally, but did not appear to place much emphasis on it, or used it in a way that led the researchers to question their understanding of the issues.
3. Group Interest: This group did not demonstrate an understanding of the ideological spectrum, but made choices based on which groups they saw the parties representing (e.g. Democrats supporting blacks, Republicans supporting big business or the rich). These people tended to not understand issues that did not clearly benefit the groups they referred to.
4. Nature of the Times: The members of this group exhibited no understanding of the ideological differences between parties, but made their decisions on the "nature of

the times.” Thus, they did not like Republicans because of the Depression, or they didn’t like the Democrats because of the Korean war.

5. No issue content: This group included the respondents whose evaluation of the political scene had “no shred of policy significance whatever” (p. 217). These people included respondents who identified a party affiliation, but had no idea what the party stood for, as well as people who based their decisions on personal qualities of candidates.

#### Elites have Little Influence on Mass Ideology

Converse also found that the mass public does not seem to share beliefs in any predictable way with elites or that the voting patterns of the people at the lower end of the scale are following the patterns of the ideologues and near ideologues who have a firm grasp of the issues.

#### Response Instability: Random Changes in Responses

In addition, Converse’s interviews with the same respondents over a two-year period often show little correlation with each other. In these cases, only 13 out of 20 managed to locate themselves on the same side of a given controversy in successive interviews. Converse’s interpretation is that this change seemed almost exclusively random instead of as a response to changing beliefs.

### 1.6.5 [Achen \(1975\)](#) Mass Political Attitudes and the Survey Response

**Author** Christopher Achen

**Year** 1975

**Journal** APSR

**Summary** Propose an individual’s opinion is not a point estimate, rather we should study it as a distribution with means and variations. Two types of instability: variation of attitudes, variation of questions (measurement error). Converse’s result of low constraint is partly due to the measurement error, because he did not take into consideration of the reliability questions. ‘Rather weak reliabilities for the survey questions were obtained. When the correlation among attitudes were corrected for this unreliability, the result was a sharply increased estimate of the stability and coherence of voters’ political thinking’.

### 1.6.6 [Klar \(2013\)](#) The Influence of Competing Identity Primes on Political Preferences

**Author** Smara Klar

**Year** 2013

**Journal** AJPS



**Summary** People with multiple group identities may experience different priming effects. For instance a democratic mother may support welfare expanding but also worry about the increasing national debt as a parent.

Identity (Tajfel 1981): an identity can be understood as 'that part of the individuals' self-concept which derives from their knowledge of their membership of a social group together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership'.

Three different priming: 1. merely mention the information but no emotional context 2. the efficacy prime not only increase the salience of an identity but also reminds the individual that a large mass of people share an interest that can be addressed by policy, thereby increasing its salience. 3. A threatening appeal increases identity salience by eliciting negative emotions.

Result: with equal strength in a competing setting, priming does not impact. However, threatening is more effective than efficacy priming in the competing setting.

#### **1.6.7 Goren (2001) Core Principles and Policy Reasoning in Mass Publics: A Test of Two Theories**

**Author** Paul Goren

**Year** 2001

**Journal** BJPS

**Summary** Question: whether citizens can use core principles in the ideological orientations to deduce their policy preferences. The general use theory: everyone draws equally on core principles to determine their preferences. the expertise interaction model: the extent to which core principles influence policy preferences is a function of political expertise.

Core beliefs: general descriptive beliefs about human nature and society in matters of public affairs. Core values are evaluative standards citizens use to judge alternative social and political arrangements. Political expertise can be defined as the ability to use organized political knowledge stored in long-term memory to process political information.

Variables used as core values and principles: economic individualism, equal opportunity, racial inequality, moral conservatism. Results show support for both models.

#### **1.6.8 Goren (2004) Political Sophistication and Policy Reasoning, A Reconsideration**

**Author** Paul Goren

**Year** 2004

**Journal** AJPS

**Summary** A direct response to the sophistication-interaction theory (check [Zaller \(1992\)](#)): the strength of the relationship between abstract principles and policy preferences is conditional on political sophistication. Analysis of 1984, 1986, 1987, 1988, and 1990 NES data yields two compelling findings: first a series of CFA indicate that beliefs about equal opportunity, self-reliance, and limit government in the social welfare domain and about militarism and anticommunism in the foreign policy domain are structured equivalently in the minds of citizens at different levels of sophistication. Second, SEM shows that political sophistication does not enhance the impact these principles have on policy preferences.

#### **1.6.9 [Goren, Federico and Kittilson \(2009\)](#) Source Cues, Partisan Identities, and Political Value Expression**

**Author** Paul Goren, Christopher Federico and Miki Kittilson

**Year** 2009

**Journal** AJPS

**Summary** Question: partisan identification and political value expression (equal opportunity, self-reliance, moral traditionalism, and moral tolerance). Through experiments, findings are 1. relationship between individual partisan identities and expressed value support is stronger in the presence of party cues. 2. Out-party (Demo receive Rep) cues are more powerful than in-party cues. 3. these relationships are usually more pronounced among ideologically congruent partisans. 4. party cues promote horizontal constraint among these values.

#### **1.6.10 [Gerber et al. \(2010\)](#) Personality and Political Attitudes**

**Author** Alan S. Gerber and Gregory A. Huber and Conor M. Dowling and Shang E. Ha

**Year** 2010

**Journal** APSR

**Summary** Personality (five big traits) affect economic and social attitudes differently, and the relationships between Big Five traits and ideology vary substantially between white and black respondents.

Big Five: Agreeableness, Openness, Emotional Stability, Conscientiousness, and Extraversion.

#### **1.6.11 [Druckman, Peterson and Slothuus \(2013\)](#) Elite Polarization and Public Opinion Formation**

**Author** James N. Druckman and Erik Peterson and Rune Slothuus

**Year** 2013

**Journal** APSR

**Summary**

Polarization affects how citizens think. Specifically, polarization intensifies the impact of party endorsements on opinions, decreases the impact of substantive information and, perhaps ironically, stimulates greater confidence in those – less substantively grounded – opinions.

Motivated reasoning and partisan motivated reasoning: motivated reasoning is the tendency to seek out information that confirms prior beliefs. Partisan motivated reasoning lead to a situation that partisans will view their party's frame as more effective

**1.6.12 Conover and Feldman (1981) The Origins and Meaning of Liberal/Conservative Self-Identifications**

**Author** Pamela Johnston Conover and Stanley Feldman

**Year** 1988

**Journal** AJPS

**Summary** Ideology may have different dimensions. Ideology is powerful political symbols to many members of the public. Two types: cognitive (objective information or substantive content associated with this symbol) and evaluative (the affect elicited by the symbol, ability to generate positive and negative feelings). The ideological self-placement is determined directly by the individual's evaluation of the two major ideological labels or groups – liberals and conservatives.

Causal chains: from evaluations to ideology self-identification. The ideological spectrum is not bipolar or unidimensional.

Conservatives and liberals aren't just looking at different sides of the same coin; they're using completely different currencies. Loving conservatives doesn't require hating liberals—it's not bipolar. Rather, we base our evaluations of liberals and conservatives on affective evaluations of symbols (groups, ideas, maybe policies) associated with each group. For example, I evaluate liberals based on my feelings about NARAL, Martin Luther King, and peaceniks; I evaluate conservatives based on my feelings about the NRA, Iraq, and evangelicals. In fact, cognitive (issue-based) evaluations play second fiddle to these symbolic evaluations when I judge each side.

**1.6.13 Feldman (1988) Structure and Consistency in Public Opinion: the Role of Core Beliefs and Values**

**Author** Stanley Feldman

**Year** 1988

**Journal** AJPS

**Summary** Political preferences may be structured by central beliefs and values. Three core values are evaluated here: support for equal opportunity, support for economic individualism, support for free enterprise system. Beliefs of equal opportunity and work ethic are found to have political influences, belief for free enterprise however is not significant.

## 1.7 Framing

### 1.7.1 **Iyengar and Kinder (1987) News That Matters**

**Author** Shanto Iyengar and Donald R. Kinder

**Year** 1987

**Summary** The media can change our (expressed) opinions without changing our (underlying) attitudes at all, through priming, framing, and agenda setting. Thus, political campaigns don't change our minds; they try to make us think about considerations that will lead us to support one candidate over another. The authors back up their arguments with experimental evidence.

Main Causal Mechanism: Priming: Affects what you'll have at the top of your head when you make a judgment (see Zaller and Feldman 1992). So if the news covers poor economic performance, then leaps into an analysis of the president's performance, it's primed you to think poorly of the president. Framing: media tells you how to think about something. Is it an indigenous rights issue, or an environmentalist story? Agenda-setting effects: There's a "lead story" effect. If you see prominent place given to unemployment stories (early, long stories in a broadcast), you pay more attention to it. Caveat: Endogeneity. The media tries to select stories that will interest the public. So although the media can set the agenda doesn't mean they necessarily do—it's endogenous.

### 1.7.2 **Kinder and Sanders (1990) Mimicking Political Debate with Survey Questions: The Case of White Opinion on Affirmative Action for Blacks**

**Author** Donald R. Kinder and Lynn M. Sanders

**Year** 1990

**Journal** Social Cognition

**Summary** This article tests the framing effect of affirmative action. Framing the issue as unfair advantage as opposed to reverse discrimination produced opinions on affirmative action among whites were 1. more coherent with their views on other race policies 2. associated more closely with their opinions on policies but not explicitly, implicating race,

such as welfare 3. linked more tightly to negative emotions provoked by preferential treatment 4. more consistent with their general political views 5. more evocative of prejudice and misgivings over equal opportunity 6. less evocative of tangible threats that affirmative action might pose to their family and group and of the political principles that affirmative action might violate. These differences suggest that by promoting rival frames, elites may alter how issues are understood and as a consequence, affect what opinions turn out to be.

## 1.8 Public Opinion and Media

### 1.8.1 [Bartels \(1993\)](#) Messages Received

**Author** Larry M. Bartels

**Year** 1993

**Journal** APSR

**Summary** In an analysis of opinion change during the 1980 presidential campaign, adjusting for the measurement error, produces mediate media exposure effects, especially for network television news.

8-month's study during the 1980s presidential campaign. Using Bayesian method, after correcting measurement error, somewhat moderate effect of media exposure. The effect is diminishing among voters with strong prior opinions. It turns out campaign and media exposure are most effective at weak opinioners.

### 1.8.2 [Ansolabehere et al. \(1994\)](#) Does Attack AD Demobilize the Electorate

**Author** Stephen Ansolabehere and Shanto Iyengar and Adman Simon and Nicholas Valentino (AISV)

**Year** 1994

**Journal** APSR

**Summary** Using an experiment, advertising tone is manipulated within the identical audiovisual context, we find that exposure to negative advertisements dropped intentions to vote by 5%. In the aggregated level campaign of 1992 Senate elections, we show that the demobilizing effects of negative ad are accompanied by a weakened sense of political efficacy. Voters who watch negative ADs become more cynical about the responsiveness of public officials and the electoral process.

Experiments: 1990 California gubernatorial race, the 1992 California Senate races, and 1993 LS mayor race. Real people, real events.

The experimental contents are mostly policy facts statements.

### **1.8.3 Finkel and Geer (1998) A Spot Check: Doubt the Demobilizing Effect of Attack AD**

**Author** Steven Finkel and John Geer

**Year** 1998

**Journal** AJPS

#### **Summary**

**Theory:** Recent research contends that campaign “attack” advertising demobilizes the electorate, with particularly strong effects among political Independents. We dispute this claim, arguing instead that there is little reason to expect a powerful relationship between the tone of campaign advertising and voter turnout. Attack advertising may depress turnout among some voters, but it is likely to stimulate others by increasing their store of political information about the candidates, by increasing the degree to which they care about the election’s outcome, or by increasing ties to their party’s nominee.

**Hypothesis:** The amount of a campaign’s attack political advertising will be unrelated to overall voter turnout and to turnout among Independents.

**Methods:** We employ a multi-method research design, combining a systematic content analysis of presidential campaign advertisements from 1960 to 1992 with aggregate data on turnout and the pooled National Election Studies survey data set. Correlational, linear, and logistic regression analyses are performed. – use the actual advertisements rather than the newspaper coverage. aggregated level analysis, overall tones; also the individual level data from NES

**Results:** Controlling for other variables known to influence turnout, we find that attack advertising does not influence either overall turnout rates or individual self-reported votes. Similarly, we find no demobilizing effect for negative advertisements among Independent voters. Further survey analyses show that the effect of attack advertisements on voter withdrawal is weakest among individuals who are most highly attentive to the mass media, and thus who are most likely to have read about or seen the negativity of the campaign.

**Why negative ADs may demobilize voters?** AISV: three possible explanations: partisan mediation, blank decrease towards both candidates, a decreased political efficacy.

**But negative ADs may also stimulate voting:** 1. increased information 2. engaged more in the political information processing 3. provide stronger emotional and affective responses than the positive ones.

### **1.8.4 Kahn and Kenny (1999) Clarifying the Relationship Between Negativity and Participation**

**Author** Kim Fridkin Kahn and Patrick J. Kenny

**Year** 1999

## **Journal APSR**

**Summary** Based on U.S. senate campaign, the answer is yes. They found people distinguish between useful information presented in an appropriate manner and irrelevant and harsh mudslinging. As the proportion of legitimate criticisms increases in campaigns, citizens become more likely to cast ballots. When campaigns degenerate into unsubstantiated and shrill attacks, voters tend to stay at home. Also in the individual level, the tone is more consequential for independents, for those with less interest in politics, and for those with less knowledge about politics.

Data: 1990 NES, tones from candidate campaign and news coverage. Identifying mudslinging races by interviewing campaign managers, who were asked to characterize the opponent's campaign as well as the media's portrayal of both campaigns.

### **1.8.5 Kahn and Kenny (2002) The Slant of the News: How Editorial Endorsements Influence Campaign Coverage and Citizens' Views of Candidates**

**Author** Kim Fridkin Kahn and Patrick J. Kenny

**Year** 2002

## **Journal APSR**

**Summary** We examine newspaper coverage of more than 60 Senatorial campaigns across three election years and find that information on news pages is slanted in favor of the candidate endorsed on the newspaper's editorial page. We find that the coverage of incumbent Senators is most affected by these newspaper's endorsement decision. We explore the consequences of slanted news coverage by showing that voters evaluate endorsed candidates more favorably than candidates who fail to secure an editorial endorsement. The impact of the endorsement decision on voter's evaluations is most powerful in races receiving a great deal of press attention and among voters who read their local newspaper on a daily base.

### **1.8.6 Lau et al. (1999) The Effects of Negative Political Advertisements: A Meta-Analysis Assessment**

**Author** Richard R. Lau and Lee Sigelman and Caroline Heldman and Paul Babbitt

**Year** 1999

## **Journal APSR**

**Summary** The data do not support the claim that negative ADs has positive/negative consequences.

### 1.8.7 **Page, Shapiro and Dempsey (1987) What Moves Public Opinions**

**Author** Benjamin I. Page and Robert Y. Shapiro and Glenn R. Dempsey

**Year** 1987

**Journal** APSR

#### **Summary**

Selected 90 pairs of policy questions from the last 15 years that were repeated within moderate time intervals averaging about three months. Results show that news media parallel opinion changes.

## 1.9 Participation and Voting Behaviors

### 1.9.1 **Brady, Verba and Schlozman (1995) Beyond SES: A Resource Model of Political Participation**

**Author** Henry Brady and Sidney Verba and Kay Lehman Schlozman

**Year** 1995

**Journal** APSR

**Summary** Previous studies have controlled for socioeconomic status variables (income, education, etc) to predict political participation, but they haven't made clear why we should expect these variables to matter. Brady et al turn it around: Why don't people participate in politics? There are three answers: They can't, they don't want to, or nobody asked them to. In other words,

They can't: They lack the time (for participation), civic skills (for involvement), or money (for contributions). They don't want to: They aren't interested in politics. Nobody asked: They are isolated from the networks that mobilize people. Using these independent variables, the authors show why people vote, make donations, or contribute their time to a cause:

Voting: Driven primarily by interest, though civic skills (e.g. education) also matter. Income and time are less important. Donating money: Driven primarily by income. Neither free time nor civic skills seems to matter. Spending free time on political activities: Driven by political interest; free time also matters, but civic skills has a greater impact. Income doesn't matter.

### 1.9.2 **Lodge, Steenbergen and Brau (1995) Responsive Voter**

**Author** Milton Lodge and Marco R. Steenbergen and Shawn Brau

**Year** 1995



## Journal APSR

**Summary** Online model of candidate evaluation. Over time people forget most of the campaign information they are exposed to but are nonetheless able to later recollect their summary affective evaluation of the candidates which they then use to inform their preferences and vote choices.

### 1.9.3 Desmarais, Raja and Kowal (2015) Extended Party Network

**Author** Bruce Desmarais and Ray La Raja and Mike Kowal

**Year** 2015

**Journal** AJPS

#### **Summary**

In recent years, there has been a re-conceptualization of political parties in the United States. Rather than think of them as single organizations, scholars have begun to conceive of them as dynamic, dispersed systems of interconnected interest groups. In other words, the 'party' is constituted by an extended partisan network (EPN) comprised of groups that do not necessarily carry the label Democrat or Republican. The prevailing theory is that the EPN collectively pursues the functions of traditional party organizations such as selecting and supporting favored candidates for office.

Using network analysis with campaign finance data, we find distinctive communities of groups that converge their political spending on particular challengers. Moreover, challengers who find themselves in this selective partisan group do substantially better in elections than other challengers even controlling for the overall amount of campaign money they spend. These findings reveal that conventional accounts of political parties are too simplistic. Instead, we find that multiple interest groups - along with the traditional party organizations - perform in coordination the tasks we typically associate with political parties.

There are at least two important implications of these findings. First, by showing that political parties are more than traditional party organizations, we raise a host of questions related to campaign finance reform and other efforts to regulate parties. If the party is not simply the Democratic or Republican Party committee, then efforts to limit party financing as a way of thwarting corruption are greatly complicated.

Second, our empirical finding provides a plausible explanation for why American parties in Congress do not converge on the preference of median voters (as predicted by Anthony Downs's economic theory of democracy) but instead stay well to the ideological left or right of the vast majority of Americans. Indeed, our findings provide some clues as to why U.S. parties are increasingly polarized ideologically.

#### 1.9.4 **Bawn et al. (2012)** A Theory of Political Parties

**Author** Kathleen Bawn and Martin Cohen and David Karol and Seth Maskett and Hans Noel and John Zaller

**Year** 2012

**Journal** Perspectives on Politics

##### **Summary**

The John Aldrich's version: parties are problem solvers and stable coalitions during the legislative process.

Authors' version: parties are established by policy demanders, in order to make party fulfill the policy goals, interest groups will try to control the nomination process. Citizens pay little attention to nomination and interest groups have the highest influence over these processes: promote a loyal friend.

Claims: 1, Policy demanders outside of government form new party coalitions and force change in established ones. Policy demanders determine the broad agendas of political conflict. 2. Centrist members of congress are more likely to win re-election than extremists, but the former are rare and the latter common in the House. The unnecessary risk borne by most office holders is consistent with our basic notion that policy-demanding groups rather than politicians are the dominant players in parties. 3. When congressional districts and media markets align to conduct more informed electorates, extreme House members are at much greater risk for defeat. This finding suggests that the extremity of most members of the Congress is not due to voter preferences, but to limitations in the ability of most voters to hold representatives accountable. 4. In some cases, interest groups or activists can be shown to determine the particular individuals nominated for office.

#### 1.9.5 **Kelley and Mirer (1974)** The Simple Act of Voting

**Author** Stanley Kelley and Thad Mirer

**Journal** APSR

**Year** 1974

**Summary** Voter's decision rule: the voter canvasses his likes and dislikes of the leading candidates and major party involved in an election. Weighing each like and dislike equally, he votes for the candidate toward whom he has the greatest net number of favorable attitudes, if there is such a candidate. If no candidate has such an advantage, the voter votes consistently with his party affiliation, if he has one. If neither condition was met, the voter made a null decision.

### 1.9.6 [Jessee \(2009\)](#) Spatial Voting in the 2004 Presidential Election

**Author** Stephen Jessee

**Year** 2009

**Journal** APSR

**Summary** The theory of spatial voting has played a large role in the development of important results across many areas of political science. Directly testing the foundational assumptions of spatial voting theory, however, has not been possible with existing data. Using a novel survey design, this article obtains estimates of voter ideology on the same scale as candidate positions. The results of this scaling demonstrate that voters possess meaningful ideologies and, furthermore, that these beliefs are strongly related to the sorts of policy proposals considered in Congress. These ideology estimates are then used to uncover the actual relationships between ideology and vote choice for citizens of various types in the 2004 presidential election. Although the choices of independent voters are shown to be largely consistent with the assumptions of spatial voting theory, the decision rules used by partisans differ strongly from what unbiased spatial voting would imply. Although partisans do converge toward the behavior of independents, and hence toward the assumptions of spatial voting theory, as information levels increase, we see that even highly informed partisans show significant differences from what would be implied by unbiased spatial voting theory.

### 1.9.7 [Tomz and Houweling \(2008\)](#) Candidate Positioning and Voter Choice

**Author** Michael Tomz and Robert P. VAN Houweling

**Year** 2008

**Journal** APSR

**Summary**

Three different theories: 1. proximity theory, assumes that citizens prefer candidates whose positions are closest to their own (Downs 1957). 2. Discounting theory: knowing that candidates cannot fully deliver their promises, voters 'discount' campaign pledges and judge each candidate based on the policies they expect the government to adopt if candidate win the office (see Fiorina 1992, Kedar 2005). Discounters may favor candidates unlike themselves if such candidates stand the best chance of producing the most desirable policy outcomes. 3. Directional theory: voters perceive political issues as two sided and want candidates who take their side or direction. This leads to a prediction that voters may want more intense candidates who are in their direction rather than a moderate opponent.

Method: survey experiments with policy scaled through a list of numbers, results: proximity voting more frequently than discounting and directionary voting.

### **1.9.8 Tomz and Houweling (2009) The Electoral Implications of Candidate Ambiguity**

**Author** Michael Tomz and Robert P. Van Houweling

**Year** 2009

**Journal** APSR

#### **Summary**

Candidates often make ambiguous statements about the policies they intend to pursue. In theory, ambiguity affects how voters make choices and who wins elections. In practice, measurement and endogeneity problems have impeded empirical research about the consequences of ambiguity. We conducted survey experiments that overcame these obstacles by manipulating a common form of ambiguity: the imprecision of candidate positions. Our data show that, on average, ambiguity does not repel and may, in fact, attract voters. In nonpartisan settings, voters who have neutral or positive attitudes toward risk, or who feel uncertain about their own policy preferences, tend to embrace ambiguity. In partisan settings, voters respond even more positively to ambiguity; they optimistically perceive the locations of ambiguous candidates from their own party without pessimistically perceiving the locations of vague candidates from the opposition. We further find, through analysis of two additional new data sets, that candidates often take—and voters frequently perceive—ambiguous positions like the ones in our experiments. The pervasive use of ambiguity in campaigns fits with our experimental finding that ambiguity can be a winning strategy, especially in partisan elections.

## **2 POS598 Political Psychology**

### **2.1 Public Opinion Week**

#### **2.1.1 Berelson (1952) Democratic Theory and Public Opinion**

Prerequisite of electorate decisions: 1. a suitable personality structure 2. Interest and participation

Components of electorate decisions: 1. the possession of information and knowledge 2. Possession of principle: the electorate is required to possess a body of stable political principle or moral standards, in contrast with fluctuating impulses or whims, to which topical questions can be referred for evaluation and decision.

The process of electorate decision: 1. accurate observation 2. Communication and discussion, the electorate is required to engage in discussion and communication on political affairs. 3. rationality, the electorate is required to exercise rational judgment in political decisions.

### **2.1.2 Adam Bernisky New Directions of Public Opinion**

**Year** 2012

**Summary** Public opinion is a property of individuals, but acquired its power in the public sphere.

Important review! Read again!

## **2.2 Self Interest**

### **2.2.1 [Green and Gerken \(1989\)](#) Self-Interest and Public Opinion Toward Smoking Restrictions and Cigarette Taxes**

**Author** Donald P. Green and Ann Elizabeth Gerken

**Journal** Public Opinion Quarterly

**Year** 1989

**Summary** Self-interest has influence over public policies. Data from two random samples of California adults collected by the Field Institute in April 1987 and February 1984 indicate that nonsmokers are far more enthusiastic about tightening smoking restrictions than smokers, although they are very similar in other aspects.

### **2.2.2 [Kinder and Kiewiet \(1979\)](#) Economic Discontent and Political Behavior: The Role of Personal Grievances in Economic Judgments in Congressional Voting**

**Author** Donald R. Kinder and D. Roderick Kiewiet

**Year** 1979

**Journal** AJPS

**Summary** Conventional wisdom argues that political decisions are influenced by general economic conditions. This study uses individual level data from 1956 to 1976, showing that voting was not influenced by personal economic grievances. Those voters unhappy with changes in their financial misfortunes showed little inclination to punish candidates of incumbent party. Rather, the voting decision was influenced by judgments regarding recent trends in general business conditions and more powerfully by judgments about the relative competence of the two major parties to manage national economic problems.

### **2.2.3 [Jacob and Shapiro \(1994\)](#) Questioning the Conventional Wisdom of Public Opinion on Health Reform**

**Author** Lawrence R. Jacob and Robert Y. Shapiro

**Year** 1994

**Journal** PS: Political Science and Politics

**Summary** Some questioning points: self-interest or collective interest. Satisfaction with own treatment and dissatisfaction towards other people's conditions. Ambivalent attitudes towards taxation; not so opposite attitudes towards government intervention.

#### 2.2.4 **Citrin et al. (1997) Public Opinion Toward Immigration Reform**

**Author** Jack Citrin and Donald P. Green and Christopher Muste and Cara Wong

**Year** 1997

**Journal** JOP

**Summary**

This paper tests hypotheses concerning the effects of economic factors on public opinion toward immigration policy. Using the 1992 and 1994 National Election Study surveys, probit models are employed to test diverse conceptualizations of the effects of economic adversity and anxiety on opposition to immigration. The results indicate that personal economic circumstances play little role in opinion formation, but beliefs about the state of the national economy, anxiety over taxes, and generalized feelings about Hispanics and Asians, the major immigrant groups, are significant determinants of restrictionist sentiment. This restricted role of economic motives rooted in one's personal circumstances held true across ethnic groups, among residents in communities with different numbers of foreign-born, and in both 1992 and 1994.

#### 2.2.5 **Funk (2000) The Dual Influence of Self-Interest and Societal Interest in Public Opinion**

**Author** Carolyn Funk

**Year** 2000

**Journal** Political Research Quarterly

**Summary** Measures: self-interest: measured by receiving benefits from the welfare program. Societal interest: measured by the support for equal opportunity index.

Result: citizens use both self-interest and societal interest in evaluating policy proposals. Citizens are not completely selfless, however, citizens seem more willing to engage in self-sacrifice when that sacrifice involves giving over benefits to others than it involves giving up benefits to themselves.

## 2.2.6 **Sears et al. (1980)** Self-Interest vs. Symbolic Policy Attitudes and Presidential Voting

**Author** David O. Sears and Richard R. Lau and Tom R. Tyler and Harris M. Allen

**Journal** APSR

**Year** 1980

**Summary** This article contrasts short-term self-interest and longstanding symbolic attitudes as determinants of (1) voters' attitudes toward government policy on four controversial issues (unemployment, national health insurance, busing, and law and order), and (2) issue voting concerning those policy areas. In general, we found the various self-interest measures to have very little effect in determining either policy preferences or voting behavior. In contrast, symbolic attitudes (liberal or conservative ideology, party identification, and racial prejudice) had major effects. Nor did self-interest play much of a role in creating "issue public" that were particularly attentive to, informed about, or constrained in their attitudes about these specific policy issues. Conditions that might facilitate more self-interested political attitudes, specifically having privatistic (rather than public-regarding) personal values, perceiving the policy area as a major national problem, being high in political sophistication, perceiving the government as responsive, or having a sense of political efficacy, were also explored, but had no effect. The possibility that some long-term self-interest might be reflected in either group membership or in symbolic attitudes themselves is examined. While such possibilities cannot be definitively rejected, problems with interpreting standard demographic findings as self-interest effects are discussed.

## 2.3 Personal Experience in Political Thinking

### 2.3.1 **Lane (1962)** Political Ideology

#### **Summary**

For most Americans, the events of day-to-day life are morselized, that is, they are not seen as part of a pattern or larger context that lends them political or social significance.

Some people use their personal experience in interpreting political events (contextual).

contextualizing and ideologizing: the difference centers on the need to confirm the pattern of ideas employed in this process: if the event is used and needed to support an emotionally involved theory or interpretation, the tendency is toward ideologizing. 'The ideologue takes his cue on the interpretation of information from all sources; the contextualist is more open to information from all sources.' – ideologue takes information selectively.

### 2.3.2 **Mutz (1994)** Contextualizing Personal Experience: The Role of Mass Media

**Author** Diana C. Mutz

**Year** 1994

**Journal** JOP

**Summary** Mass media facilitates political thinking by exposing people to similar experiences of others. Besides, mass media coverage can play an especially important role in encouraging presidential accountability for personal problems.

This study considers competing theories concerning the role of mass media in hindering or facilitating the translation of personal experiences into political preferences. Using national survey and media content data that allow evaluations of both media coverage and individual patterns of media use, this study evaluates the influence of mass media on the direct impact of personal experiences on presidential performance as Ronald Reagan completed his second term in office, and on the indirect impact of personal experiences by means of their impact on collective-level issue judgments. Exposure to unemployment news appears to strengthen the impact of personal experiences on presidential performance ratings. Heavy unemployment coverage also increases the extent to which perceptions of national unemployment conditions are generalized from personal experience. Overall, results suggest that mass media may counter the tendency to morselize personal experiences and help legitimize the translation of private interests into political attitudes.

### 2.3.3 **Hopkins (2012)** Local Oppositions to Immigrants

**Author** Daniel Hopkins

**Year** 2010

**Journal** APSR

**Summary**

A politicized places hypothesis: hostile political reactions to neighboring immigrants are most likely when communities undergo sudden influxes of immigrants and when salient national rhetoric reinforces the threat.

Racial threat or power threat: Key (1949) and Blalock (1967): the presence of an outgroup in sufficient numbers will generate competition for scarce resources and thus local hostility.

The politicized places approach assumes that people are highly selective in incorporating environmental information and that information acquisition needs to be explained.

### 2.3.4 **Egan and Mullin (2012)** Turning Personal Experience into Political Attitude: the effect of local weather on perceptions about global warming

**Author** Patrick J. Egan and Megan Mullin

**Year** 2012



**Journal JOP**

### **Summary**

How do people translate their personal experiences into political attitudes? It has been difficult question using observational data, because individuals are typically exposed to experiences in a selective fashion, and self reports of exposure may be biased and unreliable. In this study, we identify one experience to which Americans are exposed nearly at random: their local weather, and show that weather patterns have a significant effect on people's beliefs about the evidence for global warming.

### **2.3.5 Lee Ross 1977: Introduction to Attribution Theory and Attribution Error**

Attribution theory: native psychology, how ordinary people to understand the causes and implications of the events they witness.

why a native psychologist model is not sufficient?

## **2.4 Ideology and values**

### **2.4.1 Alvarez and Brehm (1995) American Ambivalence towards abortion policy**

**Author** R. Michael Alvarez and John Brehm

**Year** 1995

**Journal** AJPS

### **Summary**

Theory: Using elaboration-likelihood models and insights from the recent core beliefs literature, we show that conflicting core beliefs lead to ambivalence about policy choices.

Hypotheses: Policy choices about abortion are heterogeneous. This heterogeneity across individuals is a function of the underlying conflict in their beliefs about the role of women and the sanctity of human life.

Methods: A heteroskedastic probit model is developed to test the hypotheses. Results: Heterogeneity is observed for six of seven abortion policy choices; when core values conflict, respondents are more ambivalent in their policy responses and more difficult for our standard models to predict.

Some additional definitions: elaboration likelihood model: the ELM begins with the subject receiving a message. The subject elaborates on the message only if he or she is both able and motivated to process the communication. Subjects may have the ability to cognate a message, but lack the motivation. If not motivated, subjects take the message based on the credibility of the speaker. In the standard ELM, the subject in the central model

of persuasion subjectively evaluates the message's credibility. When there are multiple conflicting values, there will be larger variance in the subject's policy choices.

#### **2.4.2 [Jacoby \(2006\)](#) Value Choices and American Public Opinion**

**Author** William Jacoby

**Journal** AJPS

##### **Summary**

Individual preferences among core values are widely believed to be a determinant of political attitudes. Data from the 1994 multi-Investigator Study show that there exists a hierarchical structure of citizens' value preferences. Most people make transitive choices among values and that their value preferences have important influence on issue attitudes. For those who make intransitive value choices, this is more due to low levels of political sophistication.

#### **2.4.3 [Hurwitz and Mark Peffley \(1987\)](#) A Hierarchical Model of Foreign Policy Attitude**

**Author** Jon Hurwitz and Mark Peffley

**Year** 1987

**Journal** APSR

##### **Summary**

An Information Processing perspective: people are cognitive misers and taking shortcuts whenever it is possible. A complicated and confusing world requires extensive use of heuristics to render the environment interpretable and manageable.

People use simple heuristic values in reacting to the complicated foreign policy issues.

A structured view of foreign policy attitudes: Core values: morality of warfare, ethnocentrism (one country is superior to others)

Mid: Party ID

General Postures: militarism, anti-communism, isolationism

## 2.5 Parties

### 2.5.1 Campbell et al. (1960) The American Voter

**Author** Angus Campbell and Philip E. Converse and Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes

**Year** 1960

#### Summary

Party ID is the major influence on voters' perceptions of political choice as well as their final vote. Party ID is characterized by stability and resistance to contrary influence. Furthermore, it is formed early in life (i.e., it is inherited).

#### The Funnel Model

Campbell et al. argue that the best predictor (X) of whether an individual will vote Republican or Democratic is the funnel model. The funnel works like this: First, you learn your party ID from parents and socialization. You form a psychological attachment to this party. As such, your partisanship shapes the development of your attitudes; because you like your party, you adopt its positions. Your (underlying) attitudes are then reflected in your positions on the six attitudinal dimensions: the personal attributes of the Democratic candidate (Stevenson), the personal attributes of the Republican (Eisenhower), the groups involved in politics and the questions of group interest affecting them, the issues of domestic policy, the issues of foreign policy, and the comparative record of the two parties in managing the affairs of government. Finally, these issue positions are the proximal cause of your voting decision. In fact, these six issue positions predict voting decisions with 87% accuracy—which is even better than asking voters who they intend to vote for.

#### Partisan Perception

Not surprisingly, feelings across these six dimensions tend to be highly correlated. For Campbell and his coauthors, this correlation occurs because partisan feelings are strongly shaped by party identification. (Party ID leads to partisan feelings, not the reverse.) In this book, party ID is treated as a psychological force or tie through which voters interpret political issues (each of the aforementioned dimensions). The authors write that "Identification with a party raises a perceptual screen [i.e. selective perception] through which the individual tends to see what is favorable to his partisan orientation." In this sense, the party acts as a supplier of cues by which the individual may evaluate the elements of politics.

#### Origins of Partisanship

They claim that individuals "inherit" a party ID from their parents and the social milieu in which they are raised and that this party ID is characterized by stability and resistance to contrary influence. (They do recognize that objective events and conditions can lead a voter to modify her party ID or vote against it if her evaluation of the current elements of politics does not agree with her initial allegiances.)

## Issues Don't Matter

In their interviews, Campbell et al. find that policies and issues play a small part in most voters' decisions, that only a small fraction of the electorate (12%) displays anything resembling an ideology (i.e., most people when asked about their positions on specific policy issues do not have a consistent pattern of responses in terms of a liberal-conservative dimension), and that voters frequently do not know which party stands for what. These findings cast doubt on the efficacy of voting as a mechanism of democratic control of government.

## Changes in Partisanship

Changes in party ID are possible. These changes result from either personal forces (usually changes in an individual's social milieu) or social forces (usually the result of experiences related to great national crises or those experiences related to progress through the life cycle older voters tend to be more conservative).

### 2.5.2 Lavine, Johnston and Steenbergen (2015) The Ambivalent Partisanship

**Author** Howard G. Lavine and Christopher D. Johnston and Marco R. Steenbergen

#### Summary

Partisanship has been generally regarded as the most important cue for average citizens when forming political opinions and vote choices. As both political scientists and psychologists have recognized, people are busy with their everyday life, and contributing extra effort to political information has literally no personal economic returns to them. As a result, partisanship becomes the economically efficient way for decision-making. On the other hand, the long-lasting pattern of decision-making aligned with the partisan division leads to a concern about biased political opinion and the quality of democratic citizenship. Scholars start to question if average citizens just follow their party disciplines and pay little attention to issue-related policies, or the real politics. Besides, other than the pattern of partisan politics, we are observing a lot of shifts and opinion changes in both opinion polls and electoral results. How to explain these dynamics?

There are citizens who do not always vote according to their parties. They think carefully about issue-related aspects like the objective economic performance, social welfare etc. Lavine's book tackles this question directly by asking who are more likely to go beyond partisan cues and under what conditions will this effort-taking behaviors happen? According to Lavine et al., it is the ambivalent partisanship that leads to these behaviors.

Partisan ambivalence happens when there is a disconnection between an individual's long-term party identification and short-term party evaluation. For instance, partisan ambivalence may emerge when an individual's party is undergoing a long-stretch of difficulties like splitting ideas, scandals, unsuccessful reforms, or misconduct in international conflicts and domestic emergencies. To address the mechanism of partisan ambivalence, Lavine et al. resort to psychological theories of cognitive process, which are the principles

of least effort, sufficiency, and belief perseverance. Least effort relates to the idea that an individual to make minimal effort on their decision making by relying on simple rules like partisan heuristic cues. Based on this principle, party id is often useful as a cognitive shortcut which does not require too much time and effort. Sufficiency is about the confidence of decision making. Party id may not be sufficient in conditions when people are in conflictual situations with their partisan standings. Last, belief perseverance is the motive to make decisions that confirm, rather than contradict, one's system of basic belief and attitudes.

Partisan ambivalence happens when sufficiency principle is not achieved during the cognitive process. Once aroused, ambivalence decreases the cognitive accessibility and perceived reliability of partisan cues, thus motivating citizens to more diagnostic information when making political judgments. Consequently, political judgments are less biased by partisan lens, more accurate and more firmly rooted in normative desirable criteria.

- Research Design and Results

Lavine et al.'s study relies mostly on survey data from ANES (American National Election Studies) and CCES (Cooperative Congressional Election Study), and is accompanied by three small-scale experimental designs. The key independent variable in the research design is partisan ambivalence, which is measured by both open-ended questions and in-party/out-party attitudes.

When conceptualizing the ambivalence indicator, they used open-ended questions in the survey. Specifically, they asked respondents to list their favorable and unfavorable thoughts about the party that they support (in-party) and the other party (out-party). Then a following question was asked about the general likeness about in-party and out-party. Ambivalent partisans are then defined as those who score in the 95th percentile in identity-conflicting reactions (good thoughts about the out-party and negative thoughts about the in-party) and the 5th percentile in identity-consistent reactions (good thoughts about in-party and negative thoughts about out-party). Mixed partisans have lower proportions of conflicting identity and higher proportion of consistent identity. Univalent partisans have the highest proportion of consistent identity.

Detailed empirical tests are performed in chapter 4-7. Chapter 4 uses several experiments from multiple sources as well as panel data, showing that ambivalent partisans are less influenced by partisan cues than their univalent peers. Chapter 5 focuses on the accuracy aspect. Using economic perceptions as the example, they demonstrate that ambivalent partisans are more able to form accurate judgment of economic conditions. Besides, unlike the univalent peers, ambivalent partisans are less likely to be influenced by partisan bias. Chapter 6 examine the political participation (esp. voting behaviors). Using 1980-2004 ANES survey data, they found out that ambivalent partisans are not less likely to get involved in political activities. Chapter 7 looks at critical loyalty theory: unlike univalent partisans, ambivalent partisans are more likely to update their party id to reflect the political disagreement. Overall, the authors argue that ambivalent partisans paid more attention to actual policy issues rather than blindly taking the partisan cues; and their perceptions are more responsive and accurate to actual politics. To conclude, ambivalent

partisans make better citizens of democracy.

Overall, this book offers an interesting angle interpreting partisan dynamics in American politics. Scholars have been emphasizing the effect of partisanship and bias in cognition all the way since the very beginning of *The American Voter*. Lavine et al. study this question from a neat aspect by asking who are more (less) likely to be influenced by partisan bias. Their analysis starts with the differentiation of long-term party identity and short-term party evaluation, which can speak directly to SES models as well as retrospective voting behavior literatures (e.g. economic voting). The construction of the concept ambivalence is useful in the sense that it links party id and party evaluation, which allows further analysis when these two aspects are in conflicting situations. The implication of their study applies to a wide variety of researches in information processing and cognition, mass public opinions and even the longitudinal partisan realignment.

However, I do have some disagreements with the book. My first concern is the argument between ambivalence and partisan influence. As ambivalence is defined in the way when long-term party id is incompatible with short-term party evaluation, a natural inference is that ambivalent partisans are less likely to follow whatever their parties say. And then they demonstrate that partisan influences are diminished among ambivalent individuals. This seems a bit circular reasoning to me. The independent variable (partisan ambivalence) and dependent variable (partisan influence) come from similar reasons and the whole process is endogenous. A corollary of this conceptualization will be: treating partisanship as a group identity, if a group member has some disagreements with the group, we certainly believe that he/she will depreciate group decisions. This is not an interesting implication, what is missing here is who are more likely to have divergent opinions with their group? Lavine et al. did not answer this aspect in their book and they presume the preexistence of 'ambivalent partisans', which I think leads to an endogenous problem.

A related concern on conceptualization is their measurement of ambivalence. They count the numbers of likes and dislikes in the open-ended questions and use this to construct in-party ambivalence. This measurement worsens the endogeneity problem: as likes and dislikes also capture people's emotional reactions to their party other than the disagreeing policy positions. When the unfavorable emotions to parties are aroused, we certainly believe that subjects will be less influenced by their party identifications.

My second concern of their study is about the temporal dynamics. In the final chapter they conclude that ambivalent partisans are more likely to shift their party id to make it consistent with their beliefs. However, as long as they make the change eventually, will they still be ambivalent partisans as they were, or become a univalent partisan (which according to the authors are not good democratic citizens)? According to their theoretical foundations, partisan cues have the priority of opinion formation as they are efficient and cost-minimizing. As a result these 'former ambivalent' partisans who paid extra effort to form accurate political judgments may resort to partisan cues after switching. However, we believe that they have some personal traits other than 'ambivalence' which makes them be more critical to partisan cues. This aspect as I mentioned in the previous paragraph is not well discussed in their book, which is a potential flaw.

All in all, I think this book offers many important insights in American politics and political psychology. The introduction of 'ambivalence' is neat and definitely worth further exploration (especially for the conceptualization part).

### 2.5.3 Aldrich (1995) Why Parties

Aldrich's book seeks to understand the origins and transformation of political parties. Overall, he argues that a political party is an endogenous institution shaped by ambitious political actors. Political parties are the main instruments that 'help' politicians to accomplish their goals (can either be stay in office, certain policy goals and political reputations).

The form in which political parties can 'help' ambitious politicians depends on three variables: the polity (electorate), the institutional setting (for example, a republican form of government,) and the historical context (ideas, values, technological conditions and also path of development). The first two variables create collective action and collective choice problems. The historical context determines whether parties are the most efficient means of solving these two problems.

In sum, parties are designed as attempts to solve problems that current institutional arrangements do not solve and that politicians have come to believe they cannot solve.

Assumptions:

Political parties are created, shaped and transformed by political actors, which are either officeholders, office seekers or benefit seekers. Voters are not part of the political party, nonetheless they are critical as targets of party activities. Rational, elective office seekers and holders use the party to achieve their ends. These actors may have values, principles and preferences over policies and means for reaching policy goals. "They also care about office, both for its own sake and for the opportunities to achieve ends that election and reelection made possible", therefore they are concerned with winning. Just as winning elections is a means to other ends for politicians (whether career or policy ends), so too is the political party as a means to these other ends". (21)

The General Argument:

A political party is an endogenous institution shaped by ambitious political actors (office seeker and officeholder). Political parties are the main instruments that "help" politicians to accomplish their goals (long and successful career in political office, achievement of policy ends and power and prestige within the government).

The form in which political parties can "help" ambitious politicians depends on three variables: the polity (electorate), the institutional setting (for example, a republican form of government,) and the historical context (ideas, values, technological conditions and also path of development). The first two variables create collective action and collective choice problems. The historical context determines whether parties are the most efficient means of solving these two problems.

In sum, “parties are designed as attempts to solve problems that current institutional arrangements do not solve and that politicians have come to believe they cannot solve.” (22). These problems are related to collective action and collective choice.

#### **2.5.4 Bartels (2002) Beyond the Running Tally**

**Author** Larry Bartels

**Journal** Political Behavior

##### **Summary**

Bartels’s piece examines the impact of long-term partisan loyalties on perceptions of specific political figures and events. In contrast to the notion of partisanship as a simple running tally of political assessments, Bartel shows that party identification is a pervasive dynamic force shaping citizens’ perceptions of, and reactions to, the political world. In terms of empirical methods, Bartels uses ANES panel data of 1990, 91 and 92. Analysis was conducted with a Bayesian model to capture the dynamics of public opinion change. He also presents more straightforward evidence of contrasts in Democrats’ and Republicans’ perceptions of objective politically relevant events. The results show that partisan bias in political perceptions plays a crucial role in perpetuating and reinforcing sharp differences in opinion between Democrats and Republicans.

Bartels’ piece starts with a critique of the Lodge et al. (1995) ‘running tally’ argument. Using panel data, he reveals the significant impact of partisanship in information processing. But the time period of the panel data is really short, which decreases the internal validity: is 3 years enough to claim a ‘long-term’ partisan effect?

#### **2.5.5 Fiorina (1981) Explorations of a political theory of party identification**

#### **2.5.6 Green, Palmquist and Schickler (2002) Partisan Hearts and Minds**

**Author** Donald P. Green and Bradley Palmquist and Eric Schickler

**Year** 2002

##### **Summary**

The authors maintain that individuals form partisan attachments early in adulthood and that these political identities, much like religious identities, tend to persist or change only slowly over time. Scandals, recessions, and landslide elections do not greatly affect party identification; large shifts in party attachments occur only when the social imagery of a party changes, as when African Americans became part of the Democratic Party in the South after the passage of the Voting Rights Act. Conclusions are based on a wealth of data analysis using individual-level and aggregate survey data from the United States and abroad.



This study offers a new perspective on party identification: developed in the early childhood and becomes stable afterwards. The stability of partisanship somewhat supports the view that partisan bias and stereotypes exist.

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