

# Porosity

*Decompiling Ethereum Smart-Contracts*

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# Whoami

- @msuiche  
- Comae Technologies
- OPCDE - [www.opcde.com](http://www.opcde.com)
- First time in Vegas since BlackHat 2011
- Mainly Windows-related stuff
  - CloudVolumes (VMware App Volumes)
  - Memory Forensics for DFIR (Hibr2Bin, DumplIt etc.)
- “looks like such fun guy” – TheShadowBrokers
- Didn’t know much about blockchain before this project

# Just so you know...

- We won't talk about POW/POS stuff
- We won't talk about Merkle Trees
- We won't talk about how to becoming a crypto-currency millionaire
  
- We will talk about the Ethereum EVM
- We will talk about Solidity
- We will talk about smart-contract bytecodes
  
- And yes, the tool isn't perfect 😊

# Agenda

- Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM)
- Memory Management
- Addresses
- Call Types
- Type Discovery
- Smart-Contract
- Code Analysis
- Known Bugs
- Future

# Solidity

- **Solidity** the quality or state of being firm or strong in structure.
  - *But also the name of Ethereum's smart-contracts compiler*
- **Porosity** is the quality of being porous, or full of tiny holes. Liquids go right through things that have porosity.
  - *But also the name of Comae's smart-contract decompiler.*

# Accounts

- Normal Accounts: 3,488,419 (July 15)
- Contract Accounts: 930,889 (July 15)
- Verified Contract Accounts: 2285 (July 15)
  - Source code is provided.
- 40M\$ lost in July
  - 10M\$ in CoinDash's ICO
    - <http://www.coindesk.com/coindash-ico-hacker-nets-additional-ether-theft-tops-10-million/>
  - 30M\$ due to Parity's wallet.sol vulnerability
    - <https://blog.parity.io/security-alert-high-2/>
    - <https://github.com/paritytech/parity/pull/6103>

# Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM)

- Account/Contract/Blockchain
- A Smart-Contract is made of bytecode stored in the blockchain.
- An address is a 160-bits value & corresponds to an “account”
- Operates 256-bits pseudo-registers
  - EVM does not really have registers, but uses a virtual stack to replace them.

# Solidity & “Smart Contracts”

- Solidity compiles JavaScript-like code into Ethereum bytecode.

```
contract Coin {  
    // The keyword "public" makes those variables  
    // readable from outside.  
    address public minter;  
    mapping (address => uint) public balances;  
  
    // Events allow light clients to react on  
    // changes efficiently.  
    event Sent(address from, address to, uint amount);  
  
    // This is the constructor whose code is  
    // run only when the contract is created.  
    function Coin() {  
        minter = msg.sender;  
    }  
  
    function mint(address receiver, uint amount) {  
        if (msg.sender != minter) return;  
        balances[receiver] += amount;  
    }  
  
    function send(address receiver, uint amount) {  
        if (balances[msg.sender] < amount) return;  
        balances[msg.sender] -= amount;  
        balances[receiver] += amount;  
        Sent(msg.sender, receiver, amount);  
    }  
}
```



# Memory Management

- Stack
  - Virtual stack is being used for operations to pass parameters to opcodes.
  - 256-bit values/entries
  - Maximum size of 1024 elements
- Storage (Persistent)
  - Key-value storage mapping (256-to-256-bit integers)
  - Can't be enumerated.
  - **SSTORE/SLOAD**
- Memory (Volatile)
  - 256-bit values (lots of AND operations, useful for type discovery)
  - **MSTORE/MLOAD**

# Basic Blocks

- Usually start with the **JUMPDEST** instruction – except few cases.
- **JUMP\*** instruction jump to the address contained in the 1<sup>st</sup> element of the stack.
- **JUMP\*** instruction are (almost always) preceded by **PUSH** instruction
  - This allows to push the destination address in the stack, instead of hardcoding the destination offset.
- **SWAP/DUP/POP** stack manipulation instructions can make jump destination address harder to retrieve
  - This requires dynamic analysis to rebuild the relationship between each basic block.

# EVM functions/instructions

- EVM instructions are more like functions, such as:
- Arithmetic, Comparison & Bitwise Logic Operations
- SHA3
- Environmental & Block Information
- Stack, Memory, Storage and Flow Operations
- Logging & System Operations

# Instruction call - Addition

Offset	Instruction	Stack[0]	Stack[2]
n	PUSH1 0x1	0x1	
n + 1	PUSH1 0x2	0x2	0x1
n + 2	ADD	0x3	

- The above translates at the EVM-pseudo code:
  - add(0x2, 0x1)

# EVM Call

- Can be identified by the CALL instruction.
  - Call external accounts/contracts pointed by the second parameter
  - The second parameter contains the actual 160 address of the external contract
- With the exception of 4 hardcoded contracts:
  - 1 – elliptic curve public key recovery function
  - 2- SHA2 function
  - 3- RIPEMD160 function
  - 4- Identity function

```
call(  
    gasLimit,  
    to,  
    value,  
    inputOffset,  
    inputSize,  
    outputOffset,  
    outputSize  
)
```

# User-Defined functions (Solidity)

- **CALLDATALOAD** instruction is used to read the Environmental Information Block (EIB) such as parameters.
- First 4 bytes of the EIB contains the 32-bits hash of the called function.
- Followed by the parameters based on their respective types.
  - e.g. **int** would be a 256 bits word.
- a = calldataload(0x4)
- b = calldataload(0x24)
- add(calldataload(0x4), calldataload(0x24))

```
function foo(int a, int b) {  
    return a + b;  
}
```

# Type Discovery - Addresses

- As an example, addresses are 160-bit words
- Since stack registers are 256-bit words, they can easily be identified through **AND** operations using the `0xffffffffffffffffffff...ffff` mask.
- Mask can be static or computed dynamically

Ethereum Assembly	Translation (msg.sender)
<code>CALLER</code>	<code>and(reg256, sub(exp(2, 0xa0), 1)) (EVM)</code>
<code>PUSH1 0x01</code>	
<code>PUSH 0xA0</code>	<code>reg256 &amp; (2 ** 0xA0) - 1) (Intermediate)</code>
<code>PUSH1 0x02</code>	
<code>EXP</code>	
<code>SUB</code>	<code>address (Solidity)</code>
<code>AND</code>	

# Bytecode

- The bytecode is divided in two categories:
  - Pre-loader code
    - Found at the beginning that contains the routine to bootstrap the contract
  - Runtime code of the contract
    - The core code written by the user that got compiled by Solidity
    - Each contract contain a dispatch function that redirects the call to the corresponding function based on the provided hash function.

# Bytecode – Pre-loader

- **CODECOPY** copies the runtime part of the contract into the EVM memory – which gets executed at base address 0x0

00000000	6060	PUSH1 60
00000002	6040	PUSH1 40
00000004	52	MSTORE
00000005	6000	PUSH1 00
00000007	6001	PUSH1 01
00000009	6000	PUSH1 00
0000000b	610001	PUSH2 0001
0000000e	0a	EXP
0000000f	81	DUP2
00000010	54	SLOAD
00000011	81	DUP2
00000012	60ff	PUSH1 ff
00000014	02	MUL
00000015	19	NOT

00000016	16	AND
00000017	90	SWAP1
00000018	83	DUP4
00000019	02	MUL
0000001a	17	OR
0000001b	90	SWAP1
0000001c	55	SSTORE
0000001d	50	POP
0000001e	61bb01	PUSH2 bb01
00000021	80	DUP1
00000022	612b00	PUSH2 2b00
<b>00000025</b>	<b>6000</b>	<b>PUSH1 00</b>
<b>00000027</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>CODECOPY</b>
00000028	6000	PUSH1 00
0000002a	f3	RETURN

# Bytecode – Dispatcher (-list)



```
loc_00000000: calldataload(0x0) / exp(0x2, 0xe0)
0x00000000 60 60
0x00000002 60 40
0x00000004 52
0x00000005 60 e0
0x00000007 60 02
0x00000009 0a
0x0000000a 60 00
0x0000000c 35
0x0000000d 04
0x000000e 63 06 72 e9 ee
0x00000013 81
0x00000014 14
0x00000015 60 24
0x00000017 57

loc_00000018:
0x00000018 80
0x00000019 63 9d 04 0a f4
0x0000001e 14
0x0000001f 60 35
0x00000021 57

loc_00000022:
0x00000022 5b
0x00000023 00
```

```
PUSH1 60
PUSH1 40
MSTORE
PUSH1 e0
PUSH1 02
EXP
PUSH1 00
CALLDATALOAD
DIV
PUSH4 06 72 e9 ee
DUP2
EQ
PUSH1 24
JUMPI
```

```
DUP1
PUSH4 9d 04 0a f4
EQ
PUSH1 35
JUMPI
```

```
JUMPDEST
STOP
```

```
double(uint256) :
0x00000024 5b
0x00000025 60 45
0x00000027 60 04
0x00000029 35
0x0000002a 60 00
0x0000002c 60 4f
0x0000002e 82
0x0000002f 60 02
```

```
loc_00000031:
0x00000031 5b
0x00000032 02
0x00000033 90
0x00000034 56
```

```
triple(uint256) :
0x00000035 5b
0x00000036 60 45
0x00000038 60 04
0x0000003a 35
0x0000003b 60 00
0x0000003d 60 4f
0x0000003f 82
0x00000040 60 03
0x00000042 60 31
0x00000044 56
```

	JUMPDEST
PUSH1 45	
PUSH1 04	
CALLDATALOAD	
PUSH1 00	
PUSH1 4f	
DUP3	
PUSH1 02	

# Function Hashes

- The 4 bytes of the **sha3** (keccak256) value for the string `functionName(param1Type, param2Type, etc)`

```
[  
 {  
   "constant":false,  
   "inputs": [ { "name":"a", "type":"uint256" } ],  
   "name": "double",  
   "outputs": [ { "name":"","type":"uint256" } ],  
   "type": "function"  
 }  
 ]
```

keccak256("double(uint256)") =>  
**eee97206**6698d890c32fec0edb38a360c32b71d0a29ffc75b6ab6d2774ec9901

double(uint256) -> **0xeeee97206**  
triple(uint256) -> 0xf40a049d

# Extracting function hash


- `callidataload(0x0) / exp(0x2, 0xe0)`
  - `(0x12345678xxxx / 0x00000001xxxx) = 0x12345678`

## Ethereum Emulator


- jumpi(eq(calldataload(0x0) / exp(0x2, 0xe0), 0xeeee97206))

# Control Flow Graph

Static CFG (`--cfg`)



Emulated CFG (`--cfg-full`)



# Dispatcher – pseudo code

```
hash = calldataload(0x0) / exp(0x2, 0xe0);
switch (hash) {
    case 0xeeee97206: // double(uint256)
        memory[0x60] = calldataload(0x4) * 2;
        return memory[0x60];
    break;
    case 0xf40a049d: // triple(uint256)
        memory[0x60] = calldataload(0x4) * 3;
        return memory[0x60];
    break;
    default:
        // STOP
        break;
}
```


Pseudo-Code

```
contract C {
    function double(int arg_4) {
        return arg_4 * 2;
    }

    function triple(int arg_4) {
        return arg_4 * 3;
    }
}
```

Translated Code

# Bytecode – Dispatcher (- -list)



```
loc_00000000:  
0x00000000 60 60  
0x00000002 60 40  
0x00000004 52  
0x00000005 60 e0  
0x00000007 60 02  
0x00000009 0a  
0x0000000a 60 00  
0x0000000c 35  
0x0000000d 04  
0x0000000e 63 06 72 e9 ee  
0x00000013 81  
0x00000014 14  
0x00000015 60 24  
0x00000017 57  
  
loc_00000018:  
0x00000018 80  
0x00000019 63 9d 04 0a f4  
0x0000001e 14  
0x0000001f 60 35  
0x00000021 57  
  
loc_00000022:  
0x00000022 5b  
0x00000023 00
```

```
PUSH1 60  
PUSH1 40  
MSTORE  
PUSH1 e0  
PUSH1 02  
EXP  
PUSH1 00  
CALLDATALOAD  
DIV  
PUSH4 06 72 e9 ee  
DUP2  
EQ  
PUSH1 24  
JUMPI  
  
DUP1  
PUSH4 9d 04 0a f4  
EQ  
PUSH1 35  
JUMPI  
  
JUMPDEST  
STOP
```

double(uint256) :  
**0x00000024 5b**  
0x00000025 60 45  
0x00000027 60 04  
0x00000029 35  
0x0000002a 60 00  
0x0000002c 60 4f  
0x0000002e 82  
0x0000002f 60 02  
  
loc\_00000031:  
0x00000031 5b  
0x00000032 02  
0x00000033 90  
0x00000034 56  
  
triple(uint256) :  
0x00000035 5b  
0x00000036 60 45  
0x00000038 60 04  
0x0000003a 35  
0x0000003b 60 00  
0x0000003d 60 4f  
0x0000003f 82  
0x00000040 60 03  
0x00000042 60 31  
0x00000044 56

<b>JUMPDEST</b>	PUSH1 45
<b>JUMPDEST</b>	PUSH1 04
CALLDATALOAD	PUSH1 00
PUSH1 4f	DUP3
PUSH1 02	PUSH1 02
<b>JUMPDEST</b>	MUL
<b>JUMPDEST</b>	SWAP1
JUMP	JUMP
<b>JUMPDEST</b>	PUSH1 45
<b>JUMPDEST</b>	PUSH1 04
CALLDATALOAD	PUSH1 00
PUSH1 4f	DUP3
PUSH1 03	PUSH1 03
PUSH1 31	JUMP

# Bytecode – Dispatcher (- -list)



```
loc_00000000:  
0x00000000 60 60  
0x00000002 60 40  
0x00000004 52  
0x00000005 60 e0  
0x00000007 60 02  
0x00000009 0a  
0x0000000a 60 00  
0x0000000c 35  
0x0000000d 04  
0x0000000e 63 06 72 e9 ee  
0x00000013 81  
0x00000014 14  
0x00000015 60 24  
0x00000017 57
```

```
loc_00000018:  
0x00000018 80  
0x00000019 63 9d 04 0a f4  
0x0000001e 14  
0x0000001f 60 35  
0x00000021 57
```

```
loc_00000022:  
0x00000022 5b  
0x00000023 00
```

```
PUSH1 60  
PUSH1 40  
MSTORE  
PUSH1 e0  
PUSH1 02  
EXP  
PUSH1 00  
CALLDATALOAD  
DIV  
PUSH4 06 72 e9 ee  
DUP2  
EQ  
PUSH1 24  
JUMPI
```

```
DUP1  
PUSH4 9d 04 0a f4
```

```
EQ  
PUSH1 35  
JUMPI
```

```
JUMPDEST  
STOP
```

## double(uint256) :

```
0x00000024 5b  
0x00000025 60 45  
0x00000027 60 04  
0x00000029 35  
0x0000002a 60 00  
0x0000002c 60 4f  
0x0000002e 82  
0x0000002f 60 02
```

## loc\_00000031:

```
0x00000031 5b  
0x00000032 02  
0x00000033 90  
0x00000034 56
```

## triple(uint256) :

```
0x00000035 5b  
0x00000036 60 45  
0x00000038 60 04  
0x0000003a 35  
0x0000003b 60 00  
0x0000003d 60 4f  
0x0000003f 82  
0x00000040 60 03  
0x00000042 60 31  
0x00000044 56
```

## JUMPDEST

```
PUSH1 45  
PUSH1 04  
CALLDATALOAD  
PUSH1 00  
PUSH1 4f  
DUP3  
PUSH1 02
```

```
JUMPDEST  
MUL  
SWAP1  
JUMP
```

```
JUMPDEST  
PUSH1 45  
PUSH1 04  
CALLDATALOAD  
PUSH1 00  
PUSH1 4f  
DUP3  
PUSH1 03  
PUSH1 31  
JUMP
```

# Bytecode – Dispatcher (- -list)



```
loc_00000000:  
0x00000000 60 60  
0x00000002 60 40  
0x00000004 52  
0x00000005 60 e0  
0x00000007 60 02  
0x00000009 0a  
0x0000000a 60 00  
0x0000000c 35  
0x0000000d 04  
0x0000000e 63 06 72 e9 ee  
0x00000013 81  
0x00000014 14  
0x00000015 60 24  
0x00000017 57
```

```
loc_00000018:  
0x00000018 80  
0x00000019 63 9d 04 0a f4  
0x0000001e 14  
0x0000001f 60 35  
0x00000021 57
```

```
loc_00000022:  
0x00000022 5b  
0x00000023 00
```

```
PUSH1 60  
PUSH1 40  
MSTORE  
PUSH1 e0  
PUSH1 02  
EXP  
PUSH1 00  
CALLDATALOAD  
DIV  
PUSH4 06 72 e9 ee  
DUP2  
EQ  
PUSH1 24  
JUMPI
```

```
DUP1  
PUSH4 9d 04 0a f4
```

```
EQ  
PUSH1 35  
JUMPI
```

```
JUMPDEST  
STOP
```

```
double(uint256) :  
0x00000024 5b  
0x00000025 60 45  
0x00000027 60 04  
0x00000029 35  
0x0000002a 60 00  
0x0000002c 60 4f  
0x0000002e 82  
0x0000002f 60 02
```

```
loc_00000031:  
0x00000031 5b  
0x00000032 02  
0x00000033 90  
0x00000034 56
```

```
triple(uint256) :  
0x00000035 5b  
0x00000036 60 45  
0x00000038 60 04  
0x0000003a 35  
0x0000003b 60 00  
0x0000003d 60 4f  
0x0000003f 82  
0x00000040 60 03  
0x00000042 60 31  
0x00000044 56
```

**JUMPDEST**  
PUSH1 45  
PUSH1 04  
CALLDATALOAD  
PUSH1 00  
PUSH1 4f  
DUP3

**PUSH1 02**

**JUMPDEST**  
MUL  
SWAP1  
JUMP

JUMPDEST  
PUSH1 45  
PUSH1 04  
CALLDATALOAD  
PUSH1 00  
PUSH1 4f  
DUP3  
PUSH1 03  
PUSH1 31  
JUMP

# Bytecode – Dispatcher (–list)



```
loc_00000000:  
0x00000000 60 60  
0x00000002 60 40  
0x00000004 52  
0x00000005 60 e0  
0x00000007 60 02  
0x00000009 0a  
0x0000000a 60 00  
0x0000000c 35  
0x0000000d 04  
0x0000000e 63 06 72 e9 ee  
0x00000013 81  
0x00000014 14  
0x00000015 60 24  
0x00000017 57
```

```
PUSH1 60  
PUSH1 40  
MSTORE  
PUSH1 e0  
PUSH1 02  
EXP  
PUSH1 00  
CALLDATALOAD  
DIV  
PUSH4 06 72 e9 ee  
DUP2  
EQ  
PUSH1 24  
JUMPI
```

```
DUP1  
PUSH4 9d 04 0a f4
```

```
EQ  
PUSH1 35  
JUMPI
```

```
JUMPDEST  
STOP
```

double(uint256) :  
0x00000024 5b  
0x00000025 60 45  
0x00000027 60 04  
0x00000029 35  
0x0000002a 60 00  
0x0000002c 60 4f  
0x0000002e 82  
0x0000002f 60 02

**loc\_00000031:**

0x00000031 5b  
**0x00000032** 02  
0x00000033 90  
0x00000034 56

triple(uint256) :

0x00000035 5b  
0x00000036 60 45  
0x00000038 60 04  
0x0000003a 35  
0x0000003b 60 00  
0x0000003d 60 4f  
0x0000003f 82  
0x00000040 60 03  
0x00000042 60 31  
0x00000044 56

**JUMPDEST**

PUSH1 45  
PUSH1 04  
CALLDATALOAD  
PUSH1 00  
PUSH1 4f  
DUP3  
**PUSH1 02**

**JUMPDEST**

**MUL**  
SWAP1  
JUMP

JUMPDEST  
PUSH1 45  
PUSH1 04  
CALLDATALOAD  
PUSH1 00  
PUSH1 4f  
DUP3  
PUSH1 03  
PUSH1 31  
JUMP

# Bytecode – Dispatcher (-list)



```
loc_00000000:  
0x00000000 60 60  
0x00000002 60 40  
0x00000004 52  
0x00000005 60 e0  
0x00000007 60 02  
0x00000009 0a  
0x0000000a 60 00  
0x0000000c 35  
0x0000000d 04  
0x0000000e 63 06 72 e9 ee  
0x00000013 81  
0x00000014 14  
0x00000015 60 24  
0x00000017 57
```

```
loc_00000018:  
0x00000018 80  
0x00000019 63 9d 04 0a f4  
0x0000001e 14  
0x0000001f 60 35  
0x00000021 57
```

```
loc_00000022:  
0x00000022 5b  
0x00000023 00
```

```
PUSH1 60  
PUSH1 40  
MSTORE  
PUSH1 e0  
PUSH1 02  
EXP  
PUSH1 00  
CALLDATALOAD  
DIV  
PUSH4 06 72 e9 ee  
DUP2  
EQ  
PUSH1 24  
JUMPI
```

```
DUP1  
PUSH4 9d 04 0a f4
```

```
EQ  
PUSH1 35  
JUMPI
```

```
JUMPDEST  
STOP
```

```
double(uint256) :  
0x00000024 5b  
0x00000025 60 45  
0x00000027 60 04  
0x00000029 35  
0x0000002a 60 00  
0x0000002c 60 4f  
0x0000002e 82  
0x0000002f 60 02
```

```
loc_00000031:  
0x00000031 5b  
0x00000032 02  
0x00000033 90  
0x00000034 56
```

```
triple(uint256) :  
0x00000035 5b  
0x00000036 60 45  
0x00000038 60 04  
0x0000003a 35  
0x0000003b 60 00  
0x0000003d 60 4f  
0x0000003f 82  
0x00000040 60 03  
0x00000042 60 31  
0x00000044 56
```

JUMPDEST  
PUSH1 45  
PUSH1 04  
CALLDATALOAD  
PUSH1 00  
PUSH1 4f

DUP3  
PUSH1 02

JUMPDEST  
MUL  
SWAP1  
JUMP

**JUMPDEST**  
PUSH1 45  
PUSH1 04  
CALLDATALOAD  
PUSH1 00  
PUSH1 4f  
DUP3  
PUSH1 03  
PUSH1 31  
JUMP

# Bytecode – Dispatcher (-list)



```
loc_00000000:  
0x00000000 60 60  
0x00000002 60 40  
0x00000004 52  
0x00000005 60 e0  
0x00000007 60 02  
0x00000009 0a  
0x0000000a 60 00  
0x0000000c 35  
0x0000000d 04  
0x0000000e 63 06 72 e9 ee  
0x00000013 81  
0x00000014 14  
0x00000015 60 24  
0x00000017 57
```

```
loc_00000018:  
0x00000018 80  
0x00000019 63 9d 04 0a f4  
0x0000001e 14  
0x0000001f 60 35  
0x00000021 57
```

```
loc_00000022:  
0x00000022 5b  
0x00000023 00
```

```
PUSH1 60  
PUSH1 40  
MSTORE  
PUSH1 e0  
PUSH1 02  
EXP  
PUSH1 00  
CALLDATALOAD  
DIV  
PUSH4 06 72 e9 ee  
DUP2  
EQ  
PUSH1 24  
JUMPI
```

```
DUP1  
PUSH4 9d 04 0a f4
```

```
EQ  
PUSH1 35  
JUMPI
```

```
JUMPDEST  
STOP
```

```
double(uint256) :  
0x00000024 5b  
0x00000025 60 45  
0x00000027 60 04  
0x00000029 35  
0x0000002a 60 00  
0x0000002c 60 4f  
0x0000002e 82  
0x0000002f 60 02
```

```
loc_00000031:  
0x00000031 5b  
0x00000032 02  
0x00000033 90  
0x00000034 56
```

```
triple(uint256) :  
0x00000035 5b  
0x00000036 60 45  
0x00000038 60 04  
0x0000003a 35  
0x0000003b 60 00  
0x0000003d 60 4f  
0x0000003f 82  
0x00000040 60 03  
0x00000042 60 31  
0x00000044 56
```

JUMPDEST  
PUSH1 45  
PUSH1 04  
CALLDATALOAD  
PUSH1 00  
PUSH1 4f

DUP3  
PUSH1 02

JUMPDEST  
MUL  
SWAP1  
JUMP

**JUMPDEST**  
PUSH1 45  
PUSH1 04  
**CALLDATALOAD**  
PUSH1 00  
PUSH1 4f  
DUP3  
PUSH1 03  
PUSH1 31  
JUMP

# Bytecode – Dispatcher (-list)



```
loc_00000000:  
0x00000000 60 60  
0x00000002 60 40  
0x00000004 52  
0x00000005 60 e0  
0x00000007 60 02  
0x00000009 0a  
0x0000000a 60 00  
0x0000000c 35  
0x0000000d 04  
0x0000000e 63 06 72 e9 ee  
0x00000013 81  
0x00000014 14  
0x00000015 60 24  
0x00000017 57
```

```
loc_00000018:  
0x00000018 80  
0x00000019 63 9d 04 0a f4  
0x0000001e 14  
0x0000001f 60 35  
0x00000021 57
```

```
loc_00000022:  
0x00000022 5b  
0x00000023 00
```

```
PUSH1 60  
PUSH1 40  
MSTORE  
PUSH1 e0  
PUSH1 02  
EXP  
PUSH1 00  
CALLDATALOAD  
DIV  
PUSH4 06 72 e9 ee  
DUP2  
EQ  
PUSH1 24  
JUMPI
```

```
DUP1  
PUSH4 9d 04 0a f4
```

```
EQ  
PUSH1 35  
JUMPI
```

```
JUMPDEST  
STOP
```

```
double(uint256) :  
0x00000024 5b  
0x00000025 60 45  
0x00000027 60 04  
0x00000029 35  
0x0000002a 60 00  
0x0000002c 60 4f  
0x0000002e 82  
0x0000002f 60 02
```

```
loc_00000031:  
0x00000031 5b  
0x00000032 02  
0x00000033 90  
0x00000034 56
```

```
triple(uint256) :  
0x00000035 5b  
0x00000036 60 45  
0x00000038 60 04  
0x0000003a 35  
0x0000003b 60 00  
0x0000003d 60 4f  
0x0000003f 82  
0x00000040 60 03  
0x00000042 60 31  
0x00000044 56
```

JUMPDEST  
PUSH1 45  
PUSH1 04  
CALLDATALOAD  
PUSH1 00  
PUSH1 4f

DUP3  
PUSH1 02

JUMPDEST  
MUL  
SWAP1  
JUMP

**JUMPDEST**  
PUSH1 45  
PUSH1 04  
**CALLDATALOAD**  
PUSH1 00  
PUSH1 4f  
DUP3  
**PUSH1 03**  
PUSH1 31  
JUMP

# Bytecode – Dispatcher (- -list)



```
loc_00000000:  
0x00000000 60 60  
0x00000002 60 40  
0x00000004 52  
0x00000005 60 e0  
0x00000007 60 02  
0x00000009 0a  
0x0000000a 60 00  
0x0000000c 35  
0x0000000d 04  
0x0000000e 63 06 72 e9 ee  
0x00000013 81  
0x00000014 14  
0x00000015 60 24  
0x00000017 57  
  
loc_00000018:  
0x00000018 80  
0x00000019 63 9d 04 0a f4  
0x0000001e 14  
0x0000001f 60 35  
0x00000021 57  
  
loc_00000022:  
0x00000022 5b  
0x00000023 00
```

PUSH1 60  
PUSH1 40  
MSTORE  
PUSH1 e0  
PUSH1 02  
EXP  
PUSH1 00  
CALLDATALOAD  
DIV  
PUSH4 06 72 e9 ee  
DUP2  
EQ  
PUSH1 24  
JUMPI

DUP1  
**PUSH4 9d 04 0a f4**  
EQ  
PUSH1 35  
JUMPI

JUMPDEST  
STOP

```
double(uint256) :  
0x00000024 5b  
0x00000025 60 45  
0x00000027 60 04  
0x00000029 35  
0x0000002a 60 00  
0x0000002c 60 4f  
0x0000002e 82  
0x0000002f 60 02
```

JUMPDEST  
PUSH1 45  
PUSH1 04  
CALLDATALOAD  
PUSH1 00  
PUSH1 4f  
DUP3  
PUSH1 02

```
loc_00000031:  
0x00000031 5b  
0x00000032 02  
0x00000033 90  
0x00000034 56
```

JUMPDEST  
MUL  
SWAP1  
JUMP

```
triple(uint256) :  
0x00000035 5b  
0x00000036 60 45  
0x00000038 60 04  
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0x0000003b 60 00  
0x0000003d 60 4f  
0x0000003f 82  
0x00000040 60 03  
0x00000042 60 31  
0x00000044 56
```

**JUMPDEST**  
PUSH1 45  
PUSH1 04  
**CALLDATALOAD**  
PUSH1 00  
PUSH1 4f  
DUP3  
**PUSH1 03**  
**PUSH1 31**  
**JUMP**

# Bytecode – Dispatcher (- -list)



```
loc_00000000:  
0x00000000 60 60  
0x00000002 60 40  
0x00000004 52  
0x00000005 60 e0  
0x00000007 60 02  
0x00000009 0a  
0x0000000a 60 00  
0x0000000c 35  
0x0000000d 04  
0x0000000e 63 06 72 e9 ee  
0x00000013 81  
0x00000014 14  
0x00000015 60 24  
0x00000017 57  
  
loc_00000018:  
0x00000018 80  
0x00000019 63 9d 04 0a f4  
0x0000001e 14  
0x0000001f 60 35  
0x00000021 57  
  
loc_00000022:  
0x00000022 5b  
0x00000023 00
```

PUSH1 60  
PUSH1 40  
MSTORE  
PUSH1 e0  
PUSH1 02  
EXP  
PUSH1 00  
CALLDATALOAD  
DIV  
PUSH4 06 72 e9 ee  
DUP2  
EQ  
PUSH1 24  
JUMPI

DUP1  
**PUSH4 9d 04 0a f4**  
EQ  
**PUSH1 35**  
JUMPI

JUMPDEST  
STOP

```
double(uint256) :  
0x00000024 5b  
0x00000025 60 45  
0x00000027 60 04  
0x00000029 35  
0x0000002a 60 00  
0x0000002c 60 4f  
0x0000002e 82  
0x0000002f 60 02
```

JUMPDEST  
PUSH1 45  
PUSH1 04  
CALLDATALOAD  
PUSH1 00  
PUSH1 4f  
DUP3  
PUSH1 02

```
loc_00000031:  
0x00000031 5b  
0x00000032 02  
0x00000033 90  
0x00000034 56
```

JUMPDEST  
**MUL**  
SWAP1  
JUMP

```
triple(uint256) :  
0x00000035 5b  
0x00000036 60 45  
0x00000038 60 04  
0x0000003a 35  
0x0000003b 60 00  
0x0000003d 60 4f  
0x0000003f 82  
0x00000040 60 03  
0x00000042 60 31  
0x00000044 56
```

**JUMPDEST**  
PUSH1 45  
PUSH1 04  
**CALLDATALOAD**  
PUSH1 00  
PUSH1 4f  
DUP3  
**PUSH1 03**  
**PUSH1 31**  
**JUMP**

# DELEGATECALL & \$30M Parity Bug

Abusing the dispatcher to reinitialize a wallet?

```
contract Wallet {
    address _walletLibrary;
    address owner;

    // initWallet() is only invoked by the constructor. WalletLibrary is hardcoded.
    function Wallet(address _owner) {
        _walletLibrary = 0xa657491c1e7f16adb39b9b60e87bbb8d93988bc3;
        _walletLibrary.delegatecall(bytes4(sha3("initWallet(address)")), _owner);
    }

    (...)

    // fallback function behaves like a "generic forward" (WTF?)
    // Wallet.initWallet(attacker) becomes walletLibrary.initWallet(attacker)
    function () payable {
        _walletLibrary.delegatecall(msg.data);
    }
}
```

# Generic-Forward & Fall back functions

- Typical issue introduce by the lack of upgradeability of smart-contract
- Software engineering is hard enough, but smart-contracts need to be:
  - Backward-Compatible
  - Forward-Compatible
- Does not help to make the language verifiable.
- Fall back functions are undefined behaviors.
- Imagine if your kernel would behave like that.
  - Scary, right ? Now, imagine if that's your bank...

# Fixing the initialization bug

```
- function initMultiowned(address[] _owners, uint _required) {
+ function initMultiowned(address[] _owners, uint _required) internal {

- function initDaylimit(uint _limit) {
+ function initDaylimit(uint _limit) internal {

+ modifier only_uninitialized { if (m_numOwners > 0) throw; _; }
- function initWallet(address[] _owners, uint _required, uint _daylimit) {
+ function initWallet(address[] _owners, uint _required, uint _daylimit)
only_uninitialized {
```

# Code Analysis – Vulnerable Contract

```
contract SendBalance {
    mapping ( address => uint ) userBalances ;
    bool withdrawn = false ;

    function getBalance (address u) constant returns ( uint ) {
        return userBalances [u];
    }

    function addToBalance () {
        userBalances[msg.sender] += msg.value ;
    }

    function withdrawBalance () {
        if (! (msg.sender.call.value(
            userBalances [msg.sender]) () )) { throw ; }
        userBalances [msg.sender] = 0;
    }
}
```


# Code Analysis – Vulnerable Contract

```
contract SendBalance {  
    mapping ( address => uint ) userBalances ;  
    bool withdrawn = false ;  
  
    function getBalance (address u) constant returns ( uint ) {  
        return userBalances [u];  
    }  
  
    function addToBalance () {  
        userBalances[msg.sender] += msg.value ;  
    }  
  
    function withdrawBalance () {  
        if (! (msg.sender.call.value(  
            userBalances [msg.sender]) ()) ) { throw ; }  
        userBalances [msg.sender] = 0; }  
    }  
}
```

Caller contract can recall this function  
using its fallback function

# Understanding the control flow

- In the case of reentrant vulnerability, since we can record the EVM state at each instruction using porosity.
- We can track in which basic block **SSTORE** instructions are called.
  - `userBalances [msg.sender] = 0;`
- And track states for each basic block.



`.\demo.ps1`

```
Windows PowerShell
PS E:\defcon2017> .\demo.ps1
Porosity v0.1 (https://www.comae.io)
Matt Suiche, Comae Technologies <support@comae.io>
The Ethereum bytecode commandline decompiler.
Decompiles the given Ethereum input bytecode and outputs the Solidity code.

Attempting to parse ABI definition...
Success.
Hash: 0x5FD8C710
function withdrawBalance() {
    if (msg.sender.call.gas(4369).value()() {
        store[msg.sender] = 0x0;
    }
}

L3 (D8193): Potential reentrant vulnerability found.

LOC: 5
Hash: 0xC0E317FB
function addToBalance() {
    store[msg.sender] = store[msg.sender] + msg.value;
    return;
}

LOC: 4
Hash: 0xF8B2CB4F
function getBalance(address) {
    return store[arg_4];
}

LOC: 3
PS E:\defcon2017>
```

# Known class of bugs

- Reentrant Vulnerabilities / Race Condition
  - Famously known because of the \$50M USD DAO hack (2016) [8]
- Call Stack Vulnerabilities
  - Got 1024 frames but a bug ain't one – c.f. *Least Authority* [12]
- Time Dependency Vulnerabilities
  - @mhswende blogposts are generally awesome, particularly the roulette one [10]
- Unconditional DELEGATECALL

# Porosity + Quorum = <3

- Quorum: Ethereum code fork created by J.P. Morgan
  - aimed at enterprises that want to use a permissioned blockchain that adds private smart contract execution & configurable consensus.
- Quorum now includes Porosity integrated directly into geth out of the box:
  - Scan private contracts sent to your node from other network participants
  - Incorporate into security & patching processes for private networks with formalized governance models
  - Automate scanning and analyze risk across semi-public Quorum networks
- <https://github.com/jpmorganchase/quorum>



```
function scanBlock(blockNumber) {
    var b = eth.getBlock(blockNumber);
    for (var i = 0; i < b.transactions.length; i++) {
        var tx = eth.getTransaction(b.transactions[i]);
        var code;
        if (tx.v == 37 || tx.v == 38) { // private
            code = quorum.getPrivatePayload(tx.input);
            if (code === "0x") {
                continue // we weren't a party to this transaction
            }
        } else {
            // code = tx.input;
            continue; // skip public transactions
        }
        var isVulnerable = quorum.runPorosity({"code": code, "decompile": true, "silent": true})
        if (isVulnerable) {
            console.log("Reentrant vulnerability in block " + tx.blockNumber +
                        "\nTransaction: " + tx.hash +
                        "\nFrom: " + tx.from +
                        "\nTo: " + (tx.to === null ? "Contract creation" : tx.to));
        }
    }
}

console.log("Scanning all private transactions for vulnerabilities");
for (var i = 0; i < eth.blockNumber; i++) {
    scanBlock(i);
}
```

```
~/quorum-examples/examples/7nodes: ./runscript.sh porosity/scan.js
Scanning all private transactions for vulnerabilities
```

Reentrant vulnerability in block 2:

Transaction: 0x4d5155cde81d71730be693b04e6e1aadcc2e1381f08c18b774ccc154b53de82e3  
From: 0xed9d02e382b34818e88b88a309c7fe71e65f419d  
To: Contract creation

Reentrant vulnerability in block 3:

Transaction: 0x6820cc1630587495386589798d2859c27a4c20a9c82837f128e7cefc9cdbe9e8  
From: 0xed9d02e382b34818e88b88a309c7fe71e65f419d  
To: Contract creation

Reentrant vulnerability in block 4:

Transaction: 0xf0287b32d8e50508d5598069550b25c02a9a8df9217a1316f32c2a51282249fe  
From: 0xed9d02e382b34818e88b88a309c7fe71e65f419d  
To: Contract creation  
true

```
~/quorum-examples/examples/7nodes: |
```

```
..... console.log("err creating contract", e);
..... } else {
..... if (!contract.address) {
..... console.log("Contract transaction send: TransactionHash: " + contract.transactionHash + " waiting to be mined...");
..... } else {
..... console.log("Vulnerable contract mined! Address: " + contract.address);
..... console.log(contract);
..... }
..... });
Contract transaction send: TransactionHash: 0x31bf6bf870466467260797a1180aa6e626cebd1384cabef38991af0a888ecaa31 waiting to be mined...
undefined
> Vulnerable contract mined! Address: 0x3950943d8d86267c04a4bba804f9f0b8a01c2fb8
[object Object]
> quorum.runPorosity({"code": eth.getCode("0x3950943d8d86267c04a4bba804f9f0b8a01c2fb8"), "decompile": true})
Porosity v0.1 (https://www.comae.io)
Matt Suiche, Comae Technologies <support@comae.io>
The Ethereum bytecode commandline decompiler.
Decompiles the given Ethereum input bytecode and outputs the Solidity code.
```

```
Hash: 0x5fd8c710
executeInstruction: NOT_IMPLEMENTED: REVERT
executeInstruction: NOT_IMPLEMENTED: REVERT
executeInstruction: NOT_IMPLEMENTED: REVERT
function func_5fd8c710 {
    if (!msg.value) {
    }
    if (msg.sender.call.gas(4369).value()()) {
        store[msg.sender] = 0x0;
    }
    store[msg.sender] = 0x0;
}
```

L5 (D8193): Potential reentrant vulnerability found.

L7 (D8193): Potential reentrant vulnerability found.

LOC: 8
Hash: 0xC0E317FB
executeInstruction: NOT\_IMPLEMENTED: REVERT

# Future

- Ethereum DApps created a new segment for softwares.
- Porosity
  - Improving support for conditional and loop statements
- Ethereum / Solidity & Security
  - Fast growing community and more tools such as OYENTE or Porosity
  - Personally, looking forward seeing the Underhanded Solidity Coding Contest [10] results
  - EVM vulnerabilities triggered by malicious bytecode? *CLOUDBURST on the blockchain*
- More Blockchain VMs ?
  - Swapping the EVM for Web Assembly (WASM) for 2018

# Future - WebAssembly

- New Ethereum Roadmap (March 2017) mentions making the EVM obsolete and replacing it with WebAssembly for 2018.
- *"WebAssembly (or WASM) is a new, portable, size- and load-time-efficient format."*
  - WebAssembly is currently being designed as an open standard by a W3C Community Group.
  - WebAssembly defines an instruction set, intermediate source format (WAST) and a binary encoded format (WASM).
  - Major browser JavaScript engines will notably have native support for WebAssembly – including V8, Chakra and Spidermonkey.
- <https://github.com/ewasm/design>

# WASM + DApps + Blockchain

- C++ -> WASM is already a thing
  - <https://mbebenita.github.io/WasmExplorer/>
  - And a similar thing is planned for eWASM

## Goals of the eWASM project

- To provide a specification of *eWASM contract semantics* and the *Ethereum interface*
- To provide an *EVM transpiler*, preferably as an eWASM contract
- To provide a *metering injector*, preferably as an eWASM contract
- To provide a VM implementation for executing eWASM contracts
- To implement an eWASM backend in the Solidity compiler
- To provide a library and instructions for writing contracts in Rust
- To provide a library and instructions for writing contracts in C

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- Martin H. Swende
- Gavin Wood
- Andreas Olofsson

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<https://github.com/comaeio/porosity>

