



# Shard Scheduler: object placement and migration in sharded account-based blockchains

Michał Król  
City, University of London  
michal.krol@city.ac.uk

Onur Ascigil  
Lancaster University  
o.ascigil@lancaster.ac.uk

Sergi Rene  
University College London  
s.rene@ucl.ac.uk

Alberto Sonnino  
Facebook Novi  
asonnino@fb.com

Mustafa Al-Bassam  
Celestia Labs  
mustafa@celestia.org

Etienne Rivière  
UCLouvain  
etienne.riviere@uclouvain.be

## ABSTRACT

We propose Shard Scheduler, a system for object placement and migration in account-based sharded blockchains. Our system calculates optimal placement and decides on object migrations across shards. It supports complex multi-account transactions caused by smart contracts. Placement and migration decisions made by Shard Scheduler are fully deterministic, verifiable, and can be made part of the consensus protocol. Shard Scheduler reduces the number of costly cross-shard transactions, ensures balanced load distribution and maximizes the number of processed transactions for the blockchain as a whole. To this end, it leverages a novel incentive model motivating miners to maximize the global throughput of the entire blockchain rather than the throughput of a specific shard. In our simulations, Shard Scheduler can reduce the number of costly cross-shard transactions by half while ensuring equal load and increasing throughput more than 2 fold when using 60 shards. We also implement and evaluate Shard Scheduler on Chainspace, more than doubling its throughput and reducing user-perceived latency by 70% when using 10 shards.

## CCS CONCEPTS

• Security and privacy → Distributed systems security;

## KEYWORDS

distributed system, blockchain, sharding, economics, performance

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
## 1 INTRODUCTION

Sharding emerged as one of the most promising layer-1 solutions to the scalability problems of blockchains [1, 13, 22, 25, 37, 39]. A sharded system divides the blockchain infrastructure into groups called shards. Each shard has its own miners, holds a subset of the state, and processes a subset of transactions. This technique has the potential to increase the number of processed transactions per second, as they can be verified and agreed on in parallel by independent groups of miners. In theory, by increasing the number of shards, we can increase the global throughput of the blockchain.

A sharded blockchain [36] can be seen as a distributed database where each transaction performs write operations, creating, destroying or modifying objects in one or multiple partitions (shards). We can distinguish between transactions writing to only one shard (intra-shard transactions) or to multiple shards (cross-shard transactions). Intra-shard transactions are relatively cheap and can be agreed on using the consensus protocol within their shard. In contrast, cross-shard transactions are more costly as they require local consensus in all involved shards as well as a cross-shard agreement between these shards. This is achieved using expensive techniques such as 2-phase commit [1, 22, 31] or mutex-based protocols [13, 39]. Finally, cross-shard transactions must be included in the chains of all shards holding involved accounts resulting in state inflation. The placement of objects in shards plays a crucial role in determining the overall performance (*i.e.* the Transaction per Second–TPS–rate and the user-perceived confirmation latency).

In this paper, we focus on the account-based data model. Account-based objects are persistent. They represent user accounts (*i.e.* user balance) or smart contracts and can be modified multiple times. Placing an object in a shard in the account-based model influences all future transactions for this object (in contrast to single-use transaction outputs in the UTXO model). Ethereum, the largest blockchain system supporting smart contracts, is an example of an account-based blockchain transitioning into a sharded mode of operation [13].

Existing sharded blockchain designs generally use a static hash-based object-to-shard assignment [1, 13, 22, 25, 37, 39]. The hash space of object identifiers is divided equally between shards, and hashing the identifier of an object allows clients and miners to deterministically determine its location without using additional indexing services. In the long run, hash-based allocation equally spreads the load across shards but causes loss of data locality. Frequently interacting accounts may be spread across multiple shards causing costly cross-shard interactions [3]. Furthermore, a fixed assignment cannot always react to activity bursts of accounts located in a single



**Figure 1: Object-to-shard assignment:** a static placement (e.g. hash-based) results in a high number of cross-shard transactions. A better placement could place (or migrate) objects 1, 2 and 3 in (to) shard 1 and objects 4 and 5 in (to) shard 2.

shard, causing short-term load imbalance. Both problems become more pronounced with an increasing number of shards and with an increasing number of accounts involved in each transaction, e.g. as the result of the smart contracts executions.

Figure 1 presents a simplified view of a blockchain with two shards and five accounts. Edges represent interactions (transactions) between accounts. The upper hash-based placement results in a high number of cross-shard transactions. A better placement is a compromise between load-balancing and the number of cross-shard transactions. We note that achieving such a placement through initial placement decisions only is not necessarily possible, and may require *migrating* objects between shards (e.g. accounts 2 and 5 in our example). Migration operations [14, 15, 29] require additional transactions. The individual cost of these transaction executions, as well as the overhead they impose on the blockchain as a whole, must be worth paying, i.e. result in higher throughput and lower confirmation latency for future transactions.

**Contributions.** We present Shard Scheduler, a novel approach for deciding and enforcing object placement and migration decisions in sharded, account-based blockchains. Our scheduler balances the load between shards and improves data locality. It leverages the possibility to initiate account migrations when necessary and seeks to maximize the global throughput of the blockchain. At the same time, Shard Scheduler remains simple, deterministic, and verifiable for all the miners in the network to prevent abuse. Shard Scheduler is executed by the miners and does not require modifications of the clients, who are nonetheless able to verify the legitimacy of migration decisions taken as part of their transaction execution. Finally, Shard Scheduler makes scheduling decisions worth enacting for rational miners through economic incentives. We do not seek to propose novel mechanisms for handling cross-shard transactions and account migrations, but rather build upon the different proposals by other authors [1, 13, 22, 25, 37, 39]. We only make minimal and common assumptions on the capabilities of the underlying sharded blockchain, allowing Shard Scheduler to be implemented on top of a vast range of account-based blockchains, from the upcoming evolution of Ethereum [13], to current systems such as Zilliqa [35].

**Outline.** We present a background on account-based blockchains and sharding mechanisms in Section 2. We outline the design and perimeter of use of Shard Scheduler in Section 3, present our assumptions on the underlying sharded blockchain together with our

design goals in Section 4, and present our system model in Section 5. We then present our contributions as follows.

Our first contribution, presented in Section 6, is an analysis of the transaction history from Ethereum from a perspective of a sharded execution. We use the Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM) to extract all accounts that were modified by every transaction. We then investigate the activity of the accounts, their data locality, and the load balancing when using a static hash-based assignment.

In Section 7 we present the design of Shard Scheduler, a transaction scheduler for sharded, account-based blockchains. Shard Scheduler observes system load and interactions between accounts to place and migrate accounts across shards to maximize the throughput.

In Section 8, we develop and discuss an incentive scheme for sharded blockchains that motivates miners to maximize the TPS of the blockchain as a whole. By deploying this scheme, we free blockchain end-users from costly, manual migrations of the state and avoid associated security problems. Furthermore, we incentivize miners to perform migrations providing the highest global TPS instead of focusing on the fees collected on their own shard.

Section 9 discusses verifiability and security of the proposed scheme. In Section 10, we quantify the performance gain over a hash-based approach using a simulator.

In Section 11, we present the integration of Shard Scheduler with the Chainspace [1] sharded blockchain system and the results of its deployment on a large-scale testbed. Our evaluation shows that Shard Scheduler can adapt to many potential configurations of a sharded environment, more than doubles the throughput of the system, and lowers the latency by 70% for 60 shards.

Finally, Section 12 presents related work while Section 13 presents an analysis of Shard Scheduler properties, discusses future work, and concludes the paper.

## 2 BACKGROUND

In this section, we present background on account-based blockchains. We then discuss their transition into a sharded mode of operation, cross-shard transactions and migrations.

### 2.1 Accounts, state and transactions

A blockchain is an append-only ledger maintained by a number of nodes called miners. A blockchain is expanded by the addition of blocks by designated miners, who receive incentives for extending the chain with correct blocks and behave according to the protocol. A block consists of a block header together with a list of transactions. Transactions modify the state of the ledger ranging from simple coin transfers to invocation of sophisticated smart contracts. The block header contains a hash of the block, the hash of the previous block, the hash of the state snapshot at a given time, and additional information related to the consensus protocol. Each block has a fixed capacity limiting the number of transactions it can contain. Including a transaction in a block requires some of the available total capacity of the blockchain system. We refer to the capacity required by a transaction as the *cost* of that transaction. The cost usually depends on the size of the transaction (as done in Bitcoin [28]) or its complexity (as done in Ethereum [38]).

Miners that store all the blocks (including all the transactions) are called full nodes. In contrast, light nodes store only block headers

**Algorithm 1** Example of a smart contract function modifying the state of multiple accounts.

---

```

1: procedure PAYALL()
2:   users  $\leftarrow$  a list of users to be paid
3:   amount  $\leftarrow$  amount to pay each account
4:   for user in users do
5:     if user.balance < 10 then
6:       user.transfer(amount)

```

---

and reactively pull required state elements or transactions from full nodes when needed. Light nodes can verify the integrity of the received data by comparing its hash against the value in the corresponding block header (*i.e.* using Merkle proofs [26]).

In the account-based data model, the state of a blockchain consists of a list of objects representing accounts and their respective states. An account is accessed by its identifier (*e.g.* a hash of its owner's public key) and represents an externally owned account (EOA), or a contract account (CA). For EOAs, the state consists of their balance. For CAs, the state may include more complicated data structures related to the logic of a smart contract. Importantly, while the state of EOAs is small and does not grow in time, the state of CAs can inflate as more data is put in the storage.

The state of an account can be modified by two types of transactions: external and internal. A transaction is external if sent from an EOA. For instance, a coin transfer, a contract creation, and a contract invocation are the 3 main external operation types happening in Ethereum [6]. Alternatively, a transaction is internal if it results from executing a smart contract invoked by an external transaction. A single external transaction may lead to multiple internal transactions depending on the smart contract logic.

A regular account-based transaction (*i.e.* a simple coin transfer) modifies the state of up to 2 EOAs (the balance of the sender and that of the receiver). With the addition of Smart Contracts, transactions can lead to the modification of multiple accounts. Algorithm 1 presents a Smart Contract implementing a PAYALL() function. Calling this function modifies the state of the caller (to pay the transaction fees), the smart contract (to decrease its balance), and all the accounts stored in the *users* map (to increase their balance), provided they currently have less than 10 coins. Smart contracts can also interact with and modify the state of other contracts by invoking their functions. Processing smart contract transactions require the write and read sets to be known to the consensus protocol layer based on the current state of the blockchain.

## 2.2 Sharding

In fully sharded environments<sup>1</sup>, the blockchain is split into multiple groups with their own chains of blocks and miners. Each shard maintains and modifies the state of only a subset of the accounts existing in the system. Objects to shards assignments are usually static unless changed in explicit migrations caused by miners or users. A migration locks (or destroys) an object in the source shard and recreates it

in the destination shard using an atomic transaction. The object identifier may or may not change during the migration depending on the underlying objects-to-shards mapping system. Shards are expanded by running local consensus protocol between shard-specific miners. Some designs [13, 39] use a main chain that is used for coordination. The main chain periodically assigns miners to shards to prevent malicious miners from freely migrating and taking over a specific shard. As a result, only miners assigned by the main chain have the right to participate in the intra-shard consensus [36]. Furthermore, the main chain may store block headers of all the shards, which facilitates cross-shard communication [13].

**Cross-shard communication and migrations.** Transactions modifying the state of accounts placed in a single shard can be processed using intra-shard consensus similarly as in a non-sharded scenario. If the involved accounts are spread across multiple shards, however, executing the transaction requires cross-shard consensus to ensure the atomicity of transactions. There are two main types of cross-shard consensus protocols, (i) protocols based on a two-phase commit protocol [16] such as S-BAC [1] and Atomix [22], and (ii) mutex-based protocols such as RapidChain [39] and the upcoming version of Ethereum [13]. In all cases, a cross-shard transaction requires an intra-shard consensus run in each shard holding at least one of the involved accounts together with the run of cross-shard coordination. The latter always causes additional overhead in all the involved shards. If any of the shards involved rejects a transaction, all other shards should likewise reject it to guarantee atomicity; that is, an atomic commit protocol typically runs across all the concerned shards to ensure the transaction is accepted by all or none of those shards. It also means that the processing time of a cross-shard transaction is determined by the slowest shard.

Objects can be migrated across shards by users (in explicit cross-shard transactions [29]) or by miners (as a part of the consensus protocol [39]). Performing migrations cause processing overhead for the miners and transaction fees for the end-users. The cost of migrations can be reduced when combined with cross-shard transactions. If account *A* in shard 1 sends a transaction to account *B* in shard 2, both accounts may remain in their respective shards (causing a costly cross-shard consensus round) or one of the accounts can be migrated to the shard of the other one<sup>2</sup>. In the latter case, the migration cost still needs to be paid, but further processing requires cheaper intra-shard consensus in the destination shard.

The use of migration can have a significant impact on the performance of the account-based blockchains. This impact can be positive or negative depending on the migration decisions that are made. Splitting frequently interacting communities may negatively impact the throughput of the entire system for many future blocks. On the other hand, migrations can equally spread the load across shards on a per-block basis, improving resource utilization. Migrations increase the cost of individual transactions but, if done correctly, can also bring long-term performance gains. Correctly incentivizing decisions that are good for the blockchain as a whole can significantly improve the throughput of the entire system. We further discuss this topic in Section 8.

<sup>1</sup>Fully sharded environments split both the state and the transaction processing. Some sharded blockchains such as Monoxide [37] or Elastico [25] only split the latter and do not fall into this category.

<sup>2</sup>Both accounts can be also migrated to a third or different shards. However, such migration would cause significant overhead to the system.

### 3 OVERVIEW

The goal of Shard Scheduler is to integrate smart, automatic account placement and migrations decisions to improve the throughput of the sharded blockchain *as a whole*. Our system strikes a balance between balanced load distribution, data locality, and the number and costs of performed migrations. Shard Scheduler performs migrations that are supported by the underlying consensus protocol, introduce relatively low short-term overhead, and reduces the cost of future transactions in the long run.

A fundamental design principle of Shard Scheduler is the implementation of our system on miners as a part of the consensus protocol. While client-based migrations have been proposed for throughput improvements in the UTXO model [29], such an approach is not effective for account-based blockchains. A transaction in the account-based model modifies the state of multiple accounts (*e.g.* sender, receiver, smart contract) but is authorized only by its sender. It thus restricts potential migrations to moving the sender only. In contrast, migration decisions taken by miners as a part of transaction processing can achieve optimal placement by moving any account involved in a transaction.

In Shard Scheduler, all migration decisions are taken based on a state snapshot of the blockchain, are deterministic, and can be verified by other miners. With decision verifiability, Shard Scheduler protects against malicious miners who might attempt a denial of service attack by forcing sub-optimal migrations. Our system requires only simple arithmetic operations to take optimal migration decisions and introduces only negligible overhead to the transaction processing.

Shard Scheduler decouples the mining process from the collection of fees and aligns rewards collected by the miners with the throughput of the entire blockchain, rather than with the performance of a single shard. Rational miners are thus incentivized to pay the overhead cost related to automatic migrations. Finally, Shard Scheduler is completely transparent for the clients submitting transactions to the blockchain and does not require any client-side modifications.

The performance of a distributed system is tightly coupled to its submitted workload. Before outlining our design, we analyze the transaction history of Ethereum together with state-dependent smart contracts calls and extract new insights that allow understanding expected cross-shard interaction dynamics and shape the design of Shard Scheduler.

### 4 ASSUMPTIONS AND DESIGN GOALS

We base our assumptions on Ethereum [13, 38], the main account-based blockchain transitioning into a sharded environment with support for smart contracts. Where Ethereum does not yet specify all the design details of its transition to a sharded operation, we assume functionalities provided by academic sharded blockchains (Omniledger [23], Chainspace [1], and RapidChain [39]). The characteristics of these systems are shown in Table 1.

#### 4.1 Security Assumptions

We distinguish two types of actors:

- *users* are owners of EOAs that use the blockchain;
- *miners* are maintainers of the blockchain.

	Ethereum+	RapidChain	Chainspace	Omniledger
Smart Contracts	✓	✗	✓	✗
Beacon Chain	✓	✓	✗	✓
Miners reshuffling	✓	✓	-	✓
Write set specified by transactions	?	✓	✓	✓

**Table 1: Shard Scheduler assumptions in existing systems.**

We assume the presence of arbitrary malicious actors that can play the role of users or miners and try to disturb the system. No single user or miner is trusted by its peers. However, as for many sharded blockchain designs [1, 23, 31, 39], we assume that all shards have an honest consensus majority. With the current single-chain economic models applied to a sharded environment, miners may be incentivized to deviate from the protocol when taking migration decisions. In Section 8, we develop an economic model for a sharded blockchain that makes the honest majority assumption more probable in a real-world deployment.

We assume a partially synchronous network for 2PC-based protocols<sup>3</sup> [10], and a synchronous network for mutex-based protocols (in light of recent replay attacks against sharded blockchains [31]).

We assume a sharded blockchain environment as envisioned by Omniledger [23]. A measure of time is determined from the chain length of an arbitrary shard and is divided into *epochs* of equal length. In every epoch, nodes can manifest their intention to become miners for the next epoch by registering their public key to a dedicated smart contract [1] (or hardcoded logic on a beacon chain [13, 23]). The system runs a black box Sybil detection algorithm (typically proof-of-work [28, 38] or proof-of-stake [20]) that outputs the list of registered public keys of the nodes that will become miners during the next epoch. At the start of a new epoch, miners are shuffled and assigned to new shards using a pseudo-random assignment.

We assume the presence of a main chain (as in Omniledger [23] and RapidChain [39]) that additionally stores the block headers of all the shards (as proposed for Ethereum [13]). Each miner is a full node for its respective shard and acts as a light client for the beacon chain and all the other shards. We assume the presence of a mapping service holding current accounts-to-shards assignments (*e.g.* implemented as a Distributed Hash Table).

Processing a cross-shard transaction requires modifying a set of objects. For a simple transfer transaction (*i.e.* not a call to a smart contract) the set contains the sender and the receiver and can be read directly from the transaction data. For blockchains supporting smart contracts, the list of involved accounts for a specific execution may depend on the current state across multiple shards. In Algorithm 1 for instance, the caller, the contract, and accounts from *users* may be spread across multiple shards. The required state and a list of involved objects can be either proactively locked and provided to the miners by the user as part of the transaction data (as done in Chainspace [1]) or reactively pulled by miners executing the transactions (as discussed for Ethereum [13]).

<sup>3</sup>This assumption is not required by the cross-shard consensus protocol *per se*, but by the BFT protocol running within each shard.

Our system is orthogonal to the actual implementation of cross-shard transactions with or without smart contracts. For each transaction, Shard Scheduler relies only on a read and write set (*i.e.* accounts whose state will be read or modified by this transaction). Such a set is already required to process smart contract transactions (Section 2). Finally, we assume that each cross-shard transaction is forwarded to a shard responsible for its execution. We refer to this shard and more specifically to a miner including the transaction in its block, as the *transaction coordinator*. The transaction coordinator obtains a list of accounts to be modified and coordinates other shards involved in the transaction.

## 4.2 Design Goals

The design of Shard Scheduler targets the following properties.

**Migration and placement recommendations.** Shard Scheduler analyzes interactions between accounts and issues recommendations specifying how an incoming transaction should be handled and, in particular, what (if) migrations should happen. These recommendations have the goal of keeping frequently interacting accounts within one shard while providing a balanced load across shards. By reducing the number of cross-shard transactions and their associated overheads, and avoiding performance degradation due to overloaded shards, these two goals participate in unison to an increased throughput (total number of transactions per second for a given capacity).

**Recommendation verifiability.** Each recommendation is deterministic and can be reliably verified by all other miners. Shard Scheduler recommendations are part of the consensus and block validation protocols. This property is required to ensure the availability of the blockchain. Without verifiability, malicious miners may attempt to move objects towards an overloaded shard or split frequently interacting communities, thus increasing the cost of transactions and lowering the number of transactions per second [27]. Such a denial of service attack, even when targeting a single shard, influences the throughput of the entire blockchain due to the impact on cross-shard transactions.

**Lightweight recommendations.** Shard Scheduler recommendations are generated on a per-transaction basis. The system ensures that the amount of required computation is low and can be easily performed by all miners without introducing significant space and time overhead. Shard Scheduler operations remain computationally tractable also when the number of accounts present in the blockchain grows. Shard Scheduler does not introduce any significant network overhead (*i.e.* fetching large, additional state from other shards).

**No changes for the clients.** Shard Scheduler is transparent for EOA owners and, in contrast to related work [29], does not require additional operation or maintenance of state by users.

**Incentive model.** Shard Scheduler provides an incentive model for the miners to motivate them to follow the recommendations. The reward of each miner is proportional to the amount of performed work (*i.e.* the number of mined blocks) and the total amount of rewards acquired by the blockchain as a whole. Miners are still incentivized to compete for producing new blocks that include a maximum amount of transactions. However, miners do not benefit from keeping excessive numbers of accounts in their shards and

Parameters			
$s_i \in S$	states	$t_i \in T$	transactions
$o_i \in O$	objects	$acc_i \in ACC$	accounts
$b_i$	balance of $acc_i$	$\phi$	mapping function
$c(t_i)$	cost of $t_i$	$C_i$	capacity of $s_i$
$m_{j \rightarrow k}(acc_i)$	migrations		

Table 2: Notations.

ignoring ingoing or ongoing migrations decisions made by Shard Scheduler.

## 5 SYSTEM MODEL AND NOTATION

We present the notations used throughout the rest of the paper, and the model in which Shard Scheduler operates. Notations are summarized by Table 2.

### 5.1 Blockchain Model

The blockchain is maintained by a number of miners  $m \in M$  validating and processing transactions. We adopt a similar blockchain model as Al-Bassam *et al.* [2]. We model the blockchain as a set of state variables that encode its state  $s \in S$  and transactions  $t \in T$ ; at any time  $s \in S$  represents a snapshot of the state of every object (*i.e.* accounts, smart contracts). The blockchain maintains an append-only log of ordered transactions  $\{t_0 \dots t_n\} \in T$ . The blockchain starts in an initial state  $s_0 \in T$  and transitions from one valid state to the next valid state with each valid transaction  $t_i(s_i) \rightarrow s_{i+1}$ .

**Sharded blockchains.** In sharded blockchains, miners are divided into groups called shards  $z \in Z$ , and each shard maintains a subset of the objects. Shard  $z_j$  at step  $i$  maintains  $s_{ij} : acc_k \in ACC_j$ . We assume a shard assignment function mapping objects to their respective shard  $\phi(acc_i) \rightarrow z_j$  as defined by Chainspace [1].

**Transactions lifecycle.** Each miner holds all incoming transactions in a fixed-sized *transaction pool* (also called *mempool*). At every time step, the transaction pool of every miner is completely filled with transactions from clients. Executed transactions are removed from the transaction pool. Only valid transactions are considered (*e.g.*, for coin transfers, both the sender and receiver exist and the sender has sufficient funds to make the transfer). Invalid transactions are discarded.

### 5.2 Processing Capacity

The concept of *processing capacity* is key to our model. Every time period, each shard  $z_i$  has a processing capacity  $C_i$  indicating how many transactions it can process during that time period while maintaining a constant user-perceived confirmation latency. In practice, this capacity can be limited by a number of factors such a network conditions, the size of the shard, and specific implementations. We assume that each shard has the same capacity ( $\forall i, j C_i = C_j$ ), and that the capacity of the whole blockchain is the sum of the capacity of all its shards  $C = \sum C_i$ .

The cost of cross-shard transactions is higher than the cost of intra-shard transaction; we denote  $c(t_i)$  the cost of transaction  $t_i$ . The exact cost depend on the consensus protocol used, as well as on the cross-shard agreement protocol. The cost of each cross- and

intra-shard transaction depends also on its size  $c(t_i) \propto \text{size}(t_i)$ . The larger the transaction, the longer it takes to propagate the information to all concerned miners<sup>4</sup>.

To process a transaction, a shard needs to spend some of its capacity equal to the cost of the transaction. For an intra-shard transaction  $t_i$ , shard  $i$  spends  $c(t_i)$  and is left with a capacity  $C_i = C_i - c(t_i)$ . For a cross-shard transaction each concerned shard spends the cost of a cross-shard transaction; so the transaction can only be processed if all shards have enough capacity to process it during this time period.


**State migration.** Shard Scheduler migrates objects between shards. When object  $o_i$  is migrated from shard  $z_j$  to  $z_k$ ,  $m_{j \rightarrow k}(o_i)$  the shard assignment function  $\phi$  is updated accordingly. Similar to transactions, state migrations also have a cost for all involved shards that depends on the size of the migrated object  $c(m_{j \rightarrow k}(o_i)) \propto \text{size}(o_i)$ .

## 6 OBSERVATIONS

We start by investigating the transactions in the Ethereum blockchain from the perspective of a sharded operation. Our observations motivate the design of Shard Scheduler. For each transaction, we extract all the accounts whose state was modified. Details on data extraction are presented in Section 10.1.

**O1. Write-oriented.** In a blockchain, one can securely read the state from any honest participant. In contrast, writing to the blockchain is complex, because the data must be propagated to every single miner and agreed on using a consensus protocol. In this work, we focus on writing state to the blockchain.

**O2. Hot Spots.** The activity of accounts can vary significantly (Figure 2). The top 20% accounts (*e.g.* popular exchanges) are responsible for over 92% of overall transactions. In the context of sharding, the most active accounts should not all be placed in the same few (or unique) shard(s).




**Figure 2: CDF of the number of transactions all the observed accounts were involved in.**

**O3. Communities.** Multiple works reported accounts forming communities, *i.e.* groups of entities that interact frequently with each other [6, 32]. While the communities change over time, preserving them can significantly increase performance of a sharded blockchain due to a reduced number of cross-shard transactions [15].

**O4. Load spikes.** To maximize the throughput of the system, each shard should utilize its full capacity. Accounts in Ethereum experience bursts of activity caused by the market (*e.g.* Initial Coin

Offerings, new tokens being added to exchanges) and “follow the sun” cyclical workloads. We investigate the balance of load between shards if we were to use a hash-based account-to-shard allocation (Figure 3). We observe significant differences in shard load, especially for shorter periods of observation. Without account migrations, a sharded blockchain might not be able to fully utilize its capacity, and the problem becomes more pronounced with increasing number of shards.



**Figure 3: Distribution of the load between 8 shards when simulating an hash-based account-to-shard allocation, for different periods of observation.**

### O5. Migrating state during cross-shard transaction is cheap.

Under the model presented in Section 5, the cost of EOA migration is equivalent to the cost of an cross-shard transaction<sup>5</sup>. When two accounts spread across two shards are involved in a cross-shard transaction, one of the accounts can be migrated towards the other one replacing a cross-shard transaction by a migration and an intra-shard transaction. The intra-shard transaction will be processed only by the shard that hosts the accounts after the migration and does not generate additional overhead to the other shard.

**O6. Inactive accounts.** Accounts in blockchain are easy to create and are not constantly active. As of April 2020, the number of accounts exceeds 85 Millions, growing at a rate of about 50 to 150 thousands new accounts per day [12]. However, only 3% and 5% of accounts are active within one-week and one-month observation periods, respectively. A newly created address is used, on average, for 35.45 days before going inactive [8]. At the same time, active accounts are likely to be updated soon after they are updated. An account is updated in a day from its previous activity with 62% probability [21]. We can say that only a fraction of accounts are active at any point of time, but once they are activated, they are likely to be accessed again soon (temporal locality). Inactive objects do not take part in new transactions and should not be migrated between shards even if they are highly connected with active objects. A migration of an inactive object involves a costly cross-shard agreement, does not decrease the state held by the input shard and increases the state held by the output shard without bringing any benefits.

**O7. Smart Contracts.** Smart contract migration is a complex process [14]. A migration of a Smart Contract requires creating a snapshot of its current state, locking it in the input shard and re-creating it in the output shard. Noteworthy, the process of creating the snapshot is complex and there are currently no efficient mechanisms to perform it. At the same time, the migration cost depends heavily on

<sup>4</sup>We determine the exact cost of transactions for Chainspace [1] in later sections.

<sup>5</sup>A cost of smart contract migration is proportional to its size.



the size of the snapshot. In contrast to EOAs, the state size of smart contracts can be significant.




Figure 4: Simple and smart contract transactions over time.

**O8. Smart Contract Transactions.** Smart contract transactions constitute a growing part of all the transactions in Ethereum. Figure 4 presents the percentage of transactions per type. The number of ordinary user-to-user simple transactions is on a solid downward trend. Contract transactions, on the other hand, take up to 45% of the recent blocks in our sample. While the majority of smart contract transactions modify the state of 2 accounts (e.g. EOA balances or internal state of smart contracts), some transactions modify up to 50 accounts at a time. Finally, the average number of accounts modified by an average transaction is on the rise over time caused by increased usage of smart contracts.

## 7 SHARD SCHEDULER DESIGN

Shard Scheduler is implemented as a part of the consensus protocol involving the miners of the blockchain. For each external cross-shard transaction, our scheduler operates in two steps:

- (1) It determines the main shard for the transaction and decides the placement of new accounts;
- (2) It decides on the migration(s) of existing account(s) towards the main shard.

We describe both steps in subsections below. Shard Scheduler does not migrate any account that is not involved in pending transactions (**O5. Migrating state during cross-shard transaction is cheap**) thus avoiding costly migrations that will not bring benefits in the future (**O6. Inactive accounts**). The main shard selected during the first step is then used during the second step. Only the main shard will be considered as a potential migration destination.

### 7.1 Data structures

Shard Scheduler miners associate an alignment vector

$$v_i = [a_{i1}, a_{i2}, \dots, a_{in}]$$

with each account (including EOA and CA) in the blockchain where  $a_{ij}$  represents the *alignment* of account  $i$  towards a shard  $j$ . The *alignment* is a positive integer and represents the total cost of transactions the account performed with the specific shard. When an account is created, the alignment vector values are all set to 0. When an account  $acc_i$  in shard  $z_i$  is involved in a transaction  $t_k$  with account  $acc_j$  in shard  $z_j$ , the respective values of both alignments vectors will be increased by the cost of  $t_k$ , so that  $a_{ij} + = c(t_k)$  and  $a_{ji} + = c(t_k)$ . Importantly,  $v_i$  will not be updated when  $acc_j$  migrates between shards (and conversely) simplifying the operation. Consider

$acc_i$  in shard 1 that had three transactions with  $acc_j$  in shard 2 and no transaction with other shards, so that  $a_{i2} = 3$ . If at some point  $acc_j$  migrates to shard 3,  $v_i$  will not be modified, so that  $a_{i2} = 3$  and  $a_{i3} = 0$ .

The alignment vector implements a sliding window approach and takes into account transactions from the last 100 blocks. This approach allows Shard Scheduler to better react to a sudden burst of account activity (**O4. Load spikes**) and reduces memory overhead, as empty vectors can be dropped from memory. Due to the large number of inactive accounts (**O6. Inactive accounts**), Shard Scheduler maintains alignments vectors for a small fraction of the accounts at a time<sup>6</sup>.

The alignment vector of an account is held locally by each miner allocated to the shard where that account resides. It does not introduce any memory overhead to miners outside of this shard and does not require storing any additional information on chain. The alignment vector is dropped (zeroed) when an account is being migrated to another shards.

The second Shard Scheduler data structure is maintained on the beacon chain and represents the load of each shard in the system. The load for shard  $z_i$  is a positive integer that holds the total cost of all the transactions processed by this shard in the last 100 blocks. Similarly to the alignment vector, implementing a sliding window approach improves Shard Scheduler reactivity to sudden load changes. The load is reported by shards when submitting their block headers to the beacon chain and is certified by the shard-specific miners. Placing the load information on the beacon chain makes it available to all the miners in the system.

### 7.2 Determining the main shard

The first step is performed by the transaction coordinator. Shard Scheduler takes as input the list of accounts that will be modified by the incoming external transaction  $l_i$ , the shard assignment function  $\phi$  and the last state of the blockchain  $s_i$  (as defined by the previous block on the beacon chain). The list is known to the coordinator and includes accounts modified by internal transactions caused by  $l_i$  (**O8. Internal Transactions**). Based on this information, Shard Scheduler outputs allocation recommendations for new accounts (that appear on the blockchain for the first time) if any, and a *main shard* for the transaction.

Based on the list of accounts and  $\phi$ , Shard Scheduler starts by enumerating the shards involved in the transaction. Consider the smart contract from Algorithm 1, and a transaction  $t_j$  invoking the `PAYALL()` function. The list of accounts  $l_j$  includes the EOA of the caller, the CAs of the contract and of accounts that from the *users* list (from Line 2 in Algorithm 1) that have less than 10 coins<sup>7</sup>.

If the set of shards involved in the transaction is not empty, Shard Scheduler then reads the load of each involved shard from the beacon chain and chooses the least loaded one as the *main shard* for this transaction. If the set of shards involved in the transaction is empty<sup>8</sup>, our scheduler chooses the least loaded shard from all the shards.

Shard Scheduler assigns all new accounts from  $l_i$  to the main shard. The main shard identifier is then passed to shards holding

<sup>6</sup>We further show the memory overhead in Section 10.

<sup>7</sup>Assuming that the contract has enough money to pay all the accounts.

<sup>8</sup>This may happen if the transaction modified the state of new accounts that are not yet assigned to shards, e.g. a first coinbase transaction of an account.

non-new accounts involved in the transaction. The whole procedure for selecting the *main shard* is illustrated by Algorithm 2.

---

**Algorithm 2** Main shard selection
 

---

```

1: procedure SELECTMAINSHARD( $l_i, \phi, s_i$ )
2:    $involvedShards \leftarrow \text{set}()$ 
3:    $newAcc \leftarrow \text{new accounts from } l_i$ 
4:   for  $acc$  in  $l_i$  do
5:      $involvedShards.add(\phi(acc))$ 
6:   if  $involvedShards.empty()$  then
7:      $mainShard \leftarrow \text{lowestLoad}(allShards)$ 
8:   else
9:      $mainShard \leftarrow \text{lowestLoad}(involvedShards)$ 
10:  for  $acc$  in  $newAcc$  do
11:     $\phi(acc) \leftarrow mainShard$ 
12:  return  $mainShard$ 

```

---

The main shard selection is based uniquely on the load shards. It allows Shard Scheduler to migrate accounts to the least loaded shard performing load balancing (**O2. Hot Spots**).

### 7.3 Deciding to migrate existing accounts

The second step takes as input an account  $acc_j$  involved in a cross-shard transaction, the shard assignment function  $\phi$  and transaction-specific *main shard* determined in the first step. The procedure is invoked only by miners associated with shard  $z_j$  where  $acc_j$  resides (i.e.  $\phi(acc_j) = z_j$ ). Importantly, the procedure does not require any external (from other shards) data and can be performed within the specific shard.

From the local state (account alignment vector), Shard Scheduler extracts the account's alignment towards all other shards. If the alignment towards the current shard, where the account is currently located, multiplied by the cost of the cross-shard transaction is smaller than the sum of alignments towards the other shards, the account will be migrated to the *main shard* of the transaction. Otherwise, the account remains in its current shard.

Taking into account the alignment vector stops the load balance-based migration if the account has strong connection with its current shard. Such an approach preserves existing clusters of frequently interacting accounts (**O3. Communities**). The condition is more likely to stop the migration with increasing cost of cross-shard transaction. The whole procedure deciding on migrations is illustrated by Algorithm 3. For consensus protocols requiring all the accounts to reside in a single shard before processing (i.e. mutex-based), Shard Scheduler always migrates all the involved accounts to the main shard.

---

**Algorithm 3** Migration decision algorithm.
 

---

```

1: procedure SHOULD MIGRATE( $acc, \phi, mainShard$ )
2:    $V \leftarrow \text{the alignment vector for } acc$ 
3:    $sh \leftarrow \phi(acc)$ 
4:   if  $(c(\text{crossShard})V[sh]) < (sum(V) - V[sh])$  then
5:      $migrate(acc, mainShard)$ 

```

---

## 8 ECONOMICS

Maintaining a blockchain requires resources to store (disk space), exchange (network bandwidth) and verify (CPU cycles) transactions. In open systems, miners are incentivized to perform this useful work in exchange for a financial reward. Incentive mechanisms for open sharded blockchains are currently a gap in the blockchain literature [3]. We argue that naively applying incentive mechanisms from traditional (single-committee) blockchains to sharded systems has shortcomings, and then propose a novel design to fix them.

**Purpose of the incentive mechanism.** The purpose of the incentive mechanism is to motivate rational miners to follow the protocol. In the absence of externalities (e.g. secondary markets), it ensures that miners following the protocol collect a higher financial reward than if they were deviating from it. The main purpose of Shard Scheduler is to increase the performance of the blockchain. We require, therefore, an incentive mechanism that also goes in that direction: miners should be incentivized to follow the recommendations of Shard Scheduler.

**Traditional incentive mechanism.** Starting from Bitcoin, incentive schemes [13, 28, 38] typically involve collecting transaction fees from the end-user. The leader of the consensus protocol collects all the fees associated with the transactions it proposes; this leader is thus often rotated following system-specific strategies. Users are free to offer any fee for processing their transaction. Rational miners prioritize high fee transactions when constructing their blocks to maximize their financial reward.

A naive extension of the incentive mechanism described above could work as follows. A user would associate transactions fees as in single-committee systems. These fees are then shared amongst the leaders of the intra-shard consensus protocol of every shard involved in the transaction. A similar incentive mechanism is adopted by Zilliqa [35].

We argue that directly applying this mechanism to a sharded environment does not incentivize rational miners to maximize the system's performance. We show that, if given the right to perform account migrations, miners financially benefit from taking actions that harm the total system performance by creating a load imbalance between shards.

**LEMMA 8.1.** *In the sharded environment described in Section 4, rational miners financially benefit from concentrating as many accounts as possible into their own shard.*

**PROOF.** Miners are periodically elected as leaders according to the intra-shard consensus protocol and propose new blocks. When acting as the leader, rational miners choose the clients' transactions to include in their next proposal by selecting those with the highest fees. They can, however, only include transactions involving accounts in their *own* shards: these transactions are by definition a subset of the total transactions submitted to the system (for any epoch). As a result, miners have less options to select high-fees transactions than if they could choose amongst all transactions. To increase the number of transactions that involve their shard, and thus increase their choice of transactions, miners are motivated to concentrate a large portion of accounts to their shard.  $\square$



Lemma 8.1 indicates that rational miners may financially benefit from actively resisting optimal placement recommendations, which may worsen system performance.

**Adapting the model for sharded blockchains.** To overcome the shortcoming presented above, we propose an alternative solution that decouples the process of collecting transactions fees from cashing them in. We leverage the fact that miners are assigned to shards in a pseudo-random manner, and thus cannot predict which shard they will integrate next (Section 4). The incentive mechanism operates across every two consecutive epochs:

- During epoch  $e_n$ , miners collect the fees of transactions that involve their shard and lock them into a shard-specific deposit (as opposed to adding them to their private accounts). This deposit keeps a fine-grained accounting of the fees that each miner of the shard collected during the epoch. We follow classic incentive mechanisms and attribute the transactions fees to the current leader of the consensus protocol.
- Upon epoch change, miners are unpredictably shuffled and re-assigned to other shards. Upon entering the next epoch ( $e_{n+1}$ ), miners cash in the transaction fees deposited into their new shard's deposit, in proportion of their contribution during the previous epoch, generally in another shard.




Figure 5: Incentive model for Shard Scheduler.

Consider a scenario with 3 shards:  $z_1$ ,  $z_2$ , and  $z_3$ , and a miner  $m_1 \in z_i$  in epoch  $e_n$  (Figure 5). During epoch  $e_n$ , shard  $z_1$  collects a total of 100 coins in transaction fees,  $z_2$  collects 50 coins, and  $z_3$  also collects 50 coins. These fees are locked in their respective shard's deposit; that is, the deposit of  $z_1$  holds 100 coins, and the deposits of  $z_2$  and  $z_3$  each hold 50 coins. No miners have access to these deposits for the time being. Let's say that miner  $m_1$ , when acting as leader, proposed transactions containing a total of 10 coins of fees during epoch  $e_n$ . That is, we attribute 10% of the total fees collected by  $z_1$  during  $e_n$  to miner  $m_1$ . During epoch  $e_{n+1}$ ,  $m_1$  is assigned to shard  $z_2$ . Upon entering the epoch, it cashes in 10% of the deposit accumulated by  $z_2$  during epoch  $e_n$ . That is,  $m_1$  cashes in 5 coins.

**Effectiveness analysis.** We argue that our proposed incentive scheme incentivizes rational miners to increase the total system's capacity.

**LEMMA 8.2.** *Each epoch  $e_n$ , the expected reward of miners is proportional to the total transaction fees collected in the system  $x_{tot}^{n-1}$  during the previous epoch.*

**PROOF.** The expected reward of a miner during epoch  $e_n$  is  $E^n(x) = \sum_{i=1}^k x_i^{n-1} p_i$ , where  $x_i^{n-1}$  is the total reward collected by shard  $i$  during epoch  $e_{n-1}$ ,  $p_i$  is the probability that the miner ends up in shard  $i$  in epoch  $e_n$ , and  $k$  is the total number of shards in the system. Since miners are unpredictably assigned to shards,  $\forall i, j, p_i = p_j = \frac{1}{k}$ . Thus  $E^n(x) = \frac{1}{k} \sum_{i=1}^k x_i^{n-1} = \frac{1}{k} x_{tot}^{n-1}$ .  $\square$

**LEMMA 8.3.** *The total fees collected in the system  $x_{tot}$  increases with the total capacity of the system  $C$ .*

**PROOF.** As described in Section 5, we assume that the shards' processing capacity  $C_i$  is a scarce resource and that clients transactions are abundant. As a result, if the shards' capacity increases, miners can process more transactions per epoch and thus collect more fees. This implies that the fees  $x_i$  collected by shard  $i$  increases with the shards' capacity  $C_i$ . We can thus express  $x_i$  in terms of  $C_i$  as a monotonically increasing function:  $x_i(C_i)$ .

The total fee collected in the system is defined as  $x_{tot} = \sum_{i=1}^k x_i$ . We can thus write  $x_{tot} = \sum_{i=1}^k x_i(C_i)$  to show that the total fees  $x_{tot}$  increases with the shards' capacity  $C_i$ .

Section 5.2 defines the total capacity of the system as the sum of the capacity of every shard:  $C = \sum_{i=1}^k C_i$ , which means that  $C$  increases with  $\{C_i\}_{i=1}^k$ . Combining those observations, we have that both  $x_{tot}$  and  $C$  increase with the shards' capacity  $\{C_i\}_{i=1}^k$ . It follows that the total collected fees  $x_{tot}$  increase with the total capacity of the system  $C$ :  $x_{tot}$  and  $C$  are positively correlated.  $\square$

**LEMMA 8.4.** *The expected reward of miners increases with the total system's capacity.*

**PROOF.** Lemma 8.2 implies that the expected reward of miners increases with the total fees collected in the system. Lemma 8.3 shows that the total fees collected in the system increases with the total capacity of the system. Therefore, the expected reward of miners increases with the total capacity of the system.  $\square$

## 9 DISCUSSION

Shard Scheduler provides objects migration and placement recommendations for account-based sharded blockchains. It provides a number of desirable properties and achieves the design goals identified in Section 4.2. We discuss in this section how these properties hold in the presence of faulty and malicious miners.

Shard Scheduler migration decisions are publicly verifiable as they are deterministic, based uniquely on on-chain data and their determination is part of the transaction processing. Any third party can verify the correctness of object migration decisions and miners can readily apply recommendations without using an extra round of consensus. A block containing incorrect migrations will be considered invalid by honest miners.

In all sharded blockchains considered in this paper [1, 13, 23, 39], if each shard contains at most  $f$  faulty miners, the cross-shard consensus protocol guarantees consistency and validity. If this assumption is violated, i.e. one or more shards contain more than  $f$  Byzantine miners each, then honest shards can detect faulty shards. Namely,

enough auditing information is maintained by honest miners to detect inconsistencies and attribute them to specific shards (or miners within them).

The rules for transaction validity are checked in a distributed manner: each shard keeps and checks the state of objects assigned to it. An honest shard manifests its intention to commit a transaction only if all (system dependent) checks pass, and otherwise proposes to abort. A dishonest shard may emit a commit messages arbitrarily without checking the validity rules. By definition, an invalid transaction is one that does not pass one or more of the checks defined by the system [1].

Shards keep records of their operations as a non-repudiable signed hash-chain of checkpoints—with a view to prove the correctness of their operations. They also provide non-repudiable statements about their decisions in the form of signed cross-shard messages to other shards. The two forms of evidence must be both correct and consistent—otherwise their misbehavior is detected [1].

Section 8 provides a novel incentive mechanism for sharded blockchains to financially motivate rational miners to maximize the total throughput of the system—miners collect higher fees by improving the overall performance of the system rather than by concentrating accounts in their own shard. Miners who do not perform useful work (*i.e.* free-riders submitting empty blocks) will not be rewarded by the protocol as the cashed rewards are proportional to the amount of fees mined in previous epochs. Malicious miners may still ignore the incentives and deviate from the protocol by taking sub-optimal migration decisions. However, as stated above, blocks with such migrations will be considered as invalid and discarded by the honest majority. A similar rule applies for single-chain blockchains based on classical incentive models [28, 38]. By binding the expected miner rewards with the overall performance of the entire blockchain, our economic model makes the honest majority assumption more likely to occur in real-world deployments of sharded blockchains.

## 10 EVALUATION

We provide details on our data set as well as the setup and results of our simulations.

### 10.1 Data Extraction

We download the first 2M blocks of the Ethereum transaction history (1 year). We extract 8M non-coinbase transactions and all the accounts that were modified during each transaction. We use openethereum v3.2.3<sup>9</sup> operating in archive mode, which allows to recompute all the intermediary states of the blockchain. To extract the transactions and state modifications, we create a Python tool based on web3.py<sup>10</sup>. This tool queries the client with `trace_replayTransaction` calls in `stateDiff` mode. We made the code and the dataset publicly available to the scientific community<sup>11</sup>.

### 10.2 Setup

We implement a Python-based simulator to evaluate the effectiveness of our approach. The simulator closely follows the model presented

in Section 5, operates in rounds and takes transactions (extracted in Section 10.1) as the input workload. Before the first round, the simulator fills up the mempool with transactions from the input workload, and in the beginning of each subsequent round, the simulator tops up the mempool from the input workload.

The size of the mempool is fixed and set up using simulation parameters. The transactions are processed in the order of arrival by the blockchain. The policy being evaluated indicates placement decisions and in the case of Shard Scheduler, decisions on the migration of objects. Each transaction increases the load of one or multiple shards. A transaction can be processed in the current round only if there is enough processing capacity left in all involved shards. Unprocessed transactions remain in the mempool and will be processed during subsequent rounds. The simulator reports the following performance metrics:

- **Throughput** - the global throughput of the entire blockchain in terms of the number of processed transactions per block.
- **Latency** - the average elapsed time to complete the processing of the transactions in the workload. We measure the elapsed time to complete a transaction in terms of number of rounds (blocks), *i.e.* from the round when a transaction is initially read until the round when this transaction is added to the blockchain.
- **Wasted Capacity** - the load-balancing performance of the system in terms of *residual capacities* of the shards summed over all the rounds. The residual capacity of the shards is the sum of unused capacity of the shards at the end of a round.
- **Cross-shard transaction ratio** - the percentage of transactions that involve accounts from multiple shards. For Shard Scheduler, each migration is accounted as a separate cross-shard transaction.

We compare Shard Scheduler against a hash-based policy and against a baseline policy based on the application of an offline community detection algorithm. The hash-based policy represents the approach used in existing sharded blockchains [1, 13, 22, 39] that assigns accounts to shards based on a hash of their identifier and does not perform migrations. The Metis policy is a *hypothetical* one that reads all the transactions at once at the beginning of the first round and proactively performs sharding on the basis of the output of the well-known Metis community detection (graph partitioning) algorithm [19] on the transaction graph, whose nodes are individual accounts and whose edge weights indicate the number of transactions between two accounts [9].

The Metis algorithm computes a desired number of “balanced” partitions, each corresponding to a shard, on an input transaction graph—the objectives of partitioning are to minimize the total weight of cross-partition edges (*i.e.* minimizing cross-shard transactions) and to minimize variance across partitions in terms of their total of intra-partition edge weights (*i.e.* achieving similar number of intra-shard transactions in each shard). We do not compare against UTXO solutions such as OptChain [29] due to data model incompatibility. We verify the impact of the following parameters:

- **Number of shards** - we vary this parameter from 1 to 60 shards, and set its default value to 16 shards. A higher number of shards means an increased processing capacity, but also more cross-shard interactions and load balancing challenges.

<sup>9</sup><https://openethereum.org/>

<sup>10</sup><https://github.com/ethereum/web3.py>

<sup>11</sup>[https://github.com/harnen/shard\\_scheduler](https://github.com/harnen/shard_scheduler)

- **Cross-shard transaction costs** - we assume a fixed cost of all cross-shard transactions and measure the impact of changing this cost from one (as costly as an intra-shard transaction) to ten. The actual cost depends on the consensus protocol and its implementation. We set the default value to 2 as observed for the Chainspace system in Section 11. This parameter also impacts the cost of migrations performed by Shard Scheduler. We do not migrate smart contract accounts due to the difficulty to model the migration cost in a simulated environment.
- **Shard processing capacity** - we investigate the impact of modifying the processing capacity of a single shard. We set the default value to 200 (*i.e.* 200 intra shard transactions per block) as observed for Ethereum [12].
- **Mempool-to-capacity ratio** - we express the mempool size in terms of the ratio of processing capacity of the entire blockchain per block. The mempool size of the system depends in practice on the rate of transaction submissions (*i.e.* the rate of arrival to the mempool buffer) and on the processing speed (*i.e.* the rate of departures) of the blockchain.

In each experiment, we only vary one system parameter while the rest of them assume their default values. We start by measuring the performance of all the policies in terms of throughput and latency and later explain the results by observing *wasted capacity* and *cross-shard transaction ratio*.

### 10.3 Results




Figure 6: Throughput vs number of shards.

**Throughput.** Figure 6 shows the impact of varying the *number of shards* on throughput. We observe that Shard Scheduler achieves increasingly better throughput as the number of shards increases. On the other hand, the throughput of both Metis and hash-based policies flatten out with increasing number of shards. Shard Scheduler improves the throughput by 100% for 16 shards and by 250% for 60 shard over the hash-based approach. Shard Scheduler also outperforms the theoretical Metis policy, which uses future transaction information, for more than 10 shard and achieves similar performance for lower values.

Figure 7 shows the impact of varying *cross-shard transaction costs* on throughput, with the default value of 16 shards. Higher processing costs result in lower throughput. Shard Scheduler achieves the highest throughput with any of the considered cost values. The performance gain with Shard Scheduler remains steadily over both that of the hash-based policy (80-95% throughput increase) and that of the Metis policy (10-40% throughput increase).

In Figure 8, we vary the *mempool size* using multiples of the shard processing capacity. A larger mempool size allows to achieve




Figure 7: Throughput vs cross-shard transaction cost.




Figure 8: Throughput vs mempool size.

better load balancing and improves throughput for all the policies. However, the impact of an increased mempool size on hash-based and Metis policies is limited. Shard Scheduler achieves 80% throughput increase for a 0.5 mempool-to-capacity ratio and a 130% throughput increase when using a ratio of 5.




Figure 9: Average latency vs number of shards.

**Latency.** In Figure 9 we observe average processing latencies for an increasing number of shards. Shard Scheduler higher throughput translates to significantly lower latency (3.5 times lower than the other policies when using 60 shards). The surprisingly high latency of the Metis policy is caused by unequal load allocation, as discussed later in this section.




Figure 10: Average latency vs cross-shard transaction cost.

Increasing the cross-shard transaction cost (Figure 10) increases the latency for all policies. The Metis policy preserves account

communities and performs better than the hash-base policy with an increasing cost of cross-shard interactions. However, Shard Scheduler achieves 2 times lower latency than Metis and 3 times lower than hash-based policy even when cross-shard transactions cost 10 times as much as an intra-shard transaction.




Figure 11: Wasted capacity vs number of shards.

**Wasted Capacity.** Both the Metis and hash-based policies achieve equal load spread across the shards in the long run. However, they fail to adapt to fine-grained activity changes due to the lack of migrations. Shard Scheduler takes per-transaction migration decision based on the previous load of all the shards and better utilizes the overall capacity of the blockchain. This effect is more pronounced as the number of shards (Figure 11) or the cost of cross-shard transactions (Figure 12) increases. More cross-shard interactions or their increased cost translates into more transactions waiting for one of the involved shards to become available.

**Cross-shard Transaction Ratio.** Finally, we observe in Figure 13 that Shard Scheduler is able to adapt gracefully to increasing cross-shard transaction costs and reduce its ratio of cross-shard transactions. This reduction is caused by the migration stopping condition (Algorithm 3) which takes the cost of cross-shard transactions into account. On the other hand, the Metis and hash policies are oblivious to cross-shard transaction costs and their cross-shard ratio remain roughly constant, failing to adapt to the changing environment.

Overall, we observe that Shard Scheduler achieves significantly better performance despite the use of additional cross-shard transactions to enact account migration decisions. The short-term migration overhead is largely compensated by the long-term advantages of better load-balancing and of the preservation of account communities.

## 11 PROTOTYPE

In this section we confirm our simulation results with real-world experiments.

**Setup.** We implement Shard Scheduler, and the Metis and hash-based policies on top of Chainspace [1] with security improvements




Figure 12: Wasted capacity vs cross-shard transaction cost.




Figure 13: Cross-shard transaction ratio vs cross-shard transaction cost.

proposed by Byzcuit [31]. Other sharded blockchains are either not yet finished [13], do not open their source code [37, 39], or do not fully partition the state [25]. By default, Chainspace implements a UTXO data-model and does not implement blocks (*i.e.* transactions are serialized as a continuous flow). We thus add an implementation of the blocks structure and a data-model translation module that allows us to replay the history of Ethereum (Section 10.1) with an equivalent number of intra-shard and cross-shard transactions. We make the block implementation coherent with our model presented in Section 5 and publish the code<sup>12</sup>. We deploy 3 miners per shard on Amazon AWS within a single data centre and run tests using 5 and 10 shards. Due to high result variation within a single run, we repeat each test 5 times and report the average values.

We create 2 synthetic workloads of 1M transactions containing uniquely: (i) intra-shard transactions and (ii) cross-shard transactions. Both workload create perfectly balanced load across all shards. For the second workload, we observe a throughput that is 2 times lower than for the first workload. We thus assume that the cost of cross-shard transactions to be 2 for Chainspace and use it as a parameter to Shard Scheduler (Section 7).

**Results.** We start by measuring the throughput of the system reported by Chainspace as the transaction per second (TPS) rate (Figure 14). Surprisingly, we observe almost no throughput improvement for the hash-based policy when increasing the number of shards from 5 (55TPS) to 10 (56TPS). This is caused by a highly unequal load balance across shards. For 10 shards, we observe multiple blocks filled to less than 50% of their capacity. The Metis policy provides much higher throughput (123TPS) but also suffer from unequal per-block load. The performance of the Metis policy is expected to further drop down when increasing the size of the input file. Shard Scheduler is the only policy experiencing a significant throughput improvement. When using 10 shards, Shard Scheduler achieves a throughput that is three times higher than that of the hash based policy. However, the TPS rate when doubling the number of shards increases by only 23% (from 120TPS to 148TPS). This is caused by migration decisions and therefore additional cross-shard transactions that cannot be fully eliminated, in particular with complex smart contract transactions that involve large numbers of accounts.

We continue by investigating the transaction latency as perceived by end-users (Figure 15). Similarly to the results of our simulations, the number of transactions submitted per block (*i.e.* the mempoll) is proportional to the per-block capacity of the entire blockchain. Without the linear increase of throughput, this approach causes an

<sup>12</sup><https://github.com/srene/byzcuit>




Figure 14: Chainspace throughput.




Figure 15: Chainspace latency.

increase of user-perceived latency (as more blocks are necessary to fully process the mempoll). However, we observe that the average latency achieved by Shard Scheduler is significantly lower than that of both the hash-based (49% reduction for 10 shards) and the Metis policies (31% reduction for 10 shards).

## 12 RELATED WORK

We review related work on object migration and placement for sharded blockchain. We then briefly discuss related object management techniques from the area of distributed systems.

**Object migrations and allocation.** Optchain [29] proposes an oracle for transaction placement in sharded blockchains. The system uses graph clustering techniques and is implemented as an external service for the clients. However, the Optchain approach only targets UTXO blockchains and cannot be easily adapted to the account-based data model. Han *et al.* [17] study existing shard allocation protocols and propose WORMHOLE, a shard allocation protocol taking into account both self-balance and operability. However, the study focuses on allocating miners to shards, rather than objects residing on the blockchain. Fynn *et al.* [15] analyze the history of Ethereum transactions and investigate multiple graph clustering protocols in the context of account placement in sharding. Similarly to our observations, they show that proactive placement without periodic migration does not achieve optimal performance. Fynn *et al.* [14] develop techniques for moving smart contracts between shards and blockchains *de facto* enabling contract migrations. The authors implement their protocol on Ethereum [38] and Burrow [18].

**Distributed systems.** In the area of the distributed systems multiple works investigated the problem of optimal object assignment and the use of migrations. The proposed systems focus on two main aspects: (i) developing a partitioning/migration plan (*i.e.* object-to-partition allocation) and (ii) devising efficient plan execution guaranteeing safety without causing significant downtime.

For database systems, E-store [34] provides an efficient solution based on tuples monitoring and solving a bin packing problem to compute an optimal assignment of objects to partitions. However, the system does not take into account data locality. Clay [30] balances the number of cross-partition transactions, load balancing and limiting the number of migrations in order to maximize the throughput of the system. P-store [33] creates a partition plan taking into account load only. It contains a traffic prediction module [5] that can proactively scale up or down the entire platform.

Squall [11] and Mgrab [24] implement systems for object partition and migration once given a partition plan. The platforms proposed for distributed systems provide important insights also relevant for our design. However, they cannot be directly applied to sharded blockchains due to a different governance model. The majority of the platforms contain a non-deterministic element or cannot be verified by third parties [33], introduce significant computational overhead [5, 30], or migrate large clusters of the objects at once [30].

## 13 CONCLUSION

We presented Shard Scheduler, an object migration and placement recommendation system for account-based sharded blockchains. Shard Scheduler improves the overall throughput of sharded blockchains. This is achieved through the mechanisms detailed in Section 7, whose effectiveness is demonstrated by both simulations (Section 10) and real-world experiments (Section 11). In some setups, Shard Scheduler more than doubles the throughput of the system, and lowers the latency by up to 70%. In addition, Shard Scheduler is lightweight in the sense that it does not require extra protocol messages, and does not introduce significant computation or memory overhead. It integrates seamlessly into existing protocols requiring only minimal changes to the miners' software, and does not impact the way clients use the system.

We leave a number of open questions that are deferred to future work. First of all, the objects placement recommendations of Shard Scheduler are efficient based on current and past typical usages of blockchains. There are no guarantees that this would be the case if blockchains are used in significantly different ways in the future. A learning agent may solve this issue by predicting future interactions between accounts, but it is not clear how to ensure that such an agent remains both deterministic and lightweight. Secondly, handling transactions fees could become costly operations as they are associated with each transaction and may involve multiple shards. It would thus be desirable to remove fees handling from the critical path of the transaction's processing, or even offload them to a infrastructure on the side. Recent works [4, 7] demonstrate that distributed payment systems can efficiently be implemented without consensus, and by quorum-based systems that can be natively integrated into one or more shards of a sharded blockchain.

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