

Temporal Staging for Correct-by-Construction Cryptographic Hardware*

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Temporal Staging for Correct-by-Construction Cryptographic Hardware

- Software *program transformation* approach [Burstall, Dijkstra, Scherlis, . . .] applied to deriving correct, performant *hardware*
 - Semantics-preserving transformations : *Reference* $\rightsquigarrow \dots \rightsquigarrow$ *Implementation*
- Here, all transformations take place in a *functional HLS language*
 - Resulting formally verified hardware designs included in FHE accelerators currently being fabricated

Temporal Staging for Correct-by-Construction Cryptographic Hardware


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- Meet my coauthor, Yakir Forman (who did 90% of the work):
Spring 2022

Localization and Cantor Spectrum for Quasiperiodic Discrete Schrödinger Operators with Asymmetric, Smooth, Cosine-Like Sampling Functions

Yakir Moshe Forman

Yale University Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, yakir.forman@yale.edu

ReWire Functional High Level Synthesis Language



- Inherits Haskell's good qualities
 - Pure functions, strong types, monads, equational reasoning, etc.
- ReWire compiler produces Verilog, VHDL, or FIRRTL
- Freely Available: <https://github.com/twosixlabs/rewire>
- ReWire Formalization in ITP Systems (Isabelle, Coq, Agda)

Carry-Save Adders in ReWire

Carry-Save Addition (CSA) as Pure Function

```
f :: W8 → W8 → W8 → (W8, W8)
f a b c      = ( ((a & b) || (a & c) || (b & c)) << '0' , a ⊕ b ⊕ c )
```

Running in GHCI

```
ghci> f 40 25 20
      (48,37)
ghci> f 41 25 20
      (50,36)
```

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```

CSA Device in ReWire

```
csa :: (W8, W8, W8) → Re (W8, W8, W8) () (W8, W8) ()
csa (a, b, c) = do
    i ← signal (f a b c)
    csa i      -- N.b., tail-recursive
```

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```

Stream Semantics [NFM23]

$((40, 25, 20), (), (0, 0)), ((41, 25, 20), (), (48, 37)), ((40, 25, 20), (), (50, 36)), \dots$

Diagram illustrating the stream semantics of the CSA device. The stream consists of triples: $((40, 25, 20), (), (0, 0)), ((41, 25, 20), (), (48, 37)), ((40, 25, 20), (), (50, 36)), \dots$. The values are grouped by tick: $\underbrace{(40, 25, 20)}_{\text{tick0}}, \underbrace{(), (0, 0)}_{\text{tick0}}, \underbrace{(41, 25, 20)}_{\text{tick1}}, \underbrace{(), (48, 37)}_{\text{tick1}}, \underbrace{((40, 25, 20), (), (50, 36))}_{\text{tick2}}, \dots$.

Carry-Save Adders in ReWire


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Stream Semantics [NFM23]



Carry-Save Adders in ReWire

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    csa i      -- N.b., tail-recursive
```

ReWire Compiler

```
$ rwc CSA.hs --verilog
$ ls -l CSA.v
-rw-r--r-- 1 william.harrison staff 2159 Nov 14 08:33 CSA.v
```


Carry-Save Adders in ReWire

“Curried” CSA takes inputs one per cycle

```
data Ans a = DC | Val a    -- "don't care" and "valid"  
pcsa :: W8 → Re W8 () (Ans (W8, W8)) ()  
pcsa a      = do  
    b   ← signal DC  
    c   ← signal DC  
    a' ← signal (Val (f a b c))  
    pcsa a'
```


Stream Semantics

(40, (), DC), (25, (), DC), (20, (), DC), (41, (), Val (48, 37)), ...



Semantics & Staging Functions

Mealy Machine



Corresponding ReWire monad

```

type M s      = StateT s Identity
-- ReWire monad
type Re i s o = React i o (M s)
-- consume/produce inputs & outputs synchronously
signal :: o → Re i s o i
    
```


- Formal Semantics [NFM23] is stream of “snapshots”: $Stream(i, s, o)$
- Staging Functions

```

stage :: M s a → Re i s (Maybe o) i
stage x = do
    lift x
    i' ← signal Nothing
    return i'
    
```

Semantics & Staging Functions

Mealy Machine




Corresponding ReWire monad

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type M s      = StateT s Identity
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type Re i s o = React i o (M s)
-- consume/produce inputs & outputs synchronously
signal :: o → Re i s o i
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- Formal Semantics [NFM23] is stream of “snapshots” : Stream (i , s , o)
- Staging Functions
 - (stage x) turns computation x into single cycle of hardware device

Temporal Staging Methodology



- Staging transformation: applying stage functions to parts of reference algorithm
- stage functions are *akin* to lift functions of monad transformers

Temporal Staging Methodology

Imperative Algorithm

```
\ a1 a2 a3 →  
  do  
    x1 a1  
    x2 a2  
    x3 a3
```

Staged Algorithm in ReWire

```
\ a1 →  
  do  
    a2 ← stage (x1 a1)  
    a3 ← stage (x2 a2)  
    stage (x3 a3)
```

- Pseudocode Transliterated to Haskell
- “Imperative” ⇒ use State Monad

- Performant HW via ReWire compiler
- Coq Theorems relate `stage(xi)` to `xi`

BLAKE2 Case Study

Background

- Cryptographic hash function
 - Input: message blocks of 16 64-bit words
 - Output: 8 64-bit words
- Can be used for pseudorandom number generation, e.g., in openFHE library
- Defined as imperative pseudocode in
 - *RFC 7693: BLAKE2 Cryptographic Hash and Message Authentication Function*

Cryptographic Functions in ReWire

Functions are just Functions

Blake2 Mixing Function Pseudocode *

```
FUNCTION G( v[0..15], a, b, c, d, x, y )  
    v[a] := (v[a] + v[b] + x) mod 2**w  
    v[d] := (v[d] ^ v[a]) >>> R1  
    v[c] := (v[c] + v[d])      mod 2**w  
    v[b] := (v[b] ^ v[c]) >>> R2  
    v[a] := (v[a] + v[b] + y) mod 2**w  
    v[d] := (v[d] ^ v[a]) >>> R3  
    v[c] := (v[c] + v[d])      mod 2**w  
    v[b] := (v[b] ^ v[c]) >>> R4  
  
    RETURN v[0..15]  
  
END FUNCTION.
```

*RFC 7693: BLAKE2 Cryptographic Hash and Message Authentication Function

Cryptographic Functions in ReWire

Functions are just Functions

Blake2 Mixing Function Pseudocode *

```
FUNCTION G( v[0..15], a, b, c, d, x, y )
    v[a] := (v[a] + v[b] + x) mod 2**w
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    v[b] := (v[b] ^ v[c]) >>> R2
    v[a] := (v[a] + v[b] + y) mod 2**w
    v[d] := (v[d] ^ v[a]) >>> R3
    v[c] := (v[c] + v[d])      mod 2**w
    v[b] := (v[b] ^ v[c]) >>> R4

    RETURN v[0..15]
END FUNCTION.
```

Reference in ReWire (pretty printed by hand)

```
_G :: Reg → Reg → Reg → Reg → Reg → Reg → M ()
_G a b c d x y = do
    a <== a + b + x
    d <== (d ^ a) >>> _R1
    c <== c + d
    b <== (b ^ c) >>> _R2
    a <== a + b + y
    d <== (d ^ a) >>> _R3
    c <== c + d
    b <== (b ^ c) >>> _R4
```

*RFC 7693: BLAKE2 Cryptographic Hash and Message Authentication Function

Checking against RFC7369

Screenshot from RFC7693, Appendix A

```
BLAKE2b-512("abc") = BA 80 A5 3F 98 1C 4D 0D 6A 27 97 B6 9F 12 F6 E9
                      4C 21 2F 14 68 5A C4 B7 4B 12 BB 6F DB FF A2 D1
                      7D 87 C5 39 2A AB 79 2D C2 52 D5 DE 45 33 CC 95
                      18 D3 8A A8 DB F1 92 5A B9 23 86 ED D4 00 99 23
```

Checking against RFC7369

Screenshot from RFC7693, Appendix A

```
BLAKE2b-512("abc") = BA 80 A5 3F 98 1C 4D 0D 6A 27 97 B6 9F 12 F6 E9
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                      18 D3 8A A8 DB F1 92 5A B9 23 86 ED D4 00 99 23
```

Run Tests in Haskell

```
$ ghci Blake2b-reference.hs
GHCi, version 9.2.5: https://www.haskell.org/ghc/  ?: for help
[1 of 1] Compiling (Blake2b-reference.hs, interpreted )
ghci> _BLAKE2b_512 "abc"
```

```
BA 80 A5 3F 98 1C 4D 0D 6A 27 97 B6 9F 12 F6 E9
4C 21 2F 14 68 5A C4 B7 4B 12 BB 6F DB FF A2 D1
7D 87 C5 39 2A AB 79 2D C2 52 D5 DE 45 33 CC 95
18 D3 8A A8 DB F1 92 5A B9 23 86 ED D4 00 99 23
```

Pseudocode \rightsquigarrow Reference Algorithm \rightsquigarrow Staged Algorithm

Blake2 Function Pseudocode*

```
FUNCTION F( h[0..7], m[0..15], t, f )
|
|    // Initialize local work vector v[0..15]
|    ...
|    v[12] := v[12] ^ (t mod 2**w)
|    v[13] := v[13] ^ (t >> w)
|    IF f = TRUE THEN
|        v[14] := v[14] ^ 0xFF..FF
|    END IF.
|
|    // Cryptographic mixing
|    ...
|
|    FOR i = 0 TO 7 DO
|        h[i] := h[i] ^ v[i] ^ v[i + 8]
|    END FOR.
|
|    RETURN h[0..7]
|
END FUNCTION.
```

Reference Algorithm

```
_F :: W 128 → Bit → M ()
_F t f = do
    init_work_vector
    V12 <== V12 ^ lowword t
    V13 <== V13 ^ highword t
    if f then
        V14 <== V13 ^ 0xF...F
    else
        return ()
    cryptomixing
    xor_two_halves
```

Pseudocode \rightsquigarrow Reference Algorithm \rightsquigarrow Staged Algorithm

Blake2 Function Pseudocode*

```
FUNCTION F( h[0..7], m[0..15], t, f )
|
|    // Initialize local work vector v[0..15]
|    ...
|    v[12] := v[12] ^ (t mod 2**w)
|    v[13] := v[13] ^ (t >> w)
|    IF f = TRUE THEN
|        v[14] := v[14] ^ 0xFF..FF
|    END IF.
|
|    // Cryptographic mixing
|    ...
|
|    FOR i = 0 TO 7 DO
|        h[i] := h[i] ^ v[i] ^ v[i + 8]
|    END FOR.
|
|    RETURN h[0..7]
|
END FUNCTION.
```

Staged Algorithm

```
_F :: W 128 → Bit → Re ()
_F t f = do
    stage $ init_work_vector
    V12 <== V12 ^ lowword t
    V13 <== V13 ^ highword t
    if f then
        V14 <== V13 ^ 0xF...F
    else
        return ()
stage cryptomixing
stage xor_two_halves
```

Staging Theorems

Theorem (Staging Theorem)

For all snapshots (i, s, o) and input streams $(i' \triangleleft is)$,

$\llbracket \text{stage } x \ggg f \rrbracket (i, s, o) (i' \triangleleft is) = (i, s, o) \triangleleft \llbracket f a \rrbracket (i', s', \text{Nothing})$ is
where

$$(a, s') = \text{runST} \llbracket x \rrbracket s$$

- Each flavor of stage has a similar theorem
- All are formalized and proved in Coq

*The symbol \triangleleft is stream “cons”.

Correctness Theorem*

- `refb2b`: reference version of BLAKE2b
- `cycle` formalizes the action of the device on a single input
- Let `staged` be the unrolling:

```
staged = cycle Start >>= cycle >>= cycle >>= cycle >>= cycle >>= cycle
```

Theorem (Correctness)

Staged and Reference Algorithms compute identical values on identical inputs; i.e.,

$$\textcolor{blue}{o} = \textcolor{red}{a}$$

where

$$\begin{aligned} (\textcolor{red}{a}, _) &= \text{runST}(\text{refb2b}(\text{m}_0, \text{m}_1, \text{m}_2, \text{m}_3, \text{p})) \text{s} \\ (\underbrace{_ \triangleleft \dots \triangleleft _}_{\text{wait 6 cycles}} \triangleleft (_, _, \textcolor{blue}{o})) &= [\![\text{staged}]\!] (\text{i}, \text{s}, \text{o}) (\text{m}_0 \triangleleft \text{m}_1 \triangleleft \text{m}_2 \triangleleft \text{m}_3 \triangleleft \text{p} \triangleleft \text{is}) \end{aligned}$$

Summary, Conclusions, & Future Work



IEEE Spectrum 12/22/23

Hardware Verification in the large

- DARPA DPRIVE Project with Duality; starting Phase 3
- Verifying Aggressively Optimized Hardware Accelerators for FHE
- See *Formalized High Level Synthesis with Applications to Cryptographic Hardware* [NASA Formal Methods 2023] for semantics, etc.

Summary, Conclusions, & Future Work

- Summary
 - Functional HLS is a vector for transferring software science to hardware design
 - Temporal Staging slices computations by clock cycle, whereas classic SW staging separates static from dynamic [\[Scherlis,Taha, . . .\]](#)
- Related Work
 - Previous work [\[NFM23\]](#) used ReWire to model/verify complex, highly optimized Verilog designs for FHE
 - Here, we use ReWire for design, formal verification, *and* implementation
- Performance
 - Extensive performance evaluation TBD
 - . . . although individual designs (e.g., BLAKE2b) are sufficiently performant [\[Moore23\]](#) to be included with ASICs currently in fabrication
- Future Work
 - At Two Six, other crypto algorithms (e.g., AES256) have been implemented & formally verified using Temporal Staging in ReWire

THANKS!