

A Type-based Approach to Program Security

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CS8440 Fall 2015

September 28, 2016

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- The final values for v and w may differ, **but**, if P is noninterfering, then the final values for u must be identical.
- Smith & Volpano's type system enforces noninterference— P is well-typed means it's noninterfering.

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- This rule insists that h and l be typed on the same level.
How?

Running Example

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while h > 0 do  
  l := l + 1;  
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- Q: What kind of flows exist in this program?

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- The typing rule for *while* insists that the test and body of the loop be typed at the same level:

$$\frac{\gamma \vdash e : \tau \quad \gamma \vdash c : \tau \text{ cmd}}{\gamma \vdash \text{while } e \text{ do } c : \tau \text{ cmd}}$$

Programming Language Syntax

(*Phrase*) $p ::= e \mid c$

(*Expr*) $e ::= x \mid n \mid l \mid e + e' \mid e - e' \mid e = e' \mid$
 $e < e' \mid \mathbf{proc} (\mathbf{in} \ x_1, \mathbf{inout} \ x_2, \mathbf{out} \ x_3) \ c$

(*Comm*) $c ::= e := e' \mid c; c' \mid e(e_1, e_2, e_3) \mid \mathbf{while} \ e \ \mathbf{do} \ c \mid$
 $\mathbf{if} \ e \ \mathbf{then} \ c \ \mathbf{else} \ c' \mid \mathbf{letvar} \ x := e \ \mathbf{in} \ c \mid$
 $\mathbf{letproc} \ x(\mathbf{in} \ x_1, \mathbf{inout} \ x_2, \mathbf{out} \ x_3) \ c \ \mathbf{in} \ c'$

Type Syntax

$$\tau ::= s$$

$$\pi ::= \tau \mid \tau \textit{ proc}(\tau_1, \tau_2 \textit{ var}, \tau_3 \textit{ acc}) \mid \tau \textit{ cmd}$$

$$\rho ::= \pi \mid \tau \textit{ var} \mid \tau \textit{ acc}$$

N.b., s is a *security level*. It is assumed that all security levels form a lattice ordered by \leq .

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N.b., “ $\gamma(i) = \rho$ ” means i has type ρ in γ .
- λ is the *location typing environment*.
 - Locations are used for input-output in the semantics.
 - Locations are, in effect, global.
 - λ largely irrelevant to the type system; only occurs in one rule (VARLOC).

(IDENT)	$\lambda; \gamma \vdash x : \tau$	$\gamma(x) = \tau$
(VAR)	$\lambda; \gamma \vdash x : \tau \text{ var}$	$\gamma(x) = \tau \text{ var}$
(ACCEPTOR)	$\lambda; \gamma \vdash x : \tau \text{ acc}$	$\gamma(x) = \tau \text{ acc}$
(VARLOC)	$\lambda; \gamma \vdash l : \tau \text{ var}$	$\lambda(l) = \tau$
(INT)	$\lambda; \gamma \vdash n : \tau$	

$$\text{(R-VAL)} \quad \frac{\lambda; \gamma \vdash e : \tau \text{ var}}{\lambda; \gamma \vdash e : \tau}$$

$$\text{(L-VAL)} \quad \frac{\lambda; \gamma \vdash e : \tau \text{ var}}{\lambda; \gamma \vdash e : \tau \text{ acc}}$$

$$\text{(SUM)} \quad \frac{\lambda; \gamma \vdash e : \tau, \quad \lambda; \gamma \vdash e' : \tau}{\lambda; \gamma \vdash e + e' : \tau}$$

$$\text{(COMPOSE)} \quad \frac{\lambda; \gamma \vdash c : \tau \text{ cmd}, \quad \lambda; \gamma \vdash c' : \tau \text{ cmd}}{\lambda; \gamma \vdash c; c' : \tau \text{ cmd}}$$

$$\text{(ASSIGN)} \quad \frac{\lambda; \gamma \vdash e : \tau \text{ acc}, \quad \lambda; \gamma \vdash e' : \tau}{\lambda; \gamma \vdash e := e' : \tau \text{ cmd}}$$

$$\text{(IF)} \quad \frac{\lambda; \gamma \vdash e : \tau, \quad \lambda; \gamma \vdash c : \tau \text{ cmd}, \quad \lambda; \gamma \vdash c' : \tau \text{ cmd},}{\lambda; \gamma \vdash \mathbf{if} \ e \ \mathbf{then} \ c \ \mathbf{else} \ c' : \tau \text{ cmd}}$$

$$\text{(WHILE)} \quad \frac{\lambda; \gamma \vdash e : \tau, \quad \lambda; \gamma \vdash c : \tau \text{ cmd}}{\lambda; \gamma \vdash \mathbf{while} \ e \ \mathbf{do} \ c : \tau \text{ cmd}}$$

Next time

- Natural semantics for language
- Noninterference as Type soundness argument:
 - Argue that well-typed programs do not interfere.