

# KERBEROS

Distributed OS Concepts & designs  
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
- Kerberos
- X.509 authentication services.

→ Kerberos is a n/w authentication system developed by MIT.

- of several authentication sys. developed till date, Kerberos is most popular & it is continuing till date.

(Kerberos protocol)

Architecture





$$m_1 = (ID_c, N_1)$$

$$m_2 = c_2 = E((N_1, K_1, G), K_c)$$

$$c_1 = E_{K_g}((ID_c, ID_g, T_{s1}, T_{e1}, K_1), K_g)$$

$$m_3 = (ID_s, N_2, G, \underline{c_3})$$

$$c_3 = E((ID_c, T_1), K_1)$$

$$m_4 = c_5 = E((N_2, K_2, c_4), K_1)$$

$$c_4 = E((ID_c, ID_s, T_{s2}, T_{e2}, K_2), K_s)$$

$$m_5 = (c_4, c_6)$$

$$c_6 = E((ID_c, T_2), K_2)$$

$$m_6 = c_1 = E(T_3, K_2),$$

$$T_3 = T_2 + 1$$

$ID_g$  = ticket granting server identifier

$K_g$  = ticket granting server's secret key

$ID_c$  = client identifier

$K_1$  = ticket granting ticket session key

$ID_s$  = app<sup>n</sup> server identifier

$K_2$  = service-granting ticket session key

$N_i$  = Nounce

$T_{s_i}$  = starting time of validity of ticket

$K_c$  = client's secret key

$K_s$  = app<sup>n</sup> server secret key

$T_{e_i}$  = ending time of validity of ticket

$T_i$  = Time stamp.





1) Kerberos Server  $\Rightarrow$

- It is a key component of Kerberos system.
- It acts as key distribution system.
- Each Kerberos server has an authentication database, authentication server & ticket granting server.
- The authentication db has ID & password of all users of the system.
- Kerberos server shares a unique secret key with each server of the system.
- Therefore authentication database also has server ID & secret key for all servers in the sys.
- The password & the secret keys are distributed physically or in some other manner as a part of Kerberos installation.
- Kerberos uses DES algo to generate keys & encrypt msg, but this is implemented as a separate module that can be easily replaced by any other suitable algo.
- The authentication server performs the task of verifying user's identity at the time of login, without requiring password to ~~send~~ travel over the network.



- kerberos has a single sign on facility
- that's way a user has to enter his/her password only once at the time of login no matter how diff. resources are accessed by the user after that.

### Ticket granting server

- It performs the task of supplying tkt's for permitting access to other servers in the system.
  - These tkt's are used to establish secure logical comm<sup>n</sup> channel bet<sup>n</sup> client & server by performing mutual authentication
- Since kerberos server has valuable information in its authentication db that must be kept secret, it is extremely imp that it be installed on 'carefully protected & physically secure machine'.

### 2) Client :

- 2<sup>nd</sup> component of kerberos system is comprised of client processes that usually run on workstations, located in public places where their consoles are available to whatever user happens to be physically in front of it.

- Therefore they are trusted
- users (client process) must get their identification verified by Kerberos server before attempting to access any other server in the system.
- Once the identity is verified, each client process must obtain ticket ticket from the ticket granting server for communication with a server that it wants to access

### 3) application server

- A server provides a specific type of service to client upon request only after verifying the authenticity of the client
- The server runs on a machine that is located in a secure room.
- Therefore Kerberos ensures that a compromise of one server does not compromise another server.



# Kerberos Authentication Protocol

A - authentication server  
G - ticket granting server  
C - client  
S - application server

$K_a$   
 $K_g$   
 $K_s$

Secret key

$K_c$  - secret key of client  
generated from user's password  
by using one way function.

1. When user logs on to a workstation  
typing login name,  
the login program sends a request to  
the authentication server for what  
known as ticket-granting TGT in msg  
 $m_1$ .

$m_1$  contains user ID ( $ID_c$ ) & a  
nonce  $n_1$ , that is used to check  
validity of the reply.

- This msg is sent in plaintext form.

$$m_1 = ID_c, N_1$$

2. on receiving  $m_1$ , the authentication server extracts the password of this user from the authentication database.

- It then generates a random number for use as a session key  $k_1$ .
- After this it creates a ticket granting ticket that contains user's ID ( $ID_c$ ), the ticket granting ID ( $ID_g$ ), starting time for validity of ticket ( $T_{s1}$ ) ending time for the ticket ( $T_{e1}$ ) & a copy of a session key ( $k_1$ ).
- Now it encrypts this ticket by using ticket granting server's secret key ( $k_g$ ) to generate a cipher text  $C_1$ .
$$C_1 = E((ID_c, ID_g, T_{s1}, T_{e1}, k_1), k_g)$$
- This encryption ensures that no one can tamper with ticket granting tkt & only Kerberos server can decode it.



- Next it uses the client's secret key ( $K_c$ ) to generate  $C_2$

$$C_2 = E((N_1, K_1, C_1), K_c)$$

- It then returns  $C_2$  to the login program in msg  $m_2$ .

$$m_2 = C_2 = E((N_1, K_1, C_1), K_c)$$

$$C_1 = E((ID_c, ID_g, T_{s1}, T_{e1}, K_1), K_g)$$

3) On receiving  $m_2$ , the login program prompts the user for the password.

- The entered password is run through one way function that generates client's secret key  $K_c$

- The password is then removed from the computer's memory to minimize the chance of password disclosure.

- The login prog. then decrypts  $C_2$  by using  $K_c$ .

- If user supplied the correct password  $C_2$  is successfully decrypted ~~to the~~





and login prog obtains the nonce,  
session key & the encrypted ticket  
from the msg.

- It checks the nonce for validity &  
of the reply & stores the session  
key & encrypted tkt for use  
when communicating with tkt-  
granting server.
- & when this has done, the client's secret  
key can also be erased from the  
memory, since now tkt is used to  
authenticate the user.
- A login session is then started.
- user authentication is done without  
requiring password to travel over the  
n/w.

if an intruder intercepts the reply msg,  
it will be unable to decrypt it & thus  
unable to obtain session key & the  
tkt inside it.



4. When client process wants to access app<sup>n</sup> server,

- it requests tkt-granting server for tkt-granting tkt that can be used to communicate with ~~authentication~~ app server.
- for this client creates an authenticator by using session key  $k_1$  that contains client ID ( $ID_c$ ) & Timestamp ( $T_1$ )
- It encrypts this authentication by using session key ( $k_1$ ) to obtain.  
$$C_3 = E((ID_c, T_1), K_1)$$
- This authenticator is intended for one time-stamp only & has a very short span (few minutes)
- The client sends ~~C3~~ encrypted  $C_3$  authenticator, encrypted tkt granting tkt  $C_1$ , ID of app<sup>n</sup> server ( $ID_s$ ) & nonce  $N_2$  to tkt granting server in msg  $m_3$ .

$$m_3 = (ID_s, N_2, C_1, C_3) \quad C_3 = E((ID_c, T_1), K_1)$$





5. on a receiving  $C3$  m3,  
the tkt granting server decrypts  $C1$  by using  
secret key ( $K_g$ ) & make sure that  
it has not expired by comparing  $T_e$   
with current time.

- it extracts session key  $K1$  &  
uses it to decrypt  $C3$  to obtain

$ID_c$  &  $T_1$ .

- The obtained  $ID_c$  is compared with the  
value of  $ID_c$  in the tkt-granting tkt  
to authenticate the source of req.

- If all verification pass successfully,  
the tkt-granting server gets assured  
that the sender of the tkt is indeed  
the tkt's real owner.

→ here authenticator  $C3$  proves the identity  
not tkt granting tkt,

- The use of tkt granting tkt is a way to  
distribute keys securely



- after successful authentication of client the tkt-granting server generates a new random session key ( $k_2$ )

7 then creates a reusable service-granting tkt for access to the requested server.

- This tkt contains client ID ( $ID_c$ )

app's server ID ( $ID_s$ )

starting time of validity of tkt ( $T_{s2}$ )

ending time of validity of tkt ( $T_{e2}$ )

copy of new session key ( $k_2$ )

- it then encrypts service granting tkt with secret key of app's server ( $K_s$ )

to obtain  $C_4 = E((ID_c, ID_s, T_{s2}, T_{e2}, k_2), K_s) -$

$$C_4 = E(ID_c, ID_s, T_{s2}, T_{e2}, k_2, K_s).$$

- only app's server or kerberos server can decode it

- next it uses old session key  $k_1$  to

generate  $C_5 = E((N_2, k_2, C_4), k_1)$

it then returns  $C_5$  to client msg  $m_4$

$$m_4 = C_5 = E((N_2, k_2, C_4), k_1)$$





- Next it uses the client's secret key ( $k_c$ ) to generate  $C_2$

$$C_2 = E((N_1, K_1, C_1), k_c)$$

- It then returns  $C_2$  to the login program in msg  $m_2$ .

$$m_2 = C_2 = E((N_1, K_1, C_1), k_c)$$

$$C_1 = E((ID_c, ID_g, T_{s1}, T_{e1}, K_1), k_g)$$

- 3) On receiving  $m_2$ , the login program prompts the user for the password.

- The entered password is run through

one way function that generates

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- The password is then removed from the computer's memory to minimize the chance of password disclosure.

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and login prog obtains the nonce,  
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- It checks the nonce for validity & of the reply & stores the session key & encrypted tkt for use when communicating with tkt-granting servr.
- When this has done, the client's secret key can also be erased from the memory, since now tkt is used to authenticate the user.
- A login session is then started.
- user authentication is done without requiring password to travel over the n/w.

if an intruder intercepts the reply msg, it will be unable to decrypt it & thus unable to obtain session key & the tkt inside it.





4. When client process wants to access app<sup>n</sup> server,

- it requests tkt-granting server for tkt-granting tkt that can be used to communicate with ~~authentication~~ <sup>app.</sup> server.

- for this client creates an authenticator by using session key  $K_1$ .

that contains client ID ( $ID_c$ ) & Time stamp ( $T_1$ )

- It encrypts this authentication by using session key ( $K_1$ ) to obtain.

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$$m_3 = (ID_s, N_2, C_1, C_3) \quad \underline{C_3 = E((ID_c, T_1), K_1)}$$





























