

$$A: X \rightarrow Y.$$

$A(x) = y$ is an event.

$$\Pr(A(x) = y).$$

Dist. induced by x on Y .

If we have a distribution on input X . $\Pr(X = x_i)$.

A induces a joint distri.

$$A_{xy} = \Pr(X = x_i, Y = y_j) \parallel \\ = \Pr(X = x_i) \cdot \Pr(A(x_i) = y_j)$$

$$\rightarrow \Pr(A(x_i) = y_j) \\ = \Pr(Y = y_j | X = x_i)$$

$$X = \{x_1, x_2, \dots, x_m\}.$$

$$Y = \{y_1, y_2, \dots, y_m\}.$$

$$\Pr(X = x_i, Y = y_j) = \Pr(X = x_i) \cdot \Pr(Y = y_j | X = x_i)$$

$$M \rightarrow \Pr(M = m).$$

$$E(K, M) \rightarrow C.$$

$$\Pr(C = c | M = m) = \Pr(C = c).$$

$$\Pr(M = m | C = c) = \Pr(M = m).$$

If the encryption is perfectly secure, then M & C are independent.

$$\Pr(M = m, C = c) \\ = \Pr(M = m) \cdot \Pr(C = c) \\ = \Pr(M = m) \cdot \Pr(E(m) = c) \\ \text{(by Def)}$$

Dist on M & K are independent - (reasonable assumption)

Distinguishability:

Plaintext - lots of 2 $\begin{cases} c \rightarrow \text{even} \\ c \rightarrow \text{odd} \end{cases}$

$$m_0 \rightarrow 0 \dots 0$$

$$m_1 \rightarrow 1 \dots 1$$

Semantic security:

$$A \xrightarrow{m_0, m_1} C$$

$$C = E(m_0)$$

$$\Pr(A(m_0, m_1, c) = m_0) : c \leftarrow E(m_0)$$

$$= \Pr(A(m_0, m_1, c) = m_1) : c \leftarrow E(m_1)$$

$$\Pr(A(m_0, m_1, c) = m_1)$$

$$m \leftarrow \{m_0, m_1\}, c = E(m)$$

$$= \frac{1}{2}$$

$$n = 1000 \quad n \text{ headed die:} \quad n = 1 \text{ to } 1000$$

$$a < p, \text{ if } p \text{ is a prime: } a^{p-1} \equiv 1 \pmod{p}.$$

n is prime or not.

$$\begin{cases} a < n \\ a^{n-1} \equiv 1 \pmod{n} \end{cases} \xrightarrow{\text{randomly choose } a} \downarrow$$

$$\therefore n \text{ is prime.}$$

$$\begin{cases} a^{n-1} \not\equiv 1 \pmod{n} \\ n \text{ is not prime} \end{cases} \xrightarrow{\text{correct}}$$

$$n = 15, \quad 4^2 \equiv 1 \pmod{15}$$

$$a = 4, \quad 4^{14} \equiv 1 \pmod{15}$$

$$\Pr(A(m_0, m_1, c) = m) \quad c = E(m) \\ \frac{1}{2}$$

$$\Pr(m, c, A(c) = m) \\ = \Pr(m, c) \cdot \Pr(A(c) = m) \\ = \Pr(m) \cdot \Pr(E(m) = c)$$

Prob. of Success of Adversary:

$$\Pr(M = m, C = c)$$

$$= \Pr(M = m) \cdot \Pr(E(m) = c)$$

~~When $A(c) = m$, A has succeeded iff the event $E(m) = c$ should have happened, m was.~~

When $A(c) = m$,

A is said to have succeeded

iff.

(a) m is chosen for enc.

(b) $E(m) = c$.

$$\Pr(\text{Success of } A)$$

$$= \sum_{m, c} \Pr(m) \cdot \Pr(E(m) = c) \cdot \Pr(A(c) = m)$$

$$= \sum_{m, c} \Pr(m) \cdot \Pr(c) \cdot \Pr(A(c) = m)$$

$$= \sum_c \Pr(c) \cdot \sum_m \Pr(m) \cdot \Pr(A(c) = m)$$

$$\text{Let } \alpha = \max \Pr(m).$$

$$\leq \alpha \sum_c \Pr(c) \cdot \sum_m \Pr(A(c) = m)$$

$$= \alpha \cdot 1 \cdot 1$$

$$\Pr(\text{Success for } A) \leq \alpha$$

$$\max \{ \Pr(M = m) \}$$

$$M = \{1, 2, 3, 4\}$$

$$\frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{4}, \frac{1}{8}, \frac{1}{8}$$

$$= \left\{ \frac{1}{4}, \frac{1}{4}, \frac{1}{4}, \frac{1}{4} \right\}$$

$$\{H, T\} \quad \{.5, .5\}$$

$$\{.8, .2\}$$

$$C = \frac{m}{4} \oplus \frac{k}{4}$$

If same secret key is used twice, then the perfect se. can not be maintained.

Entropy of a Distribution:

$$E(m) \quad \text{Randomly choose } k. \\ c = m \oplus k.$$

$$\frac{1}{2^n} \rightarrow \frac{2^n}{2^n} \quad \text{Poly} \quad \text{exp}$$

$$A \leftrightarrow B$$

$$\text{key}$$

Secure comm.

Delfs & Knebl: Inf. Crypt.

pp 290-291-292

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