

PSG COLLEGE OF TECHNOLOGY, COIMBATORE
DEPARTMENT OF APPLIED MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTATIONAL SCIENCES
M.Sc. CYBER SECURITY

23XC52 – CRYPTANALYSIS

CONTINUOUS ASSESSMENT TEST 2

Total marks: 21 40

Date: 28-10-2025

Duration: 1 hr 30mins

INSTRUCTIONS:

1. Answer **ALL** questions. Each question carries 20 Marks.
2. Subdivision (a)(i), (a)(ii) carries 2 marks each, subdivision (b) carries 6 marks each and subdivision (c) carries 10 marks each.
3. Course Outcome Table :

Qn.1	CO4	Qn.2	CO5
------	-----	------	-----

1. (a) (i) What are the steps involved in proving the security of the cryptosystem [BTL1] using the method of provable security? 1

(ii) What are the applications of pairing-based cryptography? 2 [BTL3]

(b) What is Lattice-Reduction? What are the fundamental steps involved in Lattice-Reduction Attack? 2 [BTL4]

(c) Idealize the ElGamal encryption scheme suitable for providing provable security. Further, prove the security of scheme using random oracle model. 4 [BTL5]

2. (a) (i) Distinguish between message authentication and entity authentication. 2 [BTL1]

(ii) Does the protocol given below withstands Lowe's attack? If so, give the reason why the attack is not possible. If not, demonstrate the attack and provide an improvement.

$$\begin{aligned} A \rightarrow B : N_A \\ B \rightarrow A : \text{sig}_B(N_A) \end{aligned}$$

(b) Consider the following protocol [BTL4]

$$\begin{aligned} A \rightarrow S : M_1 &= \{A, S, B, e(NA)\} \\ S \rightarrow B : M_2 &= \{S, B, A\} \\ B \rightarrow S : M_3 &= \{B, S, A, e(NB)\} \\ S \rightarrow A : M_4 &= \{S, A, B, v(NA, NB)\} \\ S \rightarrow B : M_5 &= \{S, A, B, v(NA, NB)\} \end{aligned}$$

The main aim of this protocol is to distribute session keys for mobile communications. The unary constant $e(\cdot)$ denotes a standard encryption

function that only the Server is able to invert, and the binary constant $v(\cdot)$ stands for bit-wise exclusive-or. Demonstrate the protocol fails to enforce agent authentication. 3

- (c) (i) Describe the Needham – Schroeder Protocol for symmetric and asymmetric cryptosystems. Further, detail the possible attacks on the schemes and improvements made on them. of [BTL5]

(OR)

- (ii) Carryout the formal analysis of Needham-Schroeder shared key protocol in BAN logic.
