

## Vault Namespaces, Authentication, & ACL Policies




## Agenda

Namespaces	0
Authentication	02
Policies	03



## Vault Onboarding Program

A 7 week guided community environment Assisting customers with onboarding and adoption





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


## Namespaces



### Namespaces

- Namespaces create "Vaults within a Vault" which enables segmentation for teams & services across an organization
- Each namespace maintains its own path structure
- Namespace segmentation facilitates delegation of administration & helps control blast radius by isolating policies & secrets management





### Namespace Contents

### Unique to each namespace

- Policies
- Secrets Engines
- Authentication Methods
- Tokens
- Identity Entities and Groups



### Considerations

### Requirement

### **What to Consider**

Organizational Structure	What is your organizational structure?
	What is the level of granularity across lines of businesses (LOBs), divisions, teams, services, apps that needs to be reflected in Vault's end-state design?
Self-Service Requirements	Given your organizational structure, what is the desired level of self-service required?
	How will Vault policies be managed?
	Will teams need to directly manage policies for their own scope of responsibility?
	Will they be interacting with Vault via some abstraction layer where policies and patterns will be templatized? For example, configuration by code, Git flows, the Terraform Vault provider, custom onboarding layers, or some combination of these.

### Considerations

### Requirement


### **What to Consider**

Audit Requirements	What are the requirements around auditing usage of Vault within your organization?
	Is there a need to regularly certify access to secrets?
	Is there a need to review and/or decommission stale secrets or auth roles?
	Is there a need to determine chargeback amounts to internal customers?
Secrets Engine Requirements	What types of secrets engines will you use (KV, database, AD, PKI, etc.)?

## **Using Namespaces**

- Namespaces should be leveraged sparingly and primarily to delineate administrative boundaries
- Often many unnecessary namespaces get created by trying to replicate organizational structure

### **Anti-Pattern**






## Using Namespaces

- Instead of providing self-service by implementing many namespaces we recommend implementing an onboarding layer
- Shifting the administrative boundary from teams to the onboarding layer reduces the number of namespaces while enforcing a standard naming convention, secrets path structure, and templated policies


### **Best Practice**







### Root Namespace



Root (Namespace)



#### Members:

Security Team

#### Namespace Specific Configuration: Defined global member access


Defined global member access
Defined global authentication mounts
Defined global secrets engines

Note: Vault supports namespaces within namespaces. By default there can always be a globally managed namespace that has rights to sub-namespaces, such as the Teams, and smaller namespaces





## Namespaces for Teams and Groups



### • Engineering Org (Namespace)



#### Members:

Security Team, Operations Teams, Engineering Manager

### Namespace Specific Configuration:


Defined engineering member access
Defined engineering authentication mounts
Defined engineering secrets engines

Note: Vault supports namespaces within namespaces. By default there can always be a parent managed namespace that has rights to sub-namespaces, such as the Applications/User namespaces





# Namespace per each Application



Application (Namespace)



#### Members:

Alex Smith, Jennifer Johnson, Steve Stevens

### Namespace Specific Configuration:

Defined member access

Defined authentication mounts for AWS, Azure, and GCP systems

Defined custom secrets engine



# Getting Started with Namespaces

CLI

```
...
 Create namespace
$ vault namespace create usa-hq
# Create child namespaces
$ vault namespace create -namespace=usa-hq training
# List namespaces from within root namespace
$ vault namespace list
  Keys
  production/
 eu-hq/
 usa-hq/
# List child namespaces for usa-hq namespace
$ vault namespace list -namespace=usa-hq
  Keys
 dev-test/
 prod/
# Instead of a CLI flag, environment variables can be used
 export VAULT_NAMESPACE="usa-hq"
$ vault namespace create sales
```


# Getting Started with Namespaces

API

```
•••
# Create namespace
$ curl --header "X-Vault-Token: $VAULT_TOKEN" .\
  --header "X-Vault-Namespace: admin" \
  --request POST \
$ VAULT_ADDR/v1/sys/namespaces/usa-hq | jq -r ".data"
# Create child namespace of admin/usa-hq
$ curl --header "X-Vault-Token: $VAULT_TOKEN" \
  --request POST \
$ VAULT_ADDR/v1/admin/usa-hq/sys/namespaces/training | jq -r
".data"
```

### **Mount Move Command**

- Requires Vault 1.10.0+
- API endpoint to move secret engines & auth methods
- Works across mounts within a namespace or across namespaces






## Migrate a Secret Engine

CLI

```
•••
# List the enabled mounts in the education/training
namespace
$ vault_namespace "education/training" vault secrets list
# Migrate the data
$ vault secrets move <original namespace path> \ <new</pre>
namespace path>
# Confirm that the data was successfully migrated
$ vault_namespace=
"education/training/security-edu/vault-edu vault kv get
team-vault
# Verify the team-vault mount path no longer exists
$ vault_namespace="education/training" vault secrets list
```

02




## Authentication



### **Authentication in Vault**

Vault supports integrating with trusted identity providers to validate user or machine supplied information to create a token tied to a pre-configured policy

- If Vault is able to successfully validate the credentials, a Vault token will be returned that can then be used to access Vault
- The token Vault returns is associated to a Vault policy that defines what access and capabilities the token can perform





### **Human vs. Machine Authentication**


Vault provides authorization and not authentication of users so you will need to integrate with a trusted Identity provider to authenticate and verify the client before access to Vault is granted

- Multiple authentication methods can and should be used
- Human users should authenticate using a method that leverages an external identity provider
- Machine users should authenticate using AppRole or auth type that uses instance metadata to authenticate the machine such as AWS or GCP

Human Auth	Machine Auth
GitHub	AppRole
LDAP/AD	AWS
OIDC	Azure
Okta	Google Cloud
Cloud IAM	JWT
Username & Password	Kubernetes
	RADIUS
	TLS Certificates
	Cloud Foundry




### Vault Identity Recap



### **Entities and Aliases**


Map multiple user authentication schemes to a single entity to provide for more efficient authorization management



### **Token and Policies**


Policies can be assigned to entities which will grant **additional** permissions








### **Basic Workflow**





### **Organizational Structure**






## **Identity Groups**


## Identity group maps multiple user entities to a group for authorization management at scale

- Identity groups can have multiple entities as its members as well as subgroups
- Entities can be direct member of groups
- Inherit the policies of the groups they belong to
- Entities can be indirect member of groups
- Groups can have a set of policies and metadata inherited from the member entity or subgroups





### **Group Hierarchical Permissions**




Entity, John Smith inherits the policy assigned to the Security group



## **Identity Groups Aliases**

- Internal groups are those groups manually created by the operators via API
- External groups are the groups which Vault infers and creates based on the group associations coming from the auth methods
- Identity group alias is a mapping between identity groups and groups in an third party authentication provider
  - If a user is a part of an external group (LDAP group), automatically adds the user to the identity group inheriting the policies and metadata



03




## **Policies**



### **Vault Policies**

Role-Based Access Control

- Use policies to govern the behavior of the Vault clients
- Instrument Role-Based Access Control (RBAC)
- Safeguard access and secret distribution to apps






### **Vault Policies and Client Tokens**

How it all fits together

- Every Vault client must authenticate with Vault to acquire a client token
- The client token has policies attached
- Use the client token to invoke Vault operations (e.g. read secrets)





### Language of policies

- Policies are written in HashiCorp Configuration Language (HCL)
- Everything is path-based and corresponds to Vault API endpoints
- Policies grant or deny access to certain paths and operations
- Empty policy grants no permission

Vault is deny by default

No policy = No authorization



### **Policies**

path

```
path "<PATH>" {
   capabilities = [ <LIST> ]
}

Example path

http://VAULT_ADDR:8200/v1/auth/userpass/users/apps
```

### **Policies**


path

```
•••
path "<PATH>" {
 capabilities = [ <LIST> ]
 Capabilities
                        HTTP Verbs
 create
                        POST/PUT
 read
                        GET
 update
                        POST/PUT
 delete
                        DELETE
 list
                        LIST
 sudo
 deny
```

## Root protected paths


The **sudo** capability must be provided for those root protected paths

Refer to the **Tutorial** 





## **Policy Authoring Workflow**





# Three discovery techniques

- API documentation
- -output-curl-string
- Vault's audit logs



### **API docs**

```
•••
path "transit/encrypt/app1" {
  capabilities = [ "update" ]
Encrypt Data
This endpoint encrypts the provided plaintext using the named key.
This path supports the create and update policy capabilities as
context parameter is empty or not). If the user only has update
capability and the key does not exist, an error will be returned.
                                        app1
 Method
                Path
  POST
                 /transit/encrypt/:name
           update capability
```

# CLI command flag

-output-curl-string

```
•••
$ vault policy read -output-curl-string test
                              default HTTP verb is GET
curl -H "X-Vault-Request: true" -H "X-Vault-Token:
$(vault print token)"
http://127.0.0.1:8200/v1/sys/policies/acl/test
                                                 path
```

```
path "sys/policies/acl/test" {
    capabilities = [ "read" ]
}
```

# **Audit Log**


A detailed log of every authenticated interaction.

- Time
- Requestor
- Request
- Response

```
$ cat log/vault_audit.log | jq -s ".[-1]"
               $ cat log/vault_audit.log | jq -s ".[-1].request"
                 "id": "70419a8b-d904-542b-fe48-61d8f869a0b7",
                 "operation": "update",
                                          operation maps to capability
                 "mount_type": "transit",
                                                                 path
                 "path": "transit/keys/app-auth",
                 "remote_address": "127.0"
path "transit/keys/app-auth" {
    capabilities = [ "update" ]
```

## **Example Scenario**

Using transit secrets engine for data encryption/decryption



- Each application has its own encryption key
- Challenge:
  - The number of applications will grow
  - You cannot foresee the name of future applications to be developed

## **Policy Solutions**

Using transit secrets engine for data encryption/decryption

```
path "transit/encrypt/*" {
    capabilities = [ "update" | Is it good enough?

path "transit/decrypt/*" {
    capabilities = [ "update" ]
}
```

path "transit/encrypt/app1" {
 capabilities = [ "update" }

path "transit/decrypt/app1" {
 capabilities = [ "update" }

}

• Trouble points:

The policy is **too open**. App1 can access app4 encryption key.

• Trouble points:

You have to write policies for each app.



# ACL Templating

- Use variable replacement in some policy strings with values available to the token
- Define policy paths containing double curly braces:

```
{{<parameter>}}
```

```
path "secret/data/{{identity.entity.id}}/*" {
    capabilities = ["create", "update", "read", "delete"]
path "secret/metadata/{{identity.entity.id}}/*" {
    capabilities = ["list"]
```

# Available Templating Parameters (1 of 2)

Description

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Parameter	Description
identity.entity.id	The entity's ID
identity.entity.name	The entity's name
identity.entity.metadata.< <metadata key="">&gt;</metadata>	Metadata associated with the entity for the given key
identity.entity.aliases.< <mount accessor="">&gt;.id</mount>	Entity alias ID for the given mount
identity.entity.aliases.< <mount accessor="">&gt;.name</mount>	Entity alias name for the given mount
identity.entity.aliases.< <mount accessor="">&gt;.metadata.&lt;<metadata key="">&gt;</metadata></mount>	Metadata associated with the alias for the given mount and metadata key

# Available Templating Parameters (2 of 2)

Parameter	Description
identity.groups.ids.< <group id="">&gt;.name</group>	The group name for the given group ID
identity.groups.names.< <group name="">&gt;.id</group>	The group ID for the given group name
identity.groups.names.< <group id="">&gt;.metadata.&lt;<metadata key="">&gt;</metadata></group>	Metadata associated with the group for the given key
identity.groups.names.< <group name="">&gt;.metadata.&lt;<metadata key="">&gt;</metadata></group>	Metadata associated with the group for the given key



# Token policies & Identity Policies

```
...
$ vault token lookup
Key
                                Value
accessor
yOMHJzMZ5Krz7BSrOtF2ZzC2
creation_time
                                1622087787
creation_ttl
                                768h
display_name
                                userpass-bob
entity_id
bf3ea189-61a1-d7...snip...
expire_time
                                2021-06-28T<time_stamp>
explicit_max_ttl
                                Øs
external_namespace_policies
                                map[]
id
s.UYkAjU6ak70gwQ40CmLP3uyT
identity_policies
                                 base
issue_time
                                2021-05-27T<time_stamp>
                                map[username:bob]
meta
num_uses
orphan
                                true
path
                                auth/userpass/login/bob
policies
                                [default test]
...snip...
```

# ACL Templating with Identity Entity Names

```
path "transit/encrypt/{{identity.entity.name}}" {
  capabilities = [ "update" ]
path "transit/decrypt/{{identity.entity.name}}" {
  capabilities = [ "update" ]
```

If the app name and key name do not match, you can store the key name as a metadata → {{identity.entity.metadata.key\_name}}

# ACL Templating with Identity Groups

- Identity groups are not directly attached to a token and an entity can be associated with multiple groups
- To reference a group, the group ID or group name must be provided


```
path
"auth/ldap/groups/{{identity.groups.ids.fb036ebc-2f62-4124-9
503.name}}" {
    capabilities = [ "update", "read" ]
path
"secret/data/groups/{{identity.groups.names.education.metada
ta.product}}/*" {
    capabilities = [ "create", "update", "read", "delete" ]
```

# **CLI**

••• vault root

\$ vault policy --help \$ vault policy list default list all policies \$ vault policy read default show policy \$ vault policy write apps-policy apps-policy.hcl create or update policy

### **Vault Ul**





## root and default policies

Vault Enterprise has 2 "out of the box" policies

- root policy grants access to everything, a root token (generated when Vault was unsealed or using recovery keys) is the only token able to grant this policy to other tokens
- default policy grants a lot of the bare minimum operations



# Associate policies

Upon successful authentication, the generated token will have the policies attached

```
# LDAP group, "sre" has "dev" & "ops" policies attached

$ vault write auth/ldap/groups/sre policies="dev, ops"
```




# **Next Steps**



### **Tutorials**

Step-by-step guides to accelerate deployment of Vault



https://developer.hashicorp.com/vault/tutorials



### Resources

- Vault Namespace and Mount Structuring Guide
- Mount Move Tutorial
- Vault Authentication Tutorial
- Vault OIDC with Okta
- Vault OIDC with Azure AD
- Vault Policy Tutorial
- <u>Templated Policies</u>



## **Need Additional Help?**

### **Customer Success**

Contact our Customer Success

Management team with any questions. We will help coordinate the right resources for you to get your questions answered 
customer.success@hashicorp.com

### **Technical Support**

Something not working quite right? Engage with HashiCorp Technical Support by opening a ticket for your issue at <a href="mailto:support.hashicorp.com">support.hashicorp.com</a>

#### **Discuss**

Engage with the HashiCorp Cloud community including HashiCorp Architects and Engineers discuss.hashicorp.com



# **Upcoming Webinars**



#### Office Hours

An open forum with Vault Subject Matter Experts to answer questions that have arisen during the program and your deployment



### **Vault Operations Basics & Best Practices**

Learn best practices for deploying Telemetry & Monitoring, Disaster Recovery, and Runbooks



### **Consuming Vault with Applications**

Learn about secret distribution patterns and best practices for integrating Vault secrets with applications including Vault Agent and client libraries

### **Action Items**

- Share to <u>customer.success@hashicorp.com</u>
  - Authorized technical contacts for support
  - Stakeholders contact information (name and email addresses)
- Begin designing the namespace structure for your organization's Vault instance(s)
- Configure an authentication method and policy for your Vault Administrators





# Q&A





customer.success@hashicorp.com

www.hashicorp.com/customer-success