TECHNISCHE UNIVERSITÄT WIEN

TTTech

Dependable Computer Systems

Part 3: Fault-Tolerance and Modelling

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Reliability:
Basic Mathematical Model

Example: Lifetime of light bulbs in a building (simplified)

- We assume a building with 20 lightbulbs
- We observe the following failure pattern:



Failure Probability *Q(t)*
Reliability *R(t)*

- **Failure Probability *Q(t)*,** probability that the system will **not** conform to its specification throughout a period of duration [0:t].
- **Reliability *R(t)*,** probability that the system will conform to its specification throughout a period of duration [0:t].

- R(0) = 1 R(∞) = 0
- R(t) = 1 – Q(t)



Failure Probability Density Function

- Def.: The failure density $f(t)$ at time t is defined by the number of failures during Δt.

$$f(t) = \frac{dQ(t)}{dt} = -\frac{dR(t)}{dt}$$



Failure Probability



Probability Density Function

Failure Rate

- Def.: The failure rate $\lambda(t)$ at time t is defined by the number of failures during Δt in relation to the number of correct components at time t.

$$\lambda(t) = \frac{f(t)}{R(t)}$$
$$= -\frac{dR(t)}{dt}\frac{1}{R(t)}$$

- The dimension of failure rate is FIT (failures in time)
  - x FIT = x failures per 10^{-9} hours

Example Failure Rates in FIT
(according to IEC TR 62380)

- Resistor 0.1 FIT
- Capacitor (ceramic) 2 FIT
- Capacitor (electrolytic) 7 FIT
- Diode 9 FIT
- Inductor 6 FIT
- Transistor (low power) 8 FIT
- Transistor (high power) 46 FIT
- Varistor 1 FIT
- Switching regulator 22 FIT
- Comparator IC 5 FIT
- Flash (46 MBit) 105 FIT
- EEPROM (512 kBit) 33 FIT
- CPU (180 MHz, Dualcore)
  300 FIT (Hard Errors) /
  2700 FIT (Soft Errors)
- High-side powerswitch 25 FIT
- Shift Register IC (8 Bit) 8 FIT
- 8 to 1 analog multiplexer IC
  8 FIT
- CAN transceiver 7 FIT
- RS232 transceiver 9 FIT
- LIN transceiver 7 FIT
- Ethernet PHY 41 FIT
- Signal transformator 34 FIT

Example Failure Rate Functions

Constant Failure Rate

Used to model the normal-life period of the bathtub curve

- **failure rate**

$$\lambda(t) = \lambda$$

- **probability density function**

$$f(t) = \lambda e^{-\lambda t}$$

- **reliability**

$$R(t) = e^{-\lambda t}$$



Reliability for constant failure rate

Weibull distributed failure rate

Used to model infant mortality and wear out period of components.

$\alpha < 1$: failure rate is decreasing with time
$\alpha = 1$: constant failure rate
$\alpha > 1$: failure rate is increasing with time

- **failure rate**

$$\lambda(t) = \alpha\lambda(\lambda t)^{\alpha-1}$$

- **probability density function**

$$f(t) = \alpha\lambda(\lambda t)^{\alpha-1} e^{-(\lambda t)^{\alpha}}$$

- **reliability**

$$R(t) = e^{-(\lambda t)^{\alpha}}$$



Reliability for weibull distributed failure rate

Lognormal distributed failure rate

For semiconductors the lognormal distribution fits more data collections than any other and is assumed to be the proper distribution for semiconductor life.

- **failure rate**

$$\lambda(t) = \frac{f(t)}{R(t)}$$

- **probability density function**

$$f(t) = \frac{1}{\sigma t\sqrt{2\pi}}\, e^{-\frac{1}{2}\left(\frac{\ln t - \mu}{\sigma}\right)^2}$$

- **reliability**

$$R(t) = 1 - \frac{1}{\sigma\sqrt{2\pi}} \int_0^t \frac{1}{x}\, e^{-\frac{1}{2}\left(\frac{\ln t - \mu}{\sigma}\right)^2} dx$$

Probabilistic Structural-Based Modeling: Part 1

Assumptions

- Identifiable (independent) components,
- Each component is associated with a given failure rate,
- Model construction is based on the structure of the interconnections between components.

Example Modelling Paradigms

- Simple block diagrams
- Arbitrary block diagrams
- Markov models
- Generalized Stochastic Petri Nets (GSPN)

Simple block diagrams

- assumption of independent components
- combination of series or parallel connected components

Series Connection



$$R_{series}(t) = \prod_{i=1}^{n} R_i(t)$$

$$Q_{series}(t) = 1 - R_{series}(t) = 1 - \prod_{i=1}^{n} R_i(t)$$

$$= 1 - \prod_{i=1}^{n} \left(1 - Q_i(t)\right)$$

Parallel Connection



$$Q_{parallel}(t) = \prod_{i=1}^{n} Q_i(t)$$

$$R_{parallel}(t) = 1 - Q_{parallel}(t) = 1 - \prod_{i=1}^{n} Q_i(t)$$

$$= 1 - \prod_{i=1}^{n} \left(1 - R_i(t)\right)$$

Simple block diagrams (cont.)

Constant failure rate

$$\lambda(t) = \lambda$$

$$R(t) = e^{-\lambda t}$$

Series connection

$$R_{series}(t) = \prod_{i=1}^{n} R_i(t) = \prod_{i=1}^{n} e^{-\lambda_i t}$$

$$= e^{-t\sum_{i=1}^{n}\lambda_i}$$

- the resulting failure rate for the system is still constant



Reliability of 1,2 and 4 series connected components with constant failure rate ($\lambda_1 = \lambda_2 = \lambda_3 = \lambda_4$)

Simple block diagrams (cont.)

Parallel connection

$$R_{parallel}(t) = 1 - \prod_{i}^{n} (1 - R_i(t))$$

$$= 1 - \prod_{i}^{n} \left(1 - e^{-\lambda_i t}\right)$$

for 3 parallel components this gives:

$$R_{parallel}(t) = 1 - \left(\left(1 - e^{-\lambda_1 t}\right)\left(1 - e^{-\lambda_2 t}\right)\left(1 - e^{-\lambda_3 t}\right)\right)$$

$$= e^{-\lambda_1 t} + e^{-\lambda_2 t} + e^{-\lambda_3 t} + e^{-(\lambda_1+\lambda_2+\lambda_3)t} -$$

$$e^{-(\lambda_1+\lambda_2)t} - e^{-(\lambda_1+\lambda_3)t} - e^{-(\lambda_2+\lambda_3)t}$$



Reliability of 1,2 and 4 parallel connected components with constant failure rate ($\lambda_1 = \lambda_2 = \lambda_3 = \lambda_4$)

under the assumption $\lambda_1 = \lambda_2 = \lambda_3$ it follows

$$R_{parallel}(t) = 3\left(e^{-\lambda t} - e^{-2\lambda t}\right) + e^{-3\lambda t}$$

the resulting failure rate is no longer constant

Simple block diagrams (cont.)

Pros:

- can be used to model arbitrary combinations of series and parallel connected components
- easy mathematics for constant failure rates



Cons:

- assumption of independent failures
- maintenance cannot be modeled
- restricted to series/parallel connection
- only for active redundancy and fail-silence

Arbitrary block diagrams

no restriction to series/parallel connections



$$R_{block}(t) = R_{AB} + R_{BE} + R_{DE} + R_{CD} - R_{ABE} - R_{ABCD} - R_{BDE} - R_{CDE} + R_{ABCDE}$$

$$R_{ABC} = R_{series}(A, B, C)$$

Inclusion/exclusion principle

1:	A	B				+
2:		B			E	+
3:				D	E	+
4:			C	D		+
12:	A	B			E	–
13:	A	B		D	E	–
14:	A	B	C	D		–
23:		B		D	E	–
24:		B	C	D	E	–
34:			C	D	E	–
123:	A	B		D	E	+
124:	A	B	C	D	E	+
134:	A	B	C	D	E	+
234:		B	C	D	E	+
1234:	A	B	C	D	E	–

Arbitrary block diagrams (cont.)

Active redundancy and voting

- for TMR 2 out of 3 components have to function correctly

$$R_{TMR}(t) = R(C_A, C_B, C_C, t) + R(C_A, C_B|\overline{C}_C, t) + R(C_A, C_C|\overline{C}_B, t) + R(C_B, C_C|\overline{C}_A, t)$$



- under the assumption of identical failure rates

$$R_{TMR}(t) = R(t)^3 + 3R(t)^2 Q(t)$$

- for general voting systems where *c* out of *n* components have to function correctly

$$R_{NMR}(t) = \sum_{k=c}^{n} \binom{n}{k} \left(e^{-\lambda t}\right)^k \left(1 - e^{-\lambda t}\right)^{n-k}$$

Arbitrary block diagrams (cont.)

Parallel fail silent components vs. majority voting



$n = 1$	single component
$n = 2$	two parallel components
$n = (3,2)$	voting, 2 out of 3
$n = (5,2)$	voting, 2out of 5

Neglected issues:

- coverage of fail silence assumption
- reliability of voter

Arbitrary block diagrams (cont.)

Passive redundancy

- probability that A is performing correctly plus conditional probability that B is performing correctly and A has failed



$$R(t) = R(C_A) + R(C_B|\overline{C}_A)$$

- under the assumption of constant failure rates $\lambda_A = \lambda_B$

$$R(t) = e^{-\lambda t} + \sum_{x=0}^{t} R_B(t-x+\Delta x)\frac{[R_A(x) - R_A(x+\Delta x)]\Delta x}{\Delta x}$$

$$\Delta x \to 0: \quad e^{-\lambda t} + \int_{x=0}^{t} R_B(t-x) f(x)\, dx$$

$$= e^{-\lambda t} + \int_{x=0}^{t} e^{-\lambda(t-x)} \lambda e^{-\lambda x} dx$$

$$= e^{-\lambda t}(1+\lambda t)$$

Arbitrary block diagrams (cont.)

Passive vs. active redundancy



$n = 1$	single component
$n = 2$	two parallel components
$n = (3,2)$	voting, 2 out of 3
$n = 1 + 1$	one passive backup

Neglected issues:

- coverage of fail silence assumption
- reliability of switch

Arbitrary block diagrams (cont.)

Passive redundancy with an unreliable switch

- assumption that the switch functions correctly with probability $R_s(t)$
- the system reliability is the probability that A is performing correctly plus the conditional probability that B is performing correctly and A has failed **and** the switch still functions correctly

$$R(t) = e^{-\lambda t} + \sum_{x=0}^{t} R_B(t - x + \Delta x)\, R_s(t) \left[R_A(x) - R_A(x - \Delta x)\right]$$

$$= e^{-\lambda t} + \int_{x=0}^{t} e^{-\lambda (t-x)}\, e^{-\lambda_s t}\, \lambda e^{-\lambda x} dx$$



Arbitrary block diagrams (cont.)

Passive red. with limited error detection coverage

- assumption that errors of component A are not always detected, the error detection coverage is given by *c*
- the system reliability is the probability that A is performing correctly plus the conditional probability that B is performing correctly and A has failed **and** A's error has been detected

$$R(t) = e^{-\lambda t} + \sum_{x=0}^{t} c\, R_B(t - x + \Delta x)\left[R_A(x) - R_A(x - \Delta x)\right]$$

$$= e^{-\lambda t} + \int_{x=0}^{t} c\, e^{-\lambda (t-x)} \lambda e^{-\lambda x} dx$$



Arbitrary block diagrams (cont.)

Perfect vs. imperfect passive redundancy



$n = 1 + 1$	one passive backup
$n = 2$	two parallel components
$n = 1 +^{0.8} 1$	error detection coverage 80%
$n = 1 +^{0.5\lambda} 1$	reliability of switch is 0.5λ

- under practical conditions it is impossible to build an *ideal* passive replicated system
- an unreliable switch with $\lambda_s = 0.5\lambda$ or a switch with error detection coverage of 80% reduces the system reliability below that of active redundant components

Maintenance and Repair

Single parametric measures

- Mean time to failure:

$$MTTF = \int_0^\infty t\, f(t)\, dt$$

- Mean time to repair:

$$MTTR = \int_0^\infty t\, f_r(t)\, dt$$

- Mission reliability:

$R_m = R(t_m)$ t_m ... mission duration

- (Steady state) availability:

$$A = \frac{MTTF}{MTTF + MTTR}$$

Mean time to failure

- Constant failure rate:

$$MTTF = \int_0^\infty t\, f(t)\, dt = \int_0^\infty t\, \lambda e^{-\lambda t}\, dt = \frac{1}{\lambda}$$

- Weibull distributed failure rate:

$$MTTF = \int_0^\infty t\alpha\lambda(\lambda t)^{\alpha-1} e^{-(\lambda t)^\alpha}\, dt = \frac{\Gamma(1+\alpha^{-1})}{\lambda}$$

- Serial Connected Components

$$MTTF_{series} = \frac{1}{\lambda_1 + \lambda_2 + \cdots + \lambda_n}$$

- Passive redundancy:

$$MTTF_{passive} = \frac{1}{\lambda_1} + \frac{1}{\lambda_2} + \cdots + \frac{1}{\lambda_n}$$

- Parallel connected components:

$$MTTF_{parallel} = \frac{1}{\lambda}\left(1 + \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{3} + \cdots + \frac{1}{n}\right)$$

Repair

- Repair rate
  - repair rate $\mu(t)$ analogous to failure rate
  - most commonly constant repair rates $\mu(t) = \mu$
- Mean time to repair
  - analogous to mean time to failure

$$MTTR = \frac{1}{\mu}$$

Mission reliability

- assumption of a mission time t_m
- during mission there is no possibility of maintenance or repair
- typical examples are space flights or air planes
- suitability of architectures depends on mission time



Availability

- the percentage of time for which the system will conform to its specification
- also called steady state or instantaneous availability

$t \to \infty$:

$$A = \frac{MTTF}{MTBF} = \frac{MTTF}{MTTF + MTTR}$$

mean time between failures (*MTBF*)

- without maintenance and repair

$MTTR = \infty: \quad A = 0$

- Mission availability $t \to t_m$:

$$A_m = \frac{1}{t_m} \int_{t=0}^{t_m} R(t)\,dt$$

Probabilistic Structural-Based Modeling: Part 2

Markov models

- Suitable for modeling of:
  - arbitrary structures
    (active, passive and voting redundancy)
  - systems with complex dependencies
    (assumption of independent failures is no longer necessary)
  - coverage effects
- Markov property:
  - The system behavior at any time instant *t* is independent of history (except for the last state).
- Restriction to constant failure rates

Markov models

The two phases for Markov modeling

- **Model design:**
  - identification of relevant system states
  - identification of transitions between states
  - construction of Markov graph with transition rates
- **Model evaluation:**
  - Differential equation
  - Solution of equation gives $R(t)$
    - explicit (by hand)
    - Laplace transformation
    - numeric solution (tool based)
  - Integration of differential equation gives *MTTF*
    - system of linear equations

Markov models (cont.)

Example model for active redundant system

Two parallel connected components A and B with maintenance. Failure rates are λ_A and λ_B, repair rates are μ_A and μ_B.



Identification of system states:

1:	A correct	B correct	$P_1(t)$
2:	A failed	B correct	$P_2(t)$
3:	A correct	B failed	$P_3(t)$
4:	A failed	B failed	$P_4(t)$

Construction of Markov Graph



Markov models (cont.)

Active redundancy with identical components

- failure rates: $\lambda_A = \lambda_B = \lambda$ repair rates: $\mu_A = \mu_B = \mu$
- Identification of system states:

  1: A correct B correct $P_1(t)$
  2: one failed one correct $P_2(t)$
  3: A failed B failed $P_3(t)$

- Differential equations:

$$\frac{dP_1(t)}{dt} = -2\lambda P_1(t) + \mu P_2(t)$$
$$\frac{dP_2(t)}{dt} = 2\lambda P_1(t) - (\mu + \lambda) P_2(t)$$
$$\frac{dP_3(t)}{dt} = \lambda P_2(t)$$

- Construction of Markov Graph



Markov models (cont.)

MTTF evaluation from Markov model

- In a Markov model the MTTF is given by the period during which the system exhibits states that correspond to correct behavior.
- for the active redundant example system:

$$MTTF = \int_{t=0}^{\infty} \left(P_1(t) + P_2(t)\right) dt = T_1 + T_2$$

$$T_1 = \int_{t=0}^{\infty} P_1(t)\,dt \qquad T_2 = \int_{t=0}^{\infty} P_2(t)\,dt$$

- state probabilities for $t = 0$ and $t = \infty$

$$P_1(0) = 1 \quad P_1(\infty) = 0$$
$$P_2(0) = 0 \quad P_2(\infty) = 0$$
$$P_3(0) = 0 \quad P_3(\infty) = 1$$

Markov models (cont.)

MTTF evaluation from Markov model (cont.)

- integration of differential equation

$$\begin{aligned}
\frac{d\,P_1(t)}{dt} &= -2\lambda P_1(t) + \mu P_2(t) \\
\frac{d\,P_2(t)}{dt} &= 2\lambda P_1(t) - (\mu+\lambda) P_2(t) \\
\frac{d\,P_3(t)}{dt} &= \lambda P_2(t)
\end{aligned} \Rightarrow \begin{aligned}
0-1 &= -2\lambda T_1 + \mu T_2 \\
0-0 &= 2\lambda T_1 - (\mu+\lambda) T_2 \\
1-0 &= \lambda T_2
\end{aligned}$$

- solution of linear equation system

$$T_2 = \frac{1}{\lambda}$$

$$T_1 = \frac{\mu+\lambda}{2\lambda} T_2 = \frac{\mu+\lambda}{2\lambda^2} = \frac{1}{2\lambda} + \frac{\mu}{2\lambda^2}$$

$$MTTF = T_2 + T_2 = \frac{3}{2\lambda} + \frac{\mu}{2\lambda^2}$$

Markov models (cont.)

Effect of maintenance

- repair and failure rate: $\lambda = \frac{1}{1000}\,[\mathrm{h}]$ $\mu = \frac{1}{10}\,[\mathrm{h}]$

	without maintenance			with maintenance		
	$R(t)$	$MTTF$	h	$R(t)$	$MTTF$	h
2 components in series	$e^{-2\lambda t}$	$\frac{1}{2\lambda}$	500	$e^{-2\lambda t}$	$\frac{1}{2\lambda}$	500
single component	$e^{-\lambda t}$	$\frac{1}{\lambda}$	1000	$e^{-\lambda t}$	$\frac{1}{\lambda}$	1000
2 components in parallel	$2e^{-\lambda t} - e^{-2\lambda t}$	$\frac{3}{2\lambda}$	1500	—	$\frac{3}{2\lambda} + \frac{\mu}{2\lambda^2}$	51500
one passive backup	$e^{-\lambda t}(1+\lambda t)$	$\frac{2}{\lambda}$	2000	—	$\frac{2}{\lambda} + \frac{\mu}{\lambda^2}$	102000

- for 2 active redundant components the MTTF is improved by a factor 34
- for 2 passive redundant components the MTTF is improved by a factor 51

Markov models (cont.)

Effect of failure semantics and assumption coverage

- comparing a system with two active replicated components to a TMR systems shows that under *ideal* conditions active replication has a higher reliability

- **But:** active replication is based on the assumption that components are fail silent
  – assumption coverage ???
- TMR voting is based on the assumption of fail consistent components
  – assumption coverage ≈ 1
  (if properly constructed)



Markov models (cont.)

Effect of failure semantics and assumption coverage

- modeling of the TMR was reasonable since assumption coverage of fail consistent behavior ≈ 1
- modeling of the active redundant system was idealistic since assumption coverage of fail silent behavior < 1
- **Markov model:**
  λ .. failure rate for active redundant parallel connected components
  c .. assumption coverage for fail silent behavior



Markov models (cont.)

Effect of failure semantics and assumption coverage

- failure rate of a single component: $\lambda = 100$ FIT

System	*Description*	*MTTF*
$n = 2, 0.999$	two parallel components, coverage of fail silent assumption 99.9%	$14.99\ 10^6$
$n = 2, 0.90$	two parallel components, coverage of fail silent assumption 90%	$14.00\ 10^6$
$n = 2, 0.70$	two parallel components, coverage of fail silent assumption 70%	$12.00\ 10^6$
$n = 2, 0.50$	two parallel components, coverage of fail silent assumption 50%	$10.00\ 10^6$
$n = (2, 3)$	TMR system, coverage of fail consistent assumption 100%	$8.33\ 10^6$



Markov models (cont.)

Effect of failure semantics and assumption coverage

- comparing parallel components to a TMR systems shows that the reliability of the parallel system is superior for reasonable assumption coverages
- **Safety:**
  from the viewpoint of safety both systems needs to be reevaluated
- **Parallel system:** $R(t) = S(t)$
  for the parallel components the system reliability is equal to the system safety since the system may potentially cause a hazard if it does not function correctly
- **TMR system:** $R(t) < S(t)$
  for TMR systems the reliability is not equal to the safety since the system can be in a safe state although it is not functioning correctly, e.g. all three components disagree

Markov models (cont.)

Safety of a TMR system

- to model the safety of a TMR system it needs to be differentiated between incorrect function and the unsafe system state
- **Markov model:**
  λ .. failure rate for single component
  c .. probability of coincident failures of two components



1 .. 3 correct components
2 .. 2 correct, 1 failed comp.
3 .. 1 correct, 2 failed comp.
4 .. 3 failed components
5 .. unsafe state, ≥ 2 coincident component failures

Markov models (cont.)

Effect of assumption coverage on safety

- failure rate of a single component: λ = 100 FIT

System	*Description*	$MTTF_S$
n = (2, 3), 10 10^{-6}	TMR system, probability of two coincident failures 10 10^{-6}	333.34 10^9
n = (2, 3), 4 10^{-3}	TMR system, probability of two coincident failures 4 10^{-3}	861.71 10^6
n = (2, 3), 0.5	TMR system, probability of two coincident failures 0.5	13.33 10^6
n = 2, 0.999	two parallel comp., coverage of fail silent assumption 99.9%	14.99 10^6
n = 2, 0.90	two parallel comp., coverage of fail silent assumption 90%	14.00 10^6



coincidence probability of
two even distributed numbers

16 bit	10 10^{-6}
8 bit	4 10^{-3}
1 bit	0.5

Markov models (cont.)

Effect of assumption coverage on safety

- 10 10^{-6} probability that two 16 bit numbers coincide (independence assumption)
- 4 10^{-3} probability that two 8 bit numbers coincide (“”)
- 0.5 probability that two 1 bit numbers coincide (“”)





Generalized Stochastic Petri Nets (GSPN)

- because of the very limited mechanisms available, Markov models become easily very complex
- Petri Nets provide much richer mechanisms, they can be used to model and analyze arbitrary systems, algorithms and processes
- basic Petri Nets — which were restricted to discrete behavior only — can be extended to “Generalized Stochastic Petri Nets” by allowing transition delays to be either deterministically equal to zero or exponentially distributed random variables, or to be random variables with different distributions
- it was shown that stochastic Petri Nets are *isomorphic* to continous Markov chains, i.e. for each stochastic Petri Net there exists a functional equivalent Markov chain (and vice versa)

Generalized Stochastic Petri Nets

Example

Single-writer/multiple-reader access to a shared resource with single access.



p_i ... places
t_i ... transitions
π_i ... transition priorities

- the 3 tokens in place p_1 represents customers that may request the resource
- firing t_1 starts the protocol
- t_2 indicates “read” and t_3 “write” access, respectively
- the single token in p_5 represents the resource

Generalized Stochastic Petri Nets
Modeling

To model and analyze a system by means of GSPN the following steps have to be carried out:

- **model construction**: usually by means of structured techniques, bottom-up or top-down
- **model validation**: structural analysis, possibly formal proves of some behavioral properties
- **definition of performance indices**: definition of markings and transition firings (deterministically or stochastic)
- **conversion to Markov chain**: generation of reachability set and reachability graph to obtain the Markov chain
- **solution of the Markov chain**

Tool support for all steps exists. Conversion to a Markov chain and solution can be automated completely.

Generalized Stochastic Petri Nets

Model simulation vs. analytical solutions

- generalized stochastic petri nets are well suited for simulation
- transition rates are not restricted to be deterministic or exponentially distributed
- complex models are computationally expensive (simulation step width and simulation duration)
- too large simulation step width can result in meaningless results (variance of result is too big)

Open issues of probabilistic structural based models

Open issues of probabilistic structural based models

- large gap between system and model
- model construction is time consuming, error prone and unintuitive
- small changes in the architecture result in considerable changes in the model
- model validation for ultra-high dependability

Probabilistic structural modeling and software

Probabilistic structural based models are not well suited for software. They are rather well suited to analyze hardware architectures and design alternatives.

- for software there are no well defined individual components
- complexity of software structures is very high
- for software the assumption of independent failures is too strong
  - one CPU for many processes
  - one address range for many functions
- real-time aspects are not captured
- parallelism and synchronization is not considered (except for GSPN's)

Reliability growth models

Reliability growth models

- no assumption on identifiable components and system structure
- based on the idea of an iterative improvement process:
  - testing $\rightarrow$ correction $\rightarrow$ re-testing
- major goals of reliability growth models:
  - disciplined and managed process for reliability improvement
  - extrapolating the current reliability status to future results
  - assessing the magnitude of the test, correction and re-test effort
- allows modeling of wearout *and* design faults
- can be used for hardware and software as well

Reliability growth models (cont.)

Software

- typically continuous time reliability growth
  - the software is tested
  - the times between successive failures are recorded
  - failures are fixed
- observed execution time data t_1, t_2, t_3, ... t_{i-1} are realizations of the random variables T_1, T_2, T_3, ... T_{i-1}
- based on these data the unobserved T_i, T_{i+1}, ... should be predicted (e.g. T_i = *MTTF*)

But:

- accuracy of models is very variable
- no single model can be trusted to behave well in all contexts

Reliability growth models (cont.)

The prediction system

Software reliability growth models are prediction systems which are comprised of:

- The **probabilistic model**
  which specifies the distribution of any subset T_j's conditional on a unknown parameter α.
- A **statistical inference procedure**
  for α involving use of available data (realizations of T_j's)
- A **prediction procedure**
  combining the above two points to allow to make probability statements about future T_j's

Comparison of probabilistic modeling techniques

Comparison of probabilistic modeling techniques

Method	Advantages	Restrictions and deficienies
simple block diagrams	simple and easy to understand model, easy to calculate for constant failure rates	restricted to series and parallel connection, assumption of inde-pendent failures, maintenance can-not be modelled, only for active redundant systems, not well suited for software
arbitrary block diagrams	can be used to model arbitrary structures	same restrictions as with simple block diagrams, except series and parallel connection, not well suited for software
markov chains	can model arbitrary structures, no restriction to independent failures, complex dependencies can be ex-pressed, modeling of coverage and maintenance, good tool support	compared to GSPN higher model complexity, restriction to constant failure rates, not well suited for software

Comparison of probabilistic modeling techniques (cont.)

Method	Advantages	Restrictions and deficienies
generalized stochastic petri nets	much richer mechanisms for modeling, allows combination of discrete and stochastic behavior, good tool support, can be used to model algorithmic issues of software	it is difficult to verify that the model agrees with reality (as for any complex model)
reliability growth models	suited for prediction of software reliability, does not make assumptions on the system structure, based on relatively easy obtainable experimental data	accuracy of models is very variable, no general applicable model, user must analyze different models to select suitable one
error seeding	very easy procedure, takes few assumptions on the system	computational complexity (seeded errors by number of test cases), error size needs to be controlled

Limits of validation for ultra-high dependability

Limits of validation for ultra-high dependability

- 10^{-9} catastrophic failure conditions per hour for civil transport airplanes
- experimental system evaluation is impossible for critical applications
- modeling is therefore the only possibility to validate ultra-high dependability

Limits of validation for ultra-high dependability (cont.)

- **Limits for reliability growth models:**
  - If we want to have an assurance of high dependability, using information obtained from the failure process, then we need to observe the system for a very long time.
- **Limits of testing:**
  - If we see a period of 10^9 hours failure free operation a MTTF of 10^9 hours can be expected without bringing any apriori believe to the problem.
  - If a MTTF of 10^6 is required and only 10^3 hours of test are carried out, Bayesian analysis shows that essentially we need to *start* with a 50:50 believe that the system will attain a MTTF of 10^6.

Limits of validation for ultra-high dependability (cont.)

- **Limits of other sources of evidence:**
  - Step-wise evolution, simple design, over-engineering can be used only to a limited extent to obtain confidence because there is no continuos system model and there are no identifiable stress factors.
- **Limits of past experience:**
  - For software there is no clear understanding of how perceived differences in the design or design methodology affect dependability.
- **Limits of structural modelling:**
  - There are obvious limitations with respect to design faults, and software in particular since the assumption of failure independence does not hold.

Limits of validation for ultra-high dependability (cont.)

- **Limits of formal methods and proofs:**

  "We believe that proofs may eventually give 'practically complete' assurance about software developed for small but well-understood application problems, but the set of these problems is now empty and there is no way of foreseeing whether it will grow to be of some significance."

  (*Littlewood and Strigini, 1993*)

Example: Hardware Design Analysis at TTTech

Design Analysis Goals

- Failure Rate Prediction
  - Calculation of component FIT and MTBF values
- IEC TR 62380 Reliability Data Handbook
  - provides elements to calculate failure rate of mounted electronic components
  - Reliability data is taken from field data
  - Failures rates include the influence of component mounting processes



Advantages:

- Per component predefined analysis method
- Analysis within the schematic (see the result at the source)
- Component parameter changes are automatically adopted in the design analysis
- Analysis's can be sequenced and use results from preceding calculations