

Hacking Healthcare

A healthcare hacker's perspective

Qasim "Q" Ijaz




\$ whoami

- · Qasim / "Q"
- Director, Penetration Testing at Coalfire LABS
- Largely focused on healthcare clients
 - HIPAA and HITRUST assessor in past life
- Systems Engineer at an EHR company in my previous life
- https://twitter.com/hashtaginfosec




Healthcare IT overview





Electronic medical record (EMR)





10-Minute Domain Admin

Obvious Disclaimer: "It depends"



My Methodology: Internal Network

- cme smb <subnet>
 - Try default AD accounts
- MSF auxiliary/scanner/vnc/vnc_none_auth
 - Radiology/PACs devices often use VNC and are AD connected
- cme mssql or auxiliary/scanner/mssql/mssql_login with defaults
 - Broad force. Don't lock out EMR databases ©
- Look for creds / ePHI in user shares
 - Use creds to access EMR/EHR
 - Try both SMB and NFS shares



Default Credentials

museadmin:Muse!AdminmuseBkgnd:Muse!Bkgnd

These are Active Directory Accounts ©

https://www.slideshare.net/Shakacon/medical-devicespasswords-to-pwnage-by-scott-erven



My Methodology: Internal Network

- EyeWitness or PeepingTom to find unauthenticated WebApps with ePHI
- Quantify amount of ePHI you had access to
 - select count(*) from database.table
- Usually Responder isn't needed but if you choose to run it, be careful not to take down the EMR!



My Methodology: Privesc

Look for clinical application binaries with bad permissions or overly descriptive config files ©



My Methodology: Phishing





Sorry, just had to





My Methodology: External

- Medical defaults on OWA, Citrix, and VPN
 - Don't forget to break out of Citrix ©
- Weak passwords + TheHarvester + External Portals = <3
- site:[client domain] intitle:'Patient Portal'
 - Beware of third party hosted patient portals
- Quantify amount of ePHI you had access to




Common Vulnerabilities



HL7: MITM'ers heaven

HL7: Set of international standards for transfer of clinical and administrative data among software applications used by various healthcare providers



See

https://www.linuxincluded.com/h 17-medical-fundamental-flaw/




Healthcare defaults


Because nobody would read the manual (or Google)

- If it's a hospital, start with the following AD accounts:
 - museadmin:Muse!Admin
 - museBkgnd:Muse!Bkgnd
- https://www.cvedetails.com/vulnerability-list/vendor_id-15545/year-2015/Gehealthcare.html
- Other defaults: https://www.slideshare.net/Shakacon/medical-devices-passwords-to-pwnage-by-scott-erven



Unauthenticated VNC








Unauthenticated access to ePHI


root@	patient]# zcat patient.*.*gz wc -l
13797281142	
[2019-04-22 11:23:25 EDT	%eth0 172.23.69.206
root@	patient]# ls patient.*.*gz wc -l
8186	








Who needs a password manager anyway?






Physical Goodies







Physical Goodies





OCR Breach Portal

Because numbers don't lie

Name of Covered Entity \$	State	Covered Entity Type	Individuals Affected	Breach Submission Date	Type of Breach	Location of Breached Information
VibrantCare Rehabilitation, Inc.	CA	Healthcare Provider	1655	02/08/2020	Hacking/IT Incident	Email
Kaiser Health Plan, Southern California	CA	Health Plan	500	02/06/2020	Unauthorized Access/Disclosure	Paper/Films
Lake County Behavioral Health Services	CA	Healthcare Provider	1178	01/31/2020	Theft	Paper/Films
Solara Medical Supplies, LLC	CA	Healthcare Provider	1531	01/17/2020	Unauthorized Access/Disclosure	Paper/Films
PIH Health	CA	Healthcare Provider	199548	01/10/2020	Hacking/IT Incident	Email
San Francisco Department of Public Health - Zuckerberg SF General Hospital	CA	Healthcare Provider	1174	12/16/2019	Improper Disposal	Paper/Films
Western Health Advantage	CA	Health Plan	869	12/13/2019	Unauthorized Access/Disclosure	Network Server
Family Care Medical Specialists Group, Inc.	CA	Healthcare Provider	2490	12/08/2019	Unauthorized Access/Disclosure	Paper/Films
Adventist Health Simi Valley	CA	Healthcare Provider	62000	12/06/2019	Hacking/IT Incident	Email
Sunshine Behavioral Health Group, LLC	CA	Business Associate	3500	12/02/2019	Unauthorized Access/Disclosure	Other
San Francisco VA Health Care System	CA	Healthcare Provider	735	11/29/2019	Theft	Other, Paper/Films
La Clinica de La Raza, Inc.	CA	Healthcare Provider	2477	11/22/2019	Theft	Other Portable Electronic Device
Solara Medical Supplies, LLC	CA	Healthcare Provider	114007	11/13/2019	Hacking/IT Incident	Email
SALIH M MAYALIDAG DENTAL CORP	CA	Healthcare Provider	6000	11/12/2019	Hacking/IT Incident	Network Server
Kaiser Foundation Health Plan (Kaiser Permanente)	CA	Health Plan	515	11/07/2019	Unauthorized Access/Disclosure	Paper/Films
The Guidance Center	CA	Healthcare Provider	1189	10/28/2019	Hacking/IT Incident	Email
Central Valley Regional Center	CA	Business Associate	15975	10/11/2019	Hacking/IT Incident	Email


https://ocrportal.hhs.gov/ocr/breach/breach_report.jsf




What do we do now?



What HIPAA?








Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act

- HIPAA Security Rule requires implementation of safeguards:
 - Organizational policies and procedures
 - Administrative safeguards (e.g., access management and evaluation of safeguards)
 - Physical safeguards such as physical access controls
 - Technical implementation (e.g., encryption and authentication)
 - Risk analysis and management of risk
- Conduct penetration testing, if reasonable and appropriate (Evaluation (§ 164.308(a)(8)))







HITRUST Framework

Because HIPAA certified isn't a thing

- Based on ISO 27002 and incorporates other relevant information security assessment frameworks, such as NIST RMF, HIPAA, FedRAMP, and PCI DSS
- Three levels of requirements
- Requirements for policy (15%), procedure (20%), implementation (40%), measurement (10%), and management (15%)
 - Changes to weights went into effect 12/31/2019
- Specific requirements around technical security (e.g. password length,
- data integrity, DNSSEC, and differentiation between vulnerability scanning
- and pen testing)
- Pain in the rear to implement and assess



FHIR (pronounced "fire")

- Supports RESTful APIs
- Has OAuth, JSON, and HTTP capabilities
- Supports the use of W3C and JSON digital signatures

```
<Patient xmlns="http://hl7.org/fhir">
  <id value="glossy"/>
  <meta>
   <lastUpdated value="2014-11-13T11:41:00+11:00"/>
  </meta>
  <text>
   <status value="generated"/>
   <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
     Henry Levin the 7th
     MRN: 123456. Male, 24-Sept 1932
   </div>
  <extension url="http://example.org/StructureDefinition/trials">
   <valueCode value="renal"/>
  </extension>
  <identifier>
   <use value="usual"/>
   <type>
     <coding>
       <system value="http://hl7.org/fhir/v2/0203"/>
       <code value="MR"/>
     </coding>
   </type>
   <system value="http://www.goodhealth.org/identifiers/mrn"/>
   <value value="123456"/>
  </identifier>
  <active value="true"/>
   <family value="Levin"/>
   <given value="Henry"/>
   <suffix value="The 7th"/>
  <gender value="male"/>
  <birthDate value="1932-09-24"/>
  <careProvider>
   <reference value="Organization/2"/>
   <display value="Good Health Clinic"/>
  </careProvider>
</Patient>
```

Resource identity and metadata

Human readable summary

Extension with URL to definition

Standard data:

- MRM
- Name
- Gender
- · Birth date
- Provider



Thank you!

Questions?

@hashtaginfosec (twitter and github)
qasim.ijaz@coalfire.com



