

Privacy Preserving Biometrics based Remote Authentication Protocol for Mobile Devices

March 26, 2016

1 Motivation:

There has been a major shift from traditional passwords based authentication to biometrics based authentication in consumer applications in the recent past as major service providers such as the leaders in banking [1, 2, 3], credit cards [4] and e-commerce [5, 6] are adopting biometrics to authenticate users. Biometrics is a strong factor of authentication due to its ability to uniquely identify an individual. Different vendors have adopted it for different motivations, for examples, Amazon uses selfies based on facial recognition techniques to avoid the difficulty in typing passwords to authenticate transactions in mobile devices with small screens [5] and Master cards has adopted it in order to drastically cut-down the cost of false declined transactions [4].

Two main contexts in which biometrics is being used for authentication are: in-person authentication [7] and remote authentication [2]. In the first case, user is present at the authenticator's premise when authentication is performed whereas in the second case, authentication is performed over the network. While there are common challenges w.r.t both cases due to the sensitivity (being tightly coupled with one's identity) non-repeatability (no two biometrics samples of the same individual match exactly) and non-revocable (inability to cancel/renew) nature of biometrics, the second case involves more challenges than the first one due to spoofing attacks, the attacks on the communication channel and the attacks on the user's device. Furthermore, remote biometrics based authentication is being widely used since online-banking and e-commerce applications are increasingly adopting it.

Aforementioned commercial authentication systems that are being deployed today, inherit key security concerns irrespective of the fact that they incorporate state-of-the-art facial/voice recognition algorithms and liveness verification techniques. First, since users' biometrics templates are stored in the server databases for matching during the authentication, they become major targets of attackers. For examples, in Google Hands Free system [7], user's picture taken at the authentication time is matched with the user's Hands Free profile picture and in Citi bank system, user's pre-recorded voice samples are matched with the voice captured when the user call in. Second, multiple third party service providers are storing different biometrics traits of the same user (such as face, voice and fingerprint) for their proprietary authentication protocols. This creates multiple points of vulnerability on one's biometrics identity, due to linkability [8]. Third, the current protocols require the users to send a raw biometrics sample over the network each time the user remotely authenticates using biometrics, which is not desirable. Stolen biometrics templates from the server databases or from the authentication channels lead to identity theft which poses severe threat to user's digital identity, compared to the case in which a password is stolen, because biometrics samples reveal sensitive features of the user's biometrics identity which can not be revoked.

Therefore, it is best to avoid storing and transmitting sensitive biometrics information during authentication, when developing a secure biometrics based remote authentication protocol. The second issue mentioned above can be avoided by getting a trusted identity provider (IDP) to enroll user's biometrics identity [7, 9]. However, if the IDP is involved in each transaction that the user authenticates, it undermines the user's privacy since the IDP gets to know about different transactions that the user performs with different service providers (SPs).

To address aforementioned security and privacy concerns, we aim to develop a biometrics based remote authentication protocol with following characteristics:

1. User's biometrics identity is enrolled with only a trusted IDP (i.e: biometrics is not stored with multiple service providers).
2. Sensitive features of user's biometrics is not stored anywhere.
3. Sensitive features of user's biometrics is not revealed during authentication.
4. After the initial enrollment with the IDP, users can carry out biometrics based authentication with multiple SPs without involving the IDP. (i.e: user-centric authentication protocol as opposed to traditional IDP-centric authentication protocol).
5. Enrolled biometrics identity is revocable and renewable.

6. Efficient in terms of computation and communication in order for it to be carried out from user's mobile devices.

In what follows we describe our roadmap of realizing the goal of developing a privacy preserving biometrics based remote authentication protocol with the aforementioned characteristics.

2 Past and on-going research work:

We found zero knowledge proof (ZKP) of identity [10] to be a suitable cryptographic primitive to be used along with a secure commitment scheme [11], in order to authenticate without revealing any sensitive biometrics information to the SP. The concept of ZKP of identity, first proposed by Feige, Fiat and Shamir [10] in 1988, has been used to develop numerous identity based authentication schemes [12, 13] for static identities such as email, credit card number, etc. Making it applicable in the domain of biometrics based remote authentication is not straight forward due to non-repeatable nature of biometrics identity. In other words, since the biometrics sample used to create the commitment does not exactly match the biometrics sample captured during authentication, the ZKP might not succeed even for the genuine prover, unlike in the case of static identity. Previous approaches which addressed the non-repeatability issue of biometrics, mainly in the domain of biometrics based encryption, have used distance matching with threshold, by applying error correction on the features extracted from the second sample. Our goal is to generate a unique, repeatable and revocable biometrics based identifier for the user, to be used in creating the identity commitment during the enrollment of identity and to be used in authentication via ZKP of identity using such commitment. We employ a machine learning based classification model to generate such biometrics identifier (BID), based on the discriminative features of the user's biometrics.

Overview of the solution

In what follows we provide an overview of the protocol that we have proposed, using the aforementioned building blocks. Please refer to our paper [14] for more details. This protocol involves three main parties namely: IDP, SP and user. It involves two main phases namely: enrollment phase and authentication phase.

Enrollment Phase: First, the IDP trains the classification model using the biometrics features extracted from biometrics images. The output is a file encapsulating the base-classification model that encodes the information required for prediction. During enrollment of each user, the base classification model is customized by randomizing the class labels encoded in the model. This step is performed as a security measure to avoid compromising the BIDs of the other users of the system, if one user's device is compromised. Features extracted from the biometrics image of the enrolling user is given as input to the customized classification model and the corresponding class label is obtained through prediction. This class label is combined with the user provided secret to generate the BID, which is used in creating the identity commitment. The identity commitment, which is based on the Pedersen commitment scheme [11], takes the form: $C(x, r) = g^x h^r \text{ mod } p$, where $x = \text{BID}$ and $r = \text{user provided secret}$. Password based key generation is used to derive multiple secrets used in the protocol, from a single password provided by the user. The BID generated in this way, preserves the uniqueness as it is based on the discriminative features of the user's biometrics, is repeatable based on the prediction accuracy of the classification model and is revocable as the user can cancel any existing BID and obtain a new one simply by requesting the IDP to issue a new customized classification model, which will output a different class label, and by changing the password from which the secret used to create the BID is derived. At the end of the enrollment process, user is issued an identity token (IDT) which contains the identity commitment signed by the IDP and the customized classification model, to be used during the authentication phase, which are securely stored in the user's device.

Authentication Phase: During the authentication phase, the user provides the IDT issued by the trusted IDP, to the SP and carries out ZKP of the biometrics identity with the SP. Authentication succeeds if the user is able to prove the SP in zero-knowledge, his/her ownership of the biometrics identity and the knowledge of the secret encoded in the identity commitment of the IDT. In order to carry out the proof, features extracted from a new biometrics image of the user is given as input to the customized classification model stored in the user's device and the BID is generated in the same way as it was done in the enrollment phase. This BID and the secret derived from the user's password are used to carry out the ZKP of biometric identity.

This protocol that we have proposed in [14], possesses the characteristics: 1-5 mentioned in Section 1. The research goal of the current semester (Spring 2016) is to implement it in the mobile device and to evaluate the performance in order to confirm its compliance with the sixth characteristics as well.

3 Next research goal:

In the aforementioned solution, we assume the support of Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) in the user's mobile device to securely store the artifacts obtained from the IDP during the enrollment phase and to execute the BID generation process using the classification model during the authentication phase. TEE isolates the storage and the execution from other applications that run in the device which provides protection for trojan type attacks in addition to just encrypting the artifacts during storage. TEE is being used by Apple touch ID and android fingerprint authentication framework as well. Although there are extensive research on the development of TEE technology [15], there are attacks that have been discovered [16] on them too. Since widely used implementations of TEE technology such as ARM's TrustZone are proprietary and are not disclosed for public review, the level of assurance provided against a given threat model is unclear [17].

Furthermore, recent advancement in memory forensics techniques [18], pose threats on processing sensitive data in clear text in the memory of the user's device as it is proved that such data could be recovered from memory images even long after the processing of such data is finished. Although it is theoretically possible to clear the related memory upon destruction of a process, it is not practical because it requires accurate tracking of each data object, which is a very heavy-weight operation that no commodity operating system performs.

Therefore, our next goal is to develop a biometrics based authentication protocol which achieves all the security and privacy goals mentioned in Section 1, based only on theoretical foundations and without assuming any platform security support. Fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) [19] is one solution to avoid decryption of sensitive information during authentication, however, it has certain limitations, such as: SP learns the authentication function, which is the classification model in our case, and SP needs to obtain the secret key to decrypt the authentication decision, which in turn allows it to decrypt the biometrics data as well. Yao's garbled circuit [20], on the other hand, is a better cryptographic building block as it allows secure computation of a function f on input data x to obtain the result $f(x)$ while hiding both the function and the input data from the function evaluator.

Overview of the proposed solution:

In what follows we present the tentative design of the solution that we aim to develop next.

Enrollment Phase: As shown in Figure 1, IDP first creates a trained classification model (which is a function that can be encoded as a circuit) and then creates a garbled version of it.




Figure 1: Proposed Enrollment Phase

Authentication Phase:




Figure 2: Proposed Authentication Phase

Challenges:

One basic limitation of the original garbled circuit construction is that it offers only one-time usage. Specifically, evaluating a circuit on any new input requires an entirely new garbling of the circuit [21]. This causes the user to communicate with the IDP each time the user needs to authenticate to a SP, which we need to avoid as per the 4th requirement mentioned in Section 1. The problem of reusing garbled circuits has been open for 30 years until the reusable garbled circuit construct was proposed by Shafi et. al in 2013 [21]. This new construct sounds promising to develop our target biometrics based authentication protocol, as it allows the secure authentication artifacts that are issued upon enrollment (see step 5 of Figure 1), to be used multiple times without exposing any sensitive information during the process.

Utilizing this construct in designing and developing our target biometrics authentication protocol, however, requires addressing several challenges. First, the scheme proposed in [21] is presented in the context of two party secure computation. We need to extend it to three-party secure computation protocol to build our solution, specifically we need to address the question of how the IDP (who is the circuit generator) delegates the ability to the user to issue labels (see step 5 of Figure 1) to the SP(s) for the SPs to evaluate the garbled classification model (see step 3.1 of Figure 2). Second, encoding the classification model as a garbled function is a challenge. There are very recent efforts [22] in developing building blocks to construct privacy preserving classifiers which will be useful in addressing this challenge. Third, we need to figure out if the three sub steps in the step 3 of authentication phase (in Figure 2) could be combined into one garbled circuit or should they be executed separately, in terms of technical feasibility, security and efficiency. Fourth, we need to make sure that delegation of the ability to share GCM by the IDP to the user, does not cause any secret information be stored in the user's device. Fifth, all the existing efficient implementations of garbled circuits do not support this construct, which is a challenge when it comes to implementation of the protocol. Therefore, we believe that addressing such challenges and coming up with a secure and privacy preserving biometrics authentication protocol using this construct will contribute important results to the research literature.

Contribution of this work:

We aim to produce the following research output:

1. Designing a secure and privacy preserving biometrics based remote authentication protocol with aforementioned characteristics, using re-usable garbled circuit construct.
2. A prototype implementation of the protocol that is able to run in mobile devices.
3. Security and performance analysis of the protocol.

4 Background and potential impact:

- After the current work is over, at the end of this semester, we will have a working prototype of our past approach in the mobile phone. PhD student Hasini will be attending a summer school conducted by leaders of secure mpc and oblivious computation research to learn the current-state-of-the-art techniques. She has got a travel grant from NSF to participate in this.
- Google ATAP project has accepted a proposal written by us and has funded Purdue.
- Can help make existing biometrics based remote authentication in day-to-day transactions such as online-banking and e-commerce secure, which already has a large user base and increasing.
- Generalization of this techniques can have impact on other ML tasks where privacy is a concern.

References

- [1] B. Yurcan. (2016) Banks embrace biometrics, but will customers? [Online]. Available: <http://www.americanbanker.com/news/bank-technology/banks-embrace-biometrics-but-will-customers-1078867-1.html>
- [2] N. Cappella. (2016, Feb.) Hsbc announces biometric banking with voice and fingerprints. [Online]. Available: <https://thestack.com/world/2016/02/19/hsbc-voice-biometric-online-banking/>
- [3] P. Crosman. (2015, Feb.) Biometric tipping point: Usaa deploys face, voice recognition. [Online]. Available: <http://www.americanbanker.com/news/bank-technology/biometric-tipping-point-usaa-deploys-face-voice-recognition-1072509-1.html>
- [4] A. MacGregor. (2016, Feb.) Security in rich internet applications. [Online]. Available: <https://thestack.com/iot/2016/02/22/mastercard-rolls-out-selfie-verification-for-mobile-payments/>
- [5] A. MacGregor. (2016) Amazon wants to replace passwords with selfies and videos. [Online]. Available: <https://thestack.com/security/2016/03/15/amazon-wants-to-replace-passwords-with-selfies-and-videos/>
- [6] M. Anderson. (2015) Alibaba demonstrates facial recognition payment system at cebit. [Online]. Available: <https://thestack.com/security/2015/03/16/alibaba-demonstrates-facial-recognition-payment-system-at-cebit/>
- [7] M. Anderson. (2016) Google testing facial recognition payments on android and ios in san francisco. [Online]. Available: <https://thestack.com/cloud/2016/03/03/google-hands-free-facial-recognition-trial-san-francisco/>
- [8] H. Gunasinghe and E. Bertino, "Rahasnym: Protecting against linkability in the digital identity ecosystem," in *The 35th IEEE International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems*. IEEE, June 2015.
- [9] "IdentityX | World-Class Mobile Biometric Authentication," <http://www.identityx.com>.
- [10] A. S. U. Feige, A. Fiat, "Zero-knowledge proofs of identity," *Journal of Cryptology*, 1988.
- [11] T. P. Pedersen, "Non-interactive and information-theoretic secure verifiable secret sharing," in *Proceedings of CRYPTO'91*, 1992.
- [12] J. Camenisch and A. Lysyanskaya, "An Efficient System for Non-Transferable Anonymous Credentials with Optional Anonymity Revocation," in *Proceedings of EUROCRYPT '01*, pp. 93–118.
- [13] J. C. E. Brickell and L. Chen, "Direct anonymous attestation," in *ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security*, 2004.
- [14] H. Gunasinghe and E. Bertino, "Privacy Preserving Biometrics-Based and User Centric Authentication Protocol," in *Network and System Security - 8th International Conference, NSS 2014*, 2014, pp. 15–17.
- [15] N. Asokan, J. Ekberg, and K. Kostiaainen, "The untapped potential of trusted execution environments on mobile devices," in *Proceedings of Financial Cryptography and Data Security*, April 2013, pp. 293–294.
- [16] D. Shen. (2015) Attacking-your-trusted-core-exploiting-trustzone-on-android. [Online]. Available: <https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Shen-Attacking-Your-Trusted-Core-Exploiting-Trustzone-On-Android-wp.pdf>
- [17] Wikipedia. (2014) Arm architecture. [Online]. Available: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ARM_architecture
- [18] Z. Lin, J. Rhee, C. Wu, X. Zhang, and D. Xu, "Dimsum: Discovering semantic data of interest from un-mappable memory with confidence," in *Proceedings of the 19th Annual Network and Distributed System Security Symposium (NDSS12)*. ACM, 2012.
- [19] M. Dijk, C. Gentry, S. Halevi, and V. Vaikuntanathan, "Fully homomorphic encryption over the integers." In EUROCRYPT, 2010.
- [20] A. C. Yao., "Protocols for secure computations." in *In FOCS*, 1982.
- [21] S. Goldwasser, Y. Kalai, R. A. Popa, V. Vaikuntanathan, and N. Zeldovich, "Reusable garbled circuits and succinct functional encryption," in *Proceedings of STOC13*.
- [22] R. Bost, R. A. Popa, and S. T. amd S. Goldwasser, "Machine learning classification over encrypted data," in *NDSS '15*, 2015.