

From partners to populations: A hierarchical Bayesian account of coordination and convention

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Languages are powerful solutions to coordination problems: they provide stable, shared expectations about how the words we say correspond to the beliefs and intentions in our heads. Yet language use in a variable and non-stationary social environment requires linguistic representations to be flexible: old words acquire new *ad hoc* or partner-specific meanings on the fly. In this paper, we introduce a hierarchical Bayesian theory of convention formation that aims to reconcile the long-standing tension between these two basic observations. More specifically, we argue that the central computational problem of communication is not simply transmission, as in classical formulations, but *learning* and *adaptation* over multiple timescales. Under our account, rapid learning within dyadic interactions allows for coordination on partner-specific common ground, while social conventions are stable priors that have been abstracted away from interactions with multiple partners. We present new empirical data alongside simulations showing how our model provides a cognitive foundation for explaining several phenomena that have posed a challenge for previous accounts: (1) the convergence to more efficient referring expressions across repeated interaction with the same partner, (2) the gradual transfer of partner-specific common ground to novel partners, and (3) the influence of communicative context on which conventions eventually form.

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To communicate successfully, speakers and listeners must share a common system of semantic meaning in the language they are using. These meanings are *social conventions* in the sense that they are arbitrary to some degree, but sustained by stable expectations that each

person holds about others in their community (Lewis, 1969; Bicchieri, 2006; Hawkins, Goodman, & Goldstone, 2019). Importantly, these expectations extend to complete strangers. An English speaker may order a “cup of coffee” at any café in the United States and expect to receive (roughly) the same kind of drink.

This report is based in part on work presented at the 39th, 40th, and 42nd Conferences of the Cognitive Science Society (Hawkins, Frank, & Goodman, 2017; Hawkins, Franke, Smith, & Goodman, 2018; Hawkins, Goodman, Goldberg, & Griffiths, 2020). Materials and code for reproducing all model simulations, behavioral experiments, and analyses are open and available online at https://github.com/hawkrobe/conventions_model.

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At the same time, meaning can be remarkably flexible and *partner-specific*. The same words may be interpreted differently by different listeners. Interactions between friends and colleagues are filled with proper names, technical jargon, slang, shorthand, and inside jokes, many of which are unintelligible to outside observers. Furthermore, words take on new *ad hoc* senses over the course of a conversation (H. H. Clark, 1996).

The tension between these two basic observations, global stability and local flexibility, has posed a chal-

lenging and persistent puzzle for theories of convention. Many influential computational accounts explaining how stable social conventions emerge in populations do not allow for partner-specific meaning at all (e.g. Hurford, 1989; Barr, 2004; Skyrms, 2010; Steels, 2011; Young, 2015). These accounts typically examine groups of interacting agents who update their representation of language after each interaction. While the specific update rules range from simple associative mechanisms (e.g. Steels, 1995) or heuristics (e.g. Young, 1996) to more sophisticated deep reinforcement learning algorithms (e.g. Tielemans, Lazaridou, Mourad, Blundell, & Precup, 2019; Graesser, Cho, & Kiela, 2019; Mordatch & Abbeel, 2017), all of these accounts assume that agents update a single, monolithic representation of language to be used with every partner, and that agents do not (knowingly) interact repeatedly with the same partner.

Conversely, accounts emphasizing rapid alignment (Pickering & Garrod, 2004) or partner-specific common ground (H. H. Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986) across extended interactions with the same partner typically do not specify mechanisms by which community-wide conventions may arise over longer timescales. The philosopher Donald Davidson articulated one of the most radical of these accounts. According to Davidson (1984, 1986, 1994), it is exclusively the ability to coordinate on *partner-specific* meanings that is ultimately responsible for successful communication:

In order to judge how he will be interpreted, [the speaker] uses his starting theory of interpretation. As speaker and interpreter talk, their “prior” theories become more alike; so do their “passing” theories. The asymptote of agreement and understanding is when passing theories coincide. Not only does it have its changing list of proper names and gerrymandered vocabulary, but it includes every successful use of any other word or phrase, no matter how far out of the ordinary [...] Such meanings, transient though they may be, are literal. (Davidson, 1986, p. 261).

This line of argument led Davidson (1986) to memorably conclude that “there is no such thing as a language” (p. 265), and to abandon appeals to conven-

tion altogether (see also Heck, 2006; Lepore & Ludwig, 2007; Hacking, 1986; Dummett, 1994, for discussion).

In this paper, we propose a theory of coordination and convention that aims to reconcile the emergence of community-level conventions with partner-specific common ground in a unified cognitive model. This theory is motivated by the computational problems facing individual agents who must communicate with one another in a variable and non-stationary world. We suggest that three core cognitive capacities are needed for an agent to solve this problem, which are naturally formalized in a hierarchical Bayesian model:

- C1:** the ability to maintain **uncertainty** about what words will mean to different partners,
- C2:** flexible **online learning** to coordinate on partner-specific meanings, and
- C3:** inductive **generalization** to abstract away stable expectations about meaning to new partners.

One of our central theoretical aims is to ground the problem of convention — a fundamentally interactive, social phenomenon — in the same domain-general cognitive mechanisms supporting learning in other domains where abstract, shared properties need to be inferred along with idiosyncratic particulars of instances (Berniker & Kording, 2008; Goodman, Ullman, & Tenenbaum, 2011; Tenenbaum, Kemp, Griffiths, & Goodman, 2011; Kleinschmidt & Jaeger, 2015).

Our argument is structured around a series of three key phenomena in the empirical literature that have proved evasive for previous theoretical accounts of convention and coordination:

- P1:** the convergence to **increasingly efficient conventions** over repeated interactions with a single partner,
- P2:** the transition from **partner-specific conventions** to ones that are expected to generalize to new partners
- P3:** the influence of **communicative context** on which terms eventually become conventionalized

We begin by introducing the *repeated reference game* paradigm at the center of this literature and reviewing the empirical evidence supporting each of these phenomena. We then introduce our hierarchical Bayesian

model in detail and highlight several qualitative properties that emerge from our formulation. The remainder of the paper proceeds through each of these phenomena (**P1-P3**) in turn. For each phenomenon, we use computational simulations to evaluate our model’s explanations on existing data, and introduce data from new real-time, multi-player behavioral experiments to test novel predictions when existing data does not suffice. Finally, we close by discussing several broader consequences of the theory, including the continuity of language acquisition in childhood with adaptation in adulthood, the domain-generality of discourse processes, and the integration of social and linguistic representations.

Three lessons about convention formation from repeated reference games

A core function of language is *reference*: using words to convey the identity of an entity in the environment. Loosely inspired by Wittgenstein (1953), empirical studies of coordination and convention in communication have predominantly focused on the subset of language use captured by simple “reference games.” In a reference game task, participants are assigned to speaker and listener roles and shown a context of possible referential targets (e.g. images). On each trial, the speaker is asked to produce a referring expression — typically a noun phrase — that will allow the listener to select the intended target object from among the other objects in the context. Critically, a *repeated reference game* asks them to refer to the same targets multiple times as they build up a shared history of interaction with their partner (see Table A1 in Appendix for a review of different axes along which the design varies).

Unlike typical studies of referring expression generation (van Deemter, 2016; Degen, Hawkins, Graf, Kreiss, & Goodman, 2020; Dale & Reiter, 1995), studies of coordination and convention tend to use novel, ambiguous stimuli that participants do not already have strong conventions for. And unlike agent-based simulations of convention formation on large networks (e.g. Steels, 2011; Barr, 2004; Centola & Baronchelli, 2015), which typically match agents with a new, anonymous partner for each trial, repeated reference games ensure that participants maintain the same partner throughout an extended interaction. This design allows us to observe how the speaker’s referring expressions for the same objects change as a function of interaction with




Figure 1. Classic phenomena in repeated reference games. Across multiple repetitions of the same referent with the same partner, speakers converge to increasingly efficient utterances (reps. 1-6). When the listener is replaced by a new, naive partner, speakers display a key signature of partner-specificity, reverting to longer utterances before converging again with their new partner (reps. 7-12). Error rates were reported to be low (~ 2.3%) throughout the experiment. Reproduced from Table 3 in Wilkes-Gibbs and Clark (1992).

that particular partner. We highlight three findings of particular theoretical significance in this literature.

P1: Increasingly efficient conventions. The most well-known phenomenon observed in repeated reference games is a dramatic reduction in message length over multiple rounds (Krauss & Weinheimer, 1964; H. H. Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986; Hawkins, Frank, & Goodman, 2020). The first time participants refer to a figure, they tend to use a lengthy, detailed description (e.g. “the upside-down martini glass in a wire stand”) but with a small number of repetitions — between 3 and 6, depending on the pair of participants — the description may be cut down to the limit of just one or two words (“martini”). These final messages are as short or shorter than the messages participants produce when they are instructed to generate descriptions for themselves to interpret in the future (Fussell & Krauss, 1989) and are often incomprehensible to overhearers who were not present for the initial messages (Schober & Clark, 1989). These observations set up our first puzzle of *ad hoc* convention formation in dyads. How does a word or short phrase that would have been ineffective for communicating under the global conventions of a language take on local meaning over mere minutes of interaction?

P2: Partner-specific conventions. Because meaning is grounded in the evolving common ground shared

with each partner, *ad hoc* conventions established over a history of interaction with one partner are not necessarily transferred to other partners (Metzing & Brennan, 2003; Weber & Camerer, 2003; Horton & Gerrig, 2016). For example, Wilkes-Gibbs and Clark (1992) paired participants for a standard repeated reference game, but after six rounds, one partner was asked to leave the room and replaced by a naive partner. Without partner-specific representations, we would expect speakers to continue using the short labels they had converged on with their first partner; instead, speakers reverted to the longer utterances they had initially used and coordinated on new *ad hoc* conventions with their new partner (see Fig. 1).

These effects raise our second puzzle: how do population-level conventions form in the presence of such strong partner-specificity? When are agents justified in transferring an *ad hoc* convention formed with one partner to a new, unseen partner? One important empirical clue was provided by Fay, Garrod, Roberts, and Swoboda (2010), who examined the emergence of conventions in a lab experiment where communities of eight people played a repeated graphical communication game similar to Pictionary, where participants produced drawings to allow their partner to identify a concept from a list of possibilities. The 8 participants in each network interacted dyadically with every other member of the community in, turn, for a series of seven repeated reference games.

Strikingly, participants behaved as observed by Wilkes-Gibbs and Clark (1992) at the first few partner swaps, consistent with partner-specificity, but the initial messages they sent to subsequent partners gradually converged closer to the *ad hoc* labels conventionalized with previous partners, indicating a slow gradient of generalization within their community. While intriguing, this work was limited by an extremely small sample size ($N = 4$ groups) and technical challenges facing the measurement of conventions in the graphical modality (see Hawkins, Sano, Goodman, & Fan, 2019). More recent work has adopted a similar design for an artificial-language communication task (Raviv, Meyer, & Lev-Ari, 2019) but has collapsed across repeated dyadic interactions to exclusively analyze network-level metrics, making it difficult to assess any effects of partner-specificity. Given these limitations of existing data, we evaluate our model's predictions using a large-scale,

real-time web experiment directly extending Wilkes-Gibbs and Clark (1992) to larger networks.

P3: Context-sensitive conventions. Finally, while a degree of arbitrariness is central to conventionality – there must exist more than one solution that would work equally well – this does not necessarily imply that all possible conventions for a meaning are equally likely in practice, or even that all meanings are equally likely to become conventionalized in the first place (Hawkins & Goldstone, 2016). Indeed, functional accounts of language have frequently observed that lexical systems are well-calibrated to the needs of users under the statistics of their communicative environment (Gibson et al., 2019). This Optimal Semantic Expressivity hypothesis (OSE; Frank, 2017) has held remarkably well for the lexical distributions found in natural languages across semantic domains like color words and kinship categories (Kemp & Regier, 2012; Regier, Kemp, & Kay, 2015; Gibson et al., 2017; Kemp, Xu, & Regier, 2018).

While such long-term, diachronic sensitivity to context has been explained by abstract principles of optimality, such as the equilibria concepts of evolutionary game theory (Jäger, 2007; Jäger & Van Rooij, 2007), it has not yet been grounded in a cognitive and mechanistic account of the immediate, synchronic processes unfolding in the minds of individual agents while they interact. In other words, while there is abundant empirical evidence for context-sensitivity in the *outcomes* of convention formation processes, our third puzzle concerns which cognitive mechanisms may be necessary or sufficient to give rise to such conventions.

Repeated reference games have emerged as a promising method for probing these mechanisms in the lab. We can explicitly control the communicative context and observe the resulting distribution of conventions that emerge when participants communicate with artificial languages (Winters, Kirby, & Smith, 2014; Kirby, Tamariz, Cornish, & Smith, 2015; Winters, Kirby, & Smith, 2018) or natural language (Hawkins, Frank, & Goodman, 2020). While these outcomes are informative, it has remained challenging to directly evaluate cognitive models against the *full trajectories* of convention formation on a trial-by-trial basis. In our final section, we report new empirical data from a dyadic repeated reference task manipulating context, where simulated agents and human participants are shown exactly the same sequence of trials.

Convention formation as Hierarchical Bayesian inference

In this section, we propose a unified computational account of *ad hoc* coordination and convention formation that addresses these three empirical puzzles. We begin from first principles: What is the core computational problem that must be solved to achieve successful communication? Classically, this problem has been formulated in terms of coding and compression (Shannon, 1948). An intended meaning in the speaker’s mind must be encoded as a signal that is recoverable by the receiver after passing through a noisy transmission channel. This literal transmission problem has since been enriched to account for *pragmatics* – the ability of speakers and listeners to use context and social knowledge to draw inferences beyond the literal meaning of messages (Sperber & Wilson, 1986). We take the Rational Speech Act framework (RSA; Frank & Goodman, 2012; Goodman & Frank, 2016; Franke & Jäger, 2016) as representative of this current synthesis, formalizing communication as recursive social inference in a probabilistic model. In the next section, we will review this basic framework and then raise two fundamental computational problems facing this framework that motivate our proposal.

RSA models of communication with static meaning

In our referential communication setting¹, the RSA framework defines a pragmatic speaker, denoted by S_1 , who must choose an utterance u that will allow their partner to choose a particular target object o from the current communicative context C : They attempt to satisfy the Gricean Maxims (Grice, 1975) by selecting utterances proportional to a utility function $U(u; o)$ that balances informativity to an imagined listener against the cost of producing an utterance:

$$\begin{aligned} S_1(u|o) &\propto \exp\{\alpha_S \cdot U(u; o)\} \\ U(u; o) &= (1 - w_C) \cdot \underbrace{\log L_0(o|u)}_{\text{informativity}} - w_C \cdot \underbrace{c(u)}_{\text{cost}} \end{aligned} \quad (1)$$

where $c(u)$ is a function giving the cost of producing u , assuming a longer utterances are more costly. The speaker has two free parameters: $w_C \in [0, 1]$ controls the relative weight of informativity and parsimony in the speaker’s production, and $\alpha_S \in [0, \infty]$ controls their

softmax optimality (i.e. as $\alpha_S \rightarrow \infty$, the speaker increasingly chooses the utterance with maximal utility.)

The imagined *literal listener* L_0 in Eq. 1 is assumed to identify the target using a lexical meaning function $\mathcal{L}(u, o)$ capturing the literal semantics of the utterance u . That is, the probability of the literal listener choosing object o is proportional to the meaning of u under a static lexical meaning function \mathcal{L} :

$$L_0(o|u) \propto \mathcal{L}(u, o)$$

Throughout this paper, we will take \mathcal{L} to be a traditional truth-conditional function evaluating whether a given object is in the extension of the utterance²:

$$\mathcal{L}(u, o) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } o \in \llbracket u \rrbracket \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

However, there are many alternative representational choices compatible with our core model, including fuzzier, continuous semantics (Degen et al., 2020) or vector embeddings learned by a neural network (Potts, 2019, see Appendix B for examples), which may be more appropriate for scaling the model to larger spaces of words and referents. We return to these possibilities in the General Discussion.

Two fundamental problems for static meaning

This basic framework and its extensions have accounted for a variety of important phenomena in pragmatic language use (e.g. Scontras, Tessler, & Franke, 2018; Kao, Wu, Bergen, & Goodman, 2014; Tessler & Goodman, 2018; Lassiter & Goodman, 2015). Yet it retains a key assumption from classical models: that the speaker and listener must share the same literal “protocol” \mathcal{L} for encoding and decoding messages. In this section, we highlight two under-appreciated challenges of communication that complicate this assumption.

The first challenge is *variability* in linguistic meaning throughout a language community. Different listeners may recover systematically different meanings from

¹For concreteness, we restrict our scope to reference in a discrete context of objects, but the same formulation applies to more general spaces of meanings.

²Note that the normalization constant may be exactly zero for some possible lexicons – for instance, if a given utterance is literally false of all objects in context – in which case these distributions are not well-defined. See Appendix A for technical details of how we address this problem.

the same message, and different speakers may encode the same message in different ways. For example, doctors may fluently communicate with one another about medical conditions using specialized terminology that is meaningless to a patient. The words may not be in the patient’s lexicon, and even common words may be used in non-standard ways. That is, being fluent speakers of the same language does not ensure perfect overlap for the relevant meanings that need to be transmitted in every context: different partners may simply be using different functions \mathcal{L} .

The second challenge is the *non-stationarity* of the world. Agents are continually presented with new thoughts, feelings, and entities, which they may not already have efficient conventions to talk about. For example, when new technology is developed, the community of developers and early adopters must find ways of referring to the new concepts they are working on (e.g. *e-mailing, the Internet*). Or, when researchers design a new experiment with multiple conditions, they must find ways of talking about their own *ad hoc* abstractions, often converging on idiosyncratic names that can be used seamlessly in meetings. That is, any literal protocol \mathcal{L} that we may write down at one time would be quickly outdated at a later time (see Lazaridou et al., 2021, for a demonstration of the related problems posed by non-stationary for large neural language models). We must have some ability to extend our language on the fly as needed.

A hierarchical model of dynamic meaning

Rather than assuming a monolithic, universally shared language, we argue that agents solve the core problems posed by variability and non-stationarity by attempting to continually, adaptively *infer* the system of meaning used by their partner in context. When all agents are continually learning in this way, we will show that they are not only able to locally coordinate on *ad hoc* meanings with specific partners but also able to abstract away linguistic conventions that are expected to be shared across an entire community. We introduce our model in three steps, corresponding to three core capacities: hierarchical uncertainty about meaning, online partner-specific learning, and inductive generalization.

Hierarchical uncertainty about meaning. When an agent encounters a communication partner, they must call upon some representation about what they




Figure 2. Schematic of hierarchical Bayesian model. At the highest level, denoted by Θ , is a representation of aspects of meanings expected to be shared across all partners. These *global* conventions serve as a prior for the systems of meanings used by specific partners, ϕ_k . These partner-specific representations give rise in turn to predictions about their language use $P(D_k|\phi_k)$, where D_k represents observations in a communicative interaction with partner k . By inverting this model, agents can adapt to *local* partner-specific conventions and update their beliefs about global conventions.

expect different signals will mean to that partner. We therefore replace the static function \mathcal{L} with a *parameterized family* of lexical meaning functions by \mathcal{L}_ϕ , where different values of ϕ yield different possible systems of meaning. To expose the dependence on a fixed system of meaning, Eq. 1 can be re-written to give behavior under a fixed value of ϕ :

$$L_0(o|u, \phi) \propto \mathcal{L}_\phi(u, o) \quad (2)$$

$$U(u; o, \phi) = (1 - w_C) \cdot \log L_0(o|u, \phi) - w_C \cdot c(u)$$

$$S_1(u|o, \phi) \propto \exp\{\alpha_S \cdot U(u; o, \phi)\}$$

While we will remain agnostic for now to the exact functional form of \mathcal{L}_ϕ and the exact parameter space of ϕ (see *Inference details* section below), there are two key computational desiderata we emphasize. First, given the challenge of variability raised in the previous section, these expectations ought to be sensitive to the overall statistics of the population. An agent should know that there is tighter consensus about the meaning of *dog* than the meaning of, say, specialized medical terms like *sclerotic aorta* (H. H. Clark, 1998), and conversely, should expect more consensus around how to refer to familiar concepts than new or ambiguous concepts. Second, this representation should also, in principle, be sensitive to the social identity of the partner: a cardiologist should have different expectations about a long-time colleague than a new patient.

The first desideratum, representing population vari-

ability, motivates a *probabilistic* formulation. Instead of holding a single static function \mathcal{L}_ϕ , which an agent assumes is shared perfectly in common ground (i.e. one ϕ for the whole population), we assume each agent maintains *uncertainty* over the exact meaning of words as used by different partners. In a Bayesian framework, this uncertainty is specified by a prior probability distribution over possible values of ϕ . For example, imagine that under some possible values of ϕ , the term “sclerotic aorta” has truth conditions related to a specific condition of the heart, but under other values of ϕ , it does not: a well-trained doctor approaching a stranger should not assume their partner is using either ϕ but should assign some probability to each case. The introduction of uncertainty over a partner’s literal semantics has previously been explored in the context of one-shot pragmatic reasoning, where it was termed *lexical uncertainty* (Bergen, Levy, & Goodman, 2016), and in the context of iterated dyadic interactions (N. J. Smith, Goodman, & Frank, 2013).

The second desideratum, sensitivity to partner-specific meanings, motivates a *hierarchical* model, where uncertainty is represented by a multi-level prior. At the highest level of the hierarchy is *community-level* uncertainty $P(\Theta)$, where Θ represents an abstract “over-hypothesis” about the overall distribution of possible partners. Θ then parameterizes the agent’s *partner-specific* uncertainty $P(\phi_k|\Theta)$, where ϕ_k represents the specific system of meaning used by partner k (see Fig. 2). We focus for simplicity on this basic two-layer hierarchy, but the model can be straightforwardly extended to representing uncertainty at intermediate layers of social structure, including whether partners belong to distinct sub-communities (e.g. represented by discrete latent variables) or varying along latent dimensions (e.g. represented by a topic mixture). We return to these possible extensions in the General Discussion.

To integrate this lexical uncertainty into our speaker and listener models, we assume they each act in a way that is expected to be successful *on average*, under likely values of ϕ_k (N. J. Smith et al., 2013). In other words, they sample actions by marginalizing over their own posterior $P_S(\phi_k|D_k)$ or $P_L(\phi_k|D_k)$ of different meanings their partner k may be using.[ndg: need to say

what D_k is.]

$$\begin{aligned} L(o|u) &\propto \exp \left\{ \alpha_L \int P_L(\phi_k|D_k) \log S_1(u|o, \phi_k) d\phi_k \right\} \\ S(u|o) &\propto \exp \left\{ \alpha_S \int P_S(\phi_k|D_k) U(u; o, \phi_k) d\phi_k \right\} \end{aligned} \quad (3)$$

where $\alpha_S, \alpha_L \in [0, \infty]$ control the speaker’s and listener’s soft-max optimality, respectively³.

Partner-specific learning. This formulation derives how agents ought to act given a certain set of partner-specific beliefs about ϕ_k . But where do these beliefs come from? Although an agent may begin with significant uncertainty about the system of meaning their partner is using in the current context, an extended interaction provides useful information for reducing that uncertainty and therefore improving the success of communication. In other words, *ad hoc* convention formation may be re-cast as an inference problem. Given observations D_k from interactions with partner k , an agent can update their beliefs about their partner’s latent system of meaning following Bayes rule:

$$\begin{aligned} P(\phi_k, \Theta|D_k) &\propto P(D_k|\phi_k, \Theta)P(\phi_k, \Theta) \\ &= P(D_k|\phi_k)P(\phi_k|\Theta)P(\Theta) \end{aligned} \quad (4)$$

This joint inference decomposes the partner-specific learning problem into two terms, a prior term $P(\phi_k|\Theta)P(\Theta)$ and a likelihood term $P(D_k|\phi_k)$. The prior term captures the idea that, in the absence of strong evidence of partner-specific language use, the agent ought to regularize toward their background knowledge of conventions: the aspects of meaning that all partners are expected to share in common. The likelihood term represents predictions about how a partner would use language in context under different underlying systems of meaning (as specified in the *Referential Feedback* section below).

Importantly, the posterior obtained in Eq. 4 allows agents to explicitly maintain *partner-specific expectations*, as used in Eq. 3, by marginalizing over

³We denote L and S without a subscript because they are the final speaker and listener models we use throughout the paper – the subscripted definitions are internal constructs used to define these models – but in the terminology of the RSA framework they represent L_1 - and S_1 -level pragmatic agents. We found that higher levels of recursion were not necessary to derive the phenomena of interest, but Eq. 3 L_n and S_n -level lexical uncertainty models may be generalized by replacing S_1 in the listener equation, and L_0 in the speaker’s utility equation, with standard RSA definitions of $n - 1$ -level agents (e.g. Zaslavsky, Hu, & Levy, 2020).

community-level uncertainty:

$$P(\phi_k|D_k) = \int_{\Theta} P(\phi_k, \Theta|D_k)d\Theta \quad (5)$$

This posterior can be viewed as the “idiolect” that has been fine-tuned to account for partner-specific common ground from previous interactions. We will show that when agents learn about their partner in this way, and adjust their own production or comprehension accordingly (i.e. Eq. 3), they are able to coordinate on stable *ad hoc* conventions.

Inductive generalization. The posterior in Eq. 4 also provides an inductive pathway for partner-specific data to inform beliefs about community-wide conventions. Agents update their beliefs about Θ , using data accumulated from different partners, by marginalizing over beliefs about specific partners:

$$P(\Theta|D) = \int_{\phi} P(\phi, \Theta|D)d\phi \quad (6)$$

where $D = \bigcup_{k=1}^N D_k$, $\phi = \phi_1 \times \dots \times \phi_N$, and N is the number of partners previously encountered. Intuitively, when multiple partners are inferred to use similar systems of meaning, beliefs about Θ shift to represent this abstracted knowledge: it becomes more likely that a novel partner in one’s community will share it as well. Note that this population-level posterior over Θ not only represents what the agent has learned about the central tendency of the group’s conventions, but also the *spread*, capturing the notion that some word meanings may be more variable than others.

The updated Θ should be used to guide the prior expectations an agent brings into a subsequent interactions with a stranger. This transfer is sometimes referred to as “sharing of strength” or “partial pooling” because pooled data is smoothly integrated with domain-specific knowledge. This property has been key to explaining how the human mind solves a range of other difficult inductive problems in the domains of concept learning (Kemp, Perfors, & Tenenbaum, 2007; Tenenbaum et al., 2011), causal learning (Kemp, Goodman, & Tenenbaum, 2010; Goodman et al., 2011), motor control (Berniker & Kording, 2008), and speech perception (Kleinschmidt & Jaeger, 2015). [ndg: here or in GD should mention that blessing of abstraction means it is possible for beliefs about language “in general” to outpace beliefs about partner idiosyncrasies. i think this

may be important for reconciling our proposal with language acquisition work?]

Further challenges

The formulation in the previous section presents the core of our theory. Here, we highlight several additional features of our model, which address more specific challenges raised by prior work on communication and which we will encounter in the simulations reported in the remainder of the paper. Our organization of these details is motivated by Spike, Stadler, Kirby, and Smith (2017), which recently distilled three common problems that all accounts of convention must address: (1) the availability of referential feedback, (2) a form of information loss or forgetting, and (3) a systemic bias against ambiguity. Finally, we explain practical details of how we perform inference in this model.

Referential feedback. Learning and adaptation depends on the availability and quality of observations D_k throughout a communicative interaction. If the speaker has no way of assessing the listener’s understanding, or if the listener has no way of comparing their interpretation against the speakers intentions, however indirectly, they can only continue to rely on their prior, with no ground for conventions to form (Krauss & Weinheimer, 1966; Hupet & Chantraine, 1992; Garrod, Fay, Lee, Oberlander, & MacLeod, 2007). So, what data D_k should each agent use to update their beliefs at a particular point in an interaction?

In principle, we expect that D_k reflects all relevant sources of information that may expose an agent’s understanding or misunderstanding, including verbal and non-verbal backchannels (*mmhmm*, nodding), clarification questions, and actions taken in the world. In the more minimal setting of a reference game, we use the full feedback provided by the task, where the speaker’s intended target and the listener’s response are revealed at the end of each trial. Formally, this information can be written as a set of tuples $D_k = \{o^*, u', o'\}_{t=1}^T$, where o^* denotes the speaker’s intended target, u' denotes the utterance they produced, and o' denotes the listener’s response, on each previous trial t .

Now, to specify the likelihoods in Eq. 4 for our referential setting, we assume each agent should infer their partner’s lexicon ϕ_k by conditioning on their *partner’s* previous choices. The listener on a given trial should use the probability that a speaker would pro-

duce u to refer to the target o^* under different ϕ_k , i.e. $P_L(\{o^*, u', o'\}_t | \phi_k) = S_1(u'_t | o_t^*, \phi_k)$, and the speaker should likewise use the probability that their partner would produce response o' after hearing utterance u , $P_S(\{o^*, u', o'\}_t | \phi_k) = L_0(o'_t | u'_t)$. This symmetry, where each agent is attempting to learn from the other's behavior, creates a clear coordination problem⁴. In the case of an error, where the agent in the listener role hears the utterance u' and chooses an object o' other than the intended target o^* , they will receive feedback about the intended target and subsequently condition on the fact that the speaker chose u' to convey that target. Meanwhile, the agent in the speaker role will subsequently condition on the likelihood that the listener chose the object o' upon hearing their utterance. In other words, each agent will subsequently condition on slightly different data leading to slightly different beliefs that must be resolved through further interaction.

[ndg: when each player updates independently using bayes rule, treating their partner's lexicon as fixed, they might update "at cross purposes". i think we believe that this process will converge in the limit of enough trials.... do we have a proof of that? if we do, great! if not, we should indicate this as a reasonable open question.]

Memory and forgetting. Second, we must address the limitations imposed by memory and forgetting; it is unrealistic to expect that memories of every element of every past interaction in D is equally available. Furthermore, this may be to the agent's advantage. As described in the previous section, early errors are incorporated into the data, leading to mis-coordination much later in an interaction when each agent conditions on different data. Without a mechanism to discount these earlier data points, agents may be prevented from ever reaching consensus (Spike et al., 2017).

[ndg: I think it is worth pointing out (and perhaps changing description to embrace) that the hierarchical model could be extended one level down to treat different time points with the same partner as having different lexicons. a reasonably strong assumption of statistical sharing between neighboring timepoints would yield the simple forgetting model below.... but this is a more principled way to capture the idea that the lexicon evolves over an extended interaction?]

Forgetting is typically incorporated into Bayesian models with a decay term in the likelihood function (Anderson & Schooler, 2000; Angela & Cohen, 2009;

Fudenberg & Levine, 2014; Kalm & Norris, 2018).

$$P(D_k | \phi_k) = \prod_{\tau=0}^T \beta^\tau P(\{o^*, u', o'\}_{T-\tau} | \phi_k)$$

where $\tau = 0$ indexes the most recent trial T and decay increases further back through time. This decay is motivated by the empirical power function of forgetting (Wixted & Ebbesen, 1991), and can be interpreted as the expectation over a process where observations have some probability of dropping out of memory at each time step. Alternatively, at the algorithmic level, decay can be viewed as a form of weighted importance sampling, where more recent observations are preferentially sampled (Pearl, Goldwater, & Steyvers, 2010).

Bias against ambiguity. A third specific challenge is posed by ambiguity: if a speaker uses a label to refer to one target, it is consistent with the data for the listener to subsequently believe that the same expression may be acceptable for other targets as well. In our account, this problem is naturally solved by the principles of *pragmatic reasoning* instantiated in the RSA framework (Grice, 1975), which has been explicitly linked to *mutual exclusivity* in word learning (Bloom, 2002; Frank, Goodman, & Tenenbaum, 2009; N. J. Smith et al., 2013; Gulordava, Brochhagen, & Boleda, 2020; Ohmer, König, & Franke, 2020). Gricean pragmatic reasoning critically allows agents to learn from the *absence* of evidence by reasoning about alternatives.

Pragmatic reasoning plays two distinct roles in our model. First, Gricean agents assume that their partner is using language in a cooperative manner and account for this when inferring their partner's language model. That is, we use these equations as the linking function in the likelihood $P(D_k | \phi_k)$, representing an agent's prediction about how a partner with meaning function ϕ_k would actually behave in context (Eq. 4). S_1 is used to learn from observations generated in the speaker role and L_1 is used to learn from observations generated in the listener role. For example, upon hearing their partner use a particular utterance u to refer to an object o ,

⁴In some settings, agents in one role may be expected to take on more of the burden of adaptation, leading to an asymmetric division of labor (e.g. Moreno & Baggio, 2014). This may be especially relevant in the presence of asymmetries in power, status, or capability. In principle, this could be reflected in differing values of parameters α_S and α_L , but we leave consideration of such asymmetries for future work.

a pragmatic agent can not only infer that u means o in their partner’s lexicon, but also that all other utterances u' likely do *not* mean o : if they did, the speaker would have used them instead. Second, agents do not only make passive inferences from observation, they participate in the interaction by *using language* themselves. A Gricean agent’s own production and comprehension is also guided by cooperative principles (Eq. 3).

Many minor variations on the basic RSA model have been explored in previous work, and it is worth highlighting two technical choices in our formulation. First, both agents are “action-oriented,” in the sense that they behave proportional to the utility of different actions, according to a soft-max normalization $\sigma(U(z)) = e^{U(z)} / \sum e^{U(z)}$. This contrasts with some RSA applications, where the listener is instead assumed to be “belief-oriented,” simply inferring the speaker’s intended meaning without producing any action of their own (Qing & Franke, 2015). Second, our instantiation of lexical uncertainty allows an agent to maintain their own lexical posterior and marginalize over possible partner lexicons regardless of whether they are in the speaker or listener role. This definition differs subtly from the model used by Bergen et al. (2016), which placed the integral over lexical uncertainty at a single level of recursion (specifically, within a pragmatic listener agent), defining higher-level speakers in terms of this uncertain listener. This is a natural choice when the primary focus is to derive one-shot implicatures from a listener model, but in a repeated interaction setting, where the same agent may play both speaker and listener roles, locating uncertainty at a single site necessarily leads to an asymmetry between the speaker and listener roles. Instead, we argue that it is more natural for the uncertainty to always be placed at the highest level, where one agent is reasoning about their *partner*, regardless of what role they are currently playing. See Appendix A for further details and discussion of our RSA implementation.

Inference details. While our simulations in the remainder of the paper each address different scenarios, we have aimed to hold as many details as possible constant throughout the paper. First, we must be concrete about the space of possible lexicons that parameterizes the lexical meaning function, \mathcal{L}_ϕ . For consistency with previous Bayesian models of word learning (e.g. Xu & Tenenbaum, 2007) we take the space of possible mean-

ings for an utterance to be the set of nodes in a concept taxonomy. When targets of reference are conceptually distinct, as typically assumed in signaling games, the target space of utterance meanings reduces to the discrete space of individual objects, i.e. $\llbracket u \rrbracket_\phi = \phi(u) \in O$ for all $u \in \mathcal{U}$.

For this special case, the parameter space contains exactly $|O| \times |\mathcal{U}|$ possible values for ϕ , corresponding to all possible mappings between utterances and individual objects. Each possible lexicon can therefore be written as a binary matrix where the rows correspond to utterances, and each row contains one object. The truth-conditional function $\mathcal{L}_\phi(u, o)$ then simply checks whether the element in row u matches object o . For example, there are four possible lexicons for two utterances and two objects:

$$\phi \in \left\{ \begin{bmatrix} \text{■} \\ \text{○} \end{bmatrix}, \begin{bmatrix} \text{○} \\ \text{■} \end{bmatrix}, \begin{bmatrix} \text{■} \\ \text{■} \end{bmatrix}, \begin{bmatrix} \text{○} \\ \text{○} \end{bmatrix} \right\}$$

Second, having defined the support of ϕ , we can then define a simplicity prior $P(\phi) \propto \exp\{-|\phi|\}$ following Frank et al. (2009), where $|\phi|$ is the total size of each word’s extension, summed across words in the vocabulary. Again, for traditional signaling games, this reduces to a uniform prior because all possible lexicons are the same size: $\phi(u_i) \sim \text{Unif}(O)$. Indeed, we can compactly write distributions over ϕ in terms of the same utterance-object matrix, where row i represents the marginal distribution over possible meanings of utterance u_i . For example, the uninformative prior for two utterances and two objects can be written:

$$P(\phi) = \begin{bmatrix} \text{Unif}(\text{■}, \text{○}) \\ \text{Unif}(\text{■}, \text{○}) \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} .5 & .5 \\ .5 & .5 \end{bmatrix}$$

For **P3**, however, we consider spaces of referents with more complex conceptual structure and a larger space of possible meanings, where a single word may apply to multiple conceptually related referents or, conversely, may have a ‘null’ meaning, referring to no objects at all. [ndg: clarify this null meaning thing, and indicate that it’s there in all simulations?] In this more general case, a simplicity prior generically favors smaller word meanings as well as a smaller effective vocabulary size, since the null meaning has the smallest extension.

Finally, while the probabilistic model we have formulated in this section is theoretically motivated and

mathematically well-defined, it has been challenging to actually derive predictions from it. Historically, interactive models have been difficult to study with closed-form analytical techniques and computationally expensive to study through simulation, likely contributing to the prevalence of simplified heuristics in prior work. Our work has been facilitated by recent advances in probabilistic inference techniques that have helped to overcome these obstacles. We have implemented our simulations in the probabilistic programming language WebPPL (Goodman & Stuhlmüller, electronic). All of our simulations iterate the following trial-level loop: (1) sample an utterance from the speaker agent’s distribution, given the target object, (2) sample an object from the listener’s object distribution, given the utterance sampled in the previous step, (3) append the results to the list of observations, and (4) update both agents’ posterior distributions, conditioning on these observations before continuing to the next trial.

To obtain the speaker and listener distributions (steps 1-2; Eq. 2), we always use exhaustive enumeration for exact inference. We would prefer to use enumeration to obtain posteriors over lexical meanings (step 4; Eq. 4), but as the space of possible lexicons ϕ grows, enumeration becomes intractable. For simulations related to **P2** and **P3**, we therefore switch to Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods to obtain samples from the posterior, and approximate the expectations in Eq. 3 by summing over these samples. Because we are emphasizing a set of phenomena where our model makes qualitatively different predictions than previous models, our goal in this paper is to illustrate and evaluate these *qualitative* predictions rather than provide exact quantitative fits to empirical data. As such, we proceed by examining predictions for a regime of parameter values (w_S, w_L, w_C, β) that make qualitatively informative predictions, and leave the more computationally expensive task of parameter fitting to future studies?

Phenomenon #1: Ad hoc conventions become more efficient

We begin by considering the phenomenon of increasing efficiency in repeated reference games: speakers use detailed descriptions at the outset but converge to an increasingly compressed shorthand while remaining understandable to their partner. While this phenomenon has been extensively documented, to the point of serv-

ing as a proxy for measuring common ground, it has continued to pose a challenge for models of communication.

For example, one possibility is that speakers coordinate on meaning through priming mechanisms at lower levels of representation, as proposed by influential *interactive alignment* accounts (Pickering & Garrod, 2004, 2006; Garrod & Pickering, 2009). While low-level priming may be at play in repeated reference tasks, especially when listeners engage in extensive dialogue or alternate roles, it is not clear why priming would cause descriptions to get shorter as opposed to aligning on the same initial description. Furthermore, priming alone cannot explain why speakers still converge to more efficient labels even when the listener is prevented from saying anything at all and only minimal feedback is provided showing that the listener is responding correctly (Krauss & Weinheimer, 1966); conversely, speakers continue using longer descriptions when they receive non-verbal feedback that the listener is repeatedly making errors (see also Hawkins, Frank, & Goodman, 2020). In these cases, there are no linguistic features available for priming or alignment mechanisms. Explaining when and why speakers believe that shorter descriptions will suffice requires a mechanism for coordination on meaning even given sparse, non-verbal feedback.

Another possibility is that speakers coordinate on meaning using some lexical update rule that makes utterances more likely to be produced after communicative successes and less likely after communicative failures, such as a variant on the Roth-Erev reinforcement learning rule (Erev & Roth, 1998) adopted by a variety of agent-based models (Steels, 1995; Barr, 2004; Young, 2015). While reinforcement is a powerful mechanism for allowing groups to reach consensus, it is not clear why a newly initialized speaker would prefer to produce longer utterances over shorter utterances, or, if this bias was built-in, how simply reinforcing initially long descriptions could lead utterances to get shorter. In the rare cases that some form of reduction has been investigated in this family of models (e.g. as in the phenomenon of phonological erosion), the process has been hard-coded as an ϵ probability of speakers dropping a random token at each point in time (Beuls & Steels, 2013; Steels, 2016).

Such random dropping, however, is an unsatisfying




Figure 3. Path-dependence of conventions. The average trajectory of each agent’s beliefs about the meaning of u_1 , $\phi(u_1)$, are shown following all eight possible outcomes of the first trial in Simulation 1.1. For each of the two possible targets, the speaker could choose to produce either of the two utterances, and the listener could respond by choosing either of the two objects. In the cases where the listener chose correctly (marked with a checkmark), agents subsequently conditioned on the same data and rapidly converged on a system of meaning consistent with this feedback. For example, in the first row, when u_1 was successfully used to refer to the circle, both agents subsequently believe that u_1 means *circle* in their partner’s lexicon. In the cases where the listener fails to choose the target, the agents subsequently condition on different data, and they converge on a convention that is determined by later choices. [ndg: this figure give me the (incorrect) impression that when the initial trial is incorrect no convention arises later. it’s because the future is an average over trajectories which are equally likely to break up or down.... would it be possible to eg add lightweight lines for individual trajectories so that it’s easier to see this?]

explanations for several reasons. First, it formalizes a reductive explanation of efficiency in terms of speaker-internal noise (or laziness). This idea dates back to the early literature on repeated reference games and control experiments by Hupet and Chantraine (1992) were designed to test this possibility (see also Garrod et al., 2007). Participants were asked to repeatedly refer to the same targets for a *hypothetical* partner to see later, such that any effects of familiarity or repetition on the part of the speaker were held constant with the interactive task. No evidence of reduction was found, and in some cases utterances actually grew longer. This accords with observations in multi-partner settings by Wilkes-Gibbs and Clark (1992), which we explore further in P2: it is difficult to explain why a speaker who only shortened their descriptions due to an ϵ -noise process would suddenly switch back to a longer utterance when their partner is exchanged. Whatever drives effi-

ciency cannot be explained through speaker laziness, it must be a result of the *interaction* between partners.

In this section, we argue that our Bayesian account provides a rational explanation for increasing efficiency in terms of the inferences made by speakers across repeated interaction. Given that this phenomenon arises in purely dyadic settings, it also provides an opportunity to explore more basic properties of the first two capacities formalized in our model (representing *uncertainty* and *partner-specific learning*) before introducing hierarchical generalization in the next section. In brief, we show that increasing efficiency is a natural consequence of the speaker’s tradeoff between informativity and parsimony (Eq. 3), given their inferences about the listener’s language model. For novel, ambiguous objects like tangrams, where speakers do not expect strong referential conventions to be shared, longer initial descriptions are motivated by high initial uncertainty in

the speaker’s lexical prior $P(\phi_k|\Theta)$. Proposing multiple descriptors is a rational hedge against the possibility that any particular meaning is not shared by the listener. [ndg: our model doesn’t exactly do this “rational hedge” thing – see comments below – should we stick with that description?] As the interaction goes on, the speaker obtains feedback D_k from the listener responses and updates their posterior beliefs $P(\phi_k|D_k)$ accordingly. As uncertainty gradually decreases, they are able to achieve the same expected informativity with shorter, more efficient messages.

Simulation 1.1: Pure coordination

We build up to our explanation of increasing efficiency by first exploring a traditional signaling game scenario with only one-word utterances. This simulation tests the most fundamental competency for any model of *ad hoc* coordination: agents are able to coordinate on a communication system in the absence of shared priors. We consider the simplest possible reference game with two objects, $\mathcal{O} = \{\bullet, \square\}$, where the speaker must choose between two one-word utterances $\mathcal{U} = \{u_1, u_2\}$ with equal production cost.

For illustration, we walk explicitly through the first step of the simulation depicted in Fig. 3. Suppose the target object presented to the speaker agent on the initial trial is \bullet . Due to their uniform priors, both utterances are equally likely to apply to either object, and because each utterance is equally (un)informative, the speaker’s utility reduces to sampling an utterance at ran-

dom $u \sim S(u|\bullet)$. Suppose u_1 is sampled. The listener hears this utterance and selects an object according to their own utility, which also reduces to sampling an object at random $o \sim L(o|u_1)$ — say, \bullet , a correct response. Finally, both agents may use the observed tuple $D = \{\bullet^*, u_1, \bullet\}$, depicted as the top row in Fig. 3 to update their beliefs about their partner’s true lexicon.

$$P_S(\phi|D) \propto L_0(\bullet|u_1, \phi)P(\phi)$$

$$P_L(\phi|D) \propto S_1(u_1|\bullet^*, \phi)P(\phi)$$

Both agents then proceed to the next trial, where they use this updated posterior distribution to produce or interpret language in their new role. To examine how the dynamics of this process unfold over multiple rounds, we simulated 1000 trajectories. The trial sequence contained 30 trials, structured into 15 repetition blocks. The two objects appeared in a random order within each block, and agents swapped roles at the beginning of each block. We show representative behavior at softmax optimality parameter values $w_L = w_S = 2$ and memory discounting parameter $\beta = 0.8$, but see Appendix Fig. A1 for an exploration of behavior at other parameter values.

We highlight several key results from this simulation. First, most fundamentally, the communicative success of the dyad rises over the course of interaction; the listener is able to more accurately select the true target object (see Fig. 4A). Second, the initial symmetry between the meanings is broken by initial choices, leading to *arbitrary* but *stable* mappings in future rounds. Because




Figure 4. Pairs of agents learn to successfully coordinate on efficient *ad hoc* conventions over repeated interactions. (A) agents converge on accurate communication systems in Simulation 1.1, where only single-word utterances are available, and (B) converge on shorter, more efficient conventions in Simulation 1.2, where multi-word utterances were available. Error bars are bootstrapped 95% CIs across 1000 trajectories, computing within each block of two trials.




Figure 5. Schematic of speaker for first trial of Simulation 1.2. The speaker begins with uncertainty about the meanings in the listener's lexicon (e.g. assigning 55% probability to the possibility that utterance u_1 means object o_1 .) A target o_1 is presented, and the speaker samples an utterance from the distribution $S(u|o_1)$. Finally, they observe the listener's response and update their beliefs. Due to the compositional semantics of the utterance u_1u_2 , the speaker becomes increasingly confident that both component primitives, u_1 and u_2 , apply to object o_1 in their partner's lexicon.

agents were initialized with the same priors in every trajectory, trajectories only diverged when different actions happen to be sampled. This can be seen by examining the path-dependence of subsequent beliefs based on the outcome of the initial trial in Fig. 3. Third, we observe the influence of mutual exclusivity via Gricean pragmatic reasoning: agents also make inferences about *unheard* utterances. Observing $D = \{(u_2, \bullet)\}$ also provides evidence that u_1 likely does not mean \bullet (e.g. the third row of Fig. 3, where hearing u_2 refer to \bullet immediately led to the inference the u_1 likely refers to \blacksquare).

Simulation 1.2: Increasing efficiency

Next, we show how our model explains speakers' gains in efficiency over multiple interactions. For efficiency to change at all, speakers must be able to produce utterances that vary in length. For this simulation, we therefore extend the model to allow for multi-word utterances by allowing speakers to combine together multiple primitive utterances. Human speakers essentially form long description by proposing a collection of simpler descriptions (e.g. "kind of an X or maybe a Y with Z on top"). This behavior suggests that multi-word utterances u_iu_j ought to be interpreted according to a 'max' operation, allowing the literal listener to use any component part that fits the referent under the given lexicon⁵:

$$\mathcal{L}_\phi(u_iu_j, o) = \max\{\mathcal{L}_\phi(u_i, o), \mathcal{L}_\phi(u_j, o)\}$$

[ndg: pre-discussion comment: earlier we defined \mathcal{L} to be Boolean valued, so it's not clear what max means. i

believe we mean "logical OR"? maybe just call it OR? Also... people will be confused by this because it is not how binomial constructions actually work in language. I think we are driven to it because we don't have any "neutral" options where i can just say i'm not sure what u1 means so it doesn't contribute to the full utterance meaning. this could come from a soft semantics (ie then we have 0.5 available and product should be ok), or from composing at the level of distributions...] [ndg: updated thoughts post-discussion: i *really* don't like the logical-or semantics (aka MAX rule, but we are working with boolean denotations, so it's just OR) because it leads to some very unintended consequences if we make the world of the simulation just a bit more complex. eg if there were color and shape properties, we really want [[red square]] = [[red]] AND [[square]] (and not [[red]] OR [[square]]). so we would need some unusual semantic rules anyhow - "OR if the predicates refer to the same feature, AND if different". at which point i think it's nicer to just be explicit that we want this kind of "modal conjunction" whose meaning is AND except if it's false for all possible referents, when it's true (or equivalently neutral if we had

⁵We focus on the 'max' operation as one of the simplest and most natural ways of constructing longer, non-atomic utterances from primitives. See also Steinert-Threlkeld (2016) who consider the operation of negation. We discuss the possibility of a conjunctive operation in Appendix B, which is capable of producing the desired increases in efficiency but requires additional assumptions about strategically "failing to refer" that we find difficult to endorse.

a third value). btw i should flag that i'm happy enough with this "modal and" approach for the paper, but i actually think it derives the initial preference for two words for the wrong reason. essentially, in this approach (and the OR one) the S1 chooses "u1u2" because this leads the L0 to not update her beliefs when u1 contradicts u2, and this is preferable to risking L0 having the wrong belief (because log is asymmetric, so $\log(0)$ is a really bad utility). i think we all share the intuition that why the speaker should actually produce two words is to hedge her bets on one word not being understood as she expects – "u1u2" should be more likely to convey the correct meaning, not just be a noop. we could get the hedging (aka rational redundancy) effect if either we had soft semantics with product or max composition, or if there was some chance that each word is true of both objects. (robert, did we talk through that latter option – putting some probability mass on the lexicon $[[0,1],[1,1]]$ etc? there may be some reasons it doesn't work?) but i think robert convinced me that following down this route is too complicated in terms of inference (distributions on continuous semantics) and model description (non-truth functional semantics or uncertainty in more places), and not really needed for the purposes of this paper.]

Now, we consider a scenario with the same two objects as in Simulation 1.1, but give the speaker four primitive utterances $\{u_1, u_2, u_3, u_4\}$ instead of only two, and allow two-word utterances, u_1u_2 etc. We established in the previous section that successful *ad hoc* conventions can emerge even in a state of pure uncertainty, but human participants in repeated reference games typically bring some prior expectations about language into the interaction. For example, a participant who hears 'ice skater' on the first round of the task in H. H. Clark and Wilkes-Gibbs (1986) may be more likely to select some objects more than others while still having substantial uncertainty about the intended target (e.g. over three of the twelve tangram that have some resemblance to an ice skater). This observation is key to understanding why speakers may initially use longer utterances in repeated reference games with ambiguous stimuli. Under a completely uniform prior, where all words are expected to be equally meaningless to one's partner, longer utterances have no additional value. [ndg: could you confirm that last sentence is true of our current model? because the model is using "u1u2" to be a noop, in order to avoid L0 having a

false belief, it may actually choose "u1u2" more even if the meanings are uniform??] Under a completely concentrated prior, where there already exists a strong convention for a short label, that label would suffice and a longer utterance is redundant. We thus initialize both agents with very weak biases (represented in compressed matrix form in Fig. 5):

$$\begin{aligned} P(\phi(u_1) = o_1) &= P(\phi(u_2) = o_1) = 0.55 \\ P(\phi(u_3) = o_1) &= P(\phi(u_4) = o_1) = 0.45 \end{aligned}$$

As in Simulation 1.1, we simulated 1000 distinct trajectories of dyadic interaction between agents. Utterance cost was defined to be the number of 'words' in an utterance, so $c(u_1) = 1$ and $c(u_1u_2) = 2$. As shown in Fig. 4b, our speaker agent initially prefers longer utterance (mean length ≈ 1.5 on first block) but rapidly converges to shorter utterances after several repetitions (mean length ≈ 1 on final block), qualitatively matching the curves measured in the empirical literature (e.g. Fig. 1).

To illustrate in detail how our model derives this phenomenon, we walk step-by-step through a single trial (Fig. 5). Consider a speaker who wants to refer to object o_1 . They expect their partner to be slightly more likely to interpret their language using a lexicon in which u_1 and u_2 apply to this object, due to their weak initial biases. However, there is still a reasonable chance ($p = 0.45$) that either u_1 or u_2 alone will be interpreted to mean o_2 by their partner, which would lead to an incorrect response. Thus, it is more informative to produce the longer utterance u_1u_2 to hedge against this possibility, despite its higher production cost. [ndg: ok, we need to be careful / add more explanation here. the real reason the speaker chooses the two word utterance isn't exactly to make sure one of the words conveys the correct meaning, it's to make sure that the listener doesn't get a false belief — this is bad because of the shape of log — and the two word utterance yields no belief update when the words contradict each other.] To see why this is the case, consider the expected informativity of the utterance under different possible listener lexicons. The possibility with highest probability is that both u_1 and u_2 will mean o_1 in the listener's lexicon ($p = 0.55^2 \approx 0.3$), in which case the listener will correctly identify the target with high probability. The possibility that both u_1 and u_2 will mean o_2 in the listener's lexicon is only $p = 0.45^2 \approx 0.2$, leading the




Figure 6. Internal state of speaker in example trajectory from Simulation 1.2. Each term of the speaker's utility (Eq. 3) is shown throughout an interaction. When the speaker is initially uncertain about meanings (far left), the longer utterance $u_1 u_2$ has higher expected informativity (center-left) and therefore higher utility (center-right) than the shorter utterances u_1 and u_2 , despite its higher cost (far-right). As the speaker observes several successful interactions, they update their beliefs and become more confident about the meanings of the component lexical items u_1 and u_2 . As a result, more efficient single-word utterances gradually gain in utility as cost begins to dominate the utility. On trial 5, u_1 is sampled, breaking the symmetry between utterances.

listener to erroneously select o_2 with high probability. In the mixed cases, where just one of u_1 or u_2 means o_2 in the listener's lexicon ($p = 2 \cdot 0.45 \cdot 0.55 \approx 0.5$), the listener will choose between the objects at chance, which yields an intermediate informativity. When expected informativity is calculated across these outcomes, it is more valuable to produce the longer disjunction than the shorter component utterances.

Finally, upon observing the listener's response to the disjunction (say, o_1), the speaker becomes more confident that the component utterances u_1 and u_2 mean o_1 in their updated posterior over the listener's lexicon. This credit assignment to individual lexical items is a consequence of the compositional meaning of longer utterances in our simple grammar. [ndg: would be good to unpack that last point with another sentence or two. eg "the speaker knows a listener for whom either u_1 or u_2 means o_1 would have been likely to make the observed choice, and so the probability of those mappings increases."]

Fig. 6 shows the trajectories of internal components of the speaker utility as the interaction continues. We assume for illustrative purposes that o_1 continues to be the target on each trial and the same agent continues

to be the speaker. As the posterior probability that individual primitive utterances u_1 and u_2 independently mean o_1 increases (far left), the marginal gap in informativity between the disjunction and the shorter components gradually decreases (center left). As a consequence, production cost increasingly dominates the utility (center-right). After several trials of observing a successful listener response given the disjunction, the utility of the shorter utterances reaches parity with the disjunction (yielding a situation now similar to Simulation 1.1). Once the speaker samples a shorter utterance (e.g. u_1), the symmetry collapses and that utterance remains most probable in future rounds, allowing for a stable and efficient *ad hoc* convention. Thus, increasing efficiency is derived as a rational consequence of uncertainty and partner-specific inference about the listener's lexicon. For these simulations, we used $w_S = w_L = 7$, $w_C = 11$, $\beta = 0.8$ but the qualitative reduction effect is found over a range of different parameters (see Appendix Fig. A2).

Discussion

The simulations presented in this section aimed to establish a rational explanation for feedback-sensitive increases in efficiency over the course of *ad hoc* convention formation. Speakers initially hedge their descriptions under uncertainty about the lexical meanings their partner is using, but are able to get away with less costly components of those descriptions as their uncertainty decreases. Our explanation recalls classic observations about *hedges*, expressions like *sort of* or *like*, and morphemes like *-ish*, that explicitly mark provisionality, such as *a car*, *sort of silvery purple colored* (Fraser, 2010; Medlock & Briscoe, 2007). Brennan and Clark (1996) counted hedges across repetitions of a repeated reference game, finding a greater occurrence of hedges on early trials than later trials and a greater occurrence under more ambiguous contexts. While our model does not explicitly produce hedges, it is possible to understand this behavior as an explicit or implicit marker of the lexical uncertainty theorized by our account. [ndg: i guess we don't need to go into it, but i think caching out this idea about hedges requires L0 to be aware of some of the uncertainty — it works out nicely in a soft semantics version, but not so much in our current formulation.]

We have already discussed why this phenomenon poses a challenge for the simple model-free reinforcement learning models in the literature — namely, that successful listener feedback only reinforces long utterances with no mechanism for shortening them. This observation is not intended to rule out the entire family of reinforcement learning approaches, however. It is plausible that more sophisticated *model-based* reinforcement learning algorithms are flexible enough to account for the phenomenon. For instance, hierarchical architectures that appropriately incorporate compositionality or incrementality into the speaker's production model may be able to reinforce component parts of longer utterances in the shared history (e.g Hawkins, Kwon, Sadigh, & Goodman, 2019). Still, such an approach would bring these models much closer to the features of our proposal than to the model-free agents in the existing literature. We return to this question in our discussion of the scalability of our model in the General Discussion.

Finally, the theory of reduction explored in this section is consistent with recent analyses of exactly what

gets reduced in a large corpus of repeated reference games (Hawkins, Frank, & Goodman, 2020). These analyses found that entire modifying clauses are more likely to be dropped at once than expected by random corruption, and function words like determiners are mostly dropped as parts of larger noun phrases or prepositional phrases rather than omitted on their own. In other words, speakers apparently begin by combining multiple descriptive labels and collapse to one of these labels, rather than noisily dropping words and assuming the listener can recover the intended longer utterance, as predicted by a noisy channel model. This theoretical claim is further supported by early hand-tagged analyses by Carroll (1980), which found that in three-quarters of transcripts from Krauss and Weinheimer (1964) the conventions that participants eventually converged upon were prominent in some syntactic construction at the beginning, often as a head noun that was initially modified or qualified by other information.

While our account explains these observations as a result of structure and heterogeneity in the lexical prior, it remains an open question of how to instantiate appropriately realistic priors in our computational model. Our simulation only considered two-word descriptions with homogenous uncertainty over the components, and is likely that the semantic components of real initial descriptions have more heterogeneous uncertainty: for example, the head noun may be chosen due to a higher prior probability of being understood by the listener than other components of the initial description, thus predicting asymmetries in reduction. Future work is needed to elicit these priors and evaluate predictions about more fine-grained patterns.

Phenomenon #2: Conventions gradually generalize to new partners in a social network

How do *ad hoc* conventions formed through interaction with a single partner become *global* conventions shared throughout a community? Exactly how do we make the inferential leap to community-wide expectations from our experiences with specific partners? Grounding collective convention formation in the individual learning mechanisms explored in the previous section requires an explicit *theory of generalization* capturing how people transfer what they have learned from one partner to the next.

One influential theory is that speakers simply ignore the identity of different partners and update a single monolithic representation after every interaction (Steels, 1995; Barr, 2004; Young, 2015). We call this a *complete-pooling* theory because data from each partner is collapsed into an undifferentiated pool of evidence (Gelman & Hill, 2006). Complete-pooling models have been remarkably successful at predicting collective behavior on networks, but have typically been evaluated only in settings where anonymity is enforced. For example, Centola and Baronchelli (2015) asked how large networks of participants coordinated on conventional names for novel faces. On each trial, participants were paired with a random neighbor but were not informed of that neighbor's identity, or the total number of different possible neighbors.

While complete-pooling may be appropriate for some everyday social interactions, such as coordinating with anonymous drivers on the highway, it is less tenable for everyday communicative settings. Knowledge about a partner's identity is both available and relevant for conversation (Eckert, 2012; Davidson, 1986). Partner-specificity thus poses clear problems for complete-pooling theories but can be easily explained by another simple model, where agents maintain separate expectations about meaning for each partner. We call this a *no-pooling* model (see K. Smith et al., 2017, where). The problem with no-pooling is that agents are forced to start from scratch with each partner. Community-level expectations never get off the ground.

Our hierarchical *partial-pooling* account offers a compromise between these extremes. Unlike complete-pooling and no-pooling models, we propose that beliefs about meaning [ks: again, specific to meaning or could this also be about how meanings map to word forms or about any aspect of language?] have hierarchical structure. That is, the meanings used by different partners are expected to be drawn from a shared community-wide distribution but are also allowed to differ from one another in systematic, partner-specific ways. This structure provides an inductive pathway for abstract population-level expectations to be distilled from partner-specific experience.

The key predictions distinguishing our model thus concern the pattern of generalization across partners. Experience with a single partner ought to be relatively uninformative about further partners, hence our partial-

pooling account behaves much like a no-pooling model in predicting strong partner-specificity. After interacting with enough partners in a tight-knit community, however, speakers should become increasingly confident that labels are not simply idiosyncratic features of a particular partner's lexicon but are shared across the entire community, gradually transitioning to the behavior of a complete-pooling model. In this section, we test this novel prediction in a networked communication game and explicitly compare our model to pure complete-pooling and no-pooling variants.

[ks: There is actually a literature on how children deal with outlier language models that might be relevant here and could also strengthen your argument that we need a model that's capable of exhibiting this kind of behaviour. You can get some refs on this stuff about learning from reliable/unreliable speakers from here: <https://psyarxiv.com/ruwdk>]

Model predictions

We first compare the generalization behavior produced by each model by simulating the outcomes of interacting with multiple partners on a small network. We used a round-robin scheme to schedule four agents into a series of repeated reference games with their three neighbors, playing 4 successive trials with one partner before advancing to the next, for a total of 12 trials. These reference games used a set of two objects $\{o_1, o_2\}$ and four utterances $\{u_1, \dots, u_4\}$ as in Simulation 1.2, and agents swapped speaker and listener roles on each trial.

Unlike our previous simulations with a single partner, where hierarchical generalization was irrelevant, we must now specify the hyper-prior $P(\Theta)$ governing the overall distribution of partners (Eq. 4). We use independent Gaussian distributions for each matrix entry $\Theta_{ij} \in \Theta$. We then center the partner-specific prior $\phi_{ij} \in \phi$ at the corresponding value Θ_{ij} :

$$\begin{aligned} P(\Theta_{ij}) &\sim N(0, 1) \\ P(\phi_{ij}|\Theta_{ij}) &\sim N(\Theta_{ij}, 1) \end{aligned}$$

[ks: I just wrote "huh?" next to this in my annotated copy! :-)] These priors represent assumptions about how far partner-specific learning can drift from the community-wide value. We simulated 48 networks, setting $w_S = 11$, $w_C = 7$ (see Fig. A4 in the Appendix for an exploration of other parameters).




Figure 7. Simulation results and empirical data for (A) listener accuracy, (B) speaker reduction, and (C) network convergence across three partners. Vertical lines mark boundaries where new partners were introduced.

Listener accuracy across partners. [ks: Slightly tricky to interpret this without knowing that the community eventually converges under the pooling models - e.g. later you say “After observing multiple partners use utterances similarly” but you haven’t actually said this yet. Could consider doing convergence first, but I can see why that also works nicely last.]

We first consider the partner-specificity of a *listener*’s expectations about which object is being referred to. The probability the listener assigns to the target on each trial is shown for the different models in Fig. 7A. Under the partial-pooling model (top row), the listener agent begins at chance due to its uninformative prior, but after observing several trials of evidence from the same partner, it rapidly infers the meaning its partner is using and learns to choose the true target with higher accuracy. When a second partner is introduced, the agent’s expectations revert nearly to their original state, unlike a complete-pooling model (second row). This reversion is due to ambiguity about whether the behavior of the first partner was idiosyncratic or attributable to community-level conventions. In the absence of data from other partners, its observations are more parsimo-

niously explained at the partner-specific level. After observing multiple partners use utterances similarly, however, we find that this knowledge has gradually been incorporated into community-level expectations. This is evident in much stronger initial expectations when introduced to the fourth partner ($\sim 75\%$ accuracy vs. 50% with the first partner), unlike a no-pooling model (third row).

Speaker utterance length across partners. Next, we examined our model’s predictions about how a *speaker*’s referring expressions will change with successive listeners. While it has been frequently observed that messages reduce in length across repetitions with a single partner (Krauss & Weinheimer, 1964) and sharply revert back to longer utterances when a new partner is introduced (Wilkes-Gibbs & Clark, 1992), the key prediction distinguishing our model concerns behavior across subsequent partner boundaries. Complete-pooling accounts predict no reversion in number of words when a new partner is introduced (Fig. 7B, second row). No-pooling accounts predict that roughly the same initial description length will reoccur with every subsequent interlocutor (Fig. 7B, third

row). Here we show that a partial pooling account predicts a more complex pattern of generalization.

First, as in Simulation 1.2, we found that descriptions become more efficient over interaction with a single partner: the model becomes more confident that shorter utterances will be meaningful, so the marginal informativity provided by the longer utterance is not worth the additional cost. Second, we find that the speaker model reverts back to a longer description at the first partner swap: evidence from one partner is relatively uninformative about the community. Third, after interacting with several partners, the model becomes more confident that one of the short labels is shared across the entire community, and is correspondingly more likely to begin a new interaction with it (Fig. 7B, top row).

Network convergence. Finally, because all agents are simultaneously making inferences about the others, the network as a whole faces a coordination problem. For example, in the first block, agents 1 and 2 may coordinate on using u_1 to refer to o_1 while agent 3 and 4 coordinate on using u_2 . Once they swap partners, they must negotiate this potential mismatch in usage. How does the network as a whole manage to coordinate?

We measured alignment by examining the utterances produced by speakers: if two agents produced the same utterance, we assign a 1, otherwise we assign a 0. We compared alignment between currently interacting agents (i.e. *within* a dyad) to those who were not interacting (i.e. *across* dyads). Alignment across dyads was initially near chance, reflecting the arbitrariness of whether speakers reduce to u_1 or u_2 . Under a no-pooling model (Fig. 7C, third row), subsequent blocks remain at chance, as conventions need to be re-negotiated from scratch. Under a complete-pooling model (Fig. 7C, second row), agents persist with mis-calibrated expectations learned from previous partners rather than adapting to their new partner, and *within-dyad* alignment deteriorates. By contrast, under our partial-pooling model, alignment across dyads increases without affecting alignment within dyads, suggesting that hierarchical inference leads to emergent consensus (Fig. 7C, top row).

Behavioral experiment

To evaluate the predictions observed in our simulations, we designed a natural-language communication experiment following roughly the same network de-

sign as our simulations. That is, instead of anonymizing partners, as in many previous empirical studies of convention formation (e.g. Centola & Baronchelli, 2015), we divided the experiment into blocks of extended dyadic interactions with stable, identifiable partners (see Fay et al., 2010; Garrod & Doherty, 1994, for similar designs). Each block was a full repeated reference game, where participants had to coordinate on *ad hoc* conventions for how to refer to novel objects with their partner (Brennan & Clark, 1996). Our partial-pooling model predicted that these conventions will partially reset at partner boundaries, but agents should be increasingly willing to transfer expectations from one partner to another.

Participants. We recruited 92 participants from Amazon Mechanical Turk to play a series of interactive, natural-language reference games.

Stimuli and procedure. Each participant was randomly assigned to one of 23 fully-connected networks with three other participants as their 'neighbors' (Fig. 8A). Each network was then randomly assigned one of three distinct "contexts" containing abstract tangram stimuli taken from (H. H. Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986). The experiment was structured into a series of three repeated reference games with different partners, using these same four stimuli as referents. Partner pairings were determined by a round-robin schedule (Fig. 8B). The trial sequence for each reference game was composed of four repetition blocks, where each target appeared once per block. Participants were randomly assigned to speaker and listener roles and swapped roles on each block. After completing sixteen trials with one partner, participants were introduced to their next partner and asked to play the game again. This process repeated until each participant had partnered with all three neighbors. Because some pairs within the network took longer than others, we sent participants to a temporary waiting room if their next partner was not ready.

Each trial proceeded as follows. First, one of the four tangrams in the context was highlighted as the *target object* for the speaker. They were instructed to use a chatbox to communicate the identity of this object to their partner, the listener (see Fig. 8C). The two participants could engage freely in dialogue through the chatbox but the listener must ultimately make a selection from the array. Finally, both participants in a pair were given full feedback on each trial about their partner's




Figure 8. In our experiment, (A) participants were placed in fully-connected networks of 4, (B) paired in a round-robin schedule with each neighbor, and (C) played a series of repeated reference games using tangram stimuli.

choice and received bonus payment for each correct response. The order of the stimuli on the screen was randomized on every trial to prevent the use of spatial cues (e.g. 'the one on the left'). The display also contained an avatar representing their current partner to emphasize that they were speaking to the same partner for an extended period. [ks: Are the distinct avatars as shown in Fig 8C? It looks relatively subtle there, just different shades?]

Results

We evaluated participants' generalization behavior on the same three metrics we used in our simulations: accuracy, utterance length, and network convergence.

Listener accuracy. We first examined changes in the proportion of correct listener selections. In particular, our partial pooling model predicts (1) gains in accuracy within each partner and (2) drops in accuracy at partner boundaries, but (3) overall improvement in initial interactions with successive partners. To test the first prediction, we constructed a logistic mixed-effects regression predicting trial-level listener responses. We included a fixed effect of repetition block within partner (1, 2, 3, 4), along with random intercepts and slopes for each participant and each tangram. We found that accuracy improved over successive repetitions with every partner, $b = 0.69, z = 3.87, p < 0.001$.

To test changes at partner boundaries, we constructed another regression model. We coded the repetition blocks immediately before and after each partner swap, and included this as a categorical fixed effect. Because partner roles were randomized for each game, the same participant often did not serve as listener in both blocks, so in addition to tangram-level intercepts, we

included random slopes and intercepts at the *network* level (instead of the participant level). We found that across the two partner swaps, accuracy dropped significantly, $b = -1.56, z = -2, p < 0.05$ [ks: give exact p, even if it's pretty much bang on .05], reflecting partner-specificity of meaning [ks: "reflecting partner-specificity of meaning" - somehow this wording confused me, is it clearer to say that it reflects the fact that the population has not completely converged on a shared system of meaning / meaning-form mapping?]. Finally, to test whether performance improves for the *very first* interaction with each new partner, before observing any partner-specific information, we examined the simple effect of partner number on the trials immediately after the partner swap ($t = \{1, 5, 9\}$). As predicted, we found a significant improvement in performance, $b = 0.57, z = 2.72, p < 0.01$, suggesting that listeners are bringing increasingly well-calibrated expectations into interactions with novel neighbors (see Fig. 7A, bottom row).

Speaker utterance length. Next, as a measure of coding efficiency, we calculated the raw length (in words) of the utterance produced on each trial. We then tested analogues of the same three predictions we tested in the previous section using the same mixed-effects models, but using a linear regression on the continuous measure of efficiency instead of accuracy (see Fig. 7B, bottom row). We log-transformed utterance lengths for stability [ks: stability in what sense?]. We found that speakers reduced utterance length with every partner, $b = -0.19, t(34) = -9.88, p < 0.001$, increased length across partner-boundaries, $b = 0.43, t(22) = 4.4, p < 0.001$, and decreased the length of their *initial descriptions* with each new partner on their network,,

$b = -0.2, t(516.5) = -6.07, p < 0.001$ (see Fig. 7B, bottom row).

Network convergence. In this section, we examine the actual *content* of pacts and test whether these coarse signatures of generalization actually lead to increased alignment across the network, as predicted. Specifically, we extend the ‘exact matching’ measure of alignment used in Simulation 3 to natural language production by examining whether the *intersection* of words produced by different speakers was non-empty. We excluded a list of common stop words (e.g. ‘the’, ‘both’) to focus on the core conceptual content of pacts; using a continuous measure based on the size of the intersection instead of a binary measure yielded similar results.

As in our simulation, the main comparison of interest was between currently interacting participants and participants who are not interacting: we predicted that within-pair alignment should stay consistently high while (tacit) alignment between non-interacting pairs will increase. We thus constructed a mixed-effects logistic regression including fixed effects of pair type (within vs. across), partner number, and their interaction. We included random intercepts at the tangram level and maximal random effects at the network level (i.e. intercept, both main effects, and the interaction). As predicted, we found a significant interaction ($b = -0.85, z = -5.69, p < 0.001$; see Fig. 7C, bottom row). Although different pairs in a network may initially use different labels, these labels begin to align over subsequent interactions.

Discussion

Our partial pooling model claims[ks: assumes?] that conventions represent the shared structure that agents “abstract away” from partner-specific learning. In this section, we evaluated the extent to which our partial pooling model captured human generalization behavior in a natural-language communication experiment on small networks. Unlike complete-pooling accounts, our model allows for partner-specific common ground to override community-wide expectations given sufficient experience with a partner, or in the absence of strong conventions. Unlike no-pooling accounts, it allows[ks: results in?] networks to converge on more efficient and accurate expectations about novel partners.

While it is not easily classified into either the complete-pooling or no-pooling classes, the priming

mechanisms proposed by *interactive alignment* accounts also cannot straightforwardly account for patterns of partner-specificity. If a particular semantic representation has been activated due to precedent in the preceding dialogue, then the identity of the speaker should not in principle alter its continued influence (Brennan & Hanna, 2009). More sophisticated hierarchical memory retrieval accounts that represent different partners as different *contexts* (e.g Polyn, Norman, & Kahana, 2009) may be consistent with partner-specificity, but evoking such an account presupposes that social information like partner identity is already a salient and relevant feature of the agent’s context representation and thus no longer relies purely on “egocentric” priming and activation mechanisms. [ks: I know you guys are not big fans of priming, but is it fairer to say that they need to be augmented with social info to capture this kind of result, rather than saying they “cannot” at the start here? I think there’s a bunch of converging evidence that that’s the case.] Indeed, a process-level account assuming socially-aware context reinstatement for episodic memories, and slower consolidation of shared features into population-level expectations, may be one possible candidate for realizing our computational-level model (see General Discussion for more on process-level evidence).

Phenomenon #3: Conventions are shaped by communicative context

In the previous two sections, we examined a mechanism for rapid, partner-specific learning that allows agents to form stable but arbitrary *ad hoc* conventions with partners and gradually generalize them to their entire community. The final phenomenon we consider is the way that *ad hoc* conventions are shaped by the communicative context in which they form. This phenomenon is most immediately motivated by recent behavioral results finding that more informative words in the local context are significantly more likely to become conventionalized as labels (Hawkins, Frank, & Goodman, 2020).

However, our broader theoretical aim is to suggest that *diachronic* patterns in the long-term evolution of a community’s lexical conventions, as highlighted by the Optimal Semantic Expressivity (OSE) hypothesis (Frank, 2017), may be explained as a result of the *synchro-*nic processes at play in individual dyads’ *ad hoc*




Figure 9. Domain for context-sensitivity. (A) Example of *fine* context where one of the distractors belongs to the same fine-grained branch of the hierarchy as the target (i.e. another striped circle), so any less specific label would be insufficient to disambiguate them. The target is highlighted for the speaker with a black square. (B) Drag-and-drop chat box interface, where the label “niwa” has been selected. (C) Hierarchical organization of stimuli.

coordination on meaning. For example, while most English speakers have the basic-level word “tree” in their lexicon, along with a handful of subordinate-level words like “maple” or “fir,” we typically do not have labels exclusively referring to each individual tree in our yards. Meanwhile, we *do* often have conventionalized labels (i.e. proper nouns) for individual people and places that we regularly encounter in our daily lives. [ks: If you want to be cute: there are some very famous trees that have their own names - the Fortingall Yew is my favourite, there’s also that huge redwood in the US, General Sherman or whatever.]

As a first step toward explaining these diachronic patterns, we aim to establish in this section that our model allows a dyad’s *ad hoc* conventions to be shaped by context over short timescales. That is, when the environment imposes a communicative need to refer to particular *ad hoc* concepts (like a particular tree), communicative partners are able to coordinate on efficient lexical conventions for successfully doing so⁶. First, we show that context-sensitivity naturally emerges from our model, as a downstream consequence of recursive pragmatic reasoning. We then empirically evaluate this account by manipulating the context in an artificial-language repeated reference game, allowing us to observe the emergence of *ad hoc* conventions in the absence of global priors. In both the empirical data and our model simulations, we find that conventions come to reflect the distinctions that are functionally relevant for communicative success and that pragmatic reason-

ing is needed for these effects to arise. [ks: Again, I think you need to cite the Winters et al 2018 paper somewhere here - I don’t think it undermines the novelty of what you are doing and it doesn’t include a model, plus it’s not well-suited to modelling because the signal space was entirely open-ended.]

Model predictions

To evaluate the impact of context on convention formation, we require a different task than we used in the previous sections. Those tasks, like most reference games in the literature on convention formation, used a discrete set of unrelated objects in a fixed context, $\{o_1, \dots, o_k\}$. In real referential contexts, however, targets are embedded in larger conceptual taxonomies, where some objects are more similar than others (Bruner, Goodnow, & Austin, 1956; Collins & Quillian, 1969; Xu & Tenenbaum, 2007). Second, contexts constantly change over the coarse of an interaction: different subsets of objects are in context at different times.

To satisfy the first desideratum, we consider a space of eight objects embedded in a three-level stimulus hierarchy with shape at the top-most level, color/texture at

⁶By induction, the hierarchical generalization mechanisms evaluated in the previous section then provide the mechanism by which these *ad hoc* conventions become adopted by a larger community over longer time scales. Many *ad hoc* conventions may simply never generalize to the full language community because the contexts where they are needed are uncommon.

the intermediate levels, and frequency/intensity at the finest levels (see Fig. 9). We then populate the space of possible utterance meanings $P(\phi)$ with 8 meanings at the sub-ordinate level (one for each individual object, e.g. $\phi(u) = \text{"light blue square"}$), 4 meanings at the basic-level (e.g. $\phi(u) = \text{"blue square"}$), 2 meanings at the super-ordinate level (e.g. $\phi(u) = \text{"square"}$), and 1 exhaustive meaning ($\phi(u) = \text{"everything"}$). We populate the utterance space with 8 single-word labels.

To satisfy the second desideratum, we only displayed four of the eight objects in the context on a given trial. Distractors could differ from the target at various level of the hierarchy, creating different types of contexts defined by the finest distinction that had to be drawn. In the *fine* condition, we ensure that there is always a sub-ordinate distractor (e.g. Fig. 9A), while in the *coarse* condition, there are only basic-level distractors (e.g. a blue square when the target is a red square) [ks: I confess I still get confused about fine vs coarse - might help to give another example in the figure and also explain the intuitions about what lexical item meanings you expect to get in the two conditions?]. We constructed the trial sequence identically for the two conditions: there are 12 blocks, where all 8 objects appeared as the target once per block (in a randomized order ensuring that no target appeared more than once in a row). We randomly sampled the other three distractors on each trial according to the constraints of the condition. As before, the agents swap roles on each trial, and we run 75 distinct trajectories with parameter settings of $w_L = 5, w_S = 10$ and memory discounting parameter of $\beta = 0.8$.

Partners successfully learn to communicate.

First, we compare the model’s learning curves across context conditions (Fig. 12C). We focus on the *coarse* and *fine* conditions for simplicity, since this single comparison captures the core phenomena of interest. In a mixed-effects logic regression, we find that communicative accuracy steadily improves over time across conditions, $b = 0.72, z = 16.9, p < 0.001$. However, we also find a significant interaction with condition: the rate of improvement is significantly higher in the coarse condition than the fine condition, $b = -0.49, z = 9.3, p < 0.001$.

Lexical conventions are shaped by context. Next, we examine the effective vocabulary sizes used by speakers in each condition as a coarse marker of context sensitivity. We operationalized this measure by




Figure 10. Dynamics of lexical beliefs over time in Simulation 2.1. Regions represent the average proportion of words at each level of generality in an agent’s beliefs about the lexicon. In the coarse condition, agents initially assume sub-ordinate terms but gradually abstract away to a smaller number of basic-level terms; in the fine condition, however, agents become more confident of sub-ordinate terms.

counting the total number of unique words produced within each repetition block. Because all eight objects appeared as the target once in each block, this measure takes a maximum value of 8, in the case where a different word was used for every object, and a minimum value of 1, in the case where the same word was used for every object. In an identical mixed-effects model, we find an overall main effect of condition, with agents in the fine condition using significantly fewer words across all repetition blocks ($m = 4.7$ in *coarse*, $m = 6.5$ in *fine*, $t = 4.5, p < 0.001$). However, we also found a significant interaction: the effective vocabulary size gradually increased over time in the fine condition, while it stayed roughly constant in the coarse condition, $b = 0.18, t = 8.1, p < 0.001$, see Fig. 12D.

Finally, we examine more closely the emergence of terms at different levels of generality. We have access not only to the signalling behavior of our simulated agents, but also their internal *beliefs* about their part-

ner's lexicon, which allows us to directly examine the evolution of these beliefs from the beginning of the interaction. At each time point in each game, we take the single meaning with highest probability for each word. In Fig. 10, we show the proportion of words with meanings at each level of generality, collapsing across all games in each condition.

Qualitatively, we observe that agents begin with assumptions of ‘null’ meanings [ks: I didn’t follow the stuff about null meanings at all] due to their simplicity prior but quickly begin assigning meanings based on their partner’s usage. In both conditions, basic-level meanings and simpler subordinate-meanings [ks: I think this relates to my failure to grasp why lots of specific meanings is simple, but I was surprised to see this described as the simpler system] are equally consistent with the initial data, and agents prefer simpler meanings. After the first repetition block, however, agents in the coarse condition begin pruning out some of the subordinate-level terms and become increasingly confident of basic-level meanings. Agents in the fine condition become even more confident of subordinate level meanings. Eventually, by the *final* trial, the proportion of basic-level vs. subordinate-level terms is significantly different across the coarse and fine conditions. Only 9% of words had subordinate-level meanings (green) in the coarse condition, compared with 79% in the fine condition, $\chi^2(1) = 436, p < 0.001$. At the same time, 45% of words had basic-level meanings (blue) in the coarse condition, compared with only 8% in the fine condition, $\chi^2(1) = 136, p < 0.001$. The remaining words in each condition were assigned the ‘null’ meaning (red), consistent with an overall smaller effective vocabulary size in the coarse condition. The diverging conventions across contexts are driven by Gricean expectations: because the speaker is assumed to be informative, only lexicons distinguishing between subordinate level objects can explain the speaker’s behavior in the *fine* condition.

Experimental methods

In this section, we evaluate our model’s qualitative predictions about the effect of context on convention formation using an interactive behavioral experiment closely matched to our simulations. We use a between-subjects design where pairs of participants are assigned to different communicative contexts and test the extent

to which they converge on meaningfully different conventions.

Participants. We recruited 278 participants from Amazon Mechanical Turk to play an interactive, multi-player game using the framework described in Hawkins (2015)⁷.

Procedure & Stimuli. Participants were paired over the web and placed in a shared environment containing an array of objects (Fig. 9A) and a ‘chatbox’ to choose utterances from a fixed vocabulary by clicking-and-dragging (Fig. 9B). On each trial, one player (the ‘speaker’) was privately shown a highlighted target object and allowed to send a single word to communicate the identity of this object to their partner (the ‘listener’), who subsequently made a selection from the array. Players were given full feedback, swapped roles each trial, and both received bonus payment for each correct response.

We randomly generated distinct arrays of 16 utterances for each pair of participants (more than our model, which was restricted by computational complexity). These utterances were created by stringing together consonant-vowel pairs into pronounceable 2-syllable words to reduce the cognitive load of remembering previous labels (see Fig. 9B) These arrays were held constant across trials.

To match our model as closely as possible, pairs were assigned one of the same sequences of trials that we constructed for our simulations. In addition to behavioral responses collected over the course of the game, we designed a post-test to explicitly probe players’ final lexica. For all sixteen words, we asked players to select all objects that a word can refer to (if any), and for each object, we asked players to select all words that can refer to it (if any). This bidirectional measure allowed us to check the internal validity of the lexica reported. For comparison, we also added a *mixed* condition [ks: don’t you need to justify why you aren’t modelling the mixed condition?], where half of the targets appeared in *fine* contexts with subordinate distractors and the other half appeared in *coarse* contexts. Pairs were randomly assigned to one of three different conditions, yielding

⁷Planned sample sizes, exclusion criteria, and behavioral analysis plan were pre-registered at <https://osf.io/2hkjc/>. All statistical tests in mixed-effects models reported in this section use degrees of freedom based on the Satterthwaite approximation (Luke, 2017).




Figure 11. Different lexicons emerge in different contexts. Mean number of words, out of a word bank of 16 words, that human participants reported giving more specific meanings (black; applying to 1 object) or less specific meanings (dark grey; applying to 2 objects).

$n = 36$ dyads in the *coarse* condition, $n = 38$ in the *fine* condition, and $n = 53$ in the *mixed* condition after excluding participants who disconnected before completion.

Behavioral results

Partners successfully learn to communicate. Although participants in all conditions began with no common basis for label meanings, performing near chance on the first trial (proportion correct = 0.19, 95% CI = [0.13, 0.27]), most pairs were nonetheless able to coordinate on a successful communication system over repeated interaction (see Fig. 12A). A mixed-effects logistic regression on listener responses with trial number as a fixed effect, and including by-pair random slopes and intercepts, showed a significant improvement in accuracy overall, $z = 14.4, p < 0.001$. Accuracy also differed significantly *across* conditions: adding an additional main effect of condition to our logistic model provided a significantly better fit, $\chi^2(2) = 10.8, p = 0.004$. Qualitatively, the *coarse* condition was easiest for participants, the *fine* condition was hardest, and the *mixed* condition was in between. These effects track the qualitative results of our simulations: our artificial agents were also able to successfully coordinate in both conditions, but did so more easily in the *coarse* condition than the *fine* condition.

Validating post-test responses. Before examining post-test responses, we validate their internal consistency. For each participant, we counted the number of mismatches between the two directions of the lexicon question (e.g. if they clicked the word ‘mawa’ when we showed them one of the blue squares, but failed to click that same blue square when we showed ‘mawa’). In general, participants were highly consistent: out of 128 cells in the lexicon matrix (16 words \times 8 objects), the median number of mismatches was 2 (98% agreement), though the distribution has a long tail (mean = 7.3). We therefore conservatively take a participant’s final lexicon to be the *intersection* of their word-to-object and object-to-word responses for the subsequent analyses.

Contextual pressures shape the lexicon. We predicted that in contexts regularly requiring speakers to make fine distinctions among objects at subordinate levels of the hierarchy, we would find lexicalization of specific terms for each object (indeed, a one-to-one mapping may be the most obvious solution in a task with only 8 objects). Conversely, when no such distinctions were required, we expected participants to adaptively lexicalize less specific terms. One coarse signature of this prediction lies in the *compression* of the resulting lexicon: less specific conventions should allow participants to achieve the same communicate accuracy with a smaller vocabulary.

To test this prediction, we operationalize vocabulary size as the number of words in each participant’s reported lexicon in the post-test (i.e. the words for which they marked at least one object in the post-test in an internally consistent way). We then conducted a mixed-effects models predicting each individual’s vocabulary size as a function of dummy-coded condition factors, with random intercepts for each game. We found that participants in the *coarse* condition reported significantly smaller, simpler lexica ($m = 4.9$ words) than participants in the *mixed* ($m = 7.1, t(110.8) = 7.6, p < 0.001$) and *fine* condition ($m = 6.9, t(109.3) = 6.4, p < 0.001$; see Fig. 12A).

How did these lexica emerge over the course of interaction? We use the same measure of unique words produced in each repetition block that we used in our simulations. We constructed a mixed-effects regression model predicting the effective vocabulary size, including fixed effects of condition and repetition block, and random intercepts and effects of rep-




Figure 12. Comparison of simulation results to empirical data. [ks: are the "model" and "empirical" labels reversed here?] (A) Participants in our behavioral experiment learned to coordinate on a successful communication system, but converged faster in the coarse condition than the fine condition. Each point is the mean proportion of correct responses by listeners; curves are nonparametric fits. (B) The number of unique words used by speakers in each repetition block increased in the fine condition but stayed roughly constant in the coarse condition. (C-D) The same metrics computed on the output of our simulation, qualitatively matching the patterns observed in the empirical data.

etition block for each dyad. As in the post-test reports, we found an overall main effect of condition, with participants in the fine[ks: coarse?] condition using significantly fewer words across all repetition blocks: $m = 4.9$ in coarse, compared to $m = 5.8, t(124) = 6.1$ [ks : which condition is this?], $p < 0.001$, in mixed $m = 6.8, t(124) = 11.4, p < 0.001$). Critically, however, we also found a significant interaction between the coarse and fine conditions [ks: shouldn't this be "between block and condition" or something?]. The effective vocabulary size gradually increased over time in the fine condition but remained roughly constant in the coarse condition, $b = 0.12, t = 4.5, p < 0.001$, see Fig. 12B. This interaction, where participants initially attempt to reuse the same terms across targets in the fine condition, is consistent with a gradual differentiation based on communicative need.

Finally, if participants in the *coarse* condition could get away with fewer words in their lexicon, what are the meanings of the words they do have? We counted the numbers of 'specific' terms (e.g. words that refer to only one object) and more 'general' terms (e.g. words that refer to two objects) in the post-test. We found that

the likelihood of lexicalizing more general terms differed systematically across conditions. Participants in the *coarse* condition reported significantly more general terms ($m = 2.3$) than in the *fine* ($m = 0.24, t(121.2) = 8.5, p < 0.001$) or *mixed* ($m = 0.65, t(122.7) = 7.3, p < 0.001$) conditions, where lexicons contained almost exclusively specific terms. The modal system in the *fine* condition was exactly eight specific terms with no more general terms, and the modal system in the *coarse* condition was exactly four general terms (red, blue, striped, spotted) with no specific terms. However, many individual participants reported a mixture of terms at different levels of generality.

Discussion

There is abundant evidence that languages adapt to the needs of their users. Our model provides a cognitive account of how people coordinate on *ad hoc* linguistic conventions that suit their immediate needs. In this section, we evaluated predictions about context-sensitivity using new data from a real-time communication task. When combined with the generalization mechanisms explored in the previous section, such rapid learning

within dyadic interactions may be a powerful contributor allowing languages to adapt at the population-level over longer time scales.

Previous studies of convention formation have addressed context-sensitivity in different ways. In some common settings, there is no explicit representation of context at all, as in the task known as the “Naming Game” where agents coordinate on names for objects in isolation (Steels, 2012; Baronchelli, Loreto, & Steels, 2008). In other settings, communication is situated in a referential context, but this context is held constant, as in Lewis signaling games (Lewis, 1969) where agents must distinguish between a fixed set of world states (Skyrms, 2010; Bruner, O’Connor, Rubin, & Huttegger, 2014). Finally, in the Discrimination Game (Steels, Belpaeme, et al., 2005; Baronchelli, Gong, Puglisi, & Loreto, 2010), contexts are randomly generated on each trial, but have not been manipulated to assess context-sensitivity of the convention formation process.

In other words, context-sensitivity has typically been implicit in existing models. Models using simple update rules have accounted for referential context with a *lateral inhibition* heuristic used by both the speaker and listener agents (Franke & Jäger, 2012; Steels et al., 2005). If communication is successful, the connection strength between the label and object is not only increased, the connection between the label and competing objects (and, similarly, between the object and competing labels) is explicitly *decreased* by a corresponding amount. This lateral inhibition heuristic is functionally similar to our pragmatic reasoning mechanism, in terms of allowing the agent to learn from negative evidence (i.e. the speaker’s choice *not* to use a word, or the listener’s choice *not* to pick an object). Under our inferential framework, however, this property emerges as a natural consequence of well-established Gricean principles of pragmatic reasoning rather than as a heuristic.

General Discussion

In this paper, we considered the computational challenge faced by agents trying to communicate in a variable and non-stationary landscape of meaning. We advanced a hierarchical Bayesian approach in which agents continually adapt their beliefs about the semantics [ks: again, is this only about meaning or about mappings?] used by each partner, in turn. We formalized this approach by integrating three core cognitive

capacities in a probabilistic framework: representing initial uncertainty about what a partner thinks words mean (**C1**), partner-specific adaptation based on observations of language use in context (**C2**), and hierarchical structure for graded generalization to new partners (**C3**). This unified model resolves several puzzles that have posed challenges from prior models of coordination and convention formation: why referring expressions shorten over repeated interactions with the same partner (**P1**), how partner-specific common ground may coexist with the emergence of conventions at the population level (**P2**), and how context shapes which conventions emerge (**P3**). We conclude by discussing several broader questions raised by the theoretical perspective we have advanced, and corresponding pathways for future work.

Implications for language acquisition. Through one theoretical lens, our model provides an argument for the continuity of probabilistic models of language acquisition across development (e.g. Xu & Tenenbaum, 2007; Frank et al., 2009). In other words, we have aimed to generalize Bayesian models of word learning, traditionally used in developmental science, to explain the continual *ad hoc* learning required by mature language users. Conversely, this suggests that the lexical learning mechanisms adults use to coordinate on conventions *within* dyadic interactions may be the same as those supporting language acquisition more broadly. Our hierarchical partial pooling model suggests a new emphasis on the role of partner-specificity and generalization in development. Most laboratory tasks investigating cross-situational word learning in children use only use a single speaker, and even sophisticated models of cross-situational word learning (e.g. Frank et al., 2009) collapse over *who* is talking. [ks: again, I think that stuff on learning from reliable vs unreliable speakers (Dautriche paper I mentioned earlier) will be really useful for you here]

Yet, as we have argued, there is substantial variability in systems of meaning across different speakers and contexts; calibrating one’s lexical priors to reflect this variability is an important aspect of learning a language. If the majority of child-directed speech only comes from a single primary caregiver [ks: hmm, that sounds unlikely! or at least likely to vary radically across cultures - I think the mum-alone-at-home-with-the-kids model is not going to be universal. it would be

necessary to find a citation for this, or lay it out more neutrally as one of several possibilities], then the child may face a difficult generalization problem once they begin interacting with others. When first hearing a new word from a novel speaker, or a familiar word used in an unfamiliar way, children face the same inductive problem we have studied: it is unclear whether the new observation is a quirk of that particular speaker *or* indicative of a globally shared convention. There may therefore be substantial path-dependence in acquisition, as children develop their lexical prior and become better attuned to the overall variability in the population (see E. V. Clark, 2009, Chap. 6).

[ks: Around this point I realised that Lev-Ari 2017 might be relevant - I am very sceptical of her empirical result, although she has a couple of papers showing similar things, but it's definitely relevant to the stuff about generalising across speakers: <https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article/authors?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0185593>]

Hierarchical Bayesian models have several other properties of theoretical interest for convention formation and language acquisition. First, they offer a blessing of abstraction (Goodman et al., 2011), where community-level conventions may be learned even with relatively sparse input from each partner, as long as there is not substantial variance in the population. Second, they are more robust to partner-specific deviations from conventions (e.g. interactions with other children or non-native speakers) than complete-pooling models relying on a fixed set of memory slots or a single mental inventory. This robustness is due to their ability to explain away outliers without community-level expectations being affected.

Our work also suggests a new explanation for why young children struggle to coordinate on *ad hoc* conventions with one another in repeated reference games (Glucksberg, Krauss, & Weisberg, 1966; Krauss & Glucksberg, 1969, 1977). When an experimenter feeds them messages produced by adult speakers in other games, they are able to maintain high accuracy even as the utterance reduce down to one- or two-word label. When Kindergarteners play with one another, however, they continue to make errors even after 15 repetitions. Children as old as fifth grade only improved with assistance from the experimenter and never approached the perfect levels of adult performance. Instead of beginning with the long indef-

inite descriptions full of hedges and modifiers that adults provide, it was observed that children began with short, idiosyncratic descriptions like *Mother's dress*. [ks: Vera Kempe also has an experimental paper on this kind of thing with kids or kids + caregivers: <https://academic.oup.com/jole/article/4/1/44/5321155>]

While these failures were widely attributed to limits on theory of mind use, this explanation has been complicated by findings that children cannot even interpret their own utterances after a delay (Asher & Oden, 1976), suggesting that the source of the problem is *not* rigid adherence to one's own preferred label but instead a more broadly impoverished lexical prior for the novel object. Recent work by Leung, Hawkins, and Yurovsky (2020) explored this hypothesis by observing parent-child interactions in a repeated reference task. The data suggested that, unlike pairs of children, parent-child pairs were able to successful coordinate on *ad hoc* conventions. Parents helped to interactively scaffold these conventions: younger children were more likely to adopt the labels used by their parents. In other words, children may begin with more substantial lexical uncertainty over what labels may be appropriate than their parents, and consequently take their parents' usage as an authoritative cue to the underlying lexicon. [ks: somehow I found this a bit of an unconvincing explanation of what's going on in those experiments - isn't it just that the kids can't model the other person's uncertainty?]

While these preliminary data are intriguing, more work is needed to explore the role of inter-partner variability and partner-specificity in language learning. For example, is the child's lexical prior better viewed as a representation of others' beliefs about the lexicon, or as an (asocial) epistemic state? To what extent is the ability to retrieve or use this lexical prior constrained by theory of mind development? Are childrens' lexical priors impoverished simply because they have not obtained enough variability in their linguistic input, or is there a more fundamental representational constraint that prevents children from accounting for partner-specific differences? Even infants are sensitive to coarse social distinctions based on foreign vs. native language (Kinzler, Dupoux, & Spelke, 2007), or accent (Kinzler, Shutts, DeJesus, & Spelke, 2009), but when do fully partner-specific representations develop?

Similarities and differences across communication modalities. While we have focused primarily on verbal and textual communication channels, research on the dynamics of adaptation in other communication modalities, including graphical (Garrod et al., 2007; Theisen, Oberlander, & Kirby, 2010; Hawkins, Sano, et al., 2019) and gestural (Fay, Lister, Ellison, & Goldin-Meadow, 2013; Bohn, Kachel, & Tomasello, 2019) [ks: also <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2019.05.001>, plus that Kempe paper I mentioned above also has a weird binary beep paradigm that I do not like] modalities, is important for our account in several ways. First, it is a core claim of our hierarchical model that the basic cognitive mechanisms underlying adaptation and convention formation are domain-general. In other words, there is nothing inherently special in our account about spoken or written language as far as our ability to coordinate. Any system that we use to communicate should display similar *ad hoc* learning dynamics because in every case, agents are trying to infer the system of meaning being used by their partner. Directly comparing behavior in repeated reference games across different modalities is therefore necessary to determine which adaptation effects, if any, are robust and attributable to modality-general mechanisms.

Second, at the same time, our hierarchical learning model claims a critical role for the priors we build up across interactions with many individuals. We therefore predict that different communication modalities should display certain systematic differences due to the representational structure of the communication channel. For example, in the verbal modality, the tangram shapes from H. H. Clark and Wilkes-Gibbs (1986) are highly innominate – most people do not have much experience naming or describing them with words, so the global prior is weak and local adaptation plays a greater role. In the graphical modality, where communication takes place by drawing on a shared sketchpad, agents [ks: again the use of agents to talk about an experiment with human participants is a bit weird to me!] can be expected to have a stronger prior rooted in assumptions about shared perceptual systems and visual similarity (Fan, Yamins, & Turk-Browne, 2018) – drawing a quick sketch of the tangram’s outline may suffice for understanding. Other stimuli have precisely the opposite property: to distinguish between natural images of dogs, agents may have developed strong global conven-

tions in the linguistic modality (e.g. ‘husky’, ‘poodle’, ‘pug’, etc) but drawing the necessary fine distinctions in the graphical modality may be initially very costly for novices, requiring the formation of local conventions. Gesture also has its own distinctive prior, which also allows communicators to use time and the space around them to convey mimetic or depictive meanings that may be difficult to encode verbally or graphically (Goldin-Meadow & McNeill, 1999; H. H. Clark, 2016; McNeill, 1992).

Another modality-based manipulation is to attempt to destroy or scramble any meaningful priors that people might carry into the social interaction. For example, Galantucci (2005) introduced a novel ‘seismograph’ interface for communication – a stylus that could be moved side-to-side or lifted up or down to make contact with the sketch pad while the vertical dimension drifted downward at a constant rate. The resulting messages consequently look nothing like the usual kinds of symbols people create: the relationship between motor actions and perceptual output is broken such that executing a familiar movement for a symbol or numeral instead produces an odd, wavy scribble. Despite the relative lack of priors on signal meanings in this medium, people were nevertheless able to converge on successful signaling systems in repeated reference games (see also Roberts & Galantucci, 2012; Roberts, Lewandowski, & Galantucci, 2015). Other novel modalities used in iterated reference games include a ‘whistle’ language where movements along a vertical touch bar slider correspond to changes in pitch (Verhoef, Roberts, & Dingemanse, 2015) and a visual analog where movements along the slider were presented visually (Verhoef, Walker, & Marghetis, 2016). Our model ought to be able to account for production and comprehension across these modalities simply by exchanging its encoder and decoder components to use an appropriate prior.

The role of feedback and backchannels. If adaptation is learning, then an important corollary of our model is that the extent to which partners adapt should depend critically on the quality of the data D_i on which they are conditioning: $P(\mathcal{L}_i|\Theta, D_i)$. Our simulations used the simplest source of feedback: the utterance and response in a reference game. A key direction for future work is to account for richer forms of feedback. For example, a key feature of dialogue is the capacity

for a *real-time back-channel*. Either individual may say anything at any point in time, thus allowing for interjections (uh-huh, hmm, huh?), clarification questions, and other listener-initiated forms of feedback. Without elaborating the generative model of the listener to include these verbal behaviors, we cannot explain the inferences a speaker will make upon hearing them. Such an elaboration will thus be critical to explaining why listeners send fewer messages over time and what impact early listener responses on conventionalization.

Additionally, this elaboration would allow our model to capture early, important empirical results from Krauss and Weinheimer (1966), which manipulated the feedback channel. In one condition, participants were able to talk bidirectionally, and in another the channel was unidirectional: the speaker was unable to hear the listener's responses. This real-time feedback manipulation was crossed with a behavioral feedback manipulation where the experimenters intercepted the listener's responses: one group of speakers was told that their partner made the correct response 100% of the trials (regardless of their real responses), while another was told on half of the trials that their partner made the incorrect response.

Under our account, if the speaker is unsure how their longer descriptions are being interpreted – unsure whether or not they can get away with shorter, more ambiguous expressions – they may not have enough evidence about meanings to justify shorter utterances. Indeed, Krauss and Weinheimer (1966) found that even when told that their partner was getting 100% correct, entirely blocking the verbal feedback channel significantly limited the reduction effect. Speakers converged to utterances that were about twice as long – twice as inefficient – in the limit [ks: not clear what "in the limit" is doing here]. Telling speakers that their partner was performing poorly also inhibited reduction as a main effect, though to a lesser extent. In the extreme case of trying to communicate to a listener who can't respond and appears to not understand, speaker utterance length actually increased with repetition after an early dip. Hupet and Chantraine (1992) found that in the *complete* absence of feedback — when the speaker is instructed to repeatedly refer to a set of objects for a listener who is not present and will do their half of the task offline — there is also no reduction in message length.

More graded disruptions of feedback seem to force the speaker to use more words overall but not to significantly change the rate of reduction. For example, Krauss and Bricker (1967) tested a transmission delay to temporally shift feedback and an access delay to block the onset of listener feedback until the speaker is finished. Later, Krauss, Garlock, Bricker, and McMahon (1977) replicated the adverse effect of delay but showed that undelayed visual access to one's partner cancelled out the effect and returned the number of words used to baseline. On the listener's part, too, the ability to actively *give* feedback appears critical for coordination. Schober and Clark (1989) showed that even listeners who *overheard* the entire game were significantly less accurate than listeners who could directly interact with the speaker, even though they heard the exact same utterances. Our model provides an initial framework to begin understanding how these subtle manipulations of feedback channels license differing inferences about a partner's underlying system of meaning [ks: I wasn't sure why this last sentence followed - can you explain a bit more?].

What is being adapted? While our model has been formulated in terms of coordination on *lexical* meaning, this is only one of many levels at which conventions may form. In more complex circumstances, there is often initial uncertainty not just about which of a small set of targets a particular message refers to, but how to represent the relevant targets of reference in the first place. Learning to communicate effectively may require discovering a lower-dimensional representation in which the targets of reference vary. For instance, when using sketches to communicate about the identity of complex pieces of music (Healey, Swoboda, Umata, & King, 2007), a particular set of strokes could correspond to any number of properties (pitch, tempo, melody, rhythm, intensity) at any temporal granularity. This is made particularly clear in a classic maze game (Garrod & Anderson, 1987): in order to give effective spatial directions, speakers apparently had well-tuned lexical priors but had to coordinate on what space of *referents* to use (e.g. paths, coordinates, lines, landmarks).

By appealing to classic spreading-activation connectionist models (e.g. Roelofs, 1992), interactive alignment accounts (Pickering & Garrod, 2004) have argued that activating phonetic or syntactic features that are associated with specific lemmas in the lexicon can per-

colate to strengthen higher semantic levels of representation (Pickering & Branigan, 1998). Thus, unconsciously coupling word choices (Louwerse, Dale, Bard, & Jeuniaux, 2012), syntax (Gruberg, Ostrand, Momma, & Ferreira, 2019; Levelt & Kelter, 1982), body postures (Lakin & Chartrand, 2003), speech rate (Giles, Coupland, & Coupland, 1991), or even informational complexity (Abney, Paxton, Dale, & Kello, 2014) in dialogue could potentially contribute to the coordination of higher-level semantic representations. [ks: not sure what the point of this paragraph was]

Other theories have assumed representations of lexical meanings are relatively fixed and the only learning taking place is how one's partner construes a multi-stable percept. For example, this seems to be what Brennan and Clark (1996) had in mind when they coined the term *conceptual pact*, and Stolk, Verhagen, and Toni (2016) have influentially argued that partners in communication construct shared conceptual spaces. Given present data it is not clear how these two sources of uncertainty could be teased apart [ks: I am not sure what the two sources of uncertainty are!], though certain kinds of conventions (e.g. proper names or acronyms) seem to rely more on binding new linguistic tokens to meanings than on constructing new conceptualizations. Thus, we expect both levels of coordination are likely to play an important role. Our probabilistic model could be extended to handle additional levels of coordination by placing uncertainty over a hyper-parameter corresponding to the intended feature dimension that must be jointly inferred with the correspondence along that dimension.

Additional layers of social structure. Real-world communities are much more complex than the simple networks we considered: each speaker takes part in a number of overlapping subcommunities. For example, we use partially distinct conventions depending on whether we are communicating with psychologists, friends from high school, bilinguals, or children (Auer, 2013). For instance, when a scientist is talking to other scientists about their work, they know they can use efficient technical shorthand that they would avoid when talking to their non-expert friends and family. Previous work has probed representations of community membership by manipulating the extent to which cultural background is shared between speaker and listener. For example, Isaacs and Clark (1987) paired participants

who had either lived in NYC or had never been there for a task referring to landmarks in the city (e.g. “Rockefeller Center”). Within just a few utterances from a novel partner, people could infer whether they were playing with an expert or novice and immediately adjust their language use to be appropriate for this inferred identity. Social information about a partner's group can be so important that even players in artificial-language games react to the restrictions of social anonymity by learning to identify members of their community using distinctive signals (Roberts, 2010).

For future work using hierarchical Bayesian models to address the full scale of an individual's network of communities, additional social knowledge about these communities must be learned and represented in the generative model. Larger-scale networked experiments can be used to evaluate the hypothesis that a hierarchical representation of conventions includes not just a partner-specific level and population-wide level but also intermediate community levels. This hypothesis can be formalized by including additional latent representations of community membership into our hierarchical model. That is, in addition to updating our model of a particular *partner* based on immediate feedback, even sparse observations of a partner's language use may license much broader inferences about their lexicon via diagnostic information about their social group or background. If someone's favorite song is an obscure B-side from an 80s hardcore band, you can make fairly strong inferences about what else they like to listen to and how similar they might be to you (Vélez, Bridgers, & Gweon, 2016; Gershman, Pouncy, & Gweon, 2017). Similarly, if someone casually refers to an obscure New York landmark you also recognize, you can safely update your beliefs about their lexicon to include a number of other conventions shared among New Yorkers. Lexica cluster within social groups, so inverting this relationship can yield rapid lexical learning from inferences about social group membership.

This explanation is also consistent with broader linguistic phenomena outside the realm of repeated reference games. For example, Potts and Levy (2015) showed that lexical uncertainty is critical for capturing constructions like *oenophile* or *wine lover*, where a disjunction of synonymous terms is taken to convey a definition – information about the speaker's lexicon – rather than a disjoint set. While the reasons that speak-

ers produce such constructions are complex, we would expect that speakers will be more likely to produce the definitional *or* when the component word is expected to be rarer or more obscure for a particular partner: when there is additional uncertainty over its likely meaning in the listener's lexicon.

Conclusion. Language is not a rigid body of knowledge that we acquire at an early age and deploy mechanically for the rest of our lives. Nor is its evolution a slow, inter-generational drift. [ks: *hey, is that a dig at iterated learning? :-)*] It is a means for communication – a shared interface between minds – and must therefore adapt over the rapid timescales required by communication. In other words, we are constantly learning language. Not just one language, but a family of related languages, across every repeated interaction with every partner.

Let us conclude not that ‘there is no such thing as a language’ that we bring to interaction with others. Say rather that there is no such thing as the one total language that we bring. We bring numerous only loosely connected languages from the loosely connected communities that we inhabit. Hacking (1986)

Acknowledgments

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Appendix A: Details of RSA model

Our setting poses several technical challenges for the Rational Speech Act (RSA) framework. In this Appendix, we describe these challenges in more detail and justify our choices.

Handling degenerate lexicons

First, when we allow the full space of possible lexicons ϕ , we must confront degenerate lexicons where an utterance u is literally false of every object in context, i.e. where $\mathcal{L}_\phi(o, u) = 0$ for all $o \in C$. In this case, the normalizing constant in Eq. 2 is zero, and the literal listener distribution is not well-defined. A similar problem may arise when no utterance in the speaker’s repertoire is true of the target, in which case the S_1 distribution is not well-defined.

Several solutions to this problem were outlined by Bergen et al. (2016). One of these solutions is to use a ‘softer’ semantics in the literal listener, where a Boolean value of false does not strictly rule out an object but instead assigns a very low numerical score, e.g.

$$\mathcal{L}_\phi(o, u) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } o \in \phi(u) \\ \epsilon & \text{o.w.} \end{cases}$$

Whenever there is at least one $o \in C$ where u is true, this formulation assigns negligible listener probability to objects where u is false, but ensures that the normalization constant is non-zero even when u is false for all objects.

While this solution suffices for one-shot pragmatics under lexical uncertainty, where ϵ may be calibrated to be appropriately large, it runs into several technical complications in an iterated setting. First, due to numerical overflow at sufficiently high values of w_L and w_S at later iterations, elements may drop entirely out of the support at higher levels of recursion (e.g. L_1), leading the normalization constant to return to zero. Second, this ‘soft’ semantics creates unexpected and unintuitive consequences at the level of the pragmatic speaker. After renormalization in L_0 , an utterance u that fails to refer to any object in context is also by definition equally *successful* for all objects (i.e. evaluating to ϵ for every object), leading to a uniform selection distribution. Consequently, S_1 may in some cases prefer utterances that are literally false of the target just as much as utterances which are true.

Instead of injecting ϵ into the lexical meaning, we ensure that the normalization constant is well-defined by adapting another method suggested by Bergen et al. (2016). First, we add a ‘null’ object to every context so that, even when a particular utterance is false of every real object in context, it will still apply to the null object, assigning the true target a negligible probability of being chosen. Intuitively, this null object can be interpreted as recognizing a failure to refer to anything. Second, we add an explicit noise model at every level of recursion. That is, we assume every agent has a probability ϵ of choosing a random element of their support, ensuring a fixed non-zero floor on the likelihood of each element that is constant across levels of recursion. Formally this corresponds to a mixture distribution, e.g.

$$L_0^\epsilon(o|u, \phi) = \epsilon \cdot P_{unif}(o) + (1 - \epsilon) \cdot L_0(o|u, \phi)$$

$$S_1^\epsilon(u|o, \phi) = \epsilon \cdot P_{unif}(u) + (1 - \epsilon) \cdot S_1(u|o, \phi)$$

	Parameter	Example parameter settings
Partner design	What feedback is provided?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - no feedback at all - only correct/incorrect - real-time responses from partner
	Are you playing with the same partner?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - same partner for whole game - swap out partners every round - swap after k rounds
	What do you know about your partner?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - anonymous stranger - stranger with perceptual information - close friend
Stimulus design	How consistent are roles across repetitions?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - consistent director/matcher - alternate roles each round
	How familiar are targets?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - very familiar: colors, household objects - not at all familiar: tangrams, novel line drawings
	How complex are targets?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - very complex: busy visual scenes, clips of music - not at all complex: geometric drawings
Context design	How consistent are targets across repetitions?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - exact same image of object - different pose/view of same object - different objects from same neighborhood
	How similar are distractors to the target?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - very similar: same basic-level category - not at all similar: other categories
	What is the size of context?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - between 2 and 21
Repetition design	How consistent is context across repetitions?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - exact same context each round - randomized context (sometimes far, sometimes close)
	How many repetitions per target?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - between 3 and 100
	What is spacing between repetitions?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - block structure - sequential structure with interspersed contexts
Modality design	What medium is used for communication?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - text - audio - gesture - drawing

Table A1

Proposed parameterization for repeated reference games, each of which theoretically impacts the formation of conventions.

Marginalizing over ϕ_k

Another theoretical question arises about exactly how speaker and listener agents ought to marginalize over their uncertainty about ϕ_k when selecting actions (Eq. 3). In our formulation, the expectation is naturally taken over the entire *utility* each agent is using to act, i.e. if the speaker and listener utilities are defined to be

$$\begin{aligned} U_L(o; u, \phi_k) &= \log S_1(u|o, \phi_k) \\ U_S(u; o, \phi_k) &= (1 - w_C) \log L_0(o|u, \phi_k) - w_C \cdot c(u) \end{aligned}$$

then the expectation is taken as follow:

$$\begin{aligned} L(o|u) &\propto \exp \left\{ w_L \int P_L(\phi_k|D_k) \cdot U_L(u; o, \phi_k) d\phi_k \right\} \\ S(u|o) &\propto \exp \left\{ w_S \int P_S(\phi_k|D_k) \cdot U_S(u; o, \phi_k) d\phi_k \right\} \end{aligned}$$

This formulation may be interpreted as each agent choosing an action proportional to its expected utility across different possible values of ϕ_k , weighted by the agent's current posterior beliefs about the lexicon their partner is using.

This formulation contrasts with the one suggested by

Bergen et al. (2016), which assumes the expectation takes places at a single level of recursion, say the L_1 , as above, and then derives the other agent’s behavior by having them reason directly about this marginalized distribution, e.g.

$$\begin{aligned} U_{alt1}(u; o) &= (1 - w_C) \cdot \log L(o|u) - w_C \cdot c(u) \\ S_{alt1}(u|o) &\propto \exp\{w_S \cdot U_{alt1}(u; o)\} \end{aligned}$$

where $L(o|u)$ is defined as above. This formulation may be interpreted as an assumption on the part of the speaker that the listener is already accounting for their own uncertainty, and best responding to such a listener. Isolating lexical uncertainty over ϕ to a single level of recursion is a natural formulation for one-shot pragmatic phenomena, where additional layers of recursion can build on top of this marginal distribution to derive implicatures. However, the interpretation is messier for the multi-agent setting, since it (1) induces an asymmetry where one agent considers the other’s uncertainty but not vice versa, and (2) requires the speaker to use their own current posterior beliefs to reason about the listener’s marginalization.

A third possible variant is to place the expectation outside the listener distribution but inside the speaker’s informativity term, i.e..

$$\begin{aligned} L_{avg} &= \int P(\phi_k|D_k) \cdot L_0(o|u, \phi_k) d\phi_k \\ U_{alt2}(u; o) &= (1 - w_C) \cdot \log L_{avg}(o|u) - w_C \cdot c(u) \\ S_{alt2}(u|o) &\propto \exp\{w_S \cdot U_{alt2}(u; o)\} \end{aligned}$$

The interpretation here is that the speaker first derives a distribution representing how a listener would respond *on expectation* and then computes their surprisal relative to this composite listener. While this variant is in principle able to derive the desired phenomena, it can be shown that it induces an unintuitive initial bias under a uniform lexical prior, since the logarithm cannot distribute over the integral in the normalization constant. This bias is most apparent in the case of context-sensitivity (Simulation 3).

Mathematically, the difference between these alternatives is whether the speaker’s uncertainty about ϕ_k goes inside the renormalization of $L(o|u)$ (as in S_{alt1}), outside the renormalization but inside the logarithm (as in S_{alt2}), or over the entire utility (as in our chosen formulation). While other formulations are conceivable, we argue that marginalizing over the entire utility is not

only the most natural but also normatively correct under Bayesian decision theory. When an agent is uncertain about some aspect of the decision problem, rational choice requires the agent to optimize expected utility marginalizing over subjective uncertainty, as in our formulation.

Appendix B: Alternative lexical representations

In this section, we re-consider two specific choices we made about how to represent lexical meanings.

First, for simplicity and consistency with earlier models of Bayesian word learning, we adopted a traditional truth-conditional representation of lexical meaning throughout the paper. Each word in the lexicon is mapped to a single ‘concept’ to , e.g. $w_1 = ‘bluesquare’$, where this utterance is true of objects the fall in the given concept, and false otherwise. The inference problem over lexicons therefore requires searching over this discrete space of word-concept mappings. However, it is important to emphasize that our model is entirely consistent with alternative lexical representations.

For example, for some settings, a *continuous, real-valued* representation may be preferred, or a higher-dimensional vector representation. Rather than assigning each word a discrete concept in the lexicon, we may simply assign each word-object pair (w_i, o_j) a scalar meaning representing the extent to which word w_i applies to object o_j , such that ϕ is a real-valued matrix:

$$\phi = \begin{bmatrix} \phi^{(11)} & \phi^{(12)} & \cdots & \phi^{(1i)} \\ \phi^{(21)} & \phi^{(22)} & \cdots & \phi^{(2j)} \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ \phi^{(j1)} & \phi^{(j2)} & \cdots & \phi^{(ij)} \end{bmatrix}$$

and $\mathcal{L}_\phi(w_i, o_j) = \phi^{(ij)}$. In this case, rather than discrete categorical priors over meanings, we may place Gaussian priors over the entries of this matrix:

$$\begin{aligned} \Theta^{(ij)} &\sim \mathcal{N}(0, 1) \\ \phi^{(ij)} &\sim \mathcal{N}(\Theta^{(ij)} | 1) \end{aligned}$$

We have previously achieved similar results using this alternative lexical representations in earlier iteration of this manuscript (Hawkins et al., 2017; Hawkins, Goodman, et al., 2020), although deriving predictions required variational inference techniques rather than

Markov Chain Monte Carlo. Such optimization-based inference techniques may also provide the most promising path for extending our adaptive model to larger language models, including neural networks that operate over continuous spaces of image pixels and natural language embeddings (Hawkins, Kwon, et al., 2019).

Second, we used a ‘max’ operation to derive the semantics of longer utterances from primitive utterances, which captures the intuitive behavior of a speaker who proposes multiple possible descriptions, or ways of seeing the object. However, it is reasonable to consider alternative ways of interpreting a multi-word utterance, including a conjunctive ‘min’ operation:

$$\mathcal{L}(u_1 + u_2, o) = \min\{\mathcal{L}(u_1, o), \mathcal{L}(u_2, o)\}$$

While we are able to derive the same reduction phenomenon using this alternative operation (see Hawkins et al., 2017; Hawkins, Goodman, et al., 2020), the behavior emerges for more questionable reasons. Upon inspection of the internal mechanics, this result depends on how degenerate lexicons are handled (see Appendix

A).

Specifically, the alternative ‘min’ operation only allows for reduction when degenerate lexicons are handled by having the listener choose randomly between the objects when an utterance evaluates to false for all of them. Speakers initially prefer the longer utterance $u_1 + u_2$ because it has a higher probability of failing to refer to anything and leading to random guessing for lexicons where either u_1 or u_2 or both are false of the target. In other words, the reduction phenomenon emerges for the conjunctive semantics only as a consequence of strategically designing utterances that fail to refer to the target, which we find an unlikely explanation for human speaker behavior. When degenerate lexicons are handled by introducing a null object, however, these same lexicons lead to poor accuracy (since the listener will choose the null object instead of the target when the utterance is false), reflecting the riskiness of producing a conjunction that fails to refer to the target.




Figure A1. Coordination success (simulation 1.1) across a range of parameter values. Columns represent memory discount parameter β , and rows represent agent soft-max temperatures, where we set $\alpha_S = \alpha_L$. Communicative success is achieved under a wide range of settings, but convergence is limited in some regimes. For example, at high values of β , with no ability to discount prior evidence, accuracy rises quickly but asymptotes below perfect coordination; at low α , inferences are slightly weaker and agent actions are noisier, slowing convergence; finally, at low values of β , when prior evidence is forgotten too quickly, convergence interacts with α : the latest evidence may overwhelm all prior evidence, preventing the accumulation of shared history. The agent noise model is set to $\epsilon = 0.01$ in all simulations.




Figure A2. Speaker efficiency (simulation 1.2) across a range of parameter values representing different weights on informativity and cost. Rows represent agent optimality $w_S = w_L$, columns represent costs w_C , and different memory discount factors β shown in different colors. Agents converge on more efficient ad hoc conventions for a wide regime of parameters. When utterance production cost w_C is more heavily weighted relative to informativity, the speaker is less likely to produce longer utterances, even at the beginning of the interaction; when optimality w_S, w_L is higher, and the speaker maximizes utility, we observe faster reduction and more categorical behavior. Note that as $\alpha \rightarrow \infty$, utterances only become shorter at $w_C = 0$ in the absence of forgetting. In this case, the shorter utterances approach the exact same utility as the longer utterance, and the speaker reaches equilibrium simply sampling among them at random (i.e. choosing the longer utterance with 1/3 probability and each of the shorter utterances with 1/3 probability).




Figure A3. Raw empirical accuracy distributions for context-sensitivity experiment. Each row represents how the accuracies of different games shift across the four quarters of the task for a given condition. Dotted vertical line represents chance accuracy (0.25), solid vertical line represents pre-registered convergence threshold (0.75).




Figure A4. Speaker efficiency across partners (simulation 3.2) for a range of parameter values. Rows represent speaker optimality w_s , columns represent cost weight w_c .