


## Monopoly

- Firms with market power are:

- typically bigger
- have some technological advantage over competitors
- have a differentiated product
- industry has barriers to entry

- Non-price taking firms face a downward sloping linear demand curve. They have influence over the price, but in order to sell more, must lower the price

Graphical representation of cost structure of non-price taker




- Firms will still maximize profits by producing where  $MC = MR$
- Profit is the distance between  $P$  &  $AC$   
 $(P - AC)(Q) = \pi$

- Revenue maximization occurs at the point at which  $MR = 0$ , this is also the quantity and price of unit-elasticity
- In order for maximum revenue and profit to occur simultaneously,  $MR = MC = 0$ , meaning the additional unit is free to produce

## Monopoly

- Situation in which there is only one seller of a good
- Markets are unifiable because of constant entry and exit of other firms
- Monopolies require different barriers to entry. They can be as the firm or:
  - Technical barriers to entry, such as high startup costs or massive and increasing returns to scale
  - Ownership of a natural resource
  - Legal barriers to entry, the government may create laws that ensure the availability of resources or to encourage research, innovation, and entrepreneurship

Graph: Typical form



- note that monopolists have no supply curve because supply is a function of the interaction between  $MR$  &  $MC$ , which is derived by demand

- Monopolist will produce at the profit maximizing quantity where  $MR = MC$

- Competitive equilibrium occurs where  $MC = D$
- Monopoly price and quantity cause decrease in efficiency, DWL creation, reduction in consumer surplus, and increase in producer surplus

- Downsides of monopoly include:

- price of good is higher than at competitive equilibrium
- quantity of good sold is lower than at equilibrium
- economic surplus because of lost efficiency

### Monopoly Quant and Graph Example

Demand Function:  $Q = 50 - SP$  Rearranged,  $SP = 50 - Q$

$$P = 10 - \frac{Q}{5}$$

MR = Demand (P-form) with 2x slope (half the denominator)

$$MR = 10 - \frac{Q}{2.5}$$

Cost Function:  $TC = 2Q + \left(\frac{1}{15}\right)Q^2 + 30$

↑  
fixed - costs (short-run situation)

$$MC = 2 + \left(\frac{1}{7.5}\right) Q$$

## Profit - Maximizing

Quantity and Price : Occurs when  $MR = MC$

$$MR = 10 - \left(\frac{1}{7.5}\right)Q \quad MC = 2 + \left(\frac{1}{7.5}\right)Q$$

$$10 - \left(\frac{1}{2.5}\right)Q = 2 + \left(\frac{1}{2.5}\right)Q$$

$$8 = \left( \frac{1}{\cancel{1.5}} + \frac{1}{7.5} \right) Q$$

$$Q = \frac{8}{(\frac{1}{7.5} + \frac{1}{2.5})} = 15, \quad Q^m = 15$$

Price @  $Q^n = 15$ , plug 15 into demand function

Demand:  $P = 10 - \frac{Q}{5}$

$$P = 10 - \frac{15}{5}, P = 7$$

$p^x = 87$


$$Q^m = 15$$

$p^m = \$7$

Profit: General Form:  $\pi = (P - AC)q$  or  $\pi = R - TC$

$$\pi = [(15)(7)] - [2(15) + (\frac{1}{15})(15^2) + 30]$$

Full Graph:



$P^*$  is price of competitive equilibrium

put  $c_0$  into demand function

$$P = 10 - \frac{24}{5}$$

$P = 5.2$

$p'$  is the marginal revenue as well as the marginal cost at the  $q_m$

To find, plug  $q^m$  into  $u(p, m)$

$$MR = 10 - \frac{Q}{2.5}$$

$$MC = 2 + \left(\frac{1}{7.5}\right)Q$$

$$MR = 10 - \frac{15}{2.5}$$

$$\mu_c = 2 + \left(\frac{1}{3.5}\right)(15)$$

$MR = 4$


$$MC = 4$$

- Use these measurements to calculate DWL

## Price Discrimination


- Situation in which firm charges different consumers different prices based on their willingness to pay (individually)
- This is difficult because:
  - It is impossible for firms to have sufficient information of every consumer's individual willingness to pay
  - Consumers have incentive to misrepresent their true willingness to pay
  - Consumers will have perception of unfairness
  - More costs associated with charge prices
- Price discrimination results in loss of efficiency, and thus, no DWL, but increases producer surplus and decreases consumer surplus (extent dependent upon the situation)

### Perfect Price Discrimination




Every consumer is charged the exact willingness to pay

### Imperfect Price Discrimination



# Labour Supply

## Individual's Budget Constraint




- Individuals face the tradeoff of working vs. leisure. They must choose how to allocate their time.
- This tradeoff is represented through a budget constraint representing the available options between leisure (a good) and working (a bad).
- We represent consumption through AoG.
- X-intercept will always be 24 hours (unless the total time frame is different).
- Y-intercept will be  $24 \cdot w$ , because that is how much one can earn in a day.


- The slope of the budget constraint  $= w$ .
- The optimal point will be when the MRS for AoG  $\rightarrow$  leisure  $= w$ ,  $MRS = w$ .
- Indifference curves are downward sloping because we need to give up one to have more of the other, and convex because the more of one good we have, the more we are willing to give up to have additional units of the other.

Comparative Statics: the wage and number of hours in a day can't be changed, so the only available comparative statistics are changes in wage and changes in the preference of leisure vs. labor.

## Example 1: wage decrease



- Y-intercept falls with  $w$  because at low wages, the maximum amount of AoG that can be consumed by  $\$24w$  decreases.
- The slope of the new BC  $= w'$ .
- The new optimal point will certainly have a lower amount of consumption of AoG (and thus, lower overall utility), but the change in leisure/labor will be dependent upon the individual's preference for labor and leisure.
- Here, the person ended up working more as a result of the decreased wage.



- Alternatively, the individual could end up working less, represented by an increase in leisure ( $H' > H^*$ ).
- This would result in a low level of consumption of AoG.


Income and Substitution Effects

- When wage changes, the consumer's choice of the new optimum will have both income and substitution effects
- Substitution Effect: when  $w$  changes, the relative price of leisure as it compares to labor changes.

If wage increases, the relative price of leisure increases, so individuals substitute towards labor  
If wage decreases, the relative price of leisure decreases, so individuals substitute towards leisure


- Income Effect: when  $w$  changes, level of income changes

Leisure is a normal good, so when  $w$  increases, income increases, consumption of leisure increases  
when  $w$  decreases, income decreases, consumption of leisure decreases  
Consumption of AGG is also a normal good, so when  $w$  increases, income rises, consumption of AGG rises  
when  $w$  decreases, income decreases, consumption of AGG decreases



- To model: draw both old and new budget constraints
- Draw a budget constraint tangent to the old indifference curve and parallel to new budget constraint. This change is the SE.
- This is a wage increase, meaning the relative price of leisure has become more expensive, so the individual will substitute towards labor
- Next, draw point C by accounting for the fact that income has increased, so consumption of leisure and AGG will rise relative to B.?

Individual Supply Curve




This is what an individual's labor supply curve will typically look like.  
At low levels of income, increase in income cause them to work more, and in this case, the SE effect dominates.  
Eventually, when income is high enough, income in recreation cause them to work less, this is when IE dominates.

Market Labor Supply Curve

- The market supply curve for labor is the aggregate of all individuals. It is typically upward sloping because as wages increase, people are willing to work more hours, SE dominates. Also, wages increases expand the labor force.
- Reservation wage: the minimum wage someone would be willing to do a job for. This implies:
  - Employed: market wage > reservation wage
  - Not participating: market wage < reservation wage
  - Unemployed: market wage > reservation wage, but unable to find job


Non-linear Budget Constraints

① Non-labor Income



- Non-labor income is any income that is not dependent on labor
- Examples include: welfare, inheritance,
- Non-labor income increases income, so individuals will consume more leisure and AOL
- However, non-labor income doesn't change the relative price of leisure and consumption of AOL, so there is no substitution effect
- The slope of the new budget constraint remains  $= -w$

② Overtime




- If after a certain number of hours worked, an individual receives overtime, it changes the budget constraint
- Their new budget constraint will have a slope reflecting new wage (say  $1.5w$ ) and will increase the new maximum amount of AOL they can consume


a) Those who work under 40 hours per week will exhibit no change in their behavior because their wage/income/relative prices have not changed.

b) Those who work over 40 hours per week. Their income has increased as a result of the wage increase, so they will consume more leisure and more consumption of AOL. The wage increase has raised the relative price of leisure more expensive, so they will exhibit an SE towards labor.

c) Those who work exactly 40 hours per week with a relatively small IE towards more consumption, but will have a large SE towards labor.



d) Those who work just below 40 hours a week may end up being indifferent if that is how the substitution effect falls.



- If they do decide to work more, it would result from SE, not IE

## Labor Demand

- Derivation of labor demand comes from profit maximization, where  $MR=MC$ . Firms hire until the marginal benefit of labor = marginal cost of labor.

### Terminology:

Marginal Revenue Product of Labor (MRP<sub>L</sub>):

defined as the additional revenue a firm makes when employing additional labor

$$MRP_L = \frac{\Delta TR}{\Delta L}$$

$$MRP_L = MP_L = MR$$

Marginal Factor Cost of Labor (MFC<sub>L</sub>):

when firms are price takers on the input market, defined as the cost incurred by employing an additional unit of labor

$$MFC_L = w$$

\* When firms are price-takers on the output market,  $MRP_L = MP_L \cdot P$

When firms are price-takers on the input market,  $MFC_L = w$

Marginal Value Product (MVP<sub>L</sub>):


used when the firm is a price-taker on the output market.

$$MVP_L = MRP_L \text{ when } MRP_L = MP_L \cdot P$$

\* The MVP<sub>L</sub> curve is the labor demand curve, it summarizes how much labor a firm should use at any given output good price (and wage)


- Firms should employ such that  $MVP_L = w$

$$MR=MC$$



# Labo'r Market


## Labo'r Market Equilibrium




- The position of the labor demand curve is dependent upon marginal product of labor and the price of the output good
  - If  $MP_L$  and  $P$  increase,  $D_L$  shifts out, increasing
  - If  $MP_L$  and  $P$  fall,  $D_L$  shifts in, decreasing
- The position of the labor supply curve is dependent upon individuals' preferences for labor vs. leisure

## Comparative Exercise


- Example: individual preferences for labor have increased, shifting the labor supply curve out



- This results in the market wage,  $w$ , falling, and labor quantity rising




- Marginal product of labor decreases because of diminishing marginal return to labor,  
 $L \uparrow \rightarrow MP_L \downarrow$



- As wage falls, firm hires more workers so that  $MVP_L = w$


• In the long-run, the firm can reconfigure combinations of  $K$  &  $L$ , so it can substitute towards labor and stay on the same isoquant (different shaped isoquant)  
 • In the long-run, the market demand curve becomes more elastic because firms can substitute away from labor

Because the market wage has changed, marginal costs have changed. Therefore, the profit-maximizing quantity has also changed.



Now, the profit-maximizing quantity is higher

Effects: If the firm chooses to produce at a different quantity, its decision incorporates effects




- First, redraw a budget isocost with the same TC and the new isocost's slope
  - Because wage has fallen, the firm will substitute towards labor.  $A \rightarrow B$  (same isoquant) is SE
- Next, draw new isocost, further out, (same higher total cost due to higher production) and the new point includes the OE (output effect) which captures the move in  $K$  &  $L$  as a result of higher output




# Monopsony

Monopsony is the input market equivalent of monopoly.  
 Meaning, there are the sole employer.



- The labor supply curve faced by monopsonists is upward sloping, similar to how the demand curve faced by monopolists is downward sloping.
- This means that in order to hire more labor, wages must increase (for the new and former current employees)

## Market Wage in Monopsony



- The  $MFC_L$  curve for monopsonies will be the supply curve with 2x slope (similar to MR curve for monopolists)
- Monopsonies choose labor at a profit-maximizing quantity where  $MFC_L = MUP_L$ , and then the market wage is given this quantity meets the supply curve
- As demonstrated, the market wage is lower than in equilibrium, and the quantity of labor is lower, resulting in DWL

## Quantitative Example:

Labor Supply:  $L = 80w$

Labor Demand:  $L = 480 - 40MUP_L$

MFC curve = labor supply with 2x slope

LS:  $L = 80w$

$$w = \frac{L}{80}$$

$$w = \frac{L}{40}$$

$$MFC = \frac{L}{40}$$

Profits are maximized when  $MFC = MUP$

$$L = 480 - 40MUP$$

$$L^* = 240$$

$$40MUP = 480 - L$$

$$MUP = 12 - \frac{L}{40}$$

$$L = 80w, \text{ so } 240 = 80w, w = \$3$$


$$MUP = MFC$$

$$12 - \frac{L}{40} = \frac{L}{40}$$

$$12 = \frac{2L}{40}$$


$$480 = 2L, L = 240$$

## Minimum Wage



Minimum wage is a kind of price floor. It is binding and effective if it is set above competitive equilibrium, will create unemployment

- wages are people's needs?
- there's economic activity - under



- Effective wage:
- firm loyalty
  - improved morale

## Intertemporal Optimization

Intertemporal optimization describes the process by which individuals decide how much and when to spend.


Divides income into two categories:

$$C_{\text{today}} \leq I$$

$$C_{\text{future}} \leq I - C_{\text{today}}$$

The goal is to maximize lifetime utility

Intertemporal Budget Constraint:



• Individuals have different preferences for spending today vs. future

Marginal Rate of Time Preference (MRTP): the amount of consumption in the future an individual would be willing to give up to have more consumption today.

Optimizing when  $MRTP = \text{slope (here, -1)}$


More Realistically...

Income that isn't spent today can be invested to earn a return

$$C_2 = C_{\text{today}}$$

$$C_2 = C_{\text{future}}$$

$$C_2 = (I - C_1)(1 + r)$$



This results in an increase in consumption due to the fact that overall utility can be increased by investing money.

... Effects... Yay!

• The possibility of investment results in...

Substitution effect: consumption today's relative price has increased, so substitution towards consumption in the future

Income effect: income has increased, so  $C_{\text{today}}$  and  $C_{\text{future}}$  has increased

Preferences result from:

- Impatience (spend now!)
- Uncertainty (what and when they pay?)
- Opportunity cost (spend today, earn more)
- Interest

Discounting: Individuals tend to discount future consumption

The discount rate refers to the rate at which individuals discount future consumption

If \$100 today = \$110 later, Discount Rate = 10%

Present Value: a future amount's equivalence to today's dollars

If  $r = 10\%$ , \$110 has \$100 present value

(what amount today, given  $r$ , results in an equivalent amount)

Future Value:  $FV = PV(1+r)^t$        $PV = \frac{FV}{(1+r)^t}$

Example: what is the PV of a \$50,000 salary over the next 5 years?

$$PV = 50,000 + \frac{50,000}{(1+r)} + \frac{50,000}{(1+r)^2} + \frac{50,000}{(1+r)^3} + \frac{50,000}{(1+r)^4}$$

$$\text{If } r = 3\%, = \$234,850$$

$$FV(234,850) = 234,850(1+0.03)^5 = \$250,000$$

Two Options: \$50,000/year for 5 years ... or school and then \$100K/year for 3 years,  $r = 3\%$

$$\text{Option 1: } 50,000 + \frac{50,000}{(1.03)} + \frac{50,000}{(1.03)^2} + \frac{50,000}{(1.03)^3} + \frac{50,000}{(1.03)^4} = 234,850$$

$$\text{Option 2: } 0 + \frac{0}{(1.03)} + \frac{100,000}{(1.03)^2} + \frac{100,000}{(1.03)^3} + \frac{100,000}{(1.03)^4} = 274,620$$

Example: smoking

\$10 utility    \$5/pack    550 cigarettes in 10 years

$$PV \text{ of Benefits} = 10 \quad PV \text{ of costs} = 5 + \frac{50}{(1+r)^{10}}$$


PV of Benefits > PV of costs ... smoking is rational!

- Behaviors that have short-term benefits with long-term costs may be considered rational behavior if the PDU of Benefits > PDU of costs, this would require a sufficiently high discount rate

# Externalities and Public Goods


Externalities occur when one party's activities affect another person's utility in a way not reflected by the price.

## Negative Production Externality




$$MC^{SOC} = MC^{POC} + MD$$


## Positive Production Externality



## Negative Consumption Externality



## Positive Consumption Externality



## Solutions to Externalities:

① Internalize the externality by making the responsible party absorb the cost of the externality. Basically, make the perpetrator the victim. Property rights!

- Coase Theorem states that if don't meet the who you assign the property rights to so long as:

- bargaining is free (not free due to time/cost and legal fees) ... also externalities difficult due to the issue of calculating and assigning damages and also holdout problem, free riders

- If property rights go to perpetrator, it increases the costs and the will produce socially optimal quantity

## ② Pigouvian Tax

- Pigouvian tax is a solution that creates a tax equal to the value of the marginal damage
- Potential issues include:
  - concerns end up being more than the tax
  - question of what you do with the revenue

## ③ Regulation

- The government can set a production cap to minimize negative externalities
- Issues:
  - doesn't promote the reduction of the externalities
  - government needs to know firms cost structures
  - government must keep up with technology

## ④ Promoting positive externalities

- Regulation mandating the production of positive production externalities
- Merging two firms who benefit from each other's work
- Pigouvian subsidy encourage production

## Public Goods

- Public Goods:
- You can get it even if you don't pay for it
  - One's consumption doesn't inhibit another's
  - Additional consumption doesn't require producing another unit, zero marginal cost

Pure Public Goods: Non-excludable and Non-Rivalrous

### Problems with Public Goods:

#### ① Free-Riders

Free-riders attempt to consume public goods paid for by others. They have incentive not to pay their full willingness to pay, but also have incentive to overreport their willingness to pay.

Solutions:

- Social norms

- Stigmata
- Excluding non-payers
- Threats
- Berg among
- Promising good publicity
- appealing to religious/ethical values
- compulsory financing

#### ② Tiebout Equilibrium

- Public goods are often paid for at the local level allowing for individuals with similar values to live together (education, public health and safety, utilities, parks and recreation)
- Individuals can move to places that match their preferences
- In Tiebout Equilibrium, in the long-run, with an infinite number of places, everyone will end up somewhere that matches their preferences, and no one will be asked to pay more than their willingness to pay

## Game Theory

- Assumptions:
- All players know the full rules of the game, including the other players' payoffs
  - All players are rational and flawless
  - All players are risk-neutral to payoffs

### ① Simultaneous Games

- Both players play at the same time
- They don't know the other person's strategy until the game is over

Dominant Strategy: strategy that no matter the other's decision, is the best strategy (opposite of dominated strategy)

Nash Equilibrium: a set of strategies that are the best options for each player, regardless of the other's strategy

- Cooperation requires:
  - They derive pleasure from each other's utility (violates the assumption of selfish, rational, risk-neutral)
  - They don't know the other person's deal (violates assumption of full knowledge)
  - One of the makes a mistake (which happens → Trusting him)

- If this was a repeated game, they could cooperate (may employ a trigger strategy when if one person deviates, the agreement is off)

- However, if this was a finitely repeated game, cooperation wouldn't work because that person is deviating, and they would pre-deviate that anticipation back to round 1

- Deviate vs. Cooperate (with  $p_i = r$ )

- Payoff for sharing secret forever:  $-2 / (1-r)$


- Payoff for deviating:  $-1 - 3r(1-r)$

## Imperfect Competition

- Imperfect competition is between perfect competition and monopoly

### ① Oligopoly

Market in which there are only a few sellers of a good.



$$P^M > P^{IC} > P^{CF}$$

$$Q^M < P^{IC} < P^{CF}$$

- DWL is smaller in imperfect competition than in monopoly, but still exists

### ② Collusion

Collusion occurs when existing firms combine to make what is essentially a monopolistic firm. The firm finds the profit-maximizing quantity and price, then divide  $\frac{\pi}{n}$ .

- Individual firms have incentive to sell at low prices behind the cartel's back, so measures must be taken to stop this.

### ③ Cournot Duopoly

- Simplest model of imperfect competition in which there are two firms who set their quantities as best response functions to the other firm (we are assuming that goods are perfect substitutes, hence homogenous)

Example: Demand:  $Q = 30 - \frac{P}{2}$

Supply: Firm 1:  $MC_1 = 2Q_1$

Firm 2:  $MC_2 = 4Q_2$

$$MR: Q = 30 - \frac{P}{2}$$

$$P = 60 - 2Q$$

$$MR_1 = 60 - 4Q_1 - 2Q_2$$

$$MR_2 = 60 - 2Q_1 - 4Q_2$$

$$BR_1: 60 - 4Q_1 - 2Q_2 = 2Q_1$$

$$6Q_1 = 60 - 2Q_2$$

$$Q_1 = 10 - \left(\frac{1}{3}\right)Q_2$$

$$BR_2: 60 - 2Q_1 - 4Q_2 = 4Q_2$$

$$8Q_2 = 60 - 2Q_1$$

$$Q_2 = 7.5 - \left(\frac{1}{4}\right)Q_1$$

$$Q_1 = 10 - \left(\frac{1}{3}\right)\left[7.5 - \left(\frac{1}{4}\right)Q_1\right]$$

$$Q_1 = 10 - \left(\frac{2.5}{3}\right) + \left(\frac{1}{3} \cdot \frac{1}{4}\right)Q_1$$

$$\left(1 - \left(\frac{1}{3} \cdot \frac{1}{4}\right)\right)Q_1 = 10 - \left(\frac{2.5}{3}\right)$$

$$Q_1 = \frac{10 - \left(\frac{2.5}{3}\right)}{\left(1 - \left(\frac{1}{3} \cdot \frac{1}{4}\right)\right)} = 8.18$$

$$Q_2 = 7.5 - \left(\frac{1}{4}\right)\left[10 - \left(\frac{1}{3}\right)Q_2\right]$$

$$Q_2 = 7.5 - 2.5 + \left(\frac{1}{4} \cdot \frac{1}{3}\right)Q_2$$

$$Q_2 = \frac{5}{\left(1 - \left(\frac{1}{4} \cdot \frac{1}{3}\right)\right)} = 5.45$$

$$Q = 8.18 + 5.45$$

$$Q = 13.63$$

$$P = 60 - 2(13.63)$$

$$P = \$32.74$$

To Solve: ① Find  $MR_1$  and  $MR_2$

② Set  $MR_1 = MC_1$  and  $MR_2 = MC_2$  to get response functions

③ Find  $q_1$  and  $q_2$  by finding the intersection of  $BR_1$  and  $BR_2$

④ Find  $Q = q_1$  and  $q_2$  to find  $P$

⑤ Determine profits

### ④ Bertrand Duopoly

Market structure in which two firms compete on price. Their best response, as a function of the other's price is to undercut. They would continue to undercut until, according to the Bertrand Paradox, they would end up at a perfectly competitive market.

### ⑤ Stackelberg Duopoly

Market situation similar to Cournot duopoly, except that one firm has first mover advantage.

Example:  $BR_1: q_1 = 10 - (\frac{1}{2})q_2$

$BR_2: q_2 = 7.5 - (\frac{1}{4})q_1$

Demand:  $P = 60 - 2Q$

$P = 60 - 2Q$

$P = 60 - 2(q_1 + q_2)$

$P = 60 - 2q_1 - 2[7.5 - (\frac{1}{4})q_1]$

$P = 60 - 2q_1 - 15 + \frac{1}{2}q_1$

$P = 45 - \frac{3q_1}{2}, MR = 45 - 3q_1$

$MR_1 = MC_1$

$BR_2 @ q_1 = 9$

$45 - 3q_1 = 2q_1$

$BR_2: q_2 = 7.5 - (\frac{1}{4})9$

$45 = 5q_1$

$q_2 = 5.25$


$q_1 = 9$

$Q = (q_1 + q_2) \quad Q = 14.25, P = 31.25$

Under Stackelberg duopoly, first mover has higher profits than in Cournot

### ⑥ Price Leadership

Under price leadership, there is one firm that has sufficient market power to set price. Other competitors act as competitive fringe and are price-takers.



- Market
- Price leader fixes demand curve D and marginal cost curve MC<sub>1</sub>
- SC is supply curve for competitive fringe
- P<sup>L</sup> is the point at which competitive fringe supplies all demand
- P<sup>F</sup> is the point at which leader supplies all demand

### ③ Monopolistic Competition

The most realistic model is monopolistic competition, in which in the short-run, a firm has a differentiable product and is able to have monopolistic profits. In the long-run, firms enter the market with goods that function as substitutes. This results in the demand curve shifting in and becoming more elastic. Eventually, it will become a market that exhibits competitive equilibrium (perfectly competitive) price and quantity.

