Amrita Vishwa Vidyapeetham Mini Project Report

Stealth File Systems in Proactive Android Forensic Rom

By

SUDIP HAZRA AM.EN.P2CSN15027

Under The Guidance of

DR. PRABHAKAR MATETI WRIGHT STATE UNIVERSITY



Amrita Center For Cyber Security Systems and Networks Amrita Vishwa Vidyapeetham

A minor thesis report submitted to Amrita Vishwa Vidyapeetham in accordance with the requirements of the degree of MTECH in Cyber Security Systems and Networks.

DECEMBER 2015

ABSTRACT

Free goes the abstract

DEDICATION AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

ere goes the dedication.

AUTHOR'S DECLARATION

"Sudip Hazra (Registered Number AM.EN.P2CSN15027) hereby declare that this project report, entitled **Stealth File Systems in Proactive Android Forensic Rom** is a record of the original work done by me under the guidance of /textbf Dr.Prabhakar Mateti, Wright State University was carried out in accordance with the requirements of the University's Regulations and Code of Practice for Research Degree Programmes and that it has not been submitted for any other academic award. Except where indicated by specific reference in the text, the work is the candidate's own work. Work done in collaboration with, or with the assistance of, others, is indicated as such to the best of my knowledge.

SIGNED:	DATE:	

PLACE: AMRITAPURI.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

		Pa	age
Li	st of	Tables	ix
Li	st of	Figures	хi
1	Intr	oduction	1
	1.1	Smartphone OS Market Share	1
	1.2	Android Architecture	2
		1.2.1 Linux Kernel	2
		1.2.2 Libraries	3
		1.2.3 Android Runtime	4
		1.2.4 Application Framework	4
		1.2.5 Applications	4
2	Rela	ated Work	5
	2.1	Androphsy: Forensic Framework for Android	5
	2.2	Smartphone Forensics: A proactive Investigative Approach	5
	2.3	Frost: Forensic Recovery of Scambled Telephones	5
	2.4	Android Forensics: Automated Data Collection and Reporting Tool for Mobile Device	6
	2.5	Specifying a Realistic File System	6
	2.6	A Fast Boot, Fast Shutdown Technique for Android OS Devices	6
	2.7	Internet-Scale File Analysis	6
	2.8	Subverting Operating System Properties Through Evolutionary DKOM Attacks .	7
	2.9	Forensic Analysis of Instant Messenger Applications on Android devices	7
	2.10	Forensics Analysis of Whatsapp Messenger on Android Smartphones	7
	2.11	M.S Thesis on Forensic Analysis of whatsapp on Android Smartphone Neha Thakur	7
3	Pro	blem Statement	9
	3.1	Aim	9
4	Bac	kground	11
	4 1	Fuse(File system in User Space)	11

TABLE OF CONTENTS

A	App	endix :	A	21
6	Wor	k Don	e Till Now	19
		5.1.2	Cloud File System	18
		5.1.1	Stealth File Systems	18
	5.1	Modu	les Description:	18
5	Pro	posed	System	17
		4.3.2	Kernel Level Rootkits	14
		4.3.1	User Level Rootkits	14
	4.3	Stealt	hfs via Rootkits	13
	4.2	Cloud	ŝ	13

LIST OF TABLES

TABLE Page

LIST OF FIGURES

FIG	URE	P	age
1.1	Gartner Survey Results		2
1.2	Android Architecture		3
4.1	Filesystem in Userspace		11

CHAPTER

Introduction

Smartphones nowadays are capable of doing a multitude of tasks which was not possible with conventional phones, with the increase in complexity of smartphones , We can now send emails, click high-definition photos , access satelite navigation and remain connected to the outside world 24 x 7. The capabilities which makes smartphones different from conventional phones is giving nightmares to security organisations in tracing and extracting data from the smartphones. The criminals are now able to wipe out the traces of criminal activities performed using their phones with much ease than before. The criminal organisations are also using smartphones to communicate with others using encrypted messages which are very hard to trace and decrypt. Even if the phones are confiscated after the crime, It is becoming very hard for law-enforcement agencies to extract data from those devices as these devices are encrypted with advanced encryption features and any attempt to access the device memory using Brute-force would potentially wipe the all the data inside and overwrite it with 0. In this scenario , A radically new approach is necessary to proactively monitor the criminal activities with minimal interference and maximum stealth.

1.1 Smartphone OS Market Share

According to Gartner, it's estimated that there are roughly 2 billion smartphone users in the market (1.91 billion to be exact), with that number expected to increase another 12% in 2016 to top 2.16 billion people globally. The global share of smartphone OS is as follows:

Android dominated the smartphone market with a share of 84 %, IOS with 14.8 % and Windows with 0.7% of the Global smartphone market. As we can see Android OS is the most popular smartphone OS with almost 84 % market share and hence we are interested in examining the forensics capabilities in Android OS.

Worldwide Smartphone Sales to End Users by Operating System in 1Q16 (Thousands of Units)

Operating System	1Q16	1Q16 Market Share (%)		1Q15 Market Share (%)
	Units		Units	
Android	293,771.2	84.1	264,941.9	78.8
iOS	51,629.5	14.8	60,177.2	17.9
Windows	2,399.7	0.7	8,270.8	2.5
Blackberry	659.9	0.2	1,325.4	0.4
Others	791.1	0.2	1,582.5	0.5
Total	349,251.4	100.0	336,297.8	100.0

Source: Gartner (May2016)

Figure 1.1: Gartner Survey Results

1.2 Android Architecture

Android is a mobile operating system developed by google based on the linux kernel and designed primarily for touchscreen mobile devices. Android source code is open-source and it is one of the main reason of the immense popularity of the android OS.

1.2.1 Linux Kernel

The basic layer is the Linux kernel. The whole Android OS is built on top of the Linux 3.x Kernel with some further architectural changes made by Google. It is this Linux that interacts with the hardware and contains all the essential hardware drivers. Drivers are programs that control and communicate with the hardware. For example, consider the Bluetooth function. All devices has a Bluetooth hardware in it. Therefore the kernel must include a Bluetooth driver to communicate with the Bluetooth hardware. The Linux kernel also acts as an abstraction layer between the hardware and other software layers. Android uses the Linux for all its core functionality such as Memory management, process management, networking, security settings etc. As the Android is built on a most popular and proven foundation, it made the porting of Android to variety of hardware, a relatively painless task.




Figure 1.2: Android Architecture

1.2.2 Libraries

The next layer is the Android native libraries. It is this layer that enables the device to handle different types of data. These libraries are written in c or c++ language and are specific for a particular hardware. Some of the important native libraries include the following:

- **Surface Manager:** It is used for compositing window manager with off-screen buffering means you cant directly draw into the screen, but your drawings go to the off-screen buffer. There it is combined with other drawings and form the final screen the user will see. This off screen buffer is the reason behind the transparency of windows.
- **Media framework:** Media framework provides different media codecs allowing the recording and playback of different media formats.
- **SQLite:** SQLite is the database engine used in android for data storage purposes.
- **WebKit:** It is the browser engine used to display HTML content.
- **OpenGL:** Used to render 2D or 3D graphics content to the screen.

1.2.3 Android Runtime

Android Runtime consists of Dalvik Virtual machine and Core Java libraries.

- Dalvik Virtual Machine: It is a type of JVM used in android devices to run apps and is optimized for low processing power and low memory environments. Unlike the JVM, the Dalvik Virtual Machine doesn,Äôt run .class files, instead it runs .dex files. .dex files are built from .class file at the time of compilation and provides hifger efficiency in low resource environments. The Dalvik VM allows multiple instance of Virtual machine to be created simultaneously providing security, isolation, memory management and threading support. It is developed by Dan Bornstein of Google. Android 4.4 introduced Android Runtime (ART) as a new runtime environment, which uses aheadof-time (AOT) compilation to entirely compile the application bytecode into machine code upon the installation of an application.
- **Core Java Libraries:** These are different from Java SE and Java ME libraries. However these libraries provides most of the functionalities defined in the Java SE libraries.

1.2.4 Application Framework

These are the blocks that our applications directly interacts with. These programs manage the basic functions of phone like resource management, voice call management etc. Important blocks of Application framework are:

- Activity Manager: Manages the activity life cycle of applications.
- Content Providers: Manage the data sharing between applications.
- Location Manager: Location management, using GPS or cell tower.
- Resource Manager: Manage the various types of resources we use in our Application.

1.2.5 Applications

Applications are the top layer in the Android architecture and this is where our applications are gonna fit. Several standard applications comes pre-installed with every device, such as:

- SMS client
- App Dialer
- Web browser
- Contact manager

.

.

4

CHAPTER

RELATED WORK

2.1 Androphsy: Forensic Framework for Android

Akarawita Et.Al[2] implemented a forensic framework which can acquire data both Physically and logically from the android smartphone. For physical acquisition they used DD program to clone the system image. For logical acquisition they use adbpull to clone the filesystem partition, other tools used were logical, demsg ,dumpsys, scalpel and adb getprop to get device properties. Used Netcat to copy the system files to a remote server. It was better than other Opensource Forensic tools like Oxygen and ViaExtract CE tool. Rooting of the phone is necessary.

2.2 Smartphone Forensics: A proactive Investigative Approach

Mylonas Et.Al[11] suggested a proactive forensic framework which is regulated by an independent authority. Two modes of forensics namely Usermode and Network mode. No information about Implementation, was the phone rooted or unrooted, functionality of the app not given.

2.3 Frost: Forensic Recovery of Scambled Telephones

Muller Et.Al[10] deviced an forensic image which was flashed on to the phone and it was capable to bruteforcing Pin, direct recovery of encryption keys and decrypting user partition on phone itself. If the bootloader is locked not of much use, only option is to take memory dump but all smartphones now comes with default locked bootloader, secondly only if the handset is instantly available to the expert, he can freeze the ram to minimize data loss and recover encryption keys from ram.

2.4 Android Forensics:Automated Data Collection and Reporting Tool for Mobile Device

Justin Grover[6] made the first of its kind android forensics tool which collected data with user consent and uploaded it to a remote server. The capabilities are limited and are susceptible to tampering . Droidwatch mainly uses content observers, Broadcast Receivers and Alarms for monitoring. Broadcast Receivers and Alarms can be tampered with. No data about social networking apps , no support was there for email.

2.5 Specifying a Realistic File System

BilbyFs[3] is a an asynchronous write flash file system whose formal verification is done using Isabelle/Hol. The file system needs a C-Wrapper which is placed between the VFS and the filesystem hence direct mapping is not possible. which can be a disadvantage. It follows strict ordering of updates and do not support concurrency. It was formally verified that the Bilbyfs indeed follows async writes .

2.6 A Fast Boot, Fast Shutdown Technique for Android OS Devices

The paper [13] demonstrates a new technique of Fast Boot in android called FBFS. Here the snapshot is taken of the system only once and hence afterwards whenever the system boots, it makes a call to RSS_thread to sync the ram image with the latest files in emmc. significantly decreases the startup time to 7.8secs and shutdown to normal 10.3 secs, but when will the system know when to update the snapshot upon system update or a specified amount of time is not addressed.

2.7 Internet-Scale File Analysis

A [7] large scale malware analysis framework implemented in skald framework and has loosely coupled components like transporter ,planner and services, all inter-connected but highly failure resistant. TOTEM is the name of the tool tey created using the framework, written in scala using AKKA. Planner designates tasks to various services which execute and the reports are forwarded using RabbitMQ messaging protocol . Highly concurrent and a very good technique for mass scale malware analysis but more details are needed how the service outputs are fed to humans or scripts for report generation.

2.8 Subverting Operating System Properties Through Evolutionary DKOM Attacks

[5]New type of DKOM attack ,does not change the kernel dynamic data structures at once but continues to do it over a period of time. Difficult to detect because there is no sudden change but continuous one. attacks the cfs tree of the scheduler but not the process tree hence the app being attacked shows in the ps but it is indefinitely delayed in the scheduler as the vruntime is set to max. Detected using a thin hypervisor debugger which uses defensive mimic technique to detect the attack using periodic monitor and task tracker. Can stop ids or any antivirus and do not modify kernel code. Various other variation possible like attacking memory management.

2.9 Forensic Analysis of Instant Messenger Applications on Android devices

Adiya Mahajan Et.al [9] have done forensic investigation on whatsapp and viber using Celebrite UEFD Classic device, they were able to extract whatsapp and viber data however on using the physical analyzer software of Celebrite, it succeeded incase of whatsapp but failed in case of viber. Manual Analysis of the viber folder were needed. Pretty much everything was extracted like chat messages, images videos with timestamp, however the data in internal memory of sdcard was encrypted however they did not test it after the deleting the data, was the tool able to extract data from the unallocated space is unknown.

2.10 Forensics Analysis of Whatsapp Messenger on Android Smartphones

Anglano Et.Al [4] wrote a very good paper decoding the whatsapp artifacts and step by step linking to what is the greater picture. Artifacts were carefully correlated to infer all the required information and tracing events even if the messages were deleted using whatsapp logs but very little support what will happen if whatsapp is removed using Uninstall- it like app or the phone is formatted.

2.11 M.S Thesis on Forensic Analysis of whatsapp on Android Smartphone Neha Thakur

[12]Whatsapp Forensics can be done in two ways: If whatsapp folder is in Sdcard can be decrypted using WhatsapXtract Tool which is now obsolete beacause the Key has changed andd we need to edit the code to add the new key. Memory Forensics of volatile memory can also be done, suing memfetch to extract selective portions of ram, taking the heap of the selected appliaction

and running data extraction tool on the memory dump. Recently deleted messages can be easily discovered. Used a tool called WhatsappRamXtract.

CHAPTER

PROBLEM STATEMENT

he project is a part of an ongoing project. The Previous Work has been done by Karthik Et.al [8] and Aiyyappan Et.al [1]. Aiyyappan Et.al ported the inotifywait to android. File events are tracked by inotify tool and the inotify source was complied using NDK programming and compiled to a native shared object library. The native function excepts a directory to track and all file events are tracked. He also created the forensic examiner toolkit which runs on linux machine to image, recover and collect device speciofic data from the cloud. Some amount of stealth was also enabled using hidepid =2, where users can only see their own processes and process id's are also hidden from /proc also.

Karthik Et.al created the android apk which extensively tracks the user activities like GPS,Sensor data,WIFI Metadata,Sms,Call recording and keylogger was also included in the apk, which could be configured when the rom is flashed and used for the first time, after that there is no dialog whatsoever and the app runs in tealth mode and saves all the forensically relevant data in/forrensic partition and oppurtunistically uploads it to the cloud.However the background process can be discovered if the user roots the phone and gets root access, Then he /she can easily see all the background process ruunning and can also discover the /forensic partition, compromising the evidence, even though the partition is encrypted but it will still create suspicion in the suspects mind.

3.1 Aim

The solution is to create A Fuse File System and enable Stealth Features and Copy all Forensically Relevant Data in that File System. There will be two fuse file system one will directly mount the cloud storage in the linux level and the other file system will be used to store all the forensically

relevant data and it will copy the data to the cloud storage file system which will oppurtunistically sync with the cloud storage online. Both file system will be hidden using kernel Rootkits.

BACKGROUND

4.1 Fuse(File system in User Space)

FUSE (Filesystem in Userspace) is an interface for userspace programs to export a filesystem to the Linux kernel. The FUSE project consists of two components: the fuse kernel module and the libfuse userspace library . FUSE is particularly useful for writing virtual file systems. Unlike traditional file systems that essentially save data to, and retrieve data from, mass




Figure 4.1: Filesystem in Userspace

storage, virtual filesystems do not actually store data themselves. They act as a view or translation of an existing file system or storage device. FUSE has a small kernel module which plugs into the VFS layer in the kernel as a file system and then communicates with a user-level process that does all the work, using the FUSE library to communicate with the kernel module. IO requests from an application are redirected by the FUSE kernel module to this user level process for execution and the results are returned back to the requesting application.

Example of Fuse Filesystems: Wikipedia

- CloudStore (formerly, Kosmos filesystem): By mounting via FUSE, existing Linux utilities can interface with CloudStore
- EncFS: Encrypted virtual filesystem
- ExpanDrive: A commercial filesystem implementing SFTP/FTP/S3/Swift using FUSE
- GDFS: Filesystem which allows you to mount your Google Drive account on Linux.
- **GlusterFS:** Clustered Distributed Filesystem having ability to scale up to several petabytes.
- GmailFS: Filesystem which stores data as mail in Gmail.
- **GVfs:** The virtual filesystem for the GNOME desktop.
- **KBFS:** A distributed filesystem with end-to-end encryption and a global namespace that uses FUSE to create cryptographically secure file mounts.
- MooseFS: An open source distributed fault-tolerant file system available on every OS with FUSE implementation (Linux, FreeBSD, NetBSD, OpenSolaris, OS X), able to store petabytes of data spread over several servers visible as one resource.
- NTFS-3G and Captive NTFS: allowing access to NTFS filesystems.
- **Sector File System:** Sector is a distributed file system designed for large amount of commodity computers. Sector uses FUSE to provide a mountable local file system interface.
- **SSHFS:** Provides access to a remote filesystem through SSH.
- **Transmit:** A commercial FTP client that also adds the ability to mount WebDAV, SFTP, FTP and Amazon S3 servers as disks in Finder, via MacFUSE.
- **WebDrive:** A commercial filesystem implementing WebDAV, SFTP, FTP, FTPS and Amazon S3.
- WikipediaFS: View and edit Wikipedia articles as if they were real files.

• Wuala: A multi-platform, Java-based fully OS integrated distributed file system. Using FUSE, MacFUSE and Callback File System respectively for file system integration, in addition to a Java-based app accessible from any Java-enabled web browser.

4.2 Cloudfs

CloudFS will be developed using the file system in user-space (FUSE) toolkit. FUSE provides a framework for implementing a file system at user level. CloudFS will be implemented as user-level code that uses libfuse to communicate with applications and uses regular file system calls to access the storage. By default, FUSE is multi-threaded, so multiple system calls from user applications can be running at the same time in the user-level process, allowing higher parallelism and faster performance. Cloudfs can be used to mount cloud storage like dropbox, google drive and onedrive as local file system and any changes that are made in the local file system are syncronised with cloud storage. For example:

- WingFS, the universal coud adapter, mounts the cloud service on the desktop. Storage services can be used like a hard drive without the need for apps, specific folders, browser plug-ins and login processes.
- Google Cloud Storage Fuse: It is an open source fuse adapter that llowas us to mount Google cloud storage buckets as file systems on Linux or OS X systems. It also provides a way for applications to upload and download google cloud storage objects using standard file system semantics. It is written in Go language and hosted in github.
- The Storage Made Easy Linux App Suite is comprised of an integrated Cloud Drive (that uses FUSE), a graphical Cloud File Explorer and also Sync tools to sync cloud files to/from the Linux desktop.
- Drop-Fuse is a simple fuse based file system which is written in python and can mount the dropbox drive as local file system in Linux.

In our case We will be implementing the cloud fs below the android software stack in linux level and api's will be used synchronisation and mounting a multitude of cloud storage services.

4.3 Stealthfs via Rootkits

When we install a rootkit in that system we will be able to get administrator privileges whenever you want. Good rootkits can hide in compromised system, so that they can't be found by administrator. There are many ways to hide in a system. For example there are rootkits that replace some most important programs in system(ls, ps, netstat etc.) with modified versions of them that won't let administrator see that something's wrong. Although, such a rootkit

is quite easy to detect. Other rootkits work as linux kernel modules. They work in kernel mode, so they can do everything they want. They can hide themselves, files, processes etc. **Different types of Rootkits are explained below.**

4.3.1 User Level Rootkits

User level rootkits are unprivileged and are stored outside of kernel memory space. They are user space code that patches or replaces existing applications to provide cover for malicious activities. User level rootkits replace system binaries, add malicious utilities, change configuration files, delete files, or launch malicious processes. For example, the Linux system program ,Äòls,Äô could be changed so as to not reveal the presence of a malicious file in a directory. These rootkits, while effective, are easily detected by file system integrity and signature checking tools , therefore, most modern IDS software prevent these rootkits from being installed or can detect an active intruder.

4.3.2 Kernel Level Rootkits

Kernel level rootkits defeat such tools by directly modifying the operating system kernel. These rootkits modify the execution flow of kernel code to run their own payload. However, modifying the kernel in this way can drastically affect the stability of the system causing a kernel panic.

The simplest way to introduce code into a running kernel is through a Loadable Kernel Module (LKM). LKMs add flexibility to an operating system by providing a means to add functionality without recompiling the entire kernel. Added functionality might include device drivers, filesystem drivers, system calls, network drivers, TTY line disciplines, and executable interpreters. Most modern UNIX- like systems, including Solaris, Linux, and FreeBSD, use or support LKMs. However, the kernel packaged with Android does not support LKMs by default. The kernel can be recompiled and installed on Android to add LKM support if physical access to the mobile is available. LKMs are very useful, but they also allow maliciously written kernel modules to subvert the entire operating system which can lead to a loss of control of the Linux kernel and consequently all the layers above the kernel. Kernel level rootkits typically subvert the kernel to hide processes, modules, connections and more to avoid detection. Particular techniques include hooking system calls, direct kernel object manipulation (DKOM), run-time kernel memory patching, interrupt descriptor table hooking, and intercepting calls handled by Virtual File System (VFS). These techniques are discussed at a high level in this section.

4.3.2.1 Hooking System Calls

The kernel provides a set of interfaces or system calls by which processes running in user space can interact with the system. The applications in user space send requests through this interface and the kernel fulfills requests or returns an error. Hooking is a technique that employs handler function, called hooks, to modify control flow . A new hook registers its address as the location for a specific function, so when that function is called the hook runs instead. Typically, a hook will call the original function at some point to preserve the original behavior. System calls can be hooked using a maliciously designed LKM to alter the structure of the system call table.

4.3.2.2 Direct Kernel Object Manipulation (DKOM)


Hooking the system write call allows a rootkit to hide from system binaries like ls, lsmod, and ps; even so, robust IDSs can still detect the existence by following the kernel structures. All operating systems store internal record-keeping keeping data in main memory. The Linux kernel is no exception and provides generic data structures and primitives to encourage code reuse by developers. These structures, that all programmers are familiar with, include linked lists, queues, maps, and binary trees. Altering the data in these structures to hide an attacker,Äôs activity is called Direct Kernel Object Manipulation (DKOM).

4.3.2.3 Interrupt Descriptor Table (IDT) Hooking

An interrupt is an event that alters the sequence of instructions executed by the processor. When an interrupt occurs a system table called the Interrupt Descriptor Table (IDT) associates each interrupt or exception with the address of the corresponding handler. System calls use software interrupts to switch from user mode to kernel mode. The interrupt handler invokes the system call handler from the address stored in the system call table. A rootkit can hook the IDT by modifying the interrupt handler address in the IDT or by patching the first few instructions of the interrupt handler. These modifications would put the rootkit code in the flow of execution while still letting the system handle interrupts properly.

PROPOSED SYSTEM

Here we propose a Stealth File system with cloud support Below the Android Software stack.



5.1 Modules Description:

5.1.1 Stealth File Systems

The stealth file system will be a seperate file system which will be used by the forensic service to copy all the forensically relevant data from the relevant device partitions like /data to the stealth file system. The stealth file system will be based on ext4 file systems, rootkits will be used to hide the file volumes from commands like df and du. The rootkit will be responsible for subverting systems calls which can potentially expose the presence of the either the forensic service running or the stealth file system and the cloud file system. The rootkit will also hide the forensic service running in the background by hooking on to the sys_call_table and filtering out the output. In future the stealth file system will be based on a seperate emmc partition for added stealth.

5.1.2 Cloud File System

The cloud File system will made using fuse , and we will be able to localy mount a cloud drive as the cloud file system. It will support various cloud providers using api's .The cloud drive will oppurtunistically upload the data to the cloud storage online. The cloud file system will also be made stealth using rootkits and seamlessly copy data from the stealth file systems and sync it .It will also act a cache to prevent data loss.

As per the official android documentation the external storage (SD cards) are accessed by the Android system using FUSE which implies that FUSE is supported by the kernel directly so we dont need to add fuse support in kernel, we need to develop the cloudfs which will be controlled by the Android Cloud Storage Service(ACCS) which will run as a background service and will be configurable using an Apk and .config file. The stealth file system with the cloud file system will work with forensic service developed by aiyyappan and karthik and will be incorporated into the forensic rom.

C H A P T E R

WORK DONE TILL NOW

B

APPENDIX

APPENDIX A

P egins an appendix

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- [1] AIYYAPPAN AND PRABHAKAR, Android forensic support framework, Master's thesis, 2015.
- [2] I. U. AKARAWITA, A. B. PERERA, AND A. ATUKORALE, Androphsy forensic framework for android, 2015 Fifteenth International Conference on Advances in ICT for Emerging Regions (ICTer), (2015).
- [3] S. AMANI AND T. MURRAY, Specifying a realistic file system, Electron. Proc. Theor. Comput. Sci. Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science EPTCS, 196 (2015), p. 1,Äi9.
- [4] C. Anglano, Forensic analysis of whatsapp messenger on android smartphones, Digital Investigation, 11 (2014), p. 201,Äì213.
- [5] M. GRAZIANO, L. FLORE, A. LANZI, AND D. BALZAROTTI, Subverting operating system properties through evolutionary dkom attacks, Detection of Intrusions and Malware, and Vulnerability Assessment Lecture Notes in Computer Science, (2016), p. 3,Äì24.
- [6] J. GROVER, Android forensics: Automated data collection and reporting from a mobile device, Digital Investigation, 10 (2013).
- [7] Z. HANIF, T. K. LENGYEL, AND G. D. WEBSTER, *Internet-scale file analysis*, Black Hat Usa, (2015).
- [8] Karthik and Prabhakar, Proactive forensic support for android devices, Master's thesis, 2016.
- [9] A. MAHAJAN, M. S. DAHIYA, AND H. P. SANGHVI, Forensic analysis of instant messenger applications on android devices, International Journal of Computer Applications, 68 (2013), p. 38,Äi44.
- [10] T. MÜLLER AND M. SPREITZENBARTH, Frost: Forensic recovery of scrambled telephones, (2013), pp. 373–388.
- [11] A. MYLONAS, V. MELETIADIS, B. TSOUMAS, L. MITROU, AND D. GRITZALIS, Smartphone forensics: A proactive investigation scheme for evidence acquisition, IFIP Advances in Information and Communication Technology Information Security and Privacy Research, (2012), p. 249,Äì260.

- $[12]\ \ N.\ Thakur, \textit{Forensic Analysis of what sapp on Android Smartphone}, PhD\ thesis, 2013.$
- [13] X. Yang, P. Shi, H. Sun, W. Zheng, and J. Alves-Foss, A fast boot, fast shutdown technique for android os devices, Computer, 49 (2016), p. 62,Äì68.