

Infrastructural Power Revisited

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Conceptual Issues

I am naturally delighted that the concept of infrastructural power (IP) has elicited such interest among such a talented group of scholars. In 1983–1984, when I wrote my essay, “The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms, and Results,” I had two principal goals. The first was to specify the sources of state autonomy from civil society. To that end, I suggested that states provided power relations that were confined within a defined territory, which confined their subjects to that territory, and which derived from a central place. No other major form of power organization did this. Autonomy therefore derived from the social utility of services that were necessarily territorial and centralized—law is the obvious example. Thus, those who controlled the state had the opportunity to exploit their utility to further their own interests: from collective power there derived a measure of distributive power. My second goal was to assess how much power states actually possessed. That led me to distinguish two quite different kinds of power: first, despotic power, the range of actions that the state elite is empowered to make without consultation with civil society groups; and second, infrastructural power, the capacity of the state to actually penetrate civil society and implement its actions across its territories.

Thus, states can be “strong” in either of two different ways. Though many historic monarchies were strong in despotic power, they tended to be weak in infrastructural power. Because of the low technological development of the means of routine

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communication and control in former times, their commands could only be executed by local lords and other worthies whose powers in their own localities were substantially autonomous of the state. Conversely, modern capitalist democracies are despotically weak—leaders rule only with the consent of representatives either of the people or of the dominant classes—but they have more infrastructural power. I gave the example of income tax, whereby our salaries are assessed and taxed “at source” every month without our being able to intervene in the process. Income taxes only became major sources of taxation in the twentieth century. Before that, states were largely confined to taxing things that visibly moved around—a much weaker form of infrastructural power.

I then constructed four ideal types of states. Where both despotic power and infrastructural power were low, I termed the state “feudal” (as in medieval Europe); where infrastructural power was weak but infrastructural power high, it was “imperial” (like the Chinese Empire); where despotic power was weak but infrastructural power strong, the state was “bureaucratic” (like Britain or the United States today); and where both were high, the state was “authoritarian” (like the Soviet Union). While I still think this a useful typology, I will now rename and modify the “bureaucratic” type, and this also will have implications for the “authoritarian” type.

The term “bureaucratic” might make it seem that I limit infrastructural power to the relations between state elites and their officials, which was not my intention. Hillel Soifer in his contribution to this issue makes explicit the two faces of infrastructural power. It can refer either to the relations between state and society, or to those between state leaders and their officials. In *The Sources of Social Power*, Volume II (Mann 1993), I argued that political power relations are not merely those radiating outwards from the state (as the term bureaucracy might imply), but also those emanating in civil society radiating inward to the state in the form of parties and pressure groups seeking to control it. Whatever state autonomy this might enable, I noted, “Infrastructural power is a two-way street: It also enables civil society parties to control the state, as Marxists and pluralists emphasize” (Mann 1993: 59).

The essence of the combination of low despotic power and high infrastructural power is not bureaucracy, for this is also present in almost identical form in the “authoritarian” type (e.g., the Soviet Union). Indeed, it is present in all modern states, as Robert Michels and Max Weber noted. A second characteristic found in modern states takes very different forms in these two types of regime: the mass mobilizing party. In states with low despotic power and high infrastructural power, many parties and pressure groups compete for power. If their competition is stably institutionalized, this enables states to mobilize citizen commitment and so legitimate its infrastructures. A better label for this type would be “multiparty regimes,” or more simply “democracy.”

Similarly, the defining characteristic of the “authoritarian” type is not bureaucracy. If the authority of the Soviet Union had been reduced to a Politburo (or perhaps a Stalin) sitting on top of ministries and planning authorities, it never could have transformed a capitalist into a state socialist economy, committed its great atrocities, or won World War II. The main agent of these achievements (and comparable ones in China) was the Communist Party—the single, hierarchically structured party. Fascism

also had a single party regime. In all these cases, masses of party members, under party discipline, supervised every level of public authority and sought to mobilize the public at large. Provided that one counts the party as well as the bureaucracy as “the state,” these states (unlike multiparty ones) have enjoyed significant state autonomy from civil society—but only because they had invented the mass party that could penetrate the pores of everyday life. When communist party unity fell apart, so did the whole Soviet Union. Today in China, the CCP is being stretched to its limits by the quasi-capitalist, corrupt opportunities available to local party officials. The best term to describe these regimes when they are functioning is “single-party.” Therefore, I offer a revised two-dimensional table (Table 1).

The change means that, as with “feudal” and “imperial,” the two more modern types are now more explicitly defined in terms of the centralized-territorial relations of the state, not just of characteristics of the central state itself.

These are ideal types. Real regimes only roughly approximate to them. Thus, single-party regimes were not so monolithic in practice. For example, Mark Lupher (1996) has analyzed power struggles within the Soviet Union as predominantly arraiging the top leadership and the rank-and-file party members against the party’s middle levels. In the great purges, lower level members were also often more enthusiastic in purging than either mid-level leaders or even Stalin himself wished. The Nazi regime has been described as “polycratic,” with different party agencies involved in what they saw as a Darwinian struggle of the fittest, each seeking to implement its own version of party policy and establish its own mini-empire (Broszat 1981). Conversely, Japan has had for almost the whole post-war period a single ruling party, the LDP, though this is internally rather factionalized and pluralistic. We will see various partial versions of the democratic type later. All states are different.

Soifer distinguishes in his article three dimensions of infrastructural power: first, “capabilities” in the sense of the resources potentially at its disposal; second, what he calls the actual “weight of the state,” that is resources actually deployed; and third, its subnational variations in power. In other words, potential infrastructural power may not be mobilizeable, while states will differ in how much they manage to centralize infrastructures and how much these manage to penetrate all their territories. In Wilhelmine Germany, says Daniel Ziblatt, many infrastructures were provided at the level of the individual city rather than by the capital, Berlin (and others were provided by the provinces, the *Länder*). There were also substantial differences in providing infrastructures between the cities. But they were all providing more infrastructures than colonial cities of the time, while the historical statistics on which Ziblatt draws also suggests a national community of statisticians and some degree of informal federal coordination between the cities. Enduring federalism in countries like Germany and the United States adds complexity to our

Table 1 Two dimensions of state power, revised

	Despotic power	Infrastructural power	
		Low	High
Low		Feudal	Democracy
High		Imperial	Single-party

discussions of infrastructural power, but they produce only mild subnational variation. Alabama is more similar to California in providing infrastructures than either is to Mexico—and like all US states both receive large federal subsidies. Advanced countries have had substantial territorially centralized infrastructures. This is not so over all the world, as we see later.

I developed the concept of infrastructural power only for political power relations and not for social life more generally. I see political power relations as only one among four “sources of social power,” the other three being ideological, economic, and military. Ideological power—the control over meaning systems—depends upon media of communication of a peculiarly diffuse kind, often transcending with ease the boundaries of states, the reach of markets and the striking range of armed forces. Economic power involves the extraction, transformation, distribution, and consumption of the resources of nature. It combines the intensive, everyday cooperation of work units with extensive circuits of markets, which often diffuse across state boundaries, though to a lesser extent than ideological power. Military power (whose definition I modified slightly [Mann 2006: 351ff]) is the social organization of concentrated lethal violence. It is authoritative, indeed arbitrary, and violent. Its organization is dual. Within the armed forces it combines a high level of a combination of discipline and comradeship, which enables normally timorous human beings to face great danger with great stoicism. Second, military power has a larger striking range for inflicting or plausibly threatening lethality (aerial bombing greatly increased this during the twentieth century). Finally, political power is the territorially centralized regulation of social life. It is also authoritative and commanded, but it is willed from a center, confined to a defined territory, and wielded through highly institutionalized, routinized means (unlike military power). It is complemented by geopolitical relations, which are the power relations between such territorially centralized entities. Unlike Weber, I do not conflate political and military power. Though states wield military power, there are many nonstate militias and paramilitaries active in the world today, as in former times, while the nature of these two forms of power is very different (I defend this at length [Mann 2006]).

All four have their “infrastructures,” if by this word we mean routinized media through which information and commands are transmitted. Moreover, they often depend on the *same* infrastructures—roads, railroads, education systems, computer networks, etc.—though they will use them in different ways for different purposes. Economic and military historians have both worked extensively on the infrastructures required for economies and war making. But I resist Soifer and Matthias vom Hau’s suggestion to add a “social” to the “spatial” dimension of infrastructural power. They say they are unsure whether I am referring to “control over territory or control over society.” For me, the word “society” is fairly empty. Instead, I mean control over people (and by people) insofar as they are located within the state’s territories, its space of sovereignty, and only in their political power relations. In my work, I have tried to cast radical doubt on the notion that there exists any single bounded entity that we might call a “society.” Instead, there are overlapping, intersecting networks of interaction that have different boundaries. Of the four principal power sources, only political power has formal territorial closure. Yet social relations are involved in all the sources of power—political power relations involve only those that are distributed centralized and territorially, and that includes

state infrastructural power. We must not claim too much for political power or for infrastructural power.

The Recent History of Infrastructural Power: (1) The West and North

The most obvious theme of any history of infrastructural power during the twentieth century and up until today would be its intensification, especially in the industrial and then post-industrial “West” or “North” of the world, and including single party as well as democratic regimes. State infrastructures have grown and grown, as they also did in the nineteenth century: more taxes are assessed “at source” and have become more difficult to evade, education has become longer, standardized, compulsory, and universal; the provision of health care has rocketed, etc. Mass political parties developed, and more and more voluntary associations emerged to organize nationally. All states in the North of the world today now possess far more infrastructural power than did even the most advanced German cities of around 1900, as detailed in Ziblatt’s paper.

Increasingly, social life became territorially integrated and confined. Social interaction became more “nationalized,” a process begun in the nineteenth century. At the de facto level of social interaction, the state became the nation-state. This process reached right into intimate private life. In Volume II, I referred to Susan Watkins’ (1991) remarkable demonstration of how over the period from the 1870s to the 1960s regional differences between female fertility rates, illegitimacy rates, and the age of marriage lessened as each state acquired its own distinct, standardized national demographic profile. On such bases, the notion of common citizenship took off into what T.H. Marshall described as the realm of “social citizenship,” the right of citizens to participate in the socioeconomic life of the nation. It also meant that millions of young men regarded it as natural that they should risk their lives to defend their nation amid the carnage of two world wars. Jules Maurin (1982: 599–637) suggests that in the first war French soldiers fought because their orders resonated amid the various national hierarchies to which they were accustomed: of class, state, school, and church. Ideological commitment was relative unimportant, he concludes. Leonard Smith et al. (2003) add that a grim patriotic determination was also in play. These men defined themselves as Frenchmen and they believed they were defending their country, just as German soldiers in both wars thought they were defending theirs. Infrastructural power was not the only cause of the remarkable sense of national solidarity shown in the twentieth century. But it was an important one. The intensification of infrastructural power and the rise of the nation-state have been intimately linked.

However, the growth of infrastructural power tended to flatten out around the 1970s or 1980s—measured very crudely by state spending as a proportion of GDP. Most advanced states also became more pacific after 1945, abandoning their former powers of military conscription. The growth of mass parties and pressure groups like trade unions also tended to flatten out in the 1970s, though the exact periods of growth and stagnation varied between countries—in the US, union stagnation began in 1950 and actual decline set in during the late 1960s, earlier than elsewhere. Though the decline of labor unions has become near universal in the advanced countries over the last 20 years, this is exceptional. Overall, it seems that in this zone

of the world, nation-states and infrastructural power have stopped intensifying though they are not declining. The European Union (EU) and the fall of the Soviet Union have added additional levels of complexity. The EU is a *de facto*, partial form of federalism. The European nation-states remain strong, but they have voluntarily ceded some infrastructural power to the European level. The former Soviet countries initially saw a collapse in their infrastructural powers, but most have more latterly seen some recovery, and this will probably slowly continue.

In this zone and period, the notion of state “capabilities” seems abstract and largely irrelevant to actual political practices. This is because, for all but about a decade of the last 150 years, Western/Northern state “capabilities” have been vastly greater than their actually deployed “weight.” We only know this because in two relatively brief World Wars, having persuaded their subjects that national survival was at stake, states were suddenly able to adopt a whole new range of infrastructural power, and an increase in despotic power. Both times, over only 2 years, state spending as a proportion of GDP doubled, from around 20–30% to 40–60%, and it was supplemented by a vast range of new state regulation. Armies of millions were involved national recruiting and training networks, the testing of health, and extraordinarily complex supply chains. There was rationing of food and other essentials, the setting of maximum prices, the regulation of industry through joint management/union/state committees, even to the point of telling industrialists what goods they must produce and in what quantities. Not all powers were equally effective. Militaries enjoyed considerable autonomy—in Germany in the first war, the military even took over the government in 1916. Capitalists also had sufficient power to be able to make large profits (especially in the first war), and free, “black” markets always operated to undermine state price controls. Political did not overwhelm military or economic power—or indeed ideological power. Yet these were just some of the infrastructural powers that states clearly had the capacity to generate long before 1914 and then again well before 1939 (or whichever date a country entered each war). Neutral states were also affected. Blockades and submarine warfare induced many of them to introduce rationing powers, for example. But state elites had not even dreamed of deploying such powers beforehand, nor would they have been allowed to do so even if they had dreamed it. States could be much bigger and more powerful than anyone expected, and then they briefly were.

After both wars, though there was much demobilization and deregulation, states did not revert to their prewar limited scope. As I showed in my earlier work, wars had over many centuries ratcheted states ever upward, and so they continued to do in the twentieth century. Some institutions and regulations remained in existence, others had now become ideals in the minds of political actors. Liberals, socialists, corporatist conservatives, and fascists all aimed for the first time at reviving some of World War I’s infrastructural surge. After the second war, all states kept some degree of Keynesian economics, regulation of labor, and social welfare provision. But most lost military forms of penetration, as conscription ended and the size of armed forces and military budgets declined as a proportion of GDP—not all of this has been true of the United States.

The neoliberal turn, plus fiscal and demographic difficulties, then slowed or ended most growth from the 1970s—this has been true in the realm of state expenditures, but perhaps not in the realm of state regulation, where a whole range

of new regulations concerning financial transactions, ethnic and gender discriminations, the environment, safety, and insurance, etc. have been introduced. Most recently, another war, a more minor and peculiar war—for the advanced countries it has been largely a “virtual war”—has led to a lesser phase of enhancement as new techniques of state surveillance, like CCTV (closed circuit television) have been spread by our terrorist-obsessed or terrorist-manipulating leaders. In the UK, video cameras survey almost every public gathering place and many banks, shops, and workplaces. Overall, there has been an underlying growth of state infrastructural power since the nineteenth century, due to the maturation of industrial societies, the institutionalized compromise of class and other conflict, and the increased popular demands for social citizenship. These were predominately located in the realms of economic and ideological power. For most countries in the twentieth century, and perhaps now in the twenty-first century, the growth has not been steady. It has occurred in short, sharp, racheting bursts, primarily the result of transformations in military power relations. Note that most of the causes of growth do not lie within political power relations (though some “institutionalists” within political sociology might disagree), but in the other sources of social power. States predominantly institutionalize the results of conflicts emanating from other power sources. Again, we must not expect infrastructural power or political power to do too much theoretical work.

The Recent History of Infrastructural Power: (2) The South

The growth in infrastructural power has not occurred in the same way or to the same extent elsewhere in the world. Globalization since World War II has not been at the expense of nation-states. Quite the reverse, for the end of the European and Japanese empires meant that the nation-state became the model political form for the entire world. Globalization is not just of capitalism, but of the nation-state too—at least as an ideal. In reality, it has been easier to achieve in some parts of the world than others. I briefly consider three further regions—North East Asia, South East Asia, and Africa—focusing on work that uses the concept of IP, either explicitly or implicitly.

First, a somewhat different form of intensifying infrastructural power across North East Asia has been analyzed by Linda Weiss (1998, 2006; and Weiss and Hobson 1995). In seeking to explain the successful post-war economic development of Japan and the East Asian Tigers, she rejects neoclassical, market-based theories, while considerably modifying “statist” theories. Starting from the concept of infrastructural power, she arrived at the notion of “governed interdependence” between business and the state in these countries. In this region, the state is not autonomously commanding the economy toward late development projects. It is not despotic, for there are no coercive powers—at least not over business (there often have been over labor). Government agencies link with civil society groups, negotiate with them, and coordinate the blending of public and private resources for developmental goals. Through negotiation, state agencies set goals, and lay down the rules for information exchange and resource pooling in the pursuit of transformative economic goals—with great success in national economic development. Governed interdependence, she says, is a *species* derived from the infrastructural power *genus*.

She does not focus on explaining this emergence (but on its consequences). There are strong legacies of Japanese imperialism in this region, and initial post-war American anticommunism was also important. Doubtless, other causes were in play, too. Yet Weiss does not confine herself to this region. Though her *species* developed in this particular region (indeed, her Muse seems to have been South Korea), she argues that globalization will spread it further through the world. Indeed, she notes that it has already surfaced in Germany, France, and even the United States (in semiconductors) in state promotion of high technology entrepreneurship and its financing. Far from globalization undermining the nation-state, she argues, it is “state-enabling”—it makes governed interdependence ever more necessary for maintaining competitiveness in a global economy (Weiss 2006).

Dan Slater’s article gives a very interesting account of South East Asia. He starts with a puzzle. Though the Philippines, Thailand, and Indonesia have the longest stretches of quasi-democratic rule in the region, they have failed to build much infrastructural power; whereas Singapore and Malaysia are less democratic but have developed more powerful political infrastructures. These are more effective states, he says. The democratic regimes he describes in the region are multiparty and the parties compete in moderately free elections. Yet, as he observes, they are not mass-mobilizing parties. Rather, they are patron–client networks in which local oligarchies of landlords, merchants, and industrialists claim to “speak for” the masses. Politics are actually controlled by a decentralized, factionalized ruling class. In the Philippines, this resulted from a compromise made 100 years ago between the United States and Filipino oligarchs, which ended resistance in the islands to American rule. Slater calls this a mistake of “precocious electoralism,” but it may be simply *early* electoralism. These types of local bosses have been called *caciques*, a term that reveals its colonial Spanish origins. This kind of patron–client electoralism had also been the dominant form of polity in Europe just before the development of mass mobilizing parties. It dominated England in the eighteenth century, Germany in the early to mid-nineteenth century, and Spain in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Except for the problem of unevenness, to which I refer below, it might simply be that mass-mobilization democracy is slow to arrive.

Slater notes that Malaysia has a blend of mass mobilizing parties and authoritarian state that permits it to develop infrastructural power. It is a form of mixed multiparty/single party regime. He concludes that the quasi-democracies of the region must generate mass mobilizing parties, which can operate over all of their sovereign terrain if the states are to acquire more state infrastructural power (and more genuine democracy). Note the difference between the Weiss and Slater accounts. The Weiss model is more elite-focused, analyzing a two-way relationship between big business and the state, without much initial popular participation. I wonder if she would also explain the development of Malaysia in such terms, rejecting the importance of the greater mass mobilization perceived by Slater. She does explain Singapore’s success (left unexplained by Slater) in terms of governed interdependence. But governed interdependence—at least in the cases of Korea and Taiwan—did then lead toward more mass mobilization from below, especially of labor unions and the middle class, and toward democracy—though not yet in Singapore. She sees a progression from oligarchical infrastructural power to mass infrastructural power. However, Slater sees

the oligarchical form of democracy as a *barrier* to infrastructural development and genuine democracy. In adjudicating between these accounts and in explaining these different forms of Asian infrastructural power, we obviously have to seek causes outside infrastructural power. Again, it must not be expected to do too much theoretical work.

Africa has generally seen less infrastructural power growth and more subnational variation. I refer here to two excellent books, by Jeffrey Herbst (2000) in *States and Power in Africa*, and by Frederick Cooper (2002) in *Africa Since 1940*. They chart and then seek to explain the weak infrastructural powers of African states, though they do not explicitly use this term. Soifer and vom Hau quote Jeffrey Herbst (p. 173) who notes the inability of African states to “project authority over distance.” This is not his central point, and nor is it Cooper’s. They focus on the variability of power within given territories. They chart the trajectory of African colonies into independent states and show that the British, French, and other colonialists had not in truth governed the whole colony. Instead, they had focused on high-value zones where minerals could be extracted or where plantation agriculture could be practiced, the latter usually also having temperate climates in which European settlers could seize the land and then live comfortably. There the colonial state had developed infrastructures linking these particular zones to the capital city, normally a port city (in 70% of the African colonies), and then to the port cities of the mother country. In contrast, most of the colony’s territories were largely unpenetrated by the Europeans. This caused considerable unevenness in most colonies, whose infrastructures were spatially more “imperial” and “segmental” than “national.”

Thus, I am a little cautious about the method used by Matthew Lange and Hrag Balian’s article. Though they note that colonies like Malaysia had both directly and indirectly ruled regions, they go on to label entire British colonies as either directly or indirectly ruled. A possible blurring of internal difference may be one reason why they do not find significant differences between the two types of colony. Another may be the apparent inclusion of the white dominions in the directly ruled category along with Asian colonies. New Zealand, Australia, and Canada were wholly different to any other parts of the British Empire. I might add here that Lakshmi Iyer (2005) controlled for regime differences within the most valuable colony, India. After 1858, Britain directly ruled about half the land area and three-quarters of the population. The rest was ruled indirectly, through Indian princes, who on domestic issues ran their own budgets. She compares the fiscal accounts of the British and the Indian princes. Yet, though the British ruled over the more prosperous agricultural areas, they developed fewer public goods (infrastructures)—schools, health clinics, and communications systems. Native rulers raised higher taxes than the British. She does not discuss violence, as do Lange and Balian. This would be an interesting test case for them, too. Yet their theoretical argument that infrastructural power would seem to contain contradictory implications for civil violence seems acute, and probably true.

African unevenness had resulted partly because most colonies operated on a shoestring and sought quick profits, and partly from the deal that the Europeans had made with each other at the Congress of Berlin in 1882. The deal provided that a colonial power could claim African lands if it could send its troops to their borders without encountering another Power and making some minimal claim that they

could provide order there. Since they all had the same interests, they promptly sent off their troops as far and fast as they could, until they encountered the troops of another power, and then they did not contest each others' claims to provide order.

Post-independence states thus inherited and perpetuated uneven infrastructural power, except that the external links became as much with the overall global economy as with the former colonial power. Internally, infrastructural power is quite developed along particular segments of the country, but it then flows out of the country through the economic power infrastructures of multinational corporations, stopping on the way in the capital to provide a cut of the profits to the centralized political elite. Elsewhere in the hinterland of most African states, infrastructural power remains much weaker, as it did also in colonial times.

Lange and Balian note that small Botswana is an exception. They add that it was also the most lightly governed part of the entire British Empire. I am inclined to connect the two findings and to conclude that the British Empire brought very little benefit to those it conquered—however, that is not an argument for here. Soifer notes in his essay that small, densely settled Rwanda is also an exception. I would add that neither Germany nor Belgium (which became its colonial master after the World War I) found much of exportable value in this colony, and so they also governed lightly; and that in the early 1990s, Rwanda saw the emergence of a single-party state. “Hutu Power,” together with its “Interahamwe” paramilitary, captured the state and its parastatal economic enterprises, placed its militants and its militias in every prefecture and most villages of the country, and then led the implementation of genocide. This was an exceptional example of an African state, through a single-party state, developing great IP among the Hutu majority, to disastrous consequences for the Tutsi minority (Mann 2005: Chaps. 14, 15). In Africa, as in Europe, the countries with most infrastructural power (like Botswana and Rwanda) have tended to be small, for obvious logistical reasons.

In most of Africa, the unevenness of infrastructural power also makes the state vulnerable to three types of military challenge. One is by the local elites of lightly governed hinterlands—especially those whose ecology is suited to low-intensity or guerilla warfare, as in the Fearon and Laitin (2003) model of civil wars. The second type of challenge is by elites from mineral-rich zones able to find alternative routes to the global market. The state cannot easily mobilize “national” resources to combat either set of rivals since its infrastructures are segmental, not national. Thus, the state is increasingly seen, not as a national state, but one furthering the interests of particular regions, ethnic groups, or both. In turn, the central state becomes vulnerable to takeover by the military, the third challenge. John Lucas (1998) has described this in terms of a conflict between infrastructural and despotic power. In his case study of Nigeria, the military took power and then sought to coordinate powerful social groups to enhance their infrastructural power, but they also sought some despotic power over politicians. The military banned many parties, created two tame government parties, and annulled elections that seemed to yield antimilitary outcomes. This succeeded in repressing the politicians, but they could not now be used to strengthen the state's reach into civil society. The military's intensification of its despotic power thus led to a long-term decline in infrastructural power. In many African cases institutionalized, law-governed political power yields to the arbitrary violence of military power.

Conclusion

The growth of state infrastructural power has been a modern phenomenon, linked to, and furthering, the rise of the nation-state, first in Europe, then elsewhere. It is now spread very unevenly across the world. It intensified through most of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in the West and North of the world, and there it remains more or less at its 1960s' peak. It has greatly increased in North East Asia and is not yet at its peak there (China, however, could go either way, to further success or partial collapse). South East Asian growth has been uneven, and still confronts certain blockages. But it is more thoroughly blocked and subverted by military power across much of Africa. To explain any of these trends is beyond the scope of the infrastructural power concept itself. I am hopeful that it has been useful. Infrastructural power encouraged the development of nations and states, but it requires explanation from other sources.

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