

Correct Voting

- what is the quality of the democratic representation they provide?
- the extent to which voters, inevitably under conditions of incomplete information, nonetheless actually choose the candidate they would have chosen had they been fully informed about the issues and candidates running in that election
- Democracies differ in their constitutionally mandated electoral systems, which shape the motivations and incentives provided to both political parties and individual citizens. Democracies differ in party systems that have developed as a result of both historical and institutional pressures, which in turn determine the number and type of alternatives confronting voters.
- single-member district (SMD)-based vote and a multimember district (MMD) proportional vote from countries with a 'mixed' electoral system

WHAT IS A CORRECT VOTE?

- As Dahl writes, 'a person's interest or good is whatever that person would choose with fullest attainable understanding of the experiences resulting from that choice and its most relevant alternatives.'
- Thus Lau and Redlawsk define a correct vote decision as one that is the same as the choice that would have been made under conditions of full information
- these considerations provide a mix of instrumental and more expressive benefits or 'utility' to citizens. Correct voting makes no attempt to distinguish between different types of utility, or to tell people what criteria should be important. If a voter indicates that he or she cares about a given criterion (usually by answering survey questions about it), and that criterion can be objectively applied to all of the different alternatives under consideration, we will include it as a standard for determining a correct vote
- The difficulty of the choice itself should also affect the probability of a correct vote.
- When there are only two alternatives on the ballot, all else equal the model predicts almost 79 per cent correct voting, but when there are nine alternatives competing in an election, the probability of a correct vote drops precipitously to under 57 per cent. This is by far the largest effect present in our data.
- young people have a relatively hard time voting correctly no matter how long their country's democracy has been in place. But

Individual Differences

Prior research suggests that at the individual level, ability (particularly decision-relevant knowledge), experience and effort should all be associated with higher levels of correct voting.

It should be more difficult for citizens to vote correctly in candidate-centred political systems, compared to more party-centred systems, for the simple reason that the particulars of each new candidate must be learned anew, while party reputations are much more stable, and party affiliation provides a valuable heuristic cue for many voters.

Using post-disaster survey data, we find that earthquake damage affected interpersonal trust quite distinctly across the cases: in Chile it did not significantly reduce trust; in El Salvador it lowered trust moderately; and in Haiti it seriously corroded trust. While

Trust Shaken

individualistic reductionism

Class

1. What's the preferred methodology?
2. Typical Scheme: there are some institutions that vary (electoral systems or state capacity). Scholars examine what individuals do (their "behavior"). As opposed to more sociological views, here the "unit of analysis" (ask), is the individual, not social class.
3. Topics
 - i. Economic Voting
 - ii. Strategic Voting
 - iii. Retrospective or Prospective Voting
 - iv. Turnout
 - v. Political Psychology
 - vi. Party ID
 - vii. Public Opinion Formation
 - viii. Public Opinion and Attitudes Towards XYZ
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4. Institutions have consequences: An extension of Duverger's law: institutions that produce more parties, make it harder for voters, so they make mistakes, and vote "incorrectly."
5. Assumption that all voters have the same degree of knowledge is incorrect: younger voters make more mistakes.
6. Comparison between political economy and political psychology: people make mistakes (incorrect voting). Assumption in political economy.

7. Strategic voting: "In some cases, as mentioned earlier, citizens might consciously choose a less-preferred party or candidate in order to keep a more disliked alternative from winning." This might (incorrectly) enter the data as "incorrect voting." For the lesser evil.
8. Earthquakes and Social Trust: State capacity acts as a scope condition (ask): "Thus, we argue that state capacity moderates the influence of natural disaster damage on interpersonal trust" // ["scope conditions" serve to constrain the applicability of universal-like propositions]
9. Explain Regression Table in Earthquake Paper p. 428, and what control variables are.