

Vote-Selling and Vote-Buying: Does the House Always Win? Gambling Votes in the Lab

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Today we're Gonna Talk about Sequencing

- Sequencing creates losers and winners depending on **who plays first**.
 - **Welfare state and unions:** Do welfare outcomes differ when *unions mobilize first* versus when *governments act first*?
 - **Intergenerational inequality:** Does inequality persist when *parents invest first* (education, housing), compared to systems where *the state provides support first*?
- ✓ My talk will be about **sequencing in clientelism**.

Clientelism: distribution of private rewards to individuals during political elections in exchange for electoral support (Nichter, 2014).




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E.g., cash for your vote.



Clientelism Index (2024)




Sequencing and Clientelism: Supply and Demand

- **Qualitative:** how **voters begin** the sequence, and **sell their votes**.
- **Quantitative:** how **parties begin** the sequence, and **buy votes**.

Sequencing and Clientelism: Supply and Demand

- **Qualitative:** how **voters begin** the sequence, and **sell their votes**.
- **Quantitative:** how **parties begin** the sequence, and **buy votes**.
- ✓ **We argue:** clientelism is a **market**, with both *buyers and sellers*.
- ✓ **The gap:** the literature has failed to consider the political economy of both vote-buyers *and* vote-sellers.
 - Very few studies **vote selling**.

Sequencing and Clientelism: Supply and Demand



Annual frequency of Web of Science publications whose abstracts include the terms "vote buying" and "vote selling."

Our Paper and Today's Talk

- Exactly what we tackle: integrate **vote buying** *and* **vote selling** into the same framework.

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- **Experiment**: we designed a lab experiment based on the spatial model.
- **Findings**:
 - ✓ **When parties move first**: transfers concentrate on **party supporters**.
 - ✓ **When voters move first**: they **demand higher prices** from winning parties that are ideologically far away.
 - ✓ Voters **make more** when parties begin the exchange.

A Uni-dimensional Spatial Theory of Voting


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
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
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Utility $u_j(\gamma_i)$




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
Implication

Voters face a **tradeoff** between ideological utility

$u_j(\gamma_i)$ and electoral risk $R_i = \pi W_i$.


A Uni-dimensional Spatial Theory of Voting

- “Ideological utility” Δ




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
Implication

Δ represents the minimum compensation the voter needs to switch sides.

A Uni-dimensional Spatial Theory of Voting

- When parties begin, they make offers s_A, s_B

Party A makes minimal offer $\approx \Delta$




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- When parties begin, they make offers s_A, s_B
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$i \in \{A, B\}$ to maximize $U_j(i, s_i)$

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


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
Implication

It is cheapest to buy a vote from a **party supporter** (i^* , with advantage Δ).

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- When the voter begins, they send offers.

a_A, a_B




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
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Implication

Voters will ask more from parties with **more to lose** (big R_i).

(Formally Derived) Hypotheses

[H1] Core Targeting Under Party Initiative:

- When parties begin, parties mainly buy from their followers.

[H2] Selling to the Opponent Winning Party:

- When voters begin, they demand higher prices from electorally strong (i.e., with more loss aversion) but ideologically distant parties.

[H3] Higher Voter Payoffs Under Party Initiative:

- Because parties overspend under electoral risk (Bahamonde and Canales, 2022), voters make more in vote-buying.

Laboratory Implementation

- **Participants and implementation**
 - Following the formal model, we designed a lab experiment in oTree.
 - Recruited 102 adult participants.
 - Payed them according to the quality of their decisions.


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 - Each participant played the game **three times** (n=306).
 - Every time we executed a new randomization block.



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- **What was randomized (3x)**
 - Role (party, voter).
 - Voter's ideology (payoffs if A or B wins).
 - Party budgets (to buy votes).
 - Vote shares.

Randomized Sequencing in Two Games



The Dependent Variable: Vote-buying and vote-selling prices



- The two histograms describe **very different worlds**:
 - When **parties** move first.
 - When **voters** move first.
- What explains the differences of these two games?

Modeling when Parties Begin

- What explains the variance of the vote-buying offers? Estimate OLS:

$$\text{Offer}_{di} = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 \text{Ideology}_{di} + \gamma_2 \text{VoteShare}_{di} + \gamma_3 \text{Pivotal}_d + u_{di}$$

- Also fit a logit model for the probability of making *any* offer (same covariates).
- Standard errors clustered at the party level.

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
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
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Results: Vote-Buying Offers and Core Targeting




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- As ideological distance increases, parties are **less likely** to make any offer at all.
- If they offer, parties pay **more** to more distant voters.
- So: parties target followers cheaply (left), but pay more to buy distant voters (right).

Modeling when Voters Begin

- What explains how voters price their vote? Estimate OLS:

$$\text{Price}_{di} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Ideology}_{di} + \beta_2 \text{VoteShare}_{di} + \beta_3 \text{Ideology}_{di} \times \text{VoteShare}_{di} + \beta_4 \text{Pivotal}_d + \varepsilon_{di}$$

- Dependent variable: requested price as % of party budget,

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
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Requested Prices by Ideology and Electoral Strength



- More transfers when the party is ideologically close but likely to lose (insurance against losses).
- More transfers when the party is winning but distant (voters exploit electorally strong parties' higher electoral stakes R_i .)

Sequencing and Payoffs by Game



- Parties' payoffs are similar across vote buying and vote selling.
- Voters **make more** when parties begin the exchange.

Implication

First movers NOT always benefit the same (parties didn't).

Main Takeaways

- **Conceptual move:** integrated **vote buying** and **vote selling** into the same framework.
- **Theory:** formalized a spatial model with one voter and two parties.
 1. **Parties moved first.**
 2. **Voters moved first.**
- **Experiment:** based on the formal model, we designed an econ lab experiment.
- **Findings:**
 - ✓ **When parties move first:** transfers go to **party supporters**.
 - ✓ **When voters move first:** they **demand higher prices** from winning parties that are ideologically far away.
 - ✓ Voters **make more** when parties initiate the exchange.

So What? Why This Matters Beyond Clientelism

- **Who moves first is power.** In many settings the side that moves first *usually* captures more benefits—unions vs. governments or parents vs. the welfare state.
- **Same resources, different winners.** Our paper showed that even with the same agents and setup, simply changing who starts the exchange flips who gets the better deal. This logic also travels to other policy contexts.
- ✓ If we care about inequality or democracy, we shouldn't just ask *who gets how much*, but also *who moves first*.

Thank you



- Paper and abstract: www.HectorBahamonde.com
- Feedback very welcome.