PROPOSAL ABSTRACT:

Goals. We seem to know that clientelism is practically extinct in Chile (Luna and Zechmeister 2005, p. 413 and Calvo and Murillo 2013, p. 874). "Clientelism" can be defined as "the distribution of rewards to individuals or small groups during elections in contingent exchange for vote choices" (Nichter 2014, 316). While that is good news, we are rather ignorant about a number of other interesting, and yet, unanswered questions. First and foremost, the approach used by most quantitative scholars focuses exclusively on vote buying (parties buying votes). This approach—unfortunately—focuses solely on parties, completely ignoring voters preferences.

My goal is to "bring voters back in" by incorporating their incentives, particularly, their willingness to sell. Ultimately, my research project seeks to study the supply *and* demand conditions under which clientelist transactions occur. I seek to do so by recreating the market conditions that make clientelism possible in an experimental setting where voters' and parties' incentives are exogenously manipulated.

Current research has neglected the following research questions which I intend to shed some light on: Would voters still sell their vote to their own party of preference, or would they sell it to the opposing party? Does the selling price vary if selling the vote to the opposing party? That is, Do voters set a higher selling price if selling it to the opposing party, while lowering the price if selling to the party they would have supported anyways? Since the idea is to incorporate both the demand and supply side, these questions have a set corresponding mirroring questions. To name a few, Would parties sell to their own supporters? Moderate opposing voters? Or would they buy opposing votes? And depending on whose vote is being bought, Does the price vary?

Methodology. To address these questions, I seek to implement an economic and a list experiment in the lab. List experiments are survey experiments designed to elicit truthful answers to sensitive, illegal, or embarrassing questions, such as selling the vote (Blair and Imai 2012). In turn, economic experiments are lab experiments that assign roles (party/voter) and endowments at random. Ultimately they seek to incentivize rational decisions via actual payoffs (Morton and Williams 2010). The specific game to be formalized and implemented in the experimental design is a bargaining game in an extensive form (Watson 2007). Since the project seeks to recreate the market conditions of clientelism, a number of variables will be exogenously manipulated (i.e. selling/buying prices, weather voter and party id's match, and levels of electoral competitiveness, that is the degree in which the party believes is in risk of losing the election).

Expected results. (1) The function that determines the probability of a party buying votes, follows a U-inverted shape. This hypothesis challenges the literature. Weitz-Shapiro (2012) believes this relationship is lineal: more competition, more vote buying. I disagree: when the probability of losing or winning the election is high, investments in vote buying are wasted. I expect the probability of clientelism is the highest when there is a 50/50 chance of losing/winning. It is uncertainty, no competition what drives clientelism.

(2) The probability of getting caught decreases the probability of buying and selling votes.

(3) All else equal, parties with larger endowments buy more votes. This hypothesis also contradicts the literature. Szwarcberg (2013) explains that parties with more resources not always buy votes. I disagree.

(4) Higher incomes increase the selling price of one's vote. Higher incomes do not stop clientelism.

(5) Selling to the party that an individual would have voted for without the bribe, decreases the selling price.

(6) However, selling to the opponent party increases the selling price, while increasing the probability of defection. Hypotheses (5) and (6) seek to contribute to the famous Londregan (1996), Cox and Mccubbins (1986) and Stokes (2005) unsolved debate which leaves unclear who parties target (core or swing voters).

(7) Chilean voters would sell their votes at a high price. Since parties cannot afford it, the transaction is not produced—and hence, the observed low levels of actual vote buying.

(8) Chilean voters do not necessarily value democracy better. That is, while actual levels of clientelism are low/inexistent, that does not imply that their democratic values are high. It only means that the supply and demand of clientelism do not meet.