

Far-right Support in Finland: Bringing Income Inequality Back

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- However, actions by Trump's and Bolsonaro's supporters seriously questioned their acceptance of defeat.
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- **We know little about voters’ “systemic support” when they lose elections** (Easton, 1965).



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- Item.

H1 Item.

Voters' Commitment:

Electoral Losses and Institutional Heterogeneities

1. Social movements:

- *"Angry" losers* might be more willing to support anti-systemic politicians.

(Bowler, Donovan, and Karp 2007)

- Winners should oppose politicians supporting anti-systemic actions.

2. Institutional literature: institutional setups affect differently the costs of losing an election (Lijphart, 2012).

- **Presidential:** losers have little input outside of the electoral cycle.
- **Parliamentary:** losers' interests can be represented through a variety of power sharing institutions.

Losers' Consent and Democratic Stability

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Discussion: More Questions Than Answers

- We hypothesized (and pre-registered) that:
 - H1 *Electoral losers* were *more* willing to support anti-systemic protests.
 - H2 This effect would be *stronger* in Presidential systems (because of its zero-sum power sharing structure, **losses are more catastrophic**).
- While we did not find support in favor of our hypotheses, we still found some other interesting results.
 - **Chile:** **Extreme-right** supporters are **less** likely to support extreme anti-system protests.
 - **Estonia:** the **loser effects** are mainly **driven by extreme-right** supporters.

Thank you



to check updates on this project.