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November 20, 2020, download latest version [here](#)

Dear Members of the Search Committee,

I am writing to apply for the position available at your institution. Currently, I am an assistant professor (tenure-track) at O'Higgins University in Chile (a public research university). Since my **wife is German**, my main goal is to **begin an academic career in Europe**. I am looking forward to moving into the European academic job market and very much willing to start from the bottom of the academic hierarchy.

After receiving my PhD in Political Science from **Rutgers University**-New Brunswick, NJ, U.S. in May 2017—where I studied under the direction of Robert Kaufman—I spent one year as a post-doctoral fellow at **Tulane University**-New Orleans, LA, U.S. My **research** explores the economic and political origins of state capacity as well as the political economy of institutional development and the role of inequality on democratic development (clientelism). My methods include historical analyses, quantitative and experimental methods. While my research focuses predominantly on Latin America, my current and future research projects will be expanded to other developing and developed countries. A more detailed description of my scholarly work can be found in my [research statement](#) and my [research plan](#).

**Vote Buying.** I have **published** the following piece, *Bahamonde, H. (2018). [Aiming Right at You: Group versus Individual Clientelistic Targeting in Brazil](#)*. Journal of Politics in Latin America, 10(2), pp. 41-76., on vote buying in Brazil. The paper starts by recognizing that there is not consensus on whether parties target groups or individuals. In fact, most scholars assume that group-targeting and individual-targeting are interchangeable. What seems to be a major problem, however, is that scholars seem to base their decision on their own research designs; ethnographers typically study how parties target *individuals* while experimentalist scholars typically look at how parties target districts/municipalities/states (i.e. *groups*). I developed and tested a theory where parties make use of simultaneous segmented targeting techniques. Groups are preferred by brokers when party machines need to secure higher levels of electoral support, relying on the economies of scale and spillover effects that these groups provide. However, individuals are better targets when they are more identifiable—that is when poor individuals are nested in non-poor contexts or vice-versa. Interestingly, I find that non-poor individuals are also targeted. The paper uses observational data, matching methods and a short case study (Brazil).

**Vote Selling.** With the support of a generous grant, I designed two experiments in the U.S. out of a series of experiments to be fielded in Latin America for further comparison. In this published [piece](#) (*Bahamonde, H. [Still for Sale: The Micro-Dynamics of Vote Selling in the United States, Evidence From a List Experiment](#)*. Acta Politica, *forthcoming*.) I looked at the issue of vote selling in the US. In nineteenth-century United States politics, vote buying was commonplace. Nowadays, vote buying seems to have declined. The quantitative empirical literature emphasizes vote buying, ignoring the micro-dynamics of vote selling. We seem to know that vote buyers can no longer afford this strategy; however, we do not know what American voters would do if offered the chance to sell their vote. Would they sell, and at what price, or would they consistently opt out of vote selling? A novel experimental dataset representative at the national level comprises 1,479 U.S. voters who participated in an online list experiment in 2016, and the results are striking: Approximately 25% would sell their vote for a minimum payment of \$418. Democrats and Liberals are more likely to sell, while education or income levels do not seem to impact the likelihood of vote selling. .

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
Within the same project, I am currently designing an **economic experiment about vote selling and vote buying**. By implementing an “auction game” in the lab, the experiment recreates market conditions that exist between vote buyers and vote sellers. See more details in my [research statement](#).

In addition to my published work, I am working on a book manuscript. Using a **novel dataset on historical earthquakes** to proxy state capacity, I have a [working paper](#) (*submitted, Public Administration and Development*) explains that sectoral conflicts between the landed and industrial elites fostered inter-elite compromises that lead to higher levels of state capacity over time. The book seeks to analyze how economic structural transformations in Latin America helped states to make institutional investments that lead to the formation of states with higher capacity. I leverage fine-grained historical case study comparisons, sectoral economic outputs from 1900 to the present, time-series econometric techniques, hazard models, and a novel earthquake dataset that covers sub-national death tolls from 1900 to the present to measure state capacity. This project builds on the fiscal sociology literature and the dual-sector economy model.

As a comparativist and political economist, I believe that advanced methods should be used to answer big questions. In this sense, my research also has a disciplinary agenda. My scholarly work, for example tries to examine classic problems in comparative political development (e.g. state capacities, clientelism, etc.), while at the same time incorporating cutting-edge econometric and experimental techniques. Similarly, my working papers and experiments, are concerned with fundamental questions regarding democratic theory.

As an **instructor**, I am interested in courses that are carefully designed to answer big questions in comparative politics, not only from a Latin American perspective, but also across the broader spectrum. As a political economist, I mostly focus on economic development, economic history, institutional development and democratic development/underdevelopment. I am also interested in political participation, competitive authoritarianisms, welfare politics, party politics and other relevant topics. I would also feel very comfortable teaching both basic and advanced **methods** courses. At Rutgers and Tulane, I always received excellent teaching evaluations. Please, [send me an email](#) to receive the most recent one, or let me know if you need teaching references. **Service** to the department and its extended programs is a top priority. I firmly believe that being part of a teaching/research community requires active involvement. I am looking forward to do my part in this regard. **Collaborative research with my students** is another priority. For example, as an undergraduate student I worked very close with faculty members doing research. I learned so much outside of the classroom by doing research that it would *not* be natural for me to not replicate my experience with my own students.

More information, [syllabi](#), my [research](#), [teaching](#) and [diversity](#) statements, as well as other [papers](#) are available on my website: [www.HectorBahamonde.com](http://www.HectorBahamonde.com). Thank you for considering my application. I look forward to hearing from you.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'HBAHAMONDE', with a stylized flourish extending from the end.

Hector Bahamonde, PhD