# Interview with Turku University

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Introduction

# The Order of the Day

In this presentation I will...

1. Briefly describe my **profile**.
2. Quickly mention three of my most important **publications**.
3. Explain my 3-year **research plans** at Turku.
4. Enumerate the three main reasons to **move to Turku**.

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# Short Bio

I am a political scientist (B.A. and PhD)...

- Whose primary subfield is the political economy of **inequality**, **political development** and **clientelism**.
- Who has a strong interest in statistical and experimental methods (natural, lab and survey-based).
- Who is currently an assistant professor in Chile—but looking forward to relocate to Europe; family reasons. **Immediate availability**.

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# "Inclusive Institutions, Unequal Outcomes: Democracy, State Capacity, and Income Inequality."

- Democratic theory, inequality and stateness.
- 126 industrial and developing countries, between 1970 and 2013 (N=4,000).
- Time-series and fixed-effects methods.
- European Journal of Political Economy (forthcoming).

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# "Still for Sale: The Micro-Dynamics of Vote Selling in the United States, Evidence From a List Experiment."

- Democratic development and clientelism.
- I designed a survey experiment (list experiment) and implemented it in `Qualtrics`.
- *Original* data representative at the U.S. level.
- Acta Politica (forthcoming).

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# "Aiming Right at You: Group versus Individual Clientelistic Targeting in Brazil."

- Inequality and clientelism.
- Observational data and matching methods for causal inference.
- Journal of Politics in Latin America (2018).



Journal of Politics in Latin America

2/2019 • ISSN 1866-802X

journals.sagepub.com/home/pla

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My research plan seeks to study these issues by moving forward several pieces of research I have in the pipeline.

# Pipeline 1: Clientelism

1. **Lab and survey experiments**.
   - "Recreating Market Conditions for Vote-Selling and Vote-Buying in the Lab: An Economic Experiment" (work in progress).
   - "Analyzing Conjoint Datasets with Support Vector Machine Methods" (under review, Political Analysis).

# Pipeline 2: Inequality and COVID19

2. **Natural experiments**.
   - "Skyrocketed Inequality and (Un)lockdown Political Elites in Chile: Aerodrome Usage during Pandemic Times" (in preparation).
   - "The Bus of Inequality: Public Transportation and COVID in Santiago" (in preparation).

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Pipeline: survey and lab experiments

"Recreating Market Conditions for Vote-Selling and Vote-Buying in the Lab: An Economic Experiment."

- Economic experiments are "games": subjects embody randomly-assigned roles (2 parties/1 voter).
- Democratic theory: study conditions of **(i)lliberal democracy** that foster clientelism:
  1. **Endowments**: different for "parties" and "voters" (emulates income inequality).
  2. **Ideology**: ideological distance between "parties" and "voters" (emulates issue/spatial location).
  3. **Contestation**: "Risk" of losing the election (emulates party competition).
- **Data are being collected as we speak** (N=200).

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Pipeline: survey and lab experiments

"Analyzing Conjoint Datasets with Support Vector Machine Methods" (under review, Political Analysis).

- I designed a conjoint experiment in Qualtrics.

- Conjoint experiments are good to study the causal effect of multiple-attribute treatments.

- Democratic theory: Using Dahl's Polyarchy (1971), I devised different "political candidates" who supported different "policies."

- Tasked experimental subjects with choosing a candidate.

| Candidate 1 | Candidate 2 |
|---|---|
| Media CAN confront the government | Media CANNOT confront the government |
| President CANNOT rule without Congress | President CAN rule without Congress |
| Citizens CANNOT vote in the next two elections | Citizens CANNOT vote in the next two elections |
| Citizens CAN run for office for the next two elections | Citizens CAN run for office for the next two elections |
| Citizens CAN associate with others and form groups | Citizens CANNOT associate with others and form groups |

Which of these candidates represents the lesser of the two evils for you?

| Candidate 1 ☐ | Candidate 2 ☐ |
|---|---|

Attributes are assigned at random. This is just one realization. Five of these tasks were administered for every subject.

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"Analyzing Conjoint Datasets with Support Vector Machine Methods" (under review, Political Analysis).

- Innovative way of exploiting conjoint experimental data:
  1. Using **machine learning methods**, we exploit those data to **classify likely vote-sellers**.
  2. Building on Dahl (1971), subjects who distrust "Free media" and "Presidential dependence" (on Congress) are more likely to sell their vote in the U.S.

- **I already have this novel data—representative at the United States level** (N=1,108).



Details

"Skyrocketed Inequality and (Un)lockdown Political Elites in Chile: Aerodrome Usage during Pandemic Times."



- *Santiago de Chile* is the capital city of one of the most unequal countries in the world.

1. **Unequal** Application of the Rule of Law:

   - While the state was able to control ordinary citizens when traveling, it "failed" to control airspace.
   - Study how elites were able to travel to their vacations houses during lockdown via a small aerodrome located in one of the richest municipalities.



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Pipeline 2: Inequality and COVID19

"Skyrocketed Inequality and (Un)lockdown Political Elites in Chile: Aerodrome Usage during Pandemic Times."

Santiago City: Aerodrome Located at Wealthy Hub

2. Natural experiment:

- **Identification strategy**: The aerodrome is *strictly* used by the elite.
- **RDD**: confinement policies are exogenous and not-random. *How effective were the lockdown policies* **for the elite**?



The lighter the wealthier

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"The Bus of Inequality: Public Transportation and COVID in Santiago."

**Welfare, Covid and Inequality**:

- Chilean social safety net is very thin.
- While the wealthy were able to work from home (or flight to their vacation houses), the working class kept riding the bus to work presently.



Bus Card Transactions (2020)

Paso ▮ Some restrictions ▮ Lockdown

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"The Bus of Inequality: Public Transportation and COVID in Santiago."

## Welfare, Covid and Inequality:

- This paper explores a digitalized population dataset on daily public transportation and contagions.

- Hypothesis is that the poor bore the bore the cost of the COVID pandemic. Lower death thresholds for implementing total lockdown in wealthy municipalities.



Bus Card Transactions (2020)

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# Last But Not Least

- Attending the main conferences in the discipline.
- Organizing a workshop/mini-conference per year at your institution.
- Giving service to the Philosophy, Contemporary History and Political Science Department, particularly, political science unit.
- Teaching and/or advising undergraduate/graduate courses/students.
- Assuming administrative tasks when necessary.

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Pipeline: Explained

"Recreating Market Conditions for Vote–Selling and Vote–Buying in the Lab: An Economic Experiment."

**Tell a supply and demand story**:

- Do parties target **own supporters** (Dixit/Londregan and Cox/McCubbins) or **moderate opposer** (Stokes)?
- At what price?
- Under what conditions do vote sellers sell to their own party of choosing?

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Pipeline: Explained

"Analyzing Conjoint Datasets with Support Vector Machine Methods" (under review, Political Analysis).

- **Democratic theory**: Dahl (1971) specifies a number of dimensions any "polyarchy" should accomplish (*free press*, *free competition*, *right to run for elections*, etc.)
- The experiment captures in a causal way individual–level attitudes towards those dimensions.

| Candidate 1 | Candidate 2 |
|---|---|
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| Which of these candidates represents the lesser of the two evils for you? | |
| Candidate 1 ☐ | Candidate 2 ☐ |

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"Skyrocketed Inequality and (Un)lockdown Political Elites in Chile: Aerodrome Usage during Pandemic Times."

- **Novel data**.
- Identification strategy:
  1. Aerodrome is located right in the middle of the wealthiest municipalities.
  2. Daily arrivals/departures of an aerodrome *strictly* used by the elites.



Santiago City: Aerodrome Located at Wealthy Hub

The lighter the wealthier