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Dear Members of the Search Committee,

I am writing to apply for the position available in your institution. I am a doctoral candidate in the Department of Political Science at Rutgers University, where I will earn my Ph.D. in May 2017. My dissertation advisors are Robert Kaufman (political science professor, chair), Daniel Kelemen (political science professor and Jean Monnet chair in European union politics), Douglas Blair (political science and economics, professor), and Paul Poast (political science, University of Chicago).

My **research** explores the economic origins of state capacities as well as the political economy of institutional development and the role of inequality on democratic development. My methods include historical analyses, quantitative methods and experimental designs. Though my research focuses predominantly on Latin America, any of my current and future research projects can be expanded to other developing countries. Below I describe my interests and ongoing research. A more detailed description of my scholarly work can be found in my [research statement](#).

My **job market paper** (*in preparation*) argues that the modernization of the fiscal apparatus was product of an inter-sectoral conflict between the agricultural and industrial elites. The paper is embedded into a larger **book manuscript** where I analyze how these structural transformations helped states to make institutional investments that lead to the formation of states with higher capacities. I utilized fine-grained historical case study comparisons, sectoral outputs from 1900 to the present, time-series econometric techniques, hazard models, and a novel earthquake dataset that covers sub-national death tolls from 1900 to the present to measure state capacities. This project builds on the fiscal sociology literature and the dual-sector economy model.

My overall findings strongly suggest that the economic structural transformation, i.e. the secular decline of agriculture and substantial expansion of manufacturing, imposed tight constraints on the way politics was run by the incumbent landowning class since the colonial period. This argument differs deeply from modernization theory. What caused political development was not industrialization per se, but the emergence of a political challenger, the industrial elite. **An extension of my job market paper** (*under review, Studies in Comparative International Development*) can be found [here](#). There I argue that the emergence of an efficient and productive industrial sector not only made unsustainable the political monopoly run by the landed elites changing the inter-sectoral balance of political power, but also altered the structure of the economy *causing* economic growth.

In addition to the book manuscript, I am currently expanding the findings of a series of papers related to vote-buying and vote-selling, using both observational and an original experimental dataset in the Americas.

**Vote-Selling.** With the support of a generous grant, I designed two experiments in the U.S. out of a series

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of experiments to be fielded in Latin America for further comparison. I look at the tipping points where US citizens prefer a monetary incentive rather than keeping their right to choose for whom to vote for. My identification strategy takes advantage of a *list experiment* to capture non-biased answers on socially-condemnable/illegal behaviors (like vote-buying). In a separate study I designed a *conjoint experiment* to identify which of Dahl's democratic dimensions should 'fail' to predict individual propensities of vote-selling. Conjoint experiments allow researchers to directly isolate complex multi-dimensional concepts (such as *support for democracy*) and observe which dimension(s) is/are associated to the outcome of interest (vote-selling). Preliminary results show that when the *liberal* component, particularly the *right to associate* fails, individuals are more likely to sell. In this sense, this project is very innovative as it departs from the common strategy of correlating the standard support for democracy question with vote-buying. My identification strategy is more comprehensive as it *decomposes* "support for democracy" in several dimensions which are theoretically and substantively relevant (i.e., Dahl's democracy dimensions).

**Vote-Buying.** In addition to that I have a working [paper](#) (*under review, Journal of Politics in Latin America*) on vote-buying in Brazil. The paper starts by recognizing that there is not an agreement on whether parties target groups or individuals. In fact, most of the times, scholars assume that group-targeting and individual-targeting are interchangeable. What seems to be a major problem, however, is that scholars seem to base their decision on their research designs; ethnographers typically study how parties target *individuals* while experimentalist scholars typically look at how parties target districts/municipalities/states (i.e. *groups*). I developed and tested a theory where parties make use of simultaneous segmented targeting techniques. Groups are preferable by brokers when party machines need to secure higher levels of electoral support, relying on the economies of scale and spillover effects that these groups provide. However, individuals are better targets when they are more identifiable, that is when poor individuals are nested in non-poor contexts or when non-poor individuals are nested in poor groups. Interestingly, I find that non-poor individuals are also targeted. The paper uses observational data and matching methods and a short case study (Brazil) to confirm the assumptions made in the models.

As a comparativist and political economist, I believe that advanced methods should be used to keep answering important/big questions. In this sense, my research also has a disciplinary agenda. My scholarly work for example tries to examine classic problems in comparative political development (like state capacities) while at the same time incorporating cutting-edge econometric techniques. Similarly, my working papers and my experiments, which are framed within the behaviorist tradition, are concerned with fundamental questions regarding democratic theory. Incorporating the U.S. as a *developed* case will allow me to systematically compare it with *developing* Latin American countries. As I feel that it is very important to make this **methods-substance connection**, my efforts are to ensure that I transmit this message across to all of the graduate students I have mentored or had close professional relationships with.

More information such as my [research](#) and [diversity](#) statements, as well as other [papers](#) are available on my website: [www.HectorBahamonde.com](http://www.HectorBahamonde.com). Thank you for considering my application. I look forward to hearing from you.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'HBAHAMONDE', with a stylized flourish extending from the end.

Hector Bahamonde