

# Physical Appearance and Turnout in Finnish Elections: An Inequality Perspective

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**Vote buying:** distribution of private rewards to individuals during elections in exchange for electoral support (Nichter, 2014).

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- We contest these answers. Explain: traditional clientelism research has failed to answer these questions because it has a wrong understanding about the party's decision-making process under risk.

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- **Feedback wanted!**

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- ✓ **Are probable winners**—risk-averse in the domain of gains.
  - ✓ **Have experienced losses in the past (sunk costs)**—risk-seeking in the domain of losses.

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- These assumptions have led to several empirical inconsistencies.
  1. Clientelist Targeting.
  2. Political Contestation.