

Losers' Consent and Democratic Stability: Experimental Evidence from Chile and Estonia

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“Losers’ Consent”: A Weak Assumption

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- Yet, actions by Trump’s and Bolsonaro’s supporters question the acceptance of defeat.
- Research has looked into “losers’ consent,” focusing on satisfaction, trust, and efficacy.
- Still, we know little about the losing side’s *commitment to democracy among voters*; “systemic support” (Easton, 1965).



Voters' Commitment After Electoral Loss

& Institutional Heterogeneities

- We analyze the level of system support among electoral “losers” using data from a novel conjoint experiment in Chile (N=811) and Estonia (N=639).
- We exploit institutional heterogeneities in presidential and parliamentary systems, which effectively shift the *costs* of losing/winning an election.
- We pre-registered the following hypotheses: [▶ link](#)
 - Election “losers” favor candidates endorsing anti-systemic actions more than “winners.”
 - This tendency is stronger in presidential versus parliamentary systems.

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1. Citizens' support for anti-system mobilizations varies between electoral winners and losers.
 - *"Enraged" losers* might be more willing to support anti-systemic politicians (Bowler, Donovan, and Karp 2007).
 - Winners should oppose politicians supporting anti-systemic actions.
2. Institutional setting should affect differently the costs of losing an election (Lijphart, 2012).
 - **Presidential:** losers have little input outside of the electoral cycle.
 - **Parliamentary:** losers' interests can be represented through a variety of power sharing institutions.

Conjoint Experiment

- Designed an unconstrained, fully randomized conjoint experiment
(Hainmueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto 2014).
- Data collected from Chile (N=811) and Estonia (N=639) with gender and party sample quotas.
- Included questions on socio-demographics and support for democracy.

Dimension	Attribute Set
Gender	Male, Female.
Age	Younger than 35, Between 35-50, Over 50.
Protest	The candidate OPPOSES anti-government protest that will seek to de-stabilize the current government, The candidate SUPPORTS anti-government protest that will seek to de-stabilize the current government

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Subgroup Marginal Means (MM)

- We depart from standard AMCE analyses (Hainmueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto [2014](#)) and instead compute **subgroup marginal means** (Leeper, Hobolt, and Tilley [2020](#)).
- In practice, when using marginal means, there's no need to set a reference category.
- “In a forced-choice conjoint design, the grand mean is by definition 0.5” (p. 209).

Subgroup Marginal Means (MM): Boric, Kast

test

Main Takeaways: More Questions Than Answers

- Hipotetizamos que los *electoral losers* estarian mas dispuestos a apoyar acciones no-democraticas (protestas anti-sistemicas).
- Registramos esta hipotesis.
- Sin embargo, no encontramos resultados que vayan en linea con nuestras expectativas iniciales.
- Preguntas para ustedes: cometimos un error en mezclar a la derecha con “protestas”?

Thank you



to check updates on this project.