

# Losers' Consent and Democratic Stability: Experimental Evidence from Chile and Estonia

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# Democratic Backsliding

- Parece existir un consenso en que algunas democracias están en riesgo de retroceder, acercándose más a sistemas autoritarios.
- Estos retrocesos han sido estudiados en un sinnúmero de casos.
  - Kaufman and Haggard (2019) explican que “a transition to competitive authoritarianism in the United States is unlikely, although not impossible.”
  - **Caso 2.**
  - **Caso 3.**

## Democratic Backsliding: A “Winners Bias”

Desafortunadamente, la mayoría ha concentrado sus esfuerzos en cómo el ejecutivo agranda sus poderes.

- Pérez-Liñán (2018, p. 2) explica que “most threats to democracy originate in the *executive*, not in congress.”
- “Democratic backsliding is the incremental erosion of institutions [...] that results from the actions of [...] *elected governments* (Haggard and Kaufman 2021, p. 27).”
- Corrales (2020, p. 41) explica que “electoral irregularities contributed to democratic backsliding in Venezuela under *chavista rule*.”

## Our paper

- Unlike most research that concentrates on potential breaches of democratic values by the “winners,” we turn our attention to electoral “losers.”
- We seek to understand if voters who sided with the losing candidate are more open to supporting anti-systemic actions against the incumbent.]
- We carried out a novel, fully pre-registered survey experiment in two new democracies, Chile (and Estonia), probing into the willingness of these “losers” to tolerate transgressions against democratic principles.

## Argument

Test.

Candidates that **look like** and actually **are** wealthy (poor) will do better (worse) in elections.

## Chilean Case

- We follow a **“least-likely case design”** (Levy 2008). Finland has been consistently considered as:
  - A ‘democratic’ (Polity-V).
  - An ‘economic egalitarian’ (Walzl 2022).
  - A ‘gender egalitarian.’
  - A ‘social-mobility prone’ country (Erola 2009).
- Thus, it should be **hard to find any correlation** between **class-congruent use of status symbols** and **voting**.

...and yet, we *do*.

## Functional Form and Model

$$Y_i = \text{Votes}_i \sim \text{Poisson}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \log(\text{Votes}_i) = & \beta_1 \text{Occupation-Appearance Congruence}_i \times \text{Social Class}_i + \\ & \beta_2 \text{Age}_i + \\ & \gamma_1 \text{Party}_i + \\ & \gamma_2 \text{City}_i + \\ & \Theta_i \end{aligned}$$

- In  $\Theta$  we **also control for**: Attractiveness<sub>i</sub>, Masculinity<sub>i</sub> and Femininity<sub>i</sub>.
- Full, but also **partition the data** (male & female).
- We focus on the **marginal effects** of the interaction term.

[▶ show regression table](#)

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# Main Results

test

# Main Takeaways

✓ Test.

Thank you



to check updates on this project.

Summary Stats

Test



Corrales, Javier. 2020. "Democratic Backsliding Through Electoral Irregularities." *European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies*, no. 109, 41–65.



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