

Losers' Consent and Democratic Stability: Experimental Evidence from Chile and Estonia

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- Yet, actions by Trump’s and Bolsonaro’s supporters question the acceptance of defeat.
- Research has looked into “losers’ consent,” focusing on satisfaction, trust, and efficacy.
- Still, we know little about the losing side’s commitment to democracy among *voters*.



Voters' Commitment After Electoral Loss

& Institutional Heterogeneities

- We analyze the level of system support among electoral “losers” using data from a novel conjoint experiment.
- We exploit institutional heterogeneities in consensus and majoritarian democracies (Chile and Estonia), which effectively alter the costs for election “losers” and “winners.”
- We pre-registered the following hypotheses: [▶ link](#)
 - Election “losers” favor candidates endorsing anti-systemic actions more than “winners.”
 - This tendency is stronger in presidential versus parliamentary systems.

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Democratic Backsliding

- Bermeo (2016) “**introduced** the landmark essay on democratic backsliding” (Haggard2021ca).
- Democratic institutions, norms, and values are gradually eroded **within** a political system.
- Erosion of civil liberties, undermining of free and fair elections, and the **concentration of power in the executive branch**.

Pre-Registered Hypothesis

Argument

Respondents who voted for the candidate/party that lost the the last election (Kast) would be more likely to choose a candidate who supports anti-systemic actions (protests) against the current government than respondents in the “winning side” (Boric).

Conjoint Experiment

- Disenamos un conjoint experiment (Hainmueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto [2014](#)).
- Fully randomized design (no constrains).
- Representatividad estadística de género y partido.
- Batería de socio-demográficos, intención política (Kast, Boric), evaluación de la democracia.

Dimension	Attribute Set
Gender	Male, Female.
Age	Younger than 35, Between 35-50, Over 50.
Protest	The candidate OPPOSES anti-government protest that will seek to de-stabilize the current government, The candidate SUPPORTS anti-government protest that will seek to de-stabilize the current government

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Subgroup Marginal Means (MM)

- We depart from standard AMCE analyses (Hainmueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto [2014](#)) and instead compute **subgroup marginal means** (Leeper, Hobolt, and Tilley [2020](#)).
- In practice, when using marginal means, there's no need to set a reference category.
- “In a forced-choice conjoint design, the grand mean is by definition 0.5” (p. 209).

Subgroup Marginal Means (MM): Boric, Kast

test

Main Takeaways: More Questions Than Answers

- Hipotetizamos que los *electoral losers* estarían más dispuestos a apoyar acciones no-democráticas (protestas anti-sistémicas).
- Registramos esta hipótesis.
- Sin embargo, no encontramos resultados que vayan en línea con nuestras expectativas iniciales.
- Preguntas para ustedes: cometimos un error en mezclar a la derecha con “protestas”?

Thank you



to check updates on this project.