

Losers' Consent and Democratic Stability: Experimental Evidence from Chile and Estonia

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Democratic Backsliding

- Parece existir un consenso en que algunas democracias están en riesgo de retroceder (*democratic backsliding*).
- Estos retrocesos han sido estudiados en un sinnúmero de casos.
 - Kaufman and Haggard (2019) explican que “a transition to competitive authoritarianism in the **United States** is unlikely, although not impossible.”
 - Kreko and Zsolt (2018) estudian el caso de **Hungria**.
 - Bochsler and Andreas (2020) estudian el caso de **Rusia**.

Democratic Backsliding: A “Winners Bias”

Desafortunadamente, la mayoría ha concentrado sus esfuerzos en cómo el **ejecutivo agranda** sus poderes.

- Haggard and Kaufman (2021a, p. 27) definen “[d]emocratic backsliding is the incremental erosion of institutions [...] that results from the actions of [...] **elected governments**.”
- Pérez-Liñán (2018, p. 2) explica que “most threats to democracy originate in the **executive**, not in congress.”
- Corrales (2020, p. 41) explica que “electoral irregularities contributed to democratic backsliding in Venezuela under **chavista rule**.”

What about the electoral losers?

Qué ocurre con los que pierden la elección? Existen diferencias sistemáticas en cuanto la tolerancia de acciones no democráticas entre “ganadores” y “perdedores”?

Nuestro Paper: “El baile de los que sobran”

- A diferencia de la mayoría de quienes estudian posibles violaciones de los principios democráticos por parte de los “ganadores,” nosotros estudiamos a los “**perdedores**” electorales.
- Hicimos un conjoin experiment (pre-registrado) en dos democracias recientes, Chile (y Estonia).
- Entender si los votantes que apoyaron al **candidato perdedor** están más abiertos a respaldar acciones anti-sistémicas **contra el ganador**.
- Para esto, incluimos una teoría enfocada en *pérdidas* y *loss aversion* (“*prospect theory*,” e.g., Kahneman and Tversky 1979).

Findings no conforman con nuestras expectativas iniciales

Encontramos que los votantes de **Kast** (perdedores) *no* son mas proclives que los votantes de **Boric** (ganadores) a apoyar acciones no democraticas que pongan en peligro el *status quo* (protestas antisistémicas).

Democratic Backsliding

- Bermeo (2016) “**introduced** the landmark essay on democratic backsliding” (Haggard and Kaufman 2021b, p. 27).
- Democratic institutions, norms, and values are gradually eroded **within** a political system.
- Erosion of civil liberties, undermining of free and fair elections, and the **concentration of power in the executive branch**.

Prospect Theory

- **Losses loom larger than gains:** individuals “give more weight to losses than to comparable gains” (Levy 1992, p. 171).
- **Loss aversion:** individuals “are more concerned with preventing a decline than increasing gains” (Levy 1997, p. 89).

Pre-Registered Hypothesis

Argument

Respondents who voted for the candidate/party that lost the the last election (Kast) would be more likely to choose a candidate who supports anti-systemic actions (protests) against the current government than respondents in the “winning side” (Boric).

Conjoint Experiment

- Disenamos un conjoint experiment (Hainmueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto [2014](#)).
- La muestra es representativa a nivel país ($n = 741$).
- Fully randomized design (no constraints).
- Representatividad estadística de género y partido.
- Batería de socio-demográficos, intención política (Kast, Boric), evaluación de la democracia.

Dimension	Attribute Set
Gender	Male, Female.
Age	Younger than 35, Between 35-50, Over 50.
Protest	The candidate OPPOSES anti-government protest that will seek to de-stabilize the current government, The candidate SUPPORTS anti-government protest that will seek to de-stabilize the current government

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Conjoint Experiment


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
Subgroup Marginal Means (MM)

- We depart from standard AMCE analyses (Hainmueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto [2014](#)) and instead compute **subgroup marginal means** (Leeper, Hobolt, and Tilley [2020](#)).
- In practice, when using marginal means, there's no need to set a reference category.
- “In a forced-choice conjoint design, the grand mean is by definition 0.5” (p. 209).


Subgroup Marginal Means (MM): Boric, Kast




Other Descriptive Results: Support for Democracy



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Other Descriptive Results: Support for Democracy



Main Takeaways: More Questions Than Answers

- Hipotetizamos que los *electoral losers* estarian mas dispuestos a apoyar acciones no-democraticas (protestas anti-sistemicas).
- Registramos esta hipotesis.
- Sin embargo, no encontramos resultados que vayan en linea con nuestras expectativas iniciales.
- Preguntas para ustedes: cometimos un error en mezclar a la derecha con “protestas”?

Thank you



to check updates on this project.

Summary Stats

Table: Summary Statistics

Variable	N	Percent
Age	741	
... 18-24	120	16%
... 25-34	172	23%
... 35-44	146	20%
... 45-54	146	20%
... Mj3zja1zs de 55	157	21%
Gender	741	
... Man	315	43%
... Woman	422	57%
... Otro/Prefiero no decir	4	1%
Education	741	
... Educaci3zjb3zn bjc3zja1zsica completa (hasta octavo bjc3zja1zsico).	10	1%
... Educaci3zjb3zn media completa.	192	26%
... Educaci3zjb3zn tjc3zja9zcnico-profesional completa.	214	29%
... Educaci3zjb3zn universitaria completa.	270	36%
... Magister o Doctorado completo.	42	6%
... Menos que educaci3zjb3zn bjc3zja1zsica (menos que octavo bjc3zja1zsico).	2	0%
... Otro/Prefiero no decir	11	1%
Income	741	
... De \$1000.001 a \$2.000.000 mensuales liquidos	155	21%
... De \$110.001 a \$150.000 mensuales liquidos	7	1%
... De \$150.001 a \$225.000 mensuales liquidos	20	3%
... De \$2.000.001 a \$3.000.000 mensuales liquidos	48	6%
... De \$225.001 a \$350.000 mensuales liquidos	35	5%
... De \$3.000.001 a \$4.500.000 mensuales liquidos	31	4%
... De \$35.001 a \$75.000 mensuales liquidos	14	2%
... De \$350.001 a \$450.000 mensuales liquidos	48	6%
... De \$450.001 a \$550.000 mensuales liquidos	68	9%
... De \$550.001 a \$700.000 mensuales liquidos	86	12%
... De \$700.001 a \$1.000.000 mensuales liquidos	146	20%
... De \$75.001 a \$110.000 mensuales liquidos	18	2%
... Menos de \$35.000 mensuales liquidos	28	4%
... Mj3zja1zs de \$4.500.000 mensuales liquidos	16	2%
... No sabe / No contesta	21	3%

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