



# V-Dem

VARIETIES OF DEMOCRACY

## Codebook

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# 1 Explanatory Notes

## 1.1 New in Version 12 compared to Version 11.1

- **New indicators**
  - Regime ID (v2regidnr)
  - Regime duration (v2regdur)
- **New external variables**
  - GDP (e\_gdp)
  - GDP per capita (e\_gdppc)
  - Population (e\_pop)
- **Removed indicators**
  - COVID-19 government restrictions (v2cvgovres)
  - COVID-19 affected ratings (v2cvresp)
- **Removed external variables**
  - GDP growth (e\_migdpgro)
  - GDP growth (rescaled) (e\_migdpgrlns)
  - GDP per capita (e\_migdppe)
  - GDP per capita, logged, base 10 (e\_migdppln)
- **Other new or modified information**
  - Updated *list of countries*.
  - Updated *citations* for V-Dem's reference materials.
  - Updated *Country Coding Units* document.
- **Removed versions of indices and indicators**
  - Historical V-Dem indicators with v3-tags are continuously merged with the corresponding contemporary V-Dem v2-indicators. This results in the removal of v3-indicators, but extension of the time series (further back in time) of the corresponding v2-indicators. The year coverage is indicated in the "years" section for each variable entry.

For more details on changes to previous versions of the dataset, please see Appendix F or the specific version of the codebook. All previous codebook versions are available at <https://www.v-dem.net/> under "Dataset Archive".

## 1.2 Cautionary Notes

V-Dem is firmly committed to full transparency and release of the data we have. We ask users to take the following cautions into consideration when using the dataset.

- The *V-Dem Methodology* assumes five or more coders for the "contemporary" period starting from 1900, originally coded to 2012. With the updates covering 2013-2021 it has for a few country-variable combinations been impossible to achieve that target. We have found that this at times result in significant changes in point estimates as a consequence of self-selected attrition of Country Experts, rather than actual changes in the country. We therefore strongly advise against using point estimates for country-variable-years with three or fewer ( $\leq 3$ ) ratings. We suggest to filter these out before conducting any type of analysis. For this purpose, a special count-variable for each Country-Expert coded variable, which is suffixed with "\_nr", is included in the dataset from v7 and onwards.

- Point estimates can jump around slightly due to the simulation-based nature of the estimation process and expert turnover. Consumers of the data should therefore always be attentive to the uncertainty about the estimates, which provides vital information about the degree to which one can be certain that a change in scores reflects an actual change in the level of the concept being measured.
- We constantly improve the coding of factual data (A) to make it as accurate as possible. This may result in changes at the index-level.
- Observations for *Exclusion* and *Legitimation* indicators (section 3.13 and section 3.14) with less than 3 coders per country-date (\*\_nr < 3) have been removed. Furthermore, observations for *Exclusion indices* (section 5.6) have been removed if not at least 3 components have at least 3 coders per country-date.
- Observations for *Civic and Academic Space* indicators (section 3.15) with less than 3 coders per country-date (\*\_nr < 3) have been removed. Furthermore, observations for the *Academic Freedom Index* (section 5.15.1) have been removed if not at least 3 components have at least 3 coders per country-date.
- Due to uncertainty about the reliability of the 2021 scores for the following list of variables, scores for the year 2021 will not be released with v12: v2regantireg, v2regimpgroup, v2regimpoppgroup, v2regoppgroups, v2regoppgroupsact, v2regoppgroupssize, v2regopploc, v2regpower, v2regproreg, v2regsupgroups, v2regsupgroupssize, v2regsuploc. We will further inspect and assess this data, and hope to release the 2021-scores with v13.
- These variables had issues with convergence: v2caconmob, v2cademmob, v2castate, v2catrauni, v2csantimv, v2csreprss, v2dlcountr, v2eldonate, v2elembcap, v2elpaidig, v2elpdcamp, v2elpeace, v2elpubfin, v2exdfpphg, v2exremhsp, v2jupoatck, v2lgdomchm, v2lgotovst, v2peapsecon, v2peaspol, v2peasjgeo, v2peasjsoecon, v2pscnslnl, v2psplats, v2psprlnks, v2regoppgroupssize, v2smgovsmalt, v2smmefra, v2smpolhate, v2smregcap, v2x\_neopat, v2xdl\_delib, v2xlg\_legcon, v2xnp\_pres, v2xpe\_exlecon, v2xpe\_exlgeo, v2xpe\_exlpol. Please see individual codebook entries for additional information. For details on interpreting convergence information, please refer to 1.4.5, the Methodology Document and Pemstein et al. (2022).
- We further ask you to use the following percentage variables with caution:
  - Female journalists (v2mefemjrn)
  - Weaker civil liberties population (v2clsnlpct)
- *Historical V-Dem*: In the coding of several Historical V-Dem A type variables, the historical part of the time series—including 20 years of overlap with the "contemporary" time series (typically 1900-1920)—were conducted completely independently from the existing coding in the original V-Dem dataset, by one or more new coders. For many of these historical variables, we have gone through and checked the consistency of the coding, further scrutinized the sources, and determined which coding represents the most appropriate score after deliberation. We have subsequently made the appropriate adjustments to the data.

For other historical A variables we have yet to finalize this process. For these variables, the scores reported for the overlap period (typically 1900-1920) in the dataset are the "contemporary" V-Dem scores, by default. This means that for some countries, where there is disagreement in the historical and contemporary coding in the starting year for the contemporary time series (typically 1900), there may be artificial changes between that year and the year before that do not necessarily reflect a real-world change in the political system in the country. Hence, we advise users to exert caution before running analysis on the entire time series extending across both the historical and contemporary coding periods.

Please also note that for the variables where there is not full correspondence between the historical (1789-1920) and contemporary (1900-2021) coding, the historical coding of the variables is also provided in their original form as separate variables, carrying a "v3" rather than a "v2" prefix on the variable tag. These "v3" variables are gathered together with a

number of new (A and C type) variables that are currently only coded for the Historical V-Dem sample, in a separate section of the codebook.

### 1.3 Suggested Citation

*Nota bene:* If a variable drawn from the V-Dem dataset plays an important role in your project (published or unpublished), please use the applicable citations below:

- **V-Dem Dataset:**

Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Jan Teorell, Nazifa Alizada, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Lisa Gastaldi, Haakon Gjerløw, Adam Glynn, Sandra Grahn, Allen Hicken, Garry Hindle, Nina Ilchenko, Katrin Kinzelbach, Joshua Krusell, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Juraj Medzihorsky, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Josefine Pernes, Oskar Rydén, Johannes von Römer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jeffrey Staton, Aksel Sundström, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, Steven Wilson and Daniel Ziblatt. 2022. "V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v12" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. <https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemds22>.

and:

Pemstein, Daniel, Kyle L. Marquardt, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Juraj Medzihorsky, Joshua Krusell, Farhad Miri, and Johannes von Römer. 2022. "The V-Dem Measurement Model: Latent Variable Analysis for Cross-National and Cross-Temporal Expert-Coded Data". V-Dem Working Paper No. 21. 7th edition. University of Gothenburg: Varieties of Democracy Institute.

- **V-Dem Codebook:**

Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Lisa Gastaldi, Haakon Gjerløw, Adam Glynn, Sandra Grahn, Allen Hicken, Katrin Kinzelbach, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Johannes von Römer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jeffrey Staton, Eitan Tzelgov, Luca Uberti, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2022. "V-Dem Codebook v12" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project.

- **V-Dem Methodology:**

Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Jan Teorell, Kyle L. Marquardt, Juraj Medzihorsky, Daniel Pemstein, Nazifa Alizada, Lisa Gastaldi, Garry Hindle, Josefine Pernes, Johannes von Römer, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, and Steven Wilson. 2022. "V-Dem Methodology v12" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project.

- **V-Dem Country Coding Units:**

Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Jan Teorell, and Lisa Gastaldi. 2022. "V-Dem Country Coding Units v12" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project.

- **V-Dem Organization and Management:**

Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Jan Teorell, Nazifa Alizada, Lisa Gastaldi, Sandra Grahn, Garry Hindle, Nina Ilchenko, Natalia Natsika, Josefine Pernes, and Johannes von Römer. 2022. "V-Dem Organization and Management v12" Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project.

## 1.4 Variable Information

### 1.4.1 Variable Types

The V-Dem Codebook divides variables into the following variable types:

- **Type A\*: Variables coded by Project Managers and Research Assistants**  
This data is based on extant sources and is factual in nature. Country Experts indicate their confidence for this pre-coded data.
- **Type A: Variables coded by Project Managers and Research Assistants**  
This data is based on extant sources and is factual in nature.
- **Type B: Variables coded by Country Coordinators or Research Assistants**  
The coder is typically a graduate student or recent graduate from the country in question. These variables are factual in nature.
- **Type C: Variables coded by Country Experts**  
A Country Expert is typically a scholar or professional with deep knowledge of a country and of a particular political institution. Furthermore, the expert is usually a citizen or resident of the country. Multiple experts (usually 5 or more) code each variable. More information about the Country Experts can be found in the *V-Dem Methodology* document.
- **Type A,C: Variables coded by Country Experts and crosschecked by Research Assistants**
- **Type D: Indices**  
Variables composed of type A, B, or C variables. This data may be accomplished by adding a denominator (*e.g.*, per capita), by creating a cumulative scale (total number of...), or by aggregating larger concepts (*e.g.*, components or indices of democracy).
- **Type E: Non-V-Dem variables**  
If we import a variable from another source without doing any original coding, except for perhaps imputing missing data, it is not considered a V-Dem product. These variables are found in the sections of the Codebook labeled *Background Factors* and *Other Democracy Indices and Indicators*. If, however, we gather data from a number of sources and combine them in a more than purely mechanical fashion (requiring some judgment on our part), we regard this as a V-Dem product and classify it as type A, B, or C. All "E" variables, except those drawn from sources that have more than 30 variables, are included in the codebook. For this reason, the following examples are not included; Archigos (Goemans et al.), BDM (Bueno de Mesquita et al.), Henisz/POLCON (2000, 2002), Miller (Democratic Pieces), Performance of Nations (Kugler and Tammen), PEI (Norris et al.), PIPE (Przeworski et al.) and QoG (Quality of Government). For these and for similar cases, we ask users to consult separate codebooks, as listed above.

### 1.4.2 Number of Variables

Variable Type	A*/A/B	C	D	E	PSQ	Total
<i>V-Dem Democracy Indices and Indicators</i>						
High-level Democracy Indices			5			5
Mid-level Democracy Indices			21			21
Indices created using V-Dem data	3		58			61
Elections	48	26	4			78
Political Parties		13				13
Direct Democracy	38					38
The Executive	25	38	6			69
The Legislature	16	14	2			32
Deliberation		7				7
The Judiciary	5	12				17
Civil Liberty		24				24
Sovereignty/State	1	8				9
Civil Society		10				10
The Media		10				10
Political Equality	3	6				9
Exclusion		19				19
Legitimation		5				5
Civic and Academic Space	4	17				21
Historical V-Dem	84	29				113
Coder Comments		18				18
Post Survey Questionnaire					51	51
<i>Total</i>	227	256	96		51	630
<i>Other Democracy Indices and Indicators</i>						
Digital Society Survey		37				37
Ordinal version of the V-Dem indices			42			42
Political Regimes				4		4
Freedom House				4		4
World Bank Governance Indicators				6		6
Lexical Index of Electoral Democracy				1		1
Unified Democracy Score				1		1
Political Institutions and Events				2		2
Polity 5				5		5
Others				3		3
<i>Total</i>		37	42	26		105
<i>Background Factors</i>						
Education				2		2
Geography				4		4
Economics				6		6
Natural resource wealth				3		3
Infrastructure				1		1
Demography				9		9
Conflict				4		4
<i>Total</i>				29		29
<b>Total</b>	227	293	138	55	51	764

### 1.4.3 Variable Versions and Suffixes

The V-Dem Dataset contains several versions of the variables coded by country experts (type C variables).

- **Model Estimates**

*"Model Estimates" — Measurement Model Output:*

This version has no special suffix (*e.g.* v2elmulpar). This version of the variables provides country-year (country-date in the alternative dataset) point estimates from the V-Dem measurement model (see Pemstein et al. 2022). The measurement model aggregates the ratings provided by multiple country experts and, taking disagreement and measurement error into account, produces a probability distribution over country-year scores on a standardized interval scale (see the *V-Dem Methodology* document). The point estimates are the median values of these distributions for each country-year. The scale of a measurement model variable is similar to a normal ("Z") score (*e.g.* typically between -5 and 5, with 0 approximately representing the mean for all country-years in the sample) though it does not necessarily follow a normal distribution. For most purposes, these are the preferred versions of the variables for time series regression and other estimation strategies.

*"Model Estimates Measure of Uncertainty" — Measurement Model Highest Posterior Density (HPD) Intervals:*

This version has the suffixes: "codelow" and "codehigh" (*e.g.* v2elmulpar\_codelow and v2elmulpar\_codehigh). These two kinds of variables ["code low" and "code high"] demarcate the interval in which the measurement model places 68 percent of the probability mass for each country-year score, which is approximately equivalent to one standard deviation upper and lower bounds. If the underlying posterior distribution is skewed, the HPDs reflect this with unequal distances between the point estimate and the high and low estimates. We also provide a standard calculation for standard deviation which is marked with the suffix "sd" (*e.g.*, v2elmulpar\_sd). The SD might be used to compute the standard frequentist confidence intervals.

- **Original Scale (\*\_osp)**

*"Original Scale" — Linearized Original Scale Posterior Prediction:*

This version has the suffix "\_osp," (*e.g.* v2elmulpar\_osp). In this version of the variables, we have linearly translated the measurement model point estimates back to the original ordinal scale of each variable (*e.g.* 0-4 for v2elmulpar\_osp) as an interval measure. The decimals in the \_osp version roughly indicate the distance between the point estimate from the linearized measurement model posterior prediction and the threshold for reaching the next level on the original ordinal scale. Thus, a \_osp value of 1.25 indicates that the median measurement model posterior predicted value was closer to the ordinal value of 1 than 2 on the original scale. Technically, it calculates the sum of the posterior probabilities that the estimate is in a particular category: If a particular country-year-variable has a probability of 90% to be in category "4", a 10% probability of being in category "3", and 0% probability of being in categories "2", "1", and "0", the result is a value of 3.9 ( $4 * 0.9 + 3 * 0.1 = 3.6 + 0.3$ ). Since there is no conventional theoretical justification for linearly mapping ordinal posterior predictions onto an interval scale, these scores should primarily be used for heuristic purposes. Using the "Ordinal Scale" estimates—or incorporating the properties of ordinal probit models into the estimation procedure—is thus preferable to using the \_osp estimates in statistical analyses. However, since the \_osp version maps onto the coding criteria found in the V-Dem Codebook, and is strongly correlated with the Measurement Model output (typically at .98 or higher), some users may find the \_osp version useful in estimating quantities such as marginal effects with a clear substantive interpretation. If a user uses \_osp data in statistical analyses it is imperative that she confirm that the results are compatible with estimations using Measurement Model output.

*"Original Scale Measure of Uncertainty" — Linearized Original Scale HPD Intervals:*

This version has the suffixes "codelow" and "codehigh" (*e.g.* v2elmulpar\_osp\_codelow and v2elmulpar\_osp\_codehigh). We estimate these quantities in a similar manner as the Measurement Model Highest Posterior Density Intervals. These two variables ["code low" and "code high"] demarcate the interval in which the measurement model places 70 percent of the probability mass for each country-year score, which is approximately equivalent to one



standard deviation upper and lower bounds. If the underlying posterior distribution is skewed, the HPDs reflect this with unequal distances between the point estimate and the high and low estimates. We also provide a standard calculation for standard deviation which is marked with the suffix "sd" (e.g., v2elmulpar\_sd). The SD might be used to compute the standard frequentist confidence intervals.

- **Ordinal Scale (\*\_ord)**

*"Ordinal Scale" — Measurement Model Estimates of Original Scale Value:*

This version has the suffix "\_ord" (e.g. v2elmulpar\_ord). This method translates the measurement model estimates back to the original ordinal scale of a variable (as represented in the Codebook) after taking coder disagreement and measurement error into account. More precisely, it represents the most likely ordinal value on the original codebook scale into which a country-year would fall, given the average coder's usage of that scale. More specifically, we assign each country-year a value that corresponds to its integerized median ordinal highest posterior probability category over Measurement Model output.

*"Ordinal Scale Measure of Uncertainty" — Original Scale Value HPD Intervals:*

This version has the suffixes - "codelow" and "codehigh" (e.g. v2elmulpar\_ord\_codelow and v2elmulpar\_ord\_codehigh). We estimate these values in a similar manner as the Measurement Model Highest Posterior Density Intervals. These two variables ["code low" and "code high"] demarcate the interval in which the measurement model places 70 percent of the probability mass for each country-year score, which is approximately equivalent to one standard deviation upper and lower bounds. If the underlying posterior distribution is skewed, the HPDs reflect this with unequal distances between the point estimate and the high and low estimates. We also provide a standard calculation for standard deviation which is marked with the suffix "sd" (e.g. v2elmulpar\_sd). The SD might be used to compute the standard frequentist confidence intervals.

- **Number of Coders per Country, Variable and Year/Date (\*\_nr)**

The number of V-Dem Country Experts (regular coders, bridge- and lateral coders) who provided data on country, variable and year. V-Dem's methodology is based on the assumption that we have a minimum of five Country Experts for every single country-variable-year. Sometimes, however, we end up with fewer than five Country Experts. From v7 of the Country-Year, and the Country-Date type datasets, we provide all data we have for full transparency. By providing the number of Country Experts for each country-variable-year/date, we suggest that users primarily base analyses on observations based on five or more coders. We strongly advise against using observations based on three or fewer coders. This concerns all C type variables.

- **Arithmetic Mean of Coder Answers per Country-Year (\*\_mean)**

It is commonplace to aggregate respondents' data to the level of country or country-year using arithmetic mean in order to merge it with other country-level data. V-Dem Institute provides such variables for every expert-coded variable aggregated by the Measurement Model in Country-Date/Year dataset.

#### 1.4.4 Variable Tags

Every variable has a name and a tag. The tag consists of three or four parts and has the following structure:

Prefix + Index (if V-Dem index) + Section + Abbreviated title

While the prefix specifies the variable type, the letters that follow indicate which section the variable belongs to.

##### Prefixes

- v2: V-Dem variables (A, B, C)
- v3: Historical V-Dem only variables (A, B, C)
- v2x\_: Main indices and component-indices
- v2x[two-letter designation]\_: Indices specific for certain areas (see below). For example, v2xel\_ would be an index in the election-specific area. Sometimes used in aggregations of higher-level indices (*i.e.* v2x\_ type indices D)
- e\_: Non-V-Dem variables (E) and ordinal versions of V-Dem indices.

##### Sections

- ca: Civic and academic space
- cl: Civil liberty
- dd: Direct democracy
- de: Demography
- dl: Deliberation
- el: Elections
- ex: Executive
- exl: Legitimation
- ju: Judiciary
- lg: Legislature
- me: Media
- pe: Political equality
- ps: Political parties
- sv/st: Sovereignty/State
- x: Index (calculated from variables that are also included in the dataset)
- zz: Post survey questionnaire

### 1.4.5 Variable Entry Clarifications

The following information is available per variable (if applicable):

**Project Manager:** The team member(s) primarily responsible for designing the indicator/index, and in some cases responsible for the data collection.

**Additional versions:** Indicates if the variable is also available in the following versions; \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean and/or \*\_nr. Detailed information about the different versions can be found in section 1.4.3 (*Variable Versions and Suffixes*).

**Available versions:** Lists the available variable types (Only applicable for ordinalized versions of indices).

**Question:** The question that the variable attempts to measure.

**Clarification:** Definition of key terms, clarification of scope-conditions, contexts, and any other features needed to understand the question (if any). All key terms appear in the Glossary (*Appendix B*), unless they are specific to a single section (in which case they only appear in the introduction to that section or in the clarifications for particular questions). Key terms are sometimes cross-referenced with hypertext.

**Responses:** Numeric, Percentage, Text, Date, Countries, or specific response categories (listed below under "Answer-types" and "Scales").

**Answer-Types:**

*Multiple-choice:* Where a coder can select only one answer. This is the usual protocol and is therefore not noted.

*Multiple-selection:* Where a coder can select more than one answer. For most multiple-selection variables, the dataset contains both the original variable as well as a set of dummies for each of the responses.

**Ordering (only applicable to a selection of C variables):** This relates to the ordering of questions when the coding of one indicator depends upon the coding of other indicators (*i.e.*, whenever there is some alteration of the serial ordering of questions as listed in this document).

**Aggregation (only applicable to indices):** Explanation of how an index is constructed.

**Scale:** Dichotomous, Nominal, Ordinal, or Interval/Ratio (Extra response options such as N/A or Other, are not counted as part of this classification).

**Cross-Coder Aggregation (only applicable to C variables):** IRT, Bayesian ordinal item response theory measurement model (see the *V-Dem Methodology* document). Available in mode and mean.

**Data releases:** Indicates dataset version (1-12). Versions respond to changes to the dataset for V-Dem variables (A, B, C, D), including new variables, new indices, corrections to existing variables, and new iterations of the measurement model. Changes are synchronized with Codebook and Methodology documents so that they all share the same version number. The second number (after the decimal point), refers to sub-versions of the data.

*Releases to date:*

Version 1-4 were only internal releases, thus not publicly available.

v1: March 31, 2014

v2: September 11, 2014

v3: December 17, 2014

v4: March 31, 2015

Version 5-9 are publicly available free of charge.

v5: January 4, 2016 (first public release of data for download)

v6: March 31, 2016

v6.2: June, 2016

v7: May 2017

v7.1: July 2017

v8: April 2018

v9: April 2019

v10: March 2020

v11: March 2021

v11.1: March 2021

v12: March 2022

**Sources:** Citations for type-A\* and A variables are listed, wherever possible, with complete references in the *Bibliography*. Note that this coding sometimes rests on numerous country-specific sources, in which case it has not been possible to include all citations. Composite indices (type-D) build on other variables in the V-Dem database, which are therefore listed as the source for that index.

**Date specific:** Specifies if observations are coded on specific dates only e.g. election dates.

**Cleaning:** Specifies if observations are set to missing based on values from other variables.

**Citation:** Suggested citation when using the specific variable.

**Convergence:** V-Dem assesses convergence among expert-coded variables using the Gelman-Rubin Diagnostic. Specifically, we consider a variable to have converged if no more than 5% of parameters in each of the relevant parameter sets (universal thresholds, main-country-coded thresholds, expert thresholds, expert reliability, and country-date latent trait estimates) has  $\hat{R} \geq 1.01$ . We assess BFA convergence in a similar manner across relevant model parameter sets (intercept, slope, measurement standard error, and country-date latent trait estimates), but using  $\hat{R} \geq 1.1$ . We provide convergence information for a given variable only if a set of model parameters did not converge, reporting these set(s). Note that if country-date latent trait estimates converged (i.e. we do not mention them in the convergence details) it means that the convergence issues likely reflect a problem with model parameter identification, and the latent trait estimates are relatively safe.

**Years:** Available coverage for the respective variable. For more information on country-specific year coverage, see *the country table*.

**Note:** Additional information about the variable.

## 1.5 Notes on Methodology

### 1.5.1 Index Aggregation

The V-Dem conceptual scheme recognizes several levels of aggregation. The table below shows the structure of aggregation for one of our high-level indices: The V-Dem Electoral Democracy Index. This index consists of five sub-components (each of these sub-components being indices themselves built from a number of indicators) that together capture Dahl's seven institutions of polyarchy: freedom of association, suffrage, clean elections, elected executive, and freedom of expression and alternative sources of information.

*Appendix A* includes a table with a complete hierarchy of our democracy indices, democracy component indices, democracy sub- component indices, and indicators, as well as the hierarchy of related concept indices.

Note: High-level indices which have components that are calculated using the measurement model and/or Bayesian factor analysis use the posterior samples of these components for calculating index scores and confidence intervals (68% highest posterior density intervals).

Democracy Index Name	Mid-Level Democracy and Governance Index Name	Lower-Level Democracy and Governance Index Name	Indicator Name	Tag	Uniqueness Score*
<i>Electoral democracy index</i>				v2x_polyarchy	
	Additive polyarchy index			v2x_api	
	Multiplicative polyarchy index			v2x_mpi	
		Freedom of expression and alternative sources of information index		v2x_freexp_altinf	
		Government censorship effort—Media		v2mecenefm	0.325
		Harassment of journalists		v2meharjrn	0.362
		Media self-censorship		v2meslfcen	0.338
		Media bias		v2mebias	0.316
		Print/broadcast media perspectives		v2merange	0.316
		Print/broadcast media critical		v2mecrit	0.294
		Freedom of discussion for men		v2cldiscm	0.31
		Freedom of discussion for women		v2cldiscw	0.31
		Freedom of academic and cultural expression		v2clacfree	0.377
		Freedom of association index (thick)		v2x_frassoc_thick	
		Party ban		v2psparban	0.417
		Barriers to parties		v2psbars	0.285
		Opposition parties autonomy		v2psoppaut	0.023
		Elections multiparty		v2elmulpar	0.042
		CSO entry and exit		v2cseeorgs	0.406
		CSO repression		v2csreprss	0.466
		Share of population with suffrage		v2x_suffr	
		Percent of population with suffrage		v2elsuffrage	
		Clean elections index		v2xel_frefair	
		EMB autonomy		v2elembaut	0.481
		EMB capacity		v2elembcap	0.516
		Election voter registry		v2elrgstry	0.448
		Election vote buying		v2elvotbuy	0.556
		Election other voting irregularities		v2elirreg	0.33
		Election government intimidation		v2elintim	0.351
		Election other electoral violence		v2elpeace	0.64
		Election free and fair		v2elfrfair	0.309
		Elected officials index		v2x_elecoff	
		Legislature bicameral		v2lgbicam	
		Lower chamber elected		v2lgello	
		Upper chamber elected		v2lgelecup	
		Percentage of indirectly elected legislators lower chamber		v2lginello	
		Percentage of indirectly elected legislators upper chamber		v2lginelup	
		HOS appointment in practice		v2expathhs	
		HOG appointment in practice		v2expathhg	
		HOS selection by legislature in practice		v2exaphos	
		HOG selection by legislature in practice		v2exaphogp	
		HOS appoints cabinet in practice		v2exdfcbhs	
		HOG appoints cabinet in practice		v2exdjcbhg	
		HOS dismisses ministers in practice		v2exdfdmhs	
		HOG dismisses ministers in practice		v2exdfdsgh	
		HOS = HOG?		v2exhoshog	
		Chief executive appointment by upper chamber		v2exapup	
		Chief executive appointment by upper chamber implicit approval		v2exapupap	

\*Unmodeled Variance. Uniqueness is the variance that is 'unique' to the variable and not shared with other variables.

### 1.5.2 Country–Year Aggregation

C-variables, ratio/percentage variables, and High-Level/Mid-Level Democracy indices are aggregated from the country-date level to the country-year level by the day-weighted mean. Ordinal A-variables

and A\*-variables are aggregated by taking the last observation in the year with one exception: event-specific dichotomies or event-specific ordinal variables, which mostly concerns elections or election related data, are aggregated by max (meaning the highest observed value for a given year is retained) to reflect that an "event" of the coded type occurred within the year.

### 1.5.3 Open source code

Starting with version 11 of the V-Dem dataset we are releasing the code that is used for creating the V-Dem datasets to the public at [https://github.com/vdemoinstitute/dataset\\_construction](https://github.com/vdemoinstitute/dataset_construction).

## 1.6 Country Units

The following table contains all country units (and their year coverage) that are included in the V-Dem Dataset. Some countries are coded prior to independence, and some have gaps in their coding periods. For a more detailed description of the country units and their year coverage please consult the V-Dem *Country Coding Units* document.

Name	ID	Coverage	Name	ID	Coverage
Afghanistan	36	1789–2021	Egypt	13	1789–2021
Albania	12	1912–2021	El Salvador	22	1838–2021
Algeria	103	1900–2021	Equatorial Guinea	160	1900–2021
Angola	104	1900–2021	Eritrea	115	1900–2021
Argentina	37	1789–2021	Estonia	161	1918–2021
Armenia	105	1990–2021	Eswatini	132	1900–2021
Australia	67	1789–2021	Ethiopia	38	1789–2021
Austria	144	1789–2021	Fiji	162	1900–2021
Azerbaijan	106	1990–2021	Finland	163	1809–2021
Baden	349	1789–1871	France	76	1789–2021
Bahrain	146	1900–2021	Gabon	116	1910–2021
Bangladesh	24	1971–2021	Georgia	118	1990–2021
Barbados	147	1900–2021	German Democratic Republic	137	1949–1990
Bavaria	350	1789–1871	Germany	77	1789–2021
Belarus	107	1990–2021	Ghana	7	1902–2021
Belgium	148	1789–2021	Greece	164	1822–2021
Benin	52	1900–2021	Guatemala	78	1789–2021
Bhutan	53	1900–2021	Guinea	63	1900–2021
Bolivia	25	1825–2021	Guinea-Bissau	119	1900–2021
Bosnia and Herzegovina	150	1992–2021	Guyana	166	1900–2021
Botswana	68	1900–2021	Haiti	26	1789–2021
Brazil	19	1789–2021	Hamburg	362	1789–1867
Brunswick	363	1789–1867	Hanover	357	1789–1866
Bulgaria	152	1878–2021	Hesse-Darmstadt	359	1789–1866
Burkina Faso	54	1919–2021	Hesse-Kassel	358	1789–1866
Burma/Myanmar	10	1789–2021	Honduras	27	1838–2021
Burundi	69	1916–2021	Hong Kong	167	1900–2021
Cambodia	55	1900–2021	Hungary	210	1789–2021
Cameroon	108	1961–2021	Iceland	168	1900–2021
Canada	66	1841–2021	India	39	1789–2021
Cape Verde	70	1900–2021	Indonesia	56	1800–2021
Central African Republic	71	1920–2021	Iran	79	1789–2021
Chad	109	1920–2021	Iraq	80	1920–2021
Chile	72	1789–2021	Ireland	81	1919–2021
China	110	1789–2021	Israel	169	1948–2021
Colombia	15	1789–2021	Italy	82	1861–2021
Comoros	153	1900–2021	Ivory Coast	64	1900–2021
Costa Rica	73	1838–2021	Jamaica	120	1900–2021
Croatia	154	1941–2021	Japan	9	1789–2021
Cuba	155	1789–2021	Jordan	83	1922–2021
Cyprus	156	1900–2021	Kazakhstan	121	1990–2021
Czech Republic	157	1918–2021	Kenya	40	1900–2021
Democratic Republic of the Congo	111	1900–2021	Kosovo	43	1999–2021
Denmark	158	1789–2021	Kuwait	171	1789–2021
Djibouti	113	1900–2021	Kyrgyzstan	122	1990–2021
Dominican Republic	114	1789–2021	Laos	123	1900–2021
Ecuador	75	1830–2021	Latvia	84	1920–2021



Name	ID	Coverage	Name	ID	Coverage
Lebanon	44	1918–2021	Sao Tome and Principe	196	1900–2021
Lesotho	85	1900–2021	Saudi Arabia	197	1789–2021
Liberia	86	1821–2021	Saxe-Weimar-Eisenach	365	1809–1867
Libya	124	1789–2021	Saxony	353	1789–1867
Lithuania	173	1918–2021	Senegal	31	1904–2021
Luxembourg	174	1815–2021	Serbia	198	1804–2021
Madagascar	125	1817–2021	Seychelles	199	1903–2021
Malawi	87	1900–2021	Sierra Leone	95	1900–2021
Malaysia	177	1900–2021	Singapore	200	1867–2021
Maldives	88	1900–2021	Slovakia	201	1939–2021
Mali	28	1900–2021	Slovenia	202	1989–2021
Malta	178	1900–2021	Solomon Islands	203	1900–2021
Mauritania	65	1904–2021	Somalia	130	1900–2021
Mauritius	180	1900–2021	Somaliland	139	1900–2021
Mecklenburg-Schwerin	360	1789–1867	South Africa	8	1900–2021
Mexico	3	1789–2021	South Korea	42	1789–2021
Modena	351	1789–1859	South Sudan	32	2011–2021
Moldova	126	1990–2021	South Yemen	23	1900–1990
Mongolia	89	1911–2021	Spain	96	1789–2021
Montenegro	183	1789–2021	Sri Lanka	131	1900–2021
Morocco	90	1789–2021	Sudan	33	1900–2021
Mozambique	57	1900–2021	Suriname	4	1900–2021
Namibia	127	1900–2021	Sweden	5	1789–2021
Nassau	366	1806–1866	Switzerland	6	1789–2021
Nepal	58	1789–2021	Syria	97	1918–2021
Netherlands	91	1789–2021	Taiwan	48	1900–2021
New Zealand	185	1841–2021	Tajikistan	133	1990–2021
Nicaragua	59	1838–2021	Tanzania	47	1914–2021
Niger	60	1922–2021	Thailand	49	1789–2021
Nigeria	45	1914–2021	The Gambia	117	1900–2021
North Korea	41	1945–2021	Timor-Leste	74	1900–2021
North Macedonia	176	1991–2021	Togo	134	1916–2021
Norway	186	1789–2021	Trinidad and Tobago	135	1900–2021
Oldenburg	364	1789–1867	Tunisia	98	1789–2021
Oman	187	1789–2021	Turkey	99	1789–2021
Pakistan	29	1947–2021	Turkmenistan	136	1990–2021
Palestine/British Mandate	209	1918–1948	Tuscany	354	1789–1861
Palestine/Gaza	138	1948–2021	Two Sicilies	356	1789–1860
Palestine/West Bank	128	1948–2021	Uganda	50	1900–2021
Panama	92	1903–2021	Ukraine	100	1990–2021
Papal States	361	1789–1870	United Arab Emirates	207	1971–2021
Papua New Guinea	93	1900–2021	United Kingdom	101	1789–2021
Paraguay	189	1811–2021	United States of America	20	1789–2021
Parma	352	1789–1859	Uruguay	102	1825–2021
Peru	30	1789–2021	Uzbekistan	140	1789–2021
Philippines	46	1900–2021	Vanuatu	206	1906–2021
Piedmont-Sardinia	373	1789–1861	Venezuela	51	1789–2021
Poland	17	1789–2021	Vietnam	34	1945–2021
Portugal	21	1789–2021	Württemberg	355	1789–1871
Qatar	94	1900–2021	Yemen	14	1789–2021
Republic of the Congo	112	1903–2021	Zambia	61	1911–2021
Republic of Vietnam	35	1802–1975	Zanzibar	236	1856–2021
Romania	190	1789–2021	Zimbabwe	62	1900–2021
Russia	11	1789–2021	.	.	.
Rwanda	129	1916–2021	<b>Total number of countries</b>	<b>202</b>	

## 1.7 Identifier Variables in the V-Dem Datasets

### 1.7.1 Country Name (`country_name`)

Name of coded country. A V-Dem country is a political unit enjoying at least some degree of functional and/or formal sovereignty. For more details on country units consult the V-Dem *Country Coding Units* document.

*Response: Text.*

### 1.7.2 Time-Specific Country Name (`histname`)

Time-specific name of coded country. Many countries go by different names in different time-periods, for example due to name changes, changes in territory, colonization, occupation, or independence. This variable contains a brief description of the identity of each polity that comprises a country's history. This variable is based on the V-Dem *Country Coding Units* document.

*Response: Text.*

### 1.7.3 V-Dem Country ID (`country_id`)

Unique country ID designated for each country. A list of countries and their corresponding IDs used in the V-Dem dataset can be found in the country table in the codebook, as well as in the V-Dem *Country Coding Units* document.

*Response: Numeric.*

### 1.7.4 Country Name Abbreviation (`country_text_id`)

Abbreviated country names.

*Response: Text.*

### 1.7.5 Year (`year`)

V-Dem year coded annually from 1789-2021. This variable is included in the V-Dem Country Year as well as Country Date datasets.

*Response: Date.*

### 1.7.6 Historical Date (`historical_date`)

This variable is included in the V-Dem Country Date dataset. The default date is December 31st, as in 2021-12-31, referring to the time span from 01-01 to 12-31 in a respective year. Additionally, specific changes, such as the appointment of a Head of State, are coded on the specific date within a certain year. Thus, a code can change within a year, and will be reflected in the 12-31 date.

*Response: Date.*

### 1.7.7 Start of Coding Period (`codingstart`)

V-Dem country coding starts in 1789, or from when a country first enjoyed at least some degree of functional and/or formal sovereignty. For detailed information, please see the V-Dem *Country Coding Units* document.

*Response: Date.*

### 1.7.8 Contemporary Start of Coding Period (`codingstart_contemp`)

This variable indicates the coding start for the countries coded by Contemporary V-Dem.

*Response: Date.*

### 1.7.9 Historical Start of Coding Period (codingstart\_\_hist)

This variable indicates the coding start for the countries coded by Historical V-Dem.

*Response: Date.*

### 1.7.10 Gap in Coding Period Starts (gapstart)

Time periods when a country does not fulfill V-Dem's coding period criteria are not coded. The date that indicates the gap start is the last date coded before the gap. For more details about V-Dem country coding periods, please see the V-Dem *Country Coding Units* document.

*Response: Date.*

### 1.7.11 Gap in Coding Period Ends (gapend)

The periods of when a country does not fulfill V-Dem's coding period criteria are not coded. The date that indicates the gap end is the first date coded after the gap. For more details about V-Dem country coding periods, please see the V-Dem *Country Coding Units* document.

*Response: Date.*

### 1.7.12 Gap index (gap\_index)

An index for each country and continuous non-gap, i.e. it is reasonable for interpolation to interpolate only within the same gap index. For more details about V-Dem country coding periods, please see the V-Dem *Country Coding Units* document.

*Response: Numeric.*

### 1.7.13 End of Coding Period (codingend)

V-Dem country coding ends in 2021, or from when a country formally stopped enjoying at least some degree of functional and/or formal sovereignty. For detailed information, please see the V-Dem *Country Coding Units* document.

*Response: Date.*

### 1.7.14 Historical End of Coding Period (codingend\_\_contemp)

This variable indicates when the coding ends for countries coded by the Contemporary V-Dem project.

*Response: Date.*

### 1.7.15 Historical End of Coding Period (codingend\_\_hist)

This variable indicates when the coding ends for countries coded by the Historical V-Dem Project.

*Response: Date.*

### 1.7.16 V-Dem Project (project)

This variable indicates which V-Dem project coded that country-year: Contemporary V-Dem (0), Historical V-Dem (1), or both (2).

### 1.7.17 Historical V-Dem coding (historical)

This variable indicates if the Historical V-Dem project coded a country at any time: No (0), Yes (1).

### 1.7.18 COW Code (COWcode)

Correlates of War (COW) project country codes.

*Response: Numeric.*

*Citation: Correlates of War Project (2017).*

## 2 V-Dem Democracy Indices

### 2.1 V-Dem High-Level Democracy Indices

This section groups together macro-level indices that describe features of democracy at the highest (most abstract) level. Please see Appendix A for an overview of all indices, component-indices, and lower-level indices.

#### 2.1.1 Electoral democracy index (D) (`v2x_polyarchy`)

*Project Manager(s)*: Jan Teorell

*Additional versions*: `*_codelow`, `*_codehigh`, `*_sd`

*Question*: To what extent is the ideal of electoral democracy in its fullest sense achieved?

*Clarification*: The electoral principle of democracy seeks to embody the core value of making rulers responsive to citizens, achieved through electoral competition for the electorate's approval under circumstances when suffrage is extensive; political and civil society organizations can operate freely; elections are clean and not marred by fraud or systematic irregularities; and elections affect the composition of the chief executive of the country. In between elections, there is freedom of expression and an independent media capable of presenting alternative views on matters of political relevance. In the V-Dem conceptual scheme, electoral democracy is understood as an essential element of any other conception of representative democracy — liberal, participatory, deliberative, egalitarian, or some other.

*Scale*: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

*Source(s)*: `v2x_freexp_altinf` `v2x_frassoc_thick` `v2x_suffr` `v2xel_frefair` `v2x_elecoff`

*Data release*: 1-12. Release 1-5 used a different, preliminary aggregation formula.

*Aggregation*: The index is formed by taking the average of, on the one hand, the weighted average of the indices measuring freedom of association thick (`v2x_frassoc_thick`), clean elections (`v2xel_frefair`), freedom of expression (`v2x_freexp_altinf`), elected officials (`v2x_elecoff`), and suffrage (`v2x_suffr`) and, on the other, the five-way multiplicative interaction between those indices. This is half way between a straight average and strict multiplication, meaning the average of the two. It is thus a compromise between the two most well known aggregation formulas in the literature, both allowing partial "compensation" in one sub-component for lack of polyarchy in the others, but also punishing countries not strong in one sub-component according to the "weakest link" argument. The aggregation is done at the level of Dahl's sub-components with the one exception of the non-electoral component. The index is aggregated using this formula:

$$\begin{aligned}
 v2x\_polyarchy &= .5 * MPI + .5 * API \\
 &= .5 * (v2x\_elecoff * v2xel\_frefair * v2x\_frassoc\_thick * \\
 &\quad v2x\_suffr * v2x\_freexp\_altinf) \\
 &\quad + .5 * ((1/8) * v2x\_elecoff + (1/4) * v2xel\_frefair \\
 &\quad + (1/4) * v2x\_frassoc\_thick + (1/8) * v2x\_suffr \\
 &\quad + (1/4) * v2x\_freexp\_altinf)
 \end{aligned}$$

*Citation*: Teorell *et al.* (2019); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years*: 1789-2021

### 2.1.2 Liberal democracy index (D) (v2x\_libdem)

*Project Manager(s):* Jan Teorell

*Additional versions:* \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

*Question:* To what extent is the ideal of liberal democracy achieved?

*Clarification:* The liberal principle of democracy emphasizes the importance of protecting individual and minority rights against the tyranny of the state and the tyranny of the majority. The liberal model takes a "negative" view of political power insofar as it judges the quality of democracy by the limits placed on government. This is achieved by constitutionally protected civil liberties, strong rule of law, an independent judiciary, and effective checks and balances that, together, limit the exercise of executive power. To make this a measure of liberal democracy, the index also takes the level of electoral democracy into account.

*Scale:* Interval, from low to high (0-1).

*Source(s):* v2x\_liberal v2x\_polyarchy

*Data release:* 1-12. Release 1, 2, and 3 used a different, preliminary aggregation formula.

*Aggregation:* The index is aggregated using this formula:

$$v2x\_libdem = .25 * v2x\_polyarchy^{1.585} + .25 * v2x\_liberal + .5 * v2x\_polyarchy^{1.585} * v2x\_liberal$$

*Citation:* Coppedge *et al.* (2015, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2015:6); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

### 2.1.3 Participatory democracy index (D) (v2x\_partipdem)

*Project Manager(s):* Jan Teorell

*Additional versions:* \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

*Question:* To what extent is the ideal of participatory democracy achieved?

*Clarification:* The participatory principle of democracy emphasizes active participation by citizens in all political processes, electoral and non-electoral. It is motivated by uneasiness about a bedrock practice of electoral democracy: delegating authority to representatives. Thus, direct rule by citizens is preferred, wherever practicable. This model of democracy thus takes suffrage for granted, emphasizing engagement in civil society organizations, direct democracy, and subnational elected bodies. To make it a measure of participatory democracy, the index also takes the level of electoral democracy into account.

*Scale:* Interval, from low to high (0-1).

*Source(s):* v2x\_polyarchy v2x\_partip

*Data release:* 1-12. Release 1-3 used a different, preliminary aggregation formula.

*Aggregation:* The index is aggregated using this formula:

$$v2x\_partipdem = .25 * v2x\_polyarchy^{1.585} + .25 * v2x\_partip + .5 * v2x\_polyarchy^{1.585} * v2x\_partip$$

*Citation:* Coppedge *et al.* (2015, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2015:6); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

### 2.1.4 Deliberative democracy index (D) (v2x\_delibdem)

*Project Manager(s):* Jan Teorell

*Additional versions:* \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

*Question:* To what extent is the ideal of deliberative democracy achieved?

*Clarification:* The deliberative principle of democracy focuses on the process by which decisions are reached in a polity. A deliberative process is one in which public reasoning focused on the common good motivates political decisions—as contrasted with emotional appeals, solidary attachments, parochial interests, or coercion. According to this principle, democracy requires more than an aggregation of existing preferences. There should also be respectful dialogue

at all levels—from preference formation to final decision—among informed and competent participants who are open to persuasion. To make it a measure of not only the deliberative principle but also of democracy, the index also takes the level of electoral democracy into account.

*Scale:* Interval, from low to high (0-1).

*Source(s):* v2xdl\_delib v2x\_polyarchy

*Data release:* 1-12. Release 1-3 used a different, preliminary aggregation formula.

*Aggregation:* The index is aggregated using this formula:

$$v2x\_delibdem = .25 * v2x\_polyarchy^{1.585} + .25 * v2xdl\_delib + .5 * v2x\_polyarchy^{1.585} * v2xdl\_delib$$

*Citation:* Coppedge *et al.* (2015, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2015:6); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2021

### 2.1.5 Egalitarian democracy index (D) (v2x\_egaldem)

*Project Manager(s):* Rachel Sigman, Staffan Lindberg

*Additional versions:* \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

*Question:* To what extent is the ideal of egalitarian democracy achieved?

*Clarification:* The egalitarian principle of democracy holds that material and immaterial inequalities inhibit the exercise of formal rights and liberties, and diminish the ability of citizens from all social groups to participate. Egalitarian democracy is achieved when 1 rights and freedoms of individuals are protected equally across all social groups; and 2 resources are distributed equally across all social groups; 3 groups and individuals enjoy equal access to power. To make it a measure of egalitarian democracy, the index also takes the level of electoral democracy into account.

*Scale:* Interval, from low to high (0-1).

*Source(s):* v2x\_egal v2x\_polyarchy

*Data release:* 1-12. Release 1-4 used a different, preliminary aggregation formula.

*Aggregation:* The index is aggregated using this formula:

$$v2x\_egaldem = .25 * v2x\_polyarchy^{1.585} + .25 * v2x\_egal + .5 * v2x\_polyarchy^{1.585} * v2x\_egal$$

*Citation:* Sigman *et al.* (2015, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2015:22); Coppedge *et al.* 2015, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2015:6; *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2021

## 2.2 V-Dem Mid-Level Indices: Components of the Democracy Indices

This section includes the V-Dem mid-level indices, subcomponents of the V-Dem Democracy Indices presented in section 2.1. Please see Appendix A for an overview of all indices, component-indices, and lower-level indices.

### 2.2.1 Additive polyarchy index (D) (v2x\_api)

*Project Manager(s):* Jan Teorell

*Additional versions:* \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

*Question:* To what extent is the electoral principle of democracy achieved?

*Clarification:* The electoral principle of democracy seeks to achieve responsiveness and accountability between leaders and citizens through the mechanism of competitive elections. This is presumed to be achieved when suffrage is extensive; political and civil society organizations can operate freely; elections are clean and not marred by fraud or systematic irregularities; and the chief executive of a country is selected directly or indirectly through elections.

*Scale:* Interval, from low to high (0-1).

*Source(s):* v2x\_frassoc\_thick v2x\_suffr v2xel\_frefair v2x\_elecoff v2x\_freexp\_altinf

*Data release:* 6-12.

*Aggregation:* The index is operationalized by taking the weighted average of the indices measuring freedom of association thick (v2x\_frassoc\_thick), clean elections (v2xel\_frefair), freedom of expression (v2x\_freexp\_altinf), elected executive (v2x\_elecoff), and suffrage (v2x\_suffr). The weights are constructed so as to sum to 1 and weigh elected executive and suffrage half as much as the other three, respectively.

The index is aggregated using this formula:

$$v2x\_api = (1/4) * v2x\_frassoc\_thick + (1/4) * v2xel\_frefair + (1/4) * v2x\_freexp\_altinf + (1/8) * v2x\_elecoff + (1/8) * v2x\_suffr$$

*Citation:* Teorell *et al.* (2019); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

### 2.2.2 Multiplicative polyarchy index (D) (v2x\_mpi)

*Project Manager(s):* Jan Teorell

*Additional versions:* \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

*Question:* To what extent is the electoral principle of democracy achieved?

*Clarification:* The electoral principle of democracy seeks to achieve responsiveness and accountability between leaders and citizens through the mechanism of competitive elections. This is presumed to be achieved when suffrage is extensive; political and civil society organizations can operate freely; elections are clean and not marred by fraud or systematic irregularities; and the chief executive of a country is selected directly or indirectly through elections.

*Scale:* Interval, from low to high (0-1).

*Source(s):* v2x\_frassoc\_thick v2x\_suffr v2xel\_frefair v2x\_elecoff v2x\_freexp\_altinf

*Data release:* 6-12.

*Aggregation:* The electoral component index is operationalized as a chain defined by its weakest link. Specifically, the index is formed by multiplying indices measuring freedom of association thick (v2x\_frassoc\_thick), clean elections (v2xel\_frefair), freedom of expression (v2x\_freexp\_altinf), elected executive (v2x\_elecoff), and suffrage (v2x\_suffr), or

$$v2x\_mpi = v2x\_frassoc\_thick * v2xel\_frefair * v2x\_freexp\_altinf * v2x\_elecoff * v2x\_suffr$$

*Citation:* Teorell *et al.* (2019); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

### 2.2.3 Freedom of Expression and Alternative Sources of Information index (D) (v2x\_freexp\_altinf)

*Project Manager(s):* Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell

*Additional versions:* \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

*Question:* To what extent does government respect press and media freedom, the freedom of ordinary people to discuss political matters at home and in the public sphere, as well as the freedom of academic and cultural expression?

*Clarification:* This index includes all variables in the two indices v2x\_freexp and v2xme\_altinf.

*Scale:* Interval, from low to high (0-1).

*Source(s):* v2mecenefm v2meharjrn v2meslfcen v2xcl\_disc v2clacfree v2mebias v2mecrit v2merange

*Data release:* 4-12.

*Aggregation:* The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for media censorship effort (v2mecenefm), harassment of journalists (v2meharjrn), media bias (v2mebias), media self-censorship (v2meslfcen), print/broadcast



media critical (v2mecrit), and print/broadcast media perspectives (v2merange), freedom of discussion for men/women (v2cldiscm, v2cldiscw), and freedom of academic and cultural expression (v2clacfree).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

#### 2.2.4 Freedom of association thick index (D) (v2x\_frassoc\_thick)

*Project Manager(s):* Allen Hicken, Michael Bernhard, Jan Teorell

*Additional versions:* \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

*Question:* To what extent are parties, including opposition parties, allowed to form and to participate in elections, and to what extent are civil society organizations able to form and to operate freely?

*Scale:* Interval, from low to high (0-1).

*Source(s):* v2psparban v2psbars v2psoppaut v2elmulpar v2cseeorgs v2csreprss v2x\_elecreg

*Data release:* 1-12. Release 1-3 used a different aggregation formula for the thinner index v2x\_frassoc.

*Aggregation:* The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for party ban (v2psparban), barriers to parties (v2psbars), opposition parties autonomy (v2psoppaut), elections multiparty (v2elmulpar), CSO entry and exit (v2cseeorgs) and CSO repression (v2csreprss). Since the multiparty elections indicator is only observed in election years, its values have first been repeated within election regime periods as defined by v2x\_elecreg.

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

#### 2.2.5 Share of population with suffrage (D) (v2x\_suffr)

*Project Manager(s):* Svend-Erik Skaaning

*Question:* What share of adult citizens as defined by statute has the legal right to vote in national elections?

*Clarification:* This question does not take into consideration restrictions based on age, residence, having been convicted for crime, or being legally incompetent. It covers legal *de jure* restrictions, not restrictions that may be operative in practice *de facto*. The adult population as defined by statute is defined by citizens in the case of independent countries or the people living in the territorial entity in the case of colonies. Universal suffrage is coded as 100%. Universal male suffrage only is coded as 50%. Years before electoral provisions are introduced are scored 0%. The scores do not reflect whether an electoral regime was interrupted or not. Only if new constitutions, electoral laws, or the like explicitly introduce new regulations of suffrage, the scores were adjusted accordingly if the changes suggested doing so. If qualifying criteria other than gender apply such as property, tax payments, income, literacy, region, race, ethnicity, religion, and/or 'economic independence', estimates have been calculated by combining information on the restrictions with different kinds of statistical information on population size, age distribution, wealth distribution, literacy rates, size of ethnic groups, etc., secondary country-specific sources, and — in the case of very poor information — the conditions in similar countries or colonies. The scores reflect *de jure* provisions of suffrage extension in percentage of the adult population. If the suffrage law is revised in a way that affects the extension, the scores reflect this change as of the calendar year the law was enacted.

*Responses:*

Percent.

*Scale:* Interval, from low to high (0-1).

*Source(s):* v2elsuffrage



*Data release:* 1-12.

*Aggregation:* v2elsuffrage/100

*Country-Year Aggregation:* Last

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

### 2.2.6 Clean elections index (D) (v2xel\_frefair)

*Project Manager(s):* Staffan Lindberg, Jan Teorell

*Additional versions:* \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

*Question:* To what extent are elections free and fair?

*Clarification:* Free and fair connotes an absence of registration fraud, systematic irregularities, government intimidation of the opposition, vote buying, and election violence.

*Scale:* Interval, from low to high (0-1).

*Source(s):* v2elembaut v2elembcap v2elrgstry v2elvotbuy v2elirreg v2elintim v2elpeace v2elfrfair v2x\_elecreg

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Aggregation:* The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for EMB autonomy (v2elembaut), EMB capacity (v2elembcap), election voter registry (v2elrgstry), election vote buying (v2elvotbuy), election other voting irregularities (v2elirreg), election government intimidation (v2elintim), non-state electoral violence (v2elpeace), and election free and fair (v2elfrfair). Since the bulk of these indicators are only observed in election years, the index scores have then been repeated within election regime periods as defined by v2x\_elecreg. If a country is recorded as an electoral regime (v2x\_elecreg) at the beginning of the time series until the first election that we record, then the scores for this election are backfilled towards the beginning of the time series.

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

### 2.2.7 Elected officials index (D) (v2x\_elecoff)

*Project Manager(s):* Jan Teorell

*Question:* Is the chief executive and legislature appointed through popular elections?

*Clarification:* This index attempts to measure (a) whether the chief executive is elected, either directly elected through popular elections or indirectly through a popularly elected legislature that then appoints the chief executive; and (b) whether the legislature, in presidential systems with a directly elected president that is also chief executive, is directly or indirectly elected. Note that a popular election is minimally defined and also includes sham elections with limited suffrage and no competition. Similarly, "appointment" by legislature only implies selection and/or approval, not the power to dismiss. This index is useful primarily for aggregating higher-order indices and should not necessarily be interpreted as an important element of democracy in its own right.

*Scale:* Interval.

*Source(s):* v2ex\_elechos v2ex\_elechog v2exdfcbhs\_rec v2ex\_hosw v2xex\_elecleg v2lgbicam v2lgello v2lgelecup v2lginello v2lginelup v2exaphos v2exapathhs v2exaphogp v2exapathhg v2exdjcbhg v2exdfdmhs v2exdfdsgh v2exhoshog v2exapupap v2exapup

*Data release:* 1-12. 1-3 preliminary aggregation formula, 4-6 as v2x\_accex, 7 renamed to v2x\_elecoff and modified aggregation, 8.

*Aggregation:* The index is formed in two steps. First, there are six different chains of appointment/selection to take into account in constructing this index, all of which are scaled to vary from 0 to 1. First, whether the head of state is directly elected  $a = 1$  or not  $a = 0$ . Second, the extent to which the legislature is popularly elected  $b$ . If the legislature is unicameral,  $b$  is measured as the proportion of legislators directly elected + half of the

proportion that are indirectly elected. If the legislature is bicameral and the upper house is involved in the appointment of the chief executive, the same proportion of directly and half of the indirectly elected legislators is calculated for the upper house; the scores for the lower and upper houses are then averaged. Third, whether the head of state is appointed by the legislature, or the approval of the legislature is necessary for the appointment of the head of state  $c1 = 1$ , otherwise 0. Fourth, whether the head of government is appointed by the legislature, or the approval of the legislature is necessary for the appointment of the head of government  $c2 = 1$ , otherwise 0. Fifth, whether the head of government is appointed by the head of state  $d = 1$  or not  $d = 0$ . Sixth, whether the head of government is directly elected  $e = 1$  or not  $e = 0$ .

In the second step, the extent to which the legislature is elected (b) is also independently taken into account in order to penalize presidential systems with unelected legislatures, or legislatures with a large share of presidential appointees, for example.

Define  $hosw$  as the weight for the head of state. If the head of state is also head of government  $v2exhoshog = 1$ ,  $hosw = 1$ . If the head of state has more power than the head of government over the appointment and dismissal of cabinet ministers, then  $hosw = 1$ ; if the reverse is true,  $hosw = 0$ . If they share equal power,  $hosw = .5$ . Define the weight for the head of government as  $hogw = 1 - hosw$ . The formula then is:

$$v2x\_elecoff = hosw \times \max(a1, b \times c1) + hogw \times \max(a \times d, b \times c1 \times d, e, b \times c2),$$

unless the head of state is directly elected ( $v2ex\_elechos = 1$ ) and the chief executive ( $v2ex\_hosw = 1$ ), in case of which:

$$v2x\_elecoff = [hosw \times \max(a1, b \times c1) + hogw \times \max(a \times d, b \times c1 \times d, e, b \times c2) + b]/2)$$

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

### 2.2.8 Liberal component index (D) (v2x\_liberal)

*Project Manager(s):* Jan Teorell

*Additional versions:* \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

*Question:* To what extent is the liberal principle of democracy achieved?

*Clarification:* The liberal principle of democracy emphasizes the importance of protecting individual and minority rights against the tyranny of the state and the tyranny of the majority. The liberal model takes a "negative" view of political power insofar as it judges the quality of democracy by the limits placed on government. This is achieved by constitutionally protected civil liberties, strong rule of law, an independent judiciary, and effective checks and balances that, together, limit the exercise of executive power.

*Scale:* Interval, from low to high (0-1).

*Source(s):* v2xcl\_rol v2x\_jucon v2xlg\_legcon v2lgbicam

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Aggregation:* This index is formed by averaging the following indices: equality before the law and individual liberties (v2xcl\_rol), judicial constraints on the executive (v2x\_jucon), and legislative constraints on the executive (v2xlg\_legcon). Prior to the calculation v2xlg\_legcon gets set to 0 whenever v2lgbicam is 0.

*Citation:* Coppedge *et al.* (2015, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2015:6); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

### 2.2.9 Equality before the law and individual liberty index (D) (v2xcl\_rol)

*Project Manager(s):* Jan Teorell

*Additional versions:* \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

*Question:* To what extent are laws transparent and rigorously enforced and public administration impartial, and to what extent do citizens enjoy access to justice, secure property rights, freedom from forced labor, freedom of movement, physical integrity rights, and freedom of religion?

*Scale:* Interval, from low to high (0-1).

*Source(s):* v2clrspct v2cltrnslw v2xcl\_acjst v2xcl\_prpty v2cltort v2clkill v2xcl\_slave v2clreliq v2clfmov v2xcl\_dmove

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Aggregation:* The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for rigorous and impartial public administration (v2clrspct), transparent laws with predictable enforcement (v2cltrnslw), access to justice for men/women (v2clacjstm, v2clacjstw), property rights for men/women (v2clprptym, v2clprptyw), freedom from torture (v2cltort), freedom from political killings (v2clkill), from forced labor for men/women (v2clslavem v2clslavef), freedom of religion (v2clreliq), freedom of foreign movement (v2clfmov), and freedom of domestic movement for men/women (v2cldmovem, v2cldmovew).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

### 2.2.10 Judicial constraints on the executive index (D) (v2x\_juon)

*Project Manager(s):* Jan Teorell

*Additional versions:* \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

*Question:* To what extent does the executive respect the constitution and comply with court rulings, and to what extent is the judiciary able to act in an independent fashion?

*Scale:* Interval, from low to high (0-1).

*Source(s):* v2exrescon v2jucomp v2juhccomp v2juhcind v2juncind

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Aggregation:* The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for executive respects constitution (v2exrescon), compliance with judiciary (v2jucomp), compliance with high court (v2juhccomp), high court independence (v2juhcind), and lower court independence (v2juncind).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

### 2.2.11 Legislative constraints on the executive index (D) (v2xlg\_legcon)

*Project Manager(s):* Jan Teorell

*Additional versions:* \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

*Question:* To what extent are the legislature and government agencies *e.g.*, comptroller general, general prosecutor, or ombudsman capable of questioning, investigating, and exercising oversight over the executive?

*Scale:* Interval, from low to high (0-1).

*Source(s):* v2lgqstexp v2lgotovst v2lginvstp v2lgoppart

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Aggregation:* The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for legislature questions officials in practice (v2lgqstexp), executive oversight (v2lgotovst), legislature investigates in practice (v2lginvstp), and legislature opposition parties (v2lgoppart).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

*Convergence:* Model parameters with convergence issues: intercept.

### 2.2.12 Participatory component index (D) (v2x\_\_partip)

*Project Manager(s):* Jan Teorell

*Additional versions:* \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

*Question:* To what extent is the participatory principle achieved?

*Clarification:* The participatory principle of democracy emphasizes active participation by citizens in all political processes, electoral and non-electoral. It is motivated by uneasiness about a bedrock practice of electoral democracy: delegating authority to representatives. Thus, direct rule by citizens is preferred, wherever practicable. This model of democracy thus takes suffrage for granted, emphasizing engagement in civil society organizations, direct democracy, and subnational elected bodies.

*Scale:* Interval, from low to high (0-1).

*Source(s):* v2x\_cspart v2xdd\_dd v2xel\_locelec v2xel\_regelec

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Aggregation:* This index is formed by averaging the following indices: civil society participation (v2x\_cspart), elected local government power (v2xel\_locelec) or elected regional government power (v2xel\_regelec) — whichever has higher score — and direct popular vote (v2xdd\_dd).

*Citation:* Coppedge *et al.* (2015, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2015:6); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

### 2.2.13 Civil society participation index (D) (v2x\_\_cspart)

*Project Manager(s):* Michael Bernhard

*Additional versions:* \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

*Question:* Are major CSOs routinely consulted by policymakers; how large is the involvement of people in CSOs; are women prevented from participating; and is legislative candidate nomination within party organization highly decentralized or made through party primaries?

*Clarification:* The sphere of civil society lies in the public space between the private sphere and the state. Here, citizens organize in groups to pursue their collective interests and ideals. We call these groups civil society organizations CSOs. CSOs include, but are by no means limited to, interest groups, labor unions, spiritual organizations if they are engaged in civic or political activities, social movements, professional associations, charities, and other non-governmental organizations.

The core civil society index CCSI is designed to provide a measure of a robust civil society, understood as one that enjoys autonomy from the state and in which citizens freely and actively pursue their political and civic goals, however conceived.

*Scale:* Interval, from low to high (0-1).

*Source(s):* v2pscnslnl v2cscnsult v2csptrcpt v2csgender

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Aggregation:* The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for candidate selection — national/local (v2pscnslnl), CSO consultation (v2cscnsult), CSO participatory environment (v2csptrcpt), and CSO women participation (v2csgender).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

### 2.2.14 Direct popular vote index (D) (v2xdd\_\_dd)

*Project Manager(s):* David Altman

*Question:* To what extent is the direct popular vote utilized?

*Clarification:* Direct popular voting refers here to an institutionalized process by which citizens of a region or country register their choice or opinion on specific issues through a ballot. It is intended to embrace initiatives, referendums, and plebiscites, as those terms are usually understood. It captures some aspects of the more general concept of direct democracy at the national level. The term does not encompass recall elections, deliberative assemblies, or settings in which the vote is not secret or the purview is restricted. Likewise, it does not apply to elections for representatives.

*Scale:* Interval, from low to high (0-1).

*Source(s):* v2ddlexci v2ddsigpci v2ddsiglci v2ddsigdci v2ddpartci v2ddapprci v2ddspmc  
v2ddadmci v2ddyrci v2ddlexrf v2ddsigprf v2ddsigdrf v2ddpartrf v2ddapprrf v2ddspmr  
v2ddadmrf v2ddyrrf v2ddpartpl v2ddapprpl v2ddspmpl v2ddadmpl v2ddlexpl v2ddyrpl  
v2ddlexor v2ddpartor v2ddappor v2ddspmor v2ddadmor v2ddyror v2ddthreor v2ddthrerf  
v2ddthrepl

*Data release:* 1-12. New aggregation formula in version 7.

*Aggregation:* This index results from the addition of the weighted scores of each type of popular votes studied (popular initiatives  $\times 1.5$ , referendums  $\times 1.5$ , plebiscites, and obligatory referendums). Each type of popular vote receives a maximum score of two resulting from the addition of two terms (easiness of initiation and easiness of approval), where each term obtains a maximum value of one. As we are studying four types of popular votes, the minimum value is 0, and the maximum is 8. In the v2xdd\_dd all scores are normalized to range between 0 and 1. For an elaboration of the weighting factor of each component, see: Altman, David. 2017.

The index is aggregated using this formula:

$$v2xdd\_dd = (v2xdd\_i\_ci) \times 1.5 + (v2xdd\_i\_rf) \times 1.5 \\ + (v2xdd\_i\_pl) + (v2xdd\_i\_or)$$

Regarding each type of citizen initiated popular vote (i.e., popular initiative), the ease of initiation is measured by (a) the existence of a direct democracy process (v2ddlexci), (b) the number of signatures needed (v2ddsigpci), and (c) time-limits to circulate the signatures (v2ddsigdci). Easiness of approval is measured by the surface of the polygon determined by (a) participation quorum (v2ddsigdci), (b) approval quorum (v2ddpartci), and (c) supermajority (v2ddspmc). The resulting score is then multiplied with (d) district majority (v2ddadmci). Consequences are measured by (a) the legal status of the decision made by citizens (binding or merely consultative) (v2ddlexci), and (b) the frequency and degree of success with which direct popular votes have been held in the past (v2ddthreor). The index is aggregated using this formula:

$$\begin{aligned}
 v2xdd\_dd &= [(IF \ v2ddlexci > 0, 1, 0) \times (1 - (v2ddsigpci)) \times (IF \ v2ddsigdci \\
 &= 0, 1, .5 + (2 \times v2ddsigdci/365)) + \\
 &(v2ddsigdci) \cap (v2ddpartci) \cap (v2ddspmc i)] \\
 &\times (0.5 + ((100 - v2ddadmci)/100))/2] \\
 &\times (IF \ v2ddlexci = 2, 1, IF \ v2ddlexci = 1, 0.75, v2ddlexci = 0, 0) \\
 &\times (IF \ years \ since \ last \ successful \ event < 6, \\
 &v2ddthreci = 1, afterwards \ decreases \ by \ 0.06 \ units \ per \ year \\
 &until \ 0.1; \ if \ the \ event \ was \ not \ successful \\
 &during \ the \ first \ years \ v2ddapprci \\
 &= 0.9, afterwards \ decreases \ by \ 0.1 \ units \ per \ year \ until \ 0.1)
 \end{aligned}$$

In case the vote originates from above (i.e., authorities), there is no need to account for  $v2ddsigpci$  and  $v2ddsigdci$ . For an elaboration of the interaction among quorums,  $(v2ddsigdci) \cap (v2ddpartci) \cap (v2ddspmc i)$ , see Altman, David. 2017.

*Country–Year Aggregation:* Last

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900–2021

### 2.2.15 Local government index (D) (v2xel\_locelec)

*Project Manager(s):* Kelly McMann, Jan Teorell

*Additional versions:* \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

*Question:* Are there elected local governments, and — if so — to what extent can they operate without interference from unelected bodies at the local level?

*Clarification:* The lowest score would be reserved for a country that has no elected local governments. A medium score would be accorded a country that has elected local governments but where those governments are subordinate to unelected officials at the local level perhaps appointed by a higher-level body. A high score would be accorded to a country in which local governments are elected and able to operate without restrictions from unelected actors at the local level with the exception of judicial bodies. Naturally, local governments remain subordinate to the regional and national governments.

*Scale:* Interval, from low to high (0–1).

*Source(s):* v2ellocelc v2ellocpwr v2ellogov

*Data release:* 1–12.

*Aggregation:* First, local government elected (v2ellocelc) is recoded so that 0=none elected, 1=only executive elected, 2=only assembly elected, and 3=both elected.

This new construct is then scaled to vary from 0–1 and multiplied by local offices relative power (v2ellocpwr) scaled to vary from 0–1. v2xel\_locelec is set to 0 whenever v2ellogov is 0 (there is no local government).

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

### 2.2.16 Regional government index (D) (v2xel\_regelec)

*Project Manager(s):* Kelly McMann, Jan Teorell

*Additional versions:* \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

*Question:* Are there elected regional governments, and — if so — to what extent can they operate without interference from unelected bodies at the regional level?

*Clarification:* The lowest score would be reserved for a country that has no elected regional governments. A medium score would be accorded a country that has elected regional governments but where those governments are subordinate to unelected officials at the regional level perhaps appointed by a higher-level body. A high score would be accorded to a country in which regional governments are elected and able to operate without restrictions from unelected actors at the regional level with the exception of judicial bodies. Naturally, regional governments remain subordinate to the national government.

*Scale:* Interval, from low to high (0-1).

*Source(s):* v2elsrgel v2elrgpwr v2elreggov

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Aggregation:* First, regional government elected (v2elsrgel) is recoded so that 0=none elected, 1=only executive elected, 2=only assembly elected, and 3=both elected.

This new construct is then scaled to vary from 0-1 and multiplied by regional offices relative power (v2elrgpwr) scaled to vary from 0-1. v2xel\_regelec is set to 0 whenever v2elreggov is 0 (there is no regional government).

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

### 2.2.17 Deliberative component index (D) (v2xdl\_delib)

*Project Manager(s):* Jan Teorell

*Additional versions:* \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

*Question:* To what extent is the deliberative principle of democracy achieved?

*Clarification:* The deliberative principle of democracy focuses on the process by which decisions are reached in a polity. A deliberative process is one in which public reasoning focused on the common good motivates political decisions—as contrasted with emotional appeals, solidary attachments, parochial interests, or coercion. According to this principle, democracy requires more than an aggregation of existing preferences. There should also be respectful dialogue at all levels—from preference formation to final decision—among informed and competent participants who are open to persuasion.

To measure these features of a polity we try to determine the extent to which political elites give public justifications for their positions on matters of public policy, justify their positions in terms of the public good, acknowledge and respect counter-arguments; and how wide the range of consultation is at elite levels.

*Scale:* Interval, from low to high (0-1).

*Source(s):* v2dlreason v2dlcommon v2dlcountr v2dlconslt v2dlengage

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Aggregation:* The index is formed by point estimates drawn from a Bayesian factor analysis model including the following indicators: reasoned justification (v2dlreason), common good justification (v2dlcommon), respect for counterarguments (v2dlcountr), range of consultation (v2dlconslt), and engaged society (v2dlengage).

*Citation:* Coppedge *et al.* (2015, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2015:6); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2021



*Convergence:* Model parameters with convergence issues: intercept.

### 2.2.18 Egalitarian component index (D) (v2x\_egal)

*Project Manager(s):* Rachel Sigman, Staffan Lindberg

*Additional versions:* \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

*Question:* To what extent is the egalitarian principle achieved?

*Clarification:* The egalitarian principle of democracy holds that material and immaterial inequalities inhibit the exercise of formal rights and liberties, and diminish the ability of citizens from all social groups to participate. Egalitarian democracy is achieved when 1 rights and freedoms of individuals are protected equally across all social groups; 2 resources are distributed equally across all social groups; and 3 access to power is equally distributed by gender, socioeconomic class and social group.

*Scale:* Interval, from low to high (0-1).

*Source(s):* v2xeg\_eqprotec v2xeg\_eqaccess v2xeg\_eqdr

*Data release:* 1-12. Release 1-4 used a different, preliminary aggregation formula, 5-8 modified aggregation formula including v2xeg\_eqaccess.

*Aggregation:* This index is formed by averaging the following indices: equal protection index (v2xeg\_eqprotec), equal access index (v2xeg\_eqaccess) and equal distribution of resources (v2xeg\_eqdr).

*Citation:* Sigman *et al.* (2015, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2015:22); Coppedge *et al.* 2015, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2015:6; *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2021

### 2.2.19 Equal protection index (D) (v2xeg\_eqprotec)

*Project Manager(s):* Rachel Sigman, Staffan Lindberg

*Additional versions:* \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

*Question:* How equal is the protection of rights and freedoms across social groups by the state?

*Clarification:* Equal protection means that the state grants and protects rights and freedoms evenly across social groups. To achieve equal protection of rights and freedoms, the state itself must not interfere in the ability of groups to participate and it must also take action to ensure that rights and freedoms of one social group are not threatened by the actions of another group or individual.

*Scale:* Interval, from low to high (0-1).

*Source(s):* v2clacjust v2clsocgrp v2clsnlpct

*Data release:* 5-12. Release 7 modified excluding v2xcl\_acjst.

*Aggregation:* The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for social class equality in respect for civil liberties (v2clacjust), social group equality in respect for civil liberties (v2clsocgrp) and percent of population with weaker civil liberties (v2clsnlpct); reversed scale.

*Citation:* Sigman *et al.* (2015, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2015:22); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

### 2.2.20 Equal access index (D) (v2xeg\_eqaccess)

*Project Manager(s):* Rachel Sigman, Staffan Lindberg

*Additional versions:* \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

*Question:* How equal is access to power?

*Clarification:* The Equal Access subcomponent is based on the idea that neither the protections of rights and freedoms nor the equal distribution of resources is sufficient to ensure adequate



representation. Ideally, all groups should enjoy equal *de facto* capabilities to participate, to serve in positions of political power, to put issues on the agenda, and to influence policymaking.

*Scale:* Interval, from low to high (0-1).

*Source(s):* v2pepwrngen v2pepwrSOC v2pepwrSES

*Data release:* 7-12.

*Aggregation:* The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators power distributed by socioeconomic position (v2pepwrSES), power distributed by social group (v2pepwrSOC), and power distributed by gender (v2pepwrngen).

*Citation:* Sigman and Lindberg (2017); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

### 2.2.21 Equal distribution of resources index (D) (v2xeg\_eqdr)

*Project Manager(s):* Rachel Sigman, Staffan Lindberg

*Additional versions:* \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

*Question:* How equal is the distribution of resources?

*Clarification:* This component measures the extent to which resources — both tangible and intangible — are distributed in society. An equal distribution of resources supports egalitarian democracy in two ways. First, lower poverty rates and the distribution of goods and services such as food, water, housing, education and healthcare ensure that all individuals are capable of participating in politics and government. In short, basic needs must be met in order for individuals to effectively exercise their rights and freedoms see, for example, Sen 1999, Maslow 1943. Second, high levels of resource inequality undermine the ability of poorer populations to participate meaningfully Aristotle, Dahl 2006. Thus, it is necessary to include not only measures of poverty and the distribution of goods and services, but also the levels of inequality in these distributions, and the proportion of the population who are not eligible for social services *i.e.* means-tests, particularistic distribution, etc.. This principle also implies that social or economic inequalities can translate into political inequalities, an issue addressed most notably by Walzer 1983, who argues that overlapping "spheres" of inequality are particularly harmful to society. To address these overlapping "spheres", this component also includes measures of the distribution of power in society amongst different socio-economic groups, genders, etc.

*Scale:* Interval, from low to high (0-1).

*Source(s):* v2dlencmps v2dlunivl v2peedueq v2pehealth

*Data release:* 5, 7-12. Release 7 modified: v2pepwrSES, v2pepwrSOC and v2pepwrngen now form a separate subcomponent index.

*Aggregation:* The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for particularistic or public goods v2dlencmps, means tested vs. universalistic welfare policies v2dlunivl, educational equality v2peedueq and health equality v2pehealth.

*Citation:* Sigman *et al.* (2015, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2015:22); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2021

### 3 V-Dem Indicators

This section lists all V-Dem variables by theme.

#### 3.1 Elections

##### Instructions to the coders (as shown in the surveys)

**Elections:** Among national elections we distinguish elections to: (i) the lower or unicameral chamber of the legislature (including constituent or constitutional assemblies), (ii) the upper chamber of the legislature, and (iii) the presidency. For present purposes an executive who is elected by a legislature is considered a *prime minister*, not a president. In order to be considered a *president*, an executive must, under ordinary circumstances, be chosen directly by the electorate (perhaps mediated by an electoral college).

**Non-election specific coding:** The following questions are not election-specific and should be coded for every year from 1900 (or when applicable) to the present.

**Election specific questions:** The following questions pertain to specific national elections. The date of each election is pre-coded. In cases where more than one election is held on the same day(s), the questions in this section are for all elections taking place on that date. If you have coded for V-Dem in the past, your previous scores will be displayed in the survey. You are welcome to revise previously submitted scores in all surveys. For this section, we kindly ask you make sure that you have coded all election years.

**Election specific questions – Historical clarification:** The following questions pertain to specific national elections. National elections include elections to the presidency (if applicable) and legislature (lower and upper house, whatever applies), whether direct or indirect, as well as constituent assembly elections. It does not include other elections, *e.g.*, subnational elections, plebiscites, initiatives, referendums, or by-elections. The date of each election is pre-coded. In cases where more than one election is held on the same day(s), the questions in this section are for all elections taking place on that date."

**Subnational elections and offices:** This section of the survey asks a small number of questions about *subnational* elections and offices. You will be instructed to identify two subnational levels, referred to as "regional government" and "local government". Questions in this section should be answered for every year, rather than for specific elections.

**Lower chamber election:** The following questions pertain to specific lower chamber or unicameral legislative elections. The dates of these elections have been pre-coded.

##### Executive and legislative versions of Election specific variables

- In order to subset election specific variables for executive elections only (previously \*\_ex) – keep only those observations where v2xel\_elecpres is 1.
- In order to subset election specific variables for legislative elections only (previously \*\_leg) – keep only those observations where v2xel\_elecparl is 1.

##### 3.1.0.1 Election type (A\*) (v2eltype)

*Project Manager(s):* Staffan I. Lindberg

*Question:* What type of election was held on this date?

*Clarification:* Choose all that apply. Whenever possible, specify the exact date of each election. If the election unfolds across more than one day, enter the date for the first day. If the precise date is unavailable, enter the first of the month; if the month is unknown, enter January 1.

Multiple-round elections (*e.g.*, two-round elections) are counted separately. (More than one election in a single year can be accommodated.)

*Responses:*

- 0: Legislative; lower, sole, or both chambers, first or only round. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2eltype\_0]
- 1: Legislative, lower, sole, or both chambers, second round. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2eltype\_1]
- 2: Legislative, upper chamber only, first or only round. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2eltype\_2] (Not yet coded)
- 3: Legislative, upper chamber only, second round. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2eltype\_3] (Not yet coded)
- 4: Constituent Assembly, first or only round. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2eltype\_4]
- 5: Constituent Assembly, second round. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2eltype\_5]
- 6: Presidential, first or only round. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2eltype\_6]
- 7: Presidential, second round. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2eltype\_7]
- 8: Metropolitan or supranational legislative, first or only round. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2eltype\_8] (Not yet coded)
- 9: Metropolitan or supranational legislative, second round. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2eltype\_9] (Not yet coded)

*Scale:* Series of dichotomous scales.

*Answer-type:* Multiple selection.

*Source(s):* NELDA (Hyde and Marinov 2012); Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections (IPU); IFES; IDEA; Reif (2011, 2012); Polity IV (Marshall, Jaggers 2007); *Keesings Records*; *CIA Factbook*; Wikipedia.

*Notes:* All direct elections and elections by an electoral college that is elected by the people and has the sole purpose of electing an executive or members of parliament are coded. Note that single-party elections, elections held under limited suffrage and for only parts of a parliament, as well as elections of which the results are subsequently cancelled are included. Elections for constituent assemblies that come to perform functions beyond drafting and adopting a new constitution (*e.g.* legislating, electing president, adopting budget, etc) are also included and coded under category 0 and 1 (Legislative; lower, sole, or both chambers; first or second round). Excluded are elections that are not decisive, i. e. when the HOS alone is selecting the candidate(s). The variable includes elections where results were declared invalid after the fact, *e.g.* by a constitutional court, since they also provide information on the quality of democracy.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Country-Year Aggregation:* Maximum

*Date specific:* Election-specific dates.

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

### 3.1.1 Suffrage

#### 3.1.1.1 Suffrage (A) (v2asuffrage)

*Project Manager(s):* Staffan I. Lindberg

*Question:* What is the approximate percentage of enfranchised adults older than the minimal voting age?

*Clarification:* This variable, in contrast to v2elsuffrage, covers *de facto* enfranchised adults and not *de jure*. For example, the scores reflect whether an electoral regime was interrupted or not. If an electoral regime is interrupted (see v2x\_elecreg), v2asuffrage is zero while v2elsuffrage may still be 100.

*Responses:*

Percent.

*Scale:* Interval.

*Source(s):* Bilinski (2015); Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections (IPU); Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); constituteproject.org; v2x\_elecreg.

*Data release:* 5-12.

*Country–Year Aggregation:* Day-weighted mean

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900–2021

### 3.1.1.2 Minimum voting age (A) (v2elage)

*Project Manager(s):* Pamela Paxton, Megan Reif

*Question:* What is the minimum age at which citizens are allowed to vote in national elections?

*Responses:*

Numeric.

*Scale:* Interval.

*Source(s):* IFES; IDEA; Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Furtak (1990); KRWE (1987–2012); KRWE/KCA (1931–1987); Mackie and Rose (1991); Posada-Carbó (1996); Paxton *et al.* (2003); CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012). See Reif GVED and Reif EDATES (2011, 2012 for additional country-specific sources).

*Data release:* 1–12.

*Country–Year Aggregation:* Maximum

*Date specific:* Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789–2021

### 3.1.1.3 Compulsory voting (A) (v2elcomvot)

*Project Manager(s):* Pamela Paxton

*Question:* Is voting compulsory (for those eligible to vote) in national elections?

*Responses:*

0: No.

1: Yes. But there are no sanctions or sanctions are not enforced.

2: Yes. Sanctions exist and are enforced, but they impose minimal costs upon the offending voter.

3: Yes. Sanctions exist, they are enforced, and they impose considerable costs upon the offending voter.

*Scale:* Ordinal.

*Source(s):* IDEA; Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Constitute Project; IPU Parline; V-Dem Country coordinators.

*Notes:* Converted from (B) to (A) coding.

*Data release:* 1–12.

*Country–Year Aggregation:* Last

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900–2021

### 3.1.1.4 Female suffrage restricted (A) (v2elfemrst)

*Project Manager(s):* Staffan I. Lindberg

*Question:* Are women eligible to vote in national elections?

*Clarification:* If there are no (direct) national elections, observations are not coded (missing).

*Responses:*

0: No female suffrage. No women are allowed to vote, but some or all males vote.

1: Restricted female suffrage. Some women are allowed to vote, and face more or different restrictions than men

2: Universal female suffrage. All women are allowed to vote.

*Scale:* Ordinal.

*Source(s):* Paxton *et al.* (2003); Paxton *et al.* (2008); Reif (GVED).

*Data release:* 1-6, 10-12.

*Country–Year Aggregation:* Maximum

*Date specific:* Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

### 3.1.1.5 Suffrage level (A) (v2elgvsuffvl)

*Project Manager(s):* Megan Reif

*Question:* What is the level of suffrage practiced?

*Clarification:* Note that this question applies to citizens only. Note also that we are interested in legal (*de jure*) restrictions, not restrictions that may be operative in practice (*de facto*). In cases where married people are allowed to vote at a younger age than single people, the higher (older) age minimum for single voters is given (see v2elage).

*Responses:*

- 0: Indirect suffrage and/or offices filled by appointment only
- 1: Propertied ethnic males
- 2: Ethnic males
- 3: Propertied/educated males
- 4: Ethnic males and females
- 5: Propertied/educated males and females
- 6: All males
- 7: Spatially variant
- 8: Universal
- 9: Occupational categories/Party membership
- 10: Only citizens of colonial metropole
- 11: Propertied/tax-paying colons and non-colons
- 12: Propertied males and military females
- 13: Propertied/landowning households
- 14: All households
- 15: All males and married Females
- 16: Age differential: Married people vote at younger age than single

*Scale:* Nominal.

*Source(s):* IFES; IDEA; Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Furtak (1990); KRWE (1987-2012); KRWE/KCA (1931-1987); Mackie and Rose (1991); Posada-Carbó (1996); IPU; [constituteproject.org](http://constituteproject.org). See Reif GVED and Reif EDATES (2011, 2012 for additional country-specific sources).

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Country–Year Aggregation:* Maximum

*Date specific:* Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2021

### 3.1.1.6 Percentage of population with suffrage (A) (v2elsuffrage)

*Project Manager(s):* Svend-Erik Skaaning

*Question:* What percentage (%) of adult citizens (as defined by statute) has the legal right to vote in national elections?

*Clarification:* This question does not take into consideration restrictions based on age, residence, having been convicted for crime, being in the military service or being legally incompetent. It covers legal (*de jure*) restrictions, not restrictions that may be operative in practice (*de facto*). The adult population (as defined by statute) is defined by citizens in the case of independent countries or the people living in the territorial entity in the case of colonies.

Universal suffrage is coded as 100%. Universal male suffrage is only coded as 50%. Years before electoral provisions are introduced are scored 0%. The scores do not reflect whether

an electoral regime was interrupted or not. Only if new constitutions, electoral laws, or the like explicitly introduce new regulations of suffrage, the scores were adjusted accordingly if the changes suggested doing so. If qualifying criteria other than gender apply (such as property, tax payments, income, literacy, region, race, ethnicity, religion, and/or 'economic independence'), estimates have been calculated by combining information on the restrictions with different kinds of statistical information (on population size, age distribution, wealth distribution, literacy rates, size of ethnic groups, etc.), secondary country-specific sources, and — in the case of very poor information — the conditions in similar countries or colonies.

The scores reflect *de jure* provisions of suffrage extension in percentage of the adult population. If the suffrage law is revised in a way that affects the extension, the scores reflect this change as of the calendar year the law was enacted.

*Responses:*

Percent.

*Scale:* Interval.

*Source(s):* CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012); IDEA; Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); country-specific sources.

*Notes:* In Version 3 of the dataset this variable was re-coded from scratch based on the modified criteria reflected in the clarification section (above).

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Country–Year Aggregation:* Day-weighted mean

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

#### 3.1.1.7 Fraud allegations by Western monitors (A) (v2elwestmon)

*Project Manager(s):* Staffan I. Lindberg

*Question:* Were there allegations of significant vote-fraud by any Western monitors?

*Clarification:* If there were no Western monitors, or no international monitors, this variable is coded as missing.

*Responses:*

0: No/Unclear

1: Yes

*Source(s):* NELDA 47 (Hyde and Marinov 2012); IDEA; websites by Western election monitors.

*Data release:* 5-12.

*Country–Year Aggregation:* Maximum

*Date specific:* Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1945-2021

#### 3.1.1.8 Female suffrage (A) (v2fsuffrage)

*Project Manager(s):* Staffan I. Lindberg

*Question:* What is the approximate percentage of enfranchised female adults older than the minimal voting age?

*Clarification:* This variable, in contrast to v2elsuffrage, covers *de facto* enfranchised adults and not *de jure*. For example, the scores reflect whether an electoral regime was interrupted or not. If an electoral regime is interrupted (see v2x\_elecereg), v2fsuffrage is zero while v2elsuffrage may still be 100.

*Responses:*

Percent.

*Scale:* Interval.

*Source(s):* Bilinski (2015); Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections (IPU); Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); constituteproject.org; v2x\_elecereg.

*Data release:* 5-12.

*Country–Year Aggregation:* Day-weighted mean

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2021

### 3.1.1.9 Male suffrage (A) (v2msuffrage)

*Project Manager(s):* Staffan I. Lindberg

*Question:* What is the approximate percentage of enfranchised male adults older than the minimal voting age?

*Clarification:* This variable, in contrast to v2elsuffrage, covers *de facto* enfranchised adults and not *de jure*. For example, the scores reflect whether an electoral regime was interrupted or not. If an electoral regime is interrupted (see v2x\_elecreg), v2msuffrage is zero while v2elsuffrage may still be 100.

*Responses:*

Percent.

*Scale:* Interval.

*Source(s):* Bilinski (2015); Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections (IPU); Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); constituteproject.org; v2x\_elecreg.

*Data release:* 5-12.

*Country–Year Aggregation:* Day-weighted mean

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2021

## 3.1.2 Election Qualities

### 3.1.2.1 Disclosure of campaign donations (C) (v2eldonate)

*Project Manager(s):* Staffan I. Lindberg

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* Are there disclosure requirements for donations to national election campaigns?

*Responses:*

0: No. There are no disclosure requirements.

1: Not really. There are some, possibly partial, disclosure requirements in place but they are not observed or enforced most of the time.

2: Ambiguous. There are disclosure requirements in place, but it is unclear to what extent they are observed or enforced.

3: Mostly. The disclosure requirements may not be fully comprehensive (some donations not covered), but most existing arrangements are observed and enforced.

4: Yes. There are comprehensive requirements and they are observed and enforced almost all the time.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

*Convergence:* Model parameters with convergence issues: universal thresholds, expert thresholds, main-country-coded thresholds.

### 3.1.2.2 Public campaign finance (C) (v2elpubfin)

*Project Manager(s):* Staffan I. Lindberg



*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* Is significant public financing available for parties' and/or candidates' campaigns for national office?

*Responses:*

- 0: No. Public financing is not available.
- 1: Little. There is public financing but it is so small or so restricted that it plays a minor role in most parties' campaigns.
- 2: Ambiguous. There is some public financing available but it is unclear whether it plays a significant role for parties.
- 3: Partly. Public financing plays a significant role in the campaigns of many parties.
- 4: Yes. Public financing funds a significant share of expenditures by all, or nearly all parties.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

*Convergence:* Model parameters with convergence issues: country-date latent trait estimates, universal thresholds, expert reliability, expert thresholds, main-country-coded thresholds.

### 3.1.2.3 EMB autonomy (C) (v2elembaut)

*Project Manager(s):* Staffan I. Lindberg

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* Does the Election Management Body (EMB) have autonomy from government to apply election laws and administrative rules impartially in national elections?

*Clarification:* The EMB refers to whatever body (or bodies) is charged with administering national elections.

*Responses:*

- 0: No. The EMB is controlled by the incumbent government, the military, or other *de facto* ruling body.
- 1: Somewhat. The EMB has some autonomy on some issues but on critical issues that influence the outcome of elections, the EMB is partial to the *de facto* ruling body.
- 2: Ambiguous. The EMB has some autonomy but is also partial, and it is unclear to what extent this influences the outcome of the election.
- 3: Almost. The EMB has autonomy and acts impartially almost all the time. It may be influenced by the *de facto* ruling body in some minor ways that do not influence the outcome of elections.
- 4: Yes. The EMB is autonomous and impartially applies elections laws and administrative rules.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

### 3.1.2.4 EMB capacity (C) (v2elembcap)

*Project Manager(s):* Staffan I. Lindberg

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* Does the Election Management Body (EMB) have sufficient staff and resources to



administer a well-run national election?

*Clarification:* The EMB refers to whatever body (or bodies) is charged with administering national elections.

*Responses:*

0: No. There are glaring deficits in staff, financial, or other resources affecting the organization across the territory.

1: Not really. Deficits are not glaring but they nonetheless seriously compromised the organization of administratively well-run elections in many parts of the country.

2: Ambiguous. There might be serious deficiencies compromising the organization of the election but it could also be a product of human errors and co-incidence or other factors outside the control of the EMB.

3: Mostly. There are partial deficits in resources but these are neither serious nor widespread.

4: Yes. The EMB has adequate staff and other resources to administer a well-run election.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

*Convergence:* Model parameters with convergence issues: universal thresholds.

### 3.1.2.5 Elections multiparty (C) (v2elmulpar)

*Project Manager(s):* Staffan I. Lindberg

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* Was this national election multiparty?

*Responses:*

0: No. No-party or single-party and there is no meaningful competition (includes situations where a few parties are legal but they are all *de facto* controlled by the dominant party).

1: Not really. No-party or single-party (defined as above) but multiple candidates from the same party and/or independents contest legislative seats or the presidency.

2: Constrained. At least one real opposition party is allowed to contest but competition is highly constrained — legally or informally.

3: Almost. Elections are multiparty in principle but either one main opposition party is prevented (*de jure* or *de facto*) from contesting, or conditions such as civil unrest (excluding natural disasters) prevent competition in a portion of the territory.

4: Yes. Elections are multiparty, even though a few marginal parties may not be permitted to contest (*e.g.* far-right/left extremist parties, anti-democratic religious or ethnic parties).

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Date specific:* Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

### 3.1.2.6 Election voter registry (C) (v2elrgstry)

*Project Manager(s):* Staffan I. Lindberg

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* In this national election, was there a reasonably accurate voter registry in place and was it used?

*Responses:*

- 0: No. There was no registry, or the registry was not used.
- 1: No. There was a registry but it was fundamentally flawed (meaning 20% or more of eligible voters could have been disenfranchised or the outcome could have been affected significantly by double-voting and impersonation).
- 2: Uncertain. There was a registry but it is unclear whether potential flaws in the registry had much impact on electoral outcomes.
- 3: Yes, somewhat. The registry was imperfect but less than 10% of eligible voters may have been disenfranchised, and double-voting and impersonation could not have affected the results significantly.
- 4: Yes. The voter registry was reasonably accurate (less than 1% of voters were affected by any flaws) and it was applied in a reasonable fashion.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Date specific:* Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

### 3.1.2.7 Election vote buying (C) (v2elvotbuy)

*Project Manager(s):* Staffan I. Lindberg

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* In this national election, was there evidence of vote and/or turnout buying?

*Clarification:* Vote and turnout buying refers to the distribution of money or gifts to individuals, families, or small groups in order to influence their decision to vote/not vote or whom to vote for. It does not include legislation targeted at specific constituencies, *i.e.*, "porkbarrel" legislation.

*Responses:*

- 0: Yes. There was systematic, widespread, and almost nationwide vote/turnout buying by almost all parties and candidates.
- 1: Yes, some. There were non-systematic but rather common vote-buying efforts, even if only in some parts of the country or by one or a few parties.
- 2: Restricted. Money and/or personal gifts were distributed by parties or candidates but these offerings were more about meeting an 'entry-ticket' expectation and less about actual vote choice or turnout, even if a smaller number of individuals may also be persuaded.
- 3: Almost none. There was limited use of money and personal gifts, or these attempts were limited to a few small areas of the country. In all, they probably affected less than a few percent of voters.
- 4: None. There was no evidence of vote/turnout buying.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Date specific:* Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

### 3.1.2.8 Election other voting irregularities (C) (v2elirreg)

*Project Manager(s):* Staffan I. Lindberg

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* In this national election, was there evidence of other *intentional* irregularities by incumbent and/or opposition parties, and/or vote fraud?

*Clarification:* Examples include use of double IDs, intentional lack of voting materials, ballot-stuffing, misreporting of votes, and false collation of votes. This question does not refer to lack of access to registration, harassment of opposition parties, manipulations of the voter registry or vote-buying (dealt with in previous questions).

*Responses:*

0: Yes. There were systematic and almost nationwide other irregularities.

1: Yes, some. There were non-systematic, but rather common other irregularities, even if only in some parts of the country.

2: Sporadic. There were a limited number of sporadic other irregularities, and it is not clear whether they were intentional or disfavored particular groups.

3: Almost none. There were only a limited number of irregularities, and many were probably unintentional or did not disfavor particular groups' access to participation.

4: None. There was no evidence of intentional other irregularities. Unintentional irregularities resulting from human error and/or natural conditions may still have occurred.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Date specific:* Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

### 3.1.2.9 Election government intimidation (C) (v2elintim)

*Project Manager(s):* Staffan I. Lindberg

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* In this national election, were opposition candidates/parties/campaign workers subjected to repression, intimidation, violence, or harassment by the government, the ruling party, or their agents?

*Clarification:* Other types of clearly distinguishable civil violence, even if politically motivated, during the election period should *not* be factored in when scoring this indicator (it is dealt with separately).

*Responses:*

0: Yes. The repression and intimidation by the government or its agents was so strong that the entire period was quiet.

1: Yes, frequent: There was systematic, frequent and violent harassment and intimidation of the opposition by the government or its agents during the election period.

2: Yes, some. There was periodic, not systematic, but possibly centrally coordinated — harassment and intimidation of the opposition by the government or its agents.

3: Restrained. There were sporadic instances of violent harassment and intimidation by the government or its agents, in at least one part of the country, and directed at only one or two local branches of opposition groups.

4: None. There was no harassment or intimidation of opposition by the government or its agents, during the election campaign period and polling day.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Date specific:* Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2021

### 3.1.2.10 Election other electoral violence (C) (v2elpeace)

*Project Manager(s)*: Staffan I. Lindberg

*Additional versions*: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question*: In this national election, was the campaign period, election day, and post-election process free from other types (*not* by the government, the ruling party, or their agents) of violence related to the conduct of the election and the campaigns (but not conducted by the government and its agents)?

*Responses*:

0: No. There was widespread violence between civilians occurring throughout the election period, or in an intense period of more than a week and in large swaths of the country. It resulted in a large number of deaths or displaced refugees.

1: Not really. There were significant levels of violence but not throughout the election period or beyond limited parts of the country. A few people may have died as a result, and some people may have been forced to move temporarily.

2: Somewhat. There were some outbursts of limited violence for a day or two, and only in a small part of the country. The number of injured and otherwise affected was relatively small.

3: Almost. There were only a few instances of isolated violent acts, involving only a few people; no one died and very few were injured.

4: Peaceful. No election-related violence between civilians occurred.

*Scale*: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release*: 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation*: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Date specific*: Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

*Citation*: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2021

*Convergence*: Model parameters with convergence issues: universal thresholds.

### 3.1.2.11 Election boycotts (C) (v2elboycot)

*Project Manager(s)*: Staffan I. Lindberg

*Additional versions*: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question*: In this national election, did any registered opposition candidates or parties boycott?

*Clarification*: A boycott is a deliberate and public refusal to participate in an election by a candidate or party who is eligible to participate.

*Responses*:

0: Total. All opposition parties and candidates boycotted the election.

1: Significant. Some but not all opposition parties or candidates boycotted but they constituted a major opposition force.

2: Ambiguous. Some but not all opposition parties or candidates boycotted but it is unclear whether they would have constituted a major electoral force.

3: Minor. A few opposition parties or candidates boycotted and they were relatively insignificant ones.

4: Nonexistent. No parties or candidates boycotted the elections.

*Scale*: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release*: 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation*: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Date specific*: Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

*Citation*: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see

suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2021

#### 3.1.2.12 Election free campaign media (C) (v2elfrcamp)

*Project Manager(s)*: Staffan I. Lindberg

*Additional versions*: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question*: In this national election, did parties or candidates receive either free or publicly financed access to national broadcast media?

*Responses*:

- 0: Either no parties or only the governing party receives free access.
- 1: Some parties in addition to the governing party receive free access.
- 2: All parties receive free access.

*Scale*: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release*: 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation*: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Date specific*: Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

*Citation*: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2021

#### 3.1.2.13 Election paid campaign advertisements (C) (v2elpdcamp)

*Project Manager(s)*: Staffan I. Lindberg

*Additional versions*: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question*: In this national election, were parties or candidates able to run paid campaign ads on national broadcast media?

*Responses*:

- 0: Not at all.
- 1: It is permitted but regulated in ways that, in practice, favor the government and its allies.
- 2: It is permitted without limit.
- 3: It is permitted but regulated in ways that, in practice, foster fair competition.

*Scale*: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release*: 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation*: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Date specific*: Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

*Citation*: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2021

*Convergence*: Model parameters with convergence issues: universal thresholds, expert thresholds, main-country-coded thresholds.

#### 3.1.2.14 Election paid interest group media (C) (v2elpaidig)

*Project Manager(s)*: Michael Coppedge

*Additional versions*: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question*: In this election, were interest groups and individuals able to run paid campaign ads on national broadcast media?

*Responses*:

- 0: Not at all.
- 1: It is permitted but regulated in ways that, in practice, favor groups allied with the

government.

2: It is permitted without limit.

3: It is permitted but regulated in ways that, in practice, foster representation of diverse perspectives.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Date specific:* Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2021

*Convergence:* Model parameters with convergence issues: universal thresholds, expert thresholds, main-country-coded thresholds.

### 3.1.2.15 Election free and fair (C) (v2elfrfair)

*Project Manager(s):* Staffan I. Lindberg

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* Taking all aspects of the pre-election period, election day, and the post-election process into account, would you consider this national election to be free and fair?

*Clarification:* The only thing that should *not* be considered in coding this is the extent of suffrage (by law). Thus, a free and fair election may occur even if the law excludes significant groups (an issue measured separately).

*Responses:*

0: No, not at all. The elections were fundamentally flawed and the official results had little if anything to do with the 'will of the people' (*i.e.*, who became president; or who won the legislative majority).

1: Not really. While the elections allowed for some competition, the irregularities in the end affected the outcome of the election (*i.e.*, who became president; or who won the legislative majority).

2: Ambiguous. There was substantial competition and freedom of participation but there were also significant irregularities. It is hard to determine whether the irregularities affected the outcome or not (as defined above).

3: Yes, somewhat. There were deficiencies and some degree of fraud and irregularities but these did not in the end affect the outcome (as defined above).

4: Yes. There was some amount of human error and logistical restrictions but these were largely unintentional and without significant consequences.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Date specific:* Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

### 3.1.2.16 Election domestic election monitors (A) (v2eldommon)

*Project Manager(s):* Staffan I. Lindberg

*Question:* In this national election, were election monitors from all parties and independent domestic election monitors allowed to monitor the vote at polling stations across the country?

*Responses:*

0: No

1: Yes

*Scale:* Dichotomous.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Country–Year Aggregation:* Maximum

*Date specific:* Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2021

### **3.1.2.17 Election international monitors (A) (v2elintmon)**

*Project Manager(s):* Staffan I. Lindberg

*Question:* In this national election, were international election monitors present?

*Responses:*

0: No/Unclear

1: Yes

*Scale:* Dichotomous.

*Source(s):* NELDA 45 (Hyde and Marinov 2012); IDEA; websites by international election monitors.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Country–Year Aggregation:* Maximum

*Date specific:* Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2021

### **3.1.2.18 Election international monitors denied (A) (v2elmonden)**

*Project Manager(s):* Staffan I. Lindberg

*Question:* In this national election, were some international election monitors denied opportunity to be present by the government holding the election?

*Responses:*

0: No/Unclear

1: Yes

*Scale:* Dichotomous.

*Source(s):* NELDA 48 (Hyde and Marinov 2012); IDEA; websites by international election monitors.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Country–Year Aggregation:* Maximum

*Date specific:* Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1915-2021

### **3.1.2.19 Monitors refuse to be present (A) (v2elmonref)**

*Project Manager(s):* Staffan I. Lindberg

*Question:* Did any monitors refuse to go to an election because they believed that it would not be free and fair?

*Responses:*

0: No/Unclear

1: Yes

*Source(s):* NELDA 49 (Hyde and Marinov 2012); websites of election monitors.

*Data release:* 5-12.

*Country–Year Aggregation:* Maximum



*Date specific:* Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1915-2021

### 3.1.2.20 Candidate restriction by ethnicity, race, religion, or language (A) (v2elrstrct)

*Project Manager(s):* Staffan I. Lindberg

*Question:* Is the eligibility of candidates for national legislative office (when elected) formally restricted (by constitution or statute) by ethnicity, race, religion, or language?

*Clarification:* Language restriction should be understood as a restriction of spoken language, not literacy.

*Responses:*

0: Yes, there are such statutory restrictions.

1: No, there are no such restrictions or the candidates are not elected.

*Scale:* Dichotomous.

*Source(s):* V-Dem country coordinators; Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections (IPU); CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012), v221, v250; Constitute Project; ACE Electoral Knowledge Network.

*Notes:* Converted from (B) to (A) coding.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Country-Year Aggregation:* Last

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2021

## 3.1.3 Election Outcomes

### 3.1.3.1 Election losers accept results (C) (v2elaccept)

*Project Manager(s):* Staffan I. Lindberg

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* Did losing parties and candidates accept the result of this national election within three months?

*Responses:*

0: None. None of the losing parties or candidates accepted the results the election, or all opposition was banned.

1: A few. Some but not all losing parties or candidates accepted the results but those who constituted the main opposition force did not.

2: Some. Some but not all opposition parties or candidates accepted the results but it is unclear whether they constituted a major opposition force or were relatively insignificant.

3: Most. Many but not all opposition parties or candidates accepted the results and those who did not had little electoral support.

4: All. All parties and candidates accepted the results.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Date specific:* Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

### 3.1.3.2 Election assume office (C) (v2elasmoff)

*Project Manager(s):* Staffan I. Lindberg



*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* Following this national election, did winners assume office according to prescribed constitutional rules and norms?

*Responses:*

0: No. The official winner of the election was prevented from assuming office by *unconstitutional* means.

1: Partially. The official winner/winning party or largest vote-getter was forced at least in part by unconstitutional means to share power, or delay assuming power for more than 6 months.

2: Yes. Constitutional rules and norms were followed and the official winner/winning party or largest vote-getter assumed office accordingly (or continued in office).

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Notes:* The question text between contemporary and historical differ in inclusion of "within 12 months of the election". In contemporary it is excluded while included in historical.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Date specific:* Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

### 3.1.3.3 Election turnout (A) (v2eltrnout)

*Project Manager(s):* Pamela Paxton

*Question:* In this national election, what percentage (%) of all registered voters cast a vote according to official results?

*Responses:*

Percent.

*Source(s):* IDEA; Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); NELDA (Hyde and Marinov 2012); IPU Parline; Election Guide.

*Notes:* In cases where executive and legislative elections were held on the same day but there is a different turnout for each election, the turnout for this date is coded for the executive elections only. The turnout data for the legislative elections, in these cases, can be found in the IDEA Voter turnout database (see references).

*Data release:* 6-12.

*Country-Year Aggregation:* Maximum

*Date specific:* Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1790-2021

### 3.1.3.4 Election VAP turnout (A) (v2elvaptrn)

*Project Manager(s):* Pamela Paxton

*Question:* In this national election, what percentage (%) of the adult voting-age population cast a vote according to official results?

*Clarification:* The VAP can reflect irregularities such as problems with the voters' register or registration system. VAP numbers are estimates since they do not take into account legal or systemic barriers to the exercise of the franchise or account for non-eligible members of the population. Thus, it can occur that VAP values surpass 100 which is not an error but reflects such conditions.

*Responses:*

Percent.

*Scale:* Interval.

*Source(s)*: IDEA (VAP figures are estimates and should be treated as such).

*Notes*: In cases where executive and legislative elections were held on the same day but there is a different VAP turnout for each election, the VAP turnout for this date is coded for the executive elections only. The VAP turnout data for the legislative elections, in these cases, can be found in the IDEA Voter turnout database (see references).

*Data release*: 1-12.

*Country–Year Aggregation*: Maximum

*Date specific*: Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

*Citation*: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years*: 1830-2021

### 3.1.3.5 Name of largest party (A) (v2lpname)

*Project Manager(s)*: Carl Henrik Knutsen

*Question*: What is the name of the largest party in the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature?

*Clarification*: Based on seat share.

*Responses*:

Text.

*Source(s)*: Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010).

*Data release*: 9-12.

*Country–Year Aggregation*: Last

*Citation*: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years*: 1790-2020

### 3.1.3.6 Name of second largest party (A) (v2slpname)

*Project Manager(s)*: Carl Henrik Knutsen

*Question*: What is the name of the second largest party in the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature?

*Clarification*: Based on seat share.

*Responses*:

Text.

*Source(s)*: Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010).

*Data release*: 9-12.

*Country–Year Aggregation*: Last

*Citation*: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years*: 1790-2020

### 3.1.3.7 Name of third largest party (A) (v2tlpname)

*Project Manager(s)*: Carl Henrik Knutsen

*Question*: What is the name of the third largest party in the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature?

*Clarification*: Based on seat share.

*Responses*:

Text.

*Source(s)*: Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010).

*Data release*: 9-12.

*Country–Year Aggregation*: Last

*Citation*: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years*: 1791-2020

### 3.1.4 Executive Elections Specifics

#### 3.1.4.1 Presidential elections consecutive (D) (v2elprescons)

*Project Manager(s):* Staffan I. Lindberg

*Question:* How many consecutive presidential elections including the current election have been held since 1900?

*Clarification:* This counts the consecutive number of presidential elections since the last unconstitutional change of government or democratic breakdown, or 1900 whichever is more recent. Do not code if there is no office of the presidency.

*Source(s):* v2eltype

*Data release:* 5-12.

*Date specific:* Presidential election dates (v2eltype\_6, v2eltype\_7)

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2021

#### 3.1.4.2 Presidential elections cumulative (D) (v2elprescumul)

*Project Manager(s):* Staffan I. Lindberg

*Question:* How many presidential elections including the current election have been held since 1900?

*Clarification:* This counts the cumulative number of presidential elections, regardless of any constitutional or unconstitutional changes and interruptions that may have taken place. Do not code if there is no office of the presidency. However, if there is a presidency, and no elections have ever occurred, this should be recorded as 0.

*Scale:* Interval, from low to high (0-1).

*Source(s):* v2eltype

*Data release:* 5-12.

*Date specific:* Presidential election dates (v2eltype\_6, v2eltype\_7)

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2021

#### 3.1.4.3 HOG restriction by ethnicity, race, religion, or language (A) (v2elrsthog)

*Project Manager(s):* Staffan I. Lindberg

*Question:* Is the eligibility of candidates for the office of head of government (when elected) formally restricted (by constitution or statute) by ethnicity, race, religion, or language?

*Clarification:* Language restriction should be understood as a restriction of spoken language, not literacy.

*Responses:*

0: Yes, there are such statutory restrictions.

1: No, there are no such restrictions or the candidates are not elected.

*Scale:* Dichotomous.

*Source(s):* CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012), v221, v130 ; National constitutions; IPU Parline; IDEA; ACE Electoral Knowledge Network.

*Data release:* 4-12.

*Country-Year Aggregation:* Last

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2021

#### 3.1.4.4 HOS restriction by ethnicity, race, religion, or language (A) (v2elrsthos)

*Project Manager(s):* Staffan I. Lindberg

*Question:* Is the eligibility of candidates for the office of head of state (when elected) formally restricted (by constitution or statute) by ethnicity, race, religion, or language?

*Clarification:* Language restriction should be understood as a restriction of spoken language, not literacy.

*Responses:*

0: Yes, there are such statutory restrictions.

1: No, there are no such restrictions or the candidates are not elected.

*Scale:* Dichotomous.

*Source(s):* CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012), v221, v95; Constitute Project; IPU Parline; IDEA; ACE Electoral Knowledge Network.

*Data release:* 4-12.

*Country-Year Aggregation:* Last

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2021

#### 3.1.4.5 Election HOG turnover ordinal (A) (v2elturnhog)

*Project Manager(s):* Staffan I. Lindberg

*Question:* Was there turnover in the office of the head of government (HOG) as a result of this national election?

*Clarification:* Turnover can occur in presidential, semi-presidential, as well as parliamentary systems, and it refers not only to the individual person holding office but also to that person's party. If the HOS and HOG are the same person, the coding is the same for the two variables. The second round of election is coded as the first.

*Responses:*

0: No. The head of government- retained his/her position either as a result of the outcome of the election, or because the elections do not affect the HOG.

1: Half. The head of government is a different individual than before the election but from the same party that was in power before the election, or a new independent candidate is elected. In parliamentary systems this code applies when the head of government changes as an effect of alternations in the ruling coalition, changes in party leadership.

2: Yes. The executive(s) - head of state and head of government- lost their position(s) as a result of the outcome of the election. In presidential systems this code applies when the new president is both a different person and from a different party than before the election or an independent candidate is elected. In parliamentary systems the ruling party or coalition of parties lost and the new head of government is from a different party or from a new coalition. This code also applies if this is the first head of government elected for a newly (semi-) independent state country.

*Scale:* Ordinal.

*Source(s):* Henisz (2000; 2002); Lentz (1994; 1999); worldstatesmen.org; Election Guide; IDEA; IPU Parline; V-Dem Country Coordinators.

*Data release:* 3-12.

*Country-Year Aggregation:* Maximum

*Date specific:* Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2021

#### 3.1.4.6 Election HOS turnover ordinal (A) (v2elturnhos)

*Project Manager(s):* Staffan I. Lindberg

*Question:* Was there turnover in the office of the head of state (HOS) as a result of this national election?

*Clarification:* Turnover can occur in presidential, semi-presidential, as well as parliamentary systems, and it refers not only to the individual person holding office but also to that

person's party.

*Responses:*

0: No. The head of state retained their position either as a result of the outcome of the election, or because the elections do not affect the HOS.

1: Half. The head of state is a different individual than before the election but from the same party that was in power before the election, or a new independent candidate is elected.

2: Yes. The head of state lost their position(s) as a result of the outcome of the election. In presidential systems this code applies when the new president is both a different person and from a different party than before the election or an independent candidate is elected. This code also applies if this is the first head of state elected for a newly (semi-) independent state country.

*Scale:* Ordinal.

*Source(s):* Henisz (2000; 2002); Lentz (1994; 1999); worldstatesmen.org; Election Guide; IDEA; IPU Parline; V-Dem Country Coordinators.

*Data release:* 3-12.

*Country-Year Aggregation:* Maximum

*Date specific:* Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2021

#### 3.1.4.7 Election executive turnover ordinal (A) (v2eltvrexo)

*Project Manager(s):* Staffan I. Lindberg

*Question:* Was there turnover in the executive office as a result of this national election?

*Clarification:* Turnover in the executive can occur in presidential, semi-presidential, as well as parliamentary systems, and it refers not only to the individual person holding office but also to that person's party. This question considers whether turnover occurs both in the office of head of state and head of government, even if one of the positions is not contested in the particular elections.

*Responses:*

0: No. The executive(s) — head of state and head of government — retained their position either as a result of the outcome of the election, or because the elections do not affect the executive.

1: Half. The head of state or head of government is a different individual than before the election but from the same party (or independent) that was in power before the election. In parliamentary systems this code applies when the head of government changes as an effect of alternations in the ruling coalition, changes in party leadership, or a new independent head of government. In semi-presidential regimes, this code applies when the elections result in co-habitation after a period when one party (or independent) has held both offices, or if one of the executive office holders — the head of state or head of government changes, while the other retains their position.

2: Yes. The executive(s) — head of state and head of government — lost their position(s) as a result of the outcome of the election. In presidential systems this code applies when the new president is both a different person and from a different party (or independent) than before the election. In parliamentary systems the ruling party or coalition of parties lost and the new head of government is from a different party or from a new coalition. In semi-presidential regimes, this code applies when one party holds both the office of the head of state and head of government after a period of co-habitation, or if the holders of both offices change in terms of person and party (or independent) in the same election. This code also applies if this is the first head of state and/or head of government elected for a newly (semi-) independent state country.

*Scale:* Ordinal.

*Source(s):* Henisz (2000; 2002); Lentz (1994; 1999); worldstatesmen.org; Election Guide; IDEA; IPU Parline; V-Dem Country Coordinators.

*Notes:* Converted from (B) to (A) coding.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Country–Year Aggregation:* Maximum

*Date specific:* Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2021

#### **3.1.4.8 Presidential election vote share of largest vote-getter (A) (v2elvotlrg)**

*Project Manager(s):* Staffan I. Lindberg

*Question:* In the first (or only round) of this presidential election, what percentage (%) of the vote was received by candidate eventually winning office?

*Responses:*

Percent.

*Scale:* Interval.

*Source(s):* Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); IFES; Election Guide; IPU Parline.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Country–Year Aggregation:* Maximum

*Date specific:* Presidential election dates (v2eltype\_6, v2eltype\_7)

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1792-2021

#### **3.1.4.9 Presidential election vote share of second-largest vote-getter (A) (v2elvotsml)**

*Project Manager(s):* Staffan I. Lindberg

*Question:* In this presidential election, what percentage (%) of the vote was received by the second most successful candidate in the first round?

*Responses:*

Percent.

*Scale:* Interval.

*Source(s):* Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); IFES; Election Guide; IPU Parline.

*Notes:* In uncontested elections this question is coded 0.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Country–Year Aggregation:* Maximum

*Date specific:* Presidential election dates (v2eltype\_6, v2eltype\_7)

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1792-2021

### **3.1.5 Lower Chamber Specifics**

#### **3.1.5.1 Lower chamber election consecutive (D) (v2ellocons)**

*Project Manager(s):* Staffan I. Lindberg

*Question:* How many consecutive lower chamber or unicameral legislative elections including the current election have been held since 1900?

*Clarification:* This counts the consecutive number of lower chamber or unicameral legislative elections since the last unconstitutional change of government or democratic breakdown, or 1900 whichever is more recent. Do not code if there is no legislature.

*Source(s):* v2eltype

*Data release:* 5-12.

*Date specific:* Lower chamber election dates (v2eltype\_0, v2eltype\_1)

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2021

### 3.1.5.2 Lower chamber election cumulative (D) (v2ellocumul)

*Project Manager(s)*: Staffan I. Lindberg

*Question*: How many lower chamber or unicameral legislative elections including the current election have been held since 1900?

*Clarification*: This counts the cumulative number of elections to the lower chamber or unicameral legislature, regardless of any constitutional or unconstitutional changes and interruptions that may have taken place. Do not code if there is no legislature. However, if there is a legislature and no elections to that body have ever occurred, this should be coded as 0.

*Source(s)*: v2eltype

*Data release*: 5-12.

*Date specific*: Lower chamber election dates (v2eltype\_0, v2eltype\_1)

*Citation*: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years*: 1900-2021

### 3.1.5.3 Lower chamber election district magnitude (A) (v2elloeldm)

*Project Manager(s)*: Staffan I. Lindberg, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Jan Teorell

*Question*: For this election, what was the average district magnitude for seats in the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature?

*Responses*:

Numeric.

*Source(s)*: Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections (IPU); IDEA; Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Colomer (2016).

*Data release*: 7-12.

*Country-Year Aggregation*: Maximum

*Date specific*: Lower chamber election dates (v2eltype\_0, v2eltype\_1)

*Citation*: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years*: 1900-2021

### 3.1.5.4 Lower chamber electoral system — 13 categories (A) (v2elloelsy)

*Project Manager(s)*: Staffan I. Lindberg, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Jan Teorell

*Question*: What was the electoral system used in this election for the lower or unicameral chamber of the legislature?

*Clarification*: Mixed majoritarian systems were coded as a two-round system. Regarding multi-member districts we coded list PR with large multi-member districts when the mean district size = 7. Constituent Assembly elections are excluded from the coding, since they often use specifically designed electoral systems. Further information on the following electoral system types can be found in Reynolds/Reilly, *The New International IDEA Handbook* (2005), chapter two and Annex B (Glossary of Terms) — downloadable, free of charge, at [www.idea.int/publications/esd/](http://www.idea.int/publications/esd/).

*Responses*:

0: First-past-the-post (FPP, aka plurality) in single-member constituencies. The candidate with the most votes wins the seat.

1: Two-round system in single-member constituencies. Like FPP except that a threshold — usually 50% + 1 — is required to avoid a runoff between the two top vote-getters.

2: Alternative vote in single-member districts. Voters rank-order their preferences for the candidates who compete for a single seat. If any candidate receives an absolute majority of first preferences, s/he is elected.

If not, then the least successful candidates (based on first-preferences) are eliminated and their votes reallocated to the second-preferences. This process is repeated until a candidate reaches 50% + 1 of the votes.

3: Block vote in multi-member districts. Electors have as many votes as there are seats within that district and can rank-order them (within or across parties) as they please.



4: Party block vote in multi-member districts. Voters cast a vote for a single party (but not for individual candidates within the party's list). The party with the most votes (*i.e.*, a plurality) wins all the seats in that district.

5: Parallel (SMD/PR). Some seats are in single-member districts (allocated by FPP or two-round electoral rules) and other seats are in multimember districts (allocated by some form of PR). These districts are overlapping, meaning that each elector votes twice: once in the single-member district race and once in the multi-member district race. Results are independent.

6: Mixed-member proportional (SMD with PR compensatory seats). Some seats are in single-member districts (allocated by FPP or two-round electoral rules) and other seats are in multimember districts (allocated by some form of PR). These districts are overlapping, meaning that each elector votes twice: once in the single-member district race and once in the multi-member district race. Results are not independent. Specifically, the multimember seats are used to rectify disproportionalities achieved in the single-member district election — by adding seats, as necessary.

This means that the representation of parties in the legislature is determined entirely by the PR ballot. It also means that the result of an MMP election is similar to the result of a PR election: parties achieve representation according to their nationwide vote share (on the PR ballot).

7: List PR with small multi-member districts (mean district size  $< 7$ ). Each party presents a list of candidates for election within a district. Electors vote for a party, and parties receive seats in (rough) proportion to their overall share of the vote. Mean district size is less than seven.

8: List PR with large multi-member districts (mean district size  $> 7$ ). Each party presents a list of candidates for election within a district. Electors vote for a party, and parties receive seats in (rough) proportion to their overall share of the vote. Mean district size is greater than seven.

9: Single-transferable vote (STV) in multi-member districts. Electors rank-order candidates nominated for a district. Candidates that surpass a specified quota of first-preference votes are elected. The remaining seats are chosen by reallocating the votes of the least successful candidates to elector's second- (or third-) preferences until the specified quota is reached. This process is repeated until all seats for that district are filled.

10: Single non-transferable vote (SNTV) in multi-member districts. Each elector chooses a single candidate. The candidates with the most votes (a plurality) win. (The number of winners is of course determined by the size of the district.)

11: Limited vote in multi-member districts.

Electors have more than one vote but fewer votes than the number of seats in the district. The candidates with the most votes (a plurality) win. (The number of winners is of course determined by the size of the district.)

12: Borda Count in single- or multi-member districts. Electors use numbers to mark preferences among candidates and each preference is assigned a value. For example, in a ten-candidate field a first preference is worth one, a second preference is worth .9, and so forth. These are summed and the candidate(s) with the highest total(s) is/are elected.

*Source(s)*: Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections (IPU); IDEA; Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Colomer (2016).

*Data release*: 7-12.

*Country-Year Aggregation*: Maximum

*Date specific*: Lower chamber election dates (v2eltype\_0, v2eltype\_1)

*Citation*: V-Dem Codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years*: 1789-2021

### 3.1.5.5 Lower chamber election seats (A) (v2elloseat)

*Project Manager(s)*: Allen Hicken

*Question*: In this election, how many seats were there in the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature?

*Clarification*: Does not include appointed (nonelected) seats. Leave this question blank if election

was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

*Responses:*

Numeric.

*Scale:* Interval.

*Source(s):* Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections (IPU); Election Guide.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Country–Year Aggregation:* Maximum

*Date specific:* Lower chamber election dates (v2eltype\_0, v2eltype\_1)

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1790-2021

#### **3.1.5.6 Lower chamber election seats won by largest party (A) (v2ellostlg)**

*Project Manager(s):* Allen Hicken

*Question:* In this election to the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature, how many seats were obtained by the largest party?

*Clarification:* Does not include appointed (nonelected) seats. Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

*Responses:*

Numeric.

*Scale:* Interval.

*Source(s):* Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections (IPU); Election Guide.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Country–Year Aggregation:* Maximum

*Date specific:* Lower chamber election dates (v2eltype\_0, v2eltype\_1)

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1790-2021

#### **3.1.5.7 Lower chamber election seat share won by largest party (A) (v2ellostsl)**

*Project Manager(s):* Staffan I. Lindberg

*Question:* In this election, what percentage (%) of the total seats in the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature was obtained by the largest party?

*Clarification:* Does not include appointed (nonelected) seats. Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

*Responses:*

Percent.

*Scale:* Interval.

*Source(s):* Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections (IPU); Election Guide.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Country–Year Aggregation:* Maximum

*Date specific:* Lower chamber election dates (v2eltype\_0, v2eltype\_1)

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1790-2021

#### **3.1.5.8 Lower chamber election seats won by second largest party (A) (v2ellostsm)**

*Project Manager(s):* Staffan I. Lindberg

*Question:* In this election, how many seats in the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature were obtained by the next-largest party?

*Clarification:* Does not include appointed (nonelected) seats. Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

*Responses:*

Numeric.

*Scale:* Interval.

*Source(s):* Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections (IPU); Election Guide.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Country–Year Aggregation:* Maximum

*Date specific:* Lower chamber election dates (v2eltype\_0, v2eltype\_1)

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1790-2021

### 3.1.5.9 Lower chamber election seat share won by second largest party (A) (v2ellostss)

*Project Manager(s):* Allen Hicken

*Question:* In this election, what percentage (%) of the total seats in the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature was obtained by the next-largest party?

*Clarification:* Does not include appointed (nonelected) seats. Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

*Responses:*

Percent.

*Scale:* Interval.

*Source(s):* Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections (IPU); Election Guide.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Country–Year Aggregation:* Maximum

*Date specific:* Lower chamber election dates (v2eltype\_0, v2eltype\_1)

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1790-2021

### 3.1.5.10 Lower chamber election seats won by third largest party (A) (v2ellosttm)

*Project Manager(s):* Carl Henrik Knutsen

*Question:* In this election, how many seats in the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature were obtained by the next-largest party?

*Clarification:* Does not include appointed (nonelected) seats. Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

*Responses:*

Numeric.

*Source(s):* Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); IPU Parline; Election Guide.

*Data release:* 9-12.

*Country–Year Aggregation:* Last

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1791-2021

### 3.1.5.11 Lower chamber election seat share won by third largest party (A) (v2ellostts)

*Project Manager(s):* Carl Henrik Knutsen

*Question:* In this election, what percentage (%) of the total seats in the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature was obtained by the next-largest party?

*Clarification:* Does not include appointed (nonelected) seats. Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, i.e., no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

*Responses:*

Numeric.

*Source(s):* Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); IPU Parline; Election Guide.

*Data release:* 9-12.

*Country–Year Aggregation:* Day-weighted mean

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1791-2021

#### **3.1.5.12 Lower chamber election vote share of largest vote-getter (A) (v2ellovtlg)**

*Project Manager(s):* Allen Hicken

*Question:* In this election to the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature, what percentage (%) of the vote was received by the largest party in the first/only round?

*Clarification:* Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, i.e., no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

*Responses:*

Percent.

*Scale:* Interval.

*Source(s):* Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections (IPU); Election Guide.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Country–Year Aggregation:* Maximum

*Date specific:* Lower chamber election dates (v2eltype\_0, v2eltype\_1)

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1790-2021

#### **3.1.5.13 Lower chamber election vote share of second-largest vote-getter (A) (v2ellovtsm)**

*Project Manager(s):* Allen Hicken

*Question:* In this election to the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature, what percentage (%) of the vote was received by the second largest party in the first/only round?

*Clarification:* Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, i.e., no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

*Responses:*

Percent.

*Scale:* Interval.

*Source(s):* Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections (IPU); Election Guide.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Country–Year Aggregation:* Maximum

*Date specific:* Lower chamber election dates (v2eltype\_0, v2eltype\_1)

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1790-2021

#### **3.1.5.14 Lower chamber election vote share of third-largest vote-getter (A) (v2ellovttm)**

*Project Manager(s):* Carl Henrik Knutsen

*Question:* In this election to the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature, what percentage (%) of the vote was received by the second largest party in the first/only round?

*Clarification:* Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, i.e., no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

*Responses:*

Numeric.

*Source(s):* Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); IPU Parline; Election Guide.

*Data release:* 9-12.

*Country–Year Aggregation:* Day-weighted mean

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1795-2021

### 3.1.5.15 Lower chamber electoral system (A) (v2elparallel)

*Project Manager(s):* Staffan I. Lindberg, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Jan Teorell

*Question:* What was the electoral system used in this election for the lower or unicameral chamber of the legislature?

*Responses:*

0: Majoritarian.

1: Proportional.

2: Mixed.

3: Other (*e.g.* single non-transferable voting, limited voting)

*Source(s):* Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections (IPU); IDEA; Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Colomer (2016).

*Notes:* Mixed majoritarian systems were coded as majoritarian systems. Category 3: Other was introduced for data release 7.

*Data release:* 5-12.

*Country–Year Aggregation:* Maximum

*Date specific:* Lower chamber election dates (v2eltype\_0, v2eltype\_1)

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

### 3.1.5.16 Lower chamber election statutory threshold (B) (v2elthresh)

*Project Manager(s):* Allen Hicken

*Question:* For this election, what was the statutory threshold (% share of votes) that a party needed to obtain in order to gain representation in the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature?

*Clarification:* If there is no statutory threshold, enter 0. (Some thresholds are applied at regional levels. Nonetheless, they are usually consistent across regions.) Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, i.e., no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

*Responses:*

Percent.

*Scale:* Interval.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Country–Year Aggregation:* Last

*Date specific:* Lower chamber election dates (v2eltype\_0, v2eltype\_1)

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1816-2021

### 3.1.5.17 Lower chamber election turnover (A) (v2eltvrig)

*Project Manager(s):* Staffan I. Lindberg

*Question:* Did control of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature change as a result of this election, according to official results?

*Responses:*

0: No. The majority party or ruling coalition includes the same or substantially the same parties, even if some minor parties (holding less than 10 % of the seats in the legislature) left or joined the coalition, or because the elections do not affect the lower chamber.

1: Half. A minority party or coalition who was not in control of the chamber before the elections assumed the leading position in the legislature but is dependent on other parties for support. Or, a post-election ruling coalition includes some old parties and some new parties and the new parties represent more than 10 % of the seats in the legislature.

2: Yes. The incumbent party or coalition lost its majority or plurality-dominant position in the legislature and a different party or coalition assumes the majority position.

*Scale:* Ordinal.

*Source(s):* V-Dem country coordinators; Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections (IPU); Election Guide; IDEA.

*Notes:* Converted from (B) to (A) coding.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Country-Year Aggregation:* Maximum

*Date specific:* Lower chamber election dates (v2eltype\_0, v2eltype\_1)

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1790-2021

### 3.1.6 Subnational

#### 3.1.6.1 Regional government exists (A,C) (v2elreggov)

*Project Manager(s):* Kelly McMann

*Question:* Is there a regional government?

*Clarification:* Regional government is typically the second-highest level of government, just below the national government. There are many names for units at this level; some common ones are regions, provinces, states, departments, and cantons.

Countries with more than two subnational levels may have multiple levels that fit the definition of regional government. If this is the case, for all questions about regional government please code the regional level that, in practice, has the most responsibilities (*e.g.* making laws, providing primary, education, maintaining roads, policing, etc.) and resources to carry out those responsibilities.

Some countries are so small that, now or in earlier time periods, they have only local government and not regional government. If this is the case, please code this question as "0" for the appropriate time period.

If you have questions about identifying the regional government for your country, please send an email inquiry to your V-Dem contact.

*Responses:*

0: No.

1: Yes.

*Ordering:* If coded "0" for entire period, skip the following questions focused on regional government.

*Scale:* Dichotomous.

*Source(s):* Country expert coding (C data).

*Notes:* Converted from (C) to (A (C)) coding as of December 2014. The part of the time series coming from Historical V-Dem is of variable type A\*.

*Data release:* 3-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Mode from country experts' coding, cross-checked by research assistants in cases where a single mode was not generated because of expert disagreement.

*Country-Year Aggregation:* Last

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2021

### 3.1.6.2 Regional government name (A,C) (v2elregnam)

*Project Manager(s)*: Kelly McMann

*Question*: What is the term(s) for the regional government units?

*Clarification*: If different types of units exist at this single level of regional government use multiple terms such as "provinces and federal city." If the language of politics in your country is not English, please use whatever language is commonly used. For example, in Germany regional units are called "Länder."

*Responses*:

Text.

*Source(s)*: Country expert coding (C data).

*Notes*: Converted from (C) to (A (C)) coding as of December 2014. The part of the time series coming from Historical V-Dem is of variable type A\*.

*Data release*: 3-12.

*Country-Year Aggregation*: Last

*Citation*: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2021

### 3.1.6.3 Regional government elected (A,C) (v2elsrgel)

*Project Manager(s)*: Kelly McMann

*Question*: At the regional level, are government offices elected in practice?

*Clarification*: "Government offices" here refers to a regional executive and a regional assembly, *not* a judiciary and *not* minor bureaucrats. An *executive* is a single individual (or a very small group) (*e.g.*, a governor). An *assembly* is a larger body of officials, who may be divided into two chambers.

"Elected" refers to offices that are directly elected by citizens or indirectly elected by a regional elected assembly. All other methods of obtaining office — including appointment by higher or lower levels of government — are considered to be *non-elected*.

In classifying a position as elected one is making no judgments about the freeness/fairness of the election or the relative extent of suffrage. One is simply indicating that there is an election and that the winner of that election (however conducted) generally takes office.

*Responses*:

- 0: Generally, offices at the regional level are not elected.
- 1: Generally, the regional executive is elected but not the assembly.
- 2: Generally, the regional assembly is elected but not the executive.
- 3: Generally, the regional executive is elected and there is no assembly.
- 4: Generally, the regional assembly is elected and there is no executive.
- 5: Generally, the regional executive and assembly are elected.

*Scale*: Nominal.

*Source(s)*: Country expert coding (C data).

*Notes*: Converted from (C) to (A (C)) coding as of December 2014. The part of the time series coming from Historical V-Dem is of variable type A\*.

*Data release*: 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation*: Mode from country experts' coding, cross-checked by research assistants in cases where a single mode was not generated because of expert disagreement.

*Country-Year Aggregation*: Last

*Cleaning*: Set to missing when v2elreggov is 0

*Citation*: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2021

### 3.1.6.4 Regional offices relative power (C) (v2elrgpwr)



*Project Manager(s)*: Kelly McMann

*Additional versions*: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question*: How would you characterize the relative power, in practice, of elected and non-elected offices at the regional level?

*Clarification*: We are concerned with the relative power of regional offices to each other, *not* the power of regional offices relative to higher or lower levels of government.

Please consider only major offices, such as the executive, assembly, and judiciary, *not* those of minor bureaucrats. (A body of government officials, such as an assembly or judiciary, counts as one office.)

An office is "subordinate" if its officeholders can be chosen and removed by another office or if its decisions can be blocked or modified by another office, but it cannot similarly constrain the other office.

*Responses*:

0: All or nearly all elected offices are subordinate to non-elected offices at the regional level.

1: Some elected offices are subordinate to non-elected offices at the regional level.

2: Elected and non-elected offices are approximately equal in power at the regional level.

3: Most non-elected offices are subordinate to elected offices at the regional level.

4: All or nearly all non-elected offices are subordinate to elected offices at the regional level.

*Scale*: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release*: 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation*: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Cleaning*: Set to missing when v2elreggov is 0

*Citation*: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years*: 1789-2021

### 3.1.6.5 Local government exists (A,C) (v2ellocgov)

*Project Manager(s)*: Kelly McMann

*Question*: Is there a local government?

*Clarification*: Local government refers to the level of government below the regional government.

There are many names for units at this level; some common ones are counties, communes, cities, municipalities, towns, rural municipalities, and villages.

Countries with more than two subnational levels may have multiple levels that fit the definition of local government. If this is the case, please code the local level that, in practice, has the most responsibilities (*e.g.* making laws, providing primary, education, maintaining roads, policing, etc.) and resources to carry out those responsibilities.

*Responses*:

0: No.

1: Yes.

*Ordering*: If coded "0" for entire period, skip the following questions focused on local government.

*Scale*: Dichotomous, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Source(s)*: Country expert coding (C data).

*Notes*: Converted from (C) to (A (C)) coding as of December 2014. The part of the time series coming from Historical V-Dem is of variable type A\*.

*Data release*: 3-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation*: Mode from country experts' coding, cross-checked by research assistants in cases where a single mode was not generated because of expert disagreement.

*Country-Year Aggregation*: Last

*Citation*: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years*: 1789-2021

### 3.1.6.6 Local government name (A,C) (v2ellocnam)

*Project Manager(s):* Kelly McMann

*Question:* What is the term(s) for the local government units?

*Clarification:* If different types of units exist at this single level of local government, use multiple terms. For example, different terms may be needed for rural and urban units.

If the language of politics in your country is not English, please use whatever language is commonly used. For example, in Mexico local units are called "Municipios."

*Responses:*

Text.

*Source(s):* Country expert coding (C data).

*Notes:* Converted from (C) to (A (C)) coding as of December 2014. The part of the time series coming from Historical V-Dem is of variable type A\*.

*Data release:* 3-12.

*Country-Year Aggregation:* Last

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

### 3.1.6.7 Local government elected (A,C) (v2ellocelc)

*Project Manager(s):* Kelly McMann

*Question:* At the local level, are government (local government) offices elected in practice?

*Clarification:* "Government offices" here refers to a local executive and a local assembly, *not* a judiciary and not minor bureaucrats. An *executive* is a single individual (or a very small group) (*e.g.*, a mayor). An *assembly* is a larger body of officials.

"Elected" refers to offices that are directly elected by citizens or indirectly elected by a local elected assembly. All other methods of obtaining office — including appointment by a higher level of government — are considered to be *non-elected*.

In classifying a position as elected one is making no judgments about the freeness/fairness of the election or the relative extent of suffrage. One is simply indicating that there is an election and that the winner of that election (however conducted) generally takes office.

*Responses:*

- 0: Generally, offices at the local level are not elected.
- 1: Generally, the local executive is elected but not the assembly.
- 2: Generally, the local assembly is elected but not the executive.
- 3: Generally, the local executive is elected and there is no assembly.
- 4: Generally, the local assembly is elected and there is no executive.
- 5: Generally, the local executive and assembly are elected.

*Ordering:* If coded "0" for entire period, skip the following questions on local offices relative power.

*Scale:* Nominal.

*Source(s):* Country expert coding (C data).

*Notes:* Converted from (C) to (A (C)) coding as of December 2014. The part of the time series coming from Historical V-Dem is of variable type A\*.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Mode from country experts' coding, cross-checked by research assistants in cases where a single mode was not generated because of expert disagreement.

*Country-Year Aggregation:* Last

*Cleaning:* Set to missing when v2ellocgov is 0

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

### 3.1.6.8 Local offices relative power (C) (v2ellocpwr)

*Project Manager(s):* Kelly McMann

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* How would you characterize the relative power, in practice, of elected and non-elected offices at the local level?

*Clarification:* We are concerned with the relative power of local offices to *each other*, not the power of local offices relative to higher levels of government.

Please consider only major offices, such as the executive, assembly, and judiciary, *not* those of minor bureaucrats. (A body of government officials, such as an assembly or judiciary, counts as one office.)

An office is "subordinate" if its officeholders can be chosen and removed by another office or if its decisions can be blocked or modified by another office, but it cannot similarly constrain the other office.

*Responses:*

0: All or nearly all elected offices are subordinate to non-elected offices at the local level.

1: Some elected offices are subordinate to non-elected offices at the local level.

2: Elected and non-elected offices are approximately equal in power at the local level.

3: Most non-elected offices are subordinate to elected offices at the local level.

4: All or nearly all non-elected offices are subordinate to elected offices at the local level.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Cleaning:* Set to missing when v2ellocgov is 0

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

### 3.1.6.9 Subnational elections free and fair (C) (v2elffelr)

*Project Manager(s):* Kelly McMann

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* Taking all aspects of the pre-election period, election day, and the post-election process into account, would you consider subnational elections (regional and local, as previously identified) to be free and fair on average?

*Clarification:* This question refers to subnational levels that have elected offices and elections. It does not refer to subnational levels without elected offices and elections. If there were no subnational elections in any of the years covered in this survey, choose option 5.

"Free and fair" refers to all aspects of the election process *except* the extent of suffrage (by law). Thus, a free and fair election may occur even if the law excludes significant groups (we measure that issue separately).

*Responses:*

0: No, not at all. The elections were fundamentally flawed and the official results had little if anything to do with the 'will of the people' (who won office).

1: Not really. While the elections allowed for some competition, the irregularities in the end affected the outcome of the elections (who won office).

2: Ambiguous. There was substantial competition and freedom of participation but there were also significant irregularities. It is hard to determine whether the irregularities affected the outcome or not (who won office).

3: Yes, somewhat. There were deficiencies and some degree of fraud and irregularities but these did not in the end affect the outcome (who won office).

4: Yes. There was some amount of human error and logistical restrictions but these were largely unintentional and without significant consequences.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Notes:* As of December 2014, the former category "5" is recoded as a separate variable (v2elffelrbin).

*Data release:* 3-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem*

*Methodology*).

*Cleaning*: Set to missing when v2elffelrbin\_ord is 0.

*Citation*: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years*: 1789-2021

### 3.1.6.10 Subnational elections held (C) (v2elffelrbin)

*Project Manager(s)*: Kelly McMann

*Additional versions*: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question*: Are subnational elections held?

*Responses*:

0: No.

1: Yes.

*Scale*: Dichotomous, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Notes*: As of December 2014, the former category "5" from variable v2elffelr is recoded as a separate variable (v2elffelrbin). If a coder chose the 5th category in the original question, it receives 0 in the new "v2elffelrbin" variable (corresponding to the answer, no, there were no subnational elections); otherwise it receives 1 (yes, there are subnational elections held). The resulting series of 0-1 country-coder time-series is run in the measurement model, which calculates the final value of v2elffelrbin while taking into account background coder characteristics.

*Data release*: 3-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation*: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Citation*: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years*: 1789-2021

### 3.1.6.11 Subnational election unevenness (C) (v2elsnlsff)

*Project Manager(s)*: Kelly McMann

*Additional versions*: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question*: Does the freeness and fairness of subnational elections vary across different areas of the country?

*Clarification*: Subnational elections refer to elections to regional or local offices, as specified above.

*Responses*:

0: Yes. Subnational elections in some areas of the country are significantly more free and fair (or, alternatively, significantly less free and fair) than subnational elections in other areas of the country.

1: Somewhat. Subnational elections in some areas of the country are somewhat more free and fair (or, alternatively, somewhat less free and fair) than subnational elections in other areas of the country.

2: No. Subnational elections in most or all areas of the country are equally free and fair (or, alternatively, equally not free and not fair).

*Ordering*: If answer is "2", skip remaining questions in this section.

*Scale*: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release*: 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation*: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Citation*: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years*: 1789-2021

#### 3.1.6.12 Subnational election area less free and fair name (C) (v2elsnless)

*Project Manager(s):* Kelly McMann

*Question:* In which areas of the country are subnational elections significantly *less* free and fair than the country average for subnational elections?

*Clarification:* If providing names of all the relevant territorial units is not possible, use broad categories (for example, "the North").

*Responses:*

Text.

*Data release:* 3-12. Available upon request, subject to review and approval.

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

#### 3.1.6.13 Subnational election area less free and fair characteristics (C) (v2elsnlfc)

*Project Manager(s):* Kelly McMann

*Additional versions:* \*\_nr

*Question:* How would you describe the areas of the country in which elections are significantly *less* free and fair?

*Clarification:* Choose all that apply.

*Responses:*

- 0: Rural. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc\_0]
- 1: Urban. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc\_1]
- 2: Areas that are less economically developed. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc\_2]
- 3: Areas that are more economically developed. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc\_3]
- 4: Inside the capital city. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc\_4]
- 5: Outside the capital city. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc\_5]
- 6: North. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc\_6]
- 7: South. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc\_7]
- 8: West. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc\_8]
- 9: East. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc\_9]
- 10: Areas of civil unrest (including areas where insurgent groups are active). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc\_10]
- 11: Areas where illicit activity is widespread. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc\_11]
- 12: Areas that are very sparsely populated. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc\_12]
- 13: Areas that are remote (difficult to reach by available transportation, for example). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc\_13]
- 14: Areas where there are indigenous populations. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc\_14]
- 15: Areas where the national ruling party or group is strong. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc\_15]
- 16: Areas where the national ruling party or group is weak. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc\_16]
- 17: Areas that were subject to a longer period of foreign rule. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc\_17]
- 18: Areas that were subject to a shorter period of foreign rule. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc\_18]
- 19: Areas that were recently subject to foreign rule. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc\_19]
- 20: Areas that have not recently been subject to foreign rule. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc\_20]
- 21: None of the above. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc\_21]

*Scale:* Series of dichotomous scales.

*Answer-type:* Multiple selection.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Mean.

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2021

#### 3.1.6.14 Subnational election area more free and fair name (C) (v2elsnmore)

*Project Manager(s):* Kelly McMann

*Question:* In which areas of the country are subnational elections significantly *more* free and fair than the country average for subnational elections?

*Clarification:* If providing names of all the relevant territorial units is not possible, use broad categories (for example, "the North").

*Responses:*

Text.

*Data release:* 3-12. Available upon request, subject to review and approval.

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

### 3.1.6.15 Subnational election area more free and fair characteristics (C) (v2elsnmrfc)

*Project Manager(s):* Kelly McMann

*Additional versions:* \*\_nr

*Question:* How would you describe the areas of the country in which elections are significantly *more* free and fair?

*Clarification:* Choose all that apply.

*Responses:*

- 0: Rural. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc\_0]
- 1: Urban. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc\_1]
- 2: Areas that are less economically developed. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc\_2]
- 3: Areas that are more economically developed. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc\_3]
- 4: Inside the capital city. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc\_4]
- 5: Outside the capital city. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc\_5]
- 6: North. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc\_6]
- 7: South. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc\_7]
- 8: West. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc\_8]
- 9: East. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc\_9]
- 10: Areas of civil unrest (including areas where insurgent groups are active). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc\_10]
- 11: Areas where illicit activity is widespread. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc\_11]
- 12: Areas that are very sparsely populated. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc\_12]
- 13: Areas that are remote (difficult to reach by available transportation, for example). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc\_13]
- 14: Areas where there are indigenous populations. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc\_14]
- 15: Areas where the national ruling party or group is strong. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc\_15]
- 16: Areas where the national ruling party or group is weak. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc\_16]
- 17: Areas that were subject to a longer period of foreign rule. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc\_17]
- 18: Areas that were subject to a shorter period of foreign rule. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc\_18]
- 19: Areas that were recently subject to foreign rule. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc\_19]
- 20: Areas that have not recently been subject to foreign rule. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc\_20]
- 21: None of the above. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc\_21]

*Scale:* Series of dichotomous scales.

*Answer-type:* Multiple-selection

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Mean.

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2021

## 3.2 Political Parties

### Instructions to the coders (as shown in the surveys)

**Political parties:** A "political party" refers to an organization that nominates candidates for public office. A party may refer to a longstanding coalition such as the CDU/CSU in Germany if that coalition functions in most respects like a single party. Sometimes, the identity of a party is obscured by name changes. However, if the party/coalition changes names but retains key personnel and is still run by and for the same constituency then it should be considered the same organization. Our notion of a party includes loose factional groupings such as the Tories and Whigs in the 19th-century Britain or the Caps and Hats in 18th-century Sweden. Unless stated otherwise the following questions pertain to parties that compete for seats in the national legislature or for the presidency.

Most of the questions in the following section ask you to generalize across parties in a particular country (and at a particular point in time). We realize that practices vary from party to party; these are, after all, highly diverse organizations. However, for our purposes it is important to consider what the most common practices are.

In answering these questions it is sometimes important to distinguish between formal rules (as stipulated by statute, legislative rules, the constitution, or common law precedent) and actual practice (what happens on the ground). In order to clarify the *de jure/de facto* distinction, we employ the terms "by law..." and "in practice..." Please pay close attention to these cues wherever you see them. And if there is no clarification of the issue, assume that the question is referring to practices rather than formal rules.

#### 3.2.0.1 Barriers to parties (C) (v2psbars)

*Project Manager(s):* Allen Hicken

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* How restrictive are the barriers to forming a party?

*Clarification:* Barriers include legal requirements such as requirements for membership or financial deposits, as well as harassment.

*Responses:*

- 0: Parties are not allowed.
- 1: It is impossible, or virtually impossible, for parties not affiliated with the government to form (legally).
- 2: There are significant obstacles (*e.g.* party leaders face high levels of regular political harassment by authorities).
- 3: There are modest barriers (*e.g.* party leaders face occasional political harassment by authorities).
- 4: There are no substantial barriers.

*Ordering:* If your answer is 1-4, proceed to the next question [v2psoppaut]. If your answer is 0, skip to the question about Party organization [v2psorgs].

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

#### 3.2.0.2 Party ban (C) (v2psparban)

*Project Manager(s):* Allen Hicken

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr



*Question:* Are any parties banned?

*Clarification:* This does not apply to parties that are barred from competing for failing to meet registration requirements or support thresholds.

*Responses:*

- 0: Yes. All parties except the state-sponsored party (and closely allied parties) are banned.
- 1: Yes. Elections are non-partisan or there are no officially recognized parties.
- 2: Yes. Many parties are banned.
- 3: Yes. But only a few parties are banned.
- 4: No. No parties are officially banned.

*Ordering:* If your answer is 4, skip the next question [v2psbantar].

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

### 3.2.0.3 Party ban target (C) (v2psbantar)

*Project Manager(s):* Allen Hicken

*Additional versions:* \*\_nr

*Question:* If any parties are banned, what label best describes these parties?

*Clarification:* Choose all that apply.

*Responses:*

- 0: Ethnic party. [v2psbantar\_0]
- 1: Religious party. [v2psbantar\_1]
- 2: Regional/local party. [v2psbantar\_2]
- 3: Leftist extremist party. [v2psbantar\_3]
- 4: Rightist extremist party. [v2psbantar\_4]
- 5: Other. [v2psbantar\_5]

*Scale:* Series of dichotomous scales.

*Answer-type:* Multiple-selection.

*Notes:* The answer categories for contemporary and historical differ in the inclusion of the word "extremist". In contemporary it is included while excluded in the historical answer categories.

*Data release:* 3-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Mean.

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

### 3.2.0.4 Opposition parties autonomy (C) (v2psoppaut)

*Project Manager(s):* Allen Hicken

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* Are opposition parties independent and autonomous of the ruling regime?

*Clarification:* An opposition party is any party that is not part of the government, *i.e.*, that has no control over the executive.

*Responses:*

- 0: Opposition parties are not allowed.
- 1: There are no autonomous, independent opposition parties. Opposition parties are either selected or co-opted by the ruling regime.
- 2: At least some opposition parties are autonomous and independent of the ruling regime.
- 3: Most significant opposition parties are autonomous and independent of the ruling regime.
- 4: All opposition parties are autonomous and independent of the ruling regime.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

### 3.2.0.5 Party organizations (C) (v2psorgs)

*Project Manager(s):* Allen Hicken

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* How many political parties for national-level office have permanent organizations?

*Clarification:* A permanent organization connotes a substantial number of personnel who are responsible for carrying out party activities outside of the election season.

*Responses:*

- 0: No parties.
- 1: Fewer than half of the parties.
- 2: About half of the parties.
- 3: More than half of the parties.
- 4: All parties.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

### 3.2.0.6 Party branches (C) (v2psprbrch)

*Project Manager(s):* Allen Hicken

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* How many parties have permanent local party branches?

*Responses:*

- 0: None.
- 1: Fewer than half.
- 2: About half.
- 3: More than half.
- 4: All.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

### 3.2.0.7 Party linkages (C) (v2psprlnks)

*Project Manager(s):* Allen Hicken

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* Among the major parties, what is the main or most common form of linkage to their constituents?

*Clarification:* A party-constituent linkage refers to the sort of "good" that the party offers in exchange for political support and participation in party activities.

*Responses:*

- 0: Clientelistic. Constituents are rewarded with goods, cash, and/or jobs.
- 1: Mixed clientelistic and local collective.
- 2: Local collective. Constituents are rewarded with local collective goods, *e.g.*, wells, toilets, markets, roads, bridges, and local development.
- 3: Mixed local collective and policy/programmatic.
- 4: Policy/programmatic. Constituents respond to a party's positions on national policies, general party programs, and visions for society.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

*Convergence:* Model parameters with convergence issues: universal thresholds, expert thresholds, main-country-coded thresholds.

### 3.2.0.8 Distinct party platforms (C) (v2psplats)

*Project Manager(s):* Allen Hicken

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* How many political parties with representation in the national legislature or presidency have publicly available party platforms (manifestos) that are publicized and relatively distinct from one another?

*Clarification:* In order to be counted in the affirmative, parties must have platforms that are both distinct (either in terms of content or generalized ideology) and publicly disseminated.

This question is *not* intended to measure how much the public actually knows about these platforms or whether they are important in structuring policymaking.

*Responses:*

- 0: None, or nearly none.
- 1: Fewer than half.
- 2: About half.
- 3: More than half.
- 4: All, or nearly all.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

*Convergence:* Model parameters with convergence issues: country-date latent trait estimates, universal thresholds, expert reliability, expert thresholds, main-country-coded thresholds.

### 3.2.0.9 Candidate selection-national/local (C) (v2pscnslnl)

*Project Manager(s):* Allen Hicken

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* How centralized is legislative candidate selection within the parties?

*Clarification:* The power to select candidates for national legislative elections is often divided between local/municipal party actors, regional/state-level party organizations, and national

party leaders. One level usually dominates the selection process, while sometimes candidate selection is the outcome of bargaining between the different levels of party organization.

*Responses:*

- 0: National legislative candidates are selected exclusively by national party leaders.
- 1: National legislative candidate selection is dominated by national party leaders but with some limited influence from local or state level organizations.
- 2: National legislative candidates are chosen through bargaining across different levels of party organization.
- 3: National legislative candidates are chosen by regional or state-level organizations, perhaps with some input from local party organizations or constituency groups.
- 4: National legislative candidates are chosen by a small cadre of local or municipal level actors.
- 5: National legislative candidates are chosen by constituency groups or direct primaries.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

*Convergence:* Model parameters with convergence issues: universal thresholds.

### 3.2.0.10 Legislative party cohesion (C) (v2pscohesv)

*Project Manager(s):* Allen Hicken

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* Is it normal for members of the legislature to vote with other members of their party on important bills?

*Responses:*

- 0: Not really. Many members are elected as independents and party discipline is very weak.
- 1: More often than not. Members are more likely to vote with their parties than against them, but defections are common.
- 2: Mostly. Members vote with their parties most of the time.
- 3: Yes, absolutely. Members vote with their parties almost all the time.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

### 3.2.0.11 Party competition across regions (C) (v2pscomprg)

*Project Manager(s):* Allen Hicken

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* Which of the following best describes the nature of electoral support for major parties (those gaining over 10 % of the vote)?

*Clarification:* Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

*Responses:*

- 0: Most major parties are competitive in only one or two regions of the country, *i.e.*, their support is heavily concentrated in a few areas.
- 1: Most major parties are competitive in some regions of the country, but not in others.
- 2: Most major parties are competitive in most regions of the country.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

### 3.2.0.12 National party control (C) (v2psnatpar)

*Project Manager(s):* Allen Hicken

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* How unified is party control of the national government?

*Clarification:* With respect to the executive, consider only those offices that have effective power over policymaking. (If there is a monarch or president with very little policymaking power, this office should not be considered.) With respect to bicameral legislatures, consider only the chamber, or chambers, that have effective policymaking power. (If the upper chamber is inactive or clearly subordinate, consider only the lower chamber.) Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

*Responses:*

0: Unified coalition control. A single multi-party coalition controls the executive and legislative branches of the national government. (This is true almost by definition in a parliamentary system where a single coalition gathers together a majority of seats.).

1: Divided party control. (A) Different parties or individuals (unconnected to parties) control the executive and the legislature or (B) Executive power is divided between a president/monarch and a prime minister, each of which belongs to different parties; or between a non-partisan monarch and a prime minister.

2: Unified party control. A single party controls the executive and legislative branches of the national government. (This is true almost by definition in a parliamentary system where a single party has a majority of seats.).

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2021

### 3.2.0.13 Subnational party control (C) (v2pssunpar)

*Project Manager(s):* Allen Hicken

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* Does a single party control important policymaking bodies across subnational units (regional and local governments)?

*Clarification:* Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

*Responses:*

0: In almost all subnational units (at least 90%), a single party controls all or virtually all policymaking bodies.

1: In most subnational units (66%-90%), a single party controls all or virtually all policymaking bodies.

2: In few subnational units (less than 66%), a single party controls all or virtually all policymaking bodies.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

### 3.3 Direct Democracy

#### Instructions to the coders (as shown in the surveys)

**Direct democracy:** This set of questions focuses on direct popular votes. Four mechanisms are distinguished:

- a. Measures placed on the ballot by the executive and/or the legislature for which the constitution or basic laws require a vote. These are referred to as *constitutional referendums* (i.e. *obligatory referendums*).
- b. Measures placed on the ballot by the executive and/or the legislature that for which the constitution or basic laws does not require a vote. These are referred to as *plebiscites*.
- c. Measures placed on the ballot through a citizen petition process that concern the possible adoption of a new law or constitutional amendment. These are referred to as *popular initiatives*.
- d. Measures placed on the ballot through a citizen petition process that concern the possible rejection of a recently approved law or a bill discussed in parliament. These are referred to as *referendums*.

Note that we do not consider recall elections or citizen petitions to the legislature even they may also involve a gathering of signatures or a popular vote. Note also that in coding these questions it is sometimes important to distinguish between formal rules (as stipulated by statute, legislative rules, the constitution, or common law precedent) and actual practice. In order to clarify the *de jure/de facto* distinction, we employ the terms "by law..." and "in practice..."

#### 3.3.1 Initiatives

##### 3.3.1.1 Initiatives permitted (A) (v2ddlexci)

*Project Manager(s):* David Altman

*Question:* Is there legal provision for initiatives?

*Clarification:* These are measures placed on the ballot through a citizen petition process, not by the legislature or the executive. They may concern either a new law or a constitutional amendment.

*Responses:*

- 0: Not allowed.
- 1: Allowed but non-binding (or with an intervening institutional veto).
- 2: Allowed and binding.

*Ordering:* If no legal provision exists (option 0), skip to question "Referendums permitted" [v2ddlexrf].

*Scale:* Ordinal.

*Notes:* Converted from (B) to (A) coding by David Altman.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Country-Year Aggregation:* Last

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2021

##### 3.3.1.2 Initiatives signatures (A) (v2ddsignci)

*Project Manager(s):* David Altman

*Question:* How many signatures are required in order to place an initiative on the ballot?

*Responses:*

Numeric.

*Scale:* Interval.



*Notes:* Converted from (B) to (A) coding by David Altman.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Country–Year Aggregation:* Last

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2021

### **3.3.1.3 Initiatives signatures % (A) (v2ddsigpci)**

*Project Manager(s):* David Altman

*Question:* How many signatures — expressed as the percentage (%) of registered voters — are required in order to place an initiative on the ballot?

*Responses:*

Percent.

*Scale:* Interval.

*Notes:* Converted from (B) to (A) coding by David Altman.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Country–Year Aggregation:* Day-weighted mean

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2021

### **3.3.1.4 Initiatives signature-gathering period (A) (v2ddsigdci)**

*Project Manager(s):* David Altman

*Question:* If you answered yes to the previous question, how long is the period allowed for gathering signatures (expressed as a number of days) for an initiative?

*Responses:*

Numeric.

*Ordering:* Answer only if answered 1 for previous question.

*Scale:* Interval.

*Notes:* Converted from (B) to (A) coding by David Altman.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Country–Year Aggregation:* Last

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1919-2021

### **3.3.1.5 Initiatives signature-gathering time limit (A) (v2ddsiglci)**

*Project Manager(s):* David Altman

*Question:* Is there a limit on the time allowed for signature gathering prior to placing an initiative on the ballot?

*Responses:*

0: No.

1: Yes.

*Scale:* Dichotomous.

*Notes:* Converted from (B) to (A) coding by David Altman.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Country–Year Aggregation:* Last

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2021

### **3.3.1.6 Initiatives participation threshold (A) (v2ddpartci)**

*Project Manager(s)*: David Altman

*Question*: What threshold of participation — expressed as a percentage of registered voters — must be reached in order for an initiative to be binding?

*Clarification*: Enter 0 if there is no threshold.

*Responses*:

Percent.

*Scale*: Interval.

*Notes*: Converted from (B) to (A) coding by David Altman.

*Data release*: 1-12.

*Country–Year Aggregation*: Day-weighted mean

*Citation*: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years*: 1900-2021

### 3.3.1.7 Initiatives approval threshold (A) (v2ddapprci)

*Project Manager(s)*: David Altman

*Question*: What threshold of approval — expressed as a percentage of registered voters — must be reached in order for an initiative to be binding?

*Clarification*: Enter 0 if there is no threshold.

*Responses*:

Percent.

*Scale*: Interval.

*Notes*: Converted from (B) to (A) coding by David Altman.

*Data release*: 1-12.

*Country–Year Aggregation*: Day-weighted mean

*Citation*: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years*: 1900-2021

### 3.3.1.8 Initiatives administrative threshold (A) (v2ddadmci)

*Project Manager(s)*: David Altman

*Question*: What percentage of subnational districts (*e.g.*, cantons, provinces, states) must approve (by majority vote) in order for an initiative to be approved?

*Clarification*: Enter 0 if there is no threshold.

*Responses*:

Percent.

*Scale*: Interval.

*Data release*: 7-12.

*Country–Year Aggregation*: Day-weighted mean

*Citation*: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years*: 1900-2021

### 3.3.1.9 Initiatives super majority (A) (v2ddspmci)

*Project Manager(s)*: David Altman

*Question*: What percentage (%) of the vote is regarded as sufficient, by law, for the approval of an initiative?

*Clarification*: For 2/3, enter 66 %.

*Responses*:

Percent.

*Scale*: Interval.

*Notes*: Converted from (B) to (A) coding by David Altman.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Country–Year Aggregation:* Day-weighted mean

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2021

### **3.3.1.10 Popular initiative credible threat (A) (v2ddthreci)**

*Project Manager(s):* David Altman

*Question:* How effective is the menace of a popular initiative?

*Clarification:* If the years since the last successful event is smaller than 6, then v2ddthreci =1, afterwards decreases by 0.06 units per year until 0.1; if the event was not successful during the first years v2ddthreci =0.9, afterwards decreases by 0.1 units per year until 0.1.

*Responses:*

Percent.

*Scale:* Interval.

*Data release:* 7-12.

*Country–Year Aggregation:* Day-weighted mean

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2021

## **3.3.2 Referendums**

### **3.3.2.1 Referendums permitted (A) (v2ddlexrf)**

*Project Manager(s):* David Altman

*Question:* Is there legal provision for referendums?

*Clarification:* These are measures placed on the ballot through a citizen petition process, not by the legislature or the executive. They may concern either the rejection of a recently approved law or a bill discussed in parliament. (They do not include recall elections.)

*Responses:*

0: Not allowed.

1: Allowed but non-binding (or with an intervening institutional veto).

2: Allowed and binding.

*Ordering:* If no legal provision exists (option 0), skip to question "Occurrence of plebiscite this year" [v2ddyrrpl].

*Scale:* Ordinal.

*Notes:* Converted from (B) to (A) coding by David Altman.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Country–Year Aggregation:* Last

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2021

### **3.3.2.2 Referendums signatures (A) (v2ddsignrf)**

*Project Manager(s):* David Altman

*Question:* How many signatures are required in order to place a referendum on the ballot?

*Clarification:* If the law treats this as a percentage (%) of registered voters, please leave this question blank and answer the next question instead.

*Responses:*

Numeric.

*Scale:* Interval.

*Notes:* Converted from (B) to (A) coding by David Altman.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Country–Year Aggregation:* Last

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900–2021

### **3.3.2.3 Referendums signatures % (A) (v2ddsigprf)**

*Project Manager(s):* David Altman

*Question:* How many signatures — expressed as the percentage (%) of registered voters — are required in order to place a referendum on the ballot?

*Clarification:* If the law treats this as a raw number of registered voters, please leave this question blank and answer the previous question instead.

*Responses:*

Percent.

*Scale:* Interval.

*Notes:* Converted from (B) to (A) coding by David Altman.

*Data release:* 7–12.

*Country–Year Aggregation:* Day-weighted mean

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900–2021

### **3.3.2.4 Referendums signature-gathering period (A) (v2ddsigdrf)**

*Project Manager(s):* David Altman

*Question:* If you answered yes to the previous question, how long is period allowed for gathering signatures (expressed as a number of days) for a referendum?

*Responses:*

Numeric.

*Ordering:* Answer if previous question is coded 1.

*Scale:* Interval.

*Notes:* Converted from (B) to (A) coding by David Altman.

*Data release:* 1–12.

*Country–Year Aggregation:* Last

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900–2021

### **3.3.2.5 Referendums signature-gathering limit (A) (v2ddsiglrf)**

*Project Manager(s):* David Altman

*Question:* Is there a limit on the time allowed for signature gathering prior to placing a referendum on the ballot?

*Responses:*

0: No.

1: Yes.

*Scale:* Dichotomous.

*Notes:* Converted from (B) to (A) coding by David Altman.

*Data release:* 1–12.

*Country–Year Aggregation:* Last

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900–2021

### **3.3.2.6 Referendums participation threshold (A) (v2ddpartrf)**

*Project Manager(s):* David Altman

*Question:* What threshold of participation — expressed as a percentage of registered voters — must be reached in order for a referendum to be binding?

*Clarification:* Enter 0 if there is no threshold.

*Responses:*

Percent.

*Scale:* Interval.

*Notes:* Converted from (B) to (A) coding by David Altman.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Country–Year Aggregation:* Day-weighted mean

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2021

### **3.3.2.7 Referendums approval threshold (A) (v2ddapprf)**

*Project Manager(s):* David Altman

*Question:* What threshold of approval — expressed as a percentage of registered voters — must be reached in order for a referendum to be binding?

*Clarification:* Enter 0 if there is no threshold.

*Responses:*

Percent.

*Scale:* Interval.

*Notes:* Converted from (B) to (A) coding by David Altman.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Country–Year Aggregation:* Day-weighted mean

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2021

### **3.3.2.8 Referendums administrative threshold (A) (v2ddadmrf)**

*Project Manager(s):* David Altman

*Question:* What percentage of subnational districts (*e.g.*, cantons, provinces, states) must approve (by majority vote) in order for a referendum to be approved?

*Clarification:* Enter 0 if there is no threshold.

*Responses:*

Percent.

*Scale:* Interval.

*Data release:* 7-12.

*Country–Year Aggregation:* Day-weighted mean

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2021

### **3.3.2.9 Referendums super majority (A) (v2ddspmr)**

*Project Manager(s):* David Altman

*Question:* What percentage (%) of the vote is regarded as sufficient, by law, for the approval of a referendum?

*Clarification:* For 2/3, enter 66 %.

*Responses:*

Percent.

*Scale:* Interval.

*Notes:* Converted from (B) to (A) coding by David Altman.

*Data release:* 3-12.

*Country–Year Aggregation:* Day-weighted mean

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2021

### **3.3.2.10 Popular referendum credible threat (A) (v2ddthrerf)**

*Project Manager(s):* David Altman

*Question:* How effective is the menace of a popular referendum?

*Clarification:* If the years since the last successful event is smaller than 6, then v2ddthrerf =1, afterwards decreases by 0.06 units per year until 0.1; if the event was not successful during the first years v2ddthrerf =0.9, afterwards decreases by 0.1 units per year until 0.1.

*Responses:*

Percent.

*Scale:* Interval.

*Data release:* 7-12.

*Country–Year Aggregation:* Day-weighted mean

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2021

### **3.3.3 Obligatory referendums**

#### **3.3.3.1 Enforcement of Constitutional changes through popular vote (A) (v2ddlexor)**

*Project Manager(s):* David Altman

*Question:* Is a popular and direct vote required in order for a constitutional change to be legally binding?

*Clarification:* Unless otherwise stated, every question refers to direct democracy at the national level, *i.e.* it does not incorporate popular votes at the provincial or local level.

*Responses:*

0: No, it is not required.

1: Depends on the content of constitutional change (for some it is required, for others however it is not).

2: Yes, any constitutional must be approved directly by the citizenry.

*Scale:* Ordinal.

*Data release:* 7-12.

*Country–Year Aggregation:* Last

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2021

#### **3.3.3.2 Obligatory referendum participation threshold (A) (v2ddpartor)**

*Project Manager(s):* David Altman

*Question:* Must some threshold of participation be reached in order for an obligatory referendum to be binding?

*Clarification:* Specify the required turnout as a percentage of registered voters. Enter 0 if there is no threshold.

*Responses:*

Percent.

*Scale:* Interval.

*Data release:* 7-12.

*Country–Year Aggregation:* Day-weighted mean

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2021

### **3.3.3.3 Obligatory referendum approval threshold (A) (v2ddappor)**

*Project Manager(s):* David Altman

*Question:* Must some threshold of approval — among registered voters — be reached in order for an obligatory referendum to be binding?

*Clarification:* Express your answer as a percentage of registered voters. Enter 0 if there is no threshold.

*Responses:*

Percent.

*Scale:* Interval.

*Data release:* 7-12.

*Country–Year Aggregation:* Day-weighted mean

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2021

### **3.3.3.4 Obligatory referendum administrative threshold (A) (v2ddadmor)**

*Project Manager(s):* David Altman

*Question:* What percentage of subnational districts (*e.g.*, cantons, provinces, states) must approve (by majority vote) in order for an obligatory referendum to be approved?

*Clarification:* Enter 0 if there is no threshold.

*Responses:*

Percent.

*Scale:* Interval.

*Data release:* 7-12.

*Country–Year Aggregation:* Day-weighted mean

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2021

### **3.3.3.5 Obligatory referendum super majority (A) (v2ddspmor)**

*Project Manager(s):* David Altman

*Question:* What percentage (%) of the vote is regarded as sufficient, by law, for the approval of an obligatory referendum?

*Clarification:* For 2/3, enter 66 %.

*Responses:*

Percent.

*Scale:* Interval.

*Data release:* 3-12.

*Country–Year Aggregation:* Day-weighted mean

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2021

### **3.3.3.6 Obligatory referendum credible threat (A) (v2ddthreor)**

*Project Manager(s):* David Altman

*Question:* How effective is the menace of an obligatory referendum?

*Clarification:* If the years since the last successful event is smaller than 6, then  $v2ddthreor = 1$ , afterwards decreases by 0.06 units per year until 0.1; if the event was not successful during the first years  $v2ddthreor = 0.9$ , afterwards decreases by 0.1 units per year until 0.1.



*Responses:*

Percent.

*Scale:* Interval.

*Data release:* 7-12.

*Country–Year Aggregation:* Day-weighted mean

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2021

### 3.3.4 Plebiscites

#### 3.3.4.1 Plebiscites permitted (A) (v2ddlexpl)

*Project Manager(s):* David Altman

*Question:* Is there legal provision for plebiscites?

*Clarification:* These are measures placed on the ballot by the legislature and/or the executive.

*Responses:*

0: Not allowed.

1: Allowed but non-binding (or with an intervening institutional veto).

2: Allowed and binding.

*Ordering:* If no legal provision exists (option 0), skip to question "Initiatives permitted" [v2ddlexci].

*Scale:* Ordinal.

*Notes:* Converted from (B) to (A) coding by David Altman.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Country–Year Aggregation:* Last

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2021

#### 3.3.4.2 Plebiscites participation threshold (A) (v2ddpartpl)

*Project Manager(s):* David Altman

*Question:* What threshold of participation — expressed as a percentage of registered voters — must be reached in order for a plebiscite to be binding?

*Clarification:* Enter 0 if there is no threshold.

*Responses:*

Percent.

*Scale:* Interval.

*Notes:* Converted from (B) to (A) coding by David Altman.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Country–Year Aggregation:* Day-weighted mean

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2021

#### 3.3.4.3 Plebiscites approval threshold (A) (v2ddapprpl)

*Project Manager(s):* David Altman

*Question:* What threshold of approval — expressed as a percentage of registered voters — must be reached in order for a plebiscite to be binding?

*Clarification:* Enter 0 if there is no threshold.

*Responses:*

Percent.

*Scale:* Interval.

*Notes:* Converted from (B) to (A) coding by David Altman.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Country–Year Aggregation:* Day-weighted mean

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2021

#### **3.3.4.4 Plebiscites administrative threshold (A) (v2ddadmpl)**

*Project Manager(s):* David Altman

*Question:* Must a majority across subnational districts (*e.g.*, cantons, provinces, states) be attained in order for a plebiscite to be approved?

*Responses:*

0: No.

1: Yes — at least half of subnational districts.

2: Yes — more than half of subnational districts.

*Scale:* Ordinal.

*Notes:* Converted from (B) to (A) coding by David Altman.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Country–Year Aggregation:* Last

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2021

#### **3.3.4.5 Plebiscites super majority (A) (v2ddspmpl)**

*Project Manager(s):* David Altman

*Question:* What percentage (%) of the vote is regarded as sufficient, by law, for the approval of a plebiscite?

*Clarification:* For 2/3, enter 66 %.

*Responses:*

Percent.

*Scale:* Interval.

*Notes:* Converted from (B) to (A) coding by David Altman.

*Data release:* 3-12.

*Country–Year Aggregation:* Day-weighted mean

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2021

#### **3.3.4.6 Plebiscites credible threat (A) (v2ddthrepl)**

*Project Manager(s):* David Altman

*Question:* How effective is the menace of a plebiscite?

*Clarification:* If the years since the last successful event is smaller than 6, then  $v2ddthrepl = 1$ , afterwards decreases by 0.06 units per year until 0.1; if the event was not successful during the first years  $v2ddthrepl = 0.9$ , afterwards decreases by 0.1 units per year until 0.1.

*Responses:*

Percent.

*Scale:* Interval.

*Data release:* 7-12.

*Country–Year Aggregation:* Day-weighted mean

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2021

### 3.3.5 Occurrences

#### 3.3.5.1 Occurrence of citizen-initiatives this year (A) (v2ddyrci)

*Project Manager(s)*: David Altman

*Question*: How many *citizen-initiative* occurred this year?

*Responses*:

Numeric.

*Scale*: Interval.

*Data release*: 7-12.

*Country–Year Aggregation*: Last

*Citation*: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years*: 1900-2021

#### 3.3.5.2 Occurrence of referendum this year (A) (v2ddyrrf)

*Project Manager(s)*: David Altman

*Question*: How many *referendums* occurred this year?

*Responses*:

Numeric.

*Scale*: Interval.

*Data release*: 7-12.

*Country–Year Aggregation*: Last

*Citation*: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years*: 1900-2021

#### 3.3.5.3 Occurrence of obligatory referendum this year (A) (v2ddyrror)

*Project Manager(s)*: David Altman

*Question*: How many *obligatory referendums* occurred this year?

*Responses*:

Numeric.

*Scale*: Interval.

*Data release*: 7-12.

*Country–Year Aggregation*: Last

*Citation*: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years*: 1900-2021

#### 3.3.5.4 Occurrence of plebiscite this year (A) (v2ddyrrpl)

*Project Manager(s)*: David Altman

*Question*: How many *plebiscites* occurred this year?

*Responses*:

Numeric.

*Scale*: Interval.

*Data release*: 7-12.

*Country–Year Aggregation*: Last

*Citation*: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years*: 1900-2021

#### 3.3.5.5 Number of popular votes this year (A) (v2ddyrrall)

*Project Manager(s)*: David Altman

*Question:* How many direct democracy elections (initiatives, referendums and/or plebiscites) occurred this year?

*Responses:*

Numeric.

*Scale:* Interval.

*Data release:* 3, 7-12.

*Country–Year Aggregation:* Last

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2021

### **3.3.5.6 Occurrence of any type of popular vote this year credible (A) (v2ddcredal)**

*Project Manager(s):* David Altman

*Question:* If any direct democracy election occurred this year, was the official result of the vote, or votes (their success or failure) credible?

*Clarification:* By credible, we mean whether the official results of the vote(s) reflect the actual vote (leaving aside issues of voter exclusion, intimidation, or vote-buying).

*Responses:*

0: Not credible.

1: Credible.

*Scale:* Dichotomous.

*Notes:* Converted from (B) to (A) coding by David Altman.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Country–Year Aggregation:* Last

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2021

### 3.4 The Executive

#### Instructions to the coders (as shown in the surveys)

**Executive:** In this section, we distinguish between the head of state (HOS) and the head of government (HOG). The *head of state* is an individual or collective body that serves as the chief public representative of the country. Sometimes this is a largely ceremonial role, *e.g.* a monarch who reigns but does not rule, or a president whose powers are strictly circumscribed. The *head of government* is the chief officer(s) of the executive branch of government, typically presiding over a cabinet. In a parliamentary system, this is usually the prime minister. In a presidential system, this is usually the president, who then serves as both, head of state and head of government. In a typical semi-presidential system, the president serves as head of state and the prime minister serves as head of government.

These definitions are grounded in the *functions* that each office performs, as described above. Titles can be confusing. Do not assume, for example, that simply because an individual holds the title of "president" s/he is serving as the chief public representative of the country. Likewise, it may be that the *effective* head of state/head of government is someone other than the *official* head of state/head of government. In this instance, the following questions apply to the person who effectively wields this power. In some socialist systems, for example, the official head of state was a person within the state bureaucracy, but in practice the chief public representative of the country was the chairman of the communist party. It is the latter who is the "effective" head of state, and hence should be the focus of your answers. The same applies if the head of state/head of government is so old, sick or perhaps mentally disabled that s/he cannot perform his/her functions, which are instead performed by someone else. It is the latter person who is the effective head of state/head of government.

If you are considering a semi sovereign territory, such as a colony, an annexed territory or a member of the British Commonwealth, please answer the following questions with respect to the head of state and (if separate) the head of government who is located in the territory in question. Thus, in a typical British colony the governor-general—not the King/Queen of England—would be understood as the head of state. Likewise, in a British colony the local prime minister in the colony—not the prime minister in London—would be understood as the head of government.

In order to mitigate potential misunderstandings, the identities of the head of state and head of government for each country have been pre-coded for as many years as possible. Thus, when conducting your coding make sure to pay close attention to the names of these individuals, which you can see by clicking on the year grid for a particular year in the first question of this section, "HOS name." This is your key to what we mean by "head of state" or "head of government."

Note also that when the two functions are fused in the same office, we ask you to code only the head of state section of the survey. Any precoded years contain an orange triangle. This means that either the score or text and/or specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the precoded rating; we do not want you to change the rating, as we need all the Country Experts to answer the subsequent questions for the same executives. If you feel strongly that the precoded information is wrong, please rate your confidence in the preloaded information and then consult your V-Dem contact. You will have to rate confidence in all the available years in order to proceed to the next question.

In order to avoid spending time on short-lived executives, we have included only executives who held office for at least 100 days.

**Executive – Historical clarification:** In this section, we distinguish between the head of state (HOS) and the head of government (HOG). The head of state is an individual or collective body that serves as the chief public representative of the country. Sometimes, this is a largely ceremonial role, *e.g.*, a monarch who reigns but does not rule or a president whose powers are strictly circumscribed.

The head of government is the chief officer(s) of the executive branch of government, typically

presiding over a cabinet. In a parliamentary system, this is usually the prime minister. In a presidential system, this is usually the president, who then serves as both head of state and head of government. In a typical semi-presidential system, the president serves as head of state and the prime minister serves as head of government. These definitions are grounded in the functions that each office performs, as described above. Titles can be confusing. Do not assume, for example, that simply because an individual holds the title of "president" s/he is serving as the chief public representative of the country.

Likewise, it may be that the effective head of state/head of government is someone other than the official head of state/head of government. In this instance, the following questions apply to the person who effectively wields this power. In some socialist systems, for example, the official head of state was a person within the state bureaucracy, but in practice the chief public representative of the country was the chairman of the communist party. It is the latter who is the "effective" head of state, and hence should be the focus of your answers. The same applies if the head of state/head of government is so old, sick or perhaps mentally disabled that s/he cannot perform his/her functions, which are instead performed by someone else. It is the latter person who is the effective head of state/head of government. This would apply for example to regency councils for underage monarchs. Note also that when the two functions are fused in the same office, we ask you to code only the head of state section of the survey.

In order to avoid spending time on short-lived executives, we have only included executives who held office for at least 100 days.

**Head of Government (HOG):** This section of the survey pertains to the head of government (HOG). Answer questions in this section only for years in which the head of government is not identical to the head of state, as indicated by a zero (0) in the year grid of the previous question.

If the effective head of government is someone other than the official head of government, or there is no official head of government, the questions apply to the effective head of government. In some socialist systems, for example, the official head of government could be a person within the state bureaucracy, but in practice the chief public representative of the country is the chairman of the communist party. We then want you to code only that effective head of government (and, if that is also the head of state, you can skip this section). The same applies if the official head of government is so old, sick or perhaps mentally disabled that s/he cannot perform his/her functions, which are instead performed by someone else.

Once again, the identities of the head of government for each country have been pre-coded for as many years as possible. Thus, when conducting your coding make sure to pay close attention to the names of these individuals, which you can see by clicking on the year grid for a particular year in the first question of this section, "HOG name." This is your key to what we mean by "head of government." Any precoded years contain an orange triangle. This means that either the score or text and/or specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the precoded rating; we do not want you to change the rating, as we need all the Country Experts to answer the subsequent questions for the same executives. If you feel strongly that the precoded information is wrong, please rate your confidence in the preloaded information and then consult your V-Dem contact. You will have to rate confidence in all the available years in order to proceed to the next question. In order to avoid spending time on short-lived executives, we have included only executives who held office for at least 100 days. This section of the survey pertains to the head of government (HOG).

Answer questions in this section only for years in which the head of government is not identical to the head of state, as indicated by a zero (0) in the year grid of the previous question.

If the effective head of government is someone other than the official head of government, or there is no official head of government, the questions apply to the effective head of government. In some socialist systems, for example, the official head of government could be a person within the state bureaucracy, but in practice the chief public representative of the country is the chairman of the communist party. We then want you to code only that "effective" head of government (and, if that

is also the head of state, you can skip this section). The same applies if the official head of government is so old, sick or perhaps mentally disabled that s/he cannot perform his/her functions, which are instead performed by someone else.

Once again, the identities of the head of government for each country have been pre-coded for as many years as possible. Thus, when conducting your coding make sure to pay close attention to the names of these individuals, which you can see by clicking on the year grid for a particular year in the first question of this section, "HOG name." This is your key to what we mean by "head of government." Any precoded years contain an orange triangle. This means that either the score or text and/or specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the precoded rating; we do not want you to change the rating, as we need all the Country Experts to answer the subsequent questions for the same executives. If you feel strongly that the precoded information is wrong, please rate your confidence in the preloaded information and then consult your V-Dem contact. You will have to rate confidence in all the available years in order to proceed to the next question. In order to avoid spending time on short-lived executives, we have included only executives who held office for at least 100 days.

**Head of Government (HOG) – Historical clarification:** This section of the survey pertains to the head of government (HOG). Answer questions in this section only for years in which the head of government is not identical to the head of state, as indicated by a zero (0) in the year grid of the previous question.

If the effective head of government is someone other than the official head of government, or there is no official head of government, the questions apply to the effective head of government. In some socialist systems, for example, the official head of government could be a person within the state bureaucracy, but in practice the chief public representative of the country is the chairman of the communist party. We then want you to code only that "effective" head of government (and, if that is also the head of state, you can skip this section). The same applies if the official head of government is so old, sick or perhaps mentally disabled that s/he cannot perform his/her functions, which are instead performed by someone else.

In order to avoid spending time on short-lived executives, only include executives who held office for at least 100 days.

**Executive as a whole:** This final section of the survey pertains to the executive, considered as a whole. Some questions refer to "members of the executive", *i.e.*, the head of state, the head of government, and cabinet ministers. If you feel that the answer to a question varies across these offices, your answer should reflect the average (arithmetic mean) across these offices. Other questions refer to lower-level members of the executive branch. This will be clarified as we proceed.

**Regime – Part 1:** Thank you for answering the survey on executive! We have been prompted by scholars and policy practitioners that data for the following questions related to the regimes would be really important for the research and policy advise. Please consider coding the three new questions that follow right after an important clarifying note and two pre-coded questions with information on what we consider are the country's regimes (at different points in time) and how they ended – this is completely voluntary.

**Regime – Part 2:** This final part of this section of the survey pertains to the political regime, and asks questions about the key supporting groups the regime relies on to stay in power.

A political regime can be defined as the set of formal and/or informal rules that are essential for choosing political leaders and/or maintaining political leaders in power. If it is evident that formal and informal rules correspond (*i.e.* the formal rules are followed), then the formal rules define the regime. In these cases, we observe the formal rules (*e.g.* the constitution) to observe the regime. If, on the other hand, the formal rules do not correspond with the informal rules, such as in most dictatorships, then the regime is defined by the informal coalition of actors that select and sustain leaders, along with the informal rules they administer. In these cases, we must look to the *de facto* ruling elites and their established practice to observe the regime (*e.g.*, the military junta in a



military regime). Thus a regime is typically characterized by it determining who selects policies, and often also how these policies are typically selected. A regime change presupposes a substantial change in the formal and/or informal rules by which a country is governed.

Examples of regimes might include the Second French Republic, the Communist regime in post-WWII Poland, the current Saudi monarchic regime in Saudi Arabia and the post-WWII democratic regime in Austria. Sometimes, regime changes are related to government or leadership changes (such as the change in Zaire/DR Congo from the regime under Mobutu to the current regime under Kabila), but government or leadership changes do not necessarily bring regime changes (such as in post-election government changes in democracies or with the institutionalized changes to prime ministers and presidents in current China). Sometimes, regime changes can also take place without leadership changes (for instance when military juntas and leaders institutionalize one-party rule, or when there is substantial political liberalization e.g. by opening up for multi-party elections but where the former autocrat continues in power for some time).

Clarification: Please note that the default date for the pre-coded regime data is January 1st. Please also note that, in order to avoid overlapping data points, each regime unit is registered in the dataset as having started one day after it actually began (the true start date is reported in the next question on Regime information).

### 3.4.1 General

#### 3.4.1.1 Executive respects constitution (C) (v2exrescon)

*Project Manager(s):* Jan Teorell

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* Do members of the executive (the head of state, the head of government, and cabinet ministers) respect the constitution?

*Responses:*

- 0: Members of the executive violate the constitution whenever they want to, without legal consequences.
- 1: Members of the executive violate most provisions of the constitution without legal consequences, but still must respect certain provisions.
- 2: Somewhere in between (1) and (3). Members of the executive would face legal consequences for violating most provisions of the constitution, but can disregard some provisions without any legal consequences.
- 3: Members of the executive rarely violate the constitution, and when it happens they face legal charges.
- 4: Members of the executive never violate the constitution.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

#### 3.4.1.2 Executive bribery and corrupt exchanges (C) (v2exbribe)

*Project Manager(s):* Jan Teorell

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* How routinely do members of the executive (the head of state, the head of government, and cabinet ministers), or their agents, grant favors in exchange for bribes, kickbacks, or other material inducements?

*Responses:*

- 0: It is routine and expected.

- 1: It happens more often than not in dealings with the executive.
- 2: It happens but is unpredictable: those dealing with the executive find it hard to predict when an inducement will be necessary.
- 3: It happens occasionally but is not expected.
- 4: It never, or hardly ever, happens.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*, posted at V-Dem.net).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

### 3.4.1.3 Executive embezzlement and theft (C) (v2exembez)

*Project Manager(s):* Jan Teorell

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* How often do members of the executive (the head of state, the head of government, and cabinet ministers), or their agents, steal, embezzle, or misappropriate public funds or other state resources for personal or family use?

*Responses:*

- 0: Constantly. Members of the executive act as though all public resources were their personal or family property.
- 1: Often. Members of the executive are responsible stewards of selected public resources but treat the rest like personal property.
- 2: About half the time. Members of the executive are about as likely to be responsible stewards of selected public resources as they are to treat them like personal property.
- 3: Occasionally. Members of the executive are responsible stewards of most public resources but treat selected others like personal property.
- 4: Never, or hardly ever. Members of the executive are almost always responsible stewards of public resources and keep them separate from personal or family property.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

### 3.4.1.4 Public sector corrupt exchanges (C) (v2excrpts)

*Project Manager(s):* Jan Teorell

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* How routinely do public sector employees grant favors in exchange for bribes, kickbacks, or other material inducements?

*Clarification:* When responding to this question, we would like to you think about a typical person employed by the public sector, excluding the military. If you think there are large discrepancies between branches of the public sector, between the national/federal and subnational/state level, or between the core bureaucracy and employees working with public service delivery, please try to average them out before stating your response.

*Responses:*

- 0: Extremely common. Most public sector employees are systematically involved in petty but corrupt exchanges almost all the time.
- 1: Common. Such petty but corrupt exchanges occur regularly involving a majority of public employees.

2: Sometimes. About half or less than half of public sector employees engage in such exchanges for petty gains at times.

3: Scattered. A small minority of public sector employees engage in petty corruption from time to time.

4: No. Never, or hardly ever.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

#### 3.4.1.5 Public sector theft (C) (v2exthtfts)

*Project Manager(s):* Jan Teorell

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* How often do public sector employees steal, embezzle, or misappropriate public funds or other state resources for personal or family use?

*Clarification:* When responding to this question, we would like you to think about a typical person employed by the public sector, excluding the military. If you think there are large discrepancies between branches of the public sector, between the national/federal and subnational/state level, or between the core bureaucracy and employees working with public service delivery, please try to average them out before stating your response.

*Responses:*

0: Constantly. Public sector employees act as though all public resources were their personal or family property.

1: Often. Public sector employees are responsible stewards of selected public resources but treat the rest like personal property.

2: About half the time. Public sector employees are about as likely to be responsible stewards of selected public resources as they are to treat them like personal property.

3: Occasionally. Public sector employees are responsible stewards of most public resources but treat selected others like personal property.

4: Never, or hardly ever. Public sector employees are almost always responsible stewards of public resources and keep them separate from personal or family property.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

#### 3.4.1.6 Chief executive appointment by upper chamber (A) (v2exapup)

*Project Manager(s):* Jan Teorell

*Question:* Is the approval of the upper chamber (together with the lower chamber) necessary for the appointment of the chief executive?

*Clarification:* The chief executive is defined by whether the head of state or the head of government have more relative power (v2ex\_hosw, v2ex\_hogw). Answer v2exapup only if the legislature is playing a role in the appointment of the chief executive (if v2exaphos or v2exaphogp are 1).

*Responses:*

0: No

1: Yes

*Scale:* Dichotomous.

*Source(s):* National constitutions; Websites of national governments.

*Data release:* 7-12.

*Country–Year Aggregation:* Last

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

### **3.4.1.7 Chief executive appointment by upper chamber implicit approval (A) (v2exapupap)**

*Project Manager(s):* Jan Teorell

*Question:* Is the tacit or implicit approval of the upper chamber (alongside the lower chamber) necessary for the appointment of the chief executive?

*Clarification:* The chief executive is defined by whether the head of state or the head of government have more relative power (v2ex\_hosw, v2ex\_hogw). Answer v2exapupap only if the legislature is playing a role in the appointment of the chief executive (if v2exaphos or v2exaphogp are 1).

*Responses:*

0: No

1: Yes

*Scale:* Dichotomous.

*Source(s):* National constitutions; Websites of national governments.

*Data release:* 7-12.

*Country–Year Aggregation:* Last

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

## **3.4.2 Head of State (HOS)**

### **3.4.2.1 HOS name (A\*) (v2exnamhos)**

*Project Manager(s):* Jan Teorell

*Question:* What is the name of the head of state?

*Clarification:* If the head of state is a collective body, provide the name of the person exercising the most effective power within this body, or, if no such person exists, enter the expression "collective body." If multiple Heads of State were appointed in a given year, please answer this question with respect to each one of them; also make sure you enter the specific date of appointment and *reappointment* for each one of them. Once again, the identities of the head of state for each country have been pre-coded for as many years as possible. Any pre-coded years contain an orange triangle. This means that either the score or text and/or specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded rating; we do not want you to change the rating, as we need all the Country Experts to answer the subsequent questions for the same executives.

*Responses:*

Text.

*Source(s):* Henisz (2000; 2002); Lentz (1994; 1999); worldstatesmen.org.

*Data release:* 3-12.

*Country–Year Aggregation:* Last

*Date specific:* Coded on HOS appointment dates and December 31.

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

### **3.4.2.2 HOS title (A\*) (v2extithos)**

*Project Manager(s):* Jan Teorell

*Question:* What is the title of the head of state?

*Clarification:* If the head of state and the head of government are the same person or body, this and the following questions refer to both. Please provide a literal translation of the title in English, with the title in the native language, or a transcription thereof, within parentheses. If the head of state is a collective body, provide the title of the person exercising the most effective power over this body, or, if no such person exists, enter the expression "collective body." If multiple Heads of State with different titles were appointed any given year, please answer this question with respect to each one of them; also make sure you enter the specific date of appointment for each one of them. Once again, the identities of the head of state for each country have been pre-coded for as many years as possible. Any pre-coded years contain an orange triangle. This means that either the score or text and/or specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded rating; we do not want you to change the rating, as we need all the Country Experts to answer the subsequent questions for the same executives.

*Responses:*

Text.

*Source(s):* Lentz (1994; 1999); Henisz (2000; 2002); worldstatesmen.org.

*Data release:* 3-12.

*Country–Year Aggregation:* Last

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

### 3.4.2.3 HOS removal by legislature in practice (C) (v2exremhsp)

*Project Manager(s):* Jan Teorell

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* If the legislature, or either chamber of the legislature, took actions to remove the head of state from office, would it be likely to succeed even without having to level accusations of unlawful activity *and* without the involvement of any other agency?

*Clarification:* The question refers to whether the legislature (or either of its chambers) is considered to hold this power of removal in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not. Moreover, the question refers to removal other than through an impeachment process.

*Responses:*

0: No, under no circumstances.

1: No, unlikely, but there is a chance it would happen.

2: Yes, probably, but there is a chance it would fail.

3: Yes, most likely.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

*Convergence:* Model parameters with convergence issues: universal thresholds.

### 3.4.2.4 HOS removal by other in practice (C) (v2exrmhsol)

*Project Manager(s):* Jan Teorell

*Additional versions:* \*\_nr

*Question:* Which of the following bodies would be likely to succeed in removing the head of state if it took actions (short of military force) to do so?

*Clarification:* The question refers to whether any of these bodies are considered to hold this power of removal in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power

has been exercised or not. Choose all that apply.

*Responses:*

- 0: None. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhsol\_0]
- 1: A foreign power. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhsol\_1]
- 2: The ruling party or party leadership body (in a one-party system). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhsol\_2]
- 3: A royal council. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhsol\_3]
- 4: The military. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhsol\_4]
- 5: A religious body. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhsol\_5]
- 6: A tribal or ethnic council. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhsol\_6]
- 7: Other. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhsol\_7]

*Ordering:* If you select 7, proceed to the next question [v2exrmhsnl]. If you select 0-6, skip to question "HOS dissolution in practice" [v2exctlhs].

*Scale:* Series of dichotomous scales.

*Answer-type:* Multiple-selection.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Mean.

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

#### 3.4.2.5 HOS other body remove HOS in practice (C) (v2exrmhsnl)

*Project Manager(s):* Jan Teorell

*Question:* Which other body or bodies has the capacity to remove the head of state from office?

*Responses:*

Text.

*Data release:* 3-12. Available upon request, subject to review and approval.

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

#### 3.4.2.6 HOS control over (C) (v2exctlhs)

*Project Manager(s):* Jan Teorell

*Additional versions:* \*\_nr

*Question:* In practice, from which of the following bodies must the head of state customarily seek approval prior to making important decisions on domestic policy?

*Clarification:* Choose all that apply. In case the HOS does not have the power to make important decisions on domestic policy, select 0 (None).

*Responses:*

- 0: None. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhs\_0]
- 1: A foreign power. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhs\_1]
- 2: The ruling party or party leadership body (in a one-party system). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhs\_2]
- 3: A royal council. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhs\_3]
- 4: The military. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhs\_4]
- 5: A religious body. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhs\_5]
- 6: A tribal or ethnic council. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhs\_6]
- 7: Other. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhs\_7]

*Ordering:* If you select 7, proceed to the next question [v2exctlhos]. If you select 0-6, skip to question "HOS dissolution in practice" [v2exdfds].

*Scale:* Series of dichotomous scales.

*Answer-type:* Multiple-selection.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Mean.

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2021

### 3.4.2.7 HOS other body controls (C) (v2exctlhos)

*Project Manager(s)*: Jan Teorell

*Question*: From which kind of body or bodies does the head of state need approval for its actions?

*Responses*:

Text.

*Ordering*: Answer this question only for those years you answered "other" (7) to the previous question [v2exctlhs].

*Notes*: The question text is different for the historical coding: "From which kind of body or bodies does the head of state need approval prior to making important decisions on domestic policy?"

*Data release*: 3-12. Available upon request, subject to review and approval.

*Citation*: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

### 3.4.2.8 HOS dissolution in practice (C) (v2exdfdshs)

*Project Manager(s)*: Jan Teorell

*Additional versions*: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question*: If the head of state took actions to dissolve the legislature, would he/she be likely to succeed?

*Clarification*: The question refers to whether the head of state is considered to hold this power in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not. By "dissolving the legislature" we refer to the ability of the head of state to call a new election for the legislature.

*Responses*:

0: No.

1: Yes, but not at his/her own discretion, only when prompted to as a response to specific events (for example, after a certain number of votes of no confidence, or after a certain number of failed attempts to form a cabinet).

2: Yes, at his/her own discretion, but with restrictions (for example, by frequency, such as "once a year", by time point within term, such as "not within the last sixth months of the head of state's term", and by the requirement that the head of state must then himself/herself stand for election).

3: Yes, at his/her own discretion and without restrictions.

*Scale*: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release*: 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation*: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Citation*: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2021

### 3.4.2.9 HOS appoints cabinet in practice (C) (v2exdfcbhs)

*Project Manager(s)*: Jan Teorell

*Additional versions*: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question*: In practice, does the head of state have the power to appoint — or is the approval of the head of state necessary for the appointment of — cabinet ministers?

*Clarification*: The question refers to whether the head of state is considered to hold this power in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not. If confirmation of the legislature is needed, this should be coded as such also when the HOS controls the majority of the legislature ("tacit consent"). Moreover, by the "legislature" in this case, we mean either house of the legislature (in the case of bicameralism).



*Responses:*

0: No.

1: Yes, but only with respect to the head of the cabinet, and only with the tacit consent or explicit confirmation by the legislature.

2: Yes, but only with the tacit consent or explicit confirmation by the legislature.

3: Yes, without any need for confirmation by the legislature, but only with respect to the head of the cabinet.

4: Yes, without any need for confirmation by the legislature.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

### 3.4.2.10 HOS appoints cabinet in practice (C) (v2exdfcbhs\_rec)

*Project Manager(s):* Jan Teorell

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* In practice, does the head of state have the power to appoint – or is the approval of the head of state necessary for the appointment of – cabinet ministers?

*Clarification:* The question refers to whether the head of state is considered to hold this power in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not. If confirmation of the legislature is needed, this should be coded as such also when the HOS controls the majority of the legislature ("tacit consent"). Moreover, by the "legislature" in this case, we mean either house of the legislature (in the case of bicameralism).

*Responses:*

0: No.

1: Yes, combines answer categories 1 and 2 from v2exdfcbhs.

2: Yes, combines answer categories 3 and 4 from v2exdfcbhs.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Notes:* v2edfcbhs\_rec is a version of v2exdfcbhs, for v2edfcbhs\_rec the answer categories 1 and 2, 3 and 4 has been merged.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2018

### 3.4.2.11 HOS veto power in practice (C) (v2exdfvths)

*Project Manager(s):* Jan Teorell

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* If the head of state took actions to veto a piece of legislation, would he/she be likely to succeed?

*Clarification:* By "veto", we mean either a partial veto (concerning any parts of a bill) or package vetoes (concerning whole bills) of bills that have already been passed by the legislature. The question refers to whether the head of state is considered to hold this power in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not.

*Responses:*

0: No.

- 1: Yes, but the legislature can override the veto by a simple majority vote (a vote of more than half of those voting).
- 2: Yes, but the legislature can override the veto by an absolute majority vote (a vote of more than half of the members of the legislature).
- 3: Yes, but the legislature can override the veto by a qualified/extraordinary majority vote (a super-majority — *e.g.*, 2/3 or 3/4 — of those voting).
- 4: Yes, with no possibility of override.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

#### 3.4.2.12 HOS dismisses ministers in practice (C) (v2exdfdmhs)

*Project Manager(s):* Jan Teorell

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* If the head of state took actions to dismiss cabinet ministers, would he/she be likely to succeed?

*Clarification:* The question refers to whether the head of state is considered to hold this power in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not, and regardless of possible political repercussions (*e.g.*, vote of no confidence).

*Responses:*

0: No.

1: Yes, but not at his/her own discretion, only when prompted to as a response to specific events (for example, after a vote of no confidence taken by the legislature).

2: Yes, at his/her own discretion, but with restrictions (for example, only provided the head of state proposes an alternative minister who would need the legislature's approval, *i.e.*, so called "constructive dismissal").

3: Yes, at his/her own discretion and without restrictions.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

#### 3.4.2.13 HOS proposes legislation in practice (C) (v2exdfpchs)

*Project Manager(s):* Jan Teorell

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* Does the head of state have the capacity, in practice, to propose legislation?

*Clarification:* By "propose legislation", we mean the introduction of legislative bills. The question refers to whether the head of state is considered to hold this power in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not.

*Responses:*

0: Yes, in all policy areas, including some exclusive domains (where neither the legislature nor other bodies may initiate bills).

1: Yes, in all policy areas, but this power is shared with the legislature and perhaps with other

bodies.

2: No. The head of state cannot propose legislation.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

#### 3.4.2.14 HOS = HOG (A\*) (v2exhoshog)

*Project Manager(s):* Jan Teorell

*Question:* Is the head of state (HOS) also head of government (HOG)?

*Clarification:* Note that this question only pertains to whether the head of state and the head of government are the same person or body, regardless of the relative powers of the two. Thus, in a constitutional monarchy, for example, the head of state and head of government are not the same even though the head of state may lack any real political power. If multiple head of states/head of governments were appointed in any year, please answer this question with respect to all of them by checking or unchecking the specific dates. Once again, the identities of the head of government for each country have been pre-coded for as many years as possible. Any pre-coded years contain an orange triangle. This means that either the score or text and/or specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded rating; we do not want you to change the rating, as we need all the Country Experts to answer the subsequent questions for the same executives.

*Responses:*

0: No

1: Yes

*Ordering:* If HOS=HOG (answer is yes: 1) for all years: skip to "Executive as whole introduction" [v2exintro3].

*Scale:* Dichotomous.

*Source(s):* CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012), v83-v87; Lentz (1994; 1999); Henisz (2000; 2002).

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Country-Year Aggregation:* Last

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

#### 3.4.2.15 HOS age (A) (v2exagehos)

*Project Manager(s):* Jan Teorell

*Question:* In what year was the head of state born?

*Responses:*

[date-year only]

99: Not applicable, *e.g.* the HOS is a collective body.

*Source(s):* worldstatesman.org.

*Data release:* 7-12.

*Country-Year Aggregation:* Maximum

*Date specific:* Coded on HOS appointment dates and December 31 (v2exnamhos).

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

#### 3.4.2.16 HOS selection by legislature in practice (A) (v2exaphos)

*Project Manager(s):* Jan Teorell

*Question:* Was approval of the legislature necessary for the appointment of the head of state?

*Clarification:* By "approval" we mean both explicit approval, such as through a vote of confidence, and tacit approval, such as a practice stating that the head of state has to have majority support (or should not be opposed by the majority) in the legislature even though no vote is taken on his/her appointment. We are *not* concerned with certification of electoral college votes (as in the US, Mexico).

*Responses:*

0: No.

1: Yes.

*Ordering:* Answer this question only for those years you selected 1-5 on question v2expathhs.

*Scale:* Dichotomous.

*Source(s):* V-Dem country coordinators; constituteproject.org; IPU Parline.

*Notes:* Converted from (B) to (A) coding.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Country-Year Aggregation:* Maximum

*Date specific:* Coded on HOS appointment dates and December 31 (v2exnamhos).

*Cleaning:* Set to missing where v2expathhs is 6 or 7

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

#### **3.4.2.17 HOS directly elected (D) (v2ex\_elechos)**

*Project Manager(s):* Jan Teorell

*Question:* Is the head of state HOS directly elected?

*Responses:*

0: No.

1: Yes.

*Scale:* Dichotomous.

*Source(s):* v2expathhs

*Data release:* 5-12.

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

#### **3.4.2.18 HOS female (A) (v2exfemhos)**

*Project Manager(s):* Jan Teorell, Pamela Paxton

*Question:* What is the gender of the head of state?

*Clarification:* If the head of state is a collective body, provide the gender of the person executing the most effective power over this body, or, if no such person exists, answer if any persons in the body are female.

*Responses:*

0: Male

1: Female

*Scale:* Dichotomous.

*Source(s):* worldstatesman.org; Melander (2005); Paxton and Hughes (2007).

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Country-Year Aggregation:* Maximum

*Date specific:* Coded on HOS appointment dates and December 31 (v2exnamhos).

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

#### **3.4.2.19 HOS term length by law (A) (v2exftmhs)**

*Project Manager(s):* Jan Teorell

*Question:* What is the maximum term length of the Head of State, in years?

*Responses:*

Numeric, number of years.

0: Term length not specified in constitution.

99: Not Applicable.

100: Term length for life or there is no term length.

*Source(s):* CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012); National constitutions.

*Notes:* *De jure* term lengths for Head of State and Head of Government, coded for each head of state and head of government as coded in v2exnamhos and v2exnamhog. In the case of a single office representing both Head of State and Head of Government, HOS is coded to the appropriate term length while HOG is coded as 99. For colonies, if there was no official local constitution, HOS/HOG is coded by their constitutional status according to the colonial power. Finally, for sovereign states lacking a constitution or having suspended their constitution, HOS/HOG is coded to 99 as not applicable for those relevant years.

Changes to term lengths are recorded as occurring on the date that a new constitution or constitutional amendment takes force, or, if unavailable, date of promulgation.

*Data release:* 5-12.

*Country-Year Aggregation:* Last

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2021

#### 3.4.2.20 HOS appointment in practice (A) (v2expathhs)

*Project Manager(s):* Jan Teorell

*Question:* How did the head of state reach office?

*Clarification:* If several bodies were involved in the appointment process, select the one that exerted the most critical impact on the decision. However, in the next question we ask separately about whether the approval of the legislature was necessary. Response category 7 should only be selected if the head of state is directly elected, not if he or she was appointed by the legislature after an election. We count as direct elections (category 7) also those indirect elections carried out by an electoral college, whose only purpose is to elect the president.

*Responses:*

0: Through the threat of or application of force, such as a coup or rebellion.

1: Appointed by a foreign power.

2: Appointed by the ruling party (in a one-party system).

3: Appointed by a royal council.

4: Through hereditary succession.

5: Appointed by the military.

6: Appointed by the legislature.

7: Directly through a popular election (regardless of the extension of the suffrage).

8: Other.

*Ordering:* If you select 0 or 8, proceed to the next question [v2exothhs]. If you select 1-5, skip to question "HOS selection by legislature in practice [v2exaphos]". If you selected 6-7, skip to question [v2excomhs].

*Scale:* Nominal (v2expathhs), or a series of dichotomous scales.

*Source(s):* V-Dem country coordinators; [constituteproject.org](http://constituteproject.org); IPU Parline.

*Notes:* Converted from B to A coding. v2expathhs is coded according to appointment dates of the Head of State. The same is true for coups or rebellions where the date when the HOS was appointed through a coup, or the first day in office after the coup, is coded.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Country-Year Aggregation:* Maximum

*Date specific:* Coded on HOS appointment dates and December 31 (v2exnamhos).

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

#### **3.4.2.21 HOS year of death (A) (v2exdeathos)**

*Project Manager(s):* Jan Teorell

*Question:* In what year did the head of state die?

*Responses:*

Date — year only

*Scale:* Interval

*Source(s):* worldstatesman.org.

*Data release:* 10-12.

*Country–Year Aggregation:* Maximum

*Date specific:* Coded on HOS appointment dates and December 31 (v2exnamhos).

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

#### **3.4.2.22 HOS party affiliation (A) (v2exparhos)**

*Project Manager(s):* Nils Düpont

*Question:* What is the name of the political party to which the head of state belongs?

*Responses:*

Text.

*Source(s):* Leaders Global (Düpont, Döring, and Bederke 2021), Party Facts (Döring and Regel 2019); worldstatesmen.org

*Data release:* 11-12.

*Country–Year Aggregation:* Last

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2021

### **3.4.3 Head of Government (HOG)**

#### **3.4.3.1 HOG name (A\*) (v2exnamhog)**

*Project Manager(s):* Jan Teorell

*Question:* What is the name of the head of government?

*Clarification:* If the head of government is a collective body, provide the name of the person executing the most effective power over this body, or, if no such person exists, enter the expression "collective body." If multiple heads of government were appointed any given year, please answer this question with respect to each one of them; also make sure you enter the specific date of appointment and *reappointment* for each one of them. Once again, the identities of the head of government for each country have been pre-coded for as many years as possible. Any pre-coded years contain an orange triangle. This means that either the score or text and/or specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded rating; we do not want you to change the rating, as we need all the Country Experts to answer the subsequent questions for the same executives.

*Responses:*

Text.

*Source(s):* worldstatesmen.org; Henisz (2000; 2002); Lentz (1994; 1999).

*Data release:* 3-12.

*Country–Year Aggregation:* Last

*Date specific:* Coded on HOG appointment dates and December 31.

*Cleaning:* Set to missing when v2exhoshog is 1

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

### 3.4.3.2 HOG title (A\*) (v2extithog)

*Project Manager(s):* Jan Teorell

*Question:* What is the title of the head of government (HOG)?

*Clarification:* Please provide a literal translation of the title in English, with the title in the native language, or a transcription thereof, within parentheses. If the head of government is a collective body, provide the title of the person exercising the most effective power over this body, or, if no such person exists, the name of the entire body. If multiple heads of government with different titles were appointed any given year, please answer this question with respect to all of them; also make sure you enter the specific date of appointment for each one of them. Once again, the identities of the head of government for each country have been pre-coded for as many years as possible. Any pre-coded years contain an orange triangle. This means that either the score or text and/or specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded rating; we do not want you to change the rating, as we need all the Country Experts to answer the subsequent questions for the same executives.

*Responses:*

Text.

*Source(s):* worldstatesmen.org; Henisz (2000; 2002); Lentz (1994; 1999).

*Data release:* 3-12.

*Country-Year Aggregation:* Last

*Cleaning:* Set to missing when v2exhoshog is 1

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

### 3.4.3.3 HOG removal by legislature in practice (C) (v2exremhog)

*Project Manager(s):* Jan Teorell

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* If the legislature, or either chamber of the legislature, took actions to remove the head of government from office, would it be likely to succeed even without having to level accusations of unlawful activity *and* without the involvement of any other agency?

*Clarification:* The question refers to whether the legislature (or either of its chambers) is considered to hold this power of removal in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not. Moreover, the question refers to removal other than through an impeachment process.

*Responses:*

0: No, under no circumstances.

1: No, unlikely, but there is a chance it would happen.

2: Yes, probably, but there is a chance it would fail.

3: Yes, most likely.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Cleaning:* Set to missing when v2exhoshog is 1

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

### 3.4.3.4 HOG removal by other in practice (C) (v2exrmhgnp)



*Project Manager(s):* Jan Teorell

*Additional versions:* \*\_nr

*Question:* Which of the following bodies would be likely to succeed in removing the head of government if it took actions (short of military force) to do so?

*Clarification:* The question refers to whether any of these bodies are considered to hold this power of removal in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not. Choose all that apply.

*Responses:*

- 0: None. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhgnp\_0]
- 1: A foreign power. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhgnp\_1]
- 2: The ruling party or party leadership body (in a one-party system). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhgnp\_2]
- 3: A royal council. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhgnp\_3]
- 4: The military. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhgnp\_4]
- 5: The head of state. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhgnp\_5]
- 6: A religious body. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhgnp\_6]
- 7: A tribal or ethnic council. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhgnp\_7]
- 8: Other. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhgnp\_8]

*Ordering:* If you select 8, proceed to the next question [v2exrmhgop]. If you select 0-7, skip to question HOG control [v2exctlhg].

*Scale:* Series of dichotomous scales.

*Answer-type:* Multiple selection

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Mean.

*Cleaning:* Set to missing when v2exhoshog is 1

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

### 3.4.3.5 HOG other body remove HOG in practice (C) (v2exrmhgop)

*Project Manager(s):* Jan Teorell

*Question:* Which other body or bodies has the capacity to remove the head of government from office?

*Responses:*

Text.

*Ordering:* Answer this question only for those years you answered "other" (8) to the previous question [v2exrmhgnp].

*Data release:* 3-12. Available upon request, subject to review and approval.

*Cleaning:* Set to missing when v2exhoshog is 1

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

### 3.4.3.6 HOG control over (C) (v2exctlhg)

*Project Manager(s):* Jan Teorell

*Additional versions:* \*\_nr

*Question:* In practice, from which of the following bodies does the head of government customarily seek approval prior to making important decisions on domestic policy?

*Clarification:* Choose all that apply. In case the HOG does not have the power to make important decisions on domestic policy, select 0 (None).

*Responses:*

- 0: None. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhg\_0]
- 1: A foreign power. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhg\_1]
- 2: The ruling party or party leadership body (in a one-party system). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhg\_2]

- 3: A royal council. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhg\_3]
- 4: The military. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhg\_4]
- 5: The head of state. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhg\_5]
- 6: A religious body. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhg\_6]
- 7: A tribal or ethnic council. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhg\_7]
- 8: Other. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhg\_8]

*Ordering:* If you select 8, proceed to the next question [v2exctlhg]. If you select 0-7, skip to question HOG dissolution in practice [v2exdjdshg].

*Scale:* Series of dichotomous scales.

*Answer-type:* Multiple-selection.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Mean.

*Cleaning:* Set to missing when v2exhoshog is 1

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

#### 3.4.3.7 HOG other body controls (C) (v2exctlhg)

*Project Manager(s):* Jan Teorell

*Question:* From which kind of body or bodies does the head of government need approval for its actions?

*Responses:*

Text.

*Notes:* The question text is different for the historical coding: "From which kind of body or bodies does the head of government need approval prior to making important decisions on domestic policy?"

*Data release:* 3-12. Available upon request, subject to review and approval.

*Cleaning:* Set to missing when v2exhoshog is 1

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

#### 3.4.3.8 HOG dissolution in practice (C) (v2exdjdshg)

*Project Manager(s):* Jan Teorell

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* If the head of government took actions to dissolve the legislature, would he/she be likely to succeed?

*Clarification:* The question refers to whether the head of government is considered to hold this power in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not. By "dissolving the legislature" we refer to the ability of the head of government to call a new election for the legislature.

*Responses:*

0: No.

1: Yes, but not at his/her own discretion, only when prompted to as a response to specific events (for example, after a certain number of votes of no confidence, or after a certain number of failed attempts to form a cabinet).

2: Yes, at his/her own discretion, but with restrictions (for example, by frequency, such as "once a year", by time point within term, such as "not within the last sixth months of the head of government's term", and by the requirement that the head of government must then himself/herself stand for election).

3: Yes, at his/her own discretion and without restrictions.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Cleaning:* Set to missing when v2exhoshog is 1

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

### 3.4.3.9 HOG appoints cabinet in practice (C) (v2exdjcbhg)

*Project Manager(s):* Jan Teorell

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* In practice, does the head of government have the power to appoint — or is the approval of the head of government necessary for the appointment of — cabinet ministers?

*Clarification:* The question refers to whether the head of government is considered to hold this power in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not. If confirmation of the legislature is needed, this should be coded as such also when the HOG controls the majority of the legislature ("tacit consent"). Moreover, by the "legislature" in this case, we mean either house of the legislature (in the case of bicameralism).

*Responses:*

0: No.

1: Yes, but only with the tacit consent or explicit confirmation by the legislature.

2: Yes, without any need for confirmation by the legislature.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Cleaning:* Set to missing when v2exhoshog is 1

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

### 3.4.3.10 HOG dismisses ministers in practice (C) (v2exdfdshg)

*Project Manager(s):* Jan Teorell

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* If the head of government took actions to dismiss cabinet ministers, would he/she be likely to succeed?

*Clarification:* The question refers to whether the head of government is considered to hold this power in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not, and regardless of possible political repercussions (*e.g.*, vote of no confidence).

*Responses:*

0: No.

1: Yes, but not at his/her own discretion, only when prompted to as a response to specific events (for example, after a vote of no confidence taken by the legislature).

2: Yes, at his/her own discretion, but with restrictions (for example, only provided the head of government proposes an alternative minister who would need the legislature's approval, *i.e.*, so called "constructive dismissal").

3: Yes, at his/her own discretion and without restrictions.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Cleaning:* Set to missing when v2exhoshog is 1

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

#### 3.4.3.11 HOG veto power in practice (C) (v2exdfvthg)

*Project Manager(s):* Jan Teorell

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* If the head of government took actions to veto a piece of legislation, would he/she be likely to succeed?

*Clarification:* By "veto", we mean either a partial veto (concerning any parts of a bill) or package vetoes (concerning whole bills) of bills that have already been passed by the legislature. The question refers to whether the head of government is considered to hold this power in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not.

*Responses:*

0: No.

1: Yes, but the legislature can override the veto by a simple majority vote (a vote of more than half of those voting).

2: Yes, but the legislature can override the veto by an absolute majority vote (a vote of more than half of the members of the legislature).

3: Yes, but the legislature can override the veto by a qualified/extraordinary majority vote (a super-majority — *e.g.*, 2/3 or 3/4 — of those voting).

4: Yes, with no possibility of override.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Cleaning:* Set to missing when v2exhoshog is 1

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

#### 3.4.3.12 HOG proposes legislation in practice (C) (v2exdfpphg)

*Project Manager(s):* Jan Teorell

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* Does the head of government have the capacity, in practice, to propose legislation?

*Clarification:* By "propose legislation", we mean the introduction of legislative bills. The question refers to whether the head of government is considered to hold this power in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not.

*Responses:*

0: Yes, in all policy areas, including some exclusive domains (where neither the legislature nor other bodies may initiate bills).

1: Yes, in all policy areas, but this power is shared with the legislature and perhaps with other bodies.

2: No. The head of government cannot propose legislation.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Cleaning:* Set to missing when v2exhoshog is 1

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

*Convergence:* Model parameters with convergence issues: universal thresholds.

#### 3.4.3.13 HOG age (A) (v2exagehog)

*Project Manager(s):* Jan Teorell

*Question:* In what year was the head of government born?

*Responses:*

[date-year only]

99: Not applicable, *e.g.* the HOG is a collective body.

*Source(s):* worldstatesman.org.

*Data release:* 7-12.

*Country-Year Aggregation:* Maximum

*Date specific:* Coded on HOG appointment dates and December 31 (v2exnamhog).

*Cleaning:* Set to missing when v2exhoshog is 1

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

#### **3.4.3.14 HOG selection by legislature in practice (A) (v2exaphogp)**

*Project Manager(s):* Jan Teorell

*Question:* Was the approval of the legislature necessary for the appointment of the head of government?

*Clarification:* By "approval" we mean both explicit approval, such as through a vote of confidence, and tacit approval, such as a practice stating that the head of government has to have majority support in the legislature although no vote is taken on his/her appointment. If the same person or body is both head of state and head of government, they are only coded as head of state.

*Responses:*

0: No

1: Yes

*Ordering:* Answer this question only if you selected 1-6 on question v2expathhg.

*Scale:* Dichotomous.

*Source(s):* V-Dem country coordinators; constituteproject.org; IPU Parline.

*Notes:* Converted from (B) to (A) coding. v2expathhg is coded according to appointment dates of the Head of Government. The same is true for coups or rebellions where the date when the HOG was appointed through a coup, or the first day in office after the coup, is coded.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Country-Year Aggregation:* Maximum

*Date specific:* Coded on HOG appointment dates and December 31 (v2exnamhog).

*Cleaning:* Set to missing when v2exhoshog is 1 or when v2expathhg is 7 or 8.

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

#### **3.4.3.15 HOG directly elected (D) (v2ex\_elechog)**

*Project Manager(s):* Jan Teorell

*Question:* Is the head of government HOG directly elected?

*Responses:*

0: No.

1: Yes.

*Scale:* Dichotomous.

*Source(s):* v2expathhg

*Data release:* 5-12.

*Cleaning:* Set to missing when v2exhoshog is 1

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

#### 3.4.3.16 HOG female (A) (v2exfemhog)

*Project Manager(s)*: Pamela Paxton, Jan Teorell

*Question*: What is the gender of the head of government?

*Clarification*: If the head of government is a collective body, provide the gender of the person executing the most effective power over this body, or, if no such person exists, answer if any persons in the body are female.

*Responses*:

0: Male

1: Female

*Scale*: Dichotomous.

*Source(s)*: worldstatesmen.org; cf. Melander (2005); Paxton and Hughes (2007).

*Data release*: 1-12.

*Country-Year Aggregation*: Maximum

*Date specific*: Coded on HOG appointment dates and December 31 (v2exnamhog).

*Cleaning*: Set to missing when v2exhoshog is 1

*Citation*: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years*: 1789-2021

#### 3.4.3.17 HOG term length by law (A) (v2exfxtmhg)

*Project Manager(s)*: Jan Teorell

*Question*: What is the maximum term length of the head of government?

*Responses*:

Numeric

0: Term length not specified

99: Not Applicable

100: Term length is explicitly unlimited or the life of the office holder.

*Ordering*: CCP ordering: Asked only if EXECNUM=3 or HOSHOG=2; Constitutions.

*Scale*: Interval.

*Source(s)*: CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012), v126.

*Notes*: Changes to term lengths are recorded as occurring on the date that a new constitution or constitutional amendment takes force, or, if unavailable, date of promulgation.

*Data release*: 1-12.

*Country-Year Aggregation*: Last

*Citation*: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years*: 1900-2021

#### 3.4.3.18 Relative power of the HOG (D) (v2ex\_hogw)

*Project Manager(s)*: Jan Teorell

*Question*: Does the head of government HOG have more relative power than the head of state HOS over the appointment and dismissal of cabinet ministers?

*Clarification*: The relative power of the HOG is simply 1- v2ex\_hosw.

*Responses*:

0: No.

0.5: The HOS and HOG share equal power.

0.75: See notes.

1: Yes.

*Scale*: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

*Source(s)*: v2exdfcbhs v2exdjcbhg v2exdfdmhs v2exdfdshg

*Notes*: If the head of state is also head of government, v2ex\_hogw is 1.  
From 1900-01-01 to 1960-08-09 Belgium has a score of 0.75.

*Data release:* 5-12.

*Cleaning:* Set to missing when v2exhoshog is 1

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

#### **3.4.3.19 HOG appointed by HOS (D) (v2ex\_hosconhog)**

*Project Manager(s):* Jan Teorell

*Question:* Is the head of government HOG appointed by the head of state HOS?

*Responses:*

0: No.

1: Yes.

*Scale:* Dichotomous.

*Source(s):* v2expathhg

*Data release:* 5-12.

*Cleaning:* Set to missing when v2exhoshog is 1

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

#### **3.4.3.20 HOG appointment in practice (A) (v2expathhg)**

*Project Manager(s):* Jan Teorell

*Question:* How did the head of government gain access to office?

*Clarification:* If several bodies were involved in the appointment process, select the one that exerted the most critical impact on the decision. However, in the next question we ask separately about whether the approval of the legislature was necessary. Response category 8 should only be selected if the head of government is directly elected, not if he or she was appointed by the legislature after an election. If the same person or body is both head of state and head of government, they are only coded as head of state.

*Responses:*

0: Through the threat of or application of force, such as a coup or rebellion.

1: Appointed by a foreign power.

2: Appointed by the ruling party (in a one-party system).

3: Appointed by a royal council.

4: Through hereditary succession.

5: Appointed by the military.

6: Appointed by the head of state.

7: Appointed by the legislature.

8: Directly through a popular election (regardless of the extension of the suffrage).

9: Other.

*Ordering:* If you select 0 or 9, proceed to the next question [v2exothhgl]. If you selected 1-6, skip to question "HOG selection by legislature in practice" [v2exaphogp]. If you selected 7-8, skip to question [v2excomex].

*Scale:* Nominal (v2expathhg), or a series of dichotomous scales.

*Source(s):* V-Dem country coordinators; constituteproject.org; IPU Parline.

*Notes:* Converted from (B) to (A) coding. v2expathhg is coded according to appointment dates of the Head of Government. The same is true for coups or rebellions where the date when the HOG was appointed through a coup, or the first day in office after the coup, is coded.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Country-Year Aggregation:* Maximum

*Date specific:* Coded on HOG appointment dates and December 31 (v2exnamhog).

*Cleaning:* Set to missing when v2exhoshog is 1

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).



*Years:* 1789-2021

### 3.4.3.21 HOG year of death (A) (v2exdeathog)

*Project Manager(s):* Jan Teorell

*Question:* In what year did the head of government die?

*Responses:*

Date — year only

*Scale:* Interval

*Source(s):* worldstatesman.org.

*Data release:* 10-12.

*Country–Year Aggregation:* Maximum

*Date specific:* Coded on HOG appointment dates and December 31 (v2exnamhog).

*Cleaning:* Set to missing when v2exhoshog is 1

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

### 3.4.3.22 HOG party affiliation (A) (v2expothog)

*Project Manager(s):* Nils Düpont

*Question:* What is the name of the political party to which the head of government belongs?

*Responses:*

Text.

*Source(s):* Leaders Global (Düpont, Döring, and Bederke 2021), Party Facts (Döring and Regel 2019; Bederke et al. 2021); worldstatesmen.org

*Data release:* 11-12.

*Country–Year Aggregation:* Last

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2021

## 3.4.4 Regime

### Instructions to the coders (as shown in the surveys)

This survey pertains to the political regime, and asks questions about the support groups the regime relies on to stay in power and key opposition groups. "A support group is a group of individuals who are supportive of the existing regime, and, if it were to retract support would substantially increase the chance that the regime would lose power. A key opposition group is defined as a group of individuals (mobilized or not) who both want to and who could, under favorable circumstances, be able to remove the existing political regime." A political regime can be defined as the set of formal and/or informal rules that are essential for choosing political leaders and/or maintaining political leaders in power.

If it is evident that formal and informal rules correspond (i.e. the formal rules are followed), then the formal rules define the regime. In these cases, we observe the formal rules (e.g. the constitution) to observe the regime. If, on the other hand, the formal rules do not correspond with the informal rules, such as in most dictatorships, then the regime is defined by the informal coalition of actors that select and sustain leaders, along with the informal rules they administer. In these cases, we must look to the de facto ruling elites and their established practice to observe the regime (e.g., the military junta in a military regime).

Thus a regime is typically characterized by it determining who selects policies, and often also how these policies are typically selected. A regime change presupposes a substantial change in the formal and/or informal rules by which a country is governed.

Examples of regimes might include the Second French Republic, the Communist regime in post-WWII Poland, the current Saudi monarchic regime in Saudi Arabia and the post-WWII democratic regime in Austria. Sometimes, regime changes are related to government or leadership changes (such as the change in Zaire/DR Congo from the regime under Mobutu to the current regime under Kabila), but government or leadership changes do not necessarily bring regime changes (such as in post-election government changes in democracies or with the institutionalized changes to prime ministers and presidents in current China). Sometimes, regime changes can also take place without leadership changes (for instance when military juntas and leaders institutionalize one-party rule, or when there is substantial political liberalization e.g. by opening up for multi-party elections but where the former autocrat continues in power for some time).

#### 3.4.4.1 Regime information (A\*) (v2reginfo)

*Project Manager(s):* Carl Henrik Knutsen, Tore Wig, Vilde Lunnan Djuve

*Question:* What is the regime name as well as start and end dates of this regime?

*Clarification:* The information on this question has been pre-coded for as many years as possible. Any pre-coded years contain an orange triangle. This means that the identity of the regime, which is given a suggestive name, and its start and end dates have already been entered. We are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded information. This means that the text and/or specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded rating; we do not want you to change the rating, as we need all the Country Experts to answer the subsequent questions for the same regime.

*Data release:* 9-12.

*Country-Year Aggregation:* Last

*Citation:* Djuve, Knutsen, and Wig (2020); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

*Default date:* Default date for this variable is January 1.

#### 3.4.4.2 Regime end type (A\*) (v2regendtype)

*Project Manager(s):* Carl Henrik Knutsen, Tore Wig, Vilde Lunnan Djuve

*Question:* Could you specify the type of process that you consider the most important in leading to the end of the regime?

*Clarification:* The information on this question has been pre-coded for as many years as possible. Any pre-coded years contain an orange triangle. This means that what is considered the most important process that eventually ended the relevant regime has already been entered. We are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded information. This means that the information has already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded rating; we do not want you to change the rating, as we need all the Country Experts to answer the subsequent questions for the same regime.

*Responses:*

- 0: A military coup d'état.
- 1: A coup d'état conducted by other groups than the military.
- 2: A self-coup (autogolpe) conducted by the sitting leader.
- 3: Assassination of the sitting leader (but not related to a coup d'état)
- 4: Natural death of the sitting leader
- 5: Loss in civil war.
- 6: Loss in inter-state war.
- 7: Foreign intervention (other than loss in inter-state war)
- 8: Popular uprising.
- 9: Substantial political liberalization/democratization with some form of guidance by sitting regime leaders
- 10: Other type of directed and intentional transformational process of the regime under the guidance of sitting regime leaders (excluding political liberalization/democratization)

- 11: Substantial political liberalization/democratization without guidance by sitting regime leaders, occurring from some other process (such as an unexpected election loss for the sitting regime) than those specified by categories 1–10
- 12: Other process than those specified by categories 1–11.
- 13: The regime still exists

*Data release:* 9-12.

*Country–Year Aggregation:* Last

*Citation:* Djuve, Knutsen, and Wig (2020); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

*Default date:* Default date for this variable is January 1.

### 3.4.4.3 Regime end type, multiple selection version (A) (v2regendtypems)

*Project Manager(s):* Carl Henrik Knutsen, Tore Wig, Vilde Lunnan Djuve

*Question:* Could you specify the types of processes (one or more) that led to the end of the regime?

*Responses:*

- 0: A military coup d'état. [v2regendtypems\_0]
- 1: A coup d'état conducted by other groups than the military. [v2regendtypems\_1]
- 2: A self-coup (autogolpe) conducted by the sitting leader. [v2regendtypems\_2]
- 3: Assassination of the sitting leader (but not related to a coup d'état). [v2regendtypems\_3]
- 4: Natural death of the sitting leader. [v2regendtypems\_4]
- 5: Loss in civil war. [v2regendtypems\_5]
- 6: Loss in inter-state war. [v2regendtypems\_6]
- 7: Foreign intervention (other than loss in inter-state war). [v2regendtypems\_7]
- 8: Popular uprising. [v2regendtypems\_8]
- 9: Substantial political liberalization/democratization with some form of guidance by sitting regime leaders. [v2regendtypems\_9]
- 10: Other type of directed and intentional transformational process of the regime under the guidance of sitting regime leaders (excluding political liberalization/democratization). [v2regendtypems\_10]
- 11: Substantial political liberalization/democratization without guidance by sitting regime leaders, occurring from some other process (such as an unexpected election loss for the sitting regime) than those specified by categories 1-10. [v2regendtypems\_11]
- 12: Other process than those specified by categories 1-11. [v2regendtypems\_12]
- 13: The regime still exists. [v2regendtypems\_13]

*Scale:* Nominal

*Answer-type:* Multiple selection

*Source(s):* Encyclopedia Britannica; Wikipedia; various region- and country-specific sources.

*Data release:* 9-12.

*Country–Year Aggregation:* Last

*Citation:* Djuve, Knutsen, and Wig (2020); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

*Default date:* Default date for this variable is January 1.

### 3.4.4.4 Regime interregnum (A) (v2regint)

*Project Manager(s):* Carl Henrik Knutsen, Tore Wig, Vilde Lunnan Djuve

*Question:* Does there exist an identifiable political regime?

*Clarification:* This question is used to identify so-called interregnum periods, where no political regime is in control over the entity. Different types of political situations can lead to periods of time under which there is no identifiable political regime, one example being a civil war in which none of the parties have clear control over political bodies and processes in the country. However, the interregnum coding is employed conservatively, meaning that partial control

over political bodies and processes in fairly large parts of the country (which is often the case also during civil wars) is sufficient for a 0 score.

Please note that the expert coded (C) questions on support and opposition groups in the regime survey are only coded when v2regint=1.

*Responses:*

0: No.

1: Yes.

*Scale:* Dichotomous

*Source(s):* Encyclopedia Britannica; Wikipedia; various region- and country-specific sources.

*Data release:* 8-12.

*Country–Year Aggregation:* Last

*Citation:* Djue, Knutsen, and Wig (2020); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

*Default date:* Default date for this variable is January 1.

#### 3.4.4.5 Regime ID (D) (v2regidnr)

*Project Manager(s):* Carl Henrik Knutsen

*Question:* What is the unique identifier number given to the current regime?

*Clarification:* This numeric regime identifier consists, first, of the country's V-Dem country code and, second, of a regime numeric counter that has at least two digits (hence the first regime identified for a country would be assigned 01).

*Scale:* Nominal

*Source(s):* v2reginfo

*Data release:* 12.

*Country–Year Aggregation:* Last

*Citation:* Djue, Knutsen, and Wig (2020); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

*Default date:* Default date for this variable is January 1.

#### 3.4.4.6 Regime duration (D) (v2regdur)

*Project Manager(s):* Carl Henrik Knutsen

*Question:* How many days have passed since the current regime started?

*Clarification:* The variable pertains to the regime coded under v2reginfo, and is measured in number of calendar days.

*Scale:* Interval

*Source(s):* v2reginfo

*Data release:* 12.

*Country–Year Aggregation:* Last

*Citation:* Djue, Knutsen, and Wig (2020); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

*Default date:* Default date for this variable is January 1.

#### 3.4.4.7 Regime support groups (C) (v2regsupgroups)

*Project Manager(s):* Carl Henrik Knutsen

*Additional versions:* \*\_nr

*Question:* Which groups does the current political regime rely on in order to maintain power?  
(Check all that apply.)

*Clarification:* Consider which group(s) is supportive of the regime, and, if it/they were to retract support would substantially increase the chance that the regime would lose power.

*Responses:*

- 0: The aristocracy, including high status hereditary social groups and castes. [v2regsupgroups\_0]
- 1: Agrarian elites, including rich peasants and large landholders. [v2regsupgroups\_1]
- 2: Party elites (of the party or parties that control the executive). [v2regsupgroups\_2]
- 3: Business elites. [v2regsupgroups\_3]
- 4: The state bureaucracy. [v2regsupgroups\_4]
- 5: The military. [v2regsupgroups\_5]
- 6: An ethnic or racial group(s). [v2regsupgroups\_6]
- 7: A religious group(s). [v2regsupgroups\_7]
- 8: Local elites, including customary chiefs. [v2regsupgroups\_8]
- 9: Urban working classes, including labor unions. [v2regsupgroups\_9]
- 10: Urban middle classes. [v2regsupgroups\_10]
- 11: Rural working classes (e.g., peasants). [v2regsupgroups\_11]
- 12: Rural middle classes (e.g., family farmers). [v2regsupgroups\_12]
- 13: A foreign government or colonial power. [v2regsupgroups\_13]

*Scale:* Series of dichotomous scales.

*Answer-type:* Multiple-selection.

*Data release:* 9-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Mean.

*Cleaning:* Set to missing where v2regint is 0.

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2020

*Default date:* Default date for this variable is January 1.

#### 3.4.4.8 Regime most important support group (C) (v2regimpgroup)

*Project Manager(s):* Carl Henrik Knutsen

*Additional versions:* \*\_nr

*Question:* Which (one) group does the current political regime rely on most strongly in order to maintain power?

*Clarification:* Choose the group that, if it were to retract its support to the regime, would most endanger the regime (most strongly increase the chance that it loses power).

*Responses:*

- 0: The aristocracy, including high status hereditary social groups and castes.
- 1: Agrarian elites, including rich peasants and large landholders.
- 2: Party elites (of the party or parties that control the executive).
- 3: Business elites.
- 4: Civil servants.
- 5: The military.
- 6: An ethnic or racial group(s).
- 7: A religious group(s).
- 8: Local elites, including chiefs.
- 9: Urban working classes, including labor unions.
- 10: Urban middle classes
- 11: Rural working classes (e.g., peasants).
- 12: Rural middle classes (e.g., family farmers)
- 13: A foreign government or colonial power.

*Data release:* 9-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Mode.

"Ties" between categories are resolved so that the corresponding category in v2regsupgroups

with the highest mean for the same country-date is chosen.

*Cleaning:* Set to missing where v2regint is 0.

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2020

*Default date:* Default date for this variable is January 1.

#### 3.4.4.9 Regime support groups size (C) (v2regsupgroupsize)

*Project Manager(s):* Carl Henrik Knutsen

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* In total, how large is the percentage share of the domestic adult (18+) population that belongs to the political regime's supporting groups?

*Clarification:* You should consider the sum of all the groups (excepting foreign governments and colonial powers) entered in v2regsupgroups. Hence, your answer should take into account the total size of the/those groups that are supportive of the regime, and, if it/they were to retract support would substantially increase the chance that the regime would lose power. Regarding the issue of overlapping identities, and one individual potentially belonging to more than one groups: Individuals should only be "counted" once; thus if the two relevant supporting groups are (4) civil servants, which total about 5%, and all of them belong to a particular ethnic group (6) also coded as a relevant, the overall total size of the supporting groups is still 5% (presuming that no other members of that ethnic group are essential for the regime staying in power).

*Responses:*

0: Extremely small

(About 1 percent of the population or less; examples of this could include regimes supported by — and needing the support from — a handful of higher-rank military officers, or by only a royal council and a few hundred landowners)

1: Very small

(Between 1 percent and 5 percent of the population; examples of this could include regimes supported by — and needing the support from — higher ranking civil servants and the military, or by moderately sized business and agrarian elites)

2: Small

(Between 5 percent and 15 percent; examples of this could include regimes supported by — and needing the support from — relatively small ethnic groups, or by urban elites and the urban middle classes in predominantly rural societies)

3: Moderate

(Between 15 percent and 30 percent; examples of this could include regimes supported by — and needing the support from — moderately sized ethnic groups, by rural middle classes in rural societies, or by urban middle classes in urban societies)

4: Large

(More than 30 percent; examples of this could include regimes supported by — and needing the support from — large ethnic groups (and then not only the elites/leaders of such groups), or by rural working classes in rural societies.)

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 9-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

*Cleaning:* Set to missing where v2regint is 0

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2020

*Default date:* Default date for this variable is January 1.

#### 3.4.4.10 Regime support location (C) (v2regsuploc)

*Project Manager(s):* Carl Henrik Knutsen

*Additional versions:* \*\_nr

*Question:* In which geographic area do the support groups for the current political regime mainly reside?

*Responses:*

- 0: Abroad.
- 1: In the capital.
- 2: In urban areas outside the capital.
- 3: In rural areas.
- 4: The groups are not concentrated in any particular area.

*Scale:* Nominal

*Data release:* 11-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Mode.

"Ties" between categories receive the value 4.

*Cleaning:* Set to missing where v2regint is 0.

*Citation:* V-Dem Codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2020

*Default date:* Default date for this variable is January 1.

#### 3.4.4.11 Regime opposition groups (C) (v2regoppgroups)

*Project Manager(s):* Carl Henrik Knutsen

*Additional versions:* \*\_nr

*Question:* Which groups include noteworthy opposition actors – that is, individuals (mobilized or not) who both want to and who could, under favorable circumstances, be able to remove the existing political regime?(Check all that apply.)

*Clarification:* Consider which group(s) include a significant share of individuals who both oppose the regime and pose a non-negligible threat to the regime (either mobilized or dormant). In other words, these individuals must both want to see the regime removed and, at least under hypothetical “favorable conditions”, be capable of removing the regime. Groups need not be actively mobilized or explicitly engaged in high-level opposition activities to be counted; opposition groups also include individuals who oppose the regime without taking particular actions, at the moment. We remind you of the definition of a regime as the set of formal and/or informal rules that are essential for choosing political leaders and/or maintaining political leaders in power. Hence, we are not asking about which groups oppose the current government in a democracy (and who would vote for another party), but still accept the democratic rules as legitimate. We are, instead, asking about groups that want to see the wider political regime removed and replaced.

*Responses:*

- 0: The aristocracy, including high status hereditary social groups and castes. [v2regoppgroups\_0]
- 1: Agrarian elites, including rich peasants and large landholders. [v2regoppgroups\_1]
- 2: Party elites (of the party or parties that control the executive). [v2regoppgroups\_2]
- 3: Business elites. [v2regoppgroups\_3]
- 4: The state bureaucracy. [v2regoppgroups\_4]
- 5: The military. [v2regoppgroups\_5]
- 6: An ethnic or racial group(s). [v2regoppgroups\_6]
- 7: A religious group(s). [v2regoppgroups\_7]
- 8: Local elites, including customary chiefs. [v2regoppgroups\_8]
- 9: Urban working classes, including labor unions. [v2regoppgroups\_9]
- 10: Urban middle classes. [v2regoppgroups\_10]
- 11: Rural working classes (e.g., peasants). [v2regoppgroups\_11]
- 12: Rural middle classes (e.g., family farmers). [v2regoppgroups\_12]
- 13: A foreign government or colonial power. [v2regoppgroups\_13]

*Scale:* Series of dichotomous scales.



*Answer-type:* Multiple-selection.

*Data release:* 11-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Mean.

*Cleaning:* Set to missing where v2regint is 0.

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2020

*Default date:* Default date for this variable is January 1.

#### 3.4.4.12 Explicit and active regime opposition groups (C) (v2regoppgroupsact)

*Project Manager(s):* Sirianne Dahlum, Tore Wig

*Additional versions:* \*\_nr

*Question:* Which (if any) groups include a significant share of individuals who explicitly and actively mobilize against the regime in a particular year? (Check all that apply.)

*Clarification:* Consider which group(s) include a significant share of individuals who engage in active and explicit opposition to the regime to promote its removal. These actors make explicit statements of dissent from the regime, publicly voice their preference for regime change, and may possibly engage in other actions intended to further the removal of the regime such as anti-regime demonstrations, sit-ins, boycotts, strikes, the formation of anti-system parties, acts of sabotage, or armed rebellion. Please note that only years when anti-regime speech or activity occurs should be coded. In years when groups probably oppose the regime, but are not engaged in any explicit acts of opposition, the group should not be selected. We remind you of the definition of a regime as the set of formal and/or informal rules that are essential for choosing political leaders and/or maintaining political leaders in power. Hence, we are not asking about which groups oppose the current government in a democracy (and who would vote for another party), but still accept the democratic rules as legitimate. We are, instead, asking about groups that want to see the wider political regime removed and replaced.

*Responses:*

- 0: The aristocracy, including high status hereditary social groups and castes. [v2regoppgroupsact\_0]
- 1: Agrarian elites, including rich peasants and large landholders. [v2regoppgroupsact\_1]
- 2: Party elites (of the party or parties that control the executive). [v2regoppgroupsact\_2]
- 3: Business elites. [v2regoppgroupsact\_3]
- 4: The state bureaucracy. [v2regoppgroupsact\_4]
- 5: The military. [v2regoppgroupsact\_5]
- 6: An ethnic or racial group(s). [v2regoppgroupsact\_6]
- 7: A religious group(s). [v2regoppgroupsact\_7]
- 8: Local elites, including customary chiefs. [v2regoppgroupsact\_8]
- 9: Urban working classes, including labor unions. [v2regoppgroupsact\_9]
- 10: Urban middle classes. [v2regoppgroupsact\_10]
- 11: Rural working classes (e.g., peasants). [v2regoppgroupsact\_11]
- 12: Rural middle classes (e.g., family farmers). [v2regoppgroupsact\_12]
- 13: A foreign government or colonial power. [v2regoppgroupsact\_13]

*Scale:* Series of dichotomous scales.

*Answer-type:* Multiple-selection.

*Data release:* 11-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Mean.

*Cleaning:* Set to missing where v2regint is 0.

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2020

*Default date:* Default date for this variable is January 1.

#### 3.4.4.13 Regime most important opposition group (C) (v2regimpoppgroup)

*Project Manager(s):* Carl Henrik Knutsen

*Additional versions:* \*\_nr

*Question:* Which (one) group constitutes the greatest threat to the current regime?

*Clarification:* Choose the one group (among those you registered as opposition groups under the v2regoppgroups question) that is the most dangerous threat to the regime in a given year. That is, the group that could most strongly increase the chance that the regime loses power. The importance/danger associated with an opposition group will be affected both by its level of hostility towards the regime and its power resources/how capable it is of removing the regime should it try to do so. We remind you that groups need not be actively mobilized or explicitly engaged in high-level opposition activities to be counted; key opposition groups may include actors who oppose the regime and constitute a dormant threat to the regime, even though they do not take particular actions in a given year.

*Responses:*

- 0: The aristocracy, including high status hereditary social groups and castes.
- 1: Agrarian elites, including rich peasants and large landholders.
- 2: Party elites (of the party or parties that control the executive).
- 3: Business elites.
- 4: Civil servants.
- 5: The military.
- 6: An ethnic or racial group(s).
- 7: A religious group(s).
- 8: Local elites, including chiefs.
- 9: Urban working classes, including labor unions.
- 10: Urban middle classes
- 11: Rural working classes (e.g., peasants).
- 12: Rural middle classes (e.g., family farmers)
- 13: A foreign government or colonial power.

*Data release:* 11-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Mode.

"Ties" between categories are resolved so that the corresponding category in v2regoppgroups with the highest mean for the same country-date is chosen.

*Cleaning:* Set to missing where v2regint is 0.

*Citation:* V-Dem Codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2020

*Default date:* Default date for this variable is January 1.

#### 3.4.4.14 Regime opposition groups size (C) (v2regoppgroupssize)

*Project Manager(s):* Carl Henrik Knutsen

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* In total, how large is the share of the domestic adult (18+) population that are noteworthy opposition actors to the current political regime?

*Clarification:* Consider the sum total of all the groups (excepting foreign governments and colonial powers) entered in v2regoppgroups. Hence, your answer should take into account the total size/number of the actors that oppose the regime and pose a threat to the regime maintaining power.

We remind you that groups need not be actively mobilized or explicitly engaged in high-level opposition activities to be counted; key opposition groups may include actors who oppose the regime and constitute a dormant threat to the regime, even though they do not take particular actions in a given year.

Regarding the issue of individuals potentially belonging to more than one "opposition group": Individuals should only be "counted" once for the purpose of this question. For example, if the two relevant opposition groups are (4) civil servants, which total about 5% of the population, and all of them belong to a particular ethnic group (6) also coded as a relevant, the overall total size of the opposition groups is still 5% (presuming that there are no other members of that ethnic group who oppose the regime).

We remind you of the definition of a regime as the set of formal and/or informal rules that are

essential for choosing political leaders and/or maintaining political leaders in power. Hence, we are not asking about which groups oppose the current government in a democracy (and who would vote for another party), but still accept the democratic rules as legitimate. We are, instead, asking about groups that want to see the wider political regime removed and replaced.

*Responses:*

- 0: Extremely small (About 1 percent of the population or less)
- 1: Very small (Between 1 percent and 5 percent of the population)
- 2: Small (Between 5 percent and 15 percent)
- 3: Moderate (Between 15 percent and 30 percent)
- 4: Large (More than 30 percent)

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 11-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

*Cleaning:* Set to missing where v2regint is 0.

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2020

*Default date:* Default date for this variable is January 1.

*Convergence:* Model parameters with convergence issues: universal thresholds.

#### 3.4.4.15 Regime opposition location (C) (v2regopploc)

*Project Manager(s):* Carl Henrik Knutsen

*Additional versions:* \*\_nr

*Question:* In which geographic area do groups opposing the current political regime mainly reside?

*Clarification:* You should consider the groups entered in v2regoppgroups, hence groups that both want to see the regime removed and (at least under “favorable conditions”) are capable of removing the regime. We remind you that groups need not be actively mobilized or explicitly engaged in high-level opposition activities to be counted; key opposition groups may include actors who oppose the regime and constitute a dormant threat to the regime, even though they do not take particular actions in a given year. We remind you of the definition of a regime as the set of formal and/or informal rules that are essential for choosing political leaders and/or maintaining political leaders in power. Hence, we are not asking about which groups oppose the current government in a democracy (and who would vote for another party), but still accept the democratic rules as legitimate. We are, instead, asking about groups that want to see the wider political regime removed and replaced.

*Responses:*

- 0: Abroad.
- 1: In the capital.
- 2: In urban areas outside the capital.
- 3: In rural areas.
- 4: The groups are not concentrated in any particular area.

*Scale:* Nominal

*Data release:* 11-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Mode.

"Ties" between categories receive the value 4.

*Cleaning:* Set to missing where v2regint is 0.

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2020

*Default date:* Default date for this variable is January 1.

#### 3.4.4.16 Strongest pro-regime preferences (C) (v2regproreg)

*Project Manager(s):* Carl Henrik Knutsen

*Additional versions:* \* \_nr

*Question:* Which (one) group has the strongest pro-regime preferences, irrespective of the group's resources and capabilities for affecting the regime's hold on power?

*Clarification:* Consider only the pro-regime preferences of individuals in this group, and do not take into consideration the abilities of this group to actually affect regime survival. Hence, the group with the strongest pro-regime preferences need not be the most important support group.

One way to think about what pro-/anti-regime preferences means is: what would individuals hypothetically (honestly) answer if asked in a survey: "On a scale from 0-10, how pleased are you with the current political regime, with 10 indicating the strongest support." Select the group with the highest average score in this hypothetical survey.

We remind you of the definition of a regime as the set of formal and/or informal rules that are essential for choosing political leaders and/or maintaining political leaders in power. Hence, we are not asking about which groups oppose the current government in a democracy (and who would vote for another party), but still accept the democratic rules as legitimate. We are, instead, asking about groups that want to see the wider political regime removed and replaced.

*Responses:*

- 0: The aristocracy, including high status hereditary social groups and castes.
- 1: Agrarian elites, including rich peasants and large landholders.
- 2: Party elites (of the party or parties that control the executive).
- 3: Business elites.
- 4: Civil servants.
- 5: The military.
- 6: An ethnic or racial group(s).
- 7: A religious group(s).
- 8: Local elites, including chiefs.
- 9: Urban working classes, including labor unions.
- 10: Urban middle classes
- 11: Rural working classes (e.g., peasants).
- 12: Rural middle classes (e.g., family farmers)
- 13: A foreign government or colonial power.

*Data release:* 11-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Mode.

"Ties" between categories are resolved so that the corresponding category in v2regsupgroups with the highest mean for the same country-date is chosen.

*Cleaning:* Set to missing where v2regint is 0.

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2020

*Default date:* Default date for this variable is January 1.

#### 3.4.4.17 Strongest anti-regime preferences (C) (v2regantireg)

*Project Manager(s):* Carl Henrik Knutsen

*Additional versions:* \* \_nr

*Question:* Which (one) group has the strongest anti-regime preferences/antipathy against the current regime, irrespective of the group's resources and capabilities for affecting the regime's hold on power?

*Clarification:* Consider only the anti-regime preferences of the actors in this group, and do not take into consideration the abilities of this group to actually affect regime survival and change. Hence, the group with the strongest anti-regime preferences need not be the most important opposition group. Both capable and incapable political actors may have strong anti-regime preferences and want to see the regime removed from power. We also remind that the group needs not be currently mobilized or explicitly engaged in high-level opposition activities to be counted; individuals may strongly resent a regime, without taking particular actions, in a given

year.

One way to think about what pro-/anti-regime preferences mean, independently of ability to affect regime survival is: what would individuals hypothetically (honestly) answer if asked in a survey: “On a scale from 0-10, how pleased are you with the current political regime”.

We remind you of the definition of a regime as the set of formal and/or informal rules that are essential for choosing political leaders and/or maintaining political leaders in power. Hence, we are not asking about which groups oppose the current government in a democracy (and who would vote for another party), but still accept the democratic rules as legitimate. We are, instead, asking about groups that want to see the wider political regime removed and replaced.

*Responses:*

- 0: The aristocracy, including high status hereditary social groups and castes.
- 1: Agrarian elites, including rich peasants and large landholders.
- 2: Party elites (of the party or parties that control the executive).
- 3: Business elites.
- 4: Civil servants.
- 5: The military.
- 6: An ethnic or racial group(s).
- 7: A religious group(s).
- 8: Local elites, including chiefs.
- 9: Urban working classes, including labor unions.
- 10: Urban middle classes
- 11: Rural working classes (e.g., peasants).
- 12: Rural middle classes (e.g., family farmers)
- 13: A foreign government or colonial power.

*Data release:* 11-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Mode.

"Ties" between categories are resolved so that the corresponding category in v2regoppgroups with the highest mean for the same country-date is chosen.

*Cleaning:* Set to missing where v2regint is 0.

*Citation:* V-Dem Codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2020

*Default date:* Default date for this variable is January 1.

#### 3.4.4.18 Most powerful group in affecting regime duration and change (C) (v2regpower)

*Project Manager(s):* Carl Henrik Knutsen

*Additional versions:* \*\_nr

*Question:* Irrespective of its stance toward the regime (pro-, anti-, or neutral), which one group is the most important for affecting the current regime’s chances of staying in power?

*Clarification:* Here we ask you to disregard group preferences, and only consider a group’s resources and capabilities vis-a-vis affecting regime survival. In other words, do not consider whether this group is pro-regime, anti-regime, or neutral to the regime. Take only into consideration the capabilities of this group to affect regime survival, if key members of the group were to hypothetically mobilize the group in an effort to remove the regime. Politically neutral, as well as pro- and anti-regime groups, may have ample resources and be capable of organizing coordinated action. As a result, all three types of groups may have great influence over regime survival and change.

*Responses:*

- 0: The aristocracy, including high status hereditary social groups and castes.
- 1: Agrarian elites, including rich peasants and large landholders.
- 2: Party elites (of the party or parties that control the executive).
- 3: Business elites.
- 4: Civil servants.
- 5: The military.
- 6: An ethnic or racial group(s).

- 7: A religious group(s).
- 8: Local elites, including chiefs.
- 9: Urban working classes, including labor unions.
- 10: Urban middle classes
- 11: Rural working classes (e.g., peasants).
- 12: Rural middle classes (e.g., family farmers)
- 13: A foreign government or colonial power.

*Data release:* 11-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Mode.

"Ties" between categories are resolved so that the corresponding category in v2regsupgroups with the highest mean for the same country-date is chosen.

*Cleaning:* Set to missing where v2regint is 0.

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2020

*Default date:* Default date for this variable is January 1.

## 3.5 The Legislature

### Instructions to the coders (as shown in the surveys)

**The Legislature:** The following questions pertain to the legislature, an assembly of deputies or representatives with powers to consider, pass, amend, or repeal laws. If there is no legislature in the country you are coding for some period of years, do not code any questions for those year. If you are considering a semi-sovereign territory such as a colony please answer this question with respect to the legislature that is seated within the territory in question (such as the local legislative assembly in a British colony, not the Parliament in London). A popular election need not involve universal suffrage; indeed, suffrage may be highly restricted. A "direct election" can include seats reserved for special groups (*e.g.*, ethnic groups or women) so long as these members are chosen by popular election.

Frequently, it is important to distinguish between formal rules (as stipulated by statute, legislative rules, the constitution, or common law precedent) and actual practice (what happens on the ground). In order to clarify the *de jure/de facto* distinction, we employ the terms "by law..." and "in practice..." Please pay close attention to these cues. Note that sometimes we ask different coders to code different aspects of a question. So, you might get a question about the *de facto* state of affairs, but another source might provide the answer to the *de jure* state of affairs.

**Upper Chamber:** The following questions pertain to the upper chamber of the legislature (if bicameral; please only code for those years where `v2lgbicam` is 2). The upper chamber in a bicameral legislature, often called the "senate" or sometimes the "first chamber", typically means the less numerous chamber that is also less directly representative of the general population.

If you are considering a semi-sovereign territory, such as a colony, please answer these questions with respect to the upper chamber of the legislature that is seated within the territory in question (such as the senate or upper chamber of a local legislative assembly in a British colony, not the House of Lords in London).

**One or both houses:** The following questions pertain to one or both houses.

**Lower chamber:** The following questions pertain to the lower or unicameral chamber of the legislature. The lower chamber in a bicameral legislature, sometimes also called the "second chamber", is typically the more numerous chamber and also more directly representative of the general population.

If there is no legislature in the country you are coding for some period of years, do not code any questions for those years. If you are considering a semi-sovereign territory, such as a colony, please answer these questions with respect to the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature that is seated within the territory in question (such as the lower chamber of a local legislative assembly in a British colony, not the House of Commons in London).

Country experts will find the name (proper noun) of the lower chamber of the legislature in the first question (following this page). To see the name, click on any year in the grid. All subsequent questions in this section pertain to that body.

### 3.5.1 General

#### 3.5.1.1 Legislature bicameral (A\*) (`v2lgbicam`)

*Project Manager(s):* Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

*Question:* How many chambers does the legislature contain?

*Clarification:* The number of chambers have been pre-coded for as many years as possible. This means that the score has already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded rating. If there is a change in the number of chambers, this is coded on the



exact date of when the change occurred, for example the exact date of when a legislature was dissolved, or when the lower and/or upper chamber was established (usually coded on the date when the new legislature first meets; otherwise on the date of the legislative election where the composition of the new legislature was decided).

*Responses:*

- 0: 0 chambers.
- 1: 1 chamber.
- 2: 2 or more chambers.

*Scale:* Ordinal.

*Source(s):* Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections (IPU); IFES; Websites of national parliaments; National constitutions; Reif (2011, 2012); CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012), v191.

*Notes:* For the country-year aggregation of the dataset, we have taken the minimum value of v2lgbicam. Constituent assemblies that perform other functions except for drafting and adopting a new constitution (*e.g.* legislating, electing president, adopting budget, etc) are coded as 1 (1 chamber). In cases when a parliament consists of three or more chambers, one of the chamber names is coded in the variable "Lower chamber legislature name" (v2lgnamel0), while the others are listed in the variable "Upper chamber name" (v2lgnamelup). South Africa had a three-chamber parliament during the period of 1984-1994. Subsequently, variable v2lgbicam is coded 2, v2lgnamel0 is coded "House of Assembly", and v2lgnamelup enlists "House of Representatives, House of Delegates".

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Country-Year Aggregation:* Last

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

### 3.5.1.2 Legislature dominant chamber (C) (v2lgbicam)

*Project Manager(s):* Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* If the legislature is bicameral, which chamber is dominant?

*Responses:*

- 0: The lower chamber is clearly dominant.
- 1: The lower chamber is somewhat more powerful on most issues.
- 2: They are roughly co-equal in power.
- 3: The upper chamber is somewhat more powerful on most issues.
- 4: The upper chamber is clearly dominant.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Cleaning:* Set to missing when v2lgbicam is 0 or 1

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

*Convergence:* Model parameters with convergence issues: universal thresholds.

### 3.5.1.3 Legislature questions officials in practice (C) (v2lgbicam)

*Project Manager(s):* Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* In practice, does the legislature routinely question executive branch officials?

*Clarification:* By "question" we mean, for example, the power of summons through which the head of state or head of government could be forced to explain its policies or testify.

*Responses:*

0: No — never or very rarely.

1: Yes — routinely.

*Scale:* Dichotomous, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 3-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Cleaning:* Set to missing when v2lgbicam is 0

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

### 3.5.1.4 Legislature investigates in practice (C) (v2lginvstp)

*Project Manager(s):* Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* If the executive were engaged in unconstitutional, illegal, or unethical activity, how likely is it that a legislative body (perhaps a whole chamber, perhaps a committee, whether aligned with government or opposition) would conduct an investigation that would result in a decision or report that is unfavorable to the executive?

*Responses:*

0: Extremely unlikely.

1: Unlikely.

2: As likely as not.

3: Likely.

4: Certain or nearly certain.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

### 3.5.1.5 Executive oversight (C) (v2lgotovst)

*Project Manager(s):* Jan Teorell

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* If executive branch officials were engaged in unconstitutional, illegal, or unethical activity, how likely is it that a body *other than the legislature*, such as a comptroller general, general prosecutor, or ombudsman, would question or investigate them and issue an unfavorable decision or report?

*Responses:*

0: Extremely unlikely.

1: Unlikely.

2: Very uncertain.

3: Likely.

4: Certain or nearly certain.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

*Convergence:* Model parameters with convergence issues: universal thresholds, expert thresholds, main-country-coded thresholds.

### 3.5.1.6 Legislature corrupt activities (C) (v2lgcrrpt)

*Project Manager(s):* Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* Do members of the legislature abuse their position for financial gain?

*Clarification:* This includes any of the following: (a) accepting bribes, (b) helping to obtain government contracts for firms that the legislator (or his/her family/friends/political supporters) own, (c) doing favors for firms in exchange for the opportunity of employment after leaving the legislature, (d) stealing money from the state or from campaign donations for personal use.

Please make your best estimate, based upon what is known or suspected to be true.

*Responses:*

- 0: Commonly. Most legislators probably engage in these activities.
- 1: Often. Many legislators probably engage in these activities.
- 2: Sometimes. Some legislators probably engage in these activities.
- 3: Very occasionally. There may be a few legislators who engage in these activities but the vast majority do not.
- 4: Never, or hardly ever.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Notes:* For reasons of consistency, as of December, 2014, responses to this question are reversed so that the least democratic response is "0" and the most democratic is "4".

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Cleaning:* Set to missing when v2lgbicam is 0

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

### 3.5.1.7 Legislature opposition parties (C) (v2lgoppart)

*Project Manager(s):* Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* Are opposition parties (those not in the ruling party or coalition) able to exercise oversight and investigatory functions against the wishes of the governing party or coalition?

*Responses:*

- 0: No, not at all.
- 1: Occasionally.
- 2: Yes, for the most part.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Cleaning:* Set to missing when v2lgbicam is 0

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

### 3.5.1.8 Legislature controls resources (C) (v2lgfunds)

*Project Manager(s)*: Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

*Additional versions*: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question*: In practice, does the legislature control the resources that finance its own internal operations and the perquisites of its members?

*Responses*:

0: No. The benefits legislators receive or the finances needed for the legislature's operation depend on remaining in good standing with an outside authority, such as the executive.

1: Yes.

*Scale*: Dichotomous, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release*: 3-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation*: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Cleaning*: Set to missing when v2lgbicam is 0

*Citation*: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years*: 1789-2021

### 3.5.1.9 Representation of disadvantaged social groups (C) (v2lgdsadlo)

*Project Manager(s)*: Pamela Paxton

*Additional versions*: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question*: Considering all disadvantaged social groups in the country, how well represented are these groups, as a whole, in the national legislature?

*Clarification*: Disadvantage refers to socioeconomic disadvantage. Specifically, in order to be considered disadvantaged members of a social group must have an average income that is significantly below the median national income.

*Responses*:

0 (1): They have no representation at all.

1 (2): They are highly under-represented relative to their proportion of the general population.

2 (3): They are slightly under-represented relative to their proportion of the general population.

3 (4): They are represented roughly equal relative to their proportion of the general population.

4 (5): They are over-represented relative to their proportion of the general population.

*Scale*: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Notes*: As of December 2014, the former category 0: There are no disadvantaged groups in the society, is coded as a separate variable (v2lgdsadlobin). The variable is then rebased to zero.

*Data release*: 3-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation*: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Cleaning*: Set to missing when v2lgbicam is 0

*Citation*: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years*: 1900-2021

### 3.5.1.10 Representation of disadvantaged social groups binary (C) (v2lgdsadlobin)

*Project Manager(s)*: Pamela Paxton

*Additional versions*: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question*: Are there disadvantaged groups in the society?

*Clarification*: Disadvantage refers to socioeconomic disadvantage. Specifically, in order to be considered disadvantaged members of a social group must have an average income that is significantly below the median national income.

*Responses*:

0: No.

1: Yes.

*Scale:* Dichotomous, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 3-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2021

#### 3.5.1.11 Relative power of the HOS (A) (v2ex\_hosw)

*Project Manager(s):* Jan Teorell

*Question:* Does the head of state HOS have more relative power than the head of government HOG over the appointment and dismissal of cabinet ministers?

*Responses:*

0: No.

0.25: See notes.

0.5: The HOS and HOG share equal power.

1: Yes.

*Scale:* Nominal.

*Source(s):* v2exdfcbhs\_rec v2exdjcbhg v2exdfdmhs v2exdfdsbg v2exhoshog

*Notes:* If the head of state is also head of government, v2ex\_hosw is 1.

From 1900-01-01 to 1960-08-09 Belgium has a score of 0.25.

*Data release:* 5-12.

*Country-Year Aggregation:* Last

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

#### 3.5.1.12 HOG appointed by legislature (D) (v2ex\_legconhog)

*Project Manager(s):* Jan Teorell

*Question:* Is the head of government HOG appointed by the legislature, or is the approval of the legislature necessary for the appointment of the head of state?

*Responses:*

0: No.

1: Yes.

*Scale:* Dichotomous.

*Source(s):* v2expathhg v2exaphogp

*Data release:* 5-12.

*Cleaning:* Set to missing when v2exhoshog is 1

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

#### 3.5.1.13 HOS appointed by legislature (D) (v2ex\_legconhos)

*Project Manager(s):* Jan Teorell

*Question:* Is the head of state HOS appointed by the legislature, or is the approval of the legislature necessary for the appointment of the head of state?

*Responses:*

0: No.

1: Yes.

*Scale:* Dichotomous.

*Source(s):* v2expathhs v2exaphos

*Data release:* 5-12.

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

#### **3.5.1.14 Legislature approval of treaties by law (A) (v2lgtreaty)**

*Project Manager(s):* Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

*Question:* By law, is the approval of the legislature necessary to ratify treaties with foreign countries?

*Responses:*

0: No.

1: Yes.

*Scale:* Dichotomous.

*Source(s):* CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012), v492; National constitutions; V-Dem country coordinators.

*Notes:* Converted from (B) to (A) coding. V-Dem Country Coordinators answers were used for country-years where data was missing in CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012).

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Country–Year Aggregation:* Last

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2020

#### **3.5.1.15 Legislature declares war by law (A) (v2lgwarlaw)**

*Project Manager(s):* Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

*Question:* By law, is the approval of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature necessary to declare war?

*Responses:*

0: No.

1: Yes.

*Scale:* Dichotomous.

*Source(s):* CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012), v488; National constitutions; V-Dem country coordinators.

*Notes:* Converted from (B) to (A) coding. V-Dem Country Coordinators answers were used for country-years where data was missing in CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012).

*Data release:* 6-12.

*Country–Year Aggregation:* Last

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2020

### **3.5.2 Upper Chamber**

#### **3.5.2.1 Upper chamber name (A\*) (v2lgnameup)**

*Project Manager(s):* Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

*Question:* What is the name of the upper chamber of the legislature?

*Clarification:* Please provide an as accurate as possible literal translation of the name of the upper chamber of the legislature in English, with the name in the native language, or a transcription thereof, within parentheses.

The legislature names have been pre-coded for as many years as possible. This means that the text and specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded rating.

*Responses:*

Text.

*Notes:* In cases when a parliament consists of three or more chambers, one of the chamber names is coded in the variable "Lower chamber legislature name" (v2lgnamelo), while the others are

enlisted in the variable "Upper chamber name" (v2lgnameup). Example: South Africa had a three-chamber parliament during the period of 1984-1994. Subsequently, variable v2lgbicam is coded 2, v2lgnameup is coded "House of Assembly", and v2lgnameup enlists "House of Representatives, House of Delegates".

*Data release:* 3-12.

*Country-Year Aggregation:* Last

*Cleaning:* Set to missing when v2lgbicam is 0 or 1

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

### 3.5.2.2 Upper chamber legislates in practice (C) (v2lglegpup)

*Project Manager(s):* Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* In practice, is the approval of the upper chamber of the legislature required to pass legislation?

*Responses:*

0: No. Legislation is routinely passed without the approval of the upper chamber of the legislature.

1: Yes, usually. Legislation is usually passed with the approval of the upper chamber of the legislature, but occasionally the legislature is by-passed.

2: Yes, always. Legislation of any consequence is always approved by the upper chamber of the legislature.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Cleaning:* Set to missing when v2lgbicam is 0 or 1

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

### 3.5.2.3 Upper chamber elected (A) (v2lgelecup)

*Project Manager(s):* Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

*Question:* What percentage of the upper chamber of the legislature is directly elected in popular elections?

*Clarification:* Exceptions to the norm of direct election include members who are appointed, *e.g.*, by an executive, the military, or a theocratic body, and members who are indirectly elected by local/regional parliaments, country/city councilors or similar. Thus, if 10 % of a upper chamber is appointed in some fashion the correct answer to this question would be 90 %.

*Responses:*

Percent.

*Scale:* Interval.

*Source(s):* Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections (IPU); Websites of national parliaments.

*Notes:* Converted from B to A coding.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Country-Year Aggregation:* Day-weighted mean

*Cleaning:* Set to missing when v2lgbicam is 0 or 1

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021



#### 3.5.2.4 Percentage of indirectly elected legislators upper chamber (A) (v2lginelup)

*Project Manager(s)*: Jan Teorell

*Question*: What percentage of the upper chamber of the legislature is indirectly elected?

*Clarification*: Indirect elections include elections by local/regional parliaments, country/city councilors or similar. Exceptions to the norm of indirect election include members who are appointed, *e.g.*, by an executive, the military, or a theocratic body.

We are *not* concerned with non-voting members or with members of the legislature who do not possess the powers of most legislators.

*Responses*:

Percent.

*Scale*: Interval.

*Source(s)*: Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections (IPU); Websites of national parliaments.

*Data release*: 9-12.

*Country-Year Aggregation*: Day-weighted mean

*Cleaning*: Set to missing when v2lgbicam is 0 or 1

*Citation*: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years*: 1789-2021

#### 3.5.2.5 Upper chamber introduces bills (A) (v2lgintbup)

*Project Manager(s)*: Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

*Question*: By law, does the upper chamber of the legislature have the ability to introduce bills in all policy jurisdictions?

*Responses*:

0: No, there are policy areas in which the upper chamber cannot introduce bills.

1: Yes.

*Scale*: Dichotomous.

*Source(s)*: CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012), v263; National constitutions; V-Dem country coordinators.

*Notes*: Converted from (B) to (A) coding. V-Dem Country Coordinators answers were used for country-years where data was missing in CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012).

*Data release*: 1-12.

*Country-Year Aggregation*: Last

*Cleaning*: Set to missing when v2lgbicam is 0 or 1

*Citation*: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years*: 1789-2020

### 3.5.3 Unicameral or Lower Chamber

#### 3.5.3.1 Lower chamber legislature name (A\*) (v2lgnamelo)

*Project Manager(s)*: Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

*Question*: What is the name of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature?

*Clarification*: Please provide an as accurate as possible literal translation of the name of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature in English, with the name in the native language, or a transcription thereof, within parentheses.

The legislature names have been pre-coded for as many years as possible. This means that the text and specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded rating.

*Responses*:

Text.

*Notes*: In cases when a parliament consists of three or more chambers, one of the chamber names is coded in the variable "Lower chamber legislature name" (v2lgnamelo), while the others are

enlisted in the variable "Upper chamber name" (v2lgnameup). Example: South Africa had a three-chamber parliament during the period of 1984-1994. Subsequently, variable v2lgbicam is coded 2, v2lgnameo is coded "House of Assembly", and v2lgnameup enlists "House of Representatives, House of Delegates".

*Data release:* 3-12.

*Country-Year Aggregation:* Last

*Cleaning:* Set to missing when v2lgbicam is 0

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

### 3.5.3.2 Lower chamber legislates in practice (C) (v2lglegplo)

*Project Manager(s):* Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* In practice, is the approval of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature required to pass legislation?

*Responses:*

0: No. Legislation is routinely passed without the approval of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature.

1: Yes, usually. Legislation is usually passed with the approval of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature, but occasionally the legislature is by-passed.

2: Yes, always. Legislation of any consequence is always approved by the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Cleaning:* Set to missing when v2lgbicam is 0

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

### 3.5.3.3 Lower chamber committees (C) (v2lgcomslo)

*Project Manager(s):* Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* Does the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature have a functioning committee system?

*Responses:*

0: No, there are no committees.

1: Yes, but there are only special (not permanent) committees.

2: Yes, there are permanent committees, but they are not very significant in affecting the course of policy.

3: Yes, there are permanent committees that have strong influence on the course of policymaking.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Cleaning:* Set to missing when v2lgbicam is 0

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

#### 3.5.3.4 Lower chamber members serve in government (C) (v2lgsrvlo)

*Project Manager(s)*: Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

*Additional versions*: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question*: In practice, are members of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature able to serve simultaneously as ministers in the government?

*Responses*:

0: No.

1: Yes.

*Scale*: Dichotomous, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release*: 3-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation*: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Cleaning*: Set to missing when v2lgbicam is 0

*Citation*: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years*: 1789-2021

#### 3.5.3.5 Lower chamber staff (C) (v2lgstafflo)

*Project Manager(s)*: Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

*Additional versions*: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question*: Does each member of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature have at least one staff member with policy expertise?

*Responses*:

0: No.

1: Yes.

*Scale*: Dichotomous, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release*: 3-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation*: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Cleaning*: Set to missing when v2lgbicam is 0

*Citation*: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years*: 1900-2021

#### 3.5.3.6 Lower chamber elected (A) (v2lgello)

*Project Manager(s)*: Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

*Question*: What percentage of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature is directly elected in popular elections?

*Clarification*: Direct election includes seats reserved for special groups (*e.g.*, ethnic groups or women) so long as these members are chosen by popular election.

Exceptions to the norm of direct election include members who are appointed, *e.g.*, by an executive, the military, or a theocratic body, and members who are indirectly elected by local/ regional parliaments, country/city councilors or similar. Thus, if 10% of a lower chamber is appointed in some fashion the correct answer to this question would be 90 %.

We are *not* concerned with non-voting members or with members of the legislature who do not possess the powers of most legislators.

*Responses*:

Percent.

*Scale*: Interval.

*Source(s)*: Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections (IPU); Websites of national parliaments.

*Notes*: Converted from (B) to (A) coding.

*Data release*: 1-12.

*Country-Year Aggregation*: Day-weighted mean

*Cleaning*: Set to missing when v2lgbicam is 0

*Citation*: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years*: 1789-2021

### 3.5.3.7 Lower chamber female legislators (A) (v2lgfemleg)

*Project Manager(s)*: Staffan I. Lindberg

*Question*: What percentage (%) of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature is female?

*Responses*:

Percent.

*Scale*: Interval.

*Source(s)*: Edgel (2014); Paxton *et al.* (2008); Carmichael *et al.* (2014); Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections (IPU); genderproject.org.

*Data release*: 4-12.

*Country-Year Aggregation*: Last

*Cleaning*: Set to missing when v2lgbicam is 0

*Citation*: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years*: 1900-2021

### 3.5.3.8 Percentage of indirectly elected legislators lower chamber (A) (v2lginello)

*Project Manager(s)*: Jan Teorell

*Question*: What percentage of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature is indirectly elected?

*Clarification*: Indirect elections include elections by local/regional parliaments, country/city councilors or similar. Exceptions to the norm of indirect election include members who are appointed, *e.g.*, by an executive, the military, or a theocratic body.

We are *not* concerned with non-voting members or with members of the legislature who do not possess the powers of most legislators.

*Responses*:

Percent.

*Scale*: Interval.

*Source(s)*: Nohlen *et al.* (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections (IPU); Websites of national parliaments.

*Data release*: 9-12.

*Country-Year Aggregation*: Day-weighted mean

*Cleaning*: Set to missing when v2lgbicam is 0

*Citation*: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years*: 1789-2021

### 3.5.3.9 Lower chamber introduces bills (A) (v2lgintblo)

*Project Manager(s)*: Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

*Question*: By law, does the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature have the ability to introduce bills in all policy jurisdictions?

*Responses*:

0: No, there are policy areas in which the lower (or unicameral) chamber cannot introduce

bills.

1: Yes.

*Scale:* Dichotomous.

*Source(s):* CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012), v263; National constitutions; V-Dem country coordinators.

*Notes:* Converted from (B) to (A) coding. V-Dem Country Coordinators answers were used for country-years where data was missing in CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012).

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Country–Year Aggregation:* Last

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2020

### 3.5.3.10 Lower chamber gender quota (A) (v2lgqugen)

*Project Manager(s):* Pamela Paxton

*Question:* Is there a national-level gender quota for the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature?

*Clarification:* National-level quotas either reserve some seats for women in the legislature (as a whole or per district) or mandate through statutory law that all political parties must nominate a certain percentage of female candidates or candidates considered for nomination. A sanction for noncompliance imposes a penalty on a party that fails to meet the quota provisions. Examples of sanctions for noncompliance include rejection of the party list, loss of public campaign funds, or other financial penalties. Weak sanctions are those that parties may be able to ignore, such as a very weak financial penalty. Strong sanctions provide strong deterrents for noncompliance. An example of a strong sanction would be the rejection of a party's list. Countries with both candidate quotas and reserved seats are recorded at the stronger level. This variable records quotas from the date of implementation. The quota adoption date may be earlier, sometimes by several years. Data on quota adoption is available from the QAROT dataset (Hughes, Paxton, Clayton, and Zetterberg 2017) while the theoretical implications of adoption vs. implementation are discussed in Hughes, Paxton, Clayton, and Zetterberg (2018).

*Responses:*

0: No national level gender quota.

1: Yes, a statutory gender quota for all parties without sanctions for noncompliance.

2: Yes, statutory gender quota for all parties with weak sanctions for noncompliance.

3: Yes, statutory gender quota for all parties with strong sanctions for noncompliance.

4: Yes, there are reserved seats in the legislature for women.

*Ordering:* If you answer 1-4, proceed to the next question [v2lgqugens]. If you answer 0, skip to question [v2lglegllo].

*Scale:* Ordinal.

*Source(s):* QAROT dataset (Hughes, Paxton, Clayton, and Zetterberg 2017), Quota project (2018); International IDEA (2018a) ; Coding by project manager.

*Notes:* Converted from (B) to (A) coding.

*Data release:* 9-12.

*Country–Year Aggregation:* Last

*Citation:* Hughes, Paxton, Clayton, and Zetterberg (2018); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2021

### 3.5.3.11 Lower chamber gender quota placement mandate (A) (v2lgqugens)

*Project Manager(s):* Pamela Paxton

*Question:* Does the national-level quota for the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature contain a placement mandate?

*Clarification:* A placement mandate is a rule concerning rank order on the party list, usually to

ensure that women are placed in electable positions on the party list. An example would a rule stating that no more than three of the top five candidates can be of the same gender. Coded only for years where a gender quota was present.

*Responses:*

0: No.

1: Yes.

*Ordering:* Only answer this question if you answered 1-4 on previous question [v2lgqugen].

*Scale:* Dichotomous.

*Source(s):* QAROT dataset (Hughes, Paxton, Clayton, and Zetterberg 2017), Quota project (2018); International IDEA (2018a); Coding by project manager.

*Data release:* 9-12.

*Country–Year Aggregation:* Last

*Cleaning:* Set to missing when v2lgqugen is 0

*Citation:* Hughes, Paxton, Clayton, and Zetterberg (2018); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1947-2021

### 3.5.3.12 Lower chamber gender quota threshold (A) (v2lgqugent)

*Project Manager(s):* Pamela Paxton

*Question:* What is the threshold of the quota for the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature?

*Clarification:* A quota is the minimum threshold, understood as a percentage (%) of the total seats in the legislature. Coded only for years where a gender quota was present.

*Responses:*

Percent.

*Scale:* Interval.

*Source(s):* QAROT dataset (Hughes, Paxton, Clayton, and Zetterberg 2017), Quota project (2018); International IDEA (2018a); Coding by project manager.

*Data release:* 9-12.

*Country–Year Aggregation:* Day-weighted mean

*Cleaning:* Set to missing when v2lgqugen is 0

*Citation:* Hughes, Paxton, Clayton, and Zetterberg (2018); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1947-2021

## 3.6 Deliberation

### Instructions to the coders (as shown in the surveys)

**Deliberation:** The following questions address the deliberative or non-deliberative nature of a country's politics, with particular focus on elite levels. Some of these questions focus on the quality of discourse and others focus on public policies.

#### 3.6.0.1 Reasoned justification (C) (v2dlreason)

*Project Manager(s):* Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Staffan Lindberg

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* When important policy changes are being considered, *i.e.* before a decision has been made, to what extent do political elites give public and reasoned justifications for their positions?

*Clarification:* Because discourse varies greatly from person to person, base your answer on the style that is most typical of prominent national political leaders.

*Responses:*

0: No justification. Elites almost always only dictate that something should or should not be done, but no reasoning about justification is given. For example, "We must cut spending."

1: Inferior justification. Elites tend to give reasons why someone should or should not be for doing or not doing something, but the reasons tend to be illogical or false, although they may appeal to many voters. For example, "We must cut spending. The state is inefficient." [The inference is incomplete because addressing inefficiencies would not necessarily reduce spending and it might undermine essential services.]

2: Qualified justification. Elites tend to offer a single simple reason justifying why the proposed policies contribute to or detract from an outcome. For example, "We must cut spending because taxpayers cannot afford to pay for current programs."

3: Sophisticated justification. Elites tend to offer more than one or more complex, nuanced and complete justification. For example, "We must cut spending because taxpayers cannot afford to pay for current government programs. Raising taxes would hurt economic growth, and deficit spending would lead to inflation."

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2021

#### 3.6.0.2 Common good (C) (v2dlcommon)

*Project Manager(s):* Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Staffan Lindberg

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* When important policy changes are being considered, to what extent do political elites justify their positions in terms of the common good?

*Clarification:* Because discourse varies greatly from person to person, base your answer on the style that is most typical of prominent national political leaders.

*Responses:*

0: Little or no justification in terms of the common good is usually offered.

1: Specific business, geographic, group, party, or constituency interests are for the most part offered as justifications.

2: Justifications are for the most part a mix of specific interests and the common good and it is impossible to say which justification is more common than the other.

3: Justifications are based on a mixture of references to constituency/party/group interests



and on appeals to the common good.

4: Justifications are for the most part almost always based on explicit statements of the common good for society, understood either as the greatest good for the greatest number or as helping the least advantaged in a society.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2021

### 3.6.0.3 Respect counterarguments (C) (v2dlcountr)

*Project Manager(s):* Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Staffan Lindberg

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* When important policy changes are being considered, to what extent do political elites acknowledge and respect counterarguments?

*Clarification:* Because discourse varies greatly from person to person, base your answer on the style that is most typical of prominent national political leaders.

*Responses:*

0: Counterarguments are not allowed or if articulated, punished.

1: Counterarguments are allowed at least from some parties, but almost always are ignored.

2: Elites tend to acknowledge counterarguments but then explicitly degrade them by making a negative statement about them or the individuals and groups that propose them.

3: Elites tend to acknowledge counterarguments without making explicit negative or positive statements about them.

4: Elites almost always acknowledge counterarguments and explicitly value them, even if they ultimately reject them for the most part.

5: Elites almost always acknowledge counterarguments and explicitly value them, and frequently also even accept them and change their position.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2021

*Convergence:* Model parameters with convergence issues: universal thresholds, expert thresholds, main-country-coded thresholds.

### 3.6.0.4 Range of consultation (C) (v2dlconslt)

*Project Manager(s):* Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Staffan Lindberg

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* When important policy changes are being considered, how wide is the range of consultation at *elite levels*?

*Clarification:* Because practices vary greatly from policy to policy, base your answer on the style that is most typical of policymaking.

*Responses:*

0: No consultation. The leader or a very small group (*e.g.* military council) makes authoritative decisions on their own.

1: Very little and narrow. Consultation with only a narrow circle of loyal party/ruling elites.

2: Consultation includes the former plus a larger group that is loyal to the government, such

as the ruling party's or parties' local executives and/or women, youth and other branches.

3: Consultation includes the former plus leaders of other parties.

4: Consultation includes the former plus a select range of society/labor/business representatives.

5: Consultation engages elites from essentially all parts of the political spectrum and all politically relevant sectors of society and business.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

### 3.6.0.5 Engaged society (C) (v2dlengage)

*Project Manager(s):* Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Staffan Lindberg

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* When important policy changes are being considered, how wide and how independent are public deliberations?

*Clarification:* This question refers to deliberation as manifested in discussion, debate, and other public forums such as popular media.

*Responses:*

0: Public deliberation is never, or almost never allowed.

1: Some limited public deliberations are allowed but the public below the elite levels is almost always either unaware of major policy debates or unable to take part in them.

2: Public deliberation is not repressed but nevertheless infrequent and non-elite actors are typically controlled and/or constrained by the elites.

3: Public deliberation is actively encouraged and some autonomous non-elite groups participate, but it is confined to a small slice of specialized groups that tends to be the same across issue-areas.

4: Public deliberation is actively encouraged and a relatively broad segment of non-elite groups often participate and vary with different issue-areas.

5: Large numbers of non-elite groups as well as ordinary people tend to discuss major policies among themselves, in the media, in associations or neighborhoods, or in the streets. Grass-roots deliberation is common and unconstrained.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

### 3.6.0.6 Particularistic or public goods (C) (v2dlencmps)

*Project Manager(s):* Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Staffan Lindberg

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* Considering the profile of social and infrastructural spending in the national budget, how "particularistic" or "public goods" are most expenditures?

*Clarification:* Particularistic spending is narrowly targeted on a specific corporation, sector, social group, region, party, or set of constituents. Such spending may be referred to as "pork", "clientelistic", or "private goods."

Public-goods spending is intended to benefit all communities within a society, though it may be means-tested so as to target poor, needy, or otherwise underprivileged constituents. The

key point is that all who satisfy the means-test are allowed to receive the benefit. Your answer should consider the entire budget of social and infrastructural spending. We are interested in the relative value of particularistic and public-goods spending, not the number of bills or programs that fall into either category.

*Responses:*

- 0: Almost all of the social and infrastructure expenditures are particularistic.
- 1: Most social and infrastructure expenditures are particularistic, but a significant portion (*e.g.* 1/4 or 1/3) is public-goods.
- 2: Social and infrastructure expenditures are evenly divided between particularistic and public-goods programs.
- 3: Most social and infrastructure expenditures are public-goods but a significant portion (*e.g.*, 1/4 or 1/3) is particularistic.
- 4: Almost all social and infrastructure expenditures are public-goods in character. Only a small portion is particularistic.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

### 3.6.0.7 Means-tested v. universalistic policy (C) (v2dlunivl)

*Project Manager(s):* Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Staffan Lindberg

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* How many welfare programs are means-tested and how many benefit all (or virtually all) members of the polity?

*Clarification:* A means-tested program targets poor, needy, or otherwise underprivileged constituents. Cash-transfer programs are normally means-tested.

A universal (non-means tested) program potentially benefits everyone. This includes free education, national health care schemes, and retirement programs. Granted, some may benefit more than others from these programs (*e.g.*, when people with higher salaries get higher unemployment benefits). The key point is that practically everyone is a beneficiary, or potential beneficiary.

The purpose of this question is not to gauge the size of the welfare state but rather its quality. So, your answer should be based on whatever programs exist.

*Responses:*

- 0: There are no, or extremely limited, welfare state policies (education, health, retirement, unemployment, poverty programs).
- 1: Almost all of the welfare state policies are means-tested.
- 2: Most welfare state policies means-tested, but a significant portion (*e.g.* 1/4 or 1/3) is universalistic and potentially benefits everyone in the population.
- 3: The welfare state policies are roughly evenly divided between means-tested and universalistic.
- 4: Most welfare state policies are universalistic, but a significant portion (*e.g.*, 1/4 or 1/3) are means-tested.
- 5: Almost all welfare state policies are universal in character. Only a small portion is means-tested.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2021

### 3.7 The Judiciary

#### Instructions to the coders (as shown in the surveys)

**Judiciary:** This set of questions pertains to the judiciary. Before you proceed, we would like to clarify several general points. First, some questions below refer to the judiciary in general, whereas others ask for specific evaluations of particular courts or types of courts. Unless otherwise prompted, please consider the judiciary as a whole. This includes all courts in the judicial system at every level, both general jurisdiction courts and more specialized courts. However, with potentially one exception, it excludes specialized courts that are located outside the judiciary, *e.g.* an immigration court that lies inside the executive branch. The one potential exception is the peak constitutional court of the country. Please include this court in your considerations, even though it will be located outside of the judiciary in some countries. If the country you are coding is a federal state, please focus only on the federal judiciary and the federal government.

Seven of the questions about the judiciary concern high courts. By "high court" we are asking you to consider the country's constitutional court, if one exists. If there is no constitutional court, please consider the court of last resort for constitutional matters. If there is no court in your country with constitutional jurisdiction, please consider the highest ordinary court of the state.

For example, in Mexico in 2004, you would consider the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation and not the Electoral Tribunal for the Federal Judiciary. In Russia in the same year, you would consider the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation and not the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation. In Sweden, you would ignore the Supreme Administrative Court and instead focus on the Supreme Court. Germany has both a constitutional court, the Federal Constitutional Court, and a court of last resort for ordinary matters, the Federal Court of Justice. The Federal Constitutional Court is the high court for our purposes. In the United States, there is no separate constitutional court or review body. The Supreme Court is both the highest ordinary court and the highest court in the state with constitutional jurisdiction. Therefore, we consider it to be the high court of the United States. skip If your country's highest judicial body has separate divisions, only one of which is dedicated to final constitutional review, please consider that division to be the high court if its judges are permanently assigned to that division only. For example, the Supreme Court of Justice of Costa Rica has four chambers. The Fourth Chamber reviews constitutional matters, its judges are appointed to it specifically and the other judges of the Supreme Court do not rotate onto the Fourth Chamber. Therefore, the high court for Costa Rica is the constitutional chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice.

If a new high court was established in a given year, please consider that court as the high court for the purposes of these questions only if the court was functioning for the majority of the calendar year. If a new high court was established in a given year, but did not start functioning until a subsequent year, please do not consider the new court as the high court until it was functioning for the majority of the given calendar year. If you are considering a semi sovereign territory, such as a colony, please answer this question with respect to the government or judicial bodies seated within the territory in question (*e.g.*, the governor-general and his local administration in a British colony or a Commonwealth country), not abroad (*e.g.*, the King/Queen or government of England).

In coding the following questions it is sometimes important to distinguish between formal rules (as stipulated by statute, legislative rules, the constitution, or common law precedent) and actual practice (what happens "on the ground"). In order to clarify the *de jure/de facto* distinction, we employ the terms "by law..." and "in practice..." Please pay close attention to these cues wherever you see them.

#### 3.7.0.1 Judicial reform (C) (v2jreform)

*Project Manager(s):* Jeffrey Staton

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* Were the judiciary's formal powers altered this year in ways that affect its ability to control the arbitrary use of state authority?

*Clarification:* Evidence of this kind of reform could include the creation or removal of various forms of constitutional review, new rules increasing or decreasing access to the judiciary, changes in available judicial remedies, and any other formal institution (procedural or otherwise) that influences the ability of courts to control the arbitrary use of power.

*Responses:*

- 0: The judiciary's ability to control arbitrary power was *reduced* via institutional reform.
- 1: There was no change to the judiciary's ability to control arbitrary power via institutional review.
- 2: The judiciary's ability to control arbitrary power was *enhanced* via institutional reform.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2021

### 3.7.0.2 Judicial purges (C) (v2jupurge)

*Project Manager(s):* Jeffrey Staton

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* Judges are sometimes removed from their posts for cause, as when there is strong evidence of corruption; however, some judges are removed arbitrarily, typically for political reasons. With this distinction in mind, please describe the removal of judges that occurred this calendar year.

*Clarification:* The second and third response categories permit you to distinguish among limited arbitrary removals (*i.e.*, when only a few judges are targeted) by the political importance of the removal. For example, you may consider the arbitrary removal of a few high court judges as more important than the arbitrary removal of a few lower court judges.

*Responses:*

- 0: There was a massive, arbitrary purge of the judiciary.
- 1: There were limited but very important arbitrary removals.
- 2: There were limited arbitrary removals.
- 3: Judges were removed from office, but there is no evidence that the removals were arbitrary.
- 4: Judges were not removed from their posts.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2021

### 3.7.0.3 Government attacks on judiciary (C) (v2jupoatck)

*Project Manager(s):* Jeffrey Staton

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* How often did the government attack the judiciary's integrity in public?

*Clarification:* Attacks on the judiciary's integrity can include claims that it is corrupt, incompetent or that decisions were politically motivated. These attacks can manifest in various ways including, but not limited to prepared statements reported by the media, press conferences, interviews, and stump speeches.

*Responses:*

- 0: Attacks were carried out on a daily or weekly basis.

- 1: Attacks were common and carried out in nearly every month of the year.
- 2: Attacks occurred more than once.
- 3: There were attacks, but they were rare.
- 4: There were no attacks on the judiciary's integrity.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2021

*Convergence:* Model parameters with convergence issues: universal thresholds, main-country-coded thresholds.

#### 3.7.0.4 Court packing (C) (v2jupack)

*Project Manager(s):* Jeffrey Staton

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* The size of the judiciary is sometimes increased for very good reasons, as when judges are added to manage an increasing caseload; however, sometimes judges are added purely for political reasons. With this distinction in mind, please describe any increases in the size of the judiciary that occurred this calendar year.

*Clarification:* The second and third response categories permit you to distinguish among limited court packing efforts (*i.e.* when relatively few judgeships are added) by the political importance of the packing. For example, you may consider the packing of the high court to be more important than the packing of a lower court.

*Responses:*

- 0: There was a massive, politically motivated increase in the number of judgeships across the entire judiciary.
- 1: There was a limited, politically motivated increase in the number of judgeships on very important courts.
- 2: There was a limited, politically motivated increase in the number of judgeships.
- 3: Judgeships were added to the judiciary, but there is no evidence that the increase was politically motivated; or there was no increase.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Notes:* A previous version of the variable contained category "4: There was no increase". As of November 2014, all responses in category "4" are assigned to category "3", since the two responses have the same meaning in practice.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2021

#### 3.7.0.5 Judicial accountability (C) (v2juacct)

*Project Manager(s):* Jeffrey Staton

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* When judges are found responsible for serious misconduct, how often are they removed from their posts or otherwise disciplined?

*Responses:*

- 0: Never.
- 1: Seldom.



- 2: About half of the time.
- 3: Usually.
- 4: Always.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

### 3.7.0.6 Judicial corruption decision (C) (v2jucorrdc)

*Project Manager(s):* Jeffrey Staton

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* How often do individuals or businesses make undocumented extra payments or bribes in order to speed up or delay the process or to obtain a favorable judicial decision?

*Responses:*

- 0: Always.
- 1: Usually.
- 2: About half of the time.
- 3: Not usually.
- 4: Never.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Notes:* For reasons of consistency, as of December, 2014, responses to this question are reversed so that the least democratic response is "0" and the most democratic is "4".

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

### 3.7.0.7 High court name (A\*) (v2juhcname)

*Project Manager(s):* Jeffrey Staton

*Question:* Please enter the name of the high court.

*Clarification:* As accurately as possible, please provide a literal translation of the name of the court in English, followed by the name in the native language, or a transcription transliteration thereof, within parentheses.

*Responses:*

Text.

*Notes:* Converted from (C) to (A(C)) from version 7. Where possible, data was pre-coded, and CEs were asked to add their answers to the remaining gaps.

*Data release:* 3-12.

*Country-Year Aggregation:* Last

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

### 3.7.0.8 First woman appointed (C) (v2jufrstfm)

*Project Manager(s):* Jeffrey Staton

*Question:* In what year was the first female judge appointed to the high court?

*Clarification:* Please consider the same high court that you assessed in High court name. If the identity of the high court has changed over time, please consider the year in which the first woman was appointed to any court that has served as the country's highest court. For example, the Dominican Republic established a Constitutional Court in 2010, and it began functioning in 2012. In 2012, there were female justices on the new Constitutional Court. Before 2012, the high court was the Supreme Court of the Dominican Republic. A woman was first appointed to the Supreme Court in 1993. Since a woman was first appointed to what was considered the high court at the time in 1993, the answer to this question would be 1993.

*Responses:*

Year.

*Scale:* Numeric.

*Data release:* 7-12. Available upon request, subject to review and approval.

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

### 3.7.0.9 High court independence (C) (v2juhcind)

*Project Manager(s):* Jeffrey Staton

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* When the high court in the judicial system is ruling in cases that are salient to the government, how often would you say that it makes decisions that merely reflect government wishes regardless of its sincere view of the legal record?

*Clarification:* We are seeking to identify autonomous judicial decision-making and its absence. Decisions certainly can reflect government wishes without "merely reflecting" those wishes, *i.e.* a court can be autonomous when its decisions support the government's position. This is because a court can be fairly persuaded that the government's position is meritorious. By "merely reflect the wishes of the government" we mean that the court's own view of the record, its sincere evaluation of the record, is irrelevant to the outcome. The court simply adopts the government's position regardless of its sincere view of the record.

*Responses:*

0: Always.

1: Usually.

2: About half of the time.

3: Seldom.

4: Never.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Cleaning:* The historical version of the variable is set to missing when v3juhcourt is 0

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

### 3.7.0.10 Lower court independence (C) (v2juncind)

*Project Manager(s):* Jeffrey Staton

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* When judges *not* on the high court are ruling in cases that are salient to the government, how often would you say that their decisions merely reflect government wishes regardless of their sincere view of the legal record?

*Responses:*

0: Always.

1: Usually.

2: About half of the time.

3: Seldom.

4: Never.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

### 3.7.0.11 Compliance with high court (C) (v2juhccomp)

*Project Manager(s):* Jeffrey Staton

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* How often would you say the government complies with important decisions of the high court with which it disagrees?

*Responses:*

0: Never.

1: Seldom.

2: About half of the time.

3: Usually.

4: Always.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Cleaning:* The historical version of the variable is set to missing when v3juhcourt is 0

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

### 3.7.0.12 Compliance with judiciary (C) (v2jucomp)

*Project Manager(s):* Jeffrey Staton

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* How often would you say the government complies with important decisions by other courts with which it disagrees?

*Clarification:* We are looking for a summary judgment for the entire judiciary, excluding the high court. You should consider judges on both ordinary courts and specialized courts.

*Responses:*

0: Never.

1: Seldom.

2: About half of the time.

3: Usually.

4: Always.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

### 3.7.0.13 Judicial review (C) (v2jureview)

*Project Manager(s)*: Jeffrey Staton

*Additional versions*: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question*: Does any court in the judiciary have the legal authority to invalidate governmental policies (e.g. statutes, regulations, decrees, administrative actions) on the grounds that they violate a constitutional provision?

*Responses*:

0: No.

1: Yes.

*Scale*: Dichotomous, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release*: 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation*: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Citation*: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years*: 1789-2021

### 3.7.0.14 Codeable (A) (v2jucodable)

*Project Manager(s)*: Jeffrey Staton

*Question*: Can we generate a flowchart describing the appointment process from this constitutional event?

*Clarification*: This variable indicates the reasons we could or could not create a visual flowchart representing the selection procedure.

*Responses*:

1. Yes

2. No, the event is in a language the coder can not read

3. No, there is no appointment or removal information

4. No, the process is explicitly left to be developed via a statute

5. Yes, but much of the process is left to law

*Scale*: Ordinal.

*Source(s)*: V-Dem coding of constitutional texts in CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012).

*Data release*: 9-12.

*Country-Year Aggregation*: Last

*Citation*: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years*: 1901-2015

### 3.7.0.15 Corresponding flowchart (A) (v2jufLOW)

*Project Manager(s)*: Jeffrey Staton

*Question*: Is a flowchart of the process available?

*Clarification*: This variable indicates if a flowchart summarizing the appointment process was generated and is available.

*Responses*:

0. No

1. Yes

*Scale*: Dichotomous

*Source(s)*: V-Dem coding of constitutional texts in CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012).

*Data release*: 9-12.

*Country-Year Aggregation*: Last

*Citation*: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years*: 1901-2015

### 3.7.0.16 Language (A) (v2julanguage)

*Project Manager(s):* Jeffrey Staton

*Question:* In which language is the constitutional event written?

*Clarification:* If the Comparative Constitutions Project had the same constitutional event in both an English and a non-English language, we used the English version.

*Responses:*

1. English
2. French
3. German
4. Spanish
27. Arabic
43. Azerbaijani
82. Czech
229. Korean
245. Latvian
249. Lithuanian
282. Maltese
306. Nepali
312. Norwegian Nynorsk; Nynorsk, Norwegian
343. Polish
345. Portuguese
357. Romanian; Moldavian; Moldovan
382. Slovak
409. Swahili
410. Swedish
441. Turkish
485. Greek
113. German
121. Dutch; Flemish
130. Estonian
136. Persian
151. Georgian
170. Hebrew
180. Hungarian
185. Icelandic

*Scale:* Ordinal.

*Source(s):* V-Dem coding of constitutional texts in CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012).

*Data release:* 9-12.

*Country–Year Aggregation:* Last

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1901-2015

### 3.7.0.17 Team translated (A) (v2juteamtr)

*Project Manager(s):* Jeffrey Staton

*Question:* For constitutions not available in English, did our coders translate the relevant sections of a non-English event?

*Clarification:* This variable indicates whether someone on our coding team read the constitutional event in a non-English language and translated information in order to collect the necessary information.

*Responses:*

- 0: No
- 1: Yes, this event was translated by our team

*Scale:* Dichotomous

*Source(s):* V-Dem coding of constitutional texts in CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012).

*Data release:* 9-12.

*Country–Year Aggregation:* Last

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1901-2015

## 3.8 Civil Liberty

### Instructions to the coders (as shown in the surveys)

**Civil Liberty:** The following questions are focused on actual practices (*de facto*) rather than formal legal or constitutional rights (*de jure*). Note that if there is significant variation in the respect for a particular civil liberty across the territory, the score should reflect the "average situation" across the territorial scope of the country unit (for each period) as defined in the coder instructions.

#### 3.8.1 Personal Integrity Rights

##### 3.8.1.1 Freedom from torture (C) (v2cltort)

*Project Manager(s):* Svend-Erik Skaaning

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* Is there freedom from torture?

*Clarification:* Torture refers to the purposeful inflicting of extreme pain, whether mental or physical, with an aim to extract information or intimidate victims, who are in a state of incarceration. Here, we are concerned with torture practiced by state officials or other agents of the state (e.g., police, security forces, prison guards, and paramilitary groups).

*Responses:*

- 0: Not respected by public authorities. Torture is practiced systematically and is incited and approved by the leaders of government.
- 1: Weakly respected by public authorities. Torture is practiced frequently but is often not incited or approved by top leaders of government. At the same time, leaders of government are not actively working to prevent it.
- 2: Somewhat. Torture is practiced occasionally but is typically not approved by top leaders of government.
- 3: Mostly respected by public authorities. Torture is practiced in a few isolated cases but is not incited or approved by top government leaders.
- 4: Fully respected by public authorities. Torture is non-existent.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

##### 3.8.1.2 Freedom from political killings (C) (v2clkill)

*Project Manager(s):* Svend-Erik Skaaning

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* Is there freedom from political killings?

*Clarification:* Political killings are killings by the state or its agents without due process of law for the purpose of eliminating political opponents. These killings are the result of deliberate use of lethal force by the police, security forces, prison officials, or other agents of the state (including paramilitary groups).

*Responses:*

- 0: Not respected by public authorities. Political killings are practiced systematically and they are typically incited and approved by top leaders of government.
- 1: Weakly respected by public authorities. Political killings are practiced frequently and top leaders of government are not actively working to prevent them.
- 2: Somewhat respected by public authorities. Political killings are practiced occasionally but they are typically not incited and approved by top leaders of government.
- 3: Mostly respected by public authorities. Political killings are practiced in a few isolated cases



but they are not incited or approved by top leaders of government.

4: Fully respected by public authorities. Political killings are non-existent.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

### 3.8.1.3 Freedom from forced labor for men (C) (v2cslavem)

*Project Manager(s):* Svend-Erik Skaaning

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* Are adult men free from servitude and other kinds of forced labor?

*Clarification:* Involuntary servitude occurs when an adult is unable to quit a job s/he desires to leave — not by reason of economic necessity but rather by reason of employer's coercion. This includes labor camps but not work or service which forms part of normal civic obligations such as conscription or employment in command economies.

*Responses:*

0: Male servitude or other kinds of forced labor is widespread and accepted (perhaps even organized) by the state.

1: Male servitude or other kinds of forced labor is substantial. Although officially opposed by the public authorities, the state is unwilling or unable to effectively contain the practice.

2: Male servitude or other kinds of forced labor exists but is not widespread and usually actively opposed by public authorities, or only tolerated in some particular areas or among particular social groups.

3: Male servitude or other kinds of forced labor is infrequent and only found in the criminal underground. It is actively and sincerely opposed by the public authorities.

4: Male servitude or other kinds of forced labor is virtually non-existent.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

### 3.8.1.4 Freedom from forced labor for women (C) (v2cslavef)

*Project Manager(s):* Pamela Paxton, Svend-Erik Skaaning

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* Are adult women free from servitude and other kinds of forced labor?

*Clarification:* Involuntary servitude occurs when an adult is unable to quit a job s/he desires to leave — not by reason of economic necessity but rather by reason of employer's coercion. This includes labor camps but not work or service which forms part of normal civic obligations such as conscription or employment in command economies.

This question does not ask you to assess the *relative* freedom of men and women from forced labor. Thus, a country in which both men and women suffer the same conditions of servitude might be coded a (0) for women, even though there is equality across the sexes.

*Responses:*

0: Female servitude or other kinds of forced labor is widespread and accepted (perhaps even organized) by the state.

1: Female servitude or other kinds of forced labor is substantial. Although officially opposed

by the public authorities, the state is unwilling or unable to effectively contain the practice.

2: Female servitude or other kinds of forced labor exists but is not widespread and usually actively opposed by public authorities, or only tolerated in some particular areas or among particular social groups.

3: Female servitude or other kinds of forced labor is infrequent and only found in the criminal underground. It is actively and sincerely opposed by the public authorities.

4: Female servitude or other kinds of forced labor is virtually non-existent.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

### 3.8.2 Impartial Enforcement

#### 3.8.2.1 Transparent laws with predictable enforcement (C) (v2cltrnslw)

*Project Manager(s):* Svend-Erik Skaaning

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* Are the laws of the land clear, well publicized, coherent (consistent with each other), relatively stable from year to year, and enforced in a predictable manner?

*Clarification:* This question focuses on the transparency and predictability of the laws of the land.

*Responses:*

0: Transparency and predictability are almost non-existent. The laws of the land are created and/or enforced in completely arbitrary fashion.

1: Transparency and predictability are severely limited. The laws of the land are more often than not created and/or enforced in arbitrary fashion.

2: Transparency and predictability are somewhat limited. The laws of the land are mostly created in a non-arbitrary fashion but enforcement is rather arbitrary in some parts of the country.

3: Transparency and predictability are fairly strong. The laws of the land are usually created and enforced in a non-arbitrary fashion.

4: Transparency and predictability are very strong. The laws of the land are created and enforced in a non-arbitrary fashion.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

#### 3.8.2.2 Rigorous and impartial public administration (C) (v2clrspt)

*Project Manager(s):* Svend-Erik Skaaning

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* Are public officials rigorous and impartial in the performance of their duties?

*Clarification:* This question focuses on the extent to which public officials generally abide by the law and treat like cases alike, or conversely, the extent to which public administration is characterized by arbitrariness and biases (*i.e.*, nepotism, cronyism, or discrimination).

The question covers the public officials that handle the cases of ordinary people. If no functioning public administration exists, the lowest score (0) applies.

*Responses:*

- 0: The law is not respected by public officials. Arbitrary or biased administration of the law is rampant.
- 1: The law is weakly respected by public officials. Arbitrary or biased administration of the law is widespread.
- 2: The law is modestly respected by public officials. Arbitrary or biased administration of the law is moderate.
- 3: The law is mostly respected by public officials. Arbitrary or biased administration of the law is limited.
- 4: The law is generally fully respected by the public officials. Arbitrary or biased administration of the law is very limited.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

### 3.8.2.3 Access to justice for men (C) (v2clacjstm)

*Project Manager(s):* Svend-Erik Skaaning

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* Do men enjoy secure and effective access to justice?

*Clarification:* This question specifies the extent to which men can bring cases before the courts without risk to their personal safety, trials are fair, and men have effective ability to seek redress if public authorities violate their rights, including the rights to counsel, defense, and appeal.

This question does not ask you to assess the *relative* access to justice men and women. Thus, it is possible to assign the lowest possible score to a country even if men and women enjoy equal — and extremely limited — access to justice.

*Responses:*

- 0: Secure and effective access to justice for men is non-existent.
- 1: Secure and effective access to justice for men is usually not established or widely respected.
- 2: Secure and effective access to justice for men is inconsistently observed. Minor problems characterize most cases or occur rather unevenly across different parts of the country.
- 3: Secure and effective access to justice for men is usually observed.
- 4: Secure and effective access to justice for men is almost always observed.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

### 3.8.2.4 Access to justice for women (C) (v2clacjstw)

*Project Manager(s):* Pamela Paxton, Svend-Erik Skaaning

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* Do women enjoy equal, secure, and effective access to justice?

*Clarification:* This question specifies the extent to which women can bring cases before the courts without risk to their personal safety, trials are fair, and women have effective ability to seek redress if public authorities violate their rights, including the rights to counsel, defense, and appeal.

This question does not ask you to assess the *relative* access to justice men and women. Thus, it is possible to assign the lowest possible score to a country even if men and women enjoy equal — and extremely limited — access to justice.

*Responses:*

- 0: Secure and effective access to justice for women is non-existent.
- 1: Secure and effective access to justice for women is usually not established or widely respected.
- 2: Secure and effective access to justice for women is inconsistently observed. Minor problems characterize most cases or occur rather unevenly across different parts of the country.
- 3: Secure and effective access to justice for women is usually observed.
- 4: Secure and effective access to justice for women is almost always observed.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

### 3.8.2.5 Social class equality in respect for civil liberty (C) (v2clacjust)

*Project Manager(s):* Svend-Erik Skaaning

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* Do poor people enjoy the same level of civil liberties as rich people do?

*Clarification:* This question specifies the extent to which the level of civil liberties is generally the same across socioeconomic groups so that people with a low social status are not treated worse than people with high social status. Here, civil liberties are understood to include access to justice, private property rights, freedom of movement, and freedom from forced labor.

*Responses:*

- 0: Poor people enjoy much fewer civil liberties than rich people.
- 1: Poor people enjoy substantially fewer civil liberties than rich people.
- 2: Poor people enjoy moderately fewer civil liberties than rich people.
- 3: Poor people enjoy slightly fewer civil liberties than rich people.
- 4: Poor people enjoy the same level of civil liberties as rich people.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

### 3.8.2.6 Social group equality in respect for civil liberties (C) (v2clsocgrp)

*Project Manager(s):* Svend-Erik Skaaning

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* Do all social groups, as distinguished by language, ethnicity, religion, race, region, or caste, enjoy the same level of civil liberties, or are some groups generally in a more favorable position?

*Clarification:* Here, civil liberties are understood to include access to justice, private property rights, freedom of movement, and freedom from forced labor.

*Responses:*

- 0: Members of some social groups enjoy much fewer civil liberties than the general population.
- 1: Members of some social groups enjoy substantially fewer civil liberties than the general population.

2: Members of some social groups enjoy moderately fewer civil liberties than the general population.

3: Members of some social groups enjoy slightly fewer civil liberties than the general population.

4: Members of all salient social groups enjoy the same level of civil liberties.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

### 3.8.2.7 Subnational civil liberties unevenness (C) (v2clrgunev)

*Project Manager(s):* Kelly McMann

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* Does government respect for civil liberties vary across different areas of the country?

*Responses:*

0: Yes. Government officials in some areas of the country respect civil liberties significantly more (or, alternatively, significantly less) than government officials in other areas of the country.

1: Somewhat. Government officials in some areas of the country respect civil liberties somewhat more (or, alternatively, somewhat less) than government officials in other areas of the country.

2: No. Government officials in most or all areas of the country equally respect (or, alternatively, equally do not respect) civil liberties.

*Ordering:* If answer is "2" skip remaining civil liberties questions.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

### 3.8.2.8 Stronger civil liberties characteristics (C) (v2clrgstch)

*Project Manager(s):* Kelly McMann

*Additional versions:* \*\_nr

*Question:* How would you describe the areas of the country where government officials' respect for civil liberties is significantly *stronger*?

*Clarification:* Choose all that apply.

*Responses:*

0: Rural. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch\_0]

1: Urban. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch\_1]

2: Areas that are less economically developed. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch\_2]

3: Areas that are more economically developed. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch\_3]

4: Inside the capital city. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch\_4]

5: Outside the capital city. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch\_5]

6: North. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch\_6]

7: South. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch\_7]

8: West. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch\_8]

9: East. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch\_9]

10: Areas of civil unrest (including areas where insurgent groups are active). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch\_10]

11: Areas where illicit activity is widespread. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch\_11]

- 12: Areas that are very sparsely populated. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch\_12]
- 13: Areas that are remote (difficult to reach by available transportation, for example). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch\_13]
- 14: Areas where there are indigenous populations. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch\_14]
- 15: Areas where the national ruling party or group is strong. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch\_15]
- 16: Areas where the national ruling party or group is weak. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch\_16]
- 17: Areas that were subject to a longer period of foreign rule. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch\_17]
- 18: Areas that were subject to a shorter period of foreign rule. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch\_18]
- 19: Areas that were recently subject to foreign rule. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch\_19]
- 20: Areas that have not recently been subject to foreign rule. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch\_20]
- 21: None of the above. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch\_21]

*Scale:* Series of dichotomous scales.

*Answer-type:* Multiple-selection.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Mean.

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2021

### 3.8.2.9 Weaker civil liberties population (C) (v2clsnlpct)

*Project Manager(s):* Kelly McMann

*Additional versions:* \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* What percentage (%) of the total population of the country lives in the areas where government officials' respect for civil liberties is significantly *weaker* than the country average?

*Responses:*

Percent.

*Scale:* Interval.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bootstrapped.

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2021

### 3.8.2.10 Weaker civil liberties characteristics (C) (v2clrgwkch)

*Project Manager(s):* Kelly McMann

*Additional versions:* \*\_nr

*Question:* How would you describe the areas of the country where government officials' respect for civil liberties is significantly *weaker*?

*Clarification:* Choose all that apply.

*Responses:*

- 0: Rural. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch\_0]
- 1: Urban. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch\_1]
- 2: Areas that are less economically developed. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch\_2]
- 3: Areas that are more economically developed. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch\_3]
- 4: Inside the capital city. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch\_4]
- 5: Outside the capital city. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch\_5]
- 6: North. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch\_6]
- 7: South. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch\_7]
- 8: West. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch\_8]
- 9: East. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch\_9]
- 10: Areas of civil unrest (including areas where insurgent groups are active). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch\_10]
- 11: Areas where illicit activity is widespread. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch\_11]
- 12: Areas that are very sparsely populated. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch\_12]



- 13: Areas that are remote (difficult to reach by available transportation, for example). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch\_13]
- 14: Areas where there are indigenous populations. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch\_14]
- 15: Areas where the national ruling party or group is strong. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch\_15]
- 16: Areas where the national ruling party or group is weak. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch\_16]
- 17: Areas that were subject to a longer period of foreign rule. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch\_17]
- 18: Areas that were subject to a shorter period of foreign rule. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch\_18]
- 19: Areas that were recently subject to foreign rule. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch\_19]
- 20: Areas that have not recently been subject to foreign rule. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch\_20]
- 21: None of the above. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch\_21]

*Scale:* Series of dichotomous scales.

*Answer-type:* Multiple-selection.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Mean.

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2021

### 3.8.3 Private and Political Liberties

#### 3.8.3.1 Freedom of discussion for men (C) (v2cldiscm)

*Project Manager(s):* Svend-Erik Skaaning

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* Are men able to openly discuss political issues in private homes and in public spaces?

*Clarification:* This indicator specifies the extent to which men are able to engage in private discussions, particularly on political issues, in private homes and public spaces (restaurants, public transportation, sports events, work etc.) without fear of harassment by other members of the polity or the public authorities. We are interested in restrictions by the government and its agents but also cultural restrictions or customary laws that are enforced by other members of the polity, sometimes in informal ways.

This question does not ask you to assess the *relative* freedom of men and women. Thus, it is possible to assign the lowest possible score to a country even if men and women enjoy equal — and extremely low — rights to freedom of discussion.

*Responses:*

- 0: Not respected. Hardly any freedom of expression exists for men. Men are subject to immediate and harsh intervention and harassment for expression of political opinion.
- 1: Weakly respected. Expressions of political opinions by men are frequently exposed to intervention and harassment.
- 2: Somewhat respected. Expressions of political opinions by men are occasionally exposed to intervention and harassment.
- 3: Mostly respected. There are minor restraints on the freedom of expression in the private sphere, predominantly limited to a few isolated cases or only linked to soft sanctions. But as a rule there is no intervention or harassment if men make political statements.
- 4: Fully respected. Freedom of speech for men in their homes and in public spaces is not restricted.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

#### 3.8.3.2 Freedom of discussion for women (C) (v2cldiscw)



*Project Manager(s)*: Pamela Paxton, Svend-Erik Skaaning

*Additional versions*: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question*: Are women able to openly discuss political issues in private homes and in public spaces?

*Clarification*: This indicator specifies the extent to which women are able to engage in private discussions, particularly on political issues, in private homes and public spaces (restaurants, public transportation, sports events, work etc.) without fear of harassment by other members of the polity or the public authorities. We are interested in restrictions by the government and its agents but also cultural restrictions or customary laws that are enforced by other members of the polity, sometimes in informal ways.

This question does not ask you to assess the relative freedom of men and women. Thus, it is possible to assign the lowest possible score to a country even if men and women enjoy equal — and extremely low — rights to freedom of discussion.

*Responses*:

0: Not respected. Hardly any freedom of expression exists for women. Women are subject to immediate and harsh intervention and harassment for expression of political opinion.

1: Weakly respected. Expressions of political opinions by women are frequently exposed to intervention and harassment.

2: Somewhat respected. Expressions of political opinions by women are occasionally exposed to intervention and harassment.

3: Mostly respected. There are minor restraints on the freedom of expression in the private sphere, predominantly limited to a few isolated cases or only linked to soft sanctions. But as a rule there is no intervention or harassment if women make political statements.

4: Fully respected. Freedom of speech by women in their homes and in public spaces is not restricted.

*Scale*: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release*: 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation*: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Citation*: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years*: 1789-2021

### 3.8.3.3 Freedom of academic and cultural expression (C) (v2clacfree)

*Project Manager(s)*: Svend-Erik Skaaning

*Additional versions*: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question*: Is there academic freedom and freedom of cultural expression related to political issues?

*Responses*:

0: Not respected by public authorities. Censorship and intimidation are frequent. Academic activities and cultural expressions are severely restricted or controlled by the government.

1: Weakly respected by public authorities. Academic freedom and freedom of cultural expression are practiced occasionally, but direct criticism of the government is mostly met with repression.

2: Somewhat respected by public authorities. Academic freedom and freedom of cultural expression are practiced routinely, but strong criticism of the government is sometimes met with repression.

3: Mostly respected by public authorities. There are few limitations on academic freedom and freedom of cultural expression, and resulting sanctions tend to be infrequent and soft.

4: Fully respected by public authorities. There are no restrictions on academic freedom or cultural expression.

*Scale*: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release*: 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation*: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Citation*: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see

suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2021

#### 3.8.3.4 Freedom of religion (C) (v2clrelig)

*Project Manager(s)*: Svend-Erik Skaaning

*Additional versions*: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question*: Is there freedom of religion?

*Clarification*: This indicator specifies the extent to which individuals and groups have the right to choose a religion, change their religion, and practice that religion in private or in public as well as to proselytize peacefully without being subject to restrictions by public authorities.

*Responses*:

0: Not respected by public authorities. Hardly any freedom of religion exists. Any kind of religious practice is outlawed or at least controlled by the government to the extent that religious leaders are appointed by and subjected to public authorities, who control the activities of religious communities in some detail.

1: Weakly respected by public authorities. Some elements of autonomous organized religious practices exist and are officially recognized. But significant religious communities are repressed, prohibited, or systematically disabled, voluntary conversions are restricted, and instances of discrimination or intimidation of individuals or groups due to their religion are common.

2: Somewhat respected by public authorities. Autonomous organized religious practices exist and are officially recognized. Yet, minor religious communities are repressed, prohibited, or systematically disabled, and/or instances of discrimination or intimidation of individuals or groups due to their religion occur occasionally.

3: Mostly respected by public authorities. There are minor restrictions on the freedom of religion, predominantly limited to a few isolated cases. Minority religions face denial of registration, hindrance of foreign missionaries from entering the country, restrictions against proselytizing, or hindrance to access to or construction of places of worship.

4: Fully respected by public authorities. The population enjoys the right to practice any religious belief they choose. Religious groups may organize, select, and train personnel; solicit and receive contributions; publish; and engage in consultations without undue interference. If religious communities have to register, public authorities do not abuse the process to discriminate against a religion and do not constrain the right to worship before registration.

*Scale*: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release*: 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation*: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Citation*: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2021

#### 3.8.3.5 Freedom of foreign movement (C) (v2clfmov)

*Project Manager(s)*: Svend-Erik Skaaning

*Additional versions*: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question*: Is there freedom of foreign travel and emigration?

*Clarification*: This indicator specifies the extent to which citizens are able to travel freely to and from the country and to emigrate without being subject to restrictions by public authorities.

*Responses*:

0: Not respected by public authorities. Citizens are rarely allowed to emigrate or travel out of the country. Transgressors (or their families) are severely punished. People discredited by the public authorities are routinely exiled or prohibited from traveling.

1: Weakly respected by public authorities. The public authorities systematically restrict the right to travel, especially for political opponents or particular social groups. This can take the

form of general restrictions on the duration of stays abroad or delays/refusals of visas.

2: Somewhat respected by the public authorities. The right to travel for leading political opponents or particular social groups is occasionally restricted but ordinary citizens only met minor restrictions.

3: Mostly respected by public authorities. Limitations on freedom of movement and residence are not directed at political opponents but minor restrictions exist. For example, exit visas may be required and citizens may be prohibited from traveling outside the country when accompanied by other members of their family.

4: Fully respected by the government. The freedom of citizens to travel from and to the country, and to emigrate and repatriate, is not restricted by public authorities.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

### 3.8.3.6 Freedom of domestic movement for men (C) (v2cldmovem)

*Project Manager(s):* Svend-Erik Skaaning

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* Do men enjoy freedom of movement within the country?

*Clarification:* This indicator specifies the extent to which all men are able to move freely, in daytime and nighttime, in public thoroughfares, across regions within a country, and to establish permanent residency where they wish. Note that restrictions in movement might be imposed by the state and/or by informal norms and practices. Such restrictions sometimes fall on rural residents, on specific social groups, or on dissidents.

This question does not ask you to assess the *relative* freedom of men and women. Thus, it is possible to assign the lowest possible score to a country even if men and women enjoy equal — and extremely low — freedom of movement.

Do *not* consider restrictions in movement that are placed on ordinary (non-political) criminals. Do not consider restrictions in movement that result from crime or unrest.

*Responses:*

0: Virtually no men enjoy full freedom of movement (*e.g.*, North Korea).

1: Some men enjoy full freedom of movement, but most do not (*e.g.*, Apartheid South Africa).

2: Most men enjoy some freedom of movement but a sizeable minority does not. Alternatively all men enjoy partial freedom of movement.

3: Most men enjoy full freedom of movement but a small minority does not.

4: Virtually all men enjoy full freedom of movement.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

### 3.8.3.7 Freedom of domestic movement for women (C) (v2cldmovew)

*Project Manager(s):* Pamela Paxton, Svend-Erik Skaaning

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* Do women enjoy freedom of movement within the country?

*Clarification:* This indicator specifies the extent to which all women are able to move freely, in daytime and nighttime, in public thoroughfares, across regions within a country, and to

establish permanent residency where they wish. Note that restrictions in movement might be imposed by the state and/or by informal norms and practices. Such restrictions sometimes fall on rural residents, on specific social groups, or on dissidents.

This question does not ask you to assess the *relative* freedom of men and women. Thus, it is possible to assign the lowest possible score to a country even if men and women enjoy equal — and extremely low — freedom of movement.

Do *not* consider restrictions in movement that are placed on ordinary (non-political) criminals. Do not consider restrictions in movement that result from crime or unrest.

*Responses:*

0: Virtually no women enjoy full freedom of movement (*e.g.*, North Korea or Afghanistan under the Taliban).

1: Some women enjoy full freedom of movement, but most do not (*e.g.*, Apartheid South Africa).

2: Most women enjoy some freedom of movement but a sizeable minority does not. Alternatively all women enjoy partial freedom of movement.

3: Most women enjoy full freedom of movement but a small minority does not.

4: Virtually all women enjoy full freedom of movement.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

### 3.8.4 Property Rights

#### 3.8.4.1 State ownership of economy (C) (v2clstown)

*Project Manager(s):* Svend-Erik Skaaning

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* Does the state own or directly control important sectors of the economy?

*Clarification:* This question gauges the degree to which the state owns and controls capital (including land) in the industrial, agricultural, and service sectors.

It does *not* measure the extent of government revenue and expenditure as a share of total output; indeed, it is quite common for states with expansive fiscal policies to exercise little direct control (and virtually no ownership) over the economy.

*Responses:*

0: Virtually all valuable capital belongs to the state or is directly controlled by the state. Private property may be officially prohibited.

1: Most valuable capital either belongs to the state or is directly controlled by the state.

2: Many sectors of the economy either belong to the state or are directly controlled by the state, but others remain relatively free of direct state control.

3: Some valuable capital either belongs to the state or is directly controlled by the state, but most remains free of direct state control.

4: Very little valuable capital belongs to the state or is directly controlled by the state.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

#### 3.8.4.2 Property rights for men (C) (v2clprptym)

*Project Manager(s)*: Svend-Erik Skaaning

*Additional versions*: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question*: Do men enjoy the right to private property?

*Clarification*: Private property includes the right to acquire, possess, inherit, and sell private property, including land. Limits on property rights may come from the state (which may legally limit rights or fail to enforce them); customary laws and practices; or religious or social norms. This question concerns the right to private property, not actual ownership of property. This question does not ask you to assess the *relative* rights of men and women. Thus, it is possible to assign the lowest possible score to a country even if men and women enjoy equal — and very minimal — property rights.

*Responses*:

- 0: Virtually no men enjoy private property rights of any kind.
- 1: Some men enjoy some private property rights, but most have none.
- 2: Many men enjoy many private property rights, but a smaller proportion enjoys few or none.
- 3: More than half of men enjoy most private property rights, yet a smaller share of men have much more restricted rights.
- 4: Most men enjoy most private property rights but a small minority does not.
- 5: Virtually all men enjoy all, or almost all property rights.

*Scale*: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release*: 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation*: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Citation*: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years*: 1789-2021

### 3.8.4.3 Property rights for women (C) (v2clprptyw)

*Project Manager(s)*: Pamela Paxton, Svend-Erik Skaaning

*Additional versions*: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question*: Do women enjoy the right to private property?

*Clarification*: Private property includes the right to acquire, possess, inherit, and sell private property, including land. Limits on property rights may come from the state (which may legally limit rights or fail to enforce them); customary laws and practices; or religious or social norms. This question concerns the right to private property, not actual ownership of property. This question does not ask you to assess the *relative* rights of men and women. Thus, it is possible to assign the lowest possible score to a country even if men and women enjoy equal — and very minimal — property rights.

*Responses*:

- 0: Virtually no women enjoy private property rights of any kind.
- 1: Some women enjoy some private property rights, but most have none.
- 2: Many women enjoy many private property rights, but a smaller proportion enjoys few or none.
- 3: More than half of women enjoy most private property rights, yet a smaller share of women have much more restricted rights.
- 4: Most women enjoy most private property rights but a small minority does not.
- 5: Virtually all women enjoy all, or almost all, property rights.

*Scale*: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release*: 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation*: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Citation*: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years*: 1789-2021

### 3.9 Sovereignty/State

#### Instructions to the coders (as shown in the surveys)

**Sovereignty:** This section addresses a number of issues concerning the sovereignty of the state. A state is political organization that organizes compulsory domination over a fixed territory on a continual basis. With respect to state sovereignty, we are interested in measuring two distinct areas of sovereignty. The first is an attribute of states within the context of the international system. Here, we are interested in the state's autonomy from other actors in the system. The second component of sovereignty concerns the relationship of the state to the population and territory over which it claims to rule. Here, we want to gauge the extent of recognition of the preeminent authority of the state over its claimed territory and population.

**Sovereignty – Historical clarification:** This section addresses a number of issues concerning the state. A state is a political organization that organizes compulsory domination over a fixed territory on a continual basis. The questions concern two general themes: state sovereignty and state administration.

With respect to state sovereignty, we are interested in measuring two distinct areas of sovereignty. The first is an attribute of states within the context of the international system. Here, we are interested in the state's autonomy from and recognition by other actors in the system. The second component of sovereignty concerns the relationship of the state to the population and territory over which it claims to rule. Here, we want to gauge the extent of recognition of the preeminent authority of the state over its claimed territory and population.

A second attribute of states is the state administration: the set of institutions that administer and implement governmental decisions. Here we are mainly interested in the professionalization, or lack thereof, of the state administrative staff – in this context termed the state administrators.

**The State:** “This section addresses a number of issues concerning the state. A state is a political organization that organizes compulsory domination over a fixed territory on a continual basis. The questions concern two general themes: state sovereignty and state administration.

With respect to state sovereignty, we are interested in measuring two distinct areas of sovereignty. The first is an attribute of states within the context of the international system. Here, we are interested in the state's autonomy from and recognition by other actors in the system. The second component of sovereignty concerns the relationship of the state to the population and territory over which it claims to rule. Here, we want to gauge the extent of recognition of the preeminent authority of the state over its claimed territory and population.

A second attribute of states is the state administration: the set of institutions that administer and implement governmental decisions. Here we are mainly interested in the professionalization, or lack thereof, of the state administrative staff—in this context termed the state administrators.”

#### 3.9.0.1 Domestic autonomy (C) (v2svdomaut)

*Project Manager(s):* Michael Bernhard

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* Is the state autonomous from the control of other states with respect to the conduct of domestic policy?

*Clarification:* The question of domestic autonomy does not include restrictions emanating from treaties (*e.g.*, NATO), international organizations (*e.g.*, the WTO), or confederations (*e.g.*, the European Union) if these agreements are freely negotiated by the state and if the state is free to exit from that treaty, organization, or confederation. Nor does it include restrictions on policymaking emanating from international market forces and trans-national corporations.

*Responses:*

0: Non-autonomous. National level authority is exercised by an external power, either by



law or in practice. The most common examples of this are direct colonial rule and military occupation (*e.g.* quadripartite occupation of Germany in 1945). It also includes situations in which domestic actors provide *de jure* cover for *de facto* control by a foreign power (*e.g.* Vichy France). However, control of some part of the territory of a state by an enemy during war is not considered control by external actors if the sovereign government remains on scene and continues to wage conventional war (*e.g.*, the USSR during WW II).

1: Semi-autonomous. An external political actor directly constrains the ability of domestic actors to rule, decides who can or cannot rule through formal rules or informal understandings, or precludes certain policies through explicit treaty provisions or well-understood rules of the game from which the subject state cannot withdraw. Examples include Soviet "satellite" states in Eastern Europe, and situations where colonial powers grant limited powers of national self-government to their possessions (*e.g.*, protectorates and limited home government).

2: Autonomous. Domestic political actors exercise political authority free of the direct control of external political actors.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

### 3.9.0.2 International autonomy (C) (v2svinlaut)

*Project Manager(s):* Michael Bernhard

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* Is the state autonomous from the control of other states with respect to the conduct of its foreign policy?

*Responses:*

0: Non-autonomous. Foreign policy is controlled by an external power, either *de facto* or *de jure*. The most common examples of this are colonial rule and military occupation (*e.g.* quadripartite occupation of Germany in 1945). Situations in which domestic actors provide *de jure* cover for *de facto* control by a foreign power should not be construed as semi-autonomy (*e.g.* Vichy France). Governments in exile that control underground forces waging unconventional warfare are not considered as mitigating an occupation regime (*e.g.* countries under German occupation during WWII).

1: Semi-autonomous. An external political actor directly constrains the ability of domestic actors to pursue an independent foreign policy course in some important areas. This may be the product of explicit treaty provisions or well-understood rules of the game from which the subject state cannot withdraw. Examples would include Soviet strictures over rule in so-called "satellite" states in Eastern Europe, and explicitly negotiated postwar settlements (*e.g.* Austria following WWII).

2: Autonomous. Domestic political actors exercise foreign policy free of the direct control of external political actors. Direct control is meant to exclude the exercise of constraint or the impact of interdependence in the international system. Treaties in which states concede some part of that control to a supra- or international organization voluntarily, and from which there is a possibility of exit should not be interpreted as a violation of autonomy.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021



### 3.9.0.3 State authority over territory (C) (v2svstterr)

*Project Manager(s):* Michael Bernhard

*Additional versions:* \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* Over what percentage (%) of the territory does the state have effective control?

*Clarification:* With this question we seek to judge the extent of recognition of the preeminent authority of the state over its territory. We are not interested here in perfect control by the state, or whether it is relatively effective in comparison to other states, but an assessment of the areas over which it is hegemonic, *e.g.* where it is recognized as the preeminent authority and in a contest of wills it can assert its control over political forces that reject its authority. Several illustrative examples may help in this coding. During civil wars the claim of the state to rule is effectively neutralized by insurgent groups (*e.g.*, the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka). There are also situations in which criminals or warlords exert control in contravention of state authority (*e.g.* opium growers in parts of Indochina). There are also cases of failed states where the central government cannot assert control over a share of its territory (*e.g.*, contemporary Somalia). Here, we ask you to estimate the size of the territory that the state has effective control over, as a percentage (%) of the total territory that is officially part of the country.

By "officially part of the country" we refer to international law. In cases where international law is not entirely clear, we refer you to general understandings. For example, China claims sovereignty over Taiwan, but it remains under the control of its own government. For purposes of this question, Taiwan should not be considered a failure to control its territory by the government of the PRC.

*Responses:*

Percent.

*Scale:* Interval.

*Data release:* 1-6, 10-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bootstrapped.

*Cleaning:* Set to missing when v2svindep is 0

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

### 3.9.0.4 State fiscal source of revenue (C) (v2stfiscap)

*Project Manager(s):* Jan Teorell

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* On which of the following sources of revenue does the central government primarily rely to finance its activities?

*Responses:*

0: The state is not capable of raising revenue to finance itself.

1: The state primarily relies on external sources of funding (loans and foreign aid) to finance its activities.

2: The state primarily relies on directly controlling economic assets (natural resource rents, public monopolies, and the expropriation of assets within and outside the country) to finance its activities.

3: The state primarily relies on taxes on property (land taxes) and trade (customs duties).

4: The state primarily relies on taxes on economic transactions (such as sales taxes) and/or taxes on income, corporate profits and capital.

*Scale:* Ordinal.

*Data release:* 9-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

### 3.9.0.5 Bureaucratic remuneration (C) (v2strenadm)

*Project Manager(s):* Jan Teorell

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* To what extent are state administrators salaried employees?

*Clarification:* A state administrator is anyone who works for the state administration. By "salaried employee", we mean someone who is employed on a contract and paid a regular allowance directly out of the state coffers. It does not include unpaid work; work paid for through a private collection of fees, material perquisites or bribes; private employment by a higher-ranking "patron" within the administration; contractors being paid on an irregular basis; or "parastatals" (those working for state-owned companies), since the latter are not paid directly out of the state coffers. Note that the question refers to the practices obtaining in the state administration, excluding the armed forces.

*Responses:*

- 0: None or almost none are salaried state employees.
- 1: A small share is salaried state employees.
- 2: About half are salaried state employees.
- 3: A substantial number are salaried state employees.
- 4: All or almost all are salaried state employees.

*Scale:* Ordinal.

*Data release:* 9-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

### 3.9.0.6 Criteria for appointment decisions in the state administration (C) (v2stcritrecadm)

*Project Manager(s):* Agnes Cornell

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* To what extent are appointment decisions in the state administration based on personal and political connections, as opposed to skills and merit?

*Clarification:* Appointment decisions include hiring, firing and promotion in the state administration. Note that the question refers to the typical *de facto* (rather than *de jure*) situation obtaining in the state administration, excluding the armed forces. If there are large differences between different branches of the state administration or between top and lower level state administrators please try to consider the average when answering the question.

*Responses:*

- 0: All appointment decisions in the state administration are based on personal or political connections. None are based on skills and merit.
- 1: Most appointment decisions in the state administration are based on personal or political connections. Only a few are based on skills and merit.
- 2: Approximately half of the appointment decisions in the state administration are based on personal or political connections. Approximately half are based on skills and merit.
- 3: Only few of the appointment decisions in the state administration are based on personal or political connections. Most appointment decisions are based on skills and merit.
- 4: None of the appointment decisions in the state administration are based on personal or political connections. All are based on skills and merit.

*Scale:* Ordinal.

*Data release:* 9-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see

suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2021

### 3.9.0.7 Criteria for appointment decisions in the armed forces (C) (v2stcritapparm)

*Project Manager(s)*: Agnes Cornell, Jan Teorell

*Additional versions*: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question*: To what extent are appointment decisions in the armed forces based on personal or political connections or alternatively based on skills and merit?

*Clarification*: Appointment decisions include hiring, firing and promotions in the armed forces. Note that the question refers to the typical *de facto* (rather than *de jure*) situation obtaining in the armed forces. If there are large differences between different branches of the armed forces or between top and lower level ranks please try to consider the average when answering the question.

*Responses*:

- 0: All appointment decisions in the armed forces are based on personal or political connections. None are based on skills and merit.
- 1: Most appointment decisions in the armed forces are based on personal or political connections. Only a few are based on skills and merit.
- 2: Approximately half of the appointment decisions in the armed forces are based on personal or political connections. Approximately half are based on skills and merit.
- 3: Only few of the appointment decisions in the armed forces are based on personal or political connections. Most are based on skills and merit.
- 4: None of the appointment decisions in the armed forces are based on personal or political connections. All are based on skills and merit.

*Ordering*: Ordinal.

*Data release*: 9-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation*: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

*Citation*: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2021

### 3.9.0.8 Remuneration in the Armed Forces (C) (v2strenarm)

*Project Manager(s)*: Jan Teorell, Agnes Cornell

*Additional versions*: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question*: To what extent are members of the armed forces salaried employees?

*Clarification*: By members of the armed forces, we mean members of all ranks, excluding conscripts. By "salaried employee", we mean someone who is employed on a contract and paid a regular allowance directly out of the state coffers. It does not include unpaid work, work paid for through a private collection of fees, material perquisites or bribes, or private employment by a higher-ranking "patron" within the armed forces.

*Responses*:

- 0: None or almost none are salaried employees
- 1: A small share is salaried employees
- 2: About half are salaried employees
- 3: A substantial number are salaried employees
- 4: All or almost all are salaried employees

*Ordering*: Ordinal.

*Data release*: 9-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation*: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

### 3.9.0.9 Independent states (A) (v2svindep)

*Project Manager(s):* Svend-Erik Skaaning, Michael Bernhard

*Question:* Is the polity an independent state?

*Clarification:* We use Gleditsch and Ward's (1999) coding of independent states. Their definition recognizes that listing independent states relies at least in part on subjective evaluations. A state is considered to be an independent polity if it (a) has a relatively autonomous administration over some territory, (b) is considered a distinct entity by local actors or the state it is dependent on. Polities excluded from the list are: colonies; states that have some form of limited autonomy (*e.g.* Scotland); are alleged to be independent but are contiguous to the dominant entity (Ukraine and Belarus prior to 1991); *de facto* independent polities but recognized by at most one other state (Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus). Occupations or foreign rule are considered to be an actual loss of statehood when they extend beyond a decade. This means that cases such as the Baltic Republic during Soviet occupation are not considered independent states, but independent statehood is retained for European countries occupied during World War II.

*Responses:*

0: No

1: Yes

*Scale:* Dichotomous.

*Source(s):* Gleditsch and Ward (1999; 2013); IPU Parline; IDEA.

*Notes:* V-Dem uses the updated List of independent states (v.5.0), including the tentative list of microstates, posted on Gleditsch's webpage on 14 March 2013. We have reconciled Gleditsch and Ward's data with the V-Dem country definitions (see the document "V-Dem Countries v1.1").

*Data release:* 3-12.

*Country-Year Aggregation:* Last

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

### 3.10 Civil Society

#### Instructions to the coders (as shown in the surveys)

**Civil society organization:** The following set of questions focus on civil society organizations (CSOs). These include interest groups, labor unions, religiously inspired organizations (if they are engaged in civic or political activities), social movements, professional associations, and classic non-governmental organizations (NGOs), but *not* businesses, political parties, government agencies, or religious organizations that are primarily focused on spiritual practices. A CSO must also be at least nominally independent of government and economic institutions.

**Civil society organization – Historical clarification:** The following set of questions focus on civil society organizations (CSOs). These include interest groups, labor unions, religiously inspired organizations (if they are engaged in civic or political activities), social movements, professional associations, and classic non-governmental organizations (NGOs), but not businesses, political parties, government agencies, or religious organizations that are primarily focused on spiritual practices. A CSO must also be at least nominally independent of government and economic institutions.

If no CSOs exist at all for a particular time period, code the following relevant questions as giving the "lowest score" (indicating, for instance, strong repression or no consultation, a 0).

**Religious organizations:** In this section, we ask two questions regarding religious organizations. These may be religiously inspired civil society organizations (CSOs) or organizations whose purpose is primarily spiritual.

#### 3.10.0.1 CSO entry and exit (C) (v2cseeorgs)

*Project Manager(s):* Michael Bernhard

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* To what extent does the government achieve control over entry and exit by civil society organizations (CSOs) into public life?

*Responses:*

0: Monopolistic control. The government exercises an explicit monopoly over CSOs. The only organizations allowed to engage in political activity such as endorsing parties or politicians, sponsoring public issues forums, organizing rallies or demonstrations, engaging in strikes, or publicly commenting on public officials and policies are government-sponsored organizations. The government actively represses those who attempt to defy its monopoly on political activity.

1: Substantial control. The government licenses all CSOs and uses political criteria to bar organizations that are likely to oppose the government. There are at least some citizen-based organizations that play a limited role in politics independent of the government. The government actively represses those who attempt to flout its political criteria and bars them from any political activity.

2: Moderate control. Whether the government ban on independent CSOs is partial or full, some prohibited organizations manage to play an active political role. Despite its ban on organizations of this sort, the government does not or cannot repress them, due to either its weakness or political expedience.

3: Minimal control. Whether or not the government licenses CSOs, there exist constitutional provisions that allow the government to ban organizations or movements that have a history of anti-democratic action in the past (*e.g.* the banning of neo-fascist or communist organizations in the Federal Republic of Germany). Such banning takes place under strict rule of law and conditions of judicial independence.

4: Unconstrained. Whether or not the government licenses CSOs, the government does not impede their formation and operation unless they are engaged in activities to violently overthrow the government.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Citation:* Bernhard *et al.* (2015, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2015:13); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

### 3.10.0.2 CSO repression (C) (v2csreprss)

*Project Manager(s):* Michael Bernhard

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* Does the government attempt to repress civil society organizations (CSOs)?

*Responses:*

0: Severely. The government violently and actively pursues all real and even some imagined members of CSOs. They seek not only to deter the activity of such groups but to effectively liquidate them. Examples include Stalinist Russia, Nazi Germany, and Maoist China.

1: Substantially. In addition to the kinds of harassment outlined in responses 2 and 3 below, the government also arrests, tries, and imprisons leaders of and participants in oppositional CSOs who have acted lawfully. Other sanctions include disruption of public gatherings and violent sanctions of activists (beatings, threats to families, destruction of valuable property). Examples include Mugabe's Zimbabwe, Poland under Martial Law, Serbia under Milosevic.

2: Moderately. In addition to material sanctions outlined in response 3 below, the government also engages in minor legal harassment (detentions, short-term incarceration) to dissuade CSOs from acting or expressing themselves. The government may also restrict the scope of their actions through measures that restrict association of civil society organizations with each other or political parties, bar civil society organizations from taking certain actions, or block international contacts. Examples include post-Martial Law Poland, Brazil in the early 1980s, the late Franco period in Spain.

3: Weakly. The government uses material sanctions (fines, firings, denial of social services) to deter oppositional CSOs from acting or expressing themselves. They may also use burdensome registration or incorporation procedures to slow the formation of new civil society organizations and sidetrack them from engagement. The government may also organize Government Organized Movements or NGOs (GONGOS) to crowd out independent organizations. One example would be Singapore in the post-Yew phase or Putin's Russia.

4: No. Civil society organizations are free to organize, associate, strike, express themselves, and to criticize the government without fear of government sanctions or harassment.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Notes:* For reasons of consistency, as of December 2014, responses to this question are reversed so that the least democratic response is "0" and the most democratic is "4".

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Citation:* Bernhard *et al.* (2015, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2015:13); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

*Convergence:* Model parameters with convergence issues: universal thresholds.

### 3.10.0.3 CSO consultation (C) (v2cscnsult)

*Project Manager(s):* Michael Bernhard

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* Are major civil society organizations (CSOs) routinely consulted by policymakers on policies relevant to their members?

*Responses:*

0: No. There is a high degree of insulation of the government from CSO input. The government may sometimes enlist or mobilize CSOs after policies are adopted to sell them to the public at large. But it does not often consult with them in formulating policies.

1: To some degree. CSOs are but one set of voices that policymakers sometimes take into account.

2: Yes. Important CSOs are recognized as stakeholders in important policy areas and given voice on such issues. This can be accomplished through formal corporatist arrangements or through less formal arrangements.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Citation:* Bernhard *et al.* (2015, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2015:13); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

#### 3.10.0.4 CSO structure (C) (v2csstruc)

*Project Manager(s):* Michael Bernhard

*Additional versions:* \*\_nr

*Question:* Civil societies inevitably involve a mix of larger and smaller organizations. Please characterize the relative influence of large mass constituency civil society organizations (CSOs) versus smaller, more local, or narrowly construed CSOs.

*Responses:*

0: The state does not allow autonomous CSOs. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2csstruc\_0]

1: Large encompassing organizations dominate. The government and CSOs are linked formally through a corporatist system of interest intermediation; or, due to historical circumstances, particular large CSOs are highly influential. The voice of such organizations is recognized by the government and is accorded special weight by policymakers. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2csstruc\_1]

2: Neither large encompassing nor small CSOs dominate. Influence is contingent on circumstances. Organizations, both large and small, contend with one another to have their voice considered by policymakers. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2csstruc\_2]

3: Small CSOs dominate. Many small organizations contend with one another to have their voices heard by policymakers. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2csstruc\_3]

*Scale:* Series of dichotomous scales.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Mean.

*Citation:* Bernhard *et al.* *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2015:13); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

#### 3.10.0.5 CSO participatory environment (C) (v2csprtpt)

*Project Manager(s):* Michael Bernhard

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* Which of these best describes the involvement of people in civil society organizations (CSOs)?

*Responses:*

0: Most associations are state-sponsored, and although a large number of people may be active in them, their participation is not purely voluntary.

1: Voluntary CSOs exist but few people are active in them.

2: There are many diverse CSOs, but popular involvement is minimal.



3: There are many diverse CSOs and it is considered normal for people to be at least occasionally active in at least one of them.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Citation:* Bernhard *et al.* (2015, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2015:13); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

### 3.10.0.6 CSO women's participation (C) (v2csgender)

*Project Manager(s):* Michael Bernhard

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* Are women prevented from participating in civil society organizations (CSOs)?

*Clarification:* Please pay attention to both (A) whether women are prevented from participating in civil society organizations (CSOs) because of their gender and (B) whether CSOs pursuing women's interests are prevented from taking part in associational life.

*Responses:*

- 0: Almost always.
- 1: Frequently.
- 2: About half the time.
- 3: Rarely.
- 4: Almost never.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Citation:* Bernhard *et al.* (2015, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2015:13); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

### 3.10.0.7 CSO anti-system movements (C) (v2csantimv)

*Project Manager(s):* Michael Bernhard

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* Among civil society organizations, are there anti-system opposition movements?

*Clarification:* An anti-system opposition movement is any movement — peaceful or armed — that is based in the country (not abroad) and is organized in opposition to the current political system. That is, it aims to change the polity in fundamental ways, *e.g.*, from democratic to autocratic (or vice-versa), from capitalist to communist (or vice-versa), from secular to fundamentalist (or vice-versa). This movement may be linked to a political party that competes in elections but it must also have a "movement" character, which is to say a mass base and an existence separate from normal electoral competition.

If there are several movements, please answer in a general way about the relationship of those movements to the regime.

*Responses:*

- 0: No, or very minimal. Anti-system movements are practically nonexistent.
- 1: There is only a low-level of anti-system movement activity but it does not pose much of a threat to the regime.
- 2: There is a modest level of anti-system movement activity, posing some threat to the regime.
- 3: There is a high level of anti-system movement activity, posing substantial threat to the

regime.

4: There is a very high level of anti-system movement activity, posing a real and present threat to the regime.

*Ordering:* If coded "0", skip the following questions focused on anti-system movements.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Citation:* Bernhard *et al.* (2015, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2015:13); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

*Convergence:* Model parameters with convergence issues: universal thresholds.

### 3.10.0.8 CSO anti-system movement character (C) (v2csanmvch)

*Project Manager(s):* Michael Bernhard

*Additional versions:* \*\_nr

*Question:* How would you characterize the anti-system movement(s) identified in the previous question?

*Clarification:* Check all that apply.

*Responses:*

- 0: Works through legal channels, for the most part. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2csanmvch\_0]
- 1: Participates in elections. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2csanmvch\_1]
- 2: Works through a mix of legal and extra-legal channels. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2csanmvch\_2]
- 3: Insurrectionary. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2csanmvch\_3]
- 4: Democratic. Perceived by most disinterested observers as willing to play by the rules of the democratic game, willing to respect constitutional provisions or electoral outcomes, and willing to relinquish power (under democratic auspices). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2csanmvch\_4]
- 5: Anti-democratic. Perceived by most disinterested observers as unwilling to play by the rules of the democratic game, not willing to respect constitutional provisions or electoral outcomes, and/or not willing to relinquish power (under democratic auspices). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2csanmvch\_5]
- 6: Leftist, socialist, communist. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2csanmvch\_6]
- 7: Rightist, conservative, party of order. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2csanmvch\_7]
- 8: Ethnolinguistic, tribe, kinship, clan. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2csanmvch\_8]
- 9: Separatist or autonomist. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2csanmvch\_9]
- 10: Religious. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2csanmvch\_10]
- 11: Paramilitary. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2csanmvch\_11]
- 12: Heavily engaged in criminal activity, *e.g.*, narcotics, bootlegging, illegal exploitation of natural resources, extortion, kidnapping. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2csanmvch\_12]

*Scale:* Series of dichotomous scales.

*Answer-type:* Multiple-selection.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Mean.

*Citation:* Bernhard *et al.* (2015 *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2015:13); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

### 3.10.0.9 Religious organization repression (C) (v2csrlgprep)

*Project Manager(s):* Michael Coppedge

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* Does the government attempt to repress religious organizations?

*Responses:*

0: Severely. The government violently and actively pursues all real and even some imagined members of religious organizations. It seeks not only to deter the activity of such groups but also to effectively liquidate them. Examples include Stalinist Russia and Maoist China.

1: Substantially. In addition to the kinds of harassment outlined in 2 and 3 below, the government also arrests, tries, and imprisons leaders of and participants in oppositional religious organizations who have acted lawfully. Other sanctions include disruption of public gatherings and violent sanctions of activists (beatings, threats to families, destruction of valuable property).

2: Moderately. In addition to material sanctions outlined in 3 below, the government also engages in minor legal harassment (detentions, short-term incarceration) to dissuade religious organizations from acting or expressing themselves. The government may also restrict the scope of their actions through measures that restrict association of religious civil society organizations with each other or political parties, bar religious civil society organizations from taking certain actions, or block international contacts.

3: Weakly. The government uses material sanctions (fines, firings, denial of social services) to deter oppositional religious organizations from acting or expressing themselves. They may also use burdensome registration or incorporation procedures to slow the formation of new religious civil society organizations and sidetrack them from engagement. The government may also organize parallel religious organizations to crowd out independent religious organizations.

4: No. Religious civil society organizations are free to organize, associate, strike, express themselves, and to criticize the government without fear of government sanctions or harassment.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Citation:* Bernhard *et al.* (2015, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2015:13); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

### 3.10.0.10 Religious organization consultation (C) (v2csrlgcon)

*Project Manager(s):* Michael Coppedge

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* Are major religious organizations routinely consulted by policymakers on policies relevant to their members?

*Responses:*

0: No. There is a high degree of insulation of the government from input from religious organizations. The government may sometimes enlist or mobilize religious organizations after policies are adopted to sell them to the public at large. But typically, it does not consult with them in formulating policies.

1: To some degree. Religious organizations are but one set of voices that policymakers sometimes take into account.

2: Yes. Important religious organizations are recognized as stakeholders in important policy areas and given voice on such issues. This can be accomplished through formal corporatist arrangements or through less formal arrangements.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Citation:* Bernhard *et al.* (2015, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2015:13); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years: 1789-2021*

### 3.11 The Media

#### Instructions to the coders (as shown in the surveys)

**Media:** Two types of media are distinguished in this section: (1) print (newspapers and magazines) and broadcast (radio and television), and (2) online media. We ask that you evaluate these categories as a whole. Thus, "the print and broadcast media" can provide a wide range of perspectives in a country even when individual publications or programs take a consistently narrow perspective.

**Historical clarification:** Two types of media are distinguished in this section: (1) print (newspapers and magazines) and (2) broadcast (radio) media. The latter is, however, only for reference to the contemporary era, and should of course be ignored before it appeared. But when applicable, we ask that you evaluate these categories as a whole. If there is no print or broadcast media at all in a given time period, leave the following questions blank (missing) for this time period. Please also explicitly note in the comments section at the end for which years there was no print or broadcast media at all.

#### 3.11.0.1 Government censorship effort — Media (C) (v2mecenefm)

*Project Manager(s):* Michael Coppedge

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* Does the government directly or indirectly attempt to censor the print or broadcast media?

*Clarification:* Indirect forms of censorship might include politically motivated awarding of broadcast frequencies, withdrawal of financial support, influence over printing facilities and distribution networks, selected distribution of advertising, onerous registration requirements, prohibitive tariffs, and bribery.

We are not concerned with censorship of non-political topics such as child pornography, statements offensive to a particular religion, or defamatory speech unless this sort of censorship is used as a pretext for censoring political speech.

*Responses:*

- 0: Attempts to censor are direct and routine.
- 1: Attempts to censor are indirect but nevertheless routine.
- 2: Attempts to censor are direct but limited to especially sensitive issues.
- 3: Attempts to censor are indirect and limited to especially sensitive issues.
- 4: The government rarely attempts to censor major media in any way, and when such exceptional attempts are discovered, the responsible officials are usually punished.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*)

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2021

#### 3.11.0.2 Internet censorship effort (C) (v2mecenefi)

*Project Manager(s):* Michael Coppedge

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* Does the government attempt to censor information (text, audio, or visuals) on the Internet?

*Clarification:* Censorship attempts include Internet filtering (blocking access to certain websites or browsers), denial-of-service attacks, and partial or total Internet shutdowns. We are not concerned with censorship of topics such as child pornography, highly classified information such as military or intelligence secrets, statements offensive to a particular religion, or

defamatory speech unless this sort of censorship is used as a pretext for censoring political information or opinions. We are also not concerned with the *extent* of internet access, unless there is absolutely no access at all (in which case the coding should be 0).

*Responses:*

0 (1): The government successfully blocks Internet access except to sites that are pro-government or devoid of political content.

1 (2): The government attempts to block Internet access except to sites that are pro-government or devoid of political content, but many users are able to circumvent such controls.

2 (3): The government allows Internet access, including to some sites that are critical of the government, but blocks selected sites that deal with especially politically sensitive issues.

3 (4): The government allows Internet access that is unrestricted, with the exceptions mentioned above.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Notes:* As of December 2014, the former category "0 There is no internet" is coded separately as v2mecenefibin. The variable is then rebased to zero.

*Data release:* 3-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1993-2021

### 3.11.0.3 Internet binary (C) (v2mecenefibin)

*Project Manager(s):* Michael Coppedge

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* Is there Internet in this country?

*Responses:*

0: No.

1: Yes.

*Scale:* Dichotomous, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 3-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1993-2021

### 3.11.0.4 Print/broadcast media critical (C) (v2mecrit)

*Project Manager(s):* Michael Coppedge

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* Of the major print and broadcast outlets, how many routinely criticize the government?

*Responses:*

0: None.

1: Only a few marginal outlets.

2: Some important outlets routinely criticize the government but there are other important outlets that never do.

3: All major media outlets criticize the government at least occasionally.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

#### 3.11.0.5 Print/broadcast media perspectives (C) (v2merange)

*Project Manager(s):* Michael Coppedge

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* Do the major print and broadcast media represent a wide range of political perspectives?

*Responses:*

- 0: The major media represent only the government's perspective.
- 1: The major media represent only the perspectives of the government and a government-approved, semi-official opposition party.
- 2: The major media represent a variety of political perspectives but they systematically ignore at least one political perspective that is important in this society.
- 3: All perspectives that are important in this society are represented in at least one of the major media.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

#### 3.11.0.6 Female journalists (C) (v2mefemjrn)

*Project Manager(s):* Pamela Paxton, Michael Coppedge

*Additional versions:* \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* Please estimate the percentage (%) of journalists in the print and broadcast media who are women.

*Responses:*

Percent.

*Scale:* Interval.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bootstrapped.

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2021

#### 3.11.0.7 Harassment of journalists (C) (v2meharjrn)

*Project Manager(s):* Michael Coppedge

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* Are individual journalists harassed — *i.e.*, threatened with libel, arrested, imprisoned, beaten, or killed — by governmental or powerful nongovernmental actors while engaged in legitimate journalistic activities?

*Responses:*

- 0: No journalists dare to engage in journalistic activities that would offend powerful actors because harassment or worse would be certain to occur.
- 1: Some journalists occasionally offend powerful actors but they are almost always harassed or worse and eventually are forced to stop.
- 2: Some journalists who offend powerful actors are forced to stop but others manage to continue practicing journalism freely for long periods of time.
- 3: It is rare for any journalist to be harassed for offending powerful actors, and if this were to



happen, those responsible for the harassment would be identified and punished.

4: Journalists are never harassed by governmental or powerful nongovernmental actors while engaged in legitimate journalistic activities.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

### 3.11.0.8 Media self-censorship (C) (v2meslfcen)

*Project Manager(s):* Michael Coppedge

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* Is there self-censorship among journalists when reporting on issues that the government considers politically sensitive?

*Responses:*

0: Self-censorship is complete and thorough.

1: Self-censorship is common but incomplete.

2: There is self-censorship on a few highly sensitive political issues but not on moderately sensitive issues.

3: There is little or no self-censorship among journalists.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

### 3.11.0.9 Media bias (C) (v2mebias)

*Project Manager(s):* Michael Coppedge

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* Is there media bias against opposition parties or candidates?

*Clarification:* We ask you to take particular care in rating the year-to-year variation on this question if media bias tends to increase or decrease in election years. Coverage can be considered "more or less impartial" when the media as a whole present a mix of positive and negative coverage of each party or candidate.

*Responses:*

0: The print and broadcast media cover only the official party or candidates, or have no political coverage, or there are no opposition parties or candidates to cover.

1: The print and broadcast media cover more than just the official party or candidates but all the opposition parties or candidates receive only negative coverage.

2: The print and broadcast media cover some opposition parties or candidates more or less impartially, but they give only negative or no coverage to at least one newsworthy party or candidate.

3: The print and broadcast media cover opposition parties or candidates more or less impartially, but they give an exaggerated *amount* of coverage to the governing party or candidates.

4: The print and broadcast media cover all newsworthy parties and candidates more or less impartially and in proportion to their newsworthiness.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

#### **3.11.0.10 Media corrupt (C) (v2mecorrpt)**

*Project Manager(s):* Michael Coppedge

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* Do journalists, publishers, or broadcasters accept payments in exchange for altering news coverage?

*Responses:*

0: The media are so closely directed by the government that any such payments would be either unnecessary to ensure pro-government coverage or ineffective in producing anti-government coverage.

1: Journalists, publishers, and broadcasters routinely alter news coverage in exchange for payments.

2: It is common, but not routine, for journalists, publishers, and broadcasters to alter news coverage in exchange for payments.

3: It is not normal for journalists, publishers, and broadcasters to alter news coverage in exchange for payments, but it happens occasionally, without anyone being punished.

4: Journalists, publishers, and broadcasters rarely alter news coverage in exchange for payments, and if it becomes known, someone is punished for it.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2021

## 3.12 Political Equality

### Instructions to the coders (as shown in the surveys)

**Political Equality:** This section pertains to political equality, that is, the extent to which members of a polity possess equal political power. It does not refer to the inevitable differentiation in power that occurs in all large societies between those who hold positions of power within the state (political elites) and lay citizens. It is, rather, about the distribution of political power among identifiable groups within the population.

What does it mean for a group of individuals to wield real political power? Although political power cannot be directly observed, one can infer that groups possess power to the extent that they: (a) actively participate in politics (by voting, etc.), (b) are involved in civil society organizations, (c) secure representation in government, (d) are able to set the political agenda, (e) influence political decisions, and (f) influence the implementation of those decisions. Please consider all these factors when answering the following questions. (Of course, the picture across these different dimensions may be mixed; your response should indicate the overall picture, taking all aspects of political power into account.)

#### 3.12.0.1 Power distributed by socioeconomic position (C) (v2pepwrse)

*Project Manager(s):* John Gerring

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* Is political power distributed according to socioeconomic position?

*Clarification:* All societies are characterized by some degree of economic (wealth and income) inequality. In some societies, income and wealth are distributed in a grossly unequal fashion. In others, the difference between rich and poor is not so great. Here, we are concerned not with the degree of social inequality but rather with the political effects of this inequality. Specifically, we are concerned with the extent to which wealth and income translates into political power.

*Responses:*

- 0: Wealthy people enjoy a virtual monopoly on political power. Average and poorer people have almost no influence.
- 1: Wealthy people enjoy a dominant hold on political power. People of average income have little say. Poorer people have essentially no influence.
- 2: Wealthy people have a very strong hold on political power. People of average or poorer income have some degree of influence but only on issues that matter less for wealthy people.
- 3: Wealthy people have more political power than others. But people of average income have almost as much influence and poor people also have a significant degree of political power.
- 4: Wealthy people have no more political power than those whose economic status is average or poor. Political power is more or less equally distributed across economic groups.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

#### 3.12.0.2 Power distributed by social group (C) (v2pepwrSOC)

*Project Manager(s):* John Gerring

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* Is political power distributed according to social groups?

*Clarification:* A social group is differentiated within a country by caste, ethnicity, language, race, region, religion, or some combination thereof. (It does *not* include identities grounded in sexual orientation or socioeconomic status.) Social group identity is contextually defined and

is likely to vary across countries and through time. Social group identities are also likely to cross-cut, so that a given person could be defined in multiple ways, *i.e.*, as part of multiple groups. Nonetheless, at any given point in time there are social groups within a society that are understood — by those residing within that society — to be different, in ways that may be politically relevant.

*Responses:*

- 0: Political power is monopolized by one social group comprising a minority of the population. This monopoly is institutionalized, *i.e.*, not subject to frequent change.
- 1: Political power is monopolized by several social groups comprising a minority of the population. This monopoly is institutionalized, *i.e.*, not subject to frequent change.
- 2: Political power is monopolized by several social groups comprising a majority of the population. This monopoly is institutionalized, *i.e.*, not subject to frequent change.
- 3: Either all social groups possess some political power, with some groups having more power than others; or different social groups alternate in power, with one group controlling much of the political power for a period of time, followed by another — but all significant groups have a turn at the seat of power.
- 4: All social groups have roughly equal political power *or* there are no strong ethnic, caste, linguistic, racial, religious, or regional differences to speak of. Social group characteristics are not relevant to politics.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

### 3.12.0.3 Power distributed by gender (C) (v2pepwrgen)

*Project Manager(s):* John Gerring

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* Is political power distributed according to gender?

*Responses:*

- 0: Men have a near-monopoly on political power.
- 1: Men have a dominant hold on political power. Women have only marginal influence.
- 2: Men have much more political power but women have some areas of influence.
- 3: Men have somewhat more political power than women.
- 4: Men and women have roughly equal political power.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

### 3.12.0.4 Power distributed by sexual orientation (C) (v2pepwrrort)

*Project Manager(s):* John Gerring

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* To what extent is political power distributed according to sexual orientation?

*Clarification:* This question contrasts (A) the political power of heterosexuals and lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) members of the polity who are not open about their sexuality with (B) the political power of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) members of the polity who are open about their sexuality. (A) will be referred to as

"heterosexual" and (B) as "LGBT."

Note that in comparing the political power of these two groups we are comparing their power per person. So, when we say that LGBT have less, equal, or more power than heterosexuals we mean relative to their share of the population (as near as this can be estimated).

*Responses:*

- 0: LGBTs are entirely excluded from the public sphere and thus deprived of any real political power (even though they may possess formal powers such as the ballot).
- 1: LGBTs have much less political power than heterosexuals. LGBTs enjoy formal rights to participate in politics but are subject to informal norms that often serve to exclude them from the halls of power.
- 2: LGBTs have somewhat less political power than heterosexual citizens.
- 3: LGBTs have about the same political power as heterosexuals. Each group enjoys a degree of political power that is roughly proportional to their population.
- 4: LGBTs enjoy somewhat more political power than heterosexuals by virtue of greater wealth, education, and high level of organization and mobilization.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2021

### 3.12.0.5 Educational equality (C) (v2peedueq)

*Project Manager(s):* Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Staffan Lindberg

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* To what extent is high quality basic education guaranteed to all, sufficient to enable them to exercise their basic rights as adult citizens?

*Clarification:* Basic education refers to ages typically between 6 and 16 years of age but this varies slightly among countries.

*Responses:*

- 0: Extreme. Provision of high quality basic education is extremely unequal and at least 75 percent (%) of children receive such low-quality education that undermines their ability to exercise their basic rights as adult citizens.
- 1: Unequal. Provision of high quality basic education is extremely unequal and at least 25 percent (%) of children receive such low-quality education that undermines their ability to exercise their basic rights as adult citizens.
- 2: Somewhat equal. Basic education is relatively equal in quality but ten to 25 percent (%) of children receive such low-quality education that undermines their ability to exercise their basic rights as adult citizens.
- 3: Relatively equal. Basic education is overall equal in quality but five to ten percent (%) of children receive such low-quality education that probably undermines their ability to exercise their basic rights as adult citizens.
- 4: Equal. Basic education is equal in quality and less than five percent (%) of children receive such low-quality education that probably undermines their ability to exercise their basic rights as adult citizens.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2021

### 3.12.0.6 Health equality (C) (v2pehealth)

*Project Manager(s)*: Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Staffan Lindberg

*Additional versions*: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question*: To what extent is high quality basic healthcare guaranteed to all, sufficient to enable them to exercise their basic political rights as adult citizens?

*Clarification*: Poor-quality healthcare can make citizens unable to exercise their basic rights as adult citizens by failing to adequately treat preventable and treatable illnesses that render them unable to work, participate in social or political organizations, or vote (where voting is allowed).

*Responses*:

0: Extreme. Because of poor-quality healthcare, at least 75 percent (%) of citizens' ability to exercise their political rights as adult citizens is undermined.

1: Unequal. Because of poor-quality healthcare, at least 25 percent (%) of citizens' ability to exercise their political rights as adult citizens is undermined.

2: Somewhat equal. Because of poor-quality healthcare, ten to 25 percent (%) of citizens' ability to exercise their political rights as adult citizens is undermined.

3: Relatively equal. Basic health care is overall equal in quality but because of poor-quality healthcare, five to ten percent (%) of citizens' ability to exercise their political rights as adult citizens is undermined.

4: Equal. Basic health care is equal in quality and less than five percent (%) of citizens cannot exercise their basic political rights as adult citizens.

*Scale*: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release*: 1-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation*: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Citation*: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years*: 1900-2021

### 3.12.0.7 Primary school enrollment (A) (v2peprisch)

*Project Manager(s)*: Rachel Sigman

*Question*: What percentage of the primary school-aged population is enrolled in primary school?

*Clarification*: This is based on Barro and Lee's (2016) long-term data on primary school enrollment (available in 5-year intervals). The time series is interpolated to impute values for all years between the five-year intervals.

*Source(s)*: Barro and Lee Long-Run Enrollment Ratios by Country.

*Data release*: 6-12.

*Country-Year Aggregation*: Day-weighted mean

*Citation*: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years*: 1820-2010

### 3.12.0.8 Secondary school enrollment (A) (v2pesesch)

*Project Manager(s)*: Rachel Sigman

*Question*: What percentage of the secondary school-aged population is enrolled in secondary school?

*Clarification*: This is based on Barro and Lee's (2016) long-term data on secondary school enrollment (available in 5-year intervals). The time series is interpolated to impute values for all years between the five-year intervals.

*Source(s)*: Barro and Lee Long-Run Enrollment Ratios by Country.

*Data release*: 6-12.

*Country-Year Aggregation*: Day-weighted mean

*Citation*: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1820-2010

### **3.12.0.9 Tertiary school enrollment (A) (v2petersch)**

*Project Manager(s):* Rachel Sigman

*Question:* What percentage of the tertiary school-aged population is enrolled in tertiary school?

*Clarification:* This is based on Barro and Lee's (2016) long-term data on tertiary school enrollment (available in 5-year intervals). The time series is interpolated to impute values for all years between the five-year intervals.

*Source(s):* Barro and Lee Long-Run Enrollment Ratios by Country.

*Data release:* 6-12.

*Country-Year Aggregation:* Day-weighted mean

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1820-2010



### 3.13 Exclusion

#### Instructions to the coders (as shown in the surveys)

**Exclusion:** The following survey contains questions pertaining to exclusion. Political, economic and social well-being may depend on whether groups or individuals are excluded from positions of power, the state's protection of rights and freedoms, access to public goods and services, and opportunities to work or do business with the state.

Please bear in mind the following definitions as you respond to questions on this survey:

*Exclusion* is when individuals are denied access to services or participation in governed spaces based on their identity or belonging to a particular group. It is not necessary for all members of a group to be excluded in order for group-based exclusion to occur. Exclusion occurs even when only a single individual is excluded based on her or his identity or membership (perceived or actual) in a particular group.

*Political groups* are defined as those who are affiliated with a particular political party or candidate, or a group of parties/candidates. A common form of partisan exclusion is when state services or regulations are implemented in a way that seeks to reward the incumbent's political supporters and punish non-supporters.

*Socio-Economic position* defines groups based on attributes of wealth, occupation, or other economic circumstances such as owning property. Exclusion of economic groups occurs when, for example, those who are not property owners are restricted from voting, or when fees associated with justice, health or education are set at a rate that is unaffordable for poorer individuals.

*Social group* is differentiated within a country by caste, ethnicity, language, race, region, religion, migration status, or some combination thereof. (It does not include identities grounded in sexual orientation, gender, or socioeconomic status.) Social group identity is contextually defined and is likely to vary across countries and through time. Social group identities are also likely to cross-cut, so that a given person could be defined in multiple ways, i.e., as part of multiple groups. Nonetheless, at any given point in time there are social groups within a society that are understood - by those residing within that society - to be different, in ways that may be politically relevant. Contrast Identity group.

*Geographic group* refers to those living in rural or urban areas. Urban areas are defined as an area that meets the following conditions: population density exceeds a threshold of 150 persons per square kilometer and there is access to a sizeable settlement of 50,000 people or more within some reasonable travel time, for example 60 minutes by road. (World Development Report, 2009: 54).

#### 3.13.1 Exclusion by Socio-Economic Group

##### 3.13.1.1 Access to public services distributed by socio-economic position (C) (v2peapsecon)

*Project Manager(s):* Rachel Sigman

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* Is access to basic public services, such as order and security, primary education, clean water, and healthcare, distributed equally according to socioeconomic position?

*Clarification:* This question asks if socio-economic position is an important cleavage in society for the distribution of public services. Thus, if there are inequalities in access to public services, but these are not mainly due to differentiation between particular socio-economic position, the code should be "4" (equal). The situation could of course vary by type of public service, such that a socio-economic group is denied access to some basic public services but not others. Please base your response on whether access to most of the aforementioned services are distributed equally or unequally.

*Responses:*

- 0: Extreme. Because of poverty or low income, 75 percent (%) or more of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality.
- 1: Unequal. Because of poverty or low income, 25 percent (%) or more of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality.
- 2: Somewhat Equal. Because of poverty or low income, 10 to 25 percent (%) of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality.
- 3: Relatively Equal. Because of poverty or low income, 5 to 10 percent (%) of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality.
- 4: Equal. Because of poverty or low income, less than 5 percent (%) of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 9-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2021

*Convergence:* Model parameters with convergence issues: universal thresholds.

### 3.13.1.2 Access to state jobs by socio-economic position (C) (v2peasjsoecon)

*Project Manager(s):* Rachel Sigman

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* Are state jobs equally open to qualified individuals regardless of socio-economic position?

*Clarification:* Socio-economic position defines groups based on attributes of wealth, occupation, or other economic circumstances such as owning property.

*Responses:*

- 0: Extreme. Because of poverty or low income, 75 percent (%) or more of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.
- 1: Unequal. Because of poverty or low income, makes 25 percent (%) or more of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.
- 2: Somewhat Equal. Because of poverty or low income, 10 to 25 percent (%) of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.
- 3: Relatively Equal. Because of poverty or low income, 5 to 10 percent (%) of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.
- 4: Equal. Because of poverty or low income, less than 5 percent (%) of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 9-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2021

*Convergence:* Model parameters with convergence issues: country-date latent trait estimates, universal thresholds, expert reliability, expert thresholds, main-country-coded thresholds.

### 3.13.1.3 Access to state business opportunities by socio-economic position (C) (v2peasbecon)

*Project Manager(s):* Rachel Sigman

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* Are state business opportunities equally available to qualified individuals regardless of socio-economic position?

*Clarification:* State business opportunities refer to the ability to compete for or receive a public procurement contract, to partner with the government in public-private partnerships, etc. Socio-economic position defines groups based on attributes of wealth, occupation, or other economic circumstances such as owning property.

*Responses:*

- 0: Extreme. Because of poverty or low income makes 75 percent (%) or more of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities.
- 1: Unequal. Because of poverty or low income makes 25 percent (%) or more of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities.
- 2: Somewhat Equal. Because of poverty or low income makes 10 to 25 percent (%) of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities.
- 3: Relatively Equal. Because of poverty or low income makes 5 to 10 percent (%) of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities.
- 4: Equal. Because of poverty or low income makes less than 5 percent (%) of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 9-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2021

### 3.13.2 Exclusion by Gender

#### 3.13.2.1 Gender equality in respect for civil liberties (C) (v2clgenc1)

*Project Manager(s):* Rachel Sigman

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* Do women enjoy the same level of civil liberties as men?

*Clarification:* Here, civil liberties are understood to include access to justice, private property rights, freedom of movement, and freedom from forced labor.

*Responses:*

- 0: Women enjoy much fewer civil liberties than men.
- 1: Women enjoy substantially fewer civil liberties than men.
- 2: Women enjoy moderately fewer civil liberties than men.
- 3: Women enjoy slightly fewer civil liberties than men.
- 4: Women enjoy the same level of civil liberties as men.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 9-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2021

#### 3.13.2.2 Access to public services distributed by gender (C) (v2peapsgen)

*Project Manager(s):* Rachel Sigman

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* Is access to basic public services, such as order and security, primary education, clean water, and healthcare, distributed equally according to gender?

*Clarification:* This question asks if gender is an important cleavage in society for the distribution of public services. Thus, if there are inequalities in access to public services, but these are not mainly due to differentiation between gender, the code should be “4” (equal). The situation

could of course vary by type of public service, such that women are denied access to some basic public services but not others. Please base your response on whether access to most of the aforementioned services are distributed equally or unequally.

*Responses:*

- 0: Extreme. Because of their gender, 75 percent (%) or more of women lack access to basic public services of good quality.
- 1: Unequal. Because of their gender, 25 percent (%) or more of women lack access to basic public services of good quality.
- 2: Somewhat Equal. Because of their gender, 10 to 25 percent (%) of women lack access to basic public services of good quality.
- 3: Relatively Equal. Because of their gender, 5 to 10 percent (%) of women lack access to basic public services of good quality.
- 4: Equal. Because of their gender, less than 5 percent (%) of women lack access to basic public services of good quality.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 9-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2021

### 3.13.2.3 Access to state jobs by gender (C) (v2peasjgen)

*Project Manager(s):* Rachel Sigman

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* Are state jobs equally open to qualified individuals regardless of gender?

*Responses:*

- 0: Extreme. Because of their gender, 75 percent (%) or more of women, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.
- 1: Unequal. Because of their gender, 25 percent (%) or more of women, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.
- 2: Somewhat Equal. Because of their gender, 10 to 25 percent (%) of women, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.
- 3: Relatively Equal. Because of their gender, 5 to 10 percent (%) of women, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.
- 4: Equal. Because of their gender, less than 5 percent (%) of women, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 9-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2021

### 3.13.2.4 Access to state business opportunities by gender (C) (v2peasbgen)

*Project Manager(s):* Rachel Sigman

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* Are state business opportunities equally available to qualified individuals or firms regardless of gender?

*Clarification:* State business opportunities refer to the ability to compete for or receive a public procurement contract, to partner with the government in public-private partnerships, etc.

*Responses:*

- 0: Extreme. Because of their gender, 75 percent (%) or more of women, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities.
- 1: Unequal. Because of their gender, 25 percent (%) or more of women, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities.
- 2: Somewhat Equal. Because of their gender, 10 to 25 percent (%) of women, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities.
- 3: Relatively Equal. Because of their gender, 5 to 10 percent (%) of women, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities.
- 4: Equal. Because of their gender, 5 percent (%) of women, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 9-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2021

### 3.13.3 Exclusion by Urban-Rural Location

#### 3.13.3.1 Power distributed by urban-rural location (C) (v2pepwrgeo)

*Project Manager(s):* Rachel Sigman

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* Is political power distributed according to urban-rural location?

*Clarification:* Urban areas are defined as an area that meets the following conditions: population density exceeds a threshold of 150 persons per square kilometer, there is access to a sizeable settlement of 50,000 people or more within some reasonable travel time, for example 60 minutes by road. (World Development Report, 2009: 54)

*Responses:*

- 0: People living in urban areas have a near-monopoly on political power.
- 1: People living in urban areas have a dominant hold on political power. Those living in rural areas have only marginal influence.
- 2: People living in urban areas have much more political power but those living in rural areas have some areas of influence.
- 3: People living in urban areas have somewhat more political power than those living in rural areas.
- 4: People living in any area have roughly equal political power or people living in rural areas have more access to political power than those in urban areas.
- 5: People living in rural areas have much more political power but those living in urban areas have some areas of influence.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 9-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2021

#### 3.13.3.2 Urban-rural location equality in respect for civil liberties (C) (v2clgeocl)

*Project Manager(s):* Rachel Sigman

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* Do those who reside in rural areas enjoy same level of civil liberties as those residing in urban areas?

*Clarification:* This question specifies the extent to which the level of civil liberties is generally the same across geographic areas. Urban areas are defined as an area that meets the following conditions: population density exceeds a threshold of 150 persons per square kilometer, there is access to a sizeable settlement of 50,000 people or more within some reasonable travel time, for example 60 minutes by road (World Development Report, 2009: 54). Here, civil liberties are understood to include access to justice, private property rights, freedom of movement, and freedom from forced labor.

*Responses:*

- 0: Those who live in rural areas enjoy much fewer civil liberties than residents of urban areas.
- 1: Those who live in rural areas enjoy substantially fewer civil liberties than residents of urban areas.
- 2: Those who live in rural areas enjoy moderately fewer civil liberties than residents of urban areas.
- 3: Those who live in rural areas enjoy slightly fewer civil liberties than residents of urban areas.
- 4: Residents of rural areas enjoy the same level of civil liberties as those in urban areas.
- 5: Residents of rural areas enjoy more civil liberties than those in urban areas.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 9-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2021

### 3.13.3.3 Access to public services distributed by urban-rural location (C) (v2peapsgeo)

*Project Manager(s):* Rachel Sigman

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* Is access to basic public services, such as order and security, primary education, clean water, and healthcare, distributed equally across urban and rural areas?

*Clarification:* Urban areas are defined as an area that meets the following conditions: population density exceeds a threshold of 150 persons per square kilometer, there is access to a sizeable settlement of 50,000 people or more within some reasonable travel time, for example 60 minutes by road. (World Development Report, 2009: 54). This question asks if geographic group is an important cleavage in society for the distribution of public services. Thus, if there are inequalities in access to public services, but these are not mainly due to differentiation between urban and rural areas, the code should be “4” (equal). The situation could of course vary by type of public service, such that a geographic group is denied access to some basic public services but not others. Please base your response on whether access to most of the aforementioned services are distributed equally or unequally.

*Responses:*

- 0: Extreme. Because they live in rural areas, 75 percent (%) or more of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality.
- 1: Unequal. Because they live in rural areas, 25 percent (%) or more of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality.
- 2: Somewhat Equal. Because they live in rural areas, 10 to 25 percent (%) of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality.
- 3: Relatively Equal. Because they live in rural areas, only 5 to 10 percent (%) of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality.
- 4: Equal. Because they live in rural areas, less than 5 percent (%) of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality.
- 5: Rural-Bias: Because they live in urban areas, 25% or more of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality.



*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 9-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2021

#### 3.13.3.4 Access to state jobs by urban-rural location (C) (v2peasjgeo)

*Project Manager(s):* Rachel Sigman

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* Are state jobs equally open to qualified individuals regardless of their rural or urban location?

*Clarification:* Urban areas are defined as an area that meets the following conditions: population density exceeds a threshold of 150 persons per square kilometer, there is access to a sizeable settlement of 50,000 people or more within some reasonable travel time, for example 60 minutes by road. (World Development Report, 2009: 54)

*Responses:*

- 0: Extreme. Because they live in rural areas, 75 percent (%) or more of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.
- 1: Unequal. Because they live in rural areas, 25 percent (%) or more of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.
- 2: Somewhat Equal. Because they live in rural areas, 10 to 25 percent (%) of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.
- 3: Relatively Equal. Because they live in rural areas, only 5 to 10 percent (%) of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.
- 4: Equal. Because they live in rural areas, less than 5 percent (%) of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.
- 5: Rural-Bias. Because they live in urban areas, 25% or more of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 9-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2021

*Convergence:* Model parameters with convergence issues: country-date latent trait estimates, universal thresholds, expert reliability, expert thresholds, main-country-coded thresholds.

#### 3.13.3.5 Access to state business opportunities by urban-rural location (C) (v2peasbegeo)

*Project Manager(s):* Rachel Sigman

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* Are state business opportunities equally available to qualified individuals or firms regardless of their rural or urban locations?

*Clarification:* State business opportunities refer to the ability to compete for or receive a public procurement contract, to partner with the government in public-private partnerships, etc. Urban areas are defined as an area that meets the following conditions: population density exceeds a threshold of 150 persons per square kilometer, there is access to a sizeable settlement of 50,000 people or more within some reasonable travel time, for example 60 minutes by road. (World Development Report, 2009: 54)



*Responses:*

- 0: Extreme. Because they live in rural areas, 75 percent (%) or more of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities.
- 1: Unequal. Because they live in rural areas, 25 percent (%) or more of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities.
- 2: Somewhat Equal. Because they live in rural areas, 10 to 25 percent (%) of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities.
- 3: Relatively Equal. Because they live in rural areas, 5 to 10 percent (%) of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities.
- 4: Equal. Because they live in rural areas, less than 5 percent (%) of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities.
- 5: Rural-Bias. Because they live in urban areas, 25 percent (%) of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 9-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2021

### 3.13.4 Exclusion by Political Group

#### 3.13.4.1 Political group equality in respect for civil liberties (C) (v2clpolcl)

*Project Manager(s):* Rachel Sigman

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* Do members of all political groups enjoy the same level of civil liberties, or are some groups generally in a more favorable position?

*Clarification:* A political group is defined as those who are affiliated with a particular political party or candidate, or a group of parties/candidates that can be distinguished from others in terms of enjoyment of civil liberties. Responses should not reflect which party controls the legislature and executive. Here, civil liberties are understood to include access to justice, private property rights, freedom of movement, and freedom from forced labor.

*Responses:*

- 0: Some political groups enjoy much fewer civil liberties than other political groups.
- 1: Some political groups enjoy substantially fewer civil liberties than other political groups.
- 2: Some political groups enjoy moderately fewer civil liberties than other political groups.
- 3: Some political groups enjoy slightly fewer civil liberties than other political groups.
- 4: All political groups enjoy the same level of civil liberties.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 9-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2021

#### 3.13.4.2 Access to public services distributed by political group (C) (v2peapspol)

*Project Manager(s):* Rachel Sigman

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* Is access to basic public services, such as order and security, primary education, clean water, and healthcare, distributed equally across political groups?

*Clarification:* A political group is defined as those who are affiliated with a particular political

party or candidate, or a group of parties/candidates. This question asks if political group is an important cleavage in society for the distribution of public services. Thus, if there are inequalities in access to public services, but these are not mainly due to differentiation between particular political groups, the code should be “4” (equal). The situation could of course vary by type of public service, such that a political group is denied access to some basic public services but not others. Please base your response on whether access to most of the aforementioned services are distributed equally or unequally.

*Responses:*

- 0: Extreme. Because of their political group affiliation 75 percent (%) or more of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality.
- 1: Unequal. Because of their political group affiliation 25 percent (%) or more of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality.
- 2: Somewhat Equal. Because of their political group affiliation 10 to 25 percent (%) of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality.
- 3: Relatively Equal. Because of their political group affiliation only 5 to 10 percent (%) of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality.
- 4: Equal. Because of their political group affiliation less than 5 percent (%) of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 9-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2021

*Convergence:* Model parameters with convergence issues: country-date latent trait estimates, universal thresholds, expert reliability, expert thresholds, main-country-coded thresholds.

### 3.13.4.3 Access to state jobs by political group (C) (v2peasjpol)

*Project Manager(s):* Rachel Sigman

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* Are state jobs equally open to qualified individuals regardless of their association with a political group?

*Clarification:* A political group is defined as those who are affiliated with a particular political party or candidate, or a group of parties/candidates.

*Responses:*

- 0: Extreme. Because of their political group affiliation, 75 percent (%) or more of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.
- 1: Unequal. Because of their political group affiliation, 25 percent (%) or more of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.
- 2: Somewhat Equal. Because of their political group affiliation, 10 to 25 percent (%) of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.
- 3: Relatively Equal. Because of their political group affiliation, 5 to 10 percent (%) of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.
- 4: Equal. Because of their political group affiliation, less than 5 percent (%) of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 9-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2021

#### 3.13.4.4 Access to state business opportunities by political group (C) (v2peasbepol)

*Project Manager(s):* Rachel Sigman

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* Are state business opportunities equally available to qualified individuals or firms regardless of an individual's association with a political group?

*Clarification:* State business opportunities refer to the ability to compete for or receive a public procurement contract, to partner with the government in public-private partnerships, etc. A political group is defined as those who are affiliated with a particular political party or candidate, or a group of parties/candidates that can be distinguished from others in terms of access to power. Responses should not reflect which party controls the legislature and executive.

*Responses:*

- 0: Extreme. Because of their political group affiliation 75 percent (%) or more of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities.
- 1: Unequal. Because of their political group affiliation 25 percent (%) or more of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities.
- 2: Somewhat Equal. Because of their political group affiliation 10 to 25 percent (%) of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities.
- 3: Relatively Equal. Because of their political group affiliation 5 to 10 percent (%) of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities.
- 4: Equal. Because of their political group affiliation less than 5 percent (%) of the population, even if qualified, lack equal access to state business opportunities.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 9-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2021

#### 3.13.5 Exclusion by Social Group

##### 3.13.5.1 Access to public services distributed by social group (C) (v2peapssoc)

*Project Manager(s):* Rachel Sigman

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* Are basic public services, such as order and security, primary education, clean water, and healthcare, distributed equally across social groups?

*Clarification:* This question asks if social group is an important cleavage in society for the distribution of public services. Thus, if there are inequalities in access to public services, but these are not mainly due to differentiation between particular social groups, the code should be “4” (equal). The situation could of course vary by type of public service, such that a social group is denied access to some basic public services but not others. Please base your response on whether access to most of the aforementioned services are distributed equally or unequally.

*Responses:*

- 0: Extreme. Because of their social group, 75 percent (%) or more of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality.
- 1: Unequal. Because of their social group, 25 percent (%) or more of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality.
- 2: Somewhat Equal. Because of their social group, 10 to 25 percent (%) of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality.
- 3: Relatively Equal. Because of their social group, only 5 to 10 percent (%) of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality.
- 4: Equal. Because of their social group, less than 5 percent (%) of the population lack access to basic public services of good quality.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 9-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2021

### 3.13.5.2 Access to state jobs by social group (C) (v2peasjsoc)

*Project Manager(s):* Rachel Sigman

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* Are state jobs equally open to qualified individuals regardless of social group?

*Clarification:* Social group is differentiated within a country by caste, ethnicity, language, race, region, religion, migration status, or some combination thereof. (It does not include identities grounded in sexual orientation, gender, or socioeconomic status.)

*Responses:*

0: Extreme. Because of their social group, 75 percent (%) or more of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.

1: Unequal. Because of their social group identity, 25 percent (%) or more of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.

2: Somewhat Equal. Because of their social group identity, 10 to 25 percent (%) of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.

3: Relatively Equal. Because of their social group identity, 5 to 10 percent (%) of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.

4: Equal. Because of their social group identity, less than 5 percent (%) of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state jobs.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 9-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2021

### 3.13.5.3 Access to state business opportunities by social group (C) (v2peasbsoc)

*Project Manager(s):* Rachel Sigman

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* Are state business opportunities equally available to qualified individuals or firms regardless of social group?

*Clarification:* State business opportunities refer to the ability to compete for or receive a public procurement contract, to partner with the government in public-private partnerships, etc. Social group is differentiated within a country by caste, ethnicity, language, race, region, religion, migration status, or some combination thereof. (It does not include identities grounded in sexual orientation, gender, or socioeconomic status.)

*Responses:*

0: Extreme. Because of their social group, 75 percent (%) or more of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities.

1: Unequal. Because of their social group, 25 percent (%) or more of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities.

2: Somewhat Equal. Because of their social group, 10 to 25 percent (%) of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities.

3: Relatively Equal. Because of their social group, 5 to 10 percent (%) of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities.

4: Equal. Because of their social group, less than 5 percent (%) of the population, even if qualified, lack access to state business opportunities.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 9-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2021

### 3.14 Legitimation

#### Instructions to the coders (as shown in the surveys)

**Legitimation strategies:** Governments make legitimacy claims—provide justifications for the form of rule under which they govern. In the following section we are interested in the nature of the legitimacy claims made by the sitting government. Please note that the government’s claims to legitimacy - their legitimation strategies - are the object of inquiry here. We are not asking you to assess how ordinary people judge the legitimacy of their rulers. Do not assume that governments make legitimacy claims on only one basis. We are interested in multi-track and hybrid legitimation strategies. The regime is understood as a set of formal and/or informal rules that govern the choice of political leaders and their exercise of power. The government is understood as the chief executive along with the cabinet, ministries, and top civil servants.

#### 3.14.0.1 Ideology (C) (v2exl\_legitideol)

*Project Manager(s):* Marcus Tannenberg

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* To what extent does the current government promote a specific ideology or societal model (an officially codified set of beliefs used to justify a particular set of social, political, and economic relations; for example, socialism, nationalism, religious traditionalism, etc.) in order to justify the regime in place?

*Responses:*

- 0: Not at all.
- 1: To a small extent.
- 2: To some extent but it is not the most important component.
- 3: To a large extent but not exclusively.
- 4: Almost exclusively.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 9-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

*Citation:* Tannenberg *et al.* (2019, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2019:86); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2021

#### 3.14.0.2 Ideology character (C) (v2exl\_legitideolcr)

*Project Manager(s):* Marcus Tannenberg

*Additional versions:* \*\_nr

*Question:* How would you characterize the ideology/ideologies identified in the previous question?

*Clarification:* Check all that apply.

*Responses:*

- 0: Nationalist (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exl\_legitideolcr\_0]
- 1: Socialist or communist. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exl\_legitideolcr \_1]
- 2: Restorative or conservative. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exl\_legitideolcr \_2]
- 3: Separatist or autonomist. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exl\_legitideolcr \_3]
- 4: Religious. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exl\_legitideolcr \_4]

*Scale:* Series of dichotomous scales.

*Answer-type:* Multiple-selection.

*Data release:* 9-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Mean.

*Citation:* Tannenberg *et al.* (2019, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2019:86); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2021

### 3.14.0.3 Person of the Leader (C) (v2exl\_legitlead)

*Project Manager(s)*: Marcus Tannenberg

*Additional versions*: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question*: To what extent is the Chief Executive portrayed as being endowed with extraordinary personal characteristics and/or leadership skills (e.g. as father or mother of the nation, exceptionally heroic, moral, pious, or wise, or any other extraordinary attribute valued by the society)?

*Clarification*: The Chief Executive refers to the Head of State or the Head of Government, depending on the relative power of each office. We are interested in the key leadership figure.

*Responses*:

- 0: Not at all.
- 1: To a small extent.
- 2: To some extent but it is not the most important component.
- 3: To a large extent but not exclusively.
- 4: Almost exclusively.

*Scale*: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release*: 9-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation*: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

*Citation*: Tannenberg *et al.* (2019, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2019:86); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2021

### 3.14.0.4 Performance legitimization (C) (v2exl\_legitperf)

*Project Manager(s)*: Marcus Tannenberg

*Additional versions*: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question*: To what extent does the government refer to performance (such as providing economic growth, poverty reduction, effective and non-corrupt governance, and/or providing security) in order to justify the regime in place?

*Responses*:

- 0: Not at all.
- 1: To a small extent.
- 2: To some extent but it is not the most important component.
- 3: To a large extent but not exclusively.
- 4: Almost exclusively.

*Scale*: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release*: 9-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation*: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

*Citation*: Tannenberg *et al.* (2019, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2019:86); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1900-2021

### 3.14.0.5 Rational-legal legitimization (C) (v2exl\_legitratio)

*Project Manager(s)*: Marcus Tannenberg

*Additional versions*: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question*: To what extent does the current government refer to the legal norms and regulations in order to justify the regime in place?



*Clarification:* This question pertains to legal norms and regulations as laid out for instance in the constitution regarding access to power (e.g. elections) as well as exercise of power (e.g. rule of law). Electoral regimes may score high on this question as well as non-electoral regimes that emphasize their rule-boundedness.

*Responses:*

- 0: Not at all.
- 1: To a small extent.
- 2: To some extent but it is not the most important component.
- 3: To a large extent but not exclusively.
- 4: Almost exclusively.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 9-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

*Citation:* Tannenberg *et al.* (2019, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2019:86); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2021

### 3.15 Civic and Academic Space

#### Instructions to the coders (as shown in the surveys)

**Civic and Academic Space:** In this survey, we ask you to assess several issues concerning the space for and state of civil society and academia. First, we ask about some general issues such as polarization and peaceful assembly. Then, we probe into mobilization for mass events and associations. Finally, we ask you to consider questions related to academia.

#### 3.15.1 Civic Space

##### 3.15.1.1 Political polarization (C) (v2cacamps)

*Project Manager(s):* Sebastian Hellmeier

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* Is society polarized into antagonistic, political camps?

*Clarification:* Here we refer to the extent to which political differences affect social relationships beyond political discussions. Societies are highly polarized if supporters of opposing political camps are reluctant to engage in friendly interactions, for example, in family functions, civic associations, their free time activities and workplaces

*Responses:*

- 0: Not at all. Supporters of opposing political camps generally interact in a friendly manner.
- 1: Mainly not. Supporters of opposing political camps are more likely to interact in a friendly than a hostile manner.
- 2: Somewhat. Supporters of opposing political camps are equally likely to interact in a friendly or hostile manner.
- 3: Yes, to noticeable extent. Supporters of opposing political camps are more likely to interact in a hostile than friendly manner.
- 4: Yes, to a large extent. Supporters of opposing political camps generally interact in a hostile manner.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 10-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2021

##### 3.15.1.2 Political violence (C) (v2caviol)

*Project Manager(s):* Katrin Kinzelbach

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* How often have non-state actors used political violence against persons this year?

*Clarification:* We understand political violence as the use of physical force to achieve political objectives by non-state actors. The restriction to political objectives excludes profit-driven crime-related violence, for instance. By non-state actors we refer to individuals or entities that are not formally part of the state. Thus, politically oriented militias and youth groups count as non-state actors even though they might potentially be informally affiliated with the ruling party or the state. Political violence against persons excludes psychological and symbolic violence (e.g. destruction of objects).

*Responses:*

- 0: Not at all. Non-state actors did not use political violence.
- 1: Rare. Non-state actors rarely used political violence.
- 2: Occasionally. Non-state actors occasionally used political violence.
- 3: Frequently. Non-state actors frequently used political violence.
- 4: Often. Non-state actors often used political violence.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 10-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2021

### 3.15.1.3 Freedom of peaceful assembly (C) (v2caasemb)

*Project Manager(s):* Katrin Kinzelbach

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* To what extent do state authorities respect and protect the right of peaceful assembly?

*Clarification:* This question focuses on the ability to assemble publicly in practice. An assembly is “an intentional and temporary presence of a number of individuals in a public place, for a common expressive purpose” (ODIHR and Venice Commission of the Council of Europe 2010). Authorities may limit the right to assembly only if limitations are necessary in the interests of national security or public safety, public order, the protection of public health or morals, or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others, and are lawful, necessary, and proportionate to the aim pursued. Such reasonable and legal restrictions should not be considered when answering. However, if there is evidence that restrictions are used as a pretext for political reasons, this evidence should be considered.

*Responses:*

- 0: Never. State authorities do not allow peaceful assemblies and are willing to use lethal force to prevent them.
- 1: Rarely. State authorities rarely allow peaceful assemblies, but generally avoid using lethal force to prevent them.
- 2: Sometimes. State authorities sometimes allow peaceful assemblies, but often arbitrarily deny citizens the right to assemble peacefully.
- 3: Mostly. State authorities generally allow peaceful assemblies, but in rare cases arbitrarily deny citizens the right to assemble peacefully.
- 4: Almost always. State authorities almost always allow and actively protect peaceful assemblies except in rare cases of lawful, necessary, and proportionate limitations.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 10-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2021

### 3.15.1.4 State of emergency (C) (v2casoe)

*Project Manager(s):* Katrin Kinzelbach

*Additional versions:* \*\_nr

*Question:* Was a national state of emergency in place at any point this year?

*Clarification:* A state of emergency is a formal legal act that enables state actors and institutions to change their roles during times of international or domestic crisis. Our definition of state of emergency includes the application of martial law. If there was more than one state of emergency, code the one that was in place for the longer time. Select one option.

*Responses:*

- 0: The legal framework does not allow for a declaration of a national state of emergency. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2casoe\_0]
- 1: There was no state of emergency in place at any point this year, even though provisions for a declaration of a national state of emergency exist. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2casoe\_1]

- 2: A national state of emergency was in place due to a natural disaster. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2casoe\_2]
- 3: A national state of emergency was in place due to a terrorist attack. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2casoe\_3]
- 4: A national state of emergency was in place due to an armed conflict/war, domestically or internationally. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2casoe\_4]
- 5: A national state of emergency was in place due to mass protest/popular uprising. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2casoe\_5]
- 6: A national state of emergency was in place for reasons other than those listed above. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2casoe\_6]

*Scale:* Series of dichotomous scales.

*Data release:* 10-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Mean.

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2021

### 3.15.2 Mass Mobilization

The following four questions concern the participation of citizens in events of political mass mobilization, such as demonstrations, strikes, protests, riots, and sit-ins.

We first ask generally about participation in events of mass mobilization and then distinguish between mass mobilization for two different aims: democratic and autocratic.

These events are typically organized by non-state actors, but the question also concerns state-orchestrated rallies (e.g. to show support of an autocratic government).

#### 3.15.2.1 Mass mobilization (C) (v2cagenmob)

*Project Manager(s):* Sebastian Hellmeier

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* In this year, how frequent and large have events of mass mobilization been?

*Clarification:* This question concerns the mobilization of citizens for mass events such as demonstrations, strikes and sit-ins. These events are typically organized by non-state actors, but the question also concerns state-orchestrated rallies (e.g. to show support of an autocratic government).

*Responses:*

- 0: There have been virtually no events.
- 1: There have been several small-scale events.
- 2: There have been many small-scale events.
- 3: There have been several large-scale and small-scale events.
- 4: There have been many large-scale and small-scale events.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 10-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2021

#### 3.15.2.2 Mass mobilization concentration (C) (v2caconmob)

*Project Manager(s):* Sebastian Hellmeier

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* Were mass mobilization events concentrated in the capital?

*Clarification:* This question is about the geographic location of the events and not their intensity. In the unlikely event that no event at all took place, code option 2. This question concerns the mobilization of citizens for mass events such as demonstrations, strikes and sit-ins. These events are typically organized by non-state actors, but the question also concerns state-orchestrated rallies (e.g. to show support of an autocratic government).

*Responses:*

- 0: Yes. Events of mass mobilization were much more frequent in the capital.
- 1: Somewhat. Events of mass mobilization were somewhat more frequent in the capital.
- 2: No. Events of mass mobilization were as common in many cities across the country as in the capital or did not take place at all.
- 3: No. Events of mass mobilization were more common in cities other than the capital.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 10-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2021

*Convergence:* Model parameters with convergence issues: universal thresholds.

### 3.15.2.3 Mobilization for democracy (C) (v2cademmob)

*Project Manager(s):* Sebastian Hellmeier

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* In this year, how frequent and large have events of mass mobilization for pro-democratic aims been?

*Clarification:* Events are pro-democratic if they are organized with the explicit aim to advance and/or protect democratic institutions such as free and fair elections with multiple parties, and courts and parliaments; or if they are in support of civil liberties such as freedom of association and speech. This question concerns the mobilization of citizens for mass events such as demonstrations, strikes and sit-ins.

*Responses:*

- 0: There have been virtually no events.
- 1: There have been several small-scale events.
- 2: There have been many small-scale events.
- 3: There have been several large-scale and small-scale events.
- 4: There have been many large-scale and small-scale events.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 10-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Citation:* Hellmeier and Bernhard (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:128); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2021

*Convergence:* Model parameters with convergence issues: universal thresholds.

### 3.15.2.4 Mobilization for autocracy (C) (v2caautmob)

*Project Manager(s):* Sebastian Hellmeier

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* In this year, how frequent and large have events of mass mobilization for pro-autocratic aims been?

*Clarification:* Events are pro-autocratic if they are organized explicitly in support of non-democratic

rulers and forms of government such as a one-party state, monarchy, theocracy or military dictatorships. Events are also pro-autocratic if they are organized in support of leaders that question basic principles of democracy, or are generally aiming to undermine democratic ideas and institutions such as the rule of law, free and fair elections, or media freedom. This question concerns the mobilization of citizens for mass events such as demonstrations, strikes, sit. These events are typically organized by non-state actors, but the question also concerns also count state-orchestrated rallies (e.g. to show support of an autocratic government).

*Responses:*

- 0: There have been virtually no events.
- 1: There have been several small-scale events.
- 2: There have been many small-scale events.
- 3: There have been several large-scale and small-scale events.
- 4: There have been many large-scale and small-scale events.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 10-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Citation:* Hellmeier and Bernhard (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:128); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2021

### 3.15.3 Citizen Engagement

The following four questions concern citizen engagement in a variety of associations. We are not concerned with mere membership in such organizations, but with the extent to which citizens actively participate in such organizations. We consider an individual as active if they attend a meeting, activity or event at least twice a year.

We distinguish between four types of associations. State-administered mass organizations are created and led by the government with compulsory or voluntary membership for specific societal groups. The other three types of associations—trade unions, political associations and non-political associations—are all independent from the state and membership is always voluntary.

#### 3.15.3.1 Engagement in state-administered mass organizations (C) (v2castate)

*Project Manager(s):* Sebastian Hellmeier

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* What share of the population is regularly active in state-administered mass associations, such as women, worker or youth leagues?

*Clarification:* State-administered mass associations are civilian organizations created and led by the government or the ruling party. Large shares of specific societal groups are voluntary or compulsory members of these associations. Examples include youth leagues such as the Hitlerjugend in Nazi Germany and the pioneers in the Soviet Union, women leagues such as the Women's Federation in China or the Federacion de Mujeres Cubanas and official trade unions in the Soviet Union. Such organizations are formally or informally affiliated with the state and/or with the ruling party. We consider an individual as active if they attend a meeting, activity or event at least twice a year.

*Responses:*

- 0: Virtually no one.
- 1: A small share of the population (less than 5%).
- 2: A moderate share of the population (about 5 to 15 %).
- 3: A large share of the population (about 16 % to 25%).
- 4: A very large share of the population (about 26% or more).

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 10-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2021

*Convergence:* Model parameters with convergence issues: universal thresholds.

### 3.15.3.2 Engagement in independent trade unions (C) (v2catrauni)

*Project Manager(s):* Sebastian Hellmeier

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* What share of the population is regularly active in independent trade unions?

*Clarification:* An organization is independent if it is not controlled by the state or the ruling party and membership is voluntary. We consider an individual as active if they attend a meeting, activity or event at least twice a year.

*Responses:*

- 0: Virtually no one.
- 1: A small share of the population (less than 5%).
- 2: A moderate share of the population (about 5 to 15 %).
- 3: A large share of the population (about 16 % to 25%).
- 4: A very large share of the population (about 26% or more).

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 10-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2021

*Convergence:* Model parameters with convergence issues: universal thresholds, expert thresholds, main-country-coded thresholds.

### 3.15.3.3 Engagement in independent political associations (C) (v2capolit)

*Project Manager(s):* Sebastian Hellmeier

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* What share of the population is regularly active in independent political interest associations, such as environmental associations, animal rights groups, or LGBT rights groups?

*Clarification:* Political associations include all associations whose main purpose is the change of policy or practice at the state or societal level. It does NOT include political parties or trade unions. An organization is independent if it is not controlled by the state or the ruling party and membership is voluntary. We consider an individual as active if they attend a meeting, activity or event at least twice a year.

*Responses:*

- 0: Virtually no one.
- 1: A small share of the population (less than 5%).
- 2: A moderate share of the population (about 5 to 15 %).
- 3: A large share of the population (about 16 % to 25%).
- 4: A very large share of the population (about 26% or more).

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 10-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).



*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2021

### 3.15.3.4 Engagement in independent non-political associations (C) (v2canonpol)

*Project Manager(s):* Sebastian Hellmeier

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* What share of the population is regularly active in independent non-political associations, such as sports clubs, literary societies, charities, fraternal groups, or support groups?

*Clarification:* Non-political associations include all associations whose main purpose is not the change of policy or practice at the state or societal level. It does NOT include political parties, or trade unions. An organization is independent if it is not controlled by the state or the ruling party and membership is voluntary. We consider an individual as active if they attend a meeting activity or event at least twice a year.

*Responses:*

- 0: Virtually no one.
- 1: A small share of the population (less than 5%).
- 2: A moderate share of the population (about 5 to 15 %).
- 3: A large share of the population (about 16 % to 25%).
- 4: A very large share of the population (about 26% or more).

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 10-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2021

### 3.15.4 Academic Space

**University:** “Universities” are all higher education institutions, both public and private. They include institutions such as research universities, universities of applied sciences, undergraduate colleges, polytechnic universities and international campuses.

The questions in the following section ask you to generalize across universities in a particular country (and at a particular point in time). We realize that circumstances may vary between institutions and geographic regions. However, for our purposes it is important to consider what the prevailing practices and conditions are. Thus, when generalizing across diverse types of institutions, it is important to bear in mind their relative importance in the higher education sector of the country.

**Scholar:** By “scholar” or “academic”, we understand qualified researchers and lecturers affiliated with a university.

**Non-academic actor:** By “non-academic actor”, we mean individuals and groups that are not a scientifically trained university affiliate. Non-academic actors include individuals and groups such as politicians, party secretaries, externally appointed university management, businesses, foundations, other private funders, religious groups and advocacy groups.

In some countries, the first university was only founded during the coding period (1900-2019). In this case, you will only be shown the coding grid starting with the first year of the existence of universities. If you have any corrections to this pre-coded data, please add them in the comments field below.

In the event that all universities were closed down in a given year, please add a note in the comments field at the end of the section. Then assess the closure’s impact on the academic space by following the indicators introduced below. The impact will differ depending on the reason for closure.

#### 3.15.4.1 Existence of universities (A\*) (v2cauni)

*Project Manager(s)*: Alicja Polakiewicz, Janika Spannagel

*Question*: Have universities existed in this country?

*Clarification*: This indicator captures if universities have (ever) existed in this country. Thus, even if all universities were temporarily closed in a given year, this indicator is coded as 1 (“yes”).

*Responses*:

0: No.

1: Yes.

*Scale*: Dichotomous

*Source(s)*: Apfeld (2019) drawing on 4icu.org (Atuzzo 2019); whed.net; various country-specific sources.

*Notes*: Country-specific sources were consulted where 4icu.org and whed.net suggested conflicting years of establishment of first university.

*Data release*: 10-12.

*Country–Year Aggregation*: Last

*Citation*: Spannagel *et al.* (2020, V-Dem Users’ Working Paper Series); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years*: 1900-2021

#### 3.15.4.2 Total number of universities (A) (v2canuni)

*Project Manager(s)*: John Gerring, Brendan Apfeld

*Question*: What is the total number of universities?

*Clarification*: The total number of universities founded in or before the given year. Universities are considered to be degree-granting institutions of higher education that grant at least one bachelor’s degree or its equivalent, corresponding to International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) levels 6-8.

*Responses*:

Numeric

*Scale*: Interval

*Source(s)*: Apfeld (2019)

*Data release*: 10-12.

*Country–Year Aggregation*: Last

*Citation*: Apfeld (2019) drawing on Atuzzo (2019); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years*: 1789-2016

#### 3.15.4.3 Constitutional protection for academic freedom (A) (v2caprotac)

*Project Manager(s)*: Katrin Kinzelbach

*Question*: Do constitutional provisions for the protection of academic freedom exist?

*Responses*:

0: No.

1: Yes.

95: Constitution suspended.

97: Other, or undetermined.

99: Missing.

*Scale*: Ordinal

*Source(s)*: Elkins *et al.* (2020)

*Data release*: 10-12.

*Country–Year Aggregation*: Last

*Citation*: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years*: 1900-2021

#### 3.15.4.4 Freedom to research and teach (C) (v2cafres)

*Project Manager(s):* Katrin Kinzelbach, Ilyas Saliba, Janika Spannagel

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* To what extent are scholars free to develop and pursue their own research and teaching agendas without interference?

*Clarification:* Examples of interference include research agendas or teaching curricula being drafted, restricted, or fully censored by a non-academic actor; scholars being externally induced, through possible reprisals, to self-censor; or the university administration abusing its position of power to impose research or teaching agendas on individual academics. It also includes public pressure on academics - offline and online. We do not consider as interference restrictions that are due to research priorities, as well as ethical and quality standards, freely defined by the scholarly community as well as the development of standardized curricula by academics that aim to structure and enhance teaching.

*Responses:*

- 0: Completely restricted. When determining their research agenda or teaching curricula, scholars are, across all disciplines, consistently subject to interference or incentivized to self-censor.
- 1: Severely restricted. When determining their research agenda or teaching curricula, scholars are, in some disciplines, consistently subject to interference or incentivized to self-censor.
- 2: Moderately restricted. When determining their research agenda or teaching curricula, scholars are occasionally subject to interference or incentivized to self-censor.
- 3: Mostly free. When determining their research agenda or teaching curricula, scholars are rarely subject to interference or incentivized to self-censor.
- 4: Fully free. When determining their research agenda or teaching curricula, scholars are not subject to interference or incentivized to self-censor.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 10-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Citation:* Spannagel *et al.* (2020, V-Dem Users' Working Paper Series); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2021

#### 3.15.4.5 Freedom of academic exchange and dissemination (C) (v2cafexch)

*Project Manager(s):* Katrin Kinzelbach, Ilyas Saliba, Janika Spannagel

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* To what extent are scholars free to exchange and communicate research ideas and findings?

*Clarification:* Free academic exchange includes uncensored access to research material, unhindered participation in national or international academic conferences, and the uncensored publication of academic material. Free dissemination refers to the unrestricted possibility for scholars to share and explain research findings in their field of expertise to non-academic audiences through media engagement or public lectures.

*Responses:*

- 0: Completely restricted. Academic exchange and dissemination is, across all disciplines, consistently subject to censorship, self-censorship or other restrictions.
- 1: Severely restricted. Academic exchange and dissemination is, in some disciplines, consistently subject to censorship, self-censorship or other restrictions.
- 2: Moderately restricted. Academic exchange and dissemination is occasionally subject to censorship, self-censorship or other restrictions.
- 3: Mostly free. Academic exchange and dissemination is rarely subject to censorship, self-censorship or other restrictions.
- 4: Fully free. Academic exchange and dissemination is not subject to censorship,

self-censorship or other restrictions.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 10-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Citation:* Spannagel *et al.* (2020, V-Dem Users' Working Paper Series); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2021

#### 3.15.4.6 Institutional autonomy (C) (v2cainsaut)

*Project Manager(s):* Katrin Kinzelbach, Ilyas Saliba, Janika Spannagel

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* To what extent do universities exercise institutional autonomy in practice?

*Clarification:* Institutional autonomy “means the independence of institutions of higher education from the State and all other forces of society, to make decisions regarding its internal government, finance, administration, and to establish its policies of education, research, extension work and other related activities” (Lima Declaration). Note that institutional autonomy does not preclude universities from accepting state or third party funding, but does require that they remain in charge of all types of decisions listed above. Institutional autonomy does also not preclude a public oversight role by the state over universities' spending of public funds.

*Responses:*

0: No autonomy at all. Universities do not exercise any degree of institutional autonomy; non-academic actors control decision-making.

1: Minimal autonomy. Universities exercise only very limited institutional autonomy; non-academic actors interfere extensively with decision-making.

2: Moderate autonomy. Universities exercise some institutional autonomy; non-academic actors interfere moderately with decision-making.

3: Substantial autonomy. Universities exercise institutional autonomy to a large extent; non-academic actors have only rare and minimal influence on decision-making.

4: Complete autonomy. Universities exercise complete institutional autonomy from non-academic actors.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 10-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Citation:* Spannagel *et al.* (2020, V-Dem Users' Working Paper Series); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2021

#### 3.15.4.7 Campus integrity (C) (v2casurv)

*Project Manager(s):* Katrin Kinzelbach, Ilyas Saliba, Janika Spannagel

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* To what extent are campuses free from politically motivated surveillance or security infringements?

*Clarification:* “Campus” refers to all university buildings as well as digital research and teaching platforms. Campus integrity means the preservation of an open learning and research environment marked by an absence of an externally induced climate of insecurity or intimidation on campus. Examples of infringements of campus integrity are politically motivated on-campus or digital surveillance, presence by intelligence or security forces, presence of student militias, or violent attacks by third parties, if specifically targeting

universities to repress academic life on campus. Note that we are only interested in politically motivated infringements and targeted attacks on campus integrity, not in non-political security concerns or proportionate security measures taken on campus to address these.

*Responses:*

- 0: Completely restricted. Campus integrity is fundamentally undermined by extensive surveillance and severe intimidation, including violence or closures.
- 1: Severely restricted. Campus integrity is to a large extent undermined by surveillance and intimidation, at times including violence or closures.
- 2: Moderately restricted. Campus integrity is challenged by some significant cases of surveillance or intimidation.
- 3: Mostly free. Campus integrity is to a large extent respected, with only minor cases of surveillance or intimidation.
- 4: Fully free. Campus integrity is comprehensively respected; there are no cases of surveillance or intimidation.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 10-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Citation:* Spannagel *et al.* (2020, V-Dem Users' Working Paper Series); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2021

#### 3.15.4.8 Academics as critics (C) (v2cacritic)

*Project Manager(s):* Katrin Kinzelbach, Ilyas Saliba, Janika Spannagel

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* To what extent do scholars and university students publicly criticize government policies?

*Clarification:* This question is only about the extent scholars and students actually criticize government policies – irrespective of how free they are to do so and whether they are met with repression or not. We ask you simply to consider to what extent scholars and students are noticeable as government critics in the public discourse.

Public criticism of government policies can be conveyed for example through the publication of op-eds or social media posts on current affairs, the signing of open letters or petitions, the taking part in or organization of public protests, or the holding of critical lectures to students or the public.

*Responses:*

- 0: Not at all. Scholars and university students do not publicly express criticism of government policies.
- 1: To a small extent. Scholars and university students publicly express minor criticism of government policies.
- 2: To a moderate extent. Scholars and university students publicly express moderate criticism of government policies.
- 3: To a large extent. Scholars and university students publicly express substantive criticism of government policies.
- 4: To a major extent. Scholars and university students publicly express fundamental criticism of government policies.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 10-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Citation:* Spannagel *et al.* (2020, V-Dem Users' Working Paper Series); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2021

**3.15.4.9 International legal commitment to academic freedom under ICESCR (A)  
(v2caacadfree)**

*Project Manager(s):* Katrin Kinzelbach, Alicja Polakiewicz, Janika Spannagel

*Question:* Is the state party to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) without reservations to article 15 (right to science)?

*Clarification:* This indicator captures the country's international legal commitment to academic freedom. It indicates whether the country is party to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights without having made explicit reservations to its article 15 (right to science), which stipulates, among other things, that states parties "undertake to respect the freedom indispensable for scientific research".

*Responses:*

- 0: State not a party to ICESCR, or made reservations to article 15.
- 1: State is party to ICESCR without reservations to article 15, but treaty not yet in force.
- 2: ICESCR in force and signed without reservations to article 15.
- 3: ICESCR in force and ratified without reservations to article 15.

*Scale:* Ordinal.

*Source(s):* <https://treaties.un.org/>

*Notes:* Coded is the ratification status as of December 31st of each year.

*Data release:* 10-12.

*Country-Year Aggregation:* Last

*Citation:* Spannagel *et al.* (2020, V-Dem Users' Working Paper Series); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1966-2021

## 4 Historical V-Dem

This part of the codebook contains variables pertaining to the Historical V-Dem data collection. A maximum of 91 countries are included in the sample (see the country table), but some variables (in particular C type variables) cover fewer countries, as coding is still ongoing. For more information on the Historical V-Dem project, please refer to the *Organization and Management* document or the *Historical V-Dem* page. The vast majority of questions coded by Historical V-Dem are V-Dem indicators previously coded back to 1900, and these indicators are found in other sections of the codebook with merged time series extending all the way from 1789 to the present. In this part of the codebook, however, you will find the following types of variables, all of which have "v3" (rather than "v2") as the variable prefix:

1. Section 4.1-4.8: A number of new A, A\* and C type indicators that have (at least so far) only been coded for Historical V-Dem, with the modal time series spanning the years 1789-1920 (although time series coverage is different for some variables). This section also includes v3elcomvot, which is coded as a type C variable in Historical V-Dem, while v2elcomvot is coded as a type A variable in Contemporary V-Dem.
2. Section 4.9: V-Dem indicators that are different to their contemporary counterparts, for the purpose of gathering additional relevant information for the historical period in Historical V-Dem. These variables are also merged into their v2 equivalents.

First, In contrast to contemporary V-Dem, Historical V-Dem codes upper chamber elections and thus also includes eltype category 2. Those observations are treated as missing in the historical-contemporary merged version of v2eltype. Due to election specific variables being cleaned by v2eltype, these do not include upper chamber elections either. In order to include historical data on upper chamber elections we thus also provide v3eltype and v3 election specific variables that are cleaned by v3eltype.

Second, Historical V-Dem codes additional chambers compared to contemporary V-Dem. When merging v2lgbicam and v3lgbicam the categories get recoded as follows:

- Categories 3 (tricameral) and 4 (quadricameral) become category 2 for the merged v2lgbicam.
- Category 9 (Other types of legislature) becomes category 0 for the merged v2lgbicam.

In order to include historical data on additional chambers, we thus also provide v3lgbicam and v3 chamber specific variables that are cleaned by v3lgbicam.

3. Section 4.10: Finally, the dataset includes A and A\* variables where there is a discrepancy in the coding of some observations between the Historical and Contemporary V-Dem coding for the overlap period (typically 1900-1920). The v2-versions of these variables, reported elsewhere in the codebook, report the Contemporary V-Dem scores in cases of discrepancies in the overlap period.

Remaining inconsistencies in the Historical and Contemporary V-Dem coding, that are not due to substantive differences in the indicators, will be sorted out for version 10 of the dataset.

*For instructions given to the coders (as shown in the surveys), please see introductions to the corresponding theme in section 3 (V-Dem Indicators).*

### 4.1 Elections

#### 4.1.1 Minimum candidate age lower chamber (A) (v3canagelc)

*Project Manager(s):* Svend-Erik Skaaning

*Question:* What is the minimum age at which citizens are allowed to serve in the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the national legislature?

*Clarification:* Leave blank if there is no lower (or unicameral) chamber.



*Scale:* Interval

*Answer-type:* Numeric

*Source(s):* Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Mackie and Rose (1991); Posada-Carbó (1996); CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012); and various country specific sources.

*Data release:* 8-12.

*Country–Year Aggregation:* Last

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-1968

#### 4.1.2 Minimum candidate age upper chamber (A) (v3canageuc)

*Project Manager(s):* Svend-Erik Skaaning

*Question:* What is the minimum age at which citizens are allowed to serve in the upper chamber?

*Clarification:* Leave blank if there is no upper chamber.

*Scale:* Interval

*Answer-type:* Numeric

*Source(s):* Caramani (2000); Flora *et al.* (1983); Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Mackie and Rose (1991); Posada-Carbó (1996); Rokkan and Meyriat (1969); Sternberger and Vogel (1969); CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012); and various country specific sources, including constitutions.

*Data release:* 8-12.

*Country–Year Aggregation:* Last

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-1962

#### 4.1.3 Minimum voting age presidency (A) (v3elagepr)

*Project Manager(s):* Svend-Erik Skaaning

*Question:* What is the minimum age at which citizens are allowed to vote for presidential elections?

*Clarification:* Leave blank if there are no presidential elections.

*Scale:* Interval

*Answer-type:* Numeric

*Source(s):* Caramani (2000); Flora *et al.* (1983); Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Mackie and Rose (1991); Posada-Carbó (1996); Rokkan and Meyriat (1969); Sternberger and Vogel (1969); CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012); and various country specific sources, including constitutions.

*Data release:* 8-12.

*Country–Year Aggregation:* Maximum

*Date specific:* Presidential election dates (v3eltype\_6, v3eltype\_7)

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1792-1920

#### 4.1.4 Minimum voting age upper chamber (A) (v3elageuc)

*Project Manager(s):* Svend-Erik Skaaning

*Question:* What is the minimum age at which citizens are allowed to vote for the upper chamber of the national parliament?

*Clarification:* Leave blank if there is no upper chamber.

*Scale:* Interval

*Answer-type:* Numeric

*Source(s):* Caramani (2000); Flora *et al.* (1983); Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Mackie and Rose (1991); Posada-Carbó (1996); Rokkan and Meyriat (1969); Sternberger and

Vogel (1969); CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012); and various country specific sources, including constitutions.

*Data release:* 8-12.

*Country-Year Aggregation:* Maximum

*Date specific:* Upper chamber election dates (v3eltype\_2, v3eltype\_3)

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1849-1920

#### 4.1.5 Voting, voice or ballot (C) (v3elbalpap)

*Project Manager(s):* Jan Teorell

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* How are votes cast?

*Responses:*

- 0: Votes are cast verbally (viva voce).
- 1: Both voice votes and paper ballots are used, but verbal voting is more common.
- 2: Voice voting and paper ballots are both common.
- 3: Both voice votes and paper ballots are used, but paper ballots are more common.
- 4: All votes are cast on paper ballots.

*Ordering:* If coded "0" for entire period, skip the following question (v3elbalstat), meaning: jump to v3elecsdf.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 8-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2010

#### 4.1.6 Ballot printing (C) (v3elbalstat)

*Project Manager(s):* Jan Teorell

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* Who prints ballot papers?

*Clarification:* Leave blank if all or nearly all voting is verbal (viva voce).

*Responses:*

- 0: Political parties or candidates print all (or nearly all) the ballot papers.
- 1: Both the state and parties or candidates print the ballot papers.
- 2: The state prints all (or nearly all) ballot papers.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 8-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Cleaning:* Set to missing when v3elbalpap is 0

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2010

#### 4.1.7 Compulsory voting (C) (v3elcomvot)

*Project Manager(s):* Pamela Paxton

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* Is voting compulsory (for those eligible to vote) in national elections?

*Responses:*

- 0: No.
- 1: Yes. But there are no sanctions or sanctions are not enforced.
- 2: Yes. Sanctions exist and are enforced, but they impose minimal costs upon the offending voter.
- 3: Yes. Sanctions exist, they are enforced, and they impose considerable costs upon the offending voter.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 8-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2010

#### 4.1.8 Direct lower chamber (unicameral) elections (A) (v3eldirelc)

*Project Manager(s):* Svend-Erik Skaaning

*Question:* What is the mode of election of the parliament/lower chamber?

*Responses:*

- 0: Indirect
- 1: Direct
- 2: Mixed (differs depending on individual or collective characteristics).

*Scale:* Nominal

*Source(s):* Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010). Caramani (2000). Websites of National Parliaments. Library of Congress - Country Studies. Various country-specific sources. Constitutions.

*Data release:* 8-12.

*Country-Year Aggregation:* Maximum

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-1930

#### 4.1.9 Direct presidential elections (A) (v3eldirepr)

*Project Manager(s):* Svend-Erik Skaaning

*Question:* What is the mode of election of the president in popular elections?

*Clarification:* Cases in which the constitution provides that the president is elected by the legislature, including those in which the legislature elects only if none of the candidates obtains some minimum threshold of votes, should be coded according to the provisions concerning popular elections.

*Responses:*

- 0: Indirect
- 1: Direct
- 2: Mixed (differs depending on individual or collective characteristics).

*Scale:* Nominal

*Source(s):* Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010). Caramani (2000). Websites of National Parliaments. Library of Congress - Country Studies. Various country-specific sources. Constitutions.

*Data release:* 8-12.

*Country-Year Aggregation:* Maximum

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1792-1920

#### 4.1.10 Direct upper chamber elections (A) (v3eldireuc)

*Project Manager(s)*: Svend-Erik Skaaning

*Question*: What is the mode of election of the upper chamber?

*Responses*:

- 0: Indirect
- 1: Direct
- 2: Mixed (differs depending on individual or collective characteristics).

*Scale*: Nominal

*Source(s)*: Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010). Caramani (2000). Websites of National Parliaments. Library of Congress - Country Studies. Various country-specific sources. Constitutions.

*Data release*: 8-12.

*Country-Year Aggregation*: Maximum

*Citation*: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years*: 1790-1920

#### 4.1.11 Secret ballot (de facto) (C) (v3elecsedf)

*Project Manager(s)*: Jan Teorell

*Additional versions*: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question*: Are polling stations organized to guarantee voters a secret, anonymous choice?

*Responses*:

- 0: No. Voters cannot make a secret, anonymous choice.
- 1: No. Some voters can make a secret, anonymous choice, but voting secrecy is in most instances violated.
- 2: Mixed. Voting secrecy and anonymity is assured to roughly the same extent as it is violated.
- 3: Yes. Most voters can make a secret, anonymous choice, but voting secrecy is in some instances violated.
- 4: Yes. All voters can make a secret, anonymous choice.

*Scale*: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release*: 8-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation*: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Citation*: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years*: 1789-2010

#### 4.1.12 Malapportionment legislature/lower chamber (C) (v3elmalalc)

*Project Manager(s)*: Daniel Ziblatt

*Additional versions*: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question*: Is there a large discrepancy in the vote/seat ratio across electoral districts for the lower (or unicameral) chamber?

*Clarification*: "Malapportionment" characterizes a situation in which voters in some districts have more power by virtue of a more favorable vote/seat ratio. For example, if seats have not been reapportioned in a long time rural areas may be over-represented relative to urban areas simply because the latter have grown more rapidly than the former. (This question does not address inequality of votes based on class or other criteria.) Leave blank if there is no lower (or unicameral) chamber.

*Responses*:

- 0: There is a high degree of malapportionment. Vote/seat ratios across districts differ by as much as 50:1.
- 1: There is a substantial degree of malapportionment. Vote/seat ratios across districts differ

as much as 10:1.

2: There is some degree of malapportionment. Vote/seat ratios across districts differ by as much as 2:1.

3: There is modest or no malapportionment. Vote/seat ratios across districts differ by less than 2:1.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 8-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2010

#### 4.1.13 Malapportionment upper chamber (C) (v3elmalauc)

*Project Manager(s):* Daniel Ziblatt

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* Does the electoral system (including the size of electoral districts) involve large differences in the ratios of votes to representatives in elections for the upper chamber?

*Clarification:* This question does not address inequality of votes based on class or other criteria but only the relationship between votes and seats. Leave blank if no upper chamber.

*Responses:*

0: There is a high degree of malapportionment. Vote/seat ratios across districts differ by as much as 50:1.

1: There is a substantial degree of malapportionment. Vote/seat ratios across districts differ as much as 10:1.

2: There is some degree of malapportionment. Vote/seat ratios across districts differ by as much as 2:1.

3: There is modest or no malapportionment. Vote/seat ratios across districts differ by less than 2:1.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 8-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2010

#### 4.1.14 Minority or majority government (A) (v3elnbmaaj)

*Project Manager(s):* Carl Henrik Knutsen

*Question:* In the first cabinet after this national election, did the political parties that were represented in the cabinet hold a majority of the seats in the (lower chamber of) the legislature?

*Responses:*

0: Parties are not allowed.

1: No, the parties represented in cabinet held less than half of the (lower chamber) legislative seats.

2: Yes, the parties represented in cabinet held half, or more than half, of the (lower chamber) legislative seats.

3: Parties are allowed but nonexistent or so diffuse as to be more like factions, and the factions represented in government hold less than half of the (lower chamber) legislative seats.

4: Parties are allowed but nonexistent or so diffuse as to be more like factions, but the factions represented in government hold half, or more than half, of the (lower chamber) legislative seats.

*Scale:* Nominal

*Source(s):* <http://www.countrystudies.us>, various country specific sources.

*Data release:* 8-12.

*Country-Year Aggregation:* Last

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-1920

#### 4.1.15 Reapportionment legislature/lower chamber (C) (v3elreapplc)

*Project Manager(s):* Daniel Ziblatt

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* Is there a legal or constitutional statute, upheld in practice, stating that seats or electoral boundaries for elections to the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature should be regularly reapportioned?

*Clarification:* Reapportionment is the process of reallocating the number of seats or the boundaries of a district in order to reflect its relative share of the population. Answering yes does not imply perfect apportionment (see later question). Leave blank if no lower (or unicameral) chamber. (This question is not about suffrage or informal restrictions to suffrage.)

*Responses:*

0: No.

1: Yes, reapportionment is stipulated by constitution or law but not upheld in practice.

2: Yes, reapportionment is stipulated by constitution or law and upheld in practice.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 8-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2010

#### 4.1.16 Reapportionment upper chamber (C) (v3elreappuc)

*Project Manager(s):* Daniel Ziblatt

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* Is there a legal or constitutional statute, upheld in practice, stating that seats or electoral boundaries for elections to the upper chamber of the legislature should be regularly reapportioned?

*Clarification:* Reapportionment is the process of reallocating the number of seats or the boundaries of a district in order to reflect its relative share of the population. Answering yes does not imply perfect apportionment (see later question). Leave blank if no upper chamber. (This question is not about suffrage or informal restrictions to suffrage.)

*Responses:*

0: No.

1: Yes, reapportionment is stipulated by constitution or law but not upheld in practice.

2: Yes, reapportionment is stipulated by constitution or law and upheld in practice.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 8-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2010

#### 4.1.17 Candidate exclusions (de jure) lower (unicameral) chamber (A) (v3elstrlc)

*Project Manager(s)*: Svend-Erik Skaaning

*Question*: Is the right to run as a candidate to the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the national parliament restricted for any of the following reasons? (Check all that apply.)

*Clarification*: This question applies to citizens only and to legal (*de jure*) restrictions, not restrictions that may be operative in practice (*de facto*). Leave blank if there is no lower (or unicameral) chamber. Specify in comments section if some of the criteria are jointly necessary (*e.g.*, BOTH property AND literacy) or if some of them are mutually substitutable (*e.g.*, EITHER property OR literacy).

*Responses*:

- 0: Literacy [v3elstrlc\_0]
- 1: Property [v3elstrlc\_1]
- 2: Income [v3elstrlc\_2]
- 3: Tax payment [v3elstrlc\_3]
- 4: Economic dependency (*e.g.*, personal servants/debtors/single sons living with their father) [v3elstrlc\_4]
- 5: Slave [v3elstrlc\_5]
- 6: Ethnicity, race [v3elstrlc\_6]
- 7: Religion [v3elstrlc\_7]
- 8: Region [v3elstrlc\_8]
- 9: "Bad moral character" [v3elstrlc\_9]
- 10: Clergy/military personnel/police/civil servants [v3elstrlc\_10]
- 11 : Incarcerated or ex-felons [v3elstrlc\_11]
- 12: Gender – all women excluded [v3elstrlc\_12]
- 13: Gender – women qualified on narrower basis than men. [v3elstrlc\_13]

*Scale*: Nominal

*Answer-type*: Multiple-selection.

*Source(s)*: Caramani (2000); Flora *et al.* (1983); Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Mackie and Rose (1991); Posada-Carbó (1996); Rokkan and Meyriat (1969); Sternberger and Vogel (1969); CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012); and various country specific sources, including constitutions.

*Data release*: 8-12.

*Country–Year Aggregation*: Last

*Citation*: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years*: 1789-1968

#### 4.1.18 Candidate exclusions (de jure) presidential elections (A) (v3elstrpr)

*Project Manager(s)*: Svend-Erik Skaaning

*Question*: Is the right to run as a candidate in presidential elections restricted for any of the following reasons? Check all that apply.

*Clarification*: This question applies to citizens only and to legal (*de jure*) restrictions, not restrictions that may be operative in practice (*de facto*). Leave blank if there is no direct presidential elections. Specify in comments section if some of the criteria are jointly necessary (*e.g.*, BOTH property AND literacy) or if some of them are mutually substitutable (*e.g.*, EITHER property OR literacy).

*Responses*:

- 0: Literacy [v3elstrpr\_0]
- 1: Property [v3elstrpr\_1]
- 2: Income [v3elstrpr\_2]
- 3: Tax payment [v3elstrpr\_3]
- 4: Economic dependency (*e.g.*, personal servants/debtors/single sons living with their father) [v3elstrpr\_4]
- 5: Slave [v3elstrpr\_5]
- 6: Ethnicity, race [v3elstrpr\_6]



- 7: Religion [v3elrstrpr\_7]
- 8: Region [v3elrstrpr\_8]
- 9: "Bad moral character" [v3elrstrpr\_9]
- 10: Clergy/military personnel/police/civil servants [v3elrstrpr\_10]
- 11 : Incarcerated or ex-felons [v3elrstrpr\_11]
- 12: Gender – all women excluded [v3elrstrpr\_12]
- 13: Gender – women qualified on narrower basis than men. [v3elrstrpr\_13]

*Scale:* Nominal

*Answer-type:* Multiple-selection.

*Source(s):* Caramani (2000); Flora *et al.* (1983); Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Mackie and Rose (1991); Posada-Carbó (1996); Rokkan and Meyriat (1969); Sternberger and Vogel (1969); CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012); and various country specific sources, including constitutions.

*Data release:* 8-12.

*Country–Year Aggregation:* Last

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1804-1938

#### 4.1.19 Candidate exclusions (de jure) upper chamber (A) (v3elrstrup)

*Project Manager(s):* Svend-Erik Skaaning

*Question:* Is the right to run as a candidate to the upper chamber of the national parliament restricted for any of the following reasons? Check all that apply.

*Clarification:* This question applies to citizens only and to legal (*de jure*) restrictions, not restrictions that may be operative in practice (*de facto*). Leave blank if there is no upper chamber. Specify in comments section if some of the criteria are jointly necessary (*e.g.*, BOTH property AND literacy) or if some of them are mutually substitutable (*e.g.*, EITHER property OR literacy).

*Responses:*

- 0: Literacy [v3elrstrup\_0]
- 1: Property [v3elrstrup\_1]
- 2: Income [v3elrstrup\_2]
- 3: Tax payment [v3elrstrup\_3]
- 4: Economic dependency (*e.g.*, personal servants/debtors/single sons living with their father) [v3elrstrup\_4]
- 5: Slave [v3elrstrup\_5]
- 6: Ethnicity, race [v3elrstrup\_6]
- 7: Religion [v3elrstrup\_7]
- 8: Region [v3elrstrup\_8]
- 9: "Bad moral character" [v3elrstrup\_9]
- 10: Clergy/military personnel/police/civil servants [v3elrstrup\_10]
- 11 : Incarcerated or ex-felons [v3elrstrup\_11]
- 12: Gender – all women excluded [v3elrstrup\_12]
- 13: Gender – women qualified on narrower basis than men. [v3elrstrup\_13]

*Scale:* Nominal

*Answer-type:* Multiple-selection.

*Source(s):* Caramani (2000); Flora *et al.* (1983); Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Mackie and Rose (1991); Posada-Carbó (1996); Rokkan and Meyriat (1969); Sternberger and Vogel (1969); CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012); and various country specific sources, including constitutions.

*Data release:* 8-12.

*Country–Year Aggregation:* Last

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1795-1962

#### 4.1.20 De jure ballot secrecy (A) (v3elsec)

*Project Manager(s):* John Gerring

*Question:* Is there ballot secrecy by law?

*Responses:*

- 0: no.
- 1: Yes.
- 2: Secrecy optional.
- 3: Varies spatially and/or hierarchically.

*Scale:* Nominal

*Source(s):* IFES; IDEA; [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Secret\\_ballot](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Secret_ballot), various country specific sources.

*Data release:* 8-12.

*Country-Year Aggregation:* Last

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-1920

#### 4.1.21 Upper chamber election turnover (A) (v3eltvriguc)

*Project Manager(s):* Svend-Erik Skaaning

*Question:* Did control of the upper chamber of the legislature change as a result of this election, according to official results?

*Responses:*

- 0: No. The same party/group/coalition remained in control of the majority of seats.
- 1: Partly. The leading position within a coalition changed. Or, a new coalition includes some old groups/parties and some new groups/parties.
- 2: Yes. Another party/group/coalition gained control of the majority of seats.

*Scale:* Ordinal.

*Source(s):* Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010). Caramani (2000). Wikipedia. Websites of National Parliaments. Websites of National Bureau of Statistics. Various country-specific sources.

*Data release:* 8-12.

*Country-Year Aggregation:* Last

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1831-1900

#### 4.1.22 Upper chamber election seats (A) (v3elupseat)

*Project Manager(s):* Svend-Erik Skaaning

*Question:* In this election, how many seats were there in the upper chamber of the legislature?

*Clarification:* Does not include appointed (nonelected) seats. Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

*Scale:* Interval

*Answer-type:* Numeric

*Source(s):* Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010). Caramani (2000). Wikipedia. Websites of National Parliaments. Websites of National Bureau of Statistics. Various country-specific sources.

*Data release:* 8-12.

*Country-Year Aggregation:* Last

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1790-1900

#### 4.1.23 Upper chamber election seats won by largest party (A) (v3elupstsl)

*Project Manager(s)*: Svend-Erik Skaaning

*Question*: In this election to the upper chamber of the legislature, how many seats were obtained by the largest party?

*Clarification*: Does not include appointed (nonelected) seats. Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

*Scale*: Interval

*Answer-type*: Numeric

*Source(s)*: Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010). Caramani (2000). Wikipedia. Websites of National Parliaments. Websites of National Bureau of Statistics. Various country-specific sources.

*Data release*: 8-12.

*Country-Year Aggregation*: Last

*Citation*: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years*: 1790-1900

#### 4.1.24 Upper chamber election seats won by second largest party (A) (v3elupstsm)

*Project Manager(s)*: Svend-Erik Skaaning

*Question*: In this election, how many seats in the upper chamber of the legislature were obtained by the next-largest party?

*Clarification*: Does not include appointed (nonelected) seats. Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

*Scale*: Interval

*Answer-type*: Numeric

*Source(s)*: Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010). Caramani (2000). Wikipedia. Websites of National Parliaments. Websites of National Bureau of Statistics. Various country-specific sources.

*Data release*: 8-12.

*Country-Year Aggregation*: Last

*Citation*: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years*: 1790-1900

#### 4.1.25 Upper chamber election vote share of largest vote-getter (A) (v3elupvtlg)

*Project Manager(s)*: Svend-Erik Skaaning

*Question*: In this election to the upper chamber of the legislature, what percentage (%) of the vote was received by the largest party in the first/only round?

*Clarification*: Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

*Scale*: Interval

*Answer-type*: Percent

*Source(s)*: Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010). Caramani (2000). Wikipedia. Websites of National Parliaments. Websites of National Bureau of Statistics. Various country-specific sources.

*Data release*: 8-12.

*Country-Year Aggregation*: Day-weighted mean

*Citation*: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years*: 1894-1900

#### 4.1.26 Upper chamber election vote share of second-largest vote-getter (A) (v3elupvtsm)

*Project Manager(s):* Svend-Erik Skaaning

*Question:* In this election to the upper chamber of the legislature, what percentage (%) of the vote was received by the second largest party in the first/only round?

*Clarification:* Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

*Scale:* Interval

*Answer-type:* Percent

*Source(s):* Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010). Caramani (2000). Wikipedia. Websites of National Parliaments. Websites of National Bureau of Statistics. Various country-specific sources.

*Data release:* 8-12.

*Country-Year Aggregation:* Day-weighted mean

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1894-1900

#### 4.1.27 Suffrage exclusions (de jure) lower (unicameral) chamber (A) (v3elvstrlc)

*Project Manager(s):* Svend-Erik Skaaning

*Question:* Is the right to vote for the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the national parliament restricted for any of the following reasons?

*Clarification:* This question applies to citizens only and to legal (*de jure*) restrictions, not restrictions that may be operative in practice (*de facto*).

It applies to direct elections and not indirect elections (except situations where the electors are merely executing the will of the voters such as US presidential elections after 1800).

If there is variation across regions of a country, for each category try to estimate the modal (most common) category. Thus, if most regions of a country imposed restrictions based on property, choose answer #2.

Leave blank if there is no lower (or unicameral) parliament.

*Responses:*

- 0: Literacy [v3elvstrlc\_0]
- 1: Property [v3elvstrlc\_1]
- 2: Income [v3elvstrlc\_2]
- 3: Tax payment [v3elvstrlc\_3]
- 4: Economic dependency (*e.g.*, personal servants/debtors/single sons living with their father) [v3elvstrlc\_4]
- 5: Slave [v3elvstrlc\_5]
- 6: Ethnicity, race [v3elvstrlc\_6]
- 7: Religion [v3elvstrlc\_7]
- 8: Region [v3elvstrlc\_8]
- 9: "Bad moral character" [v3elvstrlc\_9]
- 10: Clergy/military personnel/police/civil servants [v3elvstrlc\_10]
- 11 : Incarcerated or ex-felons [v3elvstrlc\_11]
- 12: Gender – all women excluded [v3elvstrlc\_12]
- 13: Gender – women qualified on narrower basis than men. [v3elvstrlc\_13]

*Scale:* Nominal

*Answer-type:* Multiple-selection.

*Source(s):* Caramani (2000); Flora *et al.* (1983); Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Mackie and Rose (1991); Posada-Carbó (1996); Rokkan and Meyriat (1969); Sternberger and Vogel (1969); CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012); and various country specific sources, including constitutions.

*Data release:* 8-12.

*Country-Year Aggregation:* Last

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-1968

#### 4.1.28 Suffrage exclusions (de jure) presidential elections (A) (v3elvstrpr)

*Project Manager(s):* Svend-Erik Skaaning

*Question:* Is the right to vote in the presidential election restricted for any of the following reasons?  
Check all that apply.

*Clarification:* This question applies to citizens only and to legal (*de jure*) restrictions, not restrictions that may be operative in practice (*de facto*). Leave blank if the head of state is not directly elected. Specify in comments section if some of the criteria are jointly necessary (*e.g.*, BOTH property AND literacy) or if some of them are mutually substitutable (*e.g.*, EITHER property OR literacy).

*Responses:*

- 0: Literacy [v3elvstrpr\_0]
- 1: Property [v3elvstrpr\_1]
- 2: Income [v3elvstrpr\_2]
- 3: Tax payment [v3elvstrpr\_3]
- 4: Economic dependency (*e.g.*, personal servants/debtors/single sons living with their father) [v3elvstrpr\_4]
- 5: Slave [v3elvstrpr\_5]
- 6: Ethnicity, race [v3elvstrpr\_6]
- 7: Religion [v3elvstrpr\_7]
- 8: Region [v3elvstrpr\_8]
- 9: "Bad moral character" [v3elvstrpr\_9]
- 10: Clergy/military personnel/police/civil servants [v3elvstrpr\_10]
- 11 : Incarcerated or ex-felons [v3elvstrpr\_11]
- 12: Gender – all women excluded [v3elvstrpr\_12]
- 13: Gender – women qualified on narrower basis than men. [v3elvstrpr\_13]

*Scale:* Nominal

*Answer-type:* Multiple-selection.

*Source(s):* Caramani (2000); Flora *et al.* (1983); Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Mackie and Rose (1991); Posada-Carbó (1996); Rokkan and Meyriat (1969); Sternberger and Vogel (1969); CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012); and various country specific sources, including constitutions.

*Data release:* 8-12.

*Country–Year Aggregation:* Last

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-1938

#### 4.1.29 Suffrage exclusions (de jure) upper chamber (A) (v3elvstruc)

*Project Manager(s):* Svend-Erik Skaaning

*Question:* Is the right to vote for the upper house of the national parliament restricted for any of the following reasons? Check all that apply.

*Clarification:* This question applies to citizens only and to legal (*de jure*) restrictions, not restrictions that may be operative in practice (*de facto*). It applies to direct elections and not indirect elections (except situations where the electors are merely executing the will of the voters such as US presidential elections after 1800). If there is variation across regions of a country, for each category try to estimate the modal (most common) situation. Thus, if most regions imposed restrictions based on property, choose answer #2. Leave blank if there is no upper chamber or if upper chamber is not directly elected. Specify in comments section if some of the criteria are jointly necessary (*e.g.*, BOTH property AND literacy) or if some of them are mutually substitutable (*e.g.*, EITHER property OR literacy).

*Responses:*

- 0: Literacy [v3elvstruc\_0]
- 1: Property [v3elvstruc\_1]
- 2: Income [v3elvstruc\_2]
- 3: Tax payment [v3elvstruc\_3]
- 4: Economic dependency (*e.g.*, personal servants/debtors/single sons living with their father) [v3elvstruc\_4]
- 5: Slave [v3elvstruc\_5]
- 6: Ethnicity, race [v3elvstruc\_6]
- 7: Religion [v3elvstruc\_7]
- 8: Region [v3elvstruc\_8]
- 9: "Bad moral character" [v3elvstruc\_9]
- 10: Clergy/military personnel/police/civil servants [v3elvstruc\_10]
- 11 : Incarcerated or ex-felons [v3elvstruc\_11]
- 12: Gender – all women excluded [v3elvstruc\_12]
- 13: Gender – women qualified on narrower basis than men. [v3elvstruc\_13]

*Scale:* Nominal

*Answer-type:* Multiple-selection.

*Source(s):* Caramani (2000); Flora *et al.* (1983); Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Mackie and Rose (1991); Posada-Carbó (1996); Rokkan and Meyriat (1969); Sternberger and Vogel (1969); CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012); and various country specific sources, including constitutions.

*Data release:* 8-12.

*Country–Year Aggregation:* Last

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1795-1962

#### 4.1.30 Election women in the cabinet (A) (v3elwomcab)

*Project Manager(s):* John Gerring

*Question:* In the first cabinet after this national election, what percentage (%) of the ministers was female?

*Clarification:* A "minister" is defined as a person with a specific set of duties (a portfolio). It excludes ministers without portfolio and no specific responsibilities. Please provide an estimate if you do not know the exact figure.

*Responses:*

Percent.

*Scale:* Interval

*Answer-type:* Percent

*Source(s):* <http://countrystudies.us>, various country specific sources.

*Data release:* 8-12.

*Country–Year Aggregation:* Last

*Date specific:* Election-specific dates (v3eltype).

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-1920

#### 4.1.31 Total votes (A) (v3ttlvote)

*Project Manager(s):* Carl Henrik Knutsen

*Question:* What is the total number of votes cast in this election.

*Clarification:* Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

*Scale:* Interval

*Answer-type:* Numeric

*Source(s)*: Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010). Caramani (2000). Wikipedia. Websites of National Parliaments. Websites of National Bureau of Statistics. Various country-specific sources.

*Data release*: 8-12.

*Country-Year Aggregation*: Last

*Citation*: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years*: 1790-1920

## 4.2 Political Parties

### 4.2.1 Party identification (C) (v3partyid)

*Project Manager(s)*: John Gerring

*Additional versions*: \*\_nr

*Question*: Do voters identify with a political party?

*Clarification*: When party identification is strong, vote choice is largely determined by a voter's party affiliation (and his/her affiliation with that party) rather than attachments to particular candidates, non-partisan issue-positions, or material incentives (*e.g.*, vote-buying). Likewise, when party identification is strong, voters retain loyalty to a single party rather than switching from one party to another across elections or across offices in the same election (ticket-splitting). In this fashion we can somewhat crudely distinguish between partisans and non-partisans. Note that this question refers only to voters, not to members of the population who do not vote (because they are disenfranchised, choose not to vote, or are discouraged from voting). Leave this question blank if there are no national elections.

*Responses*:

- 0: There are national elections, but there are no political parties.
- 1: Only one party is allowed to participate in national elections.
- 2: More than one party participates, and nearly all voters are non-partisans.
- 3: More than one party participates, and most voters are non-partisans.
- 4: More than one party participates, and voters are equally divided between partisans and non-partisans.
- 5: More than one party participates, and most voters are partisans.
- 6: More than one party participates, and nearly all voters are partisans.

*Scale*: Nominal, but categories 2—6 constitute ordinal.

*Data release*: 8-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation*: Mean.

*Citation*: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years*: 1789-2010

### 4.2.2 Party age largest (A) (v3psagefirst)

*Project Manager(s)*: John Gerring

*Question*: How many years have passed since the party that holds the most seats in the lower chamber (or only chamber) of the legislature was formed?

*Clarification*: 1. In case of multiple elections in the same year, the party age was coded for the parliament that sat for the most days. In cases where two parties were tied in the number of seats, the one with the most votes nationally was considered the largest. 2. In cases where the share of electoral vote was not available, the party which formed the governing coalition was coded as the largest instead of the opposition party.

*Scale*: Interval

*Answer-type*: Numeric

*Source(s)*: <http://countrystudies.us>

*Data release*: 8-12.

*Country-Year Aggregation*: Last



*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-1920

#### 4.2.3 Party age executive (A) (v3psagepm)

*Project Manager(s):* John Gerring

*Question:* How many years have passed since the party controlling the executive was formed?

*Clarification:* If there is a coalition government, you should count the party of the prime minister was counted. In case of multiple elections in the same year, the party age was coded for the parliament that sat for the most days.

*Scale:* Interval

*Answer-type:* Numeric

*Source(s):* <http://countrystudies.us>

*Data release:* 8-12.

*Country-Year Aggregation:* Last

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-1920

#### 4.2.4 Party age second largest (A) (v3psagesecond)

*Project Manager(s):* John Gerring

*Question:* How many years have passed since the party that holds the second most seats in the lower chamber (or only chamber) of the legislature was formed?

*Clarification:* 1. In case of multiple elections in the same year, the party age was coded for the parliament that sat for the most days. In cases where two parties were tied in the number of seats, the one with the most votes nationally was considered the largest. 2. In cases where the share of electoral vote was not available, the party which formed the governing coalition was coded as the largest instead of the opposition party.

*Scale:* Interval

*Answer-type:* Numeric

*Source(s):* <http://countrystudies.us>

*Data release:* 8-12.

*Country-Year Aggregation:* Last

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-1920

#### 4.2.5 Party age third largest (A) (v3psagethird)

*Project Manager(s):* John Gerring

*Question:* How many years have passed since the party that holds the third most seats in the lower chamber (or only chamber) of the legislature was formed?

*Clarification:* 1. In case of multiple elections in the same year, the party age was coded for the parliament that sat for the most days. In cases where two parties were tied in the number of seats, the one with the most votes nationally was considered the largest. 2. In cases where the share of electoral vote was not available, the party which formed the governing coalition was coded as the largest instead of the opposition party.

*Scale:* Interval

*Answer-type:* Numeric

*Source(s):* <http://countrystudies.us>

*Data release:* 8-12.

*Country-Year Aggregation:* Last

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1791-1920

## 4.3 The Legislature

### 4.3.1 Lower chamber budget (C) (v3lgbudglo)

*Project Manager(s)*: John Gerring

*Additional versions*: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question*: Is the lower chamber of the legislature required to approve the budget?

*Clarification*: The budget refers to major revenue (appropriations) and expenditure (spending) bills. Typically, these are passed annually or bi-annually. Approval is understood to mean a formal vote on the floor of the chamber in which at least 50% of those voting approve the measure.

*Responses*:

0: No. Includes situations in which (a) there are no formal budget bills, or (b) the executive entirely by-passes the lower house or ignores its actions.

1: Yes. Includes situations in which (a) the executive exercises selective ("line-item") vetoes, and (b) there is a prolonged period in which no budget is passed and the executive is unable to raise and spend money, or must operate under the terms of the previous budget.

*Scale*: Dichotomous

*Data release*: 8-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation*: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Cleaning*: Set to missing when v3lgbicam is 0

*Citation*: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2010

### 4.3.2 Upper chamber budget (C) (v3lgbudgup)

*Project Manager(s)*: John Gerring

*Additional versions*: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question*: Is the upper chamber of the legislature required to approve the budget?

*Clarification*: The budget refers to major revenue (appropriations) and expenditure (spending) bills. Typically, these are passed annually or bi-annually. Approval is understood to mean a formal vote on the floor of the chamber in which at least 50% of those voting approve the measure.

*Responses*:

0: No. Includes situations in which (a) there are no formal budget bills, or (b) the executive entirely by-passes the upper house or ignores its actions.

1: Yes. Includes situations in which (a) the executive exercises selective ("line-item") vetoes, and (b) there is a prolonged period in which no budget is passed and the executive is unable to raise and spend money, or must operate under the terms of the previous budget.

*Scale*: Dichotomous

*Data release*: 8-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation*: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Cleaning*: Set to missing when v3lgbicam is 0 or 1

*Citation*: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2010

#### 4.3.3 Legislature other than uni- or bicameral (A) (v3lgbcamoth)

*Project Manager(s):* Jan Teorell

*Question:* What is the cameral structure of the legislature?

*Clarification:* Please provide the names of all chambers, as well as how they are grouped into a "upper" and "lower" chamber. For example, in Sweden prior to 1866, the names would be Estates of Nobility, Clergy, Burghers and Peasantry, where the Estates of Nobility and Clergy are grouped into the "upper" chamber, those of the Burghers and Peasantry into the "lower" chamber.

*Scale:* Nominal

*Answer-type:* Text

*Source(s):* Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010). Caramani (2000). Wikipedia. Various country-specific sources.

*Data release:* 8-12.

*Country-Year Aggregation:* Last

*Cleaning:* Set to missing when v3lgbicam is 0

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-1919

#### 4.3.4 Lower chamber in session (C) (v3lginsses)

*Project Manager(s):* John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* During the year, for how long was the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature in session?

*Clarification:* If there is only one session during the year, your answer should reflect the length of this session. If there are multiple sessions, your answer should reflect the total time spent in session, adding together the length of all session during the year.

*Responses:*

- 0: It did not convene at all during the year.
- 1: It did convene, and was in session for less than 1 month, in total.
- 2: It did convene, and was in session for 1-2 months, in total.
- 3: It did convene, and was in session for 3-5 months, in total.
- 4: It did convene, and was in session for 6-8 months, in total.
- 5: It did convene, and was in session for 9 months or more, in total.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 8-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Cleaning:* Set to missing when v3lgbicam is 0

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2010

#### 4.3.5 Upper chamber in session (C) (v3lginssesup)

*Project Manager(s):* John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* During the year, for how long was the upper chamber of the legislature in session?

*Clarification:* If there is only one session during the year, your answer should reflect the length of this session. If there are multiple sessions, your answer should reflect the total time spent in session, adding together the length of all sessions during the year.

*Responses:*

- 0: It did not convene at all during the year.
- 1: It did convene, and was in session for less than 1 month, in total.
- 2: It did convene, and was in session for 1-2 months, in total.
- 3: It did convene, and was in session for 3-5 months, in total.
- 4: It did convene, and was in session for 6-8 months, in total.
- 5: It did convene, and was in session for 9 months or more, in total.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 8-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Cleaning:* Set to missing when v3lgbicam is 0 or 1

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2010

#### 4.3.6 Lower chamber quota for social groups (A) (v3lgqumin)

*Project Manager(s):* John Gerring

*Question:* Is there a national-level quota for any social groups in the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature?

*Clarification:* These quotas are sometimes informally known as "minority quotas." Do not record gender quotas here (as gender is not part of what we mean by a social group). Also, do not include special rules that benefit parties defined by social group but do not guarantee seats for these groups. For example, do not count a rule exempting parties from threshold requirements. Code "yes" only if the groups covered by the quota have full voting rights in the legislature.

*Responses:*

- 0: No national level quota for any social group.
- 1: Yes, there are reserved seats for at least one social group.

*Scale:* Dichotomous

*Source(s):* <https://www.constituteproject.org>; <http://countrystudies.us>; <https://en.wikipedia.org>

*Data release:* 8-12.

*Country-Year Aggregation:* Last

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-1920

### 4.4 The Judiciary

#### 4.4.1 High court existence (A\*) (v3juhcourt)

*Project Manager(s):* Jan Teorell

*Question:* Is there a high court?

*Clarification:* Note that in some cases we consider an institution to be the Highest Court in a given country, even though we acknowledge that its jurisdiction covers most though not all the territory of the country. Any pre-coded years contain an orange triangle. This means that the rating and/or specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded rating; we do not want you to change the rating.

*Responses:*

- 0: No.
- 1: Yes.

*Ordering:* If answer is "0", skip to v2juncind.

*Source(s):* Various country-specific sources

*Data release:* 8-12.

*Country-Year Aggregation:* Last

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2010

## 4.5 Civil Liberty

### 4.5.1 Labor rights (C) (v3cllabrig)

*Project Manager(s):* John Gerring

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* Does labor enjoy the right to organize freely and bargain collectively?

*Clarification:* Refers to actual practice not formal (*de jure*) rights. If practices vary across the country, or across sectors, please consider the overall situation of labor.

*Responses:*

0: Independent labor unions (free from state or ruling party control) are not allowed.

1: Independent labor unions are allowed, at least in some sectors of the economy or some sections of the country. However, they are subject to harassment by the police, paramilitary groups, business associations, or other groups. Harassment refers to systematic beatings, imprisonment, outlawing of specific unions, and other actions that seriously impinge upon the ability of unions to organize and bargain collectively.

2: Independent labor unions are allowed and they do not face violent repression but the legal climate is not friendly (*e.g.*, "closed shop" rules are widespread), making it difficult to organize and bargain collectively.

3: Independent labor unions are allowed and may organize freely in all sectors of the economy.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 8-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Citation:* Penstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2010

### 4.5.2 Slavery (A) (v3clsavery)

*Project Manager(s):* John Gerring

*Question:* Is slavery legal?

*Clarification:* Refers to the *de jure* status of slavery, not its actual practice.

*Responses:*

0: Yes.

1: No.

*Scale:* Dichotomous

*Source(s):* Various country specific sources

*Data release:* 8-12.

*Country-Year Aggregation:* Last

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2015

### 4.5.3 Serfdom de jure/slavery de jure (A) (v3serfdeju)

*Project Manager(s):* John Gerring

*Question:* Is serfdom legal?

*Clarification:* Refers to the *de jure* status of serfdom, not its actual practice.

*Responses:*

- 0. Yes.
- 1. No.

*Scale:* Dichotomous

*Source(s):* Various country specific sources

*Data release:* 8-12.

*Country–Year Aggregation:* Last

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2015

## 4.6 Sovereignty/State

### 4.6.1 Census (A) (v3stcensus)

*Project Manager(s):* Jan Teorell, Thomas Brambor, Agustín Goenaga, Johannes Lindvall

*Question:* Was there a national census in this year?

*Clarification:* In order to count as a "census", the following four criteria needs to be satisfied:

1. UNIVERSALITY: the census attempted to cover the entire population and not just a sample.
2. INDIVIDUAL ENUMERATION: the census enumerates each individual separately and records his or her characteristics separately. If the census only produces aggregate or summarised information, it is only a population count and should not count as a census. For example, A population count of a household with 4 people would produce the following results:

Age—Adults: 2; Children: 2

Sex—Males: 2; Females: 2

Instead, an individual enumeration would look like this:

Head of household-male-adult

Spouse-female-adult

Son-male-child

Daughter-female-child

The key difference is that only in the individual enumeration the data on various characteristics can be cross-tabulated.

3. DEFINED TERRITORY: The territory covered, along with any changes in its area is clearly stated.

4. SIMULTANEITY AND SPECIFIED TIME: Each person is enumerated as nearly as possible to the same well-defined point in time, and the collected data should refer to a well-defined reference period.

Code "1" if a national census was completed in this year – but not if it was aborted or was not national in scope.

*Responses:*

- 0. No.
- 1. Yes.

*Scale:* Dichotomous

*Source(s):* Various country-specific sources

*Data release:* 8-12.

*Country–Year Aggregation:* Last

*Citation:* Brambor *et al.* (2016); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2015

### 4.6.2 Citizenship laws (A) (v3stcitlaw)

*Project Manager(s):* John Gerring

*Question:* Are there laws specifying who is a citizen and who is not and establishing procedures for naturalization?

*Responses:*

- 0. No.
- 1. Yes.

*Scale:* Dichotomous

*Source(s):* CCP (v543); <https://globalcit.eu/country-profiles/>; various country-specific sources.

*Data release:* 8-12.

*Country–Year Aggregation:* Last

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-1920

#### **4.6.3 Flag (A) (v3stflag)**

*Project Manager(s):* John Gerring

*Question:* Is there a national flag?

*Responses:*

- 0: No.
- 1: Yes.

*Scale:* Dichotomous

*Source(s):* CCP (v68); Whitney Smith (1975), *Flags Through the Ages and Across the World*; Wikipedia; World Fact Book, CIA.

*Data release:* 8-12.

*Country–Year Aggregation:* Last

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2015

#### **4.6.4 National anthem (A) (v3stnatant)**

*Project Manager(s):* John Gerring

*Question:* Is there a national anthem?

*Responses:*

- 0: No. There may be popular songs identified with the nation but there is no official, state-recognized national anthem.
- 1: Yes. There is an official, state-recognized national anthem.

*Scale:* Dichotomous

*Source(s):* CCP (v67); Bristow, Michael Jamieson (ed). 2006. *National Anthems of the World*, Eleventh Edition. Casell. [www.nationalanthems.info](http://www.nationalanthems.info);  
<https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/>;  
[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List\\_of\\_historical\\_national\\_anthems](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_historical_national_anthems).

*Data release:* 8-12.

*Country–Year Aggregation:* Last

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2015

#### **4.6.5 National bank (A) (v3stnatbank)**

*Project Manager(s):* John Gerring

*Question:* Is there a national bank?

*Responses:*

- 0: No.
- 1: Yes.

*Scale:* Dichotomous

*Source(s):* Various country-specific sources



*Data release:* 8-12.

*Country–Year Aggregation:* Last

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2015

#### 4.6.6 Rulers' involvement in the state administration (C) (v3struinvadm)

*Project Manager(s):* Agnes Cornell

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* To what extent are day-to-day decisions made by state administrators subject to intervention from political elites?

*Clarification:* By political elites we mean members of the executive, members of the legislature and political elites at local and regional levels. Note that the focus on the day-to-day decisions of the state administration implies interference in specific operational decisions in a meticulous manner. Decisions taken by rulers about the general direction of the state administration should not be considered. Note that the question refers to the *de facto* situation.

*Responses:*

0: Constantly. Day-to-day decisions taken by state administrators are constantly subject to intervention.

1: Often. Day-to-day decisions in the state administration are often subject to intervention.

2: About half. Approximately half of the day-to-day decisions in the state administration are subject to intervention.

3: Occasionally. Day-to-day decisions in the state administration are occasionally subject to intervention.

4: Never, or hardly ever. Day-to-day decisions in the state administration are never or hardly ever subject to intervention.

*Scale:* Ordinal.

*Data release:* 8-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2010

#### 4.6.7 Statistical agency (A) (v3ststatag)

*Project Manager(s):* Jan Teorell, Thomas Brambor, Agustín Goenaga, Johannes Lindvall

*Question:* Is there a national statistical agency?

*Clarification:* A statistical agency is an official government organization exclusively devoted to gathering numerical information in a variety of subjects about the country. This may be a completely independent agency or a distinguishable office or department within another governmental agency.

*Responses:*

0: No.

1: Yes.

*Scale:* Dichotomous

*Source(s):* Various country-specific sources

*Data release:* 8-12.

*Country–Year Aggregation:* Last

*Citation:* Brambor *et al.* (2016); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2015

#### 4.6.8 State steering capacity (C) (v3ststeecap)

*Project Manager(s)*: Jan Teorell

*Additional versions*: \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question*: Can the state oversee and regulate the economy?

*Clarification*: This refers to the state's ability to keep track of economic activities in its territory and potentially influence them by shaping the incentives and constraints that private firms face to do business; *e.g.*, through licensing, granting exploitation rights, taxing, imposing market barriers, building infrastructure, offering subsidies, adjudicating conflicts, or enforcing regulations.

*Responses*:

- 0: Most economic activities happen outside the reach of the state
- 1: The state steers some economic activities
- 2: The state steers a substantial share – but less than half – of the national economy
- 3: The state steers about half or more than half, of the national economy
- 4: The state steers all or almost all economic activities

*Scale*: Ordinal.

*Data release*: 8-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation*: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Citation*: Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years*: 1789-2010

#### 4.6.9 Statistical yearbook covered (A) (v3ststybcov)

*Project Manager(s)*: Jan Teorell, Thomas Brambor, Agustín Goenaga, Johannes Lindvall

*Question*: Was this year covered by a published statistical yearbook?

*Clarification*: By "covered" we mean whether, based on the title of the yearbook, information about this year was included in a statistical yearbook. For example, if a yearbook was published in 1914, according to its title covering 1911-1914, then v3ststybpub should be coded as 1 for 1914 only, 0 for 1911-1913, but v3ststybcov as 1 for 1911-1914.

*Responses*:

- 0: No.
- 1: Yes.

*Scale*: Dichotomous

*Source(s)*: Various country-specific sources

*Data release*: 8-12.

*Country–Year Aggregation*: Last

*Citation*: Brambor *et al.* (2016); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years*: 1789-2015

#### 4.6.10 Statistical yearbook published (A) (v3ststybpub)

*Project Manager(s)*: Jan Teorell, Thomas Brambor, Agustín Goenaga, Johannes Lindvall

*Question*: Was there a statistical yearbook issued this year?

*Clarification*: A statistical yearbook is a recurrent publication of a government agency published annually or less frequently which contain statistical tables in more than one of the following categories:

- 1. Physical environment; 2. Demography; 3. Economic Affairs; 4. Political Affairs; and 5. Cultural Affairs.

*Responses*:

- 0: No.

1: Yes.

*Scale:* Dichotomous

*Source(s):* Various country-specific sources

*Data release:* 8-12.

*Country-Year Aggregation:* Last

*Citation:* Brambor *et al.* (2016); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2015

## 4.7 Political Equality

### 4.7.1 Equal vote legislature/lower chamber (C) (v3equavolc)

*Project Manager(s):* Svend-Erik Skaaning

*Additional versions:* \*\_nr

*Question:* Are ballots in elections for the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the national legislature counted differently for different social groups? (Check all that apply.)

*Clarification:* Leave blank if there is no lower (or unicameral) chamber.

*Responses:*

0: No. All ballots are counted equally, regardless of social group. [v3equavolc\_0]

1: Yes. There is a curial/estate voting system where voters are separated into categories by, for example, class criteria and assigned a disproportionate numbers of deputies. [v3equavolc\_1]

2: Yes. There is census/plural vote for particular groups (*e.g.*, votes cast by individuals with higher incomes or tax contributions are given more weight) [v3equavolc\_2]

3: Yes. Some voters are allowed to vote in several constituencies. [v3equavolc\_3]

*Scale:* Nominal

*Data release:* 8-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Mean.

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2010

### 4.7.2 Equal vote upper chamber (C) (v3equavouc)

*Project Manager(s):* Svend-Erik Skaaning

*Additional versions:* \*\_nr

*Question:* Are ballots in elections for the upper chamber of the national legislature counted differently for different social groups? (Check all that apply.)

*Clarification:* Leave blank if there is no upper chamber.

*Responses:*

0: No. All ballots are counted equally, regardless of social group. [v3equavouc\_0]

1: Yes. There is a curial/estate voting system where voters are separated into categories by, for example, class criteria and assigned a disproportionate numbers of deputies. [v3equavouc\_1]

2: Yes. There is census/plural vote for particular groups (*e.g.*, votes cast by individuals with higher incomes or tax contributions are given more weight) [v3equavouc\_2]

3: Yes. Some voters are allowed to vote in several constituencies. [v3equavouc\_3]

*Scale:* Nominal

*Data release:* 8-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Mean.

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2010

#### 4.7.3 Child labor laws (A) (v3pechilabl)

*Project Manager(s):* John Gerring

*Question:* Is there national regulation prohibiting child labor?

*Responses:*

- 0: No.
- 1: For nonagricultural employment only.
- 2: For all sectors.

*Scale:* Ordinal.

*Source(s):* Child Labor: A Global View (A World View of Social Issues) Hardcover– October 30, 2004 by Cathryne L. Schmitz (Editor), Elizabeth K. Collardey (Editor), Desi Larson (Editor). CCP (v592) asks Does the constitution place limits on child employment? The Routledge History of Childhood in the Western World, 2013, Paula S. Fass (editor). The World of Child Labor: An Historical and Regional Survey, 2009 by Hugh D. Hindman.

*Data release:* 8-12.

*Country–Year Aggregation:* Last

*Citation:* V-Dem Codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-1920

#### 4.7.4 Minimum wage (A) (v3peminwage)

*Project Manager(s):* John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen

*Question:* Is there a minimum wage?

*Responses:*

- 0: No.
- 1: Yes, the state imposes a minimum wage (legislation, regulations).
- 2: Yes, there are corporate bargaining arrangements that effectively ensure a minimum wage.
- 3: Yes, there is a tripartite committee that sets the wage (representatives from union, employer, government).

*Scale:* Nominal

*Source(s):* ILO; East Asia Pacific at Work: Employment, Enterprise, and Well-being, By World Bank, 2014.

*Data release:* 8-12.

*Country–Year Aggregation:* Last

*Citation:* V-Dem Codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2015

#### 4.7.5 Minimum wage restriction (A) (v3peminwagerestr)

*Project Manager(s):* John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen

*Question:* If there is a minimum wage provision, are there any explicit exceptions based on one or more of the following categories?

*Clarification:* Code as missing if there is no minimum wage.

*Responses:*

- 0: Rural/urban area [v3peminwagerestr\_0]
- 1: Region of the country [v3peminwagerestr\_1]
- 2: Trade (industry) [v3peminwagerestr\_2]
- 3: Gender [v3peminwagerestr\_3]
- 4: Ethnicity [v3peminwagerestr\_4]
- 5: Age [v3peminwagerestr\_5]
- 6: Public/private sector [v3peminwagerestr\_6]
- 7: Other characteristic [v3peminwagerestr\_7]
- 8: There are no exceptions. [v3peminwagerestr\_8]

*Scale:* Nominal

*Answer-type:* Multiple-selection.

*Source(s):* ILO; East Asia Pacific at Work: Employment, Enterprise, and Well-being By World Bank, 2014; National minimum wage: Low Pay Commission report 2011, Low Pay Commission.

*Data release:* 8-12.

*Country-Year Aggregation:* Last

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1899-2015

## 4.8 Historical V-Dem Modified

### 4.8.1 Lower chamber electoral system (A) (v3elloelsy)

*Project Manager(s):* Carl Henrik Knutsen

*Question:* What was the electoral system used in this election for the lower or unicameral chamber of the legislature?

*Clarification:* Further information on the following electoral system types can be found in Reynolds/Reilly, *The New International IDEA Handbook* (2005), chapter two and Annex B (Glossary of Terms) – downloadable, free of charge, at [www.idea.int/publications/esd/](http://www.idea.int/publications/esd/).

*Responses:*

0: First-past-the-post (FPP, aka plurality) in single-member constituencies. The candidate with the most votes wins the seat.

1: Two-round system in single-member constituencies. Like FPP except that a threshold — usually 50% + 1 — is required to avoid a runoff between the two top vote-getters.

2: Alternative vote in single-member districts. Voters rank-order their preferences for the candidates who compete for a single seat. If any candidate receives an absolute majority of first preferences, s/he is elected. If not, then the least successful candidates (based on first-preferences) are eliminated and their votes reallocated to the second-preferences. This process is repeated until a candidate reaches 50% +1 of the votes.

3: Block vote in multi-member districts. Electors have as many votes as there are seats within that district and can rank-order them (within or across parties) as they please.

4: Party block vote in multi-member districts. Voters cast a vote for a single party (but not for individual candidates within the party's list). The party with the most votes (*i.e.*, a plurality) wins all the seats in that district.

5: Parallel (SMD/PR). Some seats are in single-member districts (allocated by FPP or two-round electoral rules) and other seats are in multimember districts (allocated by some form of PR). These districts are overlapping, meaning that each elector votes twice: once in the single-member district race and once in the multi-member district race. Results are independent.

6: Mixed-member proportional (SMD with PR compensatory seats). Some seats are in single-member districts (allocated by FPP or two-round electoral rules) and other seats are in multimember districts (allocated by some form of PR). These districts are overlapping, meaning that each elector votes twice: once in the single-member district race and once in the multi-member district race. Results are not independent. Specifically, the multimember seats are used to rectify disproportionalities achieved in the single-member district election — by adding seats, as necessary. This means that the representation of parties in the legislature is determined entirely by the PR ballot. It also means that the result of an MMP election is similar to the result of a PR election: parties achieve representation according to their nationwide vote share (on the PR ballot)

7: List PR with small multi-member districts (mean district size < 7). Each party presents a

list of candidates for election within a district. Electors vote for a party, and parties receive seats in (rough) proportion to their overall share of the vote. Mean district size is less than seven.

8: List PR with large multi-member districts (mean district size  $> 7$ ). Each party presents a list of candidates for election within a district. Electors vote for a party, and parties receive seats in (rough) proportion to their overall share of the vote. Mean district size is greater than seven.

9: Single-transferable vote (STV) in multi-member districts. Electors rank-order candidates nominated for a district. Candidates that surpass a specified quota of first-preference votes are elected. The remaining seats are chosen by reallocating the votes of the least successful candidates to elector's second- (or third-) preferences until the specified quota is reached. This process is repeated until all seats for that district are filled.

10: Single non-transferable vote (SNTV) in multi-member districts. Each elector chooses a single candidate. The candidates with the most votes (a plurality) win. (The number of winners is of course determined by the size of the district.)

11: Limited vote in multi-member districts.

Electors have more than one vote but fewer votes than the number of seats in the district. The candidates with the most votes (a plurality) win. (The number of winners is of course determined by the size of the district.)

12: Borda Count in single- or multi-member districts. Electors use numbers to mark preferences among candidates and each preference is assigned a value. For example, in a ten-candidate field a first preference is worth one, a second preference is worth .9, and so forth. These are summed and the candidate(s) with the highest total(s) is/are elected.

*Scale:* Nominal

*Source(s):* Golder (2006); CLEA (Kollman *et al.* 2011); Colomer (2004); Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections (IPU); IDEA; IFES; Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); various country-specific sources.

*Data release:* 8-12.

*Country-Year Aggregation:* Maximum

*Date specific:* Lower chamber election dates (v3eltype\_0, v3eltype\_1)

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-1902

#### 4.8.2 Lower chamber election seats (A) (v3elloseat)

*Project Manager(s):* Carl Henrik Knutsen

*Question:* In this election, how many seats were there in the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature?

*Clarification:* Does not include appointed (nonelected) seats. Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

*Scale:* Interval

*Answer-type:* Numeric

*Source(s):* Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010). Caramani (2000). Wikipedia. Websites of National Parliaments. Websites of National Bureau of Statistics. Various country-specific sources.

*Data release:* 8-12.

*Country-Year Aggregation:* Maximum

*Date specific:* Lower chamber election dates (v3eltype\_0, v3eltype\_1)

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1790-1920

#### 4.8.3 Lower chamber election seats won by largest party (A) (v3ellostlg)

*Project Manager(s):* Carl Henrik Knutsen

*Question:* In this election to the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature, how many seats were obtained by the largest party?

*Clarification:* Does not include appointed (nonelected) seats. Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

*Scale:* Interval

*Answer-type:* Numeric

*Source(s):* Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010). Caramani (2000). Wikipedia. Websites of National Parliaments. Websites of National Bureau of Statistics. Various country-specific sources.

*Data release:* 8-12.

*Country-Year Aggregation:* Maximum

*Date specific:* Lower chamber election dates (v3eltype\_0, v3eltype\_1)

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1790-1920

#### 4.8.4 Lower chamber election seat share won by largest party (A) (v3ellostsl)

*Project Manager(s):* Carl Henrik Knutsen

*Question:* In this election, what percentage (%) of the total seats in the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature was obtained by the largest party?

*Clarification:* Does not include appointed (nonelected) seats. Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

*Scale:* Interval

*Answer-type:* Percent

*Source(s):* Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010). Caramani (2000). Wikipedia. Websites of National Parliaments. Websites of National Bureau of Statistics. Various country-specific sources.

*Data release:* 8-12.

*Country-Year Aggregation:* Day-weighted mean

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1790-1920

#### 4.8.5 Lower chamber election seats won by second largest party (A) (v3ellostsm)

*Project Manager(s):* Carl Henrik Knutsen

*Question:* In this election, how many seats in the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature were obtained by the next-largest party?

*Clarification:* Does not include appointed (nonelected) seats. Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

*Scale:* Interval

*Answer-type:* Numeric

*Source(s):* Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010). Caramani (2000). Wikipedia. Websites of National Parliaments. Websites of National Bureau of Statistics. Various country-specific sources.

*Data release:* 8-12.

*Country-Year Aggregation:* Maximum

*Date specific:* Lower chamber election dates (v3eltype\_0, v3eltype\_1)

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1790-1920



#### 4.8.6 Lower chamber election seat share won by second largest party (A) (v3ellostss)

*Project Manager(s):* Carl Henrik Knutsen

*Question:* In this election, what percentage (%) of the total seats in the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature was obtained by the next-largest party?

*Clarification:* Does not include appointed (nonelected) seats. Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

*Scale:* Interval

*Answer-type:* Percent

*Source(s):* Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010). Caramani (2000). Wikipedia. Websites of National Parliaments. Websites of National Bureau of Statistics. Various country-specific sources.

*Data release:* 8-12.

*Country-Year Aggregation:* Last

*Date specific:* Lower chamber election dates (v3eltype\_0, v3eltype\_1)

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1790-1920

#### 4.8.7 Lower chamber election vote share of largest vote-getter (A) (v3ellovtlg)

*Project Manager(s):* Carl Henrik Knutsen

*Question:* In this election to the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature, what percentage (%) of the vote was received by the largest party in the first/only round?

*Clarification:* Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

*Scale:* Interval

*Answer-type:* Percent

*Source(s):* Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010). Caramani (2000). Wikipedia. Websites of National Parliaments. Websites of National Bureau of Statistics. Various country-specific sources.

*Data release:* 8-12.

*Country-Year Aggregation:* Last

*Date specific:* Lower chamber election dates (v3eltype\_0, v3eltype\_1)

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1790-1920

#### 4.8.8 Lower chamber election vote share of second-largest vote-getter (A) (v3ellovtsm)

*Project Manager(s):* Carl Henrik Knutsen

*Question:* In this election to the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature, what percentage (%) of the vote was received by the second largest party in the first/only round?

*Clarification:* Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

*Scale:* Interval

*Answer-type:* Percent

*Source(s):* Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010). Caramani (2000). Wikipedia. Websites of National Parliaments. Websites of National Bureau of Statistics. Various country-specific sources.

*Data release:* 8-12.

*Country-Year Aggregation:* Last

*Date specific:* Lower chamber election dates (v3eltype\_0, v3eltype\_1)

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1790-1920

#### 4.8.9 Effective number of cabinet parties (A) (v3elncbpr)

*Project Manager(s):* John Gerring

*Question:* In the first cabinet after this national election, how many political parties were represented in the cabinet?

*Responses:*

- 0: Parties are not allowed.
- 1: One party.
- 2: Two parties.
- 3: Three parties.
- 4: Four or more parties.

*Scale:* Nominal

*Source(s):* <http://www.countrystudies.us>, various country specific sources.

*Data release:* 8-12.

*Country-Year Aggregation:* Maximum

*Date specific:* Election-specific dates (v3eltype).

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1790-1920

#### 4.8.10 Lower chamber electoral system (A) (v3elparallel)

*Project Manager(s):* Carl Henrik Knutsen

*Question:* What was the electoral system used in this election for the lower or unicameral chamber of the legislature?

*Responses:*

- 0: Majoritarian.
- 1: Proportional.
- 2: Mixed.
- 3: Other (*e.g.* single non-transferable voting, limited voting)

*Scale:* Nominal

*Source(s):* Golder (2006); CLEA (Kollman *et al.* 2011); Colomer (2004); Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections (IPU); IDEA; IFES; Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); various country-specific sources.

*Data release:* 8-12.

*Country-Year Aggregation:* Maximum

*Date specific:* Lower chamber election dates (v3eltype\_0, v3eltype\_1)

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-1902

#### 4.8.11 Election turnout (A) (v3eltrnout)

*Project Manager(s):* Carl Henrik Knutsen

*Question:* In this national election, what percentage (%) of all registered voters cast a vote according to official results?

*Scale:* Interval

*Answer-type:* Percent

*Source(s):* IDEA; Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); NELDA (Hyde, Marinov 2012). Caramani (2000). Websites of National Parliaments. Library of Congress - Country Studies. Various country-specific sources.

*Data release:* 8-12.

*Country-Year Aggregation:* Last

*Date specific:* Election-specific dates (v3eltype).

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1790-1920

#### 4.8.12 Lower chamber election turnover (A) (v3eltvrig)

*Project Manager(s):* Carl Henrik Knutsen

*Question:* Did control of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature change as a result of this election, according to official results?

*Responses:*

0: No. The majority party or ruling coalition includes the same or substantially the same parties, even if some minor parties (holding less than 10 % of the seats in the legislature) left or joined the coalition, or because the elections do not affect the lower chamber.

1: Half. A minority party or coalition who was not in control of the chamber before the elections assumed the leading position in the legislature but is dependent on other parties for support. Or, a post-election ruling coalition includes some old parties and some new parties and the new parties represent more than 10 % of the seats in the legislature.

2: Yes. The incumbent party or coalition lost its majority or plurality-dominant position in the legislature and a different party or coalition assumes the majority position.

*Scale:* Ordinal.

*Source(s):* Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010). Caramani (2000). Websites of National Parliaments. Library of Congress - Country Studies. Various country-specific sources. Constitutions.

*Data release:* 8-12.

*Country-Year Aggregation:* Maximum

*Date specific:* Lower chamber election dates (v3eltype\_0, v3eltype\_1)

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1790-1912

#### 4.8.13 Election type (A\*) (v3eltype)

*Project Manager(s):* Carl Henrik Knutsen

*Question:* What type of election was held on this date?

*Clarification:* The date and type of each election has been pre-coded. Any pre-coded years contain an orange triangle. This means that the score or specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded rating; we do not want you to change the rating, as we need all the Country Experts to answer the subsequent questions for the same elections.

If the election unfolds across more than one day, the date for the first day is entered. If the precise date was unavailable, the first of the month is entered. If the month is unknown, January 1 is entered. Multiple-round elections (*e.g.*, two-round elections) are counted separately, *i.e.*, as separate elections. More than one election in a single year is accommodated by listing each election with a separate calendar date. When elections to more than one office occur on the same day these are listed separately (though naturally with the same date).

*Responses:*

0: Legislative; lower, sole, or both chambers, first or only round. [v3eltype\_0]

1: Legislative, lower, sole, or both chambers, second round. [v3eltype\_1]

2: Legislative, upper chamber only, first or only round. [v3eltype\_2]

3: Legislative, upper chamber only, second round. [v3eltype\_3]

4: Constituent Assembly, first or only round. [v3eltype\_4]

5: Constituent Assembly, second round. [v3eltype\_5]

6: Presidential, first or only round. [v3eltype\_6]

7: Presidential, second round. [v3eltype\_7]

8: Metropolitan or supranational legislative, first or only round. [v3eltype\_8]

9: Metropolitan or supranational legislative, second round. [v3eltype\_9]

*Answer-type:* Multiple-selection

*Source(s):* Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Caramani (2000); Lindvall-Larson (2000); websites of national parliaments; Wikipedia;  
Election Politique Citoyen (<http://www.election-politique.com>); CLEA (<https://electiondataarchive.org/data-and-documentation/>); various country-specific sources.

*Data release:* 8-12.

*Country-Year Aggregation:* Maximum

*Date specific:* Election-specific dates.

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2010

#### 4.8.14 Presidential election vote share of largest vote-getter (A) (v3elvtlrg)

*Project Manager(s):* Carl Henrik Knutsen

*Question:* In this presidential election, what percentage (%) of the vote was received by the winning candidate in the first round?

*Clarification:* Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

Record only direct presidential elections. Cases where the presidents are elected indirectly by the legislature (*i.e.* Germany) are not being coded since there is no popular vote share. However, in countries where electoral college is present (*i.e.* U.S.), the percentage of popular vote should be recorded if available.

*Scale:* Interval

*Answer-type:* Percent

*Source(s):* Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010). Caramani (2000). Wikipedia. Websites of National Parliaments. Websites of National Bureau of Statistics. Various country-specific sources.

*Data release:* 8-12.

*Country-Year Aggregation:* Last

*Date specific:* Presidential election dates (v3eltype\_6, v3eltype\_7)

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1792-1919

#### 4.8.15 Presidential election vote share of second-largest vote-getter (A) (v3elvtsml)

*Project Manager(s):* Carl Henrik Knutsen

*Question:* In this presidential election, what percentage (%) of the vote was received by the second most successful candidate in the first round?

*Clarification:* Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, *i.e.*, no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

Record only direct presidential elections. Cases where the presidents are elected indirectly by the legislature (*i.e.* Germany) are not being coded since there is no popular vote share. However, in countries where electoral college is present (*i.e.* U.S.), the percentage of popular vote should be recorded if available.

*Scale:* Interval

*Answer-type:* Percent

*Source(s):* Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010). Caramani (2000). Wikipedia. Websites of National Parliaments. Websites of National Bureau of Statistics. Various country-specific sources.

*Data release:* 8-12.

*Country-Year Aggregation:* Last

*Date specific:* Presidential election dates (v3eltype\_6, v3eltype\_7)

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1792-1919

#### 4.8.16 Legislature bicameral (A\*) (v3lgbicam)

*Project Manager(s):* Carl Henrik Knutsen

*Question:* How many chambers does the legislature contain?

*Clarification:* The answer to this question has been pre-coded for as many years as possible. Any pre-coded years contain an orange triangle. This means that the code and/or specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded rating; we do not want you to change the rating.

*Responses:*

- 0: No legislature exists (or the legislature is shut down).
- 1: Unicameral
- 2: Bicameral
- 3: Tricameral
- 4: Quadricameral
- 9: Other type of legislature

*Ordering:* If all years are (0), skip to The Judiciary (v2juintro). If (1) is chosen, skip to v2lgintro2.

*Scale:* Ordinal.

*Source(s):* Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Caramani (2000); Lindvall-Larson (2000); CCP (<http://comparativeconstitutionsproject.org/>); websites of National Parliaments; Library of Congress - Country Studies; Wikipedia; various country-specific sources, including books, articles, constitutions and online sources.

*Data release:* 8-12.

*Country-Year Aggregation:* Last

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2010

#### 4.8.17 Lower chamber committees (C) (v3lgcomslo)

*Project Manager(s):* Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* Does the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature have a functioning committee system?

*Responses:*

- 0: No, there are no committees.
- 1: Yes, but there are only special (not permanent) committees.
- 2: Yes, there are permanent committees, but they are not very significant in affecting the course of policy.
- 3: Yes, there are permanent committees that have strong influence on the course of policymaking.

*Data release:* 8-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Cleaning:* Set to missing when v3lgbicam is 0

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2010

#### 4.8.18 Legislature corrupt activities (C) (v3lgcrrpt)

*Project Manager(s):* Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* Do members of the legislature abuse their position for financial gain?

*Clarification:* This includes any of the following: (a) accepting bribes, (b) helping to obtain government contracts for firms that the legislator (or his/her family/friends/political supporters) own, (c) doing favors for firms in exchange for the opportunity of employment after leaving the legislature, (d) stealing money from the state or from campaign donations for personal use.

Please make your best estimate, based upon what is known or suspected to be true.

*Responses:*

- 0: Never, or hardly ever.
- 1: Very occasionally. There may be a few legislators who engage in these activities but the vast majority do not.
- 2: Sometimes. Some legislators probably engage in these activities.
- 3: Often. Many legislators probably engage in these activities.
- 4: Commonly. Most legislators probably engage in these activities.

*Data release:* 8-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

*Cleaning:* Set to missing when v3lgbicam is 0

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2010

#### 4.8.19 Legislature dominant chamber (C) (v3lgbicam)

*Project Manager(s):* Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* If the legislature is bicameral, which chamber is dominant?

*Responses:*

- 0: The lower chamber is clearly dominant.
- 1: The lower chamber is somewhat more powerful on most issues.
- 2: They are roughly co-equal in power.
- 3: The upper chamber is somewhat more powerful on most issues.
- 4: The upper chamber is clearly dominant.

*Data release:* 8-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2010

#### 4.8.20 Upper chamber elected (A) (v3lgelecup)

*Project Manager(s):* Jan Teorell

*Question:* What percentage of the upper chamber of the legislature is directly elected in popular elections?

*Clarification:* Exceptions to the norm of direct election include members who are appointed, *e.g.*, by an executive, the military, or a theocratic body. Thus, if 10% of a upper chamber is appointed in some fashion the correct answer to this question would be 90%.

*Scale:* Interval

*Answer-type:* Percent

*Source(s):* Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010). Caramani (2000). Wikipedia. Websites of National Parliaments. Websites of National Bureau of Statistics. Various country-specific sources.

*Data release:* 8-12.

*Country-Year Aggregation:* Day-weighted mean

*Cleaning:* Set to missing when v3lgbicam is 0 or 1

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-1920

#### 4.8.21 Lower chamber elected (A) (v3lgello)

*Project Manager(s):* Carl Henrik Knutsen

*Question:* What percentage of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature is directly elected in popular elections?

*Clarification:* Direct election includes seats reserved for special groups (*e.g.*, ethnic groups or women) so long as these members are chosen by popular election. Exceptions to the norm of direct election include members who are appointed, *e.g.*, by an executive, the military, or a theocratic body. Thus, if 10% of a lower chamber is appointed in some fashion the correct answer to this question would be 90%.

We are not concerned with non-voting members or with members of the legislature who do not possess the powers of most legislators.

*Scale:* Interval

*Answer-type:* Percent

*Source(s):* Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010). Caramani (2000). Wikipedia. Websites of National Parliaments. Websites of National Bureau of Statistics. Various country-specific sources.

*Data release:* 8-12.

*Country-Year Aggregation:* Day-weighted mean

*Cleaning:* Set to missing when v3lgbicam is 0

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-1917

#### 4.8.22 Legislature controls resources (C) (v3lgfunds)

*Project Manager(s):* Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* In practice, does the legislature control the resources that finance its own internal operations and the perquisites of its members?

*Responses:*

0: No. The benefits legislators receive or the finances needed for the legislature's operation depend on remaining in good standing with an outside authority, such as the executive.

1: Yes

*Data release:* 8-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Cleaning:* Set to missing when v3lgbicam is 0

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2010

#### 4.8.23 Lower chamber indirectly elected (A) (v3lginello)

*Project Manager(s):* Jan Teorell

*Question:* What percentage of the lower chamber of the legislature is indirectly elected?

*Clarification:* Indirect elections include elections by local/regional parliaments, country/city councilors or similar. Exceptions to the norm of indirect election include members who are appointed, *e.g.*, by an executive, the military, or a theocratic body.

We are not concerned with non-voting members or with members of the legislature who do



not possess the powers of most legislators.

*Scale:* Interval

*Answer-type:* Percent

*Source(s):* Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010). Caramani (2000). Wikipedia. Websites of National Parliaments. Websites of National Bureau of Statistics. Various country-specific sources.

*Data release:* 8-12.

*Country-Year Aggregation:* Day-weighted mean

*Cleaning:* Set to missing when v3lgbicam is 0

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-1920

#### 4.8.24 Upper chamber indirectly elected (A) (v3lginelup)

*Project Manager(s):* Jan Teorell

*Question:* What percentage of the upper chamber of the legislature is indirectly elected?

*Clarification:* Indirect elections include elections by local/regional parliaments, country/city councilors or similar. Exceptions to the norm of indirect election include members who are appointed, *e.g.*, by an executive, the military, or a theocratic body.

We are not concerned with non-voting members or with members of the legislature who do not possess the powers of most legislators.

*Scale:* Interval

*Answer-type:* Percent

*Source(s):* Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010). Caramani (2000). Wikipedia. Websites of National Parliaments. Websites of National Bureau of Statistics. Various country-specific sources.

*Data release:* 8-12.

*Country-Year Aggregation:* Day-weighted mean

*Cleaning:* Set to missing when v3lgbicam is 0 or 1

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-1920

#### 4.8.25 Legislature investigates in practice (C) (v3lginvstp)

*Project Manager(s):* Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* If the executive were engaged in unconstitutional, illegal, or unethical activity, how likely is it that a legislative body (perhaps a whole chamber, perhaps a committee, whether aligned with government or opposition) would conduct an investigation that would result in a decision or report that is unfavorable to the executive?

*Responses:*

0: Extremely unlikely.

1: Unlikely.

2: As likely as not.

3: Likely.

4: Certain or nearly certain.

*Data release:* 8-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Cleaning:* Set to missing when v3lgbicam is 0

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2010

#### 4.8.26 Lower chamber legislates in practice (C) (v3lglegplo)

*Project Manager(s):* Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* In practice, is the approval of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature required to pass legislation?

*Responses:*

0: No. Legislation is routinely passed without the approval of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature.

1: Yes, usually. Legislation is usually passed with the approval of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature, but occasionally the legislature is by-passed.

2: Yes, always. Legislation of any consequence is always approved by the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature.

*Data release:* 8-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

*Cleaning:* Set to missing when v3lgbicam is 0

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2010

#### 4.8.27 Upper chamber legislates in practice (C) (v3lglegpup)

*Project Manager(s):* Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* In practice, is the approval of the upper chamber of the legislature required to pass legislation?

*Responses:*

0: No. Legislation is routinely passed without the approval of the upper chamber of the legislature.

1: Yes, usually. Legislation is usually passed with the approval of the upper chamber of the legislature, but occasionally the legislature is by-passed.

2: Yes, always. Legislation of any consequence is always approved by the upper chamber of the legislature.

*Data release:* 8-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

*Cleaning:* Set to missing when v3lgbicam is 0 or 1

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2010

#### 4.8.28 Lower chamber legislature name (A\*) (v3lgnamelo)

*Project Manager(s):* Carl Henrik Knutsen

*Question:* What is the name of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature?

*Clarification:* An as accurate as possible literal translation of the name of the lower chamber of the legislature in English, and where possible with the name in the native language, or a transcription thereof, within parentheses has been pre-coded for as many years as possible. Any pre-coded years contain an orange triangle. This means that the text and/or specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded rating; we do not want you to change the rating.

*Answer-type:* Text

*Source(s):* Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Caramani (2000); Lindvall-Larson

(2000); CCP (<http://comparativeconstitutionsproject.org/>); websites of National Parliaments; Library of Congress - Country Studies; Wikipedia; various country-specific sources, including books, articles, constitutions and online sources.

*Data release:* 8-12.

*Country-Year Aggregation:* Last

*Cleaning:* Set to missing when `v3lgbicam` is 0

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2010

#### 4.8.29 Upper chamber name (A\*) (`v3lgnameup`)

*Project Manager(s):* Carl Henrik Knutsen

*Question:* What is the name of the upper chamber of the legislature?

*Clarification:* An as accurate as possible literal translation of the name of the upper chamber of the legislature in English, and where possible with the name in the native language, or a transcription thereof, within parentheses has been pre-coded for as many years as possible. Any pre-coded years contain an orange triangle. This means that the text and/or specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded rating; we do not want you to change the rating.

*Answer-type:* Text

*Source(s):* Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Caramani (2000); Lindvall-Larson (2000); CCP (<http://www.comparativeconstitutionsproject.org/>); websites of National Parliaments; Library of Congress - Country Studies; Wikipedia; various country-specific sources, including books, articles, constitutions and online sources.

*Data release:* 8-12.

*Country-Year Aggregation:* Last

*Cleaning:* Set to missing when `v3lgbicam` is 0 or 1

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2010

#### 4.8.30 Legislature opposition parties (C) (`v3lgoppart`)

*Project Manager(s):* Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

*Additional versions:* `*_osp`, `*_ord`, `*_codelow`, `*_codehigh`, `*_sd`, `*_mean`, `*_nr`

*Question:* Are opposition parties (those not in the ruling party or coalition) able to exercise oversight and investigatory functions against the wishes of the governing party or coalition?

*Responses:*

0: No, not at all.

1: Occasionally.

2: Yes, for the most part.

*Data release:* 8-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Cleaning:* Set to missing when `v3lgbicam` is 0

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2010

#### 4.8.31 Executive oversight (C) (`v3lgotovst`)

*Project Manager(s):* Jan Teorell

*Additional versions:* `*_osp`, `*_ord`, `*_codelow`, `*_codehigh`, `*_sd`, `*_mean`, `*_nr`

*Question:* If executive branch officials were engaged in unconstitutional, illegal, or unethical activity, how likely is it that a body other than the legislature, such as a comptroller general, general prosecutor, or ombudsman, would question or investigate them and issue an unfavorable decision or report?

*Responses:*

- 0: Extremely unlikely.
- 1: Unlikely.
- 2: Very uncertain.
- 3: Likely.
- 4: Certain or nearly certain.

*Data release:* 8-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

*Cleaning:* Set to missing when v3lgbicam is 0

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2010

#### 4.8.32 Legislature questions officials in practice (C) (v3lgqstexp)

*Project Manager(s):* Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* In practice, does the legislature routinely question executive branch officials?

*Clarification:* By "question" we mean, for example, the power of summons through which the head of state or head of government could be forced to explain its policies or testify.

*Responses:*

- 0: No - never or very rarely.
- 1: Yes - routinely.

*Data release:* 8-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

*Cleaning:* Set to missing when v3lgbicam is 0

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2010

#### 4.8.33 Lower chamber members serve in government (C) (v3lgsrvlo)

*Project Manager(s):* Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* In practice, are members of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature able to serve simultaneously as ministers in the government?

*Responses:*

- 0: No.
- 1: Yes.

*Data release:* 8-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

*Cleaning:* Set to missing when v3lgbicam is 0

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2010

## 4.9 Historical V-Dem – Overlap Period Discrepancies

### 4.9.1 Local government elected (A\*) (v3ellocelc)

*Project Manager(s):* Carl Henrik Knutsen

*Question:* At the local level, are government offices elected in practice?

*Clarification:* The information on this question has been pre-coded. Any pre-coded years contain an orange triangle. This means that the score and/or specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded rating; we do not want you to change the rating as we need all the Country Experts to answer the subsequent questions for the same local governments.

"Government offices" here refers to a local executive and a local assembly, not a judiciary and not minor bureaucrats. An executive is a single individual (or a very small group) (*e.g.*, a mayor). An assembly is a larger body of officials.

"Elected" refers to offices that are directly elected by citizens or indirectly elected by a local elected assembly. All other methods of obtaining office – including appointment by a higher level of government – are considered to be non-elected.

In classifying a position as elected one is making no judgments about the freeness/fairness of the election or the relative extent of suffrage. One is simply indicating that there is an election and that the winner of that election (however conducted) generally takes office.

*Responses:*

- 0: Generally, offices at the local level are not elected.
- 1: Generally, the local executive is elected but not the assembly.
- 2: Generally, the local assembly is elected but not the executive.
- 3: Generally, the local executive is elected and there is no assembly.
- 4: Generally, the local assembly is elected and there is no executive.
- 5: Generally, the local executive and assembly are elected.

*Answer-type:* Text

*Source(s):* Statoids.com; hathitrust.org; Library of Congress - Country Studies; Wikipedia; various country-specific sources, including books, articles, constitutions and online sources.

*Data release:* 8-12.

*Country-Year Aggregation:* Last

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2010

### 4.9.2 Local government exists (A\*) (v3ellogov)

*Project Manager(s):* Carl Henrik Knutsen

*Question:* Is there a local government?

*Clarification:* The information on this question has been pre-coded. Any pre-coded years contain an orange triangle. This means that the score and/or specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded rating; we do not want you to change the rating as we need all the Country Experts to answer the subsequent questions for the same local governments.

Local government refers to the level of government below the regional government. There are many names for units at this level; some common ones are counties, communes, cities, municipalities, towns, rural municipalities, and villages.

Countries with more than two subnational levels may have multiple levels that fit the definition of local government. If this is the case, please code the local level that, in practice, has the most responsibilities (*e.g.* making laws, providing primary, education, maintaining roads, policing, etc.) and resources to carry out those responsibilities.

*Responses:*

- 0: No
- 1: Yes

*Source(s):* Statoids.com; hathitrust.org; Library of Congress - Country Studies; Wikipedia; various country-specific sources, including books, articles, constitutions and online sources.

*Data release:* 8-12.

*Country–Year Aggregation:* Last

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2010

#### 4.9.3 Local government name (A\*) (v3ellocnam)

*Project Manager(s):* Carl Henrik Knutsen

*Question:* What is the term(s) for the local government units?

*Clarification:* The information on this question has been pre-coded. Any pre-coded years contain an orange triangle. This means that the score and/or specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded rating; we do not want you to change the rating as we need all the Country Experts to answer the subsequent questions for the same local governments.

*Answer-type:* Text

*Source(s):* Statoids.com; hathitrust.org; Library of Congress - Country Studies; Wikipedia; various country-specific sources, including books, articles, constitutions and online sources.

*Data release:* 8-12.

*Country–Year Aggregation:* Last

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2010

#### 4.9.4 Regional government exists (A\*) (v3elreggov)

*Project Manager(s):* Carl Henrik Knutsen

*Question:* Is there a regional government?

*Clarification:* The information on this question has been pre-coded. Any pre-coded years contain an orange triangle. This means that the score and/or specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded rating; we do not want you to change the rating as we need all the Country Experts to answer the subsequent questions for the same regional governments.

Regional government is typically the second-highest level of government, just below the national government. There are many names for units at this level; some common ones are regions, provinces, states, departments, and cantons.

Countries with more than two subnational levels may have multiple levels that fit the definition of regional government. If this is the case, for all questions about regional government please code the regional level that, in practice, has the most responsibilities (*e.g.* making laws, providing primary, education, maintaining roads, policing, etc.) and resources to carry out those responsibilities.

Some countries are so small that, now or in earlier time periods, they have only local government and not regional government. If this is the case, this question is coded as "0" for the appropriate time period.

*Responses:*

0: No

1: Yes

*Ordering:* If coded "0" for entire period, skip the following questions focused on regional government.

*Source(s):* Statoids.com; hathitrust.org; Library of Congress - Country Studies; Wikipedia; various country-specific sources, including books, articles, constitutions and online sources.

*Data release:* 8-12.

*Country–Year Aggregation:* Last

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2010

#### 4.9.5 Regional government name (A\*) (v3elregnam)

*Project Manager(s)*: Carl Henrik Knutsen

*Question*: What is the term(s) for the regional government units?

*Clarification*: The information on this question has been pre-coded. Any pre-coded years contain an orange triangle. This means that the score and/or specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded rating; we do not want you to change the rating as we need all the Country Experts to answer the subsequent questions for the same regional governments.

*Answer-type*: Text

*Source(s)*: Statoids.com; hathitrust.org; Library of Congress - Country Studies; Wikipedia; various country-specific sources, including books, articles, constitutions and online sources.

*Data release*: 8-12.

*Country-Year Aggregation*: Last

*Citation*: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years*: 1789-2010

#### 4.9.6 Regional government elected (A\*) (v3elsrgel)

*Project Manager(s)*: Carl Henrik Knutsen

*Question*: At the regional level, are government offices elected in practice?

*Clarification*: The information on this question has been pre-coded. Any pre-coded years contain an orange triangle. This means that the score and/or specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded rating; we do not want you to change the rating as we need all the Country Experts to answer the subsequent questions for the same regional governments.

"Government offices" here refers to a regional executive and a regional assembly, not a judiciary and not minor bureaucrats. An executive is a single individual (or a very small group) (*e.g.*, a governor). An assembly is a larger body of officials, who may be divided into two chambers.

"Elected" refers to offices that are directly elected by citizens or indirectly elected by a regional elected assembly. All other methods of obtaining office – including appointment by higher or lower levels of government – are considered to be non-elected.

In classifying a position as elected one is making no judgments about the freeness/fairness of the election or the relative extent of suffrage. One is simply indicating that there is an election and that the winner of that election (however conducted) generally takes office.

*Responses*:

- 0: Generally, offices at the regional level are not elected.
- 1: Generally, the regional executive is elected but not the assembly.
- 2: Generally, the regional assembly is elected but not the executive.
- 3: Generally, the regional executive is elected and there is no assembly.
- 4: Generally, the regional assembly is elected and there is no executive.
- 5: Generally, the regional executive and assembly are elected.

*Source(s)*: Statoids.com; hathitrust.org; Library of Congress - Country Studies; Wikipedia; various country-specific sources, including books, articles, constitutions and online sources.

*Data release*: 8-12.

*Country-Year Aggregation*: Last

*Citation*: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years*: 1789-2010

#### 4.9.7 HOS age (A) (v3exagehos)

*Project Manager(s)*: Jan Teorell

*Question*: In what year was the head of state born?

*Scale*: Interval



*Answer-type:* Date - year only

*Source(s):* worldstatesman.org.

*Data release:* 8-12.

*Country-Year Aggregation:* Maximum

*Date specific:* Coded on HOS appointment dates and December 31 (v3exnamhos).

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-1938

#### 4.9.8 HOS = HOG (A\*) (v3exhoshog)

*Project Manager(s):* Jan Teorell

*Question:* Is the head of state (HOS) also head of government (HOG)?

*Clarification:* Once again, the identities of the head of government for each country have been pre-coded for as many years as possible. Any pre-coded years contain an orange triangle. This means that either the score or text and/or specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded rating; we do not want you to change the rating, as we need all the Country Experts to answer the subsequent questions for the same executives.

Note that this question only pertains to whether the head of state and the head of government are the same person or body, regardless of the relative powers of the two. Thus, in a constitutional monarchy, for example, the head of state and head of government are not the same even though the head of state may lack any real political power. If multiple head of states/head of governments were appointed in any year, the question pertains to each one of them.

*Responses:*

0: No

1: Yes

*Ordering:* If HOS=HOG (answer is "yes") for all years: skip to "Introduction to entire executive." (v2exintro3)

*Source(s):* CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2012), v83-v87; Lentz (1994; 1999); Henisz (2000; 2002).

*Data release:* 8-12.

*Country-Year Aggregation:* Last

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2010

#### 4.9.9 HOG name (A\*) (v3exnamhog)

*Project Manager(s):* Jan Teorell

*Question:* What is the name of the head of government?

*Clarification:* The identities of the head of government for each country have been pre-coded for as many years as possible. Any pre-coded years contain an orange triangle. This means that the text and/or specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded rating; we do not want you to change the rating, as we need all the Country Experts to answer the subsequent questions for the same executives.

Only heads of government in office for 100 or more days are listed. If the head of government is a collective body, the name provided is of the person exercising the most effective power within this body, or, if no such person exists, the expression "collective body" is used. If multiple heads of government were appointed in a given year, this question pertains to each one of them, including the specific date of appointment and reappointment for each one of them.

*Answer-type:* Text

*Source(s):* worldstatesmen.org; Henisz (2000; 2002); Lentz (1994; 1999).

*Data release:* 8-12.

*Country–Year Aggregation:* Last

*Cleaning:* Set to missing when v3exhoshog is 1

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-1990

#### 4.9.10 HOS name (A\*) (v3exnamhos)

*Project Manager(s):* Jan Teorell

*Question:* What is the name of the head of state?

*Clarification:* The identities of the head of state for each country have been pre-coded. Any pre-coded years contain an orange triangle. This means that either the score or text and/or specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded rating; we do not want you to change the rating, as we need all the Country Experts to answer the subsequent questions for the same executives.

Only heads of states in office for 100 or more days are listed. If the head of state is a collective body, the name provided is of the person exercising the most effective power within this body, or, if no such person exists, the expression "collective body" is used. If multiple Heads of State were appointed in a given year, this question pertains to each one of them, including the specific date of appointment and reappointment for each one of them.

*Answer-type:* Text

*Source(s):* Henisz (2000; 2002); Lentz (1994; 1999); worldstatesmen.org; ARCHIGOS.

*Data release:* 8-12.

*Country–Year Aggregation:* Last

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2010

#### 4.9.11 HOS appointment in practice (A) (v3expathhs)

*Project Manager(s):* Jan Teorell

*Question:* How did the head of state reach office?

*Clarification:* If several bodies were involved in the appointment process, select the one that exerted the most critical impact on the decision. However, in the next question we ask separately about whether the approval of the legislature was necessary. Response category 7 should only be selected if the head of state is directly elected, not if he or she was appointed by the legislature after an election.

*Scale:* Nominal

*Source(s):* Various country-specific sources

*Data release:* 8-12.

*Country–Year Aggregation:* Maximum

*Date specific:* Coded on HOS appointment dates and December 31 (v3exnamhos).

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-1933

#### 4.9.12 Title of HOG (A\*) (v3extithog)

*Project Manager(s):* Jan Teorell

*Question:* What is the title of the head of government (HOG)?

*Clarification:* Again, the titles of the heads of government for each country have been pre-coded for as many years as possible. Any pre-coded years contain an orange triangle. This means that either the score or text and/or specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded rating; we do not want you to change the

rating, as we need all the Country Experts to answer the subsequent questions for the same executives.

*Answer-type:* Text

*Source(s):* worldstatesmen.org; Henisz (2000; 2002); Lentz (1994; 1999).

*Data release:* 8-12.

*Country–Year Aggregation:* Last

*Cleaning:* Set to missing when v3exhoshog is 1

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-1990

#### 4.9.13 HOS title (A\*) (v3extithos)

*Project Manager(s):* Jan Teorell

*Question:* What is the title of the head of state?

*Clarification:* Again, the identities of the head of state for each country have been pre-coded. Any pre-coded years contain an orange triangle. This means that either the score or text and/or specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded rating; we do not want you to change the rating, as we need all the Country Experts to answer the subsequent questions for the same executives.

*Answer-type:* Text

*Source(s):* Lentz (1994; 1999); Henisz (2000; 2002).

*Data release:* 8-12.

*Country–Year Aggregation:* Last

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2010

#### 4.9.14 High court name (A\*) (v3juhcname)

*Project Manager(s):* Jan Teorell

*Question:* Please enter the name of the high court.

*Clarification:* An as accurate as possible literal translation of the name of the court in English, and where possible with the name in the native language, or a transcription thereof, within parentheses has been pre-coded for as many years as possible. Any pre-coded years contain an orange triangle. This means that the text and/or specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded rating; we do not want you to change the rating.

*Answer-type:* Text

*Source(s):* Various country-specific sources

*Data release:* 8-12.

*Country–Year Aggregation:* Last

*Cleaning:* Set to missing when v3juhcourt is 0

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-1995

#### 4.9.15 Legislature amends constitution (A) (v3lgamend)

*Project Manager(s):* Carl Henrik Knutsen

*Question:* By law, can the legislature (including both chambers of the legislature) change the constitution without the involvement of any other body?

*Responses:*

0: No.

1: Yes.

*Scale:* Dichotomous

*Source(s):* <https://www.constituteproject.org>; <http://countrystudies.us>; <https://en.wikipedia.org>;  
various country specific sources

*Data release:* 8-12.

*Country–Year Aggregation:* Last

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-1920

#### **4.9.16 Legislature amnesties (A) (v3lgamnsty)**

*Project Manager(s):* John Gerring

*Question:* By law, does the legislature have the power to grant amnesty or pardon?

*Responses:*

0: No.

1: Yes.

*Scale:* Dichotomous

*Source(s):* <https://www.constituteproject.org>; <http://countrystudies.us>; <https://en.wikipedia.org>

*Data release:* 8-12.

*Country–Year Aggregation:* Last

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-1920

#### **4.9.17 Lower chamber introduces bills (A) (v3lgintblo)**

*Project Manager(s):* John Gerring

*Question:* By law, does the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature have the ability to introduce bills in all policy jurisdictions?

*Scale:* Dichotomous

*Source(s):* <https://www.constituteproject.org>; <http://countrystudies.us>; <https://en.wikipedia.org>

*Data release:* 8-12.

*Country–Year Aggregation:* Last

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-1920

#### **4.9.18 Lower chamber legislates by law (A) (v3lglegllo)**

*Project Manager(s):* John Gerring

*Question:* By law, is the approval of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature necessary to pass legislation?

*Responses:*

0: No.

1: Yes.

*Scale:* Dichotomous

*Source(s):* <https://www.constituteproject.org>; <http://countrystudies.us>; <https://en.wikipedia.org>

*Data release:* 8-12.

*Country–Year Aggregation:* Last

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-1920

#### **4.9.19 Upper chamber legislates by law (A) (v3lgleglup)**

*Project Manager(s):* John Gerring

*Question:* By law, is the approval of the upper chamber of the legislature necessary to pass legislation?

*Responses:*

0: No.

1: Yes.

*Scale:* Dichotomous

*Source(s):* <https://www.constituteproject.org>; <http://countrystudies.us>; <https://en.wikipedia.org>

*Data release:* 8-12.

*Country–Year Aggregation:* Last

*Cleaning:* Set to missing when v3lgbicam is 0 or 1

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-1920

## 5 Other Indices Created Using V-Dem Data

This section includes indices created using V-Dem data but are not subcomponents of the V-Dem Democracy Indices presented in section 2.1. Please see Appendix A for an overview of all indices, component-indices, and lower-level indices.

### 5.1 Regimes of the World (RoW)

#### 5.1.1 Regimes of the world – the RoW measure (D) (v2x\_regime)

*Project Manager(s):* Marcus Tannenberg, Staffan I Lindberg

*Question:* How can the political regime overall be classified considering the competitiveness of access to power (polyarchy) as well as liberal principles?

*Responses:*

0: Closed autocracy: No multiparty elections for the chief executive or the legislature.

1: Electoral autocracy: De-jure multiparty elections for the chief executive and the legislature, but failing to achieve that elections are free and fair, or de-facto multiparty, or a minimum level of Dahl's institutional prerequisites of polyarchy as measured by V-Dem's Electoral Democracy Index (v2x\_polyarchy).

2: Electoral democracy: De-facto free and fair multiparty elections and a minimum level of Dahl's institutional prerequisites for polyarchy as measured by V-Dem's Electoral Democracy Index (v2x\_polyarchy), but either access to justice, or transparent law enforcement, or liberal principles of respect for personal liberties, rule of law, and judicial as well as legislative constraints on the executive not satisfied as measured by V-Dem's Liberal Component Index (v2x\_liberal).

3: Liberal democracy: De-facto free and fair multiparty elections and a minimum level of Dahl's institutional prerequisites for polyarchy as measured by V-Dem's Electoral Democracy Index (v2x\_polyarchy) are guaranteed as well as access to justice, transparent law enforcement and the liberal principles of respect for personal liberties, rule of law, and judicial as well as legislative constraints on the executive satisfied as measured by V-Dem's Liberal Component Index (v2x\_liberal).

*Scale:* Ordinal.

*Source(s):* v2x\_elecreg v2xlg\_elecreg v2xex\_elecreg v2elmpar\_osp\_ex v2elmpar\_osp\_leg v2elmpar\_osp v2elfrfair\_osp v2elfrfair\_osp\_leg v2elfrfair\_osp\_ex v2expathhg v2expathhs v2ex\_legconhos v2ex\_hosw v2x\_polyarchy v2x\_liberal v2clacjstm\_osp v2clacjstw\_osp v2cltrnslw\_osp v2exaphogp

*Data release:* 9-12.

*Aggregation:* Electoral democracies score above 2 on the indicators for multi-party (v2elmpar\_osp) and free and fair elections (v2elfrfair\_osp), as well as above 0.5 on the Electoral Democracy Index (v2x\_polyarchy). Liberal democracy meets the criteria for Electoral democracy but also satisfy the liberal dimensions by a score above 0.8 on the V-Dem Liberal Component index (v2x\_liberal), as well as a score above 3 on transparent law enforcement (v2cltrnslw\_osp), access to justice for men (v2clacjstm\_osp) and women (v2clacjstw\_osp). Electoral autocracies fail to meet one or more of the above-mentioned criteria of electoral democracies, but subject the chief executive and the legislature to de-jure multiparty elections as indicated by a score above 1 on the V-Dem multiparty elections indicator (v2elmpar\_osp). Closed autocracy if either no multiparty elections for the legislature take place (v2xlg\_elecreg == 0) or the chief executive is not elected in direct or indirect multiparty elections. To identify whether this is the case, we take into account if there is no basic multiparty competition in elections (v2elmpar\_osp < 1) and the relative power of the Head of State (HoS) and the Head of Government (HoG) as well as the appointment procedures. The V-Dem variable v2ex\_hosw identifies if the HoS (v2ex\_hosw > 0.5) or HoG (v2ex\_hosw < or equal to 0.5) is the chief executive. If the HoG is the chief executive, the variable v2expathhg indicates whether the HoG is directly (8) or indirectly (7) elected or appointed by the HoS (6). In the first case, we consider whether executive elections (v2xex\_elecreg == 0) take place, in the second case whether legislative elections take place

(v2xlg\_elecreg == 0) and in the third case how HoS is selected as follows. The variable v2expathhs indicates whether the HoS is directly (7) or indirectly (6) elected. Thus, in the first case, we consider whether executive elections (v2xex\_elecreg) take place, in the second case whether legislative elections take place and the legislature approves on HoG (v2xlg\_elecreg == 0 and v2exaphog == 0). This also applies for the cases if the HoS is the chief executive.

*Citation:* Lührmann *et al.* (2018); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2021

### 5.1.2 Regimes of the world – the RoW measure with categories for ambiguous cases (D) (v2x\_regime\_amb)

*Project Manager(s):* Marcus Tannenberg, Staffan I Lindberg, Valeriya Mechkova

*Question:* How can the political regime overall be classified considering the competitiveness of access to power (polyarchy) as well as liberal principles?

*Responses:*

- 0: Closed autocracy: No multiparty elections for the chief executive or the legislature.
- 1: Closed autocracy upper bound: Same as closed autocracy, but the confidence intervals of the multiparty election indicators overlap the level of electoral autocracies.
- 2: Electoral autocracy lower bound: Same as electoral autocracy, but the confidence intervals of one or both of the multiparty election indicators overlap the level of closed autocracies.
- 3: Electoral autocracy: De-jure multiparty elections for the chief executive and the legislature, but failing to achieve that elections are free and fair, or de-facto multiparty, or a minimum level of Dahl's institutional prerequisites of polyarchy as measured by V-Dem's Electoral Democracy Index (v2x\_polyarchy).
- 4: Electoral autocracy upper bound: Same as electoral autocracy, but the upper bounds of the confidence intervals of the indicators for free and fair and multiparty elections and the Electoral Democracy Index overlap the level of electoral democracies.
- 5: Electoral democracy lower bound: Same as electoral democracy, but the lower bounds of the confidence intervals of the indicators for free and fair, or multiparty or the Electoral Democracy Index overlap the level of electoral autocracies.
- 6: Electoral democracy: Free and fair multiparty elections and a minimum level of Dahl's institutional prerequisites for polyarchy as measured by V-Dem's Electoral Democracy Index (v2x\_polyarchy), but either access to justice, or transparent law enforcement, or liberal principles of respect for personal liberties, rule of law, and judicial as well as legislative constraints on the executive not satisfied as measured by V-Dem's Liberal Component Index (v2x\_liberal).
- 7: Electoral democracy upper bound: Same as electoral democracy, but the confidence intervals of the indicators for access to justice, and transparent law enforcement, and the liberal component index overlap the level of liberal democracies.
- 8: Liberal democracy lower bound: Same as liberal democracy, but the confidence intervals of the indicators for access to justice, and transparent law enforcement, and the liberal component index reaches the level of electoral democracies.
- 9: Liberal democracy: De-facto free and fair multiparty elections and a minimum level of Dahl's institutional prerequisites for polyarchy as measured by V-Dem's Electoral Democracy Index (v2x\_polyarchy) are guaranteed as well as access to justice, transparent law enforcement and the liberal principles of respect for personal liberties, rule of law, and judicial as well as legislative constraints on the executive satisfied as measured by V-Dem's Liberal Component Index (v2x\_liberal).

*Scale:* Ordinal.

*Source(s):* v2x\_elecreg v2xlg\_elecreg v2xex\_elecreg v2elmulpar\_osp\_ex v2elmulpar\_osp\_leg v2elmulpar\_osp v2elfrfair\_osp v2elfrfair\_osp\_leg v2elfrfair\_osp\_ex v2expathhg v2expathhs v2ex\_legconhos v2ex\_hosw v2x\_polyarchy v2x\_liberal v2clacjstm\_osp v2clacjstw\_osp v2cltrnslw\_osp



*Data release:* 9-12.

*Aggregation:* Same as for “Regimes of the World Measure– the RoW Measure ” (v2x\_regime) above. In order to account for ambiguity this version of the regime type index reflects the upper and lower bounds of the point estimates used to aggregate the index in intermediate categories.

*Citation:* Lührmann *et al.* (2018); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2021

## 5.2 Accountability

### 5.2.1 Accountability index (D) (v2x\_accountability)

*Project Manager(s):* Kyle L. Marquardt and Valeriya Mechkova

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh

*Question:* To what extent is the ideal of government accountability achieved?

*Clarification:* Government accountability is understood as constraints on the government’s use of political power through requirements for justification for its actions and potential sanctions. We organize the sub-types of accountability spatially. Vertical accountability refers to the ability of a state’s population to hold its government accountable through elections, horizontal accountability refers to checks and balances between institutions; and diagonal accountability captures oversight by civil society organizations and media activity.

*Scale:* We provide two versions of this index. The first is the normalized output from the hierarchical latent variable analysis. It is on an unbounded interval scale. The second, denoted by \*\_osp, is a version of this output which we scale using a standard normal cumulative distribution function. It is thus scaled low to high (0-1).

*Source(s):* v2x\_elecreg v2elembaut v2elembcap v2elrgstry v2elirreg v2elintim v2elmulpar v2elfrfair v2elsuffrage v2expathhs v2ex\_legconhos v2expathhg v2exaphogp v2ex\_hosw v2psparban v2psbars v2psoppaut v2juhcind v2juncind v2juhccomp v2jucomp v2exrescon v2lginvstp v2lgqstexp v2lgbicam v2lgotovst v2mecenefm v2mecenefi v2meharjrn v2mecrit v2mebias v2merange v2meslfcen v2csprtcpt v2cseeorgs v2csreprss v2cldiscm v2cldiscw v2clacfree v2dlengage v2x\_suffr v2xex\_elecreg v2xlg\_elecreg

*Data release:* 7-12.

*Aggregation:* To create an aggregate measure of accountability, we conduct a hierarchical analysis using all variables included in the three sub-indices of accountability: vertical (v2x\_veracc), horizontal (v2x\_horacc) and diagonal accountability (v2x\_diagacc). This strategy assumes that overall accountability is a function of all variables included in each sub-index, though the sub-indices structure this relationship.

*Citation:* Lührmann *et al.* (2020); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2021

### 5.2.2 Vertical accountability index (D) (v2x\_veracc)

*Project Manager(s):* Kyle L. Marquardt and Valeriya Mechkova

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh

*Question:* To what extent is the ideal of vertical government accountability achieved?

*Clarification:* Vertical accountability captures the extent to which citizens have the power to hold the government accountable. The mechanisms of vertical accountability include formal political participation on part of the citizens — such as being able to freely organize in political parties — and participate in free and fair elections, including for the chief executive.

*Scale:* We provide two versions of this index. The first is the normalized output from the hierarchical latent variable analysis. It is on an unbounded interval scale. The second, denoted by \*\_osp, is a version of this output which we scale using a standard normal cumulative distribution function. It is thus scaled low to high (0-1).

*Source(s):* v2x\_elecereg v2elembaut v2elembcap v2elrgstry v2elirreg v2elintim v2elmulpar  
v2elfrfair v2expathhs v2ex\_legconhos v2expathhg v2x\_suffr v2exaphogp v2ex\_hosw  
v2x\_suffr v2psparban v2psbars v2psoppaut

*Data release:* 7-12.

*Aggregation:* Vertical accountability consists of two main components: elections and political parties. We operationalize electoral accountability with three components: 1) an aggregate measure the quality of elections; 2) the percent of enfranchised population and 3) whether the chief executive is directly or indirectly elected. We model non-electoral regimes as having no suffrage and the quality of elections as a function of having an electoral regime (v2x\_elecereg). Quality of elections consists of seven variables measuring different aspects of national elections for the executive and legislature. Specifically, we include autonomy and capacity of the electoral management body (v2elembaut) and (v2elembcap); accuracy of the voter registry (v2elrgstry), intentional irregularities conducted by the government and opposition (v2elirreg); intimidation and harassment by the government and its agents (v2elintim); to what extent the elections were multi-party in practice (v2elmulpar); and an overall measure for the freedom and fairness of elections (v2elfrfair). This is a modified version of the V-Dem Clean elections index (v2xel\_frfair). We added the variable v2elmulpar, which is theoretically important for accountability, and we removed v2elvotbuy and v2elpeace, as they have low loadings.

We measure suffrage as the percentage of people that have the legal right to vote (v2x\_suffr) to proxy the inclusivity of the exercise of electoral accountability. To account for the differences between states which have an executive subject to elections, we include a dichotomous indicator of whether or not the head of the executive either the head of state or head of government — whoever has more relative power over the appointment and dismissal of cabinet ministers as measured by v2ex\_hosw is subjected to direct or indirect elections (v2expathhs v2ex\_legconhos v2expathhg v2exaphogp).

The second form of vertical accountability focuses on political parties, which we model as a hierarchical node. This node includes variables that capture whether there are barriers to forming a party and how restrictive they are (v2psparban) and (v2psbars), as well as the degree to which opposition parties are independent of the ruling regime (v2psoppaut).

*Citation:* Lührmann *et al.* (2020); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2021

### 5.2.3 Diagonal accountability index (D) (v2x\_diagacc)

*Project Manager(s):* Kyle L. Marquardt and Valeriya Mechkova

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh

*Question:* To what extent is the ideal of diagonal government accountability achieved?

*Clarification:* Diagonal accountability covers the range of actions and mechanisms that citizens, civil society organizations CSOs, and an independent media can use to hold the government accountable. These mechanisms include using informal tools such as social mobilization and investigative journalism to enhance vertical and horizontal accountability.

*Scale:* We provide two versions of this index. The first is the normalized output from the hierarchical latent variable analysis. It is on an unbounded interval scale. The second, denoted by \*\_osp, is a version of this output which we scale using a standard normal cumulative distribution function. It is thus scaled low to high (0-1).

*Source(s):* v2mecenefm v2mecenefi v2meharjrn v2mecrit v2mebias v2merange v2meslfcen  
v2csptrcpt v2cseeorgs v2csreprss v2cldiscm v2cldiscw v2clacfree v2dlengage

*Data release:* 7-12.

*Aggregation:* We model this form of accountability as a function of four hierarchical nodes: media freedom, civil society characteristics, freedom of expression, and the degree to which citizens are engaged in politics.

The media freedom node incorporates variables representing two broad dimensions. The first dimension regards the extent to which the government attempts to censor the media (v2mecenefm) and information on the Internet (v2mecenefi), as well as the extent to which

government and other powerful actors harass journalists (v2meharjrn). The second dimension concerns the work of the media itself, namely the extent to which: the media criticizes the government at least occasionally (v2mecrit); there is bias against opposition candidates (v2mebias); the media offers a wide array of political perspectives in their coverage (v2merange); and there is self-censorship on salient issues for the government (v2meslfcen). The media freedom node is an expanded version of the V-Dem Alternative sources of information index (v2xme\_altinf).

Finally, we use the components of the V-Dem core index of civil society to account for the opportunity of citizens to channel their interests and potentially oppose the government and its policies in an organized way through a robust, self-organized and autonomous civil society organizations. The indicators included in this node are: popular and voluntary participation in CSOs, (v2cspcpt), government control to the entry and exit of CSOs into the public life, (v2cseeorgs), and government oppression of CSOs (v2csreprss).

The freedom of expression node incorporates variables regarding the degree to which men and women are free to discuss political issues without fear of harassment (v2cldiscm and v2cldiscw), as well as an indicator on the freedom of academic and cultural expression (v2clacfree).

Finally, we incorporate a variable representing engaged society (v2dlengage), which gives information on the width and depth of public deliberations when important policy changes are being considered.

*Citation:* Lührmann *et al.* (2020); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2021

#### 5.2.4 Horizontal accountability index (D) (v2x\_horacc)

*Project Manager(s):* Kyle L. Marquardt and Valeriya Mechkova

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh

*Question:* To what extent is the ideal of horizontal government accountability achieved?

*Clarification:* Horizontal accountability concerns the power of state institutions to oversee the government by demanding information, questioning officials and punishing improper behavior. This form of accountability ensures checks between institutions and prevents the abuse of power. The key agents in horizontal government accountability are: the legislature; the judiciary; and specific oversight agencies such as ombudsmen, prosecutor and comptroller generals.

*Scale:* We provide two versions of this index. The first is the normalized output from the hierarchical latent variable analysis. It is on an unbounded interval scale. The second, denoted by \*\_osp, is a version of this output which we scale using a standard normal cumulative distribution function. It is thus scaled low to high (0-1).

*Source(s):* v2juhcind v2juncind v2juhccomp v2jucomp v2exrescon v2lgotovst v2lginvstp v2lgbicam v2lgqstexp

*Data release:* 7-12.

*Aggregation:* We capture the extent to which the judiciary, the legislature and other oversight agencies hold the government to account by modeling each of these factors as separate hierarchical nodes.

The judiciary node speaks to the degree to which members of the executive compromise horizontal accountability by "unlawfully encroaching" on the legitimate authority of the judiciary branch. To capture that we use the indicators from the V-Dem judicial constraints on the executive index (v2x\_jucon).

To model the degree to which a legislature facilitates horizontal accountability we model whether or not a legislature exists a dichotomized version of v2lgbicam, and legislature activities as a function of this variable. The key function of a legislature in terms of horizontal accountability is to scrutinize government officials' potential misconduct by demanding information for their policies and decisions, and taking specific actions in case of irregularities. We use as baseline the indicators from the V-Dem legislative constraints on the executive index (v2xlg\_legcon): the degree to which: 1 the legislature routinely questions the executive (v2lgqstexp); and 2 a legislature is likely to investigate and produce a decision

unfavorable to the executive, if the latter were engaged in an illegal or unethical activity (v2lginvstp). We exclude the legislature opposition parties (v2lgoppart) as this aspect is part of vertical accountability.

Finally, we include a variable regarding the degree to which other state bodies comptroller general, general prosecutor, or ombudsman are likely to investigate and report on potential illegal or unethical activities on part of the executive (v2lgotovst).

*Citation:* Lührmann *et al.* (2020); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2021

## 5.3 Executive Bases of Power

### 5.3.1 Confidence dimension index (D) (v2x\_ex\_confidence)

*Project Manager(s):* Jan Teorell

*Question:* To what extent is the power base of the chief executive' determined by the confidence of the legislature?

*Clarification:* Representing one of five regime dimensions, each of which may be more or less present in any given case, this index taps into the extent to which the dismissal of the chief executive depends on the confidence of the legislature.

*Scale:* Interval, from low to high (0-1).

*Source(s):* v2expathhs v2expathhg v2exremhsp\_ord v2exrmhsol\_2 v2exrmhsol\_3 v2exrmhsol\_4 v2exhoshog v2ex\_hosw

*Data release:* 9-12.

*Aggregation:* The index is based on whether the "chief executive" can be dismissed by the legislature (without having to level accusations of unlawful activity and without the involvement of any other agency). In nominally dual systems, where the head of state (HOS) and the head of government (HOG) are not the same individual, we determine who is the "chief executive" by comparing HOS and HOG powers over the appointment and dismissal of cabinet ministers. We aggregate across the two executives by taking the average weighted by their relative powers over cabinet formation and dismissal.

*Citation:* Teorell, Jan, and Staffan I. Lindberg. 2019. "Beyond Democracy-Dictatorship Measures: A New Framework Capturing Executive Bases of Power, 1789-2016". *Perspectives on Politics* 17(1):66-84; *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

### 5.3.2 Direct election dimension index (D) (v2x\_ex\_direlect)

*Project Manager(s):* Jan Teorell

*Question:* To what extent is the power base of the chief executive determined by direct election?

*Clarification:* Representing one of five regime dimensions, each of which may be more or less present in any given case, this index taps into the extent to which the chief executive is appointed through direct popular election (regardless of the quality or extension of suffrage of that election).

*Scale:* Interval, from low to high (0-1).

*Source(s):* v2expathhs v2expathhg v2exremhsp\_ord v2exrmhsol\_2 v2exrmhsol\_3 v2exrmhsol\_4 v2exhoshog v2ex\_hosw

*Data release:* 9-12.

*Aggregation:* The index is based on whether the "chief executive" was directly elected. In nominally dual systems, where the head of state (HOS) and the head of government (HOG) are not the same individual, we determine who is the "chief executive" by comparing HOS and HOG powers over the appointment and dismissal of cabinet ministers. We aggregate across the two executives by taking the average weighted by their relative powers over cabinet formation and dismissal.

*Citation:* Teorell, Jan, and Staffan I. Lindberg. 2019. "Beyond Democracy-Dictatorship Measures: A New Framework Capturing Executive Bases of Power, 1789-2016". *Perspectives on Politics* 17(1):66-84; *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

### 5.3.3 Hereditary dimension index (D) (v2x\_ex\_hereditary)

*Project Manager(s):* Jan Teorell

*Question:* To what extent is the power base of the chief executive determined by hereditary succession?

*Clarification:* Representing one of five regime dimensions, each of which may be more or less present in any given case, this index taps into the extent to which the appointment and dismissal of the chief executive is based on hereditary rule.

*Scale:* Interval, from low to high (0-1).

*Source(s):* v2expathhs v2expathhg v2exremhsp\_ord v2exrmhsol\_2 v2exrmhsol\_3 v2exrmhsol\_4 v2exhoshog v2ex\_hosw

*Data release:* 9-12.

*Aggregation:* The index is based on whether the "chief executive" was (a) appointed through hereditary succession or by a royal council, and (b) can be dismissed by a royal council. Both condition (a) and (b) are coded as present (1) or not (0); we then average across the two. In nominally dual systems, where the head of state (HOS) and the head of government (HOG) are not the same individual, we determine who is the "chief executive" by comparing HOS and HOG powers over the appointment and dismissal of cabinet ministers. We aggregate across the two executives by taking the average weighted by their relative powers over cabinet formation and dismissal.

*Citation:* Teorell, Jan, and Staffan I. Lindberg. 2019. "Beyond Democracy-Dictatorship Measures: A New Framework Capturing Executive Bases of Power, 1789-2016". *Perspectives on Politics* 17(1):66-84; *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

### 5.3.4 Military dimension index (D) (v2x\_ex\_military)

*Project Manager(s):* Jan Teorell

*Question:* To what extent is the power base of the chief executive determined by the military?

*Clarification:* Representing one of five regime dimensions, each of which may be more or less present in any given case, this index taps into the extent to which the appointment and dismissal of the chief executive is based on the threat or actual use of military force.

*Scale:* Interval, from low to high (0-1).

*Source(s):* v2expathhs v2expathhg v2exremhsp\_ord v2exrmhsol\_2 v2exrmhsol\_3 v2exrmhsol\_4 v2exhoshog v2ex\_hosw v2exremhog v2exrmhgnp\_2 v2exrmhgnp\_3 v2exrmhgnp\_4 v2ex\_elechos v2ex\_elechog v2ex\_hogw

*Data release:* 9-12.

*Aggregation:* The index is based on whether the "chief executive" was (a) appointed through a coup, rebellion or by the military, and (b) can be dismissed by the military. Both condition (a) and (b) are coded as present (1) or not (0); we then average across the two. In nominally dual systems, where the head of state (HOS) and the head of government (HOG) are not the same individual, we determine who is the "chief executive" by comparing HOS and HOG powers over the appointment and dismissal of cabinet ministers. We aggregate across the two executives by taking the average weighted by their relative powers over cabinet formation and dismissal.

*Citation:* Teorell, Jan, and Staffan I. Lindberg. 2019. "Beyond Democracy-Dictatorship Measures: A New Framework Capturing Executive Bases of Power, 1789-2016". *Perspectives on Politics* 17(1):66-84; *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

### 5.3.5 Ruling party dimension index (D) (v2x\_ex\_party)

*Project Manager(s):* Jan Teorell

*Question:* To what extent is the power base of the chief executive determined by a ruling party?

*Clarification:* Representing one of five regime dimensions, each of which may be more or less present in any given case, this index taps into the extent to which a ruling party appoints and dismisses the chief executive.

*Scale:* Interval, from low to high (0-1).

*Source(s):* v2expathhs v2expathhg v2exremhsp\_ord v2exrmhsol\_2 v2exrmhsol\_3 v2exrmhsol\_4 v2exhoshog v2ex\_hosw

*Data release:* 9-12.

*Aggregation:* The index is based on whether the "chief executive" was (a) appointed by the ruling party, and (b) can be dismissed by the ruling party. Both condition (a) and (b) are coded as present (1) or not (0); we then average across the two. In nominally dual systems, where the head of state (HOS) and the head of government (HOG) are not the same individual, we determine who is the "chief executive" by comparing HOS and HOG powers over the appointment and dismissal of cabinet ministers. We aggregate across the two executives by taking the average weighted by their relative powers over cabinet formation and dismissal.

*Citation:* Teorell, Jan, and Staffan I. Lindberg. 2019. "Beyond Democracy-Dictatorship Measures: A New Framework Capturing Executive Bases of Power, 1789-2016". Perspectives on Politics 17(1):66-84; *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

## 5.4 Neopatrimonialism

### 5.4.1 Neopatrimonial Rule Index (D) (v2x\_neopat)

*Project Manager(s):* Rachel Sigman, Staffan Lindberg

*Additional versions:* \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

*Question:* To what extent is rule based on personal authority?

*Clarification:* Neopatrimonial rule reflects the idea that personalistic forms of authority pervade formal regime institutions (Clapham, 1985). According to Bratton and Van de Walle (1997) a neopatrimonialism regime is one that combines clientelistic political relationships, strong and unconstrained presidents and the use of public resources for political legitimation. The index is constructed using Bayesian Factor Analysis of 16 indicators representing these three concepts. The sixteen indicators are those included in the three sub-indices: Clientelism, Presidentialism and Regime Corruption. The point estimates for this index have been reversed such that the directionality is opposite to the input variables. That is, lower scores indicate a normatively better situation (e.g. more democratic) and higher scores a normatively worse situation (e.g. less democratic). Note that this directionality is opposite of that of other V-Dem indices, which generally run from normatively worse to better.

*Scale:* Interval, from low to high (0-1).

*Source(s):* v2elvotbuy v2dlencmps v2psprlnks v2exrescon v2lgotovst v2lgfunds v2lginvstp v2juhcind v2juncind v2juhccomp v2jucomp v2elembaut v2exembev v2exbribe v2lgcrpt v2jucorrdc v2x\_elecreg

*Data release:* 9-12.

*Aggregation:* The index is formed by taking the reversed point estimates (so that higher scores = more neopatrimonialism) from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for vote buying (v2elvotbuy), particularistic vs. public goods (v2dlencmps), party linkages (v2psprlnks), executive respects constitution (v2exrescon), executive oversight (v2lgotovst), legislature controls resources (v2lgfunds), legislature investigates the executive in practice (v2lginvstp), high court independence (v2juhcind), low court independence (v2juncind), compliance with high court (v2juhccomp), compliance with judiciary (v2jucomp), electoral management body autonomy (v2elembaut), executive embezzlement and theft (v2exembev), executive bribes and corrupt exchanges (v2exbribe), legislative corruption (v2lgcrpt) and



judicial corruption (v2jucorrde).

*Citation:* Sigman and Lindberg (2017, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2017:56); Sigman and Lindberg (2018); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

*Convergence:* Model parameters with convergence issues: intercept.

#### 5.4.2 Clientelism Index (D) (v2xnp\_client)

*Project Manager(s):* Rachel Sigman, Staffan Lindberg

*Additional versions:* \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

*Question:* To what extent are politics based on clientelistic relationships?

*Clarification:* Clientelistic relationships include the targeted, contingent distribution of resources (goods, services, jobs, money, etc) in exchange for political support. The point estimates for this index have been reversed such that the directionality is opposite to the input variables. That is, lower scores indicate a normatively better situation (e.g. more democratic) and higher scores a normatively worse situation (e.g. less democratic). Note that this directionality is opposite of that of other V-Dem indices, which generally run from normatively worse to better.

*Scale:* Interval, from low to high (0-1).

*Source(s):* v2elvotbuy v2dlencmps v2psprlnks v2x\_elecreg

*Data release:* 9-12.

*Aggregation:* The index is formed by taking the reversed point estimates (so that higher scores = more clientelism) from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for vote-buying (v2elvotbuy), particularistic vs. public goods (v2dlencmps) and whether party linkages are programmatic or clientelistic (v2psprlnks).

*Citation:* Sigman and Lindberg (2017, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2017:56); Sigman and Lindberg (2018); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

#### 5.4.3 Presidentialism Index (D) (v2xnp\_pres)

*Project Manager(s):* Rachel Sigman, Staffan Lindberg

*Additional versions:* \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

*Question:* To what extent is the regime characterized by presidentialism?

*Clarification:* Presidentialism means the "systemic concentration of political power in the hands of one individual who resists delegating all but the most trivial decision making tasks" (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997: 63). It relates closely to V-Dem's index of Horizontal Accountability (v2x\_horacc) but focuses more specifically on the extent to which the President is free from constraints by other institutions or actors. The point estimates for this index have been reversed such that the directionality is opposite to the input variables. That is, lower scores indicate a normatively better situation (e.g. more democratic) and higher scores a normatively worse situation (e.g. less democratic). Note that this directionality is opposite of that of other V-Dem indices, which generally run from normatively worse to better.

*Scale:* Interval, from low to high (0-1).

*Source(s):* v2exrescon v2lgotovst v2lgfunds v2lginvstp v2juhcind v2juncind v2juhccomp v2jucomp v2lembaut v2lgbicam

*Data release:* 9-12.

*Aggregation:* The index is formed by taking the reversed point estimates (so that higher scores = more presidentialism) from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for executive respect for the constitution (v2exrescon), whether there are mechanisms for oversight of the executive other than the legislature (v2lgotovst). For legislative constraints, the index includes an indicator of whether the legislature controls its own resources (v2lgfunds) and investigates the executive in practice (v2lginvstp). There are four indicators of judicial constraints on



the executive: high court independence (v2juhcind), lower court independence (v2jucnind), compliance with high court (v2juhccomp) and compliance with judiciary (v2jucomp). Finally, the index includes a measure of autonomy of the electoral management body (v2elembaut) that captures whether or not the President can influence its decisions and actions.

*Citation:* Sigman and Lindberg (2017, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2017:56); Sigman and Lindberg (2018); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

*Convergence:* Model parameters with convergence issues: intercept.

#### 5.4.4 Regime corruption (D) (v2xnp\_regcorr)

*Project Manager(s):* Rachel Sigman, Staffan Lindberg

*Additional versions:* \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

*Question:* To what extent do political actors use political office for private or political gain?

*Clarification:* In systems of neopatrimonial rule, politicians use their offices for private and/or political gain. This index relates closely to V-Dem's political corruption index (v2x\_corr), but focuses on a more specific set of actors – those who occupy political offices - and a more specific set of corrupt acts that relate more closely to the conceptualization of corruption in literature on neopatrimonial rule. The point estimates for this index have been reversed such that the directionality is opposite to the input variables. That is, lower scores indicate a normatively better situation (e.g. more democratic) and higher scores a normatively worse situation (e.g. less democratic). Note that this directionality is opposite of that of other V-Dem indices, which generally run from normatively worse to better.

*Scale:* Interval, from low to high (0-1).

*Source(s):* v2exembev v2exbribe v2lgcrprt v2jucorrdc

*Data release:* 9-12.

*Aggregation:* The index is formed by taking the reversed point estimates (so that higher scores = more regime corruption) from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for executive executive embezzlement (v2exembev), executive bribes (v2exbribe), legislative corruption (v2xlgrprt) and judicial corruption (v2jucorrdc).

*Citation:* Sigman and Lindberg (2017, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2017:56); Sigman and Lindberg (2018); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

## 5.5 Civil liberties

### 5.5.1 Civil liberties index (D) (v2x\_civlib)

*Project Manager(s):* Svend-Erik Skaaning

*Additional versions:* \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

*Question:* To what extent is civil liberty respected?

*Clarification:* Civil liberty is understood as liberal freedom, where freedom is a property of individuals. Civil liberty is constituted by the absence of physical violence committed by government agents and the absence of constraints of private liberties and political liberties by the government.

*Scale:* Interval, from low to high (0-1).

*Source(s):* v2x\_clpriv v2x\_clphy v2x\_clpol

*Data release:* 6-12.

*Aggregation:* The index is formed by taking the average of physical violence index (v2x\_clphy), political civil liberties index (v2x\_clpol), and private civil liberties (v2x\_clpriv).

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

### 5.5.2 Physical violence index (D) (v2x\_clphy)

*Project Manager(s):* Svend-Erik Skaaning

*Additional versions:* \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

*Question:* To what extent is physical integrity respected?

*Clarification:* Physical integrity is understood as freedom from political killings and torture by the government. Among the set of civil liberties, these liberal rights are the most relevant for political competition and accountability. The index is based on indicators that reflect violence committed by government agents and that are not directly referring to elections.

*Scale:* Interval, from low to high (0-1).

*Source(s):* v2cltort v2clkill

*Data release:* 6-12.

*Aggregation:* We estimate the index by averaging two indicators: freedom from torture (v2cltort) and freedom from political killings (v2clkill).

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

### 5.5.3 Political civil liberties index (D) (v2x\_clpol)

*Project Manager(s):* Svend-Erik Skaaning

*Additional versions:* \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

*Question:* To what extent are political liberties respected?

*Clarification:* Political liberties are understood as freedom of association and freedom of expression. Among the set of civil liberties, these liberal rights are the most relevant for political competition and accountability. The index is based on indicators that reflect government repression and that are not directly referring to elections.

*Scale:* Interval, from low to high (0-1).

*Source(s):* v2xcl\_disc v2mecenefm v2meharjrn v2meslfcen v2clacfree v2psparban v2psbars v2psoppaut v2cseeorgs v2csreprss

*Data release:* 6-12.

*Aggregation:* The index is formed by point estimates drawn from a Bayesian factor analysis model including the following indicators: government censorship effort — media (v2mecenefm), harassment of journalists (v2meharjrn), media self-censorship (v2meslfcen), freedom of discussion for men and women (v2cldiscm, v2cldiscw), freedom of academic and cultural expression (v2clacfree), party ban (v2psparban), barriers to parties (v2psbars), opposition parties autonomy (v2psoppaut), CSO entry and exit (v2cseeorgs) and CSO repression (v2csreprss).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

### 5.5.4 Private civil liberties index (D) (v2x\_clpriv)

*Project Manager(s):* Svend-Erik Skaaning

*Additional versions:* \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

*Question:* To what extent are private liberties respected?

*Clarification:* Private liberties are understood as freedom of movement, freedom of religion, freedom from forced labor, and property rights. The index is based on indicators that reflect government repression and that are not directly referring to elections.

*Scale:* Interval, from low to high (0-1).

*Source(s):* v2xcl\_slave v2xcl\_prpty v2clfmov v2xcl\_dmov v2clrelig v2csrlgrev

*Data release:* 6-12.

*Aggregation:* The index is formed by point estimates drawn from a Bayesian factor analysis model including the following indicators: property rights for men/women (v2clprptym, v2clprptyw), from forced labor for men/women (v2clslavem v2clslavef), freedom of religion (v2clrelig), religious organization repression (v2csrlgrev), freedom of foreign movement (v2clfmov), and freedom of domestic movement for men/women (v2cldmovm, v2cldmovw).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

## 5.6 Exclusion

### 5.6.1 Exclusion by Socio-Economic Group (D) (v2xpe\_exlecon)

*Project Manager(s):* Staffan I. Lindberg

*Additional versions:* \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

*Question:* Index of (political) exclusion by socio-economic group

*Clarification:* Exclusion is when individuals are denied access to services or participation in governed spaces (spaces that are part of the public space and the government should regulate, while excluding private spaces and organizations except when exclusion in those private spheres is linked to exclusion in the public sphere) based on their identity or belonging to a particular group. The point estimates for this index have been reversed such that the directionality is opposite to the input variables. That is, lower scores indicate a normatively better situation (e.g. more democratic) and higher scores a normatively worse situation (e.g. less democratic). Note that this directionality is opposite of that of other V-Dem indices, which generally run from normatively worse to better.

*Scale:* Interval, from low to high (0-1)

*Source(s):* v2pepwrses v2clacjust v2peapsecon v2peasjsoecon v2peasbecon

*Data release:* 9-12.

*Aggregation:* The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators power distributed by socio-economic group (v2pepwrses), socio-economic position equality in respect for civil liberties (v2clacjust), access to public services by socio-economic group (v2peapsecon), access to state jobs by socio-economic group (v2peasjsoecon), and access to state business opportunities by socio-economic group (v2peasbecon).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2021

*Convergence:* Model parameters with convergence issues: intercept.

### 5.6.2 Exclusion by Gender index (D) (v2xpe\_exlgender)

*Project Manager(s):* Staffan I. Lindberg

*Additional versions:* \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

*Question:* Index of (political) exclusion by gender

*Clarification:* Exclusion is when individuals are denied access to services or participation in governed spaces (spaces that are part of the public space and the government should regulate, while excluding private spaces and organizations except when exclusion in those private spheres is linked to exclusion in the public sphere) based on their identity or belonging to a particular group. The point estimates for this index have been reversed such that the directionality is opposite to the input variables. That is, lower scores indicate a normatively better situation (e.g. more democratic) and higher scores a normatively worse situation (e.g. less democratic). Note that this directionality is opposite of that of other V-Dem indices, which generally run from normatively worse to better.

*Scale:* Interval, from low to high (0-1)

*Source(s):* v2pepwrgen v2clgenc1 v2peapsgen v2peasjgen v2peasbgen

*Data release:* 9-12.

*Aggregation:* The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators power distributed by gender (v2pepwgen), equality in respect for civil liberties by gender (v2clgenc1), access to public services by gender (v2peapsgen), access to state jobs by gender (v2peasjgen), and access to state business opportunities by gender (v2peasbgen).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2021

### 5.6.3 Exclusion by Urban-Rural Location index (D) (v2xpe\_exlgeo)

*Project Manager(s):* Staffan I. Lindberg

*Additional versions:* \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

*Question:* Index of (political) exclusion by urban-rural location

*Clarification:* Exclusion is when individuals are denied access to services or participation in governed spaces (spaces that are part of the public space and the government should regulate, while excluding private spaces and organizations except when exclusion in those private spheres is linked to exclusion in the public sphere) based on their identity or belonging to a particular group. The point estimates for this index have been reversed such that the directionality is opposite to the input variables. That is, lower scores indicate a normatively better situation (e.g. more democratic) and higher scores a normatively worse situation (e.g. less democratic). Note that this directionality is opposite of that of other V-Dem indices, which generally run from normatively worse to better.

*Scale:* Interval, from low to high (0-1)

*Source(s):* v2pepwrggeo v2clgeocl v2peapsgeo v2peasjgeo v2peasbegeo

*Data release:* 9-12.

*Aggregation:* The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators power distributed by urban-rural location (v2pepwrggeo), urban-rural equality in respect for civil liberties (v2clgeocl), access to public services by urban-rural location (v2peapsgeo), access to state jobs by urban-rural location (v2peasjgeo), and access to state business opportunities by urban-rural location (v2peasbegeo).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2021

*Convergence:* Model parameters with convergence issues: intercept, measurement standard error.

### 5.6.4 Exclusion by Political Group index (D) (v2xpe\_exlpol)

*Project Manager(s):* Staffan I. Lindberg

*Additional versions:* \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

*Question:* Index of (political) exclusion by political group

*Clarification:* Exclusion is when individuals are denied access to services or participation in governed spaces (spaces that are part of the public space and the government should regulate, while excluding private spaces and organizations except when exclusion in those private spheres is linked to exclusion in the public sphere) based on their identity or belonging to a particular group. The point estimates for this index have been reversed such that the directionality is opposite to the input variables. That is, lower scores indicate a normatively better situation (e.g. more democratic) and higher scores a normatively worse situation (e.g. less democratic). Note that this directionality is opposite of that of other V-Dem indices, which generally run from normatively worse to better.

*Scale:* Interval, from low to high (0-1)

*Source(s):* v2clpolcl v2peapspol v2peasjpol v2peasbepol

*Data release:* 9-12.

*Aggregation:* The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators political group equality in respect for civil liberties (v2clpolcl), access to public services by political group (v2peapspol), access to state jobs by political group (v2peasjpol), and access to state business opportunities by political group (v2peasbpol).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2021

*Convergence:* Model parameters with convergence issues: intercept.

#### 5.6.5 Exclusion by Social Group index (D) (v2xpe\_exlsocgr)

*Project Manager(s):* Staffan I. Lindberg

*Additional versions:* \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

*Question:* Index of (political) exclusion by social group

*Clarification:* Exclusion is when individuals are denied access to services or participation in governed spaces (spaces that are part of the public space and the government should regulate, while excluding private spaces and organizations except when exclusion in those private spheres is linked to exclusion in the public sphere) based on their identity or belonging to a particular group. The point estimates for this index have been reversed such that the directionality is opposite to the input variables. That is, lower scores indicate a normatively better situation (e.g. more democratic) and higher scores a normatively worse situation (e.g. less democratic). Note that this directionality is opposite of that of other V-Dem indices, which generally run from normatively worse to better.

*Scale:* Interval, from low to high (0-1)

*Source(s):* v2pepwr soc v2clsocgrp v2peapssoc v2peasjsoc v2peasbsoc

*Data release:* 9-12.

*Aggregation:* The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators power distributed by social group (v2pepwr soc), social group equality in respect for civil liberties (v2clsocgrp), access to public services by social group (v2peapssoc), access to state jobs by social group (v2peasjsoc), and access to state business opportunities by social group (v2peasbsoc).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2021

## 5.7 Corruption

### 5.7.1 Political corruption index (D) (v2x\_corr)

*Project Manager(s):* Jan Teorell

*Additional versions:* \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

*Question:* How pervasive is political corruption?

*Clarification:* The directionality of the V-Dem corruption index runs from less corrupt to more corrupt unlike the other V-Dem variables that generally run from less democratic to more democratic situation. The corruption index includes measures of six distinct types of corruption that cover both different areas and levels of the polity realm, distinguishing between executive, legislative and judicial corruption. Within the executive realm, the measures also distinguish between corruption mostly pertaining to bribery and corruption due to embezzlement. Finally, they differentiate between corruption in the highest echelons of the executive at the level of the rulers/cabinet on the one hand, and in the public sector at large on the other. The measures thus tap into several distinguished types of corruption: both 'petty' and 'grand'; both bribery and theft; both corruption aimed and influencing law making and that affecting implementation.

*Scale:* Interval, from low to high (0-1).

*Source(s):* v2x\_pubcorr v2x\_execorr v2lgcrrpt v2jucorrdc

*Data release:* 5-12.

*Aggregation:* The index is arrived at by taking the average of (a) public sector corruption index (v2x\_pubcorr); (b) executive corruption index (v2x\_execorr); (c) the indicator for legislative corruption (v2lgcrrpt); and (d) the indicator for judicial corruption (v2jucorrdc). In other words, these four different government spheres are weighted equally in the resulting index. We replace missing values for countries with no legislature by only taking the average of a, b and d.

*Citation:* McMann *et al.* (2016, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2016:23); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

### 5.7.2 Executive corruption index (D) (v2x\_execorr)

*Project Manager(s):* Jan Teorell

*Additional versions:* \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

*Question:* How routinely do members of the executive, or their agents grant favors in exchange for bribes, kickbacks, or other material inducements, and how often do they steal, embezzle, or misappropriate public funds or other state resources for personal or family use?

*Clarification:* The point estimates for this index have been reversed such that the directionality is opposite to the input variables. That is, lower scores indicate a normatively better situation (e.g. more democratic) and higher scores a normatively worse situation (e.g. less democratic). Note that this directionality is opposite of that of other V-Dem indices, which generally run from normatively worse to better.

*Scale:* Interval, from low to high (0-1).

*Source(s):* v2exbribe v2exembezz

*Data release:* 5-12.

*Aggregation:* We estimate the index by averaging two indicators: executive bribery (v2exbribe) and executive embezzlement (v2exembezz).

*Citation:* McMann *et al.* (2016, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2016:23); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

### 5.7.3 Public sector corruption index (D) (v2x\_pubcorr)

*Project Manager(s):* Jan Teorell

*Additional versions:* \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

*Question:* To what extent do public sector employees grant favors in exchange for bribes, kickbacks, or other material inducements, and how often do they steal, embezzle, or misappropriate public funds or other state resources for personal or family use?

*Clarification:* The point estimates for this index have been reversed such that the directionality is opposite to the input variables. That is, lower scores indicate a normatively better situation (e.g. more democratic) and higher scores a normatively worse situation (e.g. less democratic). Note that this directionality is opposite of that of other V-Dem indices, which generally run from normatively worse to better.

*Scale:* Interval, from low to high (0-1).

*Source(s):* v2excrptps v2extthftps

*Data release:* 5-12.

*Aggregation:* We estimate the index by averaging two indicators: public sector bribery (v2excrptps) and embezzlement (v2extthftps).

*Citation:* McMann *et al.* (2016, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2016:23); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).



Years: 1789-2021

## 5.8 Women's Empowerment

### 5.8.1 Women political empowerment index (D) (v2x\_gender)

*Project Manager(s)*: Pamela Paxton

*Additional versions*: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

*Question*: How politically empowered are women?

*Clarification*: Women's political empowerment is defined as a process of increasing capacity for women, leading to greater choice, agency, and participation in societal decision-making. It is understood to incorporate three equally-weighted dimensions: fundamental civil liberties, women's open discussion of political issues and participation in civil society organizations, and the descriptive representation of women in formal political positions.

*Scale*: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

*Source(s)*: v2x\_gencl v2x\_gencs v2x\_genpp

*Data release*: 5-12.

*Aggregation*: The index is formed by taking the average of women's civil liberties index (v2x\_gencl), women's civil society participation index (v2x\_gencs), and women's political participation index (v2x\_genpp).

*Citation*: Sundström *et al.* (2017, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2017:19); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2021

### 5.8.2 Women civil liberties index (D) (v2x\_gencl)

*Project Manager(s)*: Pamela Paxton

*Additional versions*: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

*Question*: Do women have the ability to make meaningful decisions in key areas of their lives?

*Clarification*: Women's civil liberties are understood to include freedom of domestic movement, the right to private property, freedom from forced labor, and access to justice.

*Scale*: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

*Source(s)*: v2cldmovew v2clslavef v2clprptyw v2clacjstw

*Data release*: 5-12.

*Aggregation*: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for freedom of domestic movement for women (v2cldmovew), freedom from forced labor for women (v2clslavef), property rights for women (v2clprptyw), and access to justice for women (v2clacjstw).

*Citation*: Sundström *et al.* (2017, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2017:19); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 1789-2021

### 5.8.3 Women civil society participation index (D) (v2x\_gencs)

*Project Manager(s)*: Pamela Paxton

*Additional versions*: \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

*Question*: Do women have the ability to express themselves and to form and participate in groups?

*Clarification*: Women's civil society participation is understood to include open discussion of political issues, participation in civil society organizations, and representation in the ranks of journalists.

*Scale*: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

*Source(s)*: v2cldiscw v2csgender v2mefemjrn



*Data release:* 5-12.

*Aggregation:* The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for freedom of discussion for women (v2cldiscw), CSO women's participation (v2csgender), and female journalists (v2mefemjrn).

*Citation:* Sundström *et al.* (2017, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2017:19); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

#### 5.8.4 Women political participation index (D) (v2x\_genpp)

*Project Manager(s):* Pamela Paxton

*Additional versions:* \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

*Question:* Are women descriptively represented in formal political positions?

*Clarification:* Women's political participation is understood to include women's descriptive representation in the legislature and an equal share in the overall distribution of power.

*Scale:* Interval, from low to high (0-1).

*Source(s):* v2lgfemleg v2pepwrgen v2lgbicam

*Data release:* 5-12.

*Aggregation:* The index is formed by taking the average of the indicators for lower chamber female legislators (v2lgfemleg, standardized) and power distributed by gender (v2pepwrgen).

*Citation:* Sundström *et al.* (2017, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2017:19); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

### 5.9 Rule of Law

#### 5.9.1 Rule of law index (D) (v2x\_rule)

*Project Manager(s):* Svend-Erik Skaaning and Jeffrey Staton

*Additional versions:* \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

*Question:* To what extent are laws transparently, independently, predictably, impartially, and equally enforced, and to what extent do the actions of government officials comply with the law?

*Scale:* Interval, from low to high (0-1).

*Source(s):* v2exrescon v2exbribe v2exembev v2excrptps v2exthtfts v2juacct v2juccrdc v2juhcind v2juncind v2juhccomp v2jucomp v2cltrslw v2clrspct v2xcl\_acjst

*Data release:* 9-12.

*Aggregation:* The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for compliance with high court (v2juhccomp), compliance with judiciary (v2jucomp), high court independence (v2juhcind), lower court independence (v2juncind), executive respects constitution (v2exrescon), rigorous and impartial public administration (v2clrspct), transparent laws with predictable enforcement (v2cltrslw), access to justice for men (v2clacjstm), access to justice for women (v2clacjstw), judicial accountability (v2juacct), judicial corruption decision (v2juccrdc), public sector corrupt exchanges (v2excrptps), public sector theft (v2exthtfts), executive bribery and corrupt exchanges (v2exbribe), executive embezzlement and theft (v2exembev).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

#### 5.9.2 Access to justice (D) (v2xcl\_acjst)

*Project Manager(s):* Pamela Paxton, Svend-Erik Skaaning

*Additional versions:* \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

*Question:* Do citizens enjoy secure and effective access to justice?

*Scale:* Interval, from low to high (0-1).

*Source(s):* v2clacjstm v2clacjstw

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Aggregation:* We estimate the index by averaging two indicators: access to justice for men (v2clacjstm) and women (v2clacjstw).

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

### 5.9.3 Property rights (D) (v2xcl\_prpty)

*Project Manager(s):* Pamela Paxton, Svend-Erik Skaaning

*Additional versions:* \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

*Question:* Do citizens enjoy the right to private property?

*Clarification:* Private property includes the right to acquire, possess, inherit, and sell private property, including land. Limits on property rights may come from the state which may legally limit rights or fail to enforce them; customary laws and practices; or religious or social norms. This question concerns the right to private property, not actual ownership of property.

*Scale:* Interval, from low to high (0-1).

*Source(s):* v2clprptym v2clprptyw

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Aggregation:* We estimate the index by averaging two indicators: property rights for men (v2clprptym) and women (v2clprptyw).

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

## 5.10 Direct Democracy

### 5.10.1 Popular initiative index (D) (v2xdd\_i\_ci)

*Project Manager(s):* David Altman

*Question:* To what extent is the *popular initiative* utilized?

*Scale:* Interval, from low to high (0-1).

*Source(s):* v2ddlexci v2ddsigpci v2ddsiglci v2ddsigdci v2ddpartci v2ddapprci v2ddspmc  
v2ddadmci v2ddyrcci v2ddthreci

*Data release:* 7-12.

*Aggregation:* This index receives a maximum score of two resulting from the addition of the two terms easiness of initiation and easiness of approval of popular initiatives, where each term obtains a maximum value of one.

The ease of initiation is measured by:

- The existence of a direct democracy process v2ddlexci,
- The number of signatures needed v2ddsigpci, and
- Time-limits to circulate the signatures v2ddsigdci.

Easiness of approval is measured by the surface of the polygon determined by:

- Participation quorum v2ddpartci,
- Approval quorum v2ddapprci, and
- Supermajority v2ddspmc.

For an elaboration of the interaction among quorums, see David Altman (2017). The resulting score is then multiplied with (d) district majority v2ddadmci.

Consequences are measured by:

- The legal status of the decision made by citizens binding or merely consultative v2ddlexci, and
- The frequency and degree of success with which direct popular votes have been held in the past v2ddthreci. The baseline for those countries that have the legal apparatus to hold a particular MDD but have never experienced one is 0.1.

The index is aggregated using this formula:

$$\begin{aligned}
 v2xdd\_i\_ci &= [(IF\ v2ddlexci > 0, 1, 0) \times (1 - v2ddsigpci)) \\
 &\times (IF\ v2ddsigdci = 0, 1, 0.5 + v2ddsigdci/365/2) \\
 &+ (v2ddsigdci) \cap (v2ddpartci) \cap (v2ddspmc i)] \\
 &\times (0.5 + 1 - v2ddadmci/2)] \\
 &\times (IF\ v2ddlexci = 1, 0.75, 1 \times IF\ years\ since\ last\ successful \\
 &\quad event < 6, then\ v2ddthreci = 1, afterwards\ decreases\ by\ 0.06 \\
 &\quad then\ v2ddthreci = 1, afterwards\ decreases\ by\ 0.06\ units\ per\ year \\
 &\quad until\ 0.1; if\ the\ event\ was\ not\ successful\ during\ the\ first\ years \\
 &\quad v2ddthreci=0.9, afterwards\ decreases\ by\ 0.1 \\
 &\quad units\ per\ year\ until\ 0.1)
 \end{aligned}$$

*Country–Year Aggregation:* Last

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2021

### 5.10.2 Popular referendum index (D) (v2xdd\_i\_rf)

*Project Manager(s):* David Altman

*Question:* To what extent is the *referendum* utilized?

*Scale:* Interval, from low to high (0-1).

*Source(s):* v2ddlexrf v2ddsigprf v2ddsigdrf v2ddpartrf v2ddapprf v2ddspmr f v2ddadmrf v2ddyrrf v2ddthrerf

*Data release:* 7-12.

*Aggregation:* This index receives a maximum score of two resulting from the addition of the two terms easiness of initiation and easiness of approval of referendums, where each term obtains a maximum value of one.

The ease of initiation is measured by:

- The existence of a direct democracy process v2ddlexrf,
- The number of signatures needed v2ddsigprf,

- Time-limits to circulate the signatures v2ddsigdrf.

Easiness of approval is measured by the surface of the polygon determined by:

- Participation quorum v2ddpartrf,
- Approval quorum v2ddapprf, and
- Supermajority v2ddspmr. For an elaboration of the interaction among quorums, see David Altman 2016.

The resulting score is then multiplied with d district majority v2ddadmrf.

Consequences are measured by:

- The legal status of the decision made by citizens binding or merely consultative v2ddlexrf, and
- The frequency and degree of success with which direct popular votes have been held in the past v2ddthrerf. The baseline for those countries that have the legal apparatus to hold a particular MDD but have never experienced one is 0.1.

The index is aggregated using this *formula*:

$$\begin{aligned}
 v2xdd\_i\_rf = & [(IF \ v2ddlexrf > 0, 1, 0) \times (1 - v2ddsigprf) \\
 & \times (IF \ v2ddsigdrf = 0, 1, .5 + (v2ddsigdrf \times 2)/365) \\
 & + (v2ddpartrf \cap v2ddapprf \cap v2ddspmr)] \times (0.5 + (1 - v2ddadmrf)/2) \\
 & \times (IF \ v2ddlexrf = 1, .75, 1) \times (IF \ years \ since \ last \ successful \ event < 6, \\
 & \text{then } v2ddthrerf = 1, \text{ afterwards decreases by } .06 \text{ units per year until } .1, \\
 & \text{if the event was not successful during the first years } v2ddthrerf = .9, \\
 & \text{afterwards decreases by } 0.1 \text{ units per year until } .1)
 \end{aligned}$$

*Country-Year Aggregation:* Last

*Citation:* V-Dem Codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2021

### 5.10.3 Obligatory referendum index (D) (v2xdd\_i\_or)

*Project Manager(s):* David Altman

*Question:* To what extent is the *obligatory referendum* utilized?

*Scale:* Interval, from low to high (0-1).

*Source(s):* v2ddlexor v2ddpartor v2ddappor v2ddspmor v2ddadmor v2ddthreor

*Data release:* 7-12.

*Aggregation:* This index receives a maximum score of two resulting from the addition of the two terms easiness of initiation and easiness of approval of obligatory referendums, where each term obtains a maximum value of one.

The ease of initiation is measured by:

- The existence of a direct democracy process v2ddlexor.

Easiness of approval is measured by the surface of the polygon determined by:

- Participation quorum  $v2ddpartor$
- Approval quorum  $v2ddappor$ , and
- Supermajority  $V2ddspmor$ . For an elaboration of the interaction among quorums, see David Altman 2017.

The resulting score is then multiplied with (d) district majority  $v2ddadmor$ .

Consequences are measured by:

- The legal status of the decision made by citizens binding or merely consultative  $v2ddlexor$ , and
- The frequency and degree of success with which direct popular votes have been held in the past  $v2ddthreor$ .

The index is aggregated using this formula:

$$\begin{aligned}
 v2xdd\_i\_or = & (IF\ v2ddlexor > 0, 1, 0) + (v2ddpartor) \cap v2ddappor \cap V2ddspmor) \\
 & \times ((.5 + (1 - v2ddadmor)/2) \times (IF\ v2ddlexor = 1, .75, 1) \\
 & \times (IF\ years\ since\ last\ successful\ event < 6, then\ v2ddthreor = 1, \\
 & afterwards\ decreases\ by\ .06\ units\ per\ year\ until\ .1, \\
 & if\ the\ event\ was\ not\ successful\ during\ the\ first\ years\ v2ddthreor = .9, \\
 & afterwards\ decreases\ by\ .1\ units\ per\ year\ until\ .1)
 \end{aligned}$$

*Country–Year Aggregation:* Last

*Citation:* V-Dem Codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2021

#### 5.10.4 Plebiscite index (D) ( $v2xdd\_i\_pl$ )

*Project Manager(s):* David Altman

*Question:* To what extent is the *plebiscite* utilized?

*Scale:* Interval, from low to high (0-1).

*Source(s):*  $v2ddlexpl$   $v2ddpartpl$   $v2ddapprpl$   $v2ddspmpl$   $v2ddadmpl$   $v2ddyrpl$   $v2ddthrepl$

*Data release:* 7-12.

*Aggregation:* This index receives a maximum score of two resulting from the addition of the two terms easiness of initiation and easiness of approval of plebiscites, where each term obtains a maximum value of one.

The ease of initiation is measured by:

- The existence of a direct democracy process  $v2ddlexpl$ .

Easiness of approval is measured by the surface of the polygon determined by:

- Participation quorum  $v2ddpartpl$ ,
- Approval quorum  $v2ddapprpl$ , and
- Supermajority  $v2ddspmpl$ . For an elaboration of the interaction among quorums, see David Altman 2017.

The resulting score is then multiplied with (d) district majority  $v2ddadmpl$ .  
Consequences are measured by:

- The legal status of the decision made by citizens (binding or merely consultative) ( $v2ddlexpl$ ), and
- The frequency and degree of success with which direct popular votes have been held in the past ( $v2ddthrepl$ ). The baseline for those countries that have the legal apparatus to hold a particular MDD but have never experienced one is 0.1.

The index is aggregated using this formula:

$$\begin{aligned}
 v2xdd\_i\_pl &= (IF\ v2ddlexpl > 0, 1, 0) + (v2ddpartpl \cap v2ddapprpl \cap v2ddspmpl) \\
 &\times ((0.5 + (1 - v2ddadmpl)/2)) \times (IF\ v2ddlexpl = 1, 0.75, 1) \\
 &\times (IF\ years\ since\ last\ successful\ event < 6, then\ v2ddthrepl = 1, \\
 &\text{afterwards decreases by 0.06 units per year until 0.1,} \\
 &\text{if the event was not successful during the first years } v2ddthrepl = 0.9, \\
 &\text{afterwards decreases by 0.1 units per year until 0.1})
 \end{aligned}$$

*Country-Year Aggregation:* Last

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2021

#### 5.10.5 Citizen-initiated component of direct popular vote index (D) ( $v2xdd\_cic$ )

*Project Manager(s):* David Altman

*Question:* To what extent is the Citizen Initiated Component utilized?

*Scale:* Interval, from low to high (0-1).

*Source(s):*  $v2xdd\_i\_ci$   $v2xdd\_i\_rf$

*Data release:* 7-12.

*Aggregation:* This index is the normalized average of the scores of both indices of citizen-initiated mechanism of direct democracy popular initiatives and referendums. For an elaboration of the weighting factor of each component, see David Altman 2017. The index is aggregated using this formula:

$$v2xdd\_cic = [v2xdd\_i\_ci + v2xdd\_i\_rf]/4$$

*Country-Year Aggregation:* Last

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2021

#### 5.10.6 Top-Down component of direct popular vote index (D) ( $v2xdd\_toc$ )

*Project Manager(s):* David Altman

*Question:* To what extent is the Top-Down Component utilized?

*Scale:* Interval, from low to high (0-1).

*Source(s):*  $v2xdd\_i\_pl$   $v2xdd\_i\_or$

*Data release:* 7-12.

*Aggregation:* This index is the normalized average of the scores of both indices of mechanism of direct democracy which are not citizen-initiated obligatory referendums and plebiscites. For an elaboration of the weighting factor of each component, see David Altman 2016. The index is aggregated using this formula:

$$v2xdd\_toc = [v2xdd\_i\_pl + v2xdd\_i\_or]/4$$

*Country–Year Aggregation:* Last

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900–2021

## 5.11 Civil Society

### 5.11.1 Core civil society index (D) (v2xcs\_ccsi)

*Project Manager(s):* Michael Bernhard

*Additional versions:* \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

*Question:* How robust is civil society?

*Clarification:* The sphere of civil society lies in the public space between the private sphere and the state. Here, citizens organize in groups to pursue their collective interests and ideals. We call these groups civil society organizations CSOs. CSOs include, but are by no means limited to, interest groups, labor unions, spiritual organizations if they are engaged in civic or political activities, social movements, professional associations, charities, and other non-governmental organizations.

The core civil society index CCSI is designed to provide a measure of a robust civil society, understood as one that enjoys autonomy from the state and in which citizens freely and actively pursue their political and civic goals, however conceived.

*Scale:* Interval, from low to high (0–1).

*Source(s):* v2cseeorgs v2csreprss v2csprtcpt

*Data release:* 1–12.

*Aggregation:* The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for CSO entry and exit (v2cseeorgs), CSO repression (v2csreprss) and CSO participatory environment (v2csprtcpt).

*Citation:* Bernhard *et al.* (2015, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2015:13); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789–2021

## 5.12 Elections

### 5.12.1 Electoral regime index (A) (v2x\_elecreg)

*Project Manager(s):* Staffan I. Lindberg, Jan Teorell

*Question:* At this time, are regularly scheduled national elections on course, as stipulated by election law or well-established precedent?

*Clarification:* Coded 0 until an executive or legislative election is held, defined by v2x\_elecpres and v2x\_elecparl, then set to 1 until any of the following two events occur (if they occur): (a) that the election was "aborted", meaning that those elected did not resume power, as defined by v2x\_hosabort and v2x\_legabort; or (b) an "electoral interruption", meaning that either the legislature was shut down, as defined by v2x\_leginter, or there was an executive coup, as defined by v2x\_hosinter; in the case of (a) or (b), v2x\_elecreg is set to 0 until there is another election. The operational indicator of an "aborted" executive election (v2x\_hosabort) is that v2expathhs did not turn 7 within 12 months after the election, for a legislative election (v2x\_legabort) that v2lgbicam did not turn positive within 12 months after the election. An interruption of the electoral regime occurring through the HOS, *e.g.* a coup d'état, is indicated by v2x\_hosinter as a change in v2x\_elecpres, meaning v2expathhs turned from 7 to something



else, with the exception of 6, approval by the legislature (in case the legislature remained in place). An interruption of the electoral regime occurring through the legislature is defined by `v2xlg_leginter` based on `v2lgbicam` turning 0. We note that the coding of `v2x_elecreg` does not merely follow mechanically from the scores on these other variables, as the coding of `v2x_elecreg` has also been cross-checked and validated by research assistants. An executive and a legislative electoral regime cannot be separated since they form an integral part, where an aborted legislature is interpreted as a signal that also the executive is not standing for election any longer, and vice versa.

*Responses:*

0: No.

1: Yes.

*Scale:* Dichotomous.

*Source(s):* `v2xel_elecparl` `v2xlg_leginter` `v2xel_elecpres` `v2x_hosinter` `v2x_hosabort` `v2x_legabort` `v2ex_elechos` `v2ex_elechog`

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Country-Year Aggregation:* Maximum

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

### 5.12.2 Executive electoral regime index (A) (`v2xex_elecreg`)

*Project Manager(s):* Staffan I. Lindberg, Jan Teorell

*Question:* At this time, are regularly scheduled national elections on the executive on course, as stipulated by election law or well-established precedent?

*Clarification:* Although we advice against it, since the executive and legislative electoral regime should be considered an integral part, for completeness we also provide this separate measure of executive electoral regimes. Coded 0 until an executive election is held, defined by `v2x_elecpres`, then set to 1 until any of the following two events occur (if they occur): (a) that the election was "aborted", meaning that those elected did not resume power, as defined by `v2x_hosabort`; or (b) an "electoral interruption", meaning that there was an executive coup, as defined by `v2x_hosinter`; in the case of (a) or (b), `v2xex_elecreg` is set to 0 until there is another election.

*Responses:*

0: No.

1: Yes.

*Scale:* Dichotomous.

*Source(s):* `v2xel_elecpres` `v2x_hosinter` `v2x_hosabort` `v2ex_elechog`

*Data release:* 5-12.

*Country-Year Aggregation:* Maximum

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

### 5.12.3 Legislative electoral regime index (A) (`v2xlg_elecreg`)

*Project Manager(s):* Staffan I. Lindberg, Jan Teorell

*Question:* At this time, are regularly scheduled national elections on the legislature on course, as stipulated by election law or well-established precedent?

*Clarification:* Although we advice against it, since the executive and legislative electoral regime should be considered an integral part, for completeness we also provide this separate measure of legislative electoral regimes. Coded 0 until a legislative election is held, defined by `v2x_elecparl`, then set to 1 until any of the following two events occur (if they occur): (a) that the election was "aborted", meaning that those elected did not resume power, as defined by `v2x_legabort`; or (b) an "electoral interruption", meaning that the legislature was shut down, as defined by `v2x_leginter`; in the case of (a) or (b), `v2xlg_elecreg` is set to 0 until there is another election.

*Responses:*

0: No.

1: Yes.

*Scale:* Dichotomous.

*Source(s):* v2xel\_elecparl v2xlg\_leginter v2x\_legabort

*Data release:* 5-12.

*Country–Year Aggregation:* Maximum

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

#### 5.12.4 Electoral component index (D) (v2x\_EDcomp\_thick)

*Project Manager(s):* Jan Teorell

*Additional versions:* \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

*Question:* To what extent is the electoral principle of democracy achieved?

*Clarification:* The electoral principle of democracy seeks to achieve responsiveness and accountability between leaders and citizens through the mechanism of competitive elections. This is presumed to be achieved when suffrage is extensive; political and civil society organizations can operate freely; elections are clean and not marred by fraud or systematic irregularities; and the chief executive of a country is selected directly or indirectly through elections.

*Scale:* Interval, from low to high (0-1).

*Source(s):* v2x\_frassoc\_thick v2x\_suffr v2xel\_frefair v2x\_elecoff

*Data release:* 3-12.

*Aggregation:* The electoral component index is operationalized as a chain defined by its weakest link of freedom of association, suffrage, clean elections, and elected executive. The index is thus aggregated using this formula:

$$v2x\_EDcomp\_thick = .125 * v2x\_frassoc\_thick + .125 * v2x\_suffr + .125 * v2xel\_frefair + .125 * v2x\_elecoff + .5 * v2x\_frassoc\_thick * v2x\_suffr * v2xel\_frefair * v2x\_elecoff$$

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

#### 5.12.5 Freedom of expression index (D) (v2x\_freexp)

*Project Manager(s):* Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell

*Additional versions:* \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

*Question:* To what extent does government respect press and media freedom, the freedom of ordinary people to discuss political matters at home and in the public sphere, as well as the freedom of academic and cultural expression?

*Scale:* Interval, from low to high (0-1).

*Source(s):* v2mecenefm v2meharjrn v2meslfcen v2xcl\_disc v2clacfree

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Aggregation:* The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for print/broadcast censorship effort (v2mecenefm), harassment of journalists (v2meharjrn), media self-censorship (v2meslfcen), freedom of discussion for men/women (v2cldiscm, v2cldiscw) and freedom of academic and cultural expression (v2clacfree).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

#### 5.12.6 Presidential election aborted (D) (v2x\_\_hosabort)

*Project Manager(s):* Jan Teorell

*Question:* Have presidential election results been aborted?

*Clarification:* Aborted election results usually occur when the President-elect does not reach office from the direct elections, *e.g.* if results are nullified or a coup d'état interferes with inaugural passage.

*Responses:*

0: No.

1: Yes.

*Scale:* Dichotomous.

*Source(s):* v2exhoshog v2expathhg v2expathhs v2xel\_\_elecpres

*Data release:* 2-12.

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

#### 5.12.7 Chief executive no longer elected (D) (v2x\_\_hosinter)

*Project Manager(s):* Jan Teorell

*Question:* Is the chief executive no longer elected?

*Responses:*

0: No.

1: Yes.

*Scale:* Dichotomous.

*Source(s):* v2exhoshog v2expathhg v2expathhs

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

#### 5.12.8 Legislative or constituent assembly election aborted (D) (v2x\_\_legabort)

*Project Manager(s):* Jan Teorell

*Question:* Have legislative election results been aborted?

*Clarification:* Aborted election results usually occur when the elected members do not reach office after election occurs, *e.g.* if results are nullified or a coup d'état interferes with inaugural session.

*Responses:*

0: No.

1: Yes.

*Scale:* Dichotomous.

*Source(s):* v2lgbicam v2xel\_\_elecparl v2expathhs

*Data release:* 2-12.

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

#### 5.12.9 Freedom of discussion (D) (v2xcl\_\_disc)

*Project Manager(s):* Pamela Paxton, Svend-Erik Skaaning

*Additional versions:* \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

*Question:* Are citizens able to openly discuss political issues in private homes and in public spaces?

*Clarification:* This indicator specifies the extent to which citizens are able to engage in private discussions, particularly on political issues, in private homes and public spaces restaurants, public transportation, sports events, work etc. without fear of harassment by other members

of the polity or the public authorities. We are interested in restrictions by the government and its agents but also cultural restrictions or customary laws that are enforced by other members of the polity, sometimes in informal ways.

*Scale:* Interval, from low to high (0-1).

*Source(s):* v2cldiscm v2cldiscw

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Aggregation:* We estimate the index by averaging two indicators: freedom of discussion for men (v2cldiscm) and women (v2cldiscw).

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

#### **5.12.10 Freedom of domestic movement (D) (v2xcl\_dmove)**

*Project Manager(s):* Pamela Paxton, Svend-Erik Skaaning

*Additional versions:* \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

*Question:* Do citizens enjoy freedom of movement and residence?

*Clarification:* This indicator specifies the extent to which citizens are able to move freely, in daytime and nighttime, in public thoroughfares, across regions within a country, and to establish permanent residency where they wish. Note that restrictions in movement might be imposed by the state and/or by informal norms and practices. Such restrictions sometimes fall on rural residents, on specific social groups, or on dissidents.

Do *not* consider restrictions in movement that are placed on ordinary non-political criminals.

Do not consider restrictions in movement that result from crime or unrest.

*Scale:* Interval, from low to high (0-1).

*Source(s):* v2cldmovem v2cldmovew

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Aggregation:* We estimate the index by averaging two indicators: freedom of domestic movement for men (v2cldmovem) and women (v2cldmovew).

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

#### **5.12.11 Freedom from forced labor (D) (v2xcl\_slave)**

*Project Manager(s):* Pamela Paxton, Svend-Erik Skaaning

*Additional versions:* \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

*Question:* Are adult citizens free from servitude and other kinds of forced labor?

*Clarification:* Involuntary servitude occurs when an adult is unable to quit a job s/he desires to leave — not by reason of economic necessity but rather by reason of employer's coercion. This includes labor camps but not work or service which forms part of normal civic obligations such as conscription or employment in command economies.

*Scale:* Interval, from low to high (0-1).

*Source(s):* v2clslavem v2clslavef

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Aggregation:* We estimate the index by averaging two indicators: freedom from forced labor for men (v2clslavem) and women (v2clslavef).

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

#### **5.12.12 Legislative or constituent assembly election (D) (v2xel\_elecparl)**

*Project Manager(s):* Jan Teorell

*Question:* Did a legislative or constituent assembly election take place this year?

*Clarification:* In the country-date data set v2xel\_elecparl is coded only on the specific election date.

*Responses:*

0: No.

1: Yes.

*Scale:* Dichotomous.

*Source(s):* v2eltype\_0 v2eltype\_1 v2eltype\_4 v2eltype\_5

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Date specific:* Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

#### **5.12.13 Presidential election (D) (v2xel\_elecpres)**

*Project Manager(s):* Jan Teorell

*Question:* Did a presidential election take place this year?

*Responses:*

0: No.

1: Yes.

*Scale:* Dichotomous.

*Source(s):* v2eltype\_6 v2eltype\_7

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Date specific:* Election-specific dates (v2eltype).

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

#### **5.12.14 Legislature directly elected (D) (v2xex\_elecleg)**

*Project Manager(s):* Jan Teorell

*Question:* To what extent is the legislature directly or indirectly elected?

*Clarification:* If the legislature is unicameral, v2xex\_elecleg is measured as the proportion of legislators directly elected + half of the proportion that are indirectly elected. If the legislature is bicameral and the upper house is involved in the appointment of the chief executive, the same proportion of directly and half of the indirectly elected legislators is calculated for the upper house; the scores for the lower and upper houses are then averaged.

Note that a popular election is minimally defined and also includes sham elections with limited suffrage and no competition.

This index is useful primarily for aggregating higher-order indices and should not necessarily be interpreted as an important element of democracy in its own right. Since the variables coding the share of directly and indirectly elected legislators are not yet fully in sync for all country dates, a few observations now receive an index value larger than 1.

*Responses:*

Proportion.

*Scale:* Interval.

*Source(s):* v2lgello v2lgelecup v2lginello v2lginelup v2exapup v2exapupap

*Data release:* 5, 7-12.

*Cleaning:* Set to missing when v2lgbicam is 0

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

#### **5.12.15 Legislature closed down or aborted (D) (v2xlg\_leginter)**

*Project Manager(s):* Jan Teorell

*Question:* Has the legislature been closed down or aborted?

*Responses:*

0: No.

1: Yes.

*Scale:* Dichotomous.

*Source(s):* v2lgbicam v2lgello

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

#### 5.12.16 Alternative sources of information index (D) (v2xme\_\_altinf)

*Project Manager(s):* Jan Teorell

*Additional versions:* \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

*Question:* To what extent is the media (a) un-biased in their coverage or lack of coverage of the opposition, (b) allowed to be critical of the regime, and (c) representative of a wide array of political perspectives?

*Scale:* Interval, from low to high (0-1).

*Source(s):* v2mebias v2mecrit v2merange

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Aggregation:* The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for media bias (v2mebias), print/broadcast media critical (v2mecrit), and print/broadcast media perspectives (v2merange).

*Citation:* Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

### 5.13 Party Institutionalization

#### 5.13.1 Party institutionalization index (D) (v2xps\_\_party)

*Project Manager(s):* Allen Hicken

*Additional versions:* \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh

*Question:* To what extent are political parties institutionalized?

*Clarification:* Party institutionalization refers to various attributes of the political parties in a country, *e.g.*, level and depth of organization, links to civil society, cadres of party activists, party supporters within the electorate, coherence of party platforms and ideologies, party-line voting among representatives within the legislature. A high score on these attributes generally indicates a more institutionalized party system.

This index considers the attributes of all parties with an emphasis on larger parties, *i.e.*, those that may be said to dominate and define the party system.

*Scale:* Interval, from low to high (0-1).

*Source(s):* v2psorgs v2psprbrch v2psprlnks v2psplats v2pscohesv v2lgello

*Data release:* 1-12. Release 1-6 Party system institutionalization index, release 7 changed to Party institutionalization index.

*Aggregation:* The index is formed by adding scaled indicators for party organizations (v2psorgs), party branches (v2psprbrch), party linkages (v2psprlnks), distinct party platforms (v2psplats), and legislative party cohesion (v2pscohesv, set to missing when the lower chamber of legislature (v2lgello) does not exist). The index is then converted to its CDF in order to range from 0 to 1.

*Citation:* Bizzarro *et al.* (2017, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2017:48); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

## 5.14 Consensual Democracy Dimensions

### 5.14.1 Divided party control index (D) (v2x\_divparctrl)

*Project Manager(s)*: Michael Coppedge, Svend-Erik Skaaning

*Question*: Are the executive and legislature controlled by different political parties?

*Clarification*: This variable is a reordered version of the continuous measurement model estimates for indicator v2psnatpar: National party control. After reordering, the positive extreme signifies Divided party control. A Different parties or individuals unconnected to parties control the executive and the legislature or B Executive power is divided between a president/monarch and a prime minister, each of which belongs to different parties; or between a non-partisan monarch and a prime minister. The intermediate values signify Unified coalition control. A single multi-party coalition controls the executive and legislative branches of the national government. This is true almost by definition in a parliamentary system where a single coalition gathers together a majority of seats. And the negative extreme signifies "Unified party control. A single party controls the executive and legislative branches of the national government. This is true almost by definition in a parliamentary system where a single party has a majority of seats."

*Scale*: Interval, from low to high.

*Source(s)*: v2psnatpar v2psnatpar\_ord

*Notes*: V-Dem originally intended to generate indices to measure concepts inspired by Arend Lijphart's two dimensions of consensus vs. majoritarian democracy. The project no longer plans to produce such indices. Instead, it offers the two indices, the Divided party control index and the Division of power index, which are conceptually thinner than Lijphart's concepts and not equivalent substitutes for them. However, these alternatives are useful for some purposes.

*Data release*: 6-12. For Version 6 as Divided party control of legislature index v2x\_lgdivparctrl, 7 modified to Divided party control index.

*Aggregation*: The reordering is accomplished in two steps. First, 5 is subtracted from v2psnatpar when the ordinal version of this variable, v2psnatpar\_ord, is 2. This moves the ordinal score corresponding to unified party control to the lowest values. Then the result is standardized to have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1.

*Country-Year Aggregation*: Last

*Citation*: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years*: 1900-2021

### 5.14.2 Division of power index (D) (v2x\_feduni)

*Project Manager(s)*: Michael Coppedge, Svend-Erik Skaaning

*Question*: Are there elected local and regional governments, and — if so — to what extent can they operate without interference from unelected bodies at the local level?

*Clarification*: The lowest score would be reserved for a country that has no elected local or regional governments, or where all or nearly all elected offices are subordinate to non-elected offices at any local or regional level that exists. A high score would be accorded to a country in which both local and regional governments are elected and able to operate without restrictions from unelected actors at the local or regional level with the exception of judicial bodies. A medium score can be achieved in various ways: there are strong elected governments at the local level but not the regional level, or vice versa; or both local and regional governments elect an executive but not an assembly; or elected and non-elected offices are approximately equal in power at the local and regional levels; or various combinations of these scenarios.

*Scale*: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

*Source(s)*: v2ellogov v2elreggov v2ellocelc v2elsrgel v2ellocpwr v2elrgpwr

*Notes*: V-Dem originally intended to generate indices to measure concepts inspired by Arend Lijphart's two dimensions of consensus vs. majoritarian democracy. The project no longer plans to produce such indices. Instead, it offers the two indices, the Divided party control index and the Division of power index, which are conceptually thinner than Lijphart's concepts and



not equivalent substitutes for them. However, these alternatives are useful for some purposes.

*Data release:* 6-12.

*Aggregation:* This index is an equally weighted average of a local government index and a regional government index. The local government index is the product of a dummy variable for the existence of local government (v2ellocgov), a recoded version of Local government elected (v2ellocelc), and a CDF of local offices relative power (v2ellocpwr). Local governments are recoded as unelected 0 if they did not exist or if data is missing. They are coded 0.5 if an executive is elected but no assembly, and 1 if an assembly is elected, with or without an executive. The regional government index is calculated the same way but using the existence of regional government (v2elreggov), regional government elected (v2elsrgel), and regional offices relative power (v2elrgpwr).

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1789-2021

## 5.15 Academic Freedom

### 5.15.1 Academic Freedom Index (D) (v2xca\_academ)

*Project Manager(s):* Katrin Kinzelbach, Ilyas Saliba, Janika Spannagel

*Additional versions:* \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd

*Question:* To what extent is academic freedom respected?

*Clarification:* Academic freedom is understood as the right of academics, without constriction by prescribed doctrine, to freedom of teaching and discussion, freedom in carrying out research and disseminating and publishing the results thereof, freedom to express freely their opinion about the institution or system in which they work, freedom from institutional censorship and freedom to participate in professional or representative academic bodies (UNESCO 1997 Recommendation concerning the Status of Higher-Education Teaching Personnel). The Academic Freedom Index is designed to provide an aggregated measure that captures the de facto realization of academic freedom, including the degree to which higher-education institutions are autonomous.

*Scale:* Interval, from low to high (0-1).

*Source(s):* v2cafres v2cafexch v2cainsaut v2casurv v2clacfree

*Data release:* 10-12.

*Aggregation:* The index is formed by point estimates drawn from a Bayesian factor analysis model including the following indicators: freedom to research and teach (v2cafres), freedom of academic exchange and dissemination (v2cafexch), institutional autonomy (v2cainsaut), campus integrity (v2casurv), freedom of academic and cultural expression (v2clacfree).

*Citation:* Spannagel *et al.* (2020, *V-Dem Users' Working Paper Series*); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1900-2021

## 6 Digital Society Survey

The Digital Society Survey, designed by the Digital Society Project, contains questions pertaining to the political environment of the internet and social media. The data collected through expert-coded surveys provides information on topics related to coordinated information operations, digital media freedom, online media polarization, social cleavages as well as state internet regulation capacity and approach.

Principal investigators for the Digital Society Project are Valeriya Mechkova, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Steven Wilson.

For more information, please visit [www.digitalsocietyproject.org](http://www.digitalsocietyproject.org).

### Instructions to the coders (as shown in the surveys)

**Digital society:** The following survey contains questions pertaining to the political environment of the Internet and social media. Please bear in mind the following definitions as you respond to questions on this survey:

The government and its agents include official government organs, such as bureaucracies, courts, intelligence services, and the military, but also unofficial agents, such as officially unaffiliated cyber-warfare operatives who perform services, even “off-book” work, on behalf of the government.

Major political parties include the group of political parties that hold a significant number of seats in national legislative body(-ies), or earn a significant number of votes in elections for the executive. When we ask you to consider “major political parties,” you do not need to consider parties that run in elections but receive only a small minority of seats or votes, or those that receive no seats at all.

We define the Internet as all information that people access over public and private digital networks, worldwide. The Internet includes both publicly accessible digital spaces and private or gated information transmission platforms. The Internet does not include traditional media transmission mechanisms such as paper, television, traditional voice telephone, and radio.

Social media are a subset of Internet platforms that enable normal individuals to create and share content with networks of other people. Social media platforms are available to the public, although content on such networks may be shared privately within subgroups of users. Social media includes both publicly visible, or semi-public platforms, like Facebook, Flickr, Friendster, Google+, Instagram, Myspace, LinkedIn, Twitter, VKontakte, and Weibo and private social networking and messaging platforms like Signal, Slack, Snapchat, or WhatsApp.

Domestic online media is any media source originating in the country in question. For example, the New York Times’ website is domestic online media in the United States, but not in India, even though it operates bureaus in India. Media includes any source reporting on current events or political issues, ranging from well-established brands to newsletters and websites run by an individual.

Cyber security threats include penetration of private digital networks, using means ranging from exploiting software vulnerabilities, password cracking, or social engineering (e.g., tricking individuals into revealing passwords or other information necessary to break into a digital system) to obtain information or disrupt an organization or individual’s use of digital networks and tools. They also include unauthorized alterations of an individual or organization’s digital presence, such as defacing websites and commandeering social media accounts. These threats range from unsophisticated (e.g., exploitation of failure to password protect private networks or use of common passwords by authorized users, and spear phishing) to moderate (e.g., embedding malicious code in emails or exploiting well-known software flaws that organizations have failed to patch), to sophisticated (e.g., exploiting unknown exploits in commonly used software or even embedding exploits into commercial systems unbeknownst to their creators).

Clarification: When we discuss shutting down online content, please consider instances where a website (or websites) have been taken entirely offline as well as instances where a website (or websites) have been slowed down or had access similarly intentionally inhibited, such that use of this website is challenging. In other words, both outright shutting down and more subtle measures that inhibit access should be considered when answering these questions.

Clarification: When we discuss “censorship” or “censoring” content online, we are not concerned with censorship of topics such as child pornography, highly classified information such as military or intelligence secrets, or defamatory speech, unless this sort of censorship is used as a pretext for censoring political information or opinions.

## 6.1 Coordinated Information Operations

### 6.1.1 Government dissemination of false information domestic (C) (v2smgovdom)

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* How often do the government and its agents use social media to disseminate misleading viewpoints or false information to influence its own population?

*Responses:*

- 0: Extremely often. The government disseminates false information on all key political issues.
- 1: Often. The government disseminates false information on many key political issues.
- 2: About half the time. The government disseminates false information on some key political issues, but not others.
- 3: Rarely. The government disseminates false information on only a few key political issues.
- 4: Never, or almost never. The government never disseminates false information on key political issues.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 9-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

*Citation:* Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 2000-2021

### 6.1.2 Government dissemination of false information abroad (C) (v2smgovab)

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* How often do the government and its agents use social media to disseminate misleading viewpoints or false information to influence citizens of other countries abroad?

*Responses:*

- 0: Extremely often. The government disseminates false information on all key political issues.
- 1: Often. The government disseminates false information on many key political issues.
- 2: About half the time. The government disseminates false information on some key political issues, but not others.
- 3: Rarely. The government disseminates false information on only a few key political issues.
- 4: Never, or almost never. The government never disseminates false information on key political issues.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 9-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

*Citation:* Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 2000-2021

### 6.1.3 Party dissemination of false information domestic (C) (v2smpardom)

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* How often do major political parties and candidates for office use social media to disseminate misleading viewpoints or false information to influence their own population?

*Responses:*

- 0: Extremely often. Major political parties and candidates disseminate false information on all key political issues.
- 1: Often. Major political parties and candidates disseminate false information on many key political issues.
- 2: About half the time. Major political parties and candidates disseminate false information on some key political issues, but not others.
- 3: Rarely. Major political parties and candidates disseminate false information on only a few key political issues.
- 4: Never, or almost never. Major political parties and candidates never disseminate false information on key political issues.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 9-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

*Citation:* Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 2000-2021

### 6.1.4 Party dissemination of false information abroad (C) (v2smparab)

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* How often do major political parties and candidates for office use social media to disseminate misleading viewpoints or false information to influence citizens of other countries abroad?

*Responses:*

- 0: Extremely often. Major political parties and candidates disseminate false information on all key political issues.
- 1: Often. Major political parties and candidates disseminate false information on many key political issues.
- 2: About half the time. Major political parties and candidates disseminate false information on some key political issues, but not others.
- 3: Rarely. Major political parties and candidates disseminate false information on only a few key political issues.
- 4: Never, or almost never. Major political parties and candidates never disseminate false information on key political issues.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 9-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

*Citation:* Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 2000-2021

### 6.1.5 Foreign governments dissemination of false information (C) (v2smfordom)

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* How routinely do foreign governments and their agents use social media to disseminate misleading viewpoints or false information to influence domestic politics in this country?

*Responses:*

- 0: Extremely often. Foreign governments disseminate false information on all key political issues.
- 1: Often. Foreign governments disseminate false information on many key political issues.
- 2: About half the time. Foreign governments disseminate false information on some key political issues, but not others.
- 3: Rarely. Foreign governments disseminate false information on only a few key political issues.
- 4: Never, or almost never. Foreign governments never disseminate false information on key political issues.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 9-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

*Citation:* Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 2000-2021

### 6.1.6 Foreign governments ads (C) (v2smforads)

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* How routinely do foreign governments and their agents use paid advertisements on social media in order to disseminate misleading viewpoints or false information to influence domestic politics in this country?

*Responses:*

- 0: Extremely often. Foreign governments disseminate false information on all key political issues.
- 1: Often. Foreign governments disseminate false information on many key political issues.
- 2: About half the time. Foreign governments disseminate false information on some key political issues, but not others.
- 3: Rarely. Foreign governments disseminate false information on only a few key political issues.
- 4: Never, or almost never. Foreign governments never disseminate false information on key political issues.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 9-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

*Citation:* Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 2000-2021

## 6.2 Digital Media Freedom

### 6.2.1 Government Internet filtering capacity (C) (v2smgovfilcap)

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* Independent of whether it actually does so in practice, does the government have the

technical capacity to censor information (text, audio, images, or video) on the Internet by filtering (blocking access to certain websites) if it decided to?

*Responses:*

- 0: The government lacks any capacity to block access to any sites on the Internet.
- 1: The government has limited capacity to block access to a few sites on the Internet.
- 2: The government has adequate capacity to block access to most, but not all, specific sites on the Internet if it wanted to.
- 3: The government has the capacity to block access to any sites on the Internet if it wanted to.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 9-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

*Citation:* Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 2000-2021

### 6.2.2 Government Internet filtering in practice (C) (v2smgovfilprc)

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* How frequently does the government censor political information (text, audio, images, or video) on the Internet by filtering (blocking access to certain websites)?

*Responses:*

- 0: Extremely often. It is a regular practice for the government to remove political content, except to sites that are pro-government.
- 1: Often. The government commonly removes online political content, except sites that are pro-government.
- 2: Sometimes. The government successfully removes about half of the critical online political content.
- 3: Rarely. There have been only a few occasions on which the government removed political content.
- 4: Never, or almost never. The government allows Internet access that is unrestricted, with the exceptions mentioned in the clarifications section.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 9-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

*Citation:* Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 2000-2021

### 6.2.3 Government Internet shut down capacity (C) (v2smgovshutcap)

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* Independent of whether it actually does so in practice, does the government have the technical capacity to actively shut down domestic access to the Internet if it decided to?

*Clarification:* A domestic Internet connection is any connection originating physically within the country, whether over wired, wireless, or satellite networks. This question asks what proportion of potential Internet connections of domestic origin the government has the capacity to render inoperable.

*Responses:*

- 0: The government lacks the capacity to shut down any domestic Internet connections.
- 1: The government has the capacity to shut down roughly a quarter of domestic access to the

Internet.

2: The government has the capacity to shut down roughly half of domestic access to the Internet.

3: The government has the capacity to shut down roughly three quarters of domestic access to the Internet.

4: The government has the capacity to shut down all, or almost all, domestic access to the Internet.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 9-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

*Citation:* Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 2000-2021

#### 6.2.4 Government Internet shut down in practice (C) (v2smgovshut)

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* How often does the government shut down domestic access to the Internet?

*Responses:*

0: Extremely often. It is a regular practice for the government to shut down domestic access to the Internet.

1: Often. The government shut down domestic access to the Internet numerous times this year.

2: Sometimes. The government shut down domestic access to the Internet several times this year.

3: Rarely but there have been a few occasions throughout the year when the government shut down domestic access to Internet.

4: Never, or almost never. The government does not typically interfere with the domestic access to the Internet.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 9-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

*Citation:* Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 2000-2021

#### 6.2.5 Government social media shut down in practice (C) (v2smgovsm)

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* How often does the government shut down access to social media platforms?

*Responses:*

0: Extremely often. It is a regular practice for the government to shut down access to social media.

1: Often. The government shuts down access to social media numerous times this year.

2: Sometimes. The government shuts down access to social media several times this year.

3: Rarely. There have been a few occasions throughout the year when the government shuts down access to social media.

4: Never, or almost never. The government does not interfere with the access to social media, except in the cases mentioned in the clarifications section.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 9-12.



*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

*Citation:* Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 2000-2021

#### 6.2.6 Government social media alternatives (C) (v2smgovsmalt)

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* How prevalent is the usage of social media platforms that are wholly controlled by either the government or its agents in this country?

*Responses:*

- 0: Essentially all social media usage takes place on platforms controlled by the state.
- 1: Most usage of social media is on state-controlled platforms, although some groups use non-state-controlled alternatives.
- 2: There is significant usage of both state-controlled and non-state-controlled social media platforms.
- 3: While some state-controlled social media platforms exist, their usage only represents a small share of social media usage in the country.
- 4: Practically no one uses state-controlled social media platforms.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 9-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

*Citation:* Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 2000-2021

*Convergence:* Model parameters with convergence issues: universal thresholds, main-country-coded thresholds.

#### 6.2.7 Government social media monitoring (C) (v2smgovsmmon)

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* How comprehensive is the surveillance of political content in social media by the government or its agents?

*Responses:*

- 0: Extremely comprehensive. The government surveils virtually all content on social media.
- 1: Mostly comprehensive. The government surveils most content on social media, with comprehensive monitoring of most key political issues.
- 2: Somewhat comprehensive. The government does not universally surveil social media but can be expected to surveil key political issues about half the time.
- 3: Limited. The government only surveils political content on social media on a limited basis.
- 4: Not at all, or almost not at all. The government does not surveil political content on social media, with the exceptions mentioned in the clarifications section.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 9-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

*Citation:* Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 2000-2021

#### 6.2.8 Government social media censorship in practice (C) (v2smgovsmcenprc)

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* To what degree does the government censor political content (i.e., deleting or filtering specific posts for political reasons) on social media in practice?

*Responses:*

- 0: The government simply blocks all social media platforms.
- 1: The government successfully censors all social media with political content.
- 2: The government successfully censors a significant portion of political content on social media, though not all of it.
- 3: The government only censors social media with political content that deals with especially sensitive issues.
- 4: The government does not censor political social media content, with the exceptions mentioned in the clarifications section.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 9-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

*Citation:* Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 2000-2021

#### 6.2.9 Government cyber security capacity (C) (v2smgovcapsec)

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* Does the government have sufficiently technologically skilled staff and resources to mitigate harm from cyber-security threats?

*Responses:*

- 0: No. The government does not have the capacity to counter even unsophisticated cyber security threats.
- 1: Not really. The government has the resources to combat only unsophisticated cyber attacks.
- 2: Somewhat. The government has the resources to combat moderately sophisticated cyber attacks.
- 3: Mostly. The government has the resources to combat most sophisticated cyber attacks.
- 4: Yes. The government has the resources to combat sophisticated cyber attacks, even those launched by highly skilled actors.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 9-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

*Citation:* Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 2000-2021

#### 6.2.10 Political parties cyber security capacity (C) (v2smpolcap)

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* Do the major political parties have sufficiently technologically skilled staff and resources to mitigate harm from cyber security threats?

*Responses:*

- 0: No. The government does not have the capacity to counter even unsophisticated cyber security threats.
- 1: Not really. The government has the resources to combat only unsophisticated cyber attacks.

- 2: Somewhat. The government has the resources to combat moderately sophisticated cyber attacks.
- 3: Mostly. The government has the resources to combat most sophisticated cyber attacks.
- 4: Yes. The government has the resources to combat sophisticated cyber attacks, even those launched by highly skilled actors.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 9-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

*Citation:* Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 2000-2021

## 6.3 State Internet Regulation Capacity and Approach

### 6.3.1 Internet legal regulation content (C) (v2smregcon)

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* What type of content is covered in the legal framework to regulate Internet?

*Responses:*

- 0: The state can remove any content at will.
- 1: The state can remove most content, and the law protects speech in only specific, and politically uncontroversial contexts.
- 2: The legal framework is ambiguous. The state can remove some politically sensitive content, while other is protected by law.
- 3: The law protects most political speech, but the state can remove especially politically controversial content.
- 4: The law protects political speech, and the state can only remove content if it violates well-established legal criteria.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 9-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

*Citation:* Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 2000-2021

### 6.3.2 Privacy protection by law exists (C) (v2smprivex)

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* Does a legal framework to protect Internet users' privacy and their data exist?

*Responses:*

- 0: No. (Skip to v2smregcap)
- 1: Yes

*Ordering:* if 0 no, Skip to v2smregcap

*Scale:* yes/no

*Data release:* 9-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

*Citation:* Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 2000-2021

### 6.3.3 Privacy protection by law content (C) (v2smprivcon)

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* What does the legal framework to protect Internet users' privacy and their data stipulate?

*Responses:*

- 0: The legal framework explicitly allows the government to access any type of personal data on the Internet.
- 1: The legal framework explicitly allows the government to access most types of personal data on the Internet.
- 2: The legal framework explicitly allows the government to access many types of personal data on the Internet.
- 3: The legal framework explicitly allows the government to access only a few types of personal information on the Internet.
- 4: The legal framework explicitly allows the government to access personal information on the Internet only in extraordinary circumstances.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 9-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

*Citation:* Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 2000-2021

### 6.3.4 Government capacity to regulate online content (C) (v2smregcap)

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* Does the government have sufficient staff and resources to regulate Internet content in accordance with existing law?

*Responses:*

- 0: No, almost all online activity happens outside of reach of the state, where it lacks the capacity to remove illegal content.
- 1: Not really. The state has extremely limited resources to regulate online content.
- 2: Somewhat. The state has the capacity to regulate only some online content or some portions of the law.
- 3: Mostly. The state has robust capacity to regulate online content, though not enough to regulate all content and all portions of the law.
- 4: Yes, the government has sufficient capacity to regulate all online content.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 9-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

*Citation:* Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 2000-2021

*Convergence:* Model parameters with convergence issues: country-date latent trait estimates, universal thresholds, expert reliability, expert thresholds, main-country-coded thresholds.

### 6.3.5 Government online content regulation approach (C) (v2smregapp)

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* Does the government use its own resources and institutions to monitor and regulate online content or does it distribute this regulatory burden to private actors such as Internet service providers?

*Responses:*

- 0: All online content monitoring and regulation is done by the state.
- 1: Most online content monitoring and regulation is done by the state, though the state involves private actors in a limited way.
- 2: Some online content monitoring and regulation is done by the state, but the state also involves private actors in monitoring and regulation in various ways.
- 3: The state does little online content monitoring and regulation, and entrusts most of the monitoring and regulation to private actors.
- 4: The state off-loads all online content monitoring and regulation to private actors.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 9-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

*Citation:* Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 2000-2021

### 6.3.6 Defamation protection (C) (v2smlawpr)

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* Does the legal framework provide protection against defamatory online content, or hate speech?

*Responses:*

- 0: No. The law provides no protection against Internet defamation and hate speech.
- 1: Not really. The law provides a weak protection and to very limited range of circumstances.
- 2: Somewhat. The law provides some protection against Internet defamation and hate speech but in limited circumstances, or only to particular groups of people.
- 3: Mostly. The law provides protection against Internet defamation and hate speech under many circumstances, and to most groups of people.
- 4: Yes. The law provides comprehensive protection against Internet defamation and hate speech.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 9-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

*Citation:* Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 2000-2021

### 6.3.7 Abuse of defamation and copyright law by elites (C) (v2smdefabu)

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* To what extent do elites abuse the legal system (e.g., defamation and copyright law) to censor political speech online?

*Responses:*

- 0: Regularly. Elites abuse the legal system to remove political speech from the Internet as regular practice.
- 1: Often. Elites commonly abuse the legal system to remove political speech from the Internet.
- 2: Sometimes. Elites abuse the legal system to remove political speech from the Internet about half the time.

3: Rarely. Elites occasionally abuse the legal system to remove political speech from the Internet.

4: Never, or almost never. Elites do not abuse the legal system to remove political speech from the Internet.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 9-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

*Citation:* Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 2000-2021

## 6.4 Online Media Polarization

### 6.4.1 Online media existence (C) (v2smonex)

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* Do people consume domestic online media?

*Responses:*

0: Not at all. No one consumes domestic online media. Skip next question if this answer is selected.

1: Limited. Domestic online media consumption is limited.

2: Relatively extensive. Domestic online media consumption is common.

3: Extensive. Almost everyone consumes domestic online media.

*Ordering:* if 0, skip v2smonper

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 9-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

*Citation:* Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 2000-2021

### 6.4.2 Online media perspectives (C) (v2smonper)

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* Do the major domestic online media outlets represent a wide range of political perspectives?

*Responses:*

0: The major domestic online media outlets represent only the government's perspective.

1: The major domestic online media outlets represent only the perspectives of the government and a government approved, semi-official opposition party.

2: The major domestic online media outlets represent a variety of political perspectives but they systematically ignore at least one political perspective that is important in this society.

3: All perspectives that are important in this society are represented in at least one of the major domestic online media outlets.

4: All perspectives that are important in this society are represented in many major domestic online media outlets.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 9-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

*Citation:* Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 2000-2021

#### 6.4.3 Online media fractionalization (C) (v2smmefra)

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* Do the major domestic online media outlets give a similar presentation of major (political) news?

*Responses:*

- 0: No. The major domestic online media outlets give opposing presentation of major events.
- 1: Not really. The major domestic online media outlets differ greatly in the presentation of major events.
- 2: Sometimes. The major domestic online media outlets give a similar presentation of major events about half the time.
- 3: Mostly. The major domestic online media outlets mostly give a similar presentation of major events.
- 4: Yes. Although there are small differences in representation, the major domestic online media outlets give a similar presentation of major events.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 9-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

*Citation:* Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 2000-2021

*Convergence:* Model parameters with convergence issues: universal thresholds, expert thresholds, main-country-coded thresholds.

### 6.5 Social Cleavages

#### 6.5.1 Online harassment groups (C) (v2smhargr)

*Additional versions:* \*\_nr

*Question:* Which groups are targets of hate speech or harassment in online media?

*Clarification:* Multiple selection. Choose all that apply.

*Responses:*

- 0: Women [v2smhargr\_0]
- 1: LGBTQ groups and individuals [v2smhargr\_1]
- 2: Specific religious groups [v2smhargr\_2]
- 3: Specific ethnic groups [v2smhargr\_3]
- 4: Specific caste [v2smhargr\_4]
- 5: Specific language groups [v2smhargr\_5]
- 6: Specific race [v2smhargr\_6]
- 7: People with physical or cognitive disabilities [v2smhargr\_7]
- 8: People from specific regions [v2smhargr\_8]
- 9: Other (specify in the next question) [v2smhargr\_9]
- 10: No group is a specific target [v2smhargr\_10]

*Scale:* Series of dichotomous scales.

*Data release:* 9-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Mean.

*Citation:* Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).



Years: 2000-2021

#### 6.5.2 Other online harassment groups (C) (v2smhargrtxt)

*Question:* Which other groups are targets of hate speech or harassment in online media?

*Clarification:* Skip if the question does not apply to this country.

*Scale:* Text.

*Data release:* 9-12. Available upon request, subject to review and approval.

*Citation:* Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

#### 6.5.3 Use of social media to organize offline violence (C) (v2smorgviol)

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* How often do people use social media to organize offline violence?

*Responses:*

0: Frequently. There are numerous cases in which people have used social media to organize offline violence.

1: Sometimes. There are a few cases in which people have used social media to organize offline violence.

2: Never. People have never used social media to organize offline violence.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 9-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Citation:* Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 2000-2021

#### 6.5.4 Average people's use of social media to organize offline action (C) (v2smorgavgact)

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* How often do average people use social media to organize offline political action of any kind?

*Responses:*

0: Never or almost never. Average people have almost never used social media to organize offline political action.

1: Rarely. Average people do not typically use social media to organize offline political action.

2: Sometimes. There are a few cases in which average people have used social media to organize offline political action.

3: Often. There have been several cases in which average people have used social media to organize offline political action.

4: Regularly. There are numerous cases in which average people have used social media to organize offline political action.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 9-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Citation:* Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Years: 2000-2021

#### 6.5.5 Elites' use of social media to organize offline action (C) (v2smorgelitact)

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* How often do domestic elites use social media to organize offline political action of any kind?

*Responses:*

- 0: Never or almost never. Elites have almost never used social media to organize offline political action.
- 1: Rarely. Elites do not typically use social media to organize offline political action.
- 2: Sometimes. There are a few cases in which elites have used social media to organize offline political action.
- 3: Often. There have been several cases in which elites have used social media to organize offline political action.
- 4: Regularly. There are numerous cases in which elites have used social media to organize offline political action.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 9-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

*Citation:* Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 2000-2021

#### 6.5.6 Types of organization through social media (C) (v2smorgtypes)

*Additional versions:* \*\_nr

*Question:* What types of offline political action are most commonly mobilized on social media?

*Clarification:* Multiple selection. Choose all that apply.

*Responses:*

- 0: Petition signing [v2smorgtypes\_0]
- 1: Voter turnout [v2smorgtypes\_1]
- 2: Street protests [v2smorgtypes\_2]
- 3: Strikes/labor actions [v2smorgtypes\_3]
- 4: Riots [v2smorgtypes\_4]
- 5: Organized rebellion [v2smorgtypes\_5]
- 6: Vigilante Justice (e.g., mob lynching, stalking harassment) [v2smorgtypes\_6]
- 7: Terrorism [v2smorgtypes\_7]
- 8: Ethnic cleansing/genocide [v2smorgtypes\_8]
- 9: Other (specify in the next question) [v2smorgtypes\_9]

*Scale:* Series of dichotomous scales.

*Data release:* 9-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Mean.

*Citation:* Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 2000-2021

#### 6.5.7 Other types of organization through social media (C) (v2smorgtypestxt)

*Question:* What other types of offline political action are most commonly mobilized on social media?

*Clarification:* Skip if the question does not apply to this country.

*Scale:* Text.

*Data release:* 9-12. Available upon request, subject to review and approval.

*Citation:* Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

#### 6.5.8 Party/candidate use of social media in campaigns (C) (v2smcamp)

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* To what extent do major political parties and candidates use social media during electoral campaigns to communicate with constituents?

*Responses:*

- 0: None. Major political parties and candidates do not use social media during electoral campaigns to communicate with constituents.
- 1: A little. Major political parties and candidates rarely use social media during electoral campaigns to communicate with constituents.
- 2: Somewhat. Major political parties and candidates sometimes use social media during electoral campaigns to communicate with constituents.
- 3: Substantial. Major political parties and candidates frequently use social media during electoral campaigns to communicate with constituents.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 9-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Citation:* Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 2000-2021

#### 6.5.9 Arrests for political content (C) (v2smarrest)

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* If a citizen posts political content online that would run counter to the government and its policies, what is the likelihood that citizen is arrested?

*Responses:*

- 0: Extremely likely.
- 1: Likely.
- 2: Unlikely.
- 3: Extremely unlikely.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 9-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*).

*Citation:* Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 2000-2021

#### 6.5.10 Polarization of society (C) (v2smpolsoc)

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* How would you characterize the differences of opinions on major political issues in this society?

*Clarification:* While plurality of views exists in all societies, we are interested in knowing the extent to which these differences in opinions result in major clashes of views and polarization or, alternatively, whether there is general agreement on the general direction this society should develop.

*Responses:*

- 0: Serious polarization. There are serious differences in opinions in society on almost all key political issues, which result in major clashes of views.
- 1: Moderate polarization. There are differences in opinions in society on many key political issues, which result in moderate clashes of views.
- 2: Medium polarization. Differences in opinions are noticeable on about half of the key political issues, resulting in some clashes of views.
- 3: Limited polarization. There are differences in opinions on only a few key political issues, resulting in few clashes of views.
- 4: No polarization. There are differences in opinions but there is a general agreement on the direction for key political issues.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 9-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

*Citation:* Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 2000-2021

#### 6.5.11 Political parties hate speech (C) (v2smpolhate)

*Additional versions:* \*\_osp, \*\_ord, \*\_codelow, \*\_codehigh, \*\_sd, \*\_mean, \*\_nr

*Question:* How often do major political parties use hate speech as part of their rhetoric?

*Clarification:* Hate speech is any speech that is intended to insult, offend, or intimidate members of specific groups, defined by race, religion, sexual orientation, national origin, disability, or similar trait.

*Responses:*

- 0: Extremely often.
- 1: Often.
- 2: Sometimes.
- 3: Rarely.
- 4: Never, or almost never.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Data release:* 9-12.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology).

*Citation:* Mechkova *et al.* (2019, *Digital Society Project Working Paper* 2019:1); Pemstein *et al.* (2022, *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2022:21); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 2000-2021

*Convergence:* Model parameters with convergence issues: country-date latent trait estimates, universal thresholds, expert thresholds, main-country-coded thresholds.

## 7 Other Democracy Indices and Indicators

This section lists other indicators on democracy, that may help in evaluating the causes and effects of democracy or which may provide convergent validity tests for V-Dem data, divided into sections based on source.

### 7.1 Ordinal Versions of Indices

#### 7.1.1 Additive polyarchy index ordinal (D) (e\_v2x\_api)

*Available versions:* \*\_3C, \*\_4C, \*\_5C

*Question:* To what extent is the electoral principle of democracy achieved?

*Clarification:* These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem Additive polyarchy index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (\_3C), four (\_4C), and five (\_5C) levels respectively.

For the \_3C-version, one can interpret 0.0 as "Autocratic", 0.5 as "Electoral Authoritarian", and 1.0 as "Minimally Democratic".

For the \_4C-version, one can interpret 0.0 as "Autocratic", 0.33 as "Electoral Authoritarian", 0.67 as "Minimally Democratic" and 1.0 as "Democratic".

For the \_5C-version, one can interpret 0.0 as "Closed Autocratic", 0.25 as "Autocratic", 0.5 as "Ambivalent", 0.75 as "Minimally Democratic", and 1.0 as "Democratic".

*Scale:* Ordinal.

*Source(s):* v2x\_api

*Data release:* 5-12.

*Aggregation:*

3 CATEGORIES

0.0: if v2x\_api >= 0 and v2x\_api <= 0.25  
 0.0: if v2x\_api > 0.25 and v2x\_api <= 0.5  
 and v2elmulpar\_osp >= 0 and v2elmulpar\_osp <= 2.5  
 0.0: if v2x\_api > 0.25 and v2x\_api <= 0.5  
 and v2elfrfair\_osp >= 0 and v2elfrfair\_osp <= 2  
 0.5: if v2x\_api > 0.25 and v2x\_api <= 0.5  
 and v2elmulpar\_osp > 2.5 and v2elmulpar\_osp <= 4  
 0.5: if v2x\_api > 0.25 and v2x\_api <= 0.5  
 and v2elfrfair\_osp > 2 and v2elfrfair\_osp <= 4  
 0.5: if v2x\_api > 0.5 and v2x\_api <= 1  
 and v2elfrfair\_osp >= 0 and v2elfrfair\_osp < 3  
 1.0: if v2x\_api > 0.5 and v2x\_api <= 1  
 and v2elfrfair\_osp >= 3 and v2elfrfair\_osp <= 4

4 CATEGORIES

0.00: if v2x\_api >= 0 and v2x\_api <= 0.25  
 0.00: if v2x\_api > 0.25 and v2x\_api <= 0.5  
 and v2elmulpar\_osp >= 0 and v2elmulpar\_osp <= 2  
 0.00: if v2x\_api > 0.25 and v2x\_api <= 0.5  
 and v2elfrfair\_osp >= 0 and v2elfrfair\_osp <= 2  
 0.33: if v2x\_api >= 0.250001 and v2x\_api <= 0.5  
 and v2elmulpar\_osp > 2 and v2elmulpar\_osp <= 4  
 0.33: if v2x\_api > 0.25 and v2x\_api <= 0.5  
 and v2elfrfair\_osp > 2 and v2elfrfair\_osp <= 4  
 0.67: if v2x\_api > 0.5 and v2x\_api <= 1  
 and v2elfrfair\_osp > 2 and v2elfrfair\_osp < 3 and v2elmulpar\_osp > 2  
 1.00: if v2x\_api > 0.5 and v2x\_api <= 1  
 and v2elfrfair\_osp > 3 and v2elmulpar\_osp > 3

5 CATEGORIES

0.00: if I >= 0 and I <= 0.2

0.25: if  $I > 0.2$  and  $I \leq 0.4$

0.50: if  $I > 0.4$  and  $I \leq 0.6$

0.75: if  $I > 0.6$  and  $I \leq 0.8$

1.00: if  $I > 0.8$  and  $I \leq 1$

*Citation:* Lindberg (2016).

*Years:* 1789-2021

#### 7.1.2 Civil liberties index ordinal (D) (e\_v2x\_civlib)

*Project Manager(s):* Staffan I. Lindberg

*Available versions:* \*\_3C, \*\_4C, \*\_5C

*Question:* To what extent is civil liberty respected?

*Clarification:* These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem civil liberties index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three \_3C, four \_4C, and five \_5C levels respectively.

*Scale:* Ordinal.

*Source(s):* v2x\_civlib

*Data release:* 6-12.

*Aggregation:* Same transformation rule as for "v2x\_libdem\_3C/\_4C/\_5C".

*Citation:* Lindberg (2016).

*Years:* 1789-2021

#### 7.1.3 Physical violence index ordinal (D) (e\_v2x\_clphy)

*Project Manager(s):* Staffan I. Lindberg

*Available versions:* \*\_3C, \*\_4C, \*\_5C

*Question:* To what extent is physical integrity respected?

*Clarification:* These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem physical violence index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three \_3C, four \_4C, and five \_5C levels respectively.

*Scale:* Ordinal.

*Source(s):* v2x\_clphy

*Data release:* 6-12.

*Aggregation:* Same transformation rule as for "v2x\_libdem\_3C/\_4C/\_5C".

*Citation:* Lindberg (2016).

*Years:* 1789-2021

#### 7.1.4 Political civil liberties index ordinal (D) (e\_v2x\_clpol)

*Project Manager(s):* Staffan I. Lindberg

*Available versions:* \*\_3C, \*\_4C, \*\_5C

*Question:* To what extent are political liberties respected?

*Clarification:* These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem political liberties index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three \_3C, four \_4C, and five \_5C levels respectively.

*Scale:* Ordinal.

*Source(s):* v2x\_clpol

*Data release:* 6-12.

*Aggregation:* Same transformation rule as for "v2x\_libdem\_3C/\_4C/\_5C".

*Citation:* Lindberg (2016).

*Years:* 1789-2021

#### 7.1.5 Private liberties index ordinal (D) (e\_v2x\_clpriv)

*Project Manager(s):* Staffan I. Lindberg

*Available versions:* \*\_3C, \*\_4C, \*\_5C

*Question:* To what extent are private liberties respected?

*Clarification:* These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem private civil liberties index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three \_3C, four \_4C, and five \_5C levels respectively.

*Scale:* Ordinal.

*Source(s):* v2x\_clpriv

*Data release:* 6-12.

*Aggregation:* Same transformation rule as for "v2x\_libdem\_3C/\_4C/\_5C".

*Citation:* Lindberg (2016).

*Years:* 1789-2021

#### 7.1.6 Political corruption index ordinal (D) (e\_v2x\_corr)

*Available versions:* \*\_3C, \*\_4C, \*\_5C

*Question:* How pervasive is political corruption?

*Clarification:* These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem political corruption index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (\_3C), four (\_4C), and five (\_5C) levels respectively.

*Scale:* Ordinal.

*Source(s):* v2x\_corr

*Data release:* 5-12.

*Aggregation:* Same transformation rule as for "v2x\_libdem\_3C/\_4C/\_5C".

*Citation:* Lindberg (2016).

*Years:* 1789-2021

#### 7.1.7 Civil society participation index ordinal (D) (e\_v2x\_cspart)

*Available versions:* \*\_3C, \*\_4C, \*\_5C

*Question:* Are major CSOs routinely consulted by policymaker; how large is the involvement of people in CSOs; are women prevented from participating; and is legislative candidate nomination within party organization highly decentralized or made through party primaries?

*Clarification:* These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem civil society participation index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (\_3C), four (\_4C), and five (\_5C) levels respectively.

*Scale:* Ordinal.

*Source(s):* v2pscnslnl v2cscnsult v2csptrcpt v2csgender

*Data release:* 5-12.

*Aggregation:* Same transformation rule as for "v2x\_libdem\_3C/\_4C/\_5C".

*Citation:* Lindberg (2016).

*Years:* 1789-2021

#### 7.1.8 Deliberative democracy index ordinal (D) (e\_v2x\_delibdem)

*Available versions:* \*\_3C, \*\_4C, \*\_5C

*Question:* To what extent is the ideal of deliberative democracy achieved?

*Clarification:* These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem deliberative democracy index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (\_3C), four (\_4C), and five (\_5C) levels respectively.



For the `_3C`-version, one can interpret 0.0 as "Autocratic", 0.5 as "Electoral Authoritarian", and 1.0 as "Minimally Democratic".

For the `_4C`-version, one can interpret 0.0 as "Autocratic", 0.33 as "Electoral Authoritarian", 0.67 as "Minimally Democratic" and 1.0 as "Democratic".

For the `_5C`-version, one can interpret 0.0 as "Closed Autocratic", 0.25 as "Autocratic", 0.5 as "Ambivalent", 0.75 as "Minimally Democratic", and 1.0 as "Democratic".

*Scale:* Ordinal.

*Source(s):* `v2xdl_delib` `v2x_polyarchy`

*Data release:* 5-12.

*Aggregation:* Same transformation rule as for "`v2x_libdem_3C/_4C/_5C`".

*Citation:* Lindberg (2016).

*Years:* 1900-2021

### 7.1.9 Electoral component index ordinal (D) (`e_v2x_EDcomp_thick`)

*Available versions:* `*_3C`, `*_4C`, `*_5C`

*Question:* To what extent is the electoral principle of democracy achieved?

*Clarification:* These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem electoral component index. There are three versions with three (`_3C`), four (`_4C`), and five (`_5C`) categories respectively.

*Scale:* Ordinal.

*Source(s):* `v2x_EDcomp_thick`

*Data release:* 5-12.

*Aggregation:* Same transformation rule as for `v2x_polyarchy_3C / _4C / _5C`.

*Citation:* Lindberg (2016).

*Years:* 1789-2021

### 7.1.10 Egalitarian component index ordinal (D) (`e_v2x_egal`)

*Available versions:* `*_3C`, `*_4C`, `*_5C`

*Question:* To what extent is the egalitarian principle achieved?

*Clarification:* These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem egalitarian component index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (`_3C`), four (`_4C`), and five (`_5C`) levels respectively.

*Scale:* Ordinal.

*Source(s):* `v2xeg_eqprotec` `v2xeg_eqdr`

*Data release:* 5-12.

*Aggregation:* Same transformation rule as for "`v2x_libdem_3C/_4C/_5C`".

*Citation:* Lindberg (2016).

*Years:* 1900-2021

### 7.1.11 Egalitarian democracy index ordinal (D) (`e_v2x_egaldem`)

*Available versions:* `*_3C`, `*_4C`, `*_5C`

*Question:* To what extent is the ideal of egalitarian democracy achieved?

*Clarification:* These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem egalitarian democracy index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (`_3C`), four (`_4C`), and five (`_5C`) levels respectively.

For the `_3C`-version, one can interpret 0.0 as "Autocratic", 0.5 as "Electoral Authoritarian", and 1.0 as "Minimally Democratic".

For the `_4C`-version, one can interpret 0.0 as "Autocratic", 0.33 as "Electoral Authoritarian", 0.67 as "Minimally Democratic" and 1.0 as "Democratic".

For the `_5C`-version, one can interpret 0.0 as "Closed Autocratic", 0.25 as "Autocratic", 0.5 as "Ambivalent", 0.75 as "Minimally Democratic", and 1.0 as "Democratic".

*Scale:* Ordinal.

*Source(s):* v2x\_egal v2x\_polyarchy

*Data release:* 5-12.

*Aggregation:* Same transformation rule as for "v2x\_libdem\_3C/\_4C/\_5C".

*Citation:* Lindberg (2016).

*Years:* 1900-2021

#### 7.1.12 Elected officials index (de jure) ordinal (D) (e\_v2x\_elecoff)

*Available versions:* \*\_3C, \*\_4C, \*\_5C

*Question:* Is the chief executive appointed through popular elections (either directly or indirectly)?

*Clarification:* These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem elected executive index (*de jure*). The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (\_3C), four (\_4C), and five (\_5C) levels respectively.

*Scale:* Ordinal.

*Source(s):* v2lgello v2lgelecup v2lgdomchm v2exaphos v2expathhs v2exaphogp v2expathhg v2exdfcbhs v2exdjcbhg v2exdfdmhs v2exdfdshg v2exhoshog

*Data release:* 7-12.

*Aggregation:* Same transformation rule as for "v2x\_libdem\_3C/\_4C/\_5C".

*Citation:* Lindberg (2016).

*Years:* 1789-2021

#### 7.1.13 Executive corruption index ordinal (D) (e\_v2x\_execorr)

*Available versions:* \*\_3C, \*\_4C, \*\_5C

*Question:* How routinely do members of the executive, or their agents grant favors in exchange for bribes, kickbacks, or other material inducements, and how often do they steal, embezzle, or misappropriate public funds or other state resources for personal or family use?

*Clarification:* These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem executive corruption index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (\_3C), four (\_4C), and five (\_5C) levels respectively.

*Scale:* Ordinal.

*Source(s):* v2x\_execorr

*Data release:* 5-12.

*Aggregation:* Same transformation rule as for "v2x\_libdem\_3C/\_4C/\_5C".

*Citation:* Lindberg (2016).

*Years:* 1789-2021

#### 7.1.14 Division of power index ordinal (D) (e\_v2x\_feduni)

*Project Manager(s):* Staffan I. Lindberg

*Available versions:* \*\_3C, \*\_4C, \*\_5C

*Question:* Are there elected local and regional governments, and — if so — to what extent can they operate without interference from unelected bodies at the local level?

*Clarification:* These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem division of power index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three \_3C, four \_4C, and five \_5C levels respectively.

*Scale:* Ordinal.

*Source(s):* v2x\_feduni

*Data release:* 6-12.

*Aggregation:* Same transformation rule as for "v2x\_libdem\_3C/\_4C/\_5C".

*Citation:* Lindberg (2016).

Years: 1789-2021

#### 7.1.15 Freedom of association (thick) index ordinal (D) (e\_v2x\_frassoc\_thick)

*Available versions:* \*\_3C, \*\_4C, \*\_5C

*Question:* To what extent are parties, including opposition parties, allowed to form and to participate in elections, and to what extent are civil society organizations able to form and to operate freely?

*Clarification:* These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem freedom of association (thick) index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (\_3C), four (\_4C), and five (\_5C) levels respectively.

*Scale:* Ordinal.

*Source(s):* v2psparban v2psbars v2psoppaut v2elmulpar v2cseeorgs v2csreprss

*Data release:* 5-12.

*Aggregation:* Same transformation rule as for "v2x\_libdem\_3C/\_4C/\_5C".

*Citation:* Lindberg (2016).

Years: 1789-2021

#### 7.1.16 Freedom of expression index ordinal (D) (e\_v2x\_freexp)

*Available versions:* \*\_3C, \*\_4C, \*\_5C

*Question:* To what extent does government respect press and media freedom, the freedom of ordinary people to discuss political matters at home and in the public sphere, as well as the freedom of academic and cultural expression?

*Clarification:* These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem freedom of expression index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (\_3C), four (\_4C), and five (\_5C) levels respectively.

*Scale:* Ordinal.

*Source(s):* v2mecenefm v2meharjrn v2meslfcen v2cldiscm v2cldiscw v2clacfree

*Data release:* 5-12.

*Aggregation:* Same transformation rule as for "v2x\_libdem\_3C/\_4C/\_5C".

*Citation:* Lindberg (2016).

Years: 1789-2021

#### 7.1.17 Expanded freedom of expression index ordinal (D) (e\_v2x\_freexp\_altinf)

*Available versions:* \*\_3C, \*\_4C, \*\_5C

*Question:* To what extent does government respect press and media freedom, the freedom of ordinary people to discuss political matters at home and in the public sphere, as well as the freedom of academic and cultural expression?

*Clarification:* These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem expanded freedom of expression index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (\_3C), four (\_4C), and five (\_5C) levels respectively.

*Scale:* Ordinal.

*Source(s):* v2mecenefm v2meharjrn v2meslfcen v2mebias v2mecrit v2merange v2cldiscm v2cldiscw v2clacfree

*Data release:* 5-12.

*Aggregation:* Same transformation rule as for "v2x\_libdem\_3C/\_4C/\_5C".

*Citation:* Lindberg (2016).

Years: 1789-2021

#### 7.1.18 Women civil liberties index ordinal (D) (e\_v2x\_gencl)

*Available versions:* \*\_3C, \*\_4C, \*\_5C

*Question:* Do women have the ability to make meaningful decisions in key areas of their lives?

*Clarification:* These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem women civil liberties index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (\_3C), four (\_4C), and five (\_5C) levels respectively.

*Scale:* Ordinal.

*Source(s):* v2cldmovew v2clslavef v2clprptyw v2clacjstw

*Data release:* 5-12.

*Aggregation:* Same transformation rule as for "v2x\_libdem\_3C/\_4C/\_5C".

*Citation:* Lindberg (2016).

*Years:* 1789-2021

#### 7.1.19 Women civil society participation index ordinal (D) (e\_v2x\_gengcs)

*Available versions:* \*\_3C, \*\_4C, \*\_5C

*Question:* Do women have the ability to express themselves and to form and participate in groups?

*Clarification:* These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem women civil society participation index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (\_3C), four (\_4C), and five (\_5C) levels respectively.

*Scale:* Ordinal.

*Source(s):* v2cldiscw v2csgender v2mefemjrn

*Data release:* 5-12.

*Aggregation:* Same transformation rule as for "v2x\_libdem\_3C/\_4C/\_5C".

*Citation:* Lindberg (2016).

*Years:* 1789-2021

#### 7.1.20 Women political empowerment index ordinal (D) (e\_v2x\_gender)

*Available versions:* \*\_3C, \*\_4C, \*\_5C

*Question:* How politically empowered are women?

*Clarification:* These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem women political empowerment index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (\_3C), four (\_4C), and five (\_5C) levels respectively.

*Scale:* Ordinal.

*Source(s):* v2x\_gencl v2x\_gengcs v2x\_genpp

*Data release:* 5-12.

*Aggregation:* Same transformation rule as for "v2x\_libdem\_3C/\_4C/\_5C".

*Citation:* Lindberg (2016).

*Years:* 1789-2021

#### 7.1.21 Women political participation index ordinal (D) (e\_v2x\_genpp)

*Available versions:* \*\_3C, \*\_4C, \*\_5C

*Question:* Are women descriptively represented in formal political positions?

*Clarification:* These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem women political participation index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (\_3C), four (\_4C), and five (\_5C) levels respectively.

*Scale:* Ordinal.

*Source(s):* v2lgfemleg v2pepwrgen

*Data release:* 5-12.

*Aggregation:* Same transformation rule as for "v2x\_libdem\_3C/\_4C/\_5C".

*Citation:* Lindberg (2016).

*Years:* 1789-2021

#### 7.1.22 Judicial constraints on the executive index ordinal (D) (e\_v2x\_jucon)

*Available versions:* \*\_3C, \*\_4C, \*\_5C

*Question:* To what extent does the executive respect the constitution and comply with court rulings, and to what extent is the judiciary able to act in an independent fashion?

*Clarification:* These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem judicial constraints on the executive index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (\_3C), four (\_4C), and five (\_5C) levels respectively.

*Scale:* Ordinal.

*Source(s):* v2exrescon v2jucomp v2juhccomp v2juhcind v2juncind

*Data release:* 5-12.

*Aggregation:* Same transformation rule as for "v2x\_libdem\_3C/\_4C/\_5C".

*Citation:* Lindberg (2016).

*Years:* 1789-2021

#### 7.1.23 Liberal democracy index ordinal (D) (e\_v2x\_libdem)

*Available versions:* \*\_3C, \*\_4C, \*\_5C

*Question:* To what extent is the ideal of liberal democracy achieved?

*Clarification:* These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem liberal democracy index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (\_3C), four (\_4C), and five (\_5C) levels respectively.

For the \_3C-version, one can interpret 0.0 as "Autocratic", 0.5 as "Electoral Authoritarian", and 1.0 as "Minimally Democratic".

For the \_4C-version, one can interpret 0.0 as "Autocratic", 0.33 as "Electoral Authoritarian", 0.67 as "Minimally Democratic" and 1.0 as "Democratic".

For the \_5C-version, one can interpret 0.0 as "Closed Autocratic", 0.25 as "Autocratic", 0.5 as "Ambivalent", 0.75 as "Minimally Democratic", and 1.0 as "Democratic".

*Scale:* Ordinal.

*Source(s):* v2x\_libdem

*Data release:* 5-12.

*Aggregation:*

3 CATEGORIES

0.0: if  $I \geq 0$  and  $I \leq 0.25$

0.5: if  $I > 0.25$  and  $I \leq 0.5$

1.0: if  $I > 0.5$  and  $I \leq 1$

4 CATEGORIES

0.00: if  $I \geq 0$  and  $I \leq 0.25$

0.33: if  $I > 0.25$  and  $I \leq 0.5$

0.67: if  $I > 0.5$  and  $I \leq 0.75$

1.00: if  $I > 0.75$  and  $I \leq 1$

5 CATEGORIES

0.00: if  $I \geq 0$  and  $I \leq 0.2$

0.25: if  $I > 0.2$  and  $I \leq 0.4$

0.50: if  $I > 0.4$  and  $I \leq 0.6$

0.75: if  $I > 0.6$  and  $I \leq 0.8$

1.00: if  $I > 0.8$  and  $I \leq 1$

*Citation:* Lindberg (2016).

Years: 1789-2021

#### 7.1.24 Liberal component index ordinal (D) (e\_v2x\_liberal)

*Available versions:* \*\_3C, \*\_4C, \*\_5C

*Question:* To what extent is the liberal principle of democracy achieved?

*Clarification:* These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem liberal component index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (\_3C), four (\_4C), and five (\_5C) levels respectively.

*Scale:* Ordinal.

*Source(s):* v2xcl\_rol v2x\_jucon v2xlg\_legcon

*Data release:* 1-12.

*Aggregation:* Same transformation rule as for "v2x\_libdem\_3C/\_4C/\_5C".

*Citation:* Lindberg (2016).

Years: 1789-2021

#### 7.1.25 Multiplicative polyarchy index ordinal (D) (e\_v2x\_mpi)

*Available versions:* \*\_3C, \*\_4C, \*\_5C

*Question:* To what extent is the electoral principle of democracy achieved?

*Clarification:* These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem Multiplicative polyarchy index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (\_3C), four (\_4C), and five (\_5C) levels respectively.

For the \_3C-version, one can interpret 0.0 as "Autocratic", 0.5 as "Electoral Authoritarian", and 1.0 as "Minimally Democratic".

For the \_4C-version, one can interpret 0.0 as "Autocratic", 0.33 as "Electoral Authoritarian", 0.67 as "Minimally Democratic" and 1.0 as "Democratic".

For the \_5C-version, one can interpret 0.0 as "Closed Autocratic", 0.25 as "Autocratic", 0.5 as "Ambivalent", 0.75 as "Minimally Democratic", and 1.0 as "Democratic".

*Scale:* Ordinal.

*Source(s):* v2x\_mpi

*Data release:* 5-12.

*Aggregation:*

3 CATEGORIES

0.0: if v2x\_mpi ≥ 0 and v2x\_mpi ≤ 0.25  
0.0: if v2x\_mpi > 0.25 and v2x\_mpi ≤ 0.5  
and v2elmulpar\_osp ≥ 0 and v2elmulpar\_osp ≤ 2.5  
0.0: if v2x\_mpi > 0.25 and v2x\_mpi ≤ 0.5  
and v2elfrfair\_osp ≥ 0 and v2elfrfair\_osp ≤ 2  
0.5: if v2x\_mpi > 0.25 and v2x\_mpi ≤ 0.5  
and v2elmulpar\_osp > 2.5 and v2elmulpar\_osp ≤ 4  
0.5: if v2x\_mpi > 0.25 and v2x\_mpi ≤ 0.5  
and v2elfrfair\_osp > 2 and v2elfrfair\_osp ≤ 4  
0.5: if v2x\_mpi > 0.5 and v2x\_mpi ≤ 1  
and v2elfrfair\_osp ≥ 0 and v2elfrfair\_osp < 3  
1.0: if v2x\_mpi > 0.5 and v2x\_mpi ≤ 1  
and v2elfrfair\_osp ≥ 3 and v2elfrfair\_osp ≤ 4

4 CATEGORIES

0.00: if v2x\_mpi ≥ 0 and v2x\_mpi ≤ 0.25  
0.00: if v2x\_mpi > 0.25 and v2x\_mpi ≤ 0.5  
and v2elmulpar\_osp ≥ 0 and v2elmulpar\_osp ≤ 2  
0.00: if v2x\_mpi > 0.25 and v2x\_mpi ≤ 0.5  
and v2elfrfair\_osp ≥ 0 and v2elfrfair\_osp ≤ 2  
0.33: if v2x\_mpi ≥ 0.250001 and v2x\_mpi ≤ 0.5

and v2elmpar\_osp>2 and v2elmpar\_osp<=4  
0.33: if v2x\_mpi>0.25 and v2x\_mpi<=0.5  
and v2elfrfair\_osp>2 and v2elfrfair\_osp<=4  
0.67: if v2x\_mpi>0.5 and v2x\_mpi<=1  
and v2elfrfair\_osp>2 and v2elfrfair\_osp<3 and v2elmpar\_osp>2  
1.00: if v2x\_mpi>0.5 and v2x\_mpi<=1  
and v2elfrfair\_osp>3 and v2elmpar\_osp>3

#### 5 CATEGORIES

0.00: if I >=0 and I <=0.2  
0.25: if I >0.2 and I <=0.4  
0.50: if I >0.4 and I <=0.6  
0.75: if I >0.6 and I <=0.8  
1.00: if I >0.8 and I <=1

*Citation:* Lindberg (2016).

*Years:* 1789-2021

### 7.1.26 Participatory component index ordinal (D) (e\_v2x\_partip)

*Available versions:* \*\_3C, \*\_4C, \*\_5C

*Question:* To what extent is the participatory principle achieved?

*Clarification:* These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem participatory component index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (\_3C), four (\_4C), and five (\_5C) levels respectively.

*Scale:* Ordinal.

*Source(s):* v2x\_cspart v2xdd\_dd v2xel\_locelec v2xel\_regelec

*Data release:* 5-12.

*Aggregation:* Same transformation rule as for "v2x\_libdem\_3C/\_4C/\_5C".

*Citation:* Lindberg (2016).

*Years:* 1789-2021

### 7.1.27 Participatory democracy index ordinal (D) (e\_v2x\_partipdem)

*Available versions:* \*\_3C, \*\_4C, \*\_5C

*Question:* To what extent is the ideal of participatory democracy achieved?

*Clarification:* These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem participatory democracy index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (\_3C), four (\_4C), and five (\_5C) levels respectively.

For the \_3C-version, one can interpret 0.0 as "Autocratic", 0.5 as "Electoral Authoritarian", and 1.0 as "Minimally Democratic".

For the \_4C-version, one can interpret 0.0 as "Autocratic", 0.33 as "Electoral Authoritarian", 0.67 as "Minimally Democratic" and 1.0 as "Democratic".

For the \_5C-version, one can interpret 0.0 as "Closed Autocratic", 0.25 as "Autocratic", 0.5 as "Ambivalent", 0.75 as "Minimally Democratic", and 1.0 as "Democratic".

*Scale:* Ordinal.

*Source(s):* v2x\_partidem

*Data release:* 5-12.

*Aggregation:* Same transformation rule as for "v2x\_libdem\_3C/\_4C/\_5C".

*Citation:* Lindberg (2016).

*Years:* 1789-2021

### 7.1.28 Electoral democracy index ordinal (D) (e\_v2x\_polyarchy)

*Available versions:* \*\_3C, \*\_4C, \*\_5C



*Question:* To what extent is the ideal of electoral democracy in its fullest sense achieved?

*Clarification:* These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem electoral democracy index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (\_3C), four (\_4C), and five (\_5C) levels respectively.

For the \_3C-version, one can interpret 0.0 as "Autocratic", 0.5 as "Electoral Authoritarian", and 1.0 as "Minimally Democratic".

For the \_4C-version, one can interpret 0.0 as "Autocratic", 0.33 as "Electoral Authoritarian", 0.67 as "Minimally Democratic" and 1.0 as "Democratic".

For the \_5C-version, one can interpret 0.0 as "Closed Autocratic", 0.25 as "Autocratic", 0.5 as "Ambivalent", 0.75 as "Minimally Democratic", and 1.0 as "Democratic".

*Scale:* Ordinal.

*Source(s):* v2x\_polyarchy

*Data release:* 5-12.

*Aggregation:*

#### 3 CATEGORIES

0.0: if v2x\_polyarchy >= 0 and v2x\_polyarchy <= 0.25

0.0: if v2x\_polyarchy > 0.25 and v2x\_polyarchy <= 0.5  
and v2elmulpar\_osp >= 0 and v2elmulpar\_osp <= 2.5

0.0: if v2x\_polyarchy > 0.25 and v2x\_polyarchy <= 0.5  
and v2elfrfair\_osp >= 0 and v2elfrfair\_osp <= 2

0.5: if v2x\_polyarchy > 0.25 and v2x\_polyarchy <= 0.5  
and v2elmulpar\_osp > 2.5 and v2elmulpar\_osp <= 4

0.5: if v2x\_polyarchy > 0.25 and v2x\_polyarchy <= 0.5  
and v2elfrfair\_osp > 2 and v2elfrfair\_osp <= 4

0.5: if v2x\_polyarchy > 0.5 and v2x\_polyarchy <= 1  
and v2elfrfair\_osp >= 0 and v2elfrfair\_osp < 3

1.0: if v2x\_polyarchy > 0.5 and v2x\_polyarchy <= 1  
and v2elfrfair\_osp >= 3 and v2elfrfair\_osp <= 4

#### 4 CATEGORIES

0.00: if v2x\_polyarchy >= 0 and v2x\_polyarchy <= 0.25

0.00: if v2x\_polyarchy > 0.25 and v2x\_polyarchy <= 0.5  
and v2elmulpar\_osp >= 0 and v2elmulpar\_osp <= 2

0.00: if v2x\_polyarchy > 0.25 and v2x\_polyarchy <= 0.5  
and v2elfrfair\_osp >= 0 and v2elfrfair\_osp <= 2

0.33: if v2x\_polyarchy >= 0.250001 and v2x\_polyarchy <= 0.5  
and v2elmulpar\_osp > 2 and v2elmulpar\_osp <= 4

0.33: if v2x\_polyarchy > 0.25 and v2x\_polyarchy <= 0.5  
and v2elfrfair\_osp > 2 and v2elfrfair\_osp <= 4

0.67: if v2x\_polyarchy > 0.5 and v2x\_polyarchy <= 1  
and v2elfrfair\_osp > 2 and v2elfrfair\_osp < 3 and v2elmulpar\_osp > 2

1.00: if v2x\_polyarchy > 0.5 and v2x\_polyarchy <= 1  
and v2elfrfair\_osp > 3 and v2elmulpar\_osp > 3

#### 5 CATEGORIES

0.00: if I >= 0 and I <= 0.2

0.25: if I > 0.2 and I <= 0.4

0.50: if I > 0.4 and I <= 0.6

0.75: if I > 0.6 and I <= 0.8

1.00: if I > 0.8 and I <= 1

*Citation:* Lindberg (2016).

*Years:* 1789-2021

### 7.1.29 Public sector corruption index ordinal (D) (e\_v2x\_pubcorr)

*Available versions:* \*\_3C, \*\_4C, \*\_5C

*Question:* To what extent do public sector employees grant favors in exchange for bribes, kickbacks, or other material inducements, and how often do they steal, embezzle, or misappropriate public funds or other state resources for personal or family use?

*Clarification:* These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem public sector corruption index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (\_3C), four (\_4C), and five (\_5C) levels respectively.

*Scale:* Ordinal.

*Source(s):* v2x\_pubcorr

*Data release:* 5-12.

*Aggregation:* Same transformation rule as for "v2x\_libdem\_3C/\_4C/\_5C".

*Citation:* Lindberg (2016).

*Years:* 1789-2021

### 7.1.30 Share of population with suffrage ordinal (D) (e\_v2x\_suffr)

*Available versions:* \*\_3C, \*\_4C, \*\_5C

*Question:* What share of adult citizens (as defined by statute) has the legal right to vote in national elections?

*Clarification:* These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem share of population with suffrage. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (\_3C), four (\_4C), and five (\_5C) levels respectively.

*Scale:* Ordinal.

*Source(s):* v2elsuffrage

*Data release:* 5-12.

*Aggregation:* Same transformation rule as for "v2x\_libdem\_3C/\_4C/\_5C".

*Citation:* Lindberg (2016).

*Years:* 1789-2021

### 7.1.31 Equality before the law and individual liberty index ordinal (D) (e\_v2xcl\_rol)

*Available versions:* \*\_3C, \*\_4C, \*\_5C

*Question:* To what extent are laws transparent and rigorously enforced and public administration impartial, and to what extent do citizens enjoy access to justice, secure property rights, freedom from forced labor, freedom of movement, physical integrity rights, and freedom of religion?

*Clarification:* These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem equality before the law and individual liberty index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (\_3C), four (\_4C), and five (\_5C) levels respectively.

*Scale:* Ordinal.

*Source(s):* v2clrspct v2cltrnslw v2clacjstm v2clacjstw v2clprptym v2clprptyw v2cltort v2clkill v2clslavem v2clslavew v2clrelig v2clfmovew v2clmovem v2clmovew

*Data release:* 5-12.

*Aggregation:* Same transformation rule as for "v2x\_libdem\_3C/\_4C/\_5C".

*Citation:* Lindberg (2016).

*Years:* 1789-2021

### 7.1.32 Core civil society index ordinal (D) (e\_v2xcs\_ccsi)

*Available versions:* \*\_3C, \*\_4C, \*\_5C

*Question:* How robust is civil society?

*Clarification:* These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem core civil society index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (\_3C), four (\_4C), and five (\_5C) levels respectively.

*Scale:* Ordinal.

*Source(s):* v2cseeorgs v2csreprss v2csptrcpt

*Data release:* 5-12.

*Aggregation:* Same transformation rule as for "v2x\_libdem\_3C/\_4C/\_5C".

*Citation:* Lindberg (2016).

*Years:* 1789-2021

### 7.1.33 Direct popular vote index ordinal (D) (e\_v2xdd\_dd)

*Available versions:* \*\_3C, \*\_4C, \*\_5C

*Question:* To what extent is the direct popular vote utilized?

*Clarification:* These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem direct popular vote index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (\_3C), four (\_4C), and five (\_5C) levels respectively.

*Scale:* Ordinal.

*Source(s):* v2ddlexci v2ddsigpci v2ddsiglci v2ddsigdci v2ddpartci v2ddapprci v2ddspmc  
v2ddadmci v2ddyrcei v2ddlexrf v2ddsigprf v2ddsigdrf v2ddpartrf v2ddapprrf v2ddspmr  
v2ddadmrf v2ddyrpf v2ddpartpl v2ddapprpl v2ddspmpl v2ddadmpl v2ddlexpl v2ddyrpl  
v2ddlexor v2ddpartor v2ddappor v2ddspmor v2ddadmor v2ddyor, v2ddthreor, v2ddthrerf,  
v2ddthrepl

*Data release:* 5-12. Release 7 (new aggregation formula).

*Aggregation:* Same transformation rule as for "v2x\_libdem\_3C/\_4C/\_5C".

*Citation:* Lindberg (2016).

*Years:* 1900-2021

### 7.1.34 Deliberative component index ordinal (D) (e\_v2xdl\_delib)

*Available versions:* \*\_3C, \*\_4C, \*\_5C

*Question:* To what extent is the deliberative principle of democracy achieved?

*Clarification:* These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem deliberative component index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (\_3C), four (\_4C), and five (\_5C) levels respectively.

*Scale:* Ordinal.

*Source(s):* v2dlreason v2dlcommon v2dlcountr v2dlconslt v2dlengage

*Data release:* 5-12.

*Aggregation:* Same transformation rule as for "v2x\_libdem\_3C/\_4C/\_5C".

*Citation:* Lindberg (2016).

*Years:* 1900-2021

### 7.1.35 Equal distribution of resources index ordinal (D) (e\_v2xeg\_eqdr)

*Available versions:* \*\_3C, \*\_4C, \*\_5C

*Question:* How equal is the distribution of resources?

*Clarification:* These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem equal distribution of resources index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (\_3C), four (\_4C), and five (\_5C) levels respectively.

*Scale:* Ordinal.

*Source(s):* v2dlencmps v2dlunivl v2peedueq v2pehealth v2pepwrses v2pepwrsoc v2pepwrgen

*Data release:* 5-12.

*Aggregation:* Same transformation rule as for "v2x\_libdem\_3C/\_4C/\_5C".

*Citation:* Lindberg (2016).

*Years:* 1900-2021

#### 7.1.36 Equal protection index ordinal (D) (e\_v2xeg\_eqprotec)

*Available versions:* \*\_3C, \*\_4C, \*\_5C

*Question:* How equal is the protection of rights and freedoms across social groups by the state?

*Clarification:* These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem equal protection index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (\_3C), four (\_4C), and five (\_5C) levels respectively.

*Scale:* Ordinal.

*Source(s):* v2xcl\_acjst v2clacjust v2clsocgrp v2clsnlpct

*Data release:* 5-12.

*Aggregation:* Same transformation rule as for "v2x\_libdem\_3C/\_4C/\_5C".

*Citation:* Lindberg (2016).

*Years:* 1789-2021

#### 7.1.37 Clean elections index ordinal (D) (e\_v2xel\_frefair)

*Available versions:* \*\_3C, \*\_4C, \*\_5C

*Question:* To what extent are elections free and fair?

*Clarification:* These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem clean elections index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (\_3C), four (\_4C), and five (\_5C) levels respectively.

*Scale:* Ordinal.

*Source(s):* v2el\_frefair

*Data release:* 5-12.

*Aggregation:* Same transformation rule as for "v2x\_polyarchy\_3C/\_4C/\_5C" above.

*Citation:* Lindberg (2016).

*Years:* 1789-2021

#### 7.1.38 Local government index ordinal (D) (e\_v2xel\_locelec)

*Available versions:* \*\_3C, \*\_4C, \*\_5C

*Question:* Are there elected local governments, and — if so — to what extent can they operate without interference from unelected bodies at the local level?

*Clarification:* These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem local government index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (\_3C), four (\_4C), and five (\_5C) levels respectively.

*Scale:* Ordinal.

*Source(s):* v2ellocelc v2ellocpwr

*Data release:* 5-12.

*Aggregation:* Same transformation rule as for "v2x\_libdem\_3C/\_4C/\_5C".

*Citation:* Lindberg (2016).

*Years:* 1789-2021

#### 7.1.39 Regional government index ordinal (D) (e\_v2xel\_regelec)

*Available versions:* \*\_3C, \*\_4C, \*\_5C

*Question:* Are there elected regional governments, and — if so — to what extent can they operate without interference from unelected bodies at the regional level?

*Clarification:* These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem regional government index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (\_3C), four (\_4C), and five (\_5C) levels respectively.

*Scale:* Ordinal.

*Source(s):* v2elsrgel v2elrgpwr

*Data release:* 5-12.

*Aggregation:* Same transformation rule as for "v2x\_libdem\_3C/\_4C/\_5C".

*Citation:* Lindberg (2016).

*Years:* 1789-2021

#### 7.1.40 Legislative constraints on the executive index ordinal (D) (e\_v2xlg\_legcon)

*Available versions:* \*\_3C, \*\_4C, \*\_5C

*Question:* To what extent is the legislature and government agencies (*e.g.*, comptroller general, general prosecutor, or ombudsman) capable of questioning, investigating, and exercising oversight over the executive?

*Clarification:* These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem legislative constraints on the executive index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (\_3C), four (\_4C), and five (\_5C) levels respectively.

*Scale:* Ordinal.

*Source(s):* v2lgqstexp v2lgotovst v2lginvstp v2lgoppart

*Data release:* 5-12.

*Aggregation:* Same transformation rule as for "v2x\_libdem\_3C/\_4C/\_5C".

*Citation:* Lindberg (2016).

*Years:* 1789-2021

#### 7.1.41 Alternative sources of information index ordinal (D) (e\_v2xme\_altinf)

*Available versions:* \*\_3C, \*\_4C, \*\_5C

*Question:* To what extent is the media (a) un-biased in their coverage (or lack of coverage) of the opposition, (b) allowed to be critical of the regime, and (c) representative of a wide array of political perspectives?

*Clarification:* These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem alternative sources of information index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (\_3C), four (\_4C), and five (\_5C) levels respectively.

*Scale:* Ordinal.

*Source(s):* v2mebias v2mecrit v2merange

*Data release:* 5-12.

*Aggregation:* Same transformation rule as for "v2x\_libdem\_3C/\_4C/\_5C".

*Citation:* Lindberg (2016).

*Years:* 1789-2021

#### 7.1.42 Party institutionalization index ordinal (D) (e\_v2xps\_party)

*Available versions:* \*\_3C, \*\_4C, \*\_5C

*Question:* To what extent are political parties institutionalized?

*Clarification:* These are ordinalized versions of the V-Dem party institutionalization index. The original index ranges from 0 to 1. These transformations offer three different ordinal versions with three (\_3C), four (\_4C), and five (\_5C) levels respectively.

*Scale:* Ordinal.

*Source(s):* v2psorgs v2psprbrch v2psprlnks v2psplats v2pscohesv v2lgello

*Data release:* 5-12.

*Aggregation:* Same transformation rule as for "v2x\_libdem\_3C/\_4C/\_5C".

*Citation:* Lindberg (2016).

*Years:* 1789-2021

## 7.2 Political Regimes

### 7.2.1 Democracy (BMR) (E) (e\_boix\_regime)

*Question:* Is a country democratic?

*Clarification:* Dichotomous democracy measure based on contestation and participation. Countries coded democratic have (1) political leaders that are chosen through free and fair elections and (2) a minimal level of suffrage.

*Responses:*

0: No

1: Yes

*Source(s):* Boix *et al.* (2013), Boix *et al.* (2018)

*Data release:* 5-12.

*Citation:* Boix *et al.* (2013).

*Years:* 1800-2015

### 7.2.2 Democratic breakdowns (E) (e\_democracy\_breakdowns)

*Question:* How many previous democratic breakdowns occurred?

*Responses:*

Numeric.

*Source(s):* Boix *et al.* (2013), Boix *et al.* (2018)

*Data release:* 5-12.

*Citation:* Boix *et al.* (2013).

*Years:* 1800-2015

### 7.2.3 Omitted data (E) (e\_democracy\_omitteddata)

*Question:* Is the country a democracy?

*Clarification:* This is the same measure as democracy, except it records an "NA" for countries occupied during an international war (*e.g.*, the Netherlands 1940-44) or experiencing state collapse during a civil war (*e.g.*, Lebanon 1976-89). The democracy variable instead fills in these years as continuations of the same regime type.

*Responses:*

0: No

1: Yes

2: NA

*Source(s):* Boix *et al.* (2013), Boix *et al.* (2018)

*Data release:* 5-12.

*Citation:* Boix *et al.* (2013).

*Years:* 1800-2015

### 7.2.4 Democratic transition (E) (e\_democracy\_trans)

*Question:* Was there a democratic transition?

*Responses:*

-1: Democratic breakdown

0: No change

1: Democratic transition

*Source(s):* Boix *et al.* (2013), Boix *et al.* (2018)

*Data release:* 5-12.

*Citation:* Boix *et al.* (2013).

*Years:* 1800-2015

## 7.3 Freedom House

### 7.3.1 Civil liberties (E) (e\_fh\_cl)

*Clarification:* Civil liberties allow for the freedoms of expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of law, and personal autonomy without interference from the state. The more specific list of rights considered vary over the years.

*Responses:*

Countries are graded between 1 (most free) and 7 (least free).

*Source(s):* Freedom House (2021).

*Notes:* This variable is rescaled between 0 and 1 for comparison with V-Dem democracy indices for the online visualisation tools on the website.

*Data release:* 5-12.

*Citation:* Freedom House (2021)

*Years:* 1972-2020

### 7.3.2 Political rights (E) (e\_fh\_pr)

*Clarification:* Political rights enable people to participate freely in the political process, including the right to vote freely for distinct alternatives in legitimate elections, compete for public office, join political parties and organizations, and elect representatives who have a decisive impact on public policies and are accountable to the electorate. The specific list of rights considered varies over the years.

*Responses:*

Countries are graded between 1 (most free) and 7 (least free).

*Source(s):* Freedom House (2021).

*Notes:* This variable is rescaled between 0 and 1 for comparison with V-Dem democracy indices for the online visualisation tools on the website.

*Data release:* 5-12.

*Citation:* Freedom House (2021)

*Years:* 1972-2020

### 7.3.3 Rule of law (E) (e\_fh\_rol)

*Clarification:* The variable measures the independence of the judiciary; the extent to which rule of law prevails in civil and criminal matters; the existence of direct civil control over the police; the protection from political terror, unjustified imprisonment, exile and torture; absence of war and insurgencies; and the extent to which laws, policies and practices guarantee equal treatment of various segments of the population.

*Responses:*

Countries are graded between 0 (worst) and 16 (best).

*Source(s):* Freedom House (2021). Taken from Teorell et al (2018).

*Notes:* This variable is rescaled between 0 and 1 for comparison with V-Dem democracy indices for the online visualisation tools on the website.

*Data release:* 5-12.

*Citation:* Freedom House (2021).

*Years:* 2005-2018

### 7.3.4 Status (E) (e\_fh\_status)

*Responses:*

1: Free.

2: Partly Free.

3: Not Free.



*Scale:* Ordinal.

*Source(s):* Freedom House (2021).

*Notes:* Until 2003, countries whose combined average ratings for Political Rights and Civil Liberties fell between 1.0 and 2.5 were designated "Free"; between 3.0 and 5.5 "Partly Free", and between 5.5 and 7.0 "Not Free". Since then, countries whose ratings average 1.0 to 2.5 are considered "Free", 3.0 to 5.0 "Partly Free", and 5.5 to 7.0 "Not Free". This variable is rescaled between 0 and 1 for comparison with V-Dem democracy indices for the online visualisation tools on the website.

*Data release:* 5-12.

*Citation:* Freedom House (2021)

*Years:* 1972-2020

## 7.4 World Bank Governance Indicators

### 7.4.1 Control of corruption — estimate (E) (e\_wbgi\_cce)

*Clarification:* "Control of Corruption" measures perceptions of corruption, conventionally defined as the exercise of public power for private gain. The particular aspect of corruption measured by the various sources differs somewhat, ranging from the frequency of "additional payments to get things done", to the effects of corruption on the business environment, to measuring "grand corruption" in the political arena or in the tendency of elite forms to engage in "state capture".

*Source(s):* Kaufmann *et al.* (2016).

*Data release:* 5-12.

*Citation:* Kaufmann *et al.* (2016).

*Years:* 1996-2020

### 7.4.2 Government effectiveness (E) (e\_wbgi\_gee)

*Clarification:* "Government Effectiveness" combines into a single grouping responses on the quality of public service provision, the quality of the bureaucracy, the competence of civil servants, the independence of the civil service from political pressures, and the credibility of the government's commitment to policies. The main focus of this index is on "inputs" required for the government to be able to produce and implement good policies and deliver public goods.

*Source(s):* Kaufmann *et al.* (2016).

*Data release:* 5-12.

*Citation:* Kaufmann *et al.* (2016).

*Years:* 1996-2020

### 7.4.3 Political stability — estimate (E) (e\_wbgi\_pve)

*Clarification:* "Political Stability" combines several indicators which measure perceptions of the likelihood that the government in power will be destabilized or overthrown by possibly unconstitutional and/or violent means, including domestic violence and terrorism.

*Source(s):* Kaufmann *et al.* (2016).

*Data release:* 5-12.

*Citation:* Kaufmann *et al.* (2016).

*Years:* 1996-2020

### 7.4.4 Rule of law — estimate (E) (e\_wbgi\_rle)

*Clarification:* "Rule of Law" includes several indicators which measure the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society. These include perceptions of the incidence of crime, the effectiveness and predictability of the judiciary, and the enforceability of contracts.

Together, these indicators measure the success of a society in developing an environment in which fair and predictable rules form the basis for economic and social interactions and the extent to which property rights are protected.

*Source(s)*: Kaufmann *et al.* (2016).

*Data release*: 5-12.

*Citation*: Kaufmann *et al.* (2016).

*Years*: 1996-2020

#### 7.4.5 Regulatory quality — estimate (E) (e\_wbgi\_rqe)

*Clarification*: "Regulatory Quality" includes measures of the incidence of marketunfriendly policies such as price controls or inadequate bank supervision, as well as perceptions of the burdens imposed by excessive regulation in areas such as foreign trade and business development.

*Source(s)*: Kaufmann *et al.* (2016).

*Data release*: 5-12.

*Citation*: Kaufmann *et al.* (2016).

*Years*: 1996-2020

#### 7.4.6 Voice and accountability — estimate (E) (e\_wbgi\_vae)

*Clarification*: "Voice and Accountability" includes a number of indicators measuring various aspects of the political process, civil liberties and political rights. These indicators measure the extent to which citizens of a country are able to participate in the selection of governments. This category also includes indicators measuring the independence of the media, which serves an important role in monitoring those in authority and holding them accountable for their actions.

*Source(s)*: Kaufmann *et al.* (2016).

*Data release*: 5-12.

*Citation*: Kaufmann *et al.* (2016).

*Years*: 1996-2020

### 7.5 Lexical Index of Electoral Democracy

#### 7.5.1 Lexical index (E) (e\_lexical\_index)

*Question*: What is the lexical index of democracy in the country?

*Responses*:

- 0: No elections
- 1: No party or one-party elections
- 2: Multi-party elections for legislature
- 3: Multi-party elections for legislature and executive
- 4: Minimally competitive elections
- 5: Male or female suffrage
- 6: Universal suffrage

*Source(s)*: Skaaning *et al.* (2015).

*Data release*: 5-12.

*Citation*: Skaaning *et al.* (2015).

*Years*: 1789-2019

### 7.6 Unified Democracy Score

#### 7.6.1 Unified democracy score posterior (median) (E) (e\_uds)

*Additional versions*: \*\_mean, \*\_pct025, \*\_pct975

*Clarification*: Unified democracy score posterior median.

*Source(s)*: Pemstein *et al.* (2010).

*Notes*: The dataset also contains posterior mean as well as 2,5 and 97,5 posterior percentile.

*Data release*: 5-12.

*Citation*: Pemstein *et al.* (2010).

*Years*: 1946-2012

## 7.7 Political Institutions and Political Events

### 7.7.1 Coups (E) (e\_coups)

*Clarification*: Number of successful coups d'état during a given year. A coup is any event resulting in an irregular removal or resignation of the chief executive that involves a violent action or an explicit threat of resorting to it, by an armed organization. Assassinations of the chief executive are not considered coups unless the group responsible for the action takes over the office. Whenever the rules about the replacement of the chief executive are either not codified or unclear, the force criterion prevails. The definition excludes resignations under pressure of popular mobilization if no armed group (legal or not) is involved (resignation of Carlos Mesa in Bolivia). Similarly, irregular transfers of power among civilians that do not entail force (such as changes of communist leaders) are not considered coups. We place no restriction on whether the armed group causing the replacement is domestic or foreign, nor on the identity of the incoming ruler. In particular, any military intervention of foreign powers producing a replacement of the chief executive is coded as a coup, even if they restore a previously elected ruler (French troops overthrowing Bokassa in Central African Republic). As a general rule, any replacement of a military chief executive by another military man is considered a coup, unless the succession occurred according to pre-established rules (Figueirido replacing Geisel in Brazil). Specifically, resignations of the military chief executive caused by votes of non-confidence of irregular military bodies are considered coups (Galtieri replacing Viola in Argentina). The variable is compatible to other conventional sources such as Powell and Thyne (2011), Marshall and Marshall (2009), and Svobik and Akcinaroglu (2010) for the period 1950-2008, with some difference in the interpretation of specific events. Information for the pre-1950 era is more scarce and therefore the coding may be less reliable.

*Source(s)*: Przeworski *et al.* (2013).

*Notes*: Where there is more than one observation per country-year, the maximum of the variable for this period is taken.

*Data release*: 5-12.

*Citation*: Przeworski *et al.* (2013).

*Years*: 1789-2008

### 7.7.2 Number of Parties in legislature (E) (e\_legparty)

*Clarification*: Number of parties in the legislature. By "party" we take here any recognizable, named grouping, regardless whether and how they appeared in elections. This variable is coded regardless whether the legislature was elected or appointed.

*Responses*:

-1: if no legislature.

0: if none (including cases where parties are officially banned).

1: if one (including cases where other parties are officially banned).

2: if more.

*Scale*: Nominal.

*Source(s)*: Przeworski *et al.* (2013).

*Notes*: During the early period candidates typically competed in elections on an individual basis, without any kind of centralized party organizations or shared programs. Within legislatures, however, they often coalesced into groups, currents, factions, "sentiments," etc. Hence, subjective judgments are inevitable in coding this variable. Our rule of thumb was to code as parties any kind of groups that bore a label that survived over two consecutive legislatures.

This was true in several countries of "Liberals" and "Conservatives." In other countries, notably France between 1815 and 1848, however, the divisive issues, the parliamentary groups, and their labels changed frequently, and such cases are coded as "none." A legislature consisting of one party and independents is coded as one party. When there is more than one observation per country-year, the one which has higher value is taken.

*Data release:* 5-12.

*Citation:* Przeworski *et al.* (2013).

*Years:* 1789-2008

## 7.8 Polity 5

### 7.8.1 Institutionalized autocracy (E) (e\_autoc)

*Question:* Is the polity an institutionalized autocracy?

*Clarification:* Autocracy is defined operationally in terms of the presence of a distinctive set of political characteristics. In mature form, autocracies sharply restrict or suppress competitive political participation. Their chief executives are chosen in a regularized process of selection within the political elite, and once in office they exercise power with few institutional constraints.

*Responses:*

Numeric.

*Source(s):* Polity 5 (Marshall and Jaggers 2020).

*Notes:* This variable is rescaled between 0 and 1 for comparison with V-Dem democracy indices for the online visualisation tools on the website.

*Data release:* 5-12.

*Citation:* Polity 5 (Marshall and Jaggers 2020).

*Years:* 1800-2018

### 7.8.2 Institutionalized democracy (E) (e\_democ)

*Question:* Is the polity an institutionalized democracy?

*Clarification:* Democracy is conceived as three essential, interdependent elements. One is the presence of institutions and procedures through which citizens can express effective preferences about alternative policies and leaders. Second is the existence of institutionalized constraints on the exercise of power by the executive. Third is the guarantee of civil liberties to all citizens in their daily lives and in acts of political participation.

The Democracy indicator is an additive eleven-point scale (0-10). The operational indicator of democracy is derived from codings of the competitiveness of political participation (PARCOMP), the openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment (XROPEN and XRCOMP), and constraints on the chief executive (XCONST).

*Responses:*

Numeric.

*Source(s):* Polity 5 (Marshall and Jaggers 2020).

*Notes:* This variable is rescaled between 0 and 1 for comparison with V-Dem democracy indices for the online visualisation tools on the website.

*Data release:* 5-12.

*Citation:* Polity 5 (Marshall and Jaggers 2020).

*Years:* 1800-2018

### 7.8.3 Polity combined score (E) (e\_p\_polity)

*Question:* What is the Polity score?

*Clarification:* The Polity score is computed by subtracting the autocracy score from the democracy score. The resulting unified POLITY scale ranges from +10 (strongly democratic) to -10

(strongly autocratic).

*Responses:*

Numeric.

*Source(s):* Polity 5 (Marshall and Jaggers 2020).

*Data release:* 5-12.

*Citation:* Polity 5 (Marshall and Jaggers 2020).

*Years:* 1800-2018

#### 7.8.4 Political competition (E) (e\_polcomp)

*Question:* Is there any (institutionalized) political competition?

*Clarification:* This variable combines information presented in two component variables: the degree of institutionalization, or regulation, of political competition (e\_parreg) and the extent of government restriction on political competition (e\_parcomp).

*Responses:*

- 1: Repressed Competition: While no significant political activity is permitted outside the ranks of the hegemonic regime, nevertheless, some organized political participation occurs within the regime through highly circumscribed institutional channels.
- 2: Restricted Competition: Some organized political activity occurs outside the ranks of the hegemonic regime, but the regime systematically limits its form, extent, or both in ways that exclude substantial groups from participating in the political arena and/or suppresses the contestation of rival political interests.
- 3: Authoritarian-guided liberalization of repressed or restricted competition or the deepening of hegemonic control: Used to indicate either the concerted effort on the part of hegemonic regimes to open up their political systems to limited (and typically factional) political competition or the transformation of factional-based "quasi-democracies" or "weak authoritarian regimes" into more repressive hegemonic systems in which political competition is increasingly institutionalized and restricted.
- 4: Uninstitutionalized Competition: Political participation is decentralized and fluid in character — revolving around personalities, regional interests, and religious/ethnic/clan groups. There are no enduring national political organizations and systematic regime control of political activity is limited, that is, a situation characterized by a coincidence of weak state and weak society. In the contemporary context, uninstitutionalized competition is most likely to occur in resource poor countries and/or following the collapse of central authority under a (former) repressive, authoritarian state.
- 5: Gradual transition from uninstitutionalized (unregulated) competition to more regulated forms of political competition (the increasing regulation of competition may be centrally-guided or decentralized through the gradual development of political parties and interest groups).
- 6: Factional/Restricted Competition: Polities that oscillate more or less regularly between intense factionalism and faction-based restrictions: that is, when one faction secures power it uses that power to promote its exclusive interests and favor group members while restricting the political access and activities of other, excluded groups, until it is displaced in turn.
- 7: Factional Competition: There are relatively stable and enduring political groups which compete for political influence at the national level — parties, regional groups, or ethnic groups — but particularistic/parochial agendas tend to be exclusive and uncompromising with limited social integration or accommodation across identity boundaries. Factional competition is distinguished by a relative balance of group capabilities that prevents any one of the groups from capturing state power and imposing restrictions on other groups.
- 8: Political liberalization or democratic retrenchment: persistent over coercion: relatively coercive/restrictive transitions either from factional/restricted competition to institutionalized competitive participation or from institutionalized competitive participation to factional/restricted competition. In either case, this code reflects the unconsolidated nature of liberal political participation in otherwise procedurally democratic polities.
- 9: Political liberalization or democratic retrenchment: limited and/or decreasing overt coercion: This code is used to indicate relatively peaceful transitions either to or from institutionalized competitive participation. In either case, this code reflects the

unconsolidated nature of liberal political participation in otherwise procedurally open electoral polities.

10: Institutionalized open electoral participation: Relatively stable and enduring political groups regularly compete for political influence with little use of coercion. No significant or substantial groups, issues, or types of conventional political action are regularly excluded from the political process.

*Source(s)*: Polity 5 (Marshall and Jaggers 2020).

*Data release*: 5-12.

*Citation*: Polity 5 (Marshall and Jaggers 2020).

*Years*: 1800-2018

### 7.8.5 Polity revised combined score (E) (e\_polity2)

*Question*: What is the Revised Polity score?

*Clarification*: This variable is a modified version of the Polity variable added in order to facilitate the use of the Polity regime measure in time-series analyses. It modifies the combined annual Polity score by applying a simple treatment, or "fix," to convert instances of "standardized authority scores" (*i.e.*, -66, -77, and -88) to conventional polity scores (*i.e.*, within the range, -10 to +10). The values have been converted according to the following rule set

-66: Cases of foreign "interruption" are treated as "system missing."

-77: Cases of "interregnum," or anarchy, are converted to a "neutral" Polity score of "0."

-88: Cases of "transition" are prorated across the span of the transition. For example, country X has a POLITY score of -7 in 1957, followed by three years of -88 and, finally, a score of +5 in 1961. The change (+12) would be prorated over the intervening three years at a rate of per year, so that the converted scores would be as follows: 1957 -7; 1958 -4; 1959 -1; 1960 +2; and 1961 +5.

*Source(s)*: Polity 5 (Marshall and Jaggers 2020).

*Notes*: This variable is rescaled between 0 and 1 for comparison with V-Dem democracy indices for the online visualisation tools on the website.

*Data release*: 5-12.

*Citation*: Polity 5 (Marshall and Jaggers 2020).

*Years*: 1800-2018

## 7.9 Others

### 7.9.1 Democratic breakdown (E) (e\_bnr\_dem)

*Clarification*: Countries that meet the minimum conditions for democracy (see below) enter the dataset and are coded "0." When countries cease to meet those minimum criteria they are coded "1" and exit from the dataset.

*Scale*: Dichotomous.

*Source(s)*: Bernhard *et al.* (2001). Taken from Teorell *et al.* (2021).

*Notes*: If, after a democratic breakdown, a country again meets our minimum criteria it re-enters the data as a new democratic episode. The time frame onset in 1913 is a function of when the first country (Norway) meets the minimum conditions. All series terminate in either in a breakdown in various years or right censorship in 2005. The minimal conditions are based on Dahl's notion of polyarchy (competitiveness, inclusiveness) combined with Linz and Stepan's stateness criteria. Competitiveness: Like Przeworski *et al.* we include countries that hold elections for both the executive and legislature, and in which more than one party contests the elections. However, we exclude cases in which we detected outcome changing vote fraud, in which there was either extensive or extreme violence that inhibited voters' preference expression, or in which political parties representing a substantial portion of the population were banned. Inclusiveness: We only include competitive polities in which at least fifty percent of all adult citizens are enfranchised to vote in our set of democracies. Stateness: We also considered questions of sovereignty, not including colonial states, where founding

elections were held prior to the granting of independence, and countries experiencing internal wars in which twenty percent or greater of the population or territory was out of control of the state.

*Data release:* 5-12.

*Citation:* Bernhard *et al.* (2001), Teorell *et al.* (2021).

*Years:* 1946-2005

### 7.9.2 Democracy (E) (e\_chga\_demo)

*Clarification:* A regime is considered a democracy if the executive and the legislature is directly or indirectly elected by popular vote, multiple parties are allowed, there is *de facto* existence of multiple parties outside of regime front, there are multiple parties within the legislature, and there has been no consolidation of incumbent advantage (*e.g.* unconstitutional closing of the lower house or extension of incumbent's term by postponing of subsequent elections). Transition years are coded as the regime that emerges in that year.

*Responses:*

1: Democracy.

0: Otherwise.

*Scale:* Dichotomous.

*Source(s):* Cheibub *et al.* (2010).

*Data release:* 5-12.

*Citation:* Cheibub *et al.* (2010).

*Years:* 1946-2008

### 7.9.3 Corruption perception index (E) (e\_ti\_cpi)

*Clarification:* The CPI focuses on corruption in the public sector and defines corruption as the abuse of public office for private gain. The surveys used in compiling the CPI tend to ask questions in line with the misuse of public power for private benefit, with a focus, for example, on bribe-taking by public officials in public procurement. The sources do not distinguish between administrative and political corruption. The CPI Score relates to perceptions of the degree of corruption as seen by business people, risk analysts and the general public and **ranges between 100 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt).**

*Source(s):* Transparency International (2021).

*Notes:* The data spans 2012–present due to the methodological incomparability with the data prior 2012.

*Data release:* 7-12.

*Citation:* Transparency International (2021).

*Years:* 2012-2021



## 8 Background Factors (E)

This section lists variables gathered from other sources that may help in evaluating the causes and effects of democracy. The variables are divided into sections based on theme.

### 8.1 Education

#### 8.1.1 Education 15+ (E) (e\_peaveduc)

*Question:* What is the average years of education among citizens older than 15?

*Clarification:* The Average years of education in the total population aged 15 years and older.

*Source(s):* Clio Infra (clio-infra.eu), drawing on Mitchell (1998a, 1998b, 1998c), United States Census Bureau (2021), UNESCO, Földvári and van Leeuwen (2014), Leeuwen, van Leeuwen-Li, Földvári (2011), Leeuwen, van Leeuwen-Li, Földvári (2012a), Leeuwen, van Leeuwen-Li, Földvári (2012b), Didenko, Foldvari, van Leeuwen (2012).

*Notes:* Missing data within a time-series is interpolated using linear interpolation for each country. In addition to this, from the last recorded data point to nowadays the data is extrapolated.

*Data release:* 2-12.

*Citation:* Clio Infra (clio-infra.eu), along with other sources listed above.

*Years:* 1820-2021

#### 8.1.2 Educational inequality, Gini (E) (e\_peedgini)

*Question:* How unequal is the level of education achieved by the population aged 15 years and older?

*Clarification:* Gini coefficient of educational inequality estimated from average education data using the method as suggested by Thomas, Wang, and Fan (2000), Checchi (2004) and Castelló and Doménech (2002: 4). Van Leeuwen, van Leeuwen-Li, and Foldvari (N.d.) provide a more detailed explanation in the Clio-Infra codebook.

*Source(s):* Clio Infra (clio-infra.eu), drawing on Mitchell (1998a, 1998b, 1998c), United States Census Bureau (2021), UNESCO, Földvári and van Leeuwen (2010a), Leeuwen, van Leeuwen-Li, Földvári (2011), Leeuwen, van Leeuwen-Li, Földvári (2012a), Leeuwen, van Leeuwen-Li, Földvári (2012b), Didenko, Foldvari, van Leeuwen (2012).

*Data release:* 5-12.

*Citation:* Clio Infra (clio-infra.eu), along with other sources listed above.

*Years:* 1850-2010

### 8.2 Geography

#### 8.2.1 Land area (E) (e\_area)

*Question:* What is the land area of a country?

*Clarification:* Country land area in square kilometers.

*Source(s):* Haber and Menaldo (2011); Schvitz et al. (2021).

*Notes:* Uses v2.0 of R package cshapes; Where several values were available per country-year, the latest one was chosen for the dataset.

*Data release:* 5-12.

*Citation:* Schvitz et al. (2021).

*Years:* 1886-2019

#### 8.2.2 Region (geographic) (E) (e\_regiongeo)

*Question:* In which geographic region is this country located?

*Clarification:* Regions are described based on geographic location.

*Responses:*

- 1: Western Europe
- 2: Northern Europe
- 3: Southern Europe
- 4: Eastern Europe
- 5: Northern Africa
- 6: Western Africa
- 7: Middle Africa
- 8: Eastern Africa
- 9: Southern Africa
- 10: Western Asia
- 11: Central Asia
- 12: Eastern Asia
- 13: South-Eastern Asia
- 14: Southern Asia
- 15: Oceania (including Australia and the Pacific)
- 16: North America
- 17: Central America
- 18: South America
- 19: Caribbean (including Belize, Cuba, Haiti, Dominican Republic and Guyana)

*Source(s):* United Nations Statistics Division (2013).

*Notes:* For the countries coded only in the historical project or for which the UN does not have the code, the region is coded by V-Dem Data Manager in accordance with the position of the neighboring countries.

*Data release:* 5-12.

*Citation:* United Nations Statistics Division (2013).

*Years:* 1789-2021

### 8.2.3 Region (politico-geographic) (E) (e\_regionpol)

*Question:* In which politico-geographic region is this country located?

*Clarification:* This is a tenfold politico-geographic classification of world regions, based on a mixture of two considerations: geographical proximity (with Cyprus, German Democratic Republic, and Mongolia being recoded from original coding) and demarcation by area specialists having contributed to a regional understanding of democratization. The categories are as follow:

*Responses:*

- 1: Eastern Europe and post Soviet Union (including Central Asia, Mongolia, and German Democratic Republic)
- 2: Latin America (including Cuba, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic)
- 3: North Africa and the Middle East (including Israel and Turkey, but excluding Cyprus)
- 4: Sub-Saharan Africa
- 5: Western Europe and North America (including Australia, New Zealand, and Cyprus, but excluding German Democratic Republic)
- 6: Eastern Asia (including Japan, excluding Mongolia)
- 7: South-Eastern Asia
- 8: Southern Asia
- 9: The Pacific (excluding Australia and New Zealand)
- 10: The Caribbean (including Guyana and Suriname, but excluding Cuba, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic)

*Source(s):* Quality of Government Standard Dataset version Jan21 (Teorell et al., 2021).

*Notes:* The values are filled backwards to the first year of coding.

*Data release:* 5-12.

*Citation:* Teorell *et al.* (2018).

*Years:* 1789-2021

#### 8.2.4 Region (politico-geographic 6-category) (E) (e\_regionpol\_6C)

*Question:* In which politico-geographic region is this country located?

*Clarification:* Regions are described as politico-geographic in the sense that they are based on geographical proximity as well as characteristics that contribute to regional understanding as identified by scholars in studies of democratization (e.g. post-Communist). This is a modification of *e\_regionpol* above.

*Responses:*

- 1: Eastern Europe and Central Asia (including Mongolia and German Democratic Republic)
- 2: Latin America and the Caribbean
- 3: The Middle East and North Africa (including Israel and Turkey, excluding Cyprus)
- 4: Sub-Saharan Africa
- 5: Western Europe and North America (including Cyprus, Australia and New Zealand, but excluding German Democratic Republic)
- 6: Asia and Pacific (excluding Australia and New Zealand; see 5)

*Source(s):* Quality of Government Standard Dataset (2019).

*Notes:* The values are filled backwards to the first year of coding.

*Data release:* 9-12.

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document); Teorell *et al.* (2018).

*Years:* 1789-2021

### 8.3 Economics

#### 8.3.1 Exports (E) (e\_cow\_exports)

*Question:* What is the total value of a country's exports?

*Clarification:* Total exports in 2014 US millions of dollars.

*Source(s):* Barbieri *et al.* (2009), Barbieri and Keshk (2016)

*Data release:* 5-12.

*Citation:* Barbieri *et al.* (2009), Barbieri and Keshk (2016)

*Years:* 1870-2014

#### 8.3.2 Imports (E) (e\_cow\_imports)

*Question:* What is the total value of a country's imports?

*Clarification:* Total imports in 2014 US millions of dollars.

*Source(s):* Barbieri *et al.* (2009), Barbieri and Keshk (2016)

*Data release:* 5-12.

*Citation:* Barbieri *et al.* (2009), Barbieri and Keshk (2016)

*Years:* 1870-2014

#### 8.3.3 GDP (E) (e\_gdp)

*Additional versions:* \*\_sd

*Clarification:* Point estimate from latent variable model of Gross Domestic Product based on a number of sources. For details, see the citation.

*Data release:* 12.

*Citation:* Fariss *et al.* (2021)

*Years:* 1789-2019

#### 8.3.4 GDP per capita (E) (e\_gdppc)

*Additional versions:* \*\_sd

*Clarification:* Point estimate from latent variable model of Gross Domestic Product Per Capita based on a number of sources. For details, see the citation.

*Data release:* 12.

*Citation:* Fariss *et al.* (2021)

*Years:* 1789-2019

### 8.3.5 Inflation (E) (e\_miinflat)

*Question:* What is the annual inflation rate?

*Source(s):* Clio Infra (clio-infra.eu), based on Abad, Davies and van Zanden (2012), Montevideo-Oxford Latin America Economic History Database (<https://www.lac.ox.ac.uk/research-projects/moxlad-database>), De Zwart (2011), De Zwart (2012), Reinhart and Rogoff (2011), Santing (N.d.), World Bank (2021).

*Notes:* Missing data within a time-series is interpolated using linear interpolation.

*Data release:* 5-12.

*Citation:* Clio Infra (clio-infra.eu).

*Years:* 1789-2010

### 8.3.6 Population (E) (e\_pop)

*Additional versions:* \*\_sd

*Clarification:* Point estimate from latent variable model of Population based on a number of sources. For details, see the citation.

*Data release:* 12.

*Citation:* Fariss *et al.* (2021)

*Years:* 1789-2019

## 8.4 Natural Resource Wealth

### 8.4.1 Petroleum, coal, and natural gas production per capita (E) (e\_total\_fuel\_income\_pc)

*Question:* What is the real value of a country's petroleum, coal, and natural gas production?

*Clarification:* Real value of petroleum, coal, and natural gas produced per capita.

*Source(s):* Haber and Menaldo (2011).

*Data release:* 5-12.

*Citation:* Haber and Menaldo (2011).

*Years:* 1900-2006

### 8.4.2 Petroleum production per capita (E) (e\_total\_oil\_income\_pc)

*Question:* What is the real value of a country's petroleum production?

*Clarification:* Real value of petroleum produced per capita.

*Source(s):* Haber and Menaldo (2011).

*Data release:* 5-12.

*Citation:* Haber and Menaldo (2011).

*Years:* 1800-2006

### 8.4.3 Petroleum, coal, natural gas, and metals production per capita (E) (e\_total\_resources\_income\_pc)

*Question:* What is the real value of a country's petroleum, coal, natural gas, and metals production?

*Clarification:* Real value of petroleum, coal, natural gas, and metals produced per capita.

*Source(s):* Haber and Menaldo (2011).

*Data release:* 5-12.

*Citation:* Haber and Menaldo (2011).

*Years:* 1900-2006

## 8.5 Infrastructure

### 8.5.1 Radios (E) (e\_\_radio\_n)

*Question:* What is the number of radio sets?

*Clarification:* Original source doesn't specify if the indicators considers total number of radio sets or only radio sets in use.

*Source(s):* Comin and Hobijn (2009).

*Data release:* 5-12.

*Citation:* Comin and Hobijn (2009).

*Years:* 1815-2000

## 8.6 Demography

### 8.6.1 Fertility rate (E) (e\_\_miferrat)

*Question:* What is the fertility rate?

*Clarification:* The fertility rate (*i.e.* total fertility rate, period total fertility rate, total period fertility rate) of a population is the mean number of children that would be born to a woman over her lifetime if (a) she were to experience the current age-specific fertility rates through her lifetime, and (b) she were to survive through the end of her reproductive life. It is obtained by adding single-year age-specific rates at a given time.

*Source(s):* Gapminder (gapminder.org), drawn from various sources (unspecified).

*Data release:* 2-12.

*Citation:* Gapminder (gapminder.org).

*Years:* 1960-2019

### 8.6.2 Population total (E) (e\_\_mipopula)

*Question:* What is the total population (in thousands)?

*Source(s):* Clio Infra (clio-infra.eu), drawing on Goldewijk, Beusen, Janssen (2010), History Database of Global Environment (www.pbl.nl/hyde).

*Notes:* Missing data within a time-series is interpolated using linear interpolation.

*Data release:* 2-12.

*Citation:* Clio Infra (clio-infra.eu).

*Years:* 1800-2000

### 8.6.3 Urbanization (E) (e\_\_miurbani)

*Question:* What is the urbanization rate?

*Clarification:* Ratio of Urban Population to Population.

*Source(s):* See Population and Urban population.

*Data release:* 2-12.

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

*Years:* 1800-2000

#### 8.6.4 Urban population (E) (e\_miurbpop)

*Question:* What is the total urban population?

*Clarification:* The population living in areas classified as urban according to the criteria of each area or country (United Nations, with reference to 1950-present).

*Source(s):* Clio Infra (clio-infra.eu) based on Bairoch, Batou, Chevre (1988), Chandler (1987), de Vries (1984), History Database of Global Environment (www.pbl.nl/hyde), Etter, McAlpine, Possingham (2008), Grigg (1980), Goldewijk, Beusen, Janssen (2010), Maddison (2001), Rozman (1973), United Nations (2009a), United Nations (2009b), Urquhart and Buckley (1965), Van Zanden (2012).

*Notes:* No definition is provided by sources used by Clio-Infra for years prior to 1950. Missing data within a time-series is interpolated using linear interpolation.

*Data release:* 5-12.

*Citation:* Clio Infra (clio-infra.eu).

*Years:* 1800-2000

#### 8.6.5 Life expectancy, female (E) (e\_pefeliex)

*Question:* What is the life expectancy at birth among women?

*Clarification:* Life expectancy refers to expected longevity at birth based on current age-specific mortality rates.

*Source(s):* Clio Infra (clio-infra.eu), drawing on Human Mortality Database (2008), Human Life Table Database (2007), World Bank (2021), Gapminder (gapminder.org), Montevideo-Oxford Latin America Economic History Database (https://www.lac.ox.ac.uk/research-projects/moxlad-database).

*Notes:* Missing data within a time-series is interpolated using linear interpolation.

*Data release:* 5-12.

*Citation:* Clio Infra (clio-infra.eu).

*Years:* 1800-2000

#### 8.6.6 Infant mortality rate (E) (e\_peinfmor)

*Question:* What is the infant mortality rate?

*Clarification:* Deaths of children during first year of life (per 1000 live births).

*Source(s):* Gapminder (gapminder.org), drawing on various sources.

*Notes:* Missing data within a time-series is interpolated using linear interpolation.

*Data release:* 2-12.

*Citation:* Gapminder (gapminder.org), drawing on various sources.

*Years:* 1800-2015

#### 8.6.7 Life expectancy (E) (e\_pelifeex)

*Question:* What is the life expectancy?

*Clarification:* The average number of years a newborn child would live if current mortality patterns were to stay the same.

*Source(s):* Gapminder (gapminder.org), drawing on Human Mortality Database (2008), Riley (2005a, 2005b), Human Life Table Database (2007), United Nations Population Division (2010). Clio Infra (clio-infra.eu), Human Life Table Database (2017), World Bank (2021), Montevideo-Oxford Latin America Economic History Database (https://www.lac.ox.ac.uk/research-projects/moxlad-database).

*Notes:* Missing data within a time-series is interpolated using linear interpolation.

*Data release:* 2-3, 7-12.

*Citation:* Gapminder (gapminder.org).

Years: 1800-2021

### 8.6.8 Maternal mortality rate (E) (e\_pematmor)

*Question:* What is the maternal mortality rate?

*Clarification:* The number of maternal deaths divided by the number of live births in a given year, multiplied by 100000. Maternal death is defined as the death of a woman while pregnant or within 42 days after the termination of that pregnancy, regardless of the length and site of the pregnancy, from a cause related to or aggravated by the pregnancy.

*Source(s):* Gapminder (gapminder.org), drawing from various sources (unspecified).

*Data release:* 5-12.

*Citation:* Gapminder (gapminder.org).

Years: 1800-2013

### 8.6.9 Population (E) (e\_wb\_pop)

*Question:* What is the total population?

*Clarification:* Total population is based on the de facto definition of population, which counts all residents regardless of legal status or citizenship. The values shown are midyear estimates.

*Scale:* Continuous

*Source(s):* (1) United Nations Population Division. World Population Prospects: 2019 Revision. (2) Census reports and other statistical publications from national statistical offices, (3) Eurostat: Demographic Statistics, (4) United Nations Statistical Division. Population and Vital Statistics Reprot (various years), (5) U.S. Census Bureau: International Database, and (6) Secretariat of the Pacific Community: Statistics and Demography Programme.

*Data release:* 9-12.

*Citation:* World Bank (2021)

Years: 1960-2020

## 8.7 Conflict

### 8.7.1 Civil war (E) (e\_civil\_war)

*Question:* Was there a civil war?

*Clarification:* Civil war — at least one intra-state war with at least 1,000 battle deaths for each country-year.

*Responses:*

0: No

1: Yes

*Source(s):* Haber and Menaldo (2011).

*Data release:* 5-12.

*Citation:* Haber and Menaldo (2011).

Years: 1816-2006

### 8.7.2 Armed conflict, international (E) (e\_miinteco)

*Question:* Did the country participate in an international armed conflict?

*Clarification:* Coded 1 if the country participated in an international armed conflict in a given year, 0 otherwise. The original source codebook (Brecke 2001) states that no war is coded as 0 and war is coded as 1. However, the data contains only 1's along with missing data (no 0's). Following the authors' instructions (personal communication), we re-code missing observations as non-conflict (0) for countries where at least one year in the original times series (which runs from 1500 until present) was coded as 1.

*Source(s):* Clio Infra (clio-infra.eu), drawing on Brecke (2001).



*Data release:* 5-12.

*Citation:* Brecke (2001).

*Years:* 1789-2000

### 8.7.3 Armed conflict, internal (E) (e\_miinterc)

*Question:* Did the country experience an internal armed conflict?

*Clarification:* Coded 1 if the country suffered in an internal armed conflict in a given year, 0 otherwise. The original source codebook (Brecke 2001) states that no war is coded as 0 and war is coded as 1. However, the data contains only 1's along with missing data (no 0's). Following the authors' instructions (personal communication), we re-code missing observations as non-conflict (0) for countries where at least one year in the original times series (which runs from 1500 until present) was coded as 1.

*Source(s):* Clio Infra (clio-infra.eu), drawing on Brecke (2001).

*Data release:* 5-12.

*Citation:* Brecke (2001).

*Years:* 1789-2000

### 8.7.4 Coups d'état (E) (e\_pt\_coup)

*Question:* Did a coup d'état occur?

*Clarification:* Coups d'état are defined as "overt attempts by the military or other elites within the state apparatus to unseat the sitting head of state using unconstitutional means(...)there is no minimal death threshold for defining a coup. A coup attempt is defined as successful if the coup perpetrators seize and hold power for at least seven days" (Powell & Thyne 2011:252).

*Responses:*

- 0: No coup attempt occurred
- 1: Unsuccessful coup attempt occurred
- 2: Successful coup attempt occurred

*Scale:* Categorical

*Source(s):* Powell and Thyne (2011)

*Notes:* Where the number of observations per country-year is more than one, the maximum value was taken to indicate whether there was a coup or not.

*Data release:* 9-12.

*Citation:* Powell and Thyne (2011)

*Years:* 1950-2021

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## 10 Appendix A: Structure of Aggregation

### 10.1 V-Dem Democracy Indices and Indicators

Democracy Index Name	Mid-Level Democracy and Governance Index Name	Lower-Level Democracy and Governance Index Name	Indicator Name	Tag	Uniqueness Score*
<i>Electoral democracy index</i>				v2x_polyarchy	
	Additive polyarchy index			v2x_api	
	Multiplicative polyarchy index			v2x_mpi	
		Freedom of expression and alternative sources of information index		v2x_freexp_altinf	
		Government censorship effort—Media		v2mecenefm	0.325
		Harassment of journalists		v2meharjrn	0.362
		Media self-censorship		v2meslfcen	0.384
		Media bias		v2mebias	0.316
		Print/broadcast media perspectives		v2merange	0.316
		Print/broadcast media critical		v2mecrit	0.294
		Freedom of discussion for men		v2cldiscm	0.31
		Freedom of discussion for women		v2cldiscw	0.31
		Freedom of academic and cultural expression		v2clacfree	0.377
		Freedom of association index (thick)		v2x_frassoc_thick	
		Party ban		v2psparban	0.417
		Barriers to parties		v2psbars	0.285
		Opposition parties autonomy		v2psoppaut	0.023
		Elections multiparty		v2elmulpar	0.042
		CSO entry and exit		v2cseeorgs	0.406
		CSO repression		v2csreprss	0.466
		Share of population with suffrage		v2x_suffr	
		Percent of population with suffrage		v2elsuffrage	
		Clean elections index		v2xel_frefair	
		EMB autonomy		v2lembaut	0.481
		EMB capacity		v2lembcap	0.516
		Election voter registry		v2elrgstry	0.448
		Election vote buying		v2elvotbuy	0.556
		Election other voting irregularities		v2elirreg	0.33
		Election government intimidation		v2elintim	0.351
		Election other electoral violence		v2elpeace	0.64
		Election free and fair		v2elfrfair	0.309
		Elected officials index		v2x_elecoff	
		Legislature bicameral		v2lgbicam	
		Lower chamber elected		v2lrello	
		Upper chamber elected		v2lgelecup	
		Percentage of indirectly elected legislators lower chamber		v2lginello	
		Percentage of indirectly elected legislators upper chamber		v2lginelup	
		HOS appointment in practice		v2expathhs	
		HOG appointment in practice		v2expathhg	
		HOS selection by legislature in practice		v2exaphos	
		HOG selection by legislature in practice		v2exaphogp	
		HOS appoints cabinet in practice		v2exdfcbhs	
		HOG appoints cabinet in practice		v2exdjcbhg	
		HOS dismisses ministers in practice		v2exdfdmhs	
		HOG dismisses ministers in practice		v2exdfdsbg	
		HOS = HOG?		v2exhoshog	
		Chief executive appointment by upper chamber		v2exapup	
		Chief executive appointment by upper chamber implicit approval		v2exapupap	
		HOS = HOG?		v2exhoshog	
		Chief executive appointment by upper chamber		v2exapup	
		Chief executive appointment by upper chamber implicit approval		v2exapupap	

Democracy Index Name	Mid-Level Democracy and Governance Index Name	Lower-Level Democracy and Governance Index Name	Indicator Name	Tag	Uniqueness Score*
<i>Liberal democracy index</i>				v2x_libdem	
	Electoral democracy index			v2x_polyarchy	
	Liberal component index			v2x_liberal	
		Equality before the law and individual liberty index		v2xcl_rol	
		Rigorous and impartial public administration		v2clrspct	0.53
		Transparent laws with predictable enforcement		v2cltrnslw	0.406
		Access to justice for men		v2clacjstm	0.255
		Access to justice for women		v2clacjstw	0.255
		Property rights for men		v2clprptym	0.459
		Property rights for women		v2clprptyw	0.459
		Freedom from torture		v2cltort	0.418
		Freedom from political killings		v2clkill	0.469
		Freedom from forced labor for men		v2clslavem	0.497
		Freedom from forced labor for women		v2clslavef	0.497
		Freedom of religion		v2clrelig	0.595
		Freedom of foreign movement		v2clfmov	0.461
		Freedom of domestic movement for men		v2cldmovm	0.427
		Freedom of domestic movement for women		v2cldmovw	0.427
		Judicial constraints on the executive index		v2x_jucon	
		Executive respects constitution		v2exrescon	0.573
		Compliance with judiciary		v2jucomp	0.372
		Compliance with high court		v2juhccomp	0.36
		High court independence		v2juhcind	0.421
		Lower court independence		v2juncind	0.431
		Legislative constraints on the executive index		v2xlg_legcon	
		Legislature questions officials in practice		v2lgqstexp	0.513
		Executive oversight		v2lgotovst	0.39
		Legislature investigates in practice		v2lginvstp	0.284
		Legislature opposition parties		v2lgoppart	0.433
<i>Participatory democracy index</i>				v2x_partipdem	
	Electoral democracy index			v2x_polyarchy	
	Participatory component index			v2x_partip	
		Civil society participation index		v2x_cspart	
		Candidate selection, National/local		v2pscnslnl	0.795
		CSO consultation		v2cscnsult	0.429
		CSO participatory environment		v2csprtcpt	0.438
		CSO womens participation		v2csgender	0.675
		Direct popular vote index		v2xdd_dd	
		Initiatives permitted		v2ddlexci	
		Initiatives signatures %		v2ddsigpci	
		Initiatives signature-gathering time limit		v2ddsiglci	
		Initiatives signature-gathering period		v2ddsigdei	
		Initiatives participation threshold		v2ddpartci	
		Initiatives approval threshold		v2ddapprci	
		Initiatives administrative threshold		v2ddadmci	
		Initiatives super majority		v2ddspmci	
		Popular initiative credible threat		v2ddthreci	
		Occurrence of citizen-initiative this year		v2ddyrci	
		Referendums permitted		v2ddlexrf	
		Referendums signatures %		v2ddsigprf	
		Referendums signature-gathering period		v2ddsigdrf	
		Referendums participation threshold		v2ddpartrf	
		Referendums approval threshold		v2ddapprf	
		Referendums super majority		v2ddspmrf	
		Referendums administrative threshold		v2ddadmrf	

Democracy Index Name	Mid-Level Democracy and Governance Index Name	Lower-Level Democracy and Governance Index Name	Indicator Name	Tag	Uniqueness Score*
			Occurrence of referendum this year	v2ddyrrf	
			Popular referendum credible threat	v2ddthrrf	
			Constitutional changes popular vote	v2ddlexor	
			Obligatory referendum participation threshold	v2ddpartor	
			Obligatory referendum approval threshold	v2ddappor	
			Obligatory referendum super majority	v2ddspmor	
			Obligatory referendum administrative threshold	v2ddadmor	
			Obligatory referendum credible threat	v2ddthreor	
			Occurrence of obligatory referendum this year	v2ddyror	
			Plebiscite permitted	v2ddlexpl	
			Plebiscite participation threshold	v2ddpartpl	
			Plebiscite approval threshold	v2ddapprpl	
			Plebiscite super majority	v2ddspmpl	
			Plebiscite administrative threshold	v2ddadmpl	
			Occurrence of plebiscite this year	v2ddytpl	
			Plebiscite credible threat	v2ddthrepl	
		Local government index		v2xel_locelec	
			Local government elected	v2ellocelc	
			Local offices relative power	v2ellocpwr	
			Local government exists	v2ellocgov	
		Regional government index		v2xel_regelec	
			Regional government elected	v2elsrgel	
			Regional offices relative power	v2elrgpwr	
			Regional government exists	v2elreggov	
<i>Deliberative democracy index</i>				v2x_delibdem	
	Electoral democracy index			v2x_polyarchy	
	Deliberative component index			v2xdl_delib	
			Reasoned justification	v2dlreason	0.338
			Common good	v2dlcommon	0.584
			Respect counterarguments	v2dlcountr	0.332
			Range of consultation	v2dlconstl	0.248
			Engaged society	v2dlengage	0.238
<i>Egalitarian democracy index</i>				v2x_egaldem	
	Electoral democracy index			v2x_polyarchy	
	Egalitarian component index			v2x_egal	
		Equal protection index		v2xeg_eqprotec	
			Social class equality in respect for civil liberties	v2clacjust	0.207
			Social group equality in respect for civil liberties	v2clsocgrp	0.56
			Weaker civil liberties population	v2clsnlpct	0.87
		Equal access index		v2xeg_eqaccess	
			Power distributed by gender	v2pepwrngen	0.552
			Power distributed by socioeconomic position	v2pepwrses	0.458
			Power distributed by social group	v2pepwrsoc	0.49
		Equal distribution of resources index		v2xeg_eqdrr	
			Means-tested vs. universalistic policy	v2dlunivl	0.671
			Particularistic or Public good	v2dlencmps	0.66
			Educational equality	v2peedueq	0.268
			Health equality	v2pehealth	0.201

\*Unmodeled Variance. Uniqueness is the variance that is 'unique' to the variable and not shared with other variables.

## 10.2 Indices Created Using V-Dem Data

Democracy Indices Created Using V- Dem Data Name	Lower-Level Democracy and Governance Index Name	Indicator Name	Tag	Uniqueness Score*
<i>Regimes of the World index</i>			v2x_regime	
		Elections multiparty	v2elmulpar_osp	
		Executive elections multiparty	v2elmulpar_osp_ex	
		Legislative elections multiparty	v2elmulpar_osp_leg	
		Election free and fair	v2elfrfair_osp	
		Legislative election free and fair	v2elfrfair_osp_leg	
		Executive election free and fair	v2elfrfair_osp_ex	
		HOS appointed by legislature	v2ex_legconhos	
		Relative power of the HOS	v2ex_hosw	
		Access to justice for men	v2clacjstm_osp	
		Access to justice for women	v2clacjstw_osp	
		Transparent laws with predictable enforcement	v2cltrnslw_osp	
	Electoral regime index		v2x_elecreg	
	Executive electoral regime index		v2xex_elecreg	
	Legislative electoral regime index		v2xlg_elecreg	
	Electoral democracy index		v2x_polyarchy	
	Liberal component index		v2x_liberal	
<i>Accountability index**</i>			v2x_accountability	
	Vertical accountability index		v2x_veracc	
		Electoral regime index	v2x_elecreg	
		HOS appointed by legislature	v2ex_legconhos	
		Relative power of the HOS	v2ex_hosw	
		EMB autonomy	v2elembaut	
		EMB capacity	v2elembcap	
		Election voter registry	v2elrgstry	
		Election other voting irregularities	v2elirreg	
		Election government intimidation	v2elintim	
		Elections multiparty	v2elmulpar	
		Election free and fair	v2elfrfair	
		Percentage of population with suffrage	v2elsuffrage	
		HOS appointment in practice	v2expathhs	
		HOG appointment in practice	v2expathhg	
		HOG selection by legislature in practice	v2exaphogp	
		Party ban	v2psparban	
		Barriers to parties	v2psbars	
		Opposition parties autonomy	v2psoppaut	
	Diagonal accountability index		v2x_diagacc	
		Government censorship effort—Media	v2mecenefm	
		Internet censorship effort	v2mecenefi	
		Harassment of journalists	v2meharjrn	
		Print/broadcast media critical	v2mecrit	
		Media bias	v2mebias	
		Print/broadcast media perspectives	v2merange	
		Media self-censorship	v2meslfcen	
		CSO participatory environment	v2csprtcpt	
		CSO entry and exit	v2cseeorgs	
		CSO repression	v2csreprss	
		Freedom of discussion for men	v2cldiscm	
		Freedom of discussion for women	v2cldiscw	
		Freedom of academic and cultural expression	v2clacfree	
		Engaged society	v2dlengage	
	Horizontal accountability index		v2x_horacc	
		High court independence	v2juhcind	
		Lower court independence	v2juncind	
		Compliance with high court	v2juhccomp	
		Compliance with judiciary	v2jucomp	
		Executive respects constitution	v2exrescon	
		Executive oversight	v2lgotovst	
		Legislature investigates in practice	v2lginvstp	
		Legislature bicameral	v2lgbicam	

Democracy Indices Created Using V- Dem Data Name	Lower-Level Democracy and Governance Index Name	Indicator Name	Tag	Uniqueness Score*
<i>Confidence dimension index</i>			v2x_ex_confidence	
		HOS appointment in practice	v2expathhs	
		HOG appointment in practice	v2expathhg	
		HOS removal by legislature in practice (Ordinal version)	v2exremhsp_ord	
		HOS removal by the ruling party or party leadership body in a one-party system in practice (Mean)	v2exrmhsol_2_mean	
		HOS removal by a royal council in practice (Mean)	v2exrmhsol_3_mean	
		HOS removal by the military in practice (Mean)	v2exrmhsol_3_mean	
		HOS = HOG	v2exhoshog	
		Relative power of the HOS	v2ex_hosw	
<i>Direct election dimension index</i>			v2x_ex_direlect	
		HOS appointment in practice	v2expathhs	
		HOG appointment in practice	v2expathhg	
		HOS removal by legislature in practice (Ordinal version)	v2exremhsp_ord	
		HOS removal by the ruling party or party leadership body in a one-party system in practice (Mean)	v2exrmhsol_2_mean	
		HOS removal by a royal council in practice (Mean)	v2exrmhsol_3_mean	
		HOS removal by the military in practice (Mean)	v2exrmhsol_3_mean	
		HOS = HOG	v2exhoshog	
		Relative power of the HOS	v2ex_hosw	
<i>Hereditary dimension index</i>			v2x_ex_hereditary	
		HOS appointment in practice	v2expathhs	
		HOG appointment in practice	v2expathhg	
		HOS removal by legislature in practice (Ordinal version)	v2exremhsp_ord	
		HOS removal by the ruling party or party leadership body in a one-party system in practice (Mean)	v2exrmhsol_2_mean	
		HOS removal by a royal council in practice (Mean)	v2exrmhsol_3_mean	
		HOS removal by the military in practice (Mean)	v2exrmhsol_3_mean	
		HOS = HOG	v2exhoshog	
		Relative power of the HOS	v2ex_hosw	
<i>Military dimension index</i>			v2x_ex_military	
		HOS appointment in practice	v2expathhs	
		HOG appointment in practice	v2expathhg	
		HOS removal by legislature in practice (Ordinal version)	v2exremhsp_ord	
		HOS removal by the ruling party or party leadership body in a one-party system in practice (Mean)	v2exrmhsol_2_mean	
		HOS removal by a royal council in practice (Mean)	v2exrmhsol_3_mean	
		HOS removal by the military in practice (Mean)	v2exrmhsol_3_mean	
		HOS = HOG	v2exhoshog	
		Relative power of the HOS	v2ex_hosw	

Democracy Indices Created Using V- Dem Data Name	Lower-Level Democracy and Governance Index Name	Indicator Name	Tag	Uniqueness Score*
<i>Ruling party dimension index</i>			v2x_ex_party	
		HOS appointment in practice	v2expathhs	
		HOG appointment in practice	v2expathhg	
		HOS removal by legislature in practice (Ordinal version)	v2exremhsp_ord	
		HOS removal by the ruling party or party leadership body in a one-party system in practice (Mean)	v2exrmhsol_2_mean	
		HOS removal by a royal council in practice (Mean)	v2exrmhsol_3_mean	
		HOS removal by the military in practice (Mean)	v2exrmhsol_3_mean	
		HOS = HOG	v2exhoshog	
		Relative power of the HOS	v2ex_hosw	
<i>Neopatrimonial rule index</i>			v2x_neopat	
	Clientelism index		v2xnp_client	
		Election vote buying	v2elvotbuy	0.425
		Particularistic or public goods	v2dlencmps	0.693
		Party linkages	v2psprlnks	0.554
	Presidentialism index		v2xnp_pres	
		Executive respects constitution	v2exrescon	0.512
		Executive oversight	v2lgotovst	0.523
		Legislature controls resources	v2lgfunds	2.755
		Legislature investigates in practice	v2lginvstp	2.32
		High court independence	v2juhcind	0.418
		Lower court independence	v2juncind	0.454
		Compliance with high court	v2juhccomp	0.415
		Compliance with judiciary	v2jucomp	0.409
		EMB autonomy	v2elembaut	0.537
	Regime corruption index		v2xnp_regcorr	
		Executive embezzlement and theft	v2exembezz	0.337
		Executive bribery and corrupt exchanges	v2exbribe	0.263
		Legislature corrupt activities	v2lgcrrpt	0.493
		Judicial corruption decision	v2jucorrdc	0.532
<i>Civil liberties index</i>			v2x_civlib	
	Physical violence index		v2x_clphy	
		Freedom from political killings	v2clkill	
		Freedom from torture	v2cltort	
	Political civil liberties index		v2x_clpol	
		Government censorship effort—Media	v2mecenefm	0.358
		Harassment of journalists	v2meharjrn	0.394
		Media self-censorship	v2meslfcen	0.402
		Freedom of discussion for men	v2cldiscm	0.26
		Freedom of discussion for women	v2cldiscw	0.26
		Party ban	v2psparban	0.561
		Barriers to parties	v2psbars	0.454
		Opposition parties autonomy	v2psoppaut	0.455
		CSO entry and exit	v2cseeorgs	0.316
		CSO repression	v2csreprss	0.344
	Private civil liberties index		v2x_clpriv	
		Freedom from forced labor for men	v2clslavem	0.467
		Freedom from forced labor for women	v2clslavf	0.467
		Property rights for men	v2clprptym	0.389
		Property rights for women	v2clprptyw	0.389
		Freedom of foreign movement	v2clfmov	0.411
		Freedom of domestic movement for men	v2cldmovm	0.286
		Freedom of domestic movement for women	v2cldmovw	0.286
		Freedom of religion	v2clrelig	0.529
		Religious organization repression	v2csrlgrrp	0.573

Democracy Indices Created Using V- Dem Data Name	Lower-Level Democracy and Governance Index Name	Indicator Name	Tag	Uniqueness Score*
<i>Exclusion by Socio-Economic Group</i>			v2xpe_exlecon	
		Power distributed by socio-economic position	2pepwrses	0.624
		Social class equality in respect for civil liberty	v2clacjust	0.468
		Access to public services distributed by socio-economic position	v2peapsecon	0.329
		Access to state jobs by socio-economic position	v2peasjsoecon	0.271
		Access to state business opportunities by socio-economic position	v2peasbecon	0.378
<i>Exclusion by Gender index</i>			v2xpe_exlgender	
		Power distributed by gender	v2pepwrgen	0.445
		Gender equality in respect for civil liberties	v2clgencl	0.333
		Access to public services distributed by gender	v2peapsge	0.473
		Access to state jobs by gender	v2peasjgen	0.239
		Access to state business opportunities by gender	v2peasbgen	0.281
<i>Exclusion by Urban-Rural Location index</i>			v2xpe_exlgeo	
		Power distributed by urban-rural location	v2pepwrgeo	0.606
		Urban-rural location equality in respect for civil liberties	v2clgeocl	0.415
		Access to public services distributed by urban-rural location	v2peapsgeo	0.328
		Access to state jobs by urban-rural location	v2peasjgeo	0.323
		Access to state business opportunities by urban-rural location	v2peasbegeo	0.29
<i>Exclusion by Political Group index</i>			v2xpe_exlpol	
		Political group equality in respect for civil liberties	v2clpolcl	0.54
		Access to public services distributed by political group	v2peapspol	0.449
		Access to state jobs by political group	v2peasjpol	0.241
		Access to state business opportunities by political group	v2peasbepol	0.339
<i>Exclusion by Social Group index</i>			v2xpe_exlsocgr	
		Power distributed by social group	v2pepwrsoc	0.519
		Social group equality in respect for civil liberties	v2clsocgrp	0.534
		Access to public services distributed by social group	v2peapssoc	0.43
		Access to state jobs by social group	v2peasjsoc	0.311
		Access to state business opportunities by social group	v2peasbsoc	0.302
<i>Political corruption index</i>			v2x_corr	
		Legislature corrupt activities	v2lgcrrpt	
		Judicial corruption decision	v2jucorrdc	
	Executive corruption index		v2x_execorr	
		Executive bribery and corrupt exchanges	v2exbribe	
		Executive embezzlement and theft	v2exembe	
	Public sector corruption index		v2x_pubcorr	
		Public sector corrupt exchanges	v2excrptps	
		Public sector theft	v2exthtfts	



Democracy Indices Created Using V- Dem Data Name	Lower-Level Democracy and Governance Index Name	Indicator Name	Tag	Uniqueness Score*
<i>Women political empowerment index</i>			v2x_gender	
	Women civil liberties index		v2x_genc1	
		Freedom of domestic movement for women	v2cldmovew	0.452
		Freedom from forced labor for women	v2clslavef	0.445
		Property rights for women	v2clprptyw	0.408
		Access to justice for women	v2clacjstw	0.371
	Women civil society participation index		v2x_gencs	
		Freedom of discussion for women	v2cldiscw	0.661
		CSO womens participation	v2csgender	0.224
		Percent (%) female journalists	v2mefemjrn	0.569
	Women political participation index		v2x_genpp	
		Power distributed by gender	v2pepwrgen	
		Lower chamber female legislators	v2lgfemleg	
<i>Rule of law index</i>			v2x_rule	
		Compliance with high court	v2juhccomp	0.535
		Compliance with judiciary	v2jucomp	0.497
		High court independence	v2juhcind	0.595
		Lower court independence	v2juncind	0.635
		Executive respects constitution	v2exrescon	0.484
		Rigorous and impartial public administration	v2clrspct	0.42
		Transparent laws with predictable enforcement	v2cltrnslw	0.504
		Judicial accountability	v2juacct	0.662
		Judicial corruption decision	v2juccorrdc	0.56
		Public sector corrupt exchanges	v2excrptps	0.456
		Public sector theft	v2exthtfts	0.452
		Executive bribery and corrupt exchanges	v2exbribe	0.526
		Executive embezzlement and theft	v2exembez	0.434
		Access to justice for men	v2clacjstm	0.519
		Access to justice for women	v2clacjstw	0.519
<i>Citizen-initiated component of direct popular vote index</i>			v2xdd_cic	
	Popular initiative index		v2xdd_i_ci	
		Initiatives permitted	v2ddlexci	
		Initiatives signatures %	v2ddsigpci	
		Initiatives signature-gathering time limit	v2ddsiglci	
		Initiatives signature-gathering period	v2ddsigdci	
		Initiatives participation threshold	v2ddpartci	
		Initiatives approval threshold	v2ddapprci	
		Initiatives super majority	v2ddspmci	
		Initiatives administrative threshold	v2ddadmci	
		Occurrence of citizen-initiative this year	v2ddyrci	
		Popular initiative credible threat	v2ddthreci	
	Popular referendum index		v2xdd_i_rf	
		Referendums permitted	v2ddlexrf	
		Referendums signatures %	v2ddsigprf	
		Referendums signature-gathering period	v2ddsigdrf	
		Referendums participation threshold	v2ddpartrf	
		Referendums approval threshold	v2ddapprrf	
		Referendums super majority	v2ddspmrf	
		Referendums administrative threshold	v2ddadmrfr	
		Occurrence of referendum this year	v2ddyrrf	
		Popular referendum credible threat	v2ddthrerf	
<i>Top-Down component of direct popular vote index</i>			v2xdd_toc	
	Plebiscite index		v2xdd_i_pl	
		Plebiscite permitted	v2ddlexpl	
		Plebiscite participation threshold	v2ddpartpl	
		Plebiscite approval threshold	v2ddapprpl	
		Plebiscite super majority	v2ddspmpl	
		Plebiscite administrative threshold	v2ddadmpl	
		Occurrence of plebiscite this year	v2ddyrrpl	
		Plebiscite credible threat	v2ddthrepl	

Democracy Indices Created Using V- Dem Data Name	Lower-Level Democracy and Governance Index Name	Indicator Name	Tag	Uniqueness Score*
		Obligatory referendum index	v2xdd_i_or	
		Enforcement of Constitutional changes through popular vote	v2ddlexor	
		Obligatory referendum participation threshold	v2ddpartor	
		Obligatory referendum approval threshold	v2ddappor	
		Obligatory referendum super majority	v2ddspmor	
		Obligatory referendum administrative threshold	v2ddadmor	
		Obligatory referendum credible threat	v2ddthreor	
<i>Core civil society index</i>			v2xcs_ccsi	
		CSO participatory environment	v2csprtpt	0.52
		CSO entry and exit	v2cseeorgs	0.205
		CSO repression	v2csreprss	0.339
<i>Electoral regime index</i>			v2x_elecreg	
		Legislative or constituent assembly election	v2xel_elecparl	
		Election type	v2eltype_0	
		Election type	v2eltype_1	
		Election type	v2eltype_4	
		Election type	v2eltype_5	
		Legislature closed down or aborted	v2xlg_leginter	
		Legislature bicameral	v2lgbicam	
		Presidential election	v2xel_elecpres	
		Election type	v2eltype_6	
		Election type	v2eltype_7	
		Chief executive no longer elected	v2x_hosinter	
		HOS = HOG?	v2exhoshog	
		HOG appointment in practice	v2expathhg	
		HOS appointment in practice	v2expathhs	
		Presidential election aborted	v2x_hosabort	
		HOS = HOG?	v2exhoshog	
		HOG appointment in practice	v2expathhg	
		HOS appointment in practice	v2expathhs	
		Presidential election	v2xel_elecpres	
		Legislative or constituent assembly election aborted	v2x_legabort	
		Legislature bicameral	v2lgbicam	
		Legislative or constituent assembly election	v2xel_elecparl	
<i>Executive electoral regime index</i>			v2xex_elecreg	
		Presidential election	v2xel_elecpres	
		Election type	v2eltype_6	
		Election type	v2eltype_7	
		Chief executive no longer elected	v2x_hosinter	
		HOS = HOG?	v2exhoshog	
		HOG appointment in practice	v2expathhg	
		HOS appointment in practice	v2expathhs	
		Presidential election aborted	v2x_hosabort	
		HOS = HOG?	v2exhoshog	
		HOG appointment in practice	v2expathhg	
		HOS appointment in practice	v2expathhs	
		Presidential election	v2xel_elecpres	

Democracy Indices Created Using V- Dem Data Name	Lower-Level Democracy and Governance Index Name	Indicator Name	Tag	Uniqueness Score*
<i>Legislative electoral regime index</i>			v2xlg_elecreg	
	Legislative or constituent assembly election		v2xel_elecparl	
		Election type	v2eltype_0	
		Election type	v2eltype_1	
		Election type	v2eltype_4	
		Election type	v2eltype_5	
	Legislature closed down or aborted		v2xlg_leginter	
		Legislature bicameral	v2lgbicam	
	Legislative or constituent assembly election aborted		v2x_legabort	
		Legislature bicameral	v2lgbicam	
		Legislative or constituent assembly election	v2xel_elecparl	
<i>Electoral component index</i>			v2x_EDcomp_thick	
	Freedom of association index (thick)		v2x_frassoc_thick	
		Party ban	v2psparban	0.417
		Barriers to parties	v2psbars	0.285
		Opposition parties autonomy	v2psoppaut	0.023
		Elections multiparty	v2elmulpar	0.042
		CSO entry and exit	v2cseeorgs	0.406
		CSO repression	v2csreprss	0.466
<i>Legislature directly elected</i>			v2xex_elecleq	
		Lower chamber directly elected	v2lrello	
		Upper chamber directly elected	v2lgelecup	
		Percentage of indirectly elected legislators lower chamber	v2lginello	
		Percentage of indirectly elected legislators upper chamber	v2lginelup	
		Chief executive appointment by upper chamber	v2exapup	
		Chief executive appointment by upper chamber implicit approval	v2exapupap	
<i>Freedom of expression index</i>			v2x_freexp	
		Government censorship effort—Media	v2mecenefm	0.327
		Harassment of journalists	v2meharjrn	0.364
		Media self-censorship	v2meslfcen	0.384
		Freedom of discussion for men	v2cldiscm	0.246
		Freedom of discussion for women	v2cldiscw	0.246
		Freedom of academic and cultural expression	v2clacfree	0.315
<i>Alternative sources of information index</i>			v2xme_altinf	
		Media bias	v2mebias	0.286
		Print/broadcast media critical	v2mecrit	0.265
		Print/broadcast media perspectives	v2merange	0.261
<i>Freedom of discussion</i>			v2xcl_disc	
		Freedom of discussion for men	v2cldiscm	
		Freedom of discussion for women	v2cldiscw	
<i>Access to justice</i>			v2xcl_acjst	
		Access to justice for men	v2clacjstm	
		Access to justice for women	v2clacjstw	
<i>Property rights</i>			v2xcl_prpty	
		Property rights for men	v2clprptym	
		Property rights for women	v2clprptyw	
<i>Freedom from forced labor</i>			v2xcl_slave	
		Freedom from forced labor for men	v2clslavem	
		Freedom from forced labor for women	v2clslavef	

Democracy Indices Created Using V- Dem Data Name	Lower-Level Democracy and Governance Index Name	Indicator Name	Tag	Uniqueness Score*
<i>Freedom of domestic movement</i>			v2xcl_slave	
		Freedom of domestic movement for men	v2cldmovem	
		Freedom of domestic movement for women	v2cldmovew	
<i>Party institutionalization index</i>			v2xps_party	
		Party organizations	v2psorgs	
		Party branches	v2psprbrch	
		Party linkages	v2psprlnks	
		Distinct party platforms	v2psplats	
		Legislative party cohesion	v2pscohesv	
<i>Divided party control of legislature index</i>			v2x_divparctrl	
		National party control	v2psnatpar	
		National party control ordinal version	v2psnatpar_ord	
<i>Division of power index</i>			v2x_feduni	
		Local government exists	v2ellocgov	
		Regional government exists	v2elreggov	
		Local government elected	v2ellocelc	
		Regional government elected	v2elsrgel	
		Local offices relative power	v2ellocpwr	
		Regional offices relative power	v2elrgpwr	
<i>Academic Freedom Index</i>			v2xca_academ	
		Freedom to research and teach	v2cafres	0.189
		Freedom of academic exchange and dissemination	v2cafexch	0.182
		Institutional autonomy	v2cainsaut	0.335
		Campus integrity	v2casurv	0.306
		Freedom of academic and cultural expression	v2clacfree	0.388

\*Unmodeled Variance. Uniqueness is the variance that is 'unique' to the variable and not shared with other variables.

\*\* Since the accountability indices do not use standard BFAs, we do not report uniqueness scores here. Details regarding model fit can be found in the methodological appendix of V-Dem Working Paper No. 58.

## 11 Appendix B: Glossary

**Attributes:** This section includes the most specific conceptual building blocks we use to discuss democracy and related concepts. Many of our survey questions attempt to ask about a single attribute, for example, "What percentage of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature is directly elected in popular elections?" Although any of these questions could also be seen as a compendium of multiple attributes (What does it mean to be a legislature? What is a "popular" election?), in a project covering all countries for more than a century, there are degrees of specificity that it is not practical to approach, so attributes are the most specific concepts that we consider feasible to measure.

**Chief Executive:** The Head of State or the Head of Government, depending on the relative power of each office.

**Civil Society:** An organizational layer of the polity that lies between the state and private life. Civil society is composed of voluntary associations of people joined together in common purpose. Four varieties of organizations should *not* be considered part of civil society:

- A: Any organization that has forced membership for some class of people (*e.g.* transmission belt organizations under totalitarian, post-totalitarian regimes, or authoritarian regimes).
- B: Economic firms (whether private or public). However, if owners or workers of firms organize for their mutual interest such organizations are part of civil society. Illustration—General Motors is not part of civil society, but any producers association it takes part in, or any labor union which its workers belong to, clearly is.
- C: Those parts of religious organizations devoted to the practice of spirituality. However, organizations devoted to social or political ends that are based in common religious belief or affiliation (the Moral Majority, CARE, American Friends Service Committee, Southern Christian Leadership Conference, the Anti-Defamation League, or the Council on American-Islamic Relations) are clearly part of civil society. To clarify: the Catholic Church should not be considered a civil society organization, but in many societies there are a multitude of Catholic organizations, linked to the Church in varying degrees, that are a part of civil society. Such public activities even when physically housed in places of worship should be considered civil society organizations (*e.g.*, charitable or social action committees that are physically located on ecclesiastical property).
- D: Criminal Associations. Such associations may influence or even capture elements within the state or political society. They are not to be considered part of civil society. Examples include narcotics cartels, smuggling organizations, and slavery networks. Civic associations that are declared criminal by political authorities for carrying out civic or political activities should not be conflated with criminal associations.

**Component and Subcomponent:** Relative concepts that are useful when describing the structure of either a concept or an index. For example, egalitarianism is a component of egalitarian democracy, but egalitarianism in turn has its own components, including health and educational equality, which are therefore subcomponents of egalitarian democracy. The V-Dem conceptual scheme sometimes distinguishes five or more levels of specificity. Because these terms are relative, knowing whether a concept is a component or a subcomponent does not reveal how general or specific it is in an absolute sense.

**Conceptions:** The most general concepts of democracy. These are more complex notions that allow for a version of democracy to embrace multiple properties and dimensions. They are attempts to define more holistic, thick concepts that approach natural-language understandings of democracy. In doing so, they tend to overlap with other general concepts of democracy. For example, our conceptions of liberal, participatory, deliberative, and egalitarian democracy all include electoral democracy and therefore overlap quite a bit.

**Country:** A sovereign state or semi-sovereign territory. All political units of concern to V-Dem are referred to as countries, even though their status in international law varies—some being colonies others being nation-states or empires.

**Cyber Security Threats:** Cyber security threats include penetration of private digital networks, using means ranging from exploiting software vulnerabilities, password cracking, or social engineering (*e.g.*, tricking individuals into revealing passwords or other information necessary to break into a digital system) to obtain information or disrupt an organization or individual's use of digital networks and tools. They also include unauthorized alterations of an individual or organization's digital presence, such as defacing websites and commandeering social media accounts. These threats range from unsophisticated (*e.g.*, exploitation of failure to password protect private networks or use of common passwords by authorized users, and spear phishing) to moderate (*e.g.*, embedding malicious code in emails or exploiting well-known software flaws that organizations have failed to patch), to sophisticated (*e.g.*, exploiting unknown exploits in commonly used software or even embedding exploits into commercial systems unbeknownst to their creators).

**Dimension:** A property with an added empirical characteristic: it describes a straight line connecting two poles of a concept. It is practically synonymous with scale. Often we reserve the term dimension for properties whose attributes also can be arrayed between the same two poles. For example, if "civil liberty" is a dimension, many specific civil liberties are correlated: if a case has a high degree of freedom of discussion, it tends to have high degrees of freedom of movement, freedom to organize, freedom from political murder, and so on. There are exceptions, however, when there are accepted ways of reducing multidimensional attributes to a single dimension. For example, male suffrage and female suffrage vary somewhat independently but they can be combining into a dimension of adult suffrage.

**Disadvantage:** Refers to socioeconomic disadvantage. Specifically, a group or individual is judged disadvantaged if their annual income is significantly below the median national income.

**Domestic Online Media:** Domestic online media is any media source originating in the country in question. For example, the New York Times' website is domestic online media in the United States, but not in India, even though it operates bureaus in India. Media includes any source reporting on current events or political issues, ranging from well-established brands to newsletters and websites run by an individual.

**Exclusion:** Exclusion is when individuals are denied access to services or participation in governed spaces based on their identity or belonging to a particular group. It is not necessary for *all* members of a group to be excluded in order for group-based exclusion to occur. Exclusion occurs even when only a single individual is excluded based on her or his identity or membership (perceived or actual) in a particular group.

**Geographic Group:** Geographic group refers to those living in rural or urban areas. Urban areas are defined as an area that meets the following conditions: population density exceeds a threshold of 150 persons per square kilometer, there is access to a sizeable settlement of 50,000 people or more within some reasonable travel time, for example 60 minutes by road. (World Development Report, 2009: 54).

**Government:** The executive branch of the government, including its head of state (HOS) and/or head of government (HOG)—whichever is most prominent, or both if they are both powerful—along with the cabinet, ministries, and top civil servants. We are only concerned here with the government that actually resides within the country or semi-sovereign territory. Thus, in a typical British colony the government would include the governor-general and his local administration but not the King/Queen of England or the government of England.

**Government and its Agents:** The government and its agents include official government organs, such as bureaucracies, courts, intelligence services, and the military, but also unofficial agents, such as officially unaffiliated cyber-warfare operatives who perform services, even "off-book" work, on behalf of the government.

**Head of Government (HOG):** A head of government (HOG) is the chief officer(s) of the executive branch of its government, typically presiding over a cabinet. If you are considering a semi-sovereign territory, such as a colony, please answer the questions respect to the head of government that is seated within the territory in question (such as the local prime minister in a British colony, not the prime minister in London).

**Head of State (HOS):** A head of state (HOS) is an individual or collective body that serves as the chief public representative of the country. If you are considering a semi-sovereign territory, such as a colony, please answer the questions with respect to the head of state that is seated within the territory in question (such as the governor-general in a British colony, not the King/Queen of England).

**High Court:** By high court we mean the constitutional court of your country or the highest ordinary court. Specifically, if your country has a constitutional court, please answer the question with respect to that court. If there is no constitutional court, please answer the question with respect to the country's highest ordinary court. For example, in Mexico in 2004, you would consider the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation and not the Electoral Tribunal for the Federal Judiciary. In Russia the same year, you would consider the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation and not the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, and in Sweden, you would ignore the Supreme Administrative Court and instead focus on the Supreme Court. Germany has both a constitutional court, the Federal Constitutional Court, and a court of last resort for ordinary matters, the Federal Court of Justice. The Federal Constitutional Court is the high court for our purposes. In the United States, there is no separate constitutional court, tribunal, or review body. The Supreme Court of the United States is both the highest ordinary court and the highest court in the state with constitutional jurisdiction. Therefore we consider it to be the high court of the United States.

Sometimes a country's highest judicial body has separate chambers or divisions. If the court's judges do not rotate between divisions, and only one division possesses jurisdiction over constitutional matters, then please only consider that division in your responses. For example, the Supreme Court of Justice of Costa Rica has four chambers. The Fourth Chamber reviews constitutional matters, its judges are appointed to it specifically and the other judges of the Supreme Court do not rotate onto the Fourth Chamber. Therefore, the high court for Costa Rica is the constitutional chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice.

If the state is a federation, please focus on the federal judiciary. Finally, if you are considering a semi-sovereign territory, such as a colony, please answer this question with respect to highest ordinary court seated within the territory in question, not abroad (*i.e.*, do not consider a colonial court like the Privy Council for British Colonies).

**Index (Plural: indices):** A measure constructed from multiple variables or indicators.

**Internet:** We define the Internet as all information that people access over public and private digital networks, worldwide. The Internet includes both publicly accessible digital spaces and private or gated information transmission platforms. The Internet does not include traditional media transmission mechanisms such as paper, television, traditional voice telephone, and radio.

**Legislature:** A collective body, commonly associated with national governments, having the formal right to propose, amend, enact, and repeal legislation that is binding for the entire political unit. It is typically distinct from other branches of government such as the judiciary and the executive. Advisory bodies that do not have the formal authority to legislate—as stipulated by statute, legislative rules, the



constitution, or common law precedent—are not considered legislatures. Legislative bodies typically have the power to decide on one or more of the following:

- National budget
- Domestic taxation
- International treaty ratification
- Instituting states of emergency
- Declaring war
- Territorial integrity and national sovereignty
- Executive oversight

Membership of a legislative body may be the result of a popular election, selection by lower level bodies, or appointment by representatives of the executive. A legislature may be organized as one or more chambers, often though not always, having distinct responsibilities.

A legislature is a permanent body, considered to exist from the day it has first convened until the end of its legal mandate; or until another date when the body is dissolved for another reason or when it is practically incapacitated during protracted states of emergency, civil wars, or similar conditions; or when its legal existence is eliminated by a suspension of the constitutional order.

**Local Government:** The lowest level of government recognized by the V-Dem project. Situated below regional government (if there is a regional government). Refers to government at the level of towns, cities, and counties/communes (all-inclusive).

**Lower Chamber:** The lower chamber in a bicameral legislature, sometimes also called the "second chamber," typically means the more numerous chamber that is also more directly representative of the general population. If you are considering a semi-sovereign territory, such as a colony, please answer these questions with respect to the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature that is seated within the territory in question (such as the lower chamber of a local legislative assembly in a British colony, not the House of Commons in London).

**Major Political Parties:** Major political parties include the group of political parties that hold a significant number of seats in national legislative body(-ies), or earn a significant number of votes in elections for the executive. When we ask you to consider "major political parties", you do not need to consider parties that run in elections but receive only a small minority of seats or votes, or those that receive no seats at all.

**National Government:** The highest level of aggregation recognized by the V-Dem project. Refers to the national government of a sovereign state or the territorial level of government for a semi-sovereign colony or territory. Thus, the "national" government of India prior to independence—the British Raj—was situated in New Delhi, *not* in London—even though decisions affecting the Indian colony were often made in London.

**Ordinary Court:** A court with general jurisdiction or a court with civil and/or criminal jurisdiction.

**Political Groups:** Political groups are defined as those who are affiliated with a particular political party or candidate, or a group of parties/candidates. A common form of partisan exclusion is when state services or regulations are implemented in a way that seeks to reward incumbent political supporters and punish non-supporters.

**Political Party:** An organization that nominates candidates for public office. The term includes a longstanding coalition such as the CDU/CSU in Germany if that coalition functions in most respects like a single party. Sometimes, the identity of a party is obscured by name changes. However, if the party changes names but retains key personnel and is still run by and for the same constituencies then it should be considered the same organization.

**Popular Election:** A process of direct leadership selection in which voters choose parties or individuals to serve in executive offices or as representatives in legislative or constitutional assemblies. The only accepted mediation is the situation where voters select a body of electors, who are pledged to support specific candidates, and whose sole purpose is to intermediate the leadership selection process, as in US presidential elections.

The electorate (those allowed to vote) in a popular election may include all adult citizens or it may be restricted to particular groups (*e.g.*, men, property holders, racial or ethnic groups). The extent of suffrage is not what qualifies an election as popular (so long as the number of voters is much larger than the number of representatives being selected). Likewise, the freeness or fairness of an election is not at issue. A popular election may be restricted to a single party or candidate, for example, but does not include referendums on term extensions for incumbents.

**Principles:** Properties with normative connotations. When we wish to make reference to the various intellectual traditions that have fostered debate about what democracy should be, we prefer the term principles to properties. For example, when describing theories of deliberative democracy, it is necessary to refer to philosophers such as Habermas who argue for the principle that governments must earn their authority to rule by respectfully providing citizens with rationales for their decisions—a normative claim. However, by referring to various principles we are not endorsing them, only saying that others do. Principles are not necessarily dimensions, as realizing a principle can require achieving a high standard on more than one dimension; and dimensions are not necessarily principles; but both are special types of properties.

**Properties:** Concepts that are more general than attributes. We speak of the participatory property of participatory democracy, for example, to call attention to the participatory aspects of participatory democracy, as distinct from the other features that it may share with egalitarian, liberal, electoral, or deliberative democracy. Because they are at a relatively high level of generality, properties tend to contain many attributes.

**Public Authorities:** Includes the government as well as subnational governments, agencies, parastatals, and the like. Compare State.

**Regional Government:** The second-highest level of government recognized by the V-Dem project. A regional government is situated below the national government. Regional units may be referred to as cantons, departments, provinces, regions, or states. Note that some countries are so small that they do not have regional governments, or did not have regional governments for some portion of the 20th century.

**Semisovereign Territory:** This refers to a country that is not fully sovereign but nonetheless exercises some—at least minimal—level of self-determination. Many of the countries of concern to this project began as colonies of an empire. If a country moved from semi-sovereign status to sovereign status over the course of the twentieth century—maintaining comparable borders—then we want to code both entities. Likewise, we want to include countries like Taiwan that are not universally recognized as sovereign but nonetheless enjoy self-determination (in part or in full).

Most questions pertaining to semi-sovereign territories ask you to reflect on the practices and institutions located within that territory—rather than the empire or nation-state that may claim ultimate sovereignty over the territory. Thus, a question about the government or judicial bodies seated within a British colony would refer to the governor-general and his local administration rather than the King/Queen or government of England.

**Social Group:** A social group is differentiated within a country by caste, ethnicity, language, race, region, religion, migration status, or some combination thereof. (It does *not* include identities grounded in sexual orientation, gender, or socioeconomic status.) Social group identity is contextually defined and is likely to vary across countries and through time. Social group identities are also likely to cross-cut, so that a given person could be defined in multiple ways, *i.e.*, as part of multiple groups. Nonetheless, at any given point in time there are social groups within a society that are understood—by those residing within that society—to be different, in ways that may be politically relevant. Contrast Identity group.

**Social Media:** Social media are a subset of Internet platforms that enable normal individuals to create and share content with networks of other people. Social media platforms are available to the public, although content on such networks may be shared privately within subgroups of users. Social media includes both publicly visible, or semi-public platforms, like Facebook, Flickr, Friendster, Google+, Instagram, Myspace, LinkedIn, Twitter, VKontakte, and Weibo and private social networking and messaging platforms like Signal, Slack, Snapchat, or WhatsApp.

**Socio-Economic Position:** Socio-Economic position defines groups based on attributes of wealth, occupation, or other economic circumstances such as owning property. Exclusion of economic groups occurs when, for example, those who are not property owners are restricted from voting, or when fees associated with justice, health or education are set at a rate that is unaffordable for poorer individuals.

**Specialized Court:** Specialized courts have jurisdiction restricted to particular areas of the law outside of criminal and civil law. Examples of specialized courts include administrative, commercial, immigration or environmental courts. We exclude constitutional courts from this category.

**State:** A political organization that organizes compulsory domination over a fixed territory on a continual basis.

**Upper Chamber:** The upper chamber in a bicameral legislature, often called the "senate" or sometimes the "first chamber," typically means the less numerous chamber that is also less directly representative of the general population. If you are considering a semi-sovereign territory, such as a colony, please consider the upper chamber of the legislature that is seated within the territory in question (such as the "senate" or upper chamber of a local legislative assembly in a British colony, not the House of Lords in London).

**Variable:** A measure of a small number of attributes. Synonymous with "indicator."

**Variety of Democracy:** A loose term that could refer both to conceptions of democracy (as defined above) and to other notions of democracy, such as direct democracy (which in our conceptual scheme is a property of participatory democracy).

## 12 Appendix C: Background Notes

This section of the document lays out background information about various topics undertaken in the questionnaire and in the V-Dem project at large: (1) Civic and Academic Space, (2) Civil Liberty, (3) Civil Society Organizations, (4) Deliberation, (5) Direct Democracy, (6) Elections, (7) Exclusion, (8) Executive, (9) Judiciary, (10) Legislature, (11) Media, (12) Political Equality, (13) Political Parties, (14) Sovereignty, (15) Subnational Democracy, and (16) Voting and Representation.

We list the V-Dem Project Manager who constructed the indicators for that topic, scholars whose work has influenced our thinking (some of whom were personally consulted in the process of designing these indicators), organizations that collect data on these subjects (if any), and extant studies or datasets that relate to the subject (if any).

### 12.1 Civic and Academic Space

*Project manager:* Anna Lührmann

*Scholars:* Sebastian Hellmeier, Katrin Kinzelbach, Ilyas Saliba, Janika Spannagel, Jean Lachapelle, Olga Onuch, Michael Bernhard, Kyle Marquardt, Anja Neundorf, Jennifer McCoy.

*Organizations:* Scholars at Risk, Global Public Policy Institute, Civicus Studies, Comparative Constitutions Project, Competitive Authoritarian Protest Research Network (CAPRN).

*Studies, datasets:* Bjørnskov, C. and S. Voigt (2016); Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton (2016); State of Emergency Mapping Project (STEMP), Zwitter, Fister and Groeneweg (2017); McCoy, and Somer (2019); Hellmeier, and Weidmann, (2020)

### 12.2 Civil Liberty

*Project manager:* Svend-Erik Skaaning

*Scholars:* David Beetham (U. of Leeds, emeritus), David Cingranelli (SUNY, Binghamton), Christian Davenport (U. of Notre Dame), Todd Landman (Essex), David Richards (U. of Connecticut).

*Organizations:* Amnesty International, Freedom House, Hauge Institute for the Internationalisation of Law, Human Rights First (formerly Lawyers Committee for Human Rights), Human Rights Watch, Interamerican Commission on Human Rights, World Justice Project.

*Studies, datasets:* Annual Reports (Amnesty International); Annual Reports (Human Rights Watch); Arat (1991); Bertelsmann Transformation Index (Bertelsmann Foundation); Cederman *et al.* (2010); Cingranelli and Richards (1999; 2014); Freedom in the World, Nations in Transit, Countries at the Crossroads (Freedom House); Freedom House (2006); Gibney and Dalton (1996); Green (2001); Landman (2004); Landman, Carvalho (2010); Skaaning (2006a, 2006b, 2008); Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (US Department of State).

### 12.3 Civil Society Organizations

*Project manager:* Michael Bernhard

*Scholars:* Sheri Berman (Barnard College), Lena Blomstrand (Head of Civil Society Center, Sida), David Campbell (Notre Dame), Grzegorz Ekiert (Harvard), Andrew Green (independent scholar), Gretchen Helmke (Rochester), Marc Howard (Georgetown), Jude Howell (Director, Centre for Civil Society, LSE), Jan Kubik (Rutgers), Steven Levitsky (Harvard), Susan Stokes (Yale), Lucan Way (University of Toronto), Meredith Weiss (SUNY Albany).

*Organizations:* Center for Civil Society (UCLA), Centre for Civil Society (LSE), Civil Society Center (Sida, Sweden), National Endowment for Democracy (Washington, DC), Center for Civil Society and Democracy (Georgetown), Center for Civil Society Studies (Johns Hopkins University).

*Studies, datasets:* Anheier (2004); Andrew Green (proposal); The Comparative Non-Profit Sector Project, Ekiert, Kubik (2001); Helmke, Levitsky (2004); Civil Society Index (CIVICUS); Civil

Society Ratings (the Civil Society Center at Sida and Helmut K. Anheier); European Social Survey; Freedom House; Nations in Transit; The U.S. "Citizenship, Involvement, Democracy" Survey; World Values Survey.

## 12.4 Deliberation

*Project managers:* Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Staffan I. Lindberg

*Scholars:* Andre Bächtiger (University of Luzern), John Dryzek (ANU), Jurg Steiner (UNC, Chapel Hill).

*Studies, datasets.* Bächtiger (2005); Dryzek (2009); Mutz (2008); Ryfe (2005); Steiner *et al.* (2004); Thompson (2008).

## 12.5 Direct Democracy

*Project manager:* David Altman

*Scholars:* Shaun Bowler (UC Riverside), Anita Breuer (Cologne), Todd Donovan (Western Washington), Markus Freitag (Konstanz), Archon Fung (Kennedy School of Gov, Harvard), Elisabeth Gerber (Michigan), Sara Hobolt (Oxford), Simon Hug (Geneve), John Matsusaka (USC), Maija Setälä (Turku), Caroline J. Tolbert (Iowa), Adrian Vatter (Zurich).

*Organizations:* Centre for Democracy (C2D), IRI-USA.

*Studies, datasets:* Suchmaschine für direkte Demokratie; National Conference of State Legislatures (US only).

## 12.6 Elections

*Project manager:* Staffan I. Lindberg

*Scholars:* Matthijs Bogaards (Jacobs University, Bremen), Jörgen Elklit (Aarhus U., Denmark), Jennifer Gandhi (Emory), Susan Hyde (Yale), Philip Keefer (World Bank), Judith Kelly (Duke), Gerry Munck (USC), Andrew Reynolds (UNC), Andreas Schedler (CIDE), Rakesh Sharma (IFES).

*Organizations:* ACE Electoral Knowledge Network, Carter Center, IFES, National Democratic Institute (NDI), OAS Department of Cooperation and Electoral Observation. *Studies, datasets:* Bjornlund (2004); Carter Center *et al.* (2005); Elklit, Reynolds (2005); Eriksson (2002); European Union (2007); Gerken (2009); Hyde and Malinov (2009); Kelley, Kolev (2010); Kollman *et al.* (2011); Lindberg (2009); Munck (2006); Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Polity 5 (Marshall, Jaggers 2020); Project on International Election Monitoring; Schedler (2006).

## 12.7 Exclusion

*Project manager:* Rachel Sigman

*Scholars:* Melani Cammett, Lahra Smith, Kanchan Chandra, Lars-Erik Cedermann, Andreas Wimmer.

*Organizations:* World Bank, ETH-Zurich.

*Studies, datasets:* World Bank, World Development Report 2017 Ethnic Power Relations Datasets; Vogt, Manuel, Nils-Christian Bormann, Seraina Rüegger, Lars-Erik Cederman, Philipp Hunziker, and Luc Girardin. (2015).

## 12.8 Executive

*Project manager:* Jan Teorell

*Scholars:* Kirk Bowman (Georgia Institute of Technology), John Carey (Dartmouth), Steven Fish (UC Berkeley), Jennifer Gandhi (Emory), Fabrice Lehoucq (UNC Greensboro), Gerardo Munck (USC), Anibal Perez-Linan (U. of Pittsburgh), Andreas Schedler (CIDE), Matthew Shugart

(UCSD).

*Studies, datasets:* Amorim Neto (1998); the ARCHIGOS project (Goemans, Gleditsch, Chiozza 2009); Banks, Müller, Overstreet and Isacoff (2009); Bienen and van de Walle (1991); Bowman, Lehoucq and Mahoney (2005); CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2014), CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2014) (Elkins *et al.* 2009); van Cranenburgh (2008); DPI (Beck *et al.* 2001); the ACLP dataset (Cheibub *et al.* 2010); Henisz (2000; 2002); the Institutions and Elections Project, IAEP (Regan *et al.* 2009); Lentz (1994; 1999); Metcalf (2000); Ahmed Mushfiq Mobarak (dataset); Schemmel (rulers.org); Siaroff (2003); UNDP (2004:77-84); worldstatesmen.org.

## 12.9 Judiciary

*Project manager:* Jeffrey Staton *Scholars:* Vanessa Baird (Colorado-Boulder), Rebecca Bill-Chavez (Navy), Dan Brinks (UT-Austin), Clifford J. Carrubba (Emory), Matthew Gabel (Washington U.), Gretchen Helmke (Rochester), Jeffrey Lax (Columbia), Andrew Martin (Washington U.), Georg Vanberg (UNC).

*Organizations:* Human Rights Watch; The World Justice Project (American Bar Association); World Bank. See also organizations listed under Civil Liberties.

*Studies, datasets:* American Bar Association (2007); Bertelsmann (2008); Carrubba, Gabel, Helmke, Martin, Staton (2008); Cingranelli and Richards (2014); Clague *et al.* (1999); Elkins and Ginsburg (2009); Executive Opinion Survey of the Global Competitiveness Report (available for 80 countries in 2002); Feld and Voigt (2003); Gwartney and Lawson (2007); Henisz (2000); Howard and Carey (2004); Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2009); Keith (2012); La Porta *et al.* (2004); Ríos-Figueroa (2006); Ríos-Figueroa and Staton (2009); Tate and Keith (2007); Tate *et al.* (2002); Vera Institute of Justice (2003).

## 12.10 Legislature

*Project managers:* Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

*Scholars:* Joel Barkan (University of Iowa), John Carey (Dartmouth), Scott Desposato (UCSD), John Huber (Columbia), Mark Jones (Rice), Lanny Martin (Rice), Robert Mattes (U. of Cape Town), Scott Morgenstern (U. of Pittsburgh), Shaheen Mozaffar (Bridgewater State College).

*Organizations:* IPU.

*Studies, datasets:* African Legislatures Project (ALP); CCP (Elkins *et al.* 2014); Fish, Kroenig (2009).

## 12.11 Media

*Project manager:* Michael Coppedge / Holli Semetko

*Scholars:* Devra Moehler (Annenburg School, University of Pennsylvania), Erik Nisbet (Ohio State), Pippa Norris (Kennedy School of Government); Wisdom Tettey (University of Calgary).

*Organizations:* IREX.

*Studies, datasets:* IREX Media Sustainability Index ([www.irex.org/msi/index.asp](http://www.irex.org/msi/index.asp)); Freedom House Freedom of the Press Index; Index of internet freedom (Berkman Center for Internet and Society, Harvard University).

## 12.12 Political Parties

*Project manager:* Allen Hicken

*Scholars:* Stefano Bartolini (EU Institute, Florence), Pradeep Chhibber (UC Berkeley), Kenneth Janda (Northwestern), Mark Jones (Rice), Richard S. Katz (Johns Hopkins University), Philip Keefer (World Bank), Herbert Kitschelt (Duke), Steven Levitsky (Harvard), Scott Mainwaring (Notre Dame), Peter Mair (EU Institute, Florence), Karen Remmer (Duke), Kenneth Roberts (Cornell), Erik Wibbels (Duke).



*Studies, datasets:* John Carey (dataset); Comparative Manifestoes Project; Michael Coppedge (classification of Latin American parties); DPI (Beck *et al.* 2001); Kenneth Janda (dataset); Wiesehomeier-Benoit (dimensions of party competition), CLEA (Kollman *et al.* 2011).

## 12.13 Political Equality

*Project manager:* John Gerring

*Scholars:* Kathryn Hochstetler (University of New Mexico), Ayesha Jalal (History and Sociology, Tufts), Raúl Madrid (Texas-Austin), Mick Moore (Center for the Future State/Institute for Development Studies, Sussex), Alex Pacek (Texas A&M), Deborah Yashar (Princeton).

## 12.14 Sovereignty

*Project manager:* Michael Bernhard

*Scholars:* Karen Adams (U. of Montana), Tanisha Fazal (Columbia), Erik Gartzke (UCSD), Robert Jackson (Boston University), Stephen Krasner (Stanford), Douglas Lemke (Penn State), Kunle Owolabi (Villanova).

*Organizations:* Correlates of War project.

*Studies, datasets:* Karen Adams (dataset); Correlates of War (dataset); List of Independent States (Gleditsch, Ward).

## 12.15 Subnational Democracy

*Project manager:* Kelly McMann

*Scholars:* Andrew Barnes (Kent State University), Caroline Beer (University of Vermont), Karen Beckwith (Case Western Reserve University), Dan Berger (University of Chicago), Justin Buchler (Case Western Reserve University), Ernesto Calvo (University of Maryland, College Park), Rebecca Bill Chavez (U.S. Navel Academy), Todd Eisenstadt (American University), Carlos Gervasoni (Universidad Torcuato), Agustina Giraudy (American University), Brian Grodsky (University of Maryland, Baltimore), Matt Ingram (State University of New York, Albany), Pierre Landry (University of Pittsburgh), Tomila Lankina (De Montfort University), Alfred Montero (Carleton College), Bryon Moraski (University of Florida), Nikolai Petrov (Carnegie Center Moscow), Elizabeth Remick (Tufts University), Karen Remmer (Duke University), Aseema Sinha (Claremont-McKenna College), Oxana Shevel (Tufts University), Lily Tsai (MIT).

*Organizations:* United Cities and Local Government, Global Observatory on Local Democracy and Decentralization.

*Studies, datasets:* Ammons (2001); Bardhan, Mookherjee (2006); Bierschenk, Olivier de Sardan (1997); Campbell (2003); Clark, Hoffmann-Martinot (1998); Commonwealth Local Government Forum ; Council of Europe (Local democracy reports for member states) ; Crook, Manor (1998); Fiscal Austerity and Urban Innovation Project; Globalization and World Cities; John (2001); Kaufmann, Leautier, Mastruzzi (2005); McCarney, Stren (2003); Montero, Samuels (2004); Municipal Development Partnership (PDM, seat in Cotonou, Benin) ; Olowu, Wunsch (2004); Oxhorn (2004); Soos (2002); UN Habitat (various years); World Report on Decentralization and Local Democracy, aka the Gold Report.

## 12.16 Voting and Representation

*Project manager:* Pamela Paxton

*Scholars:* Kenneth Bollen (UNC), Drude Dahlerup (Stockholm), Matt Golder (Florida State U.), (Rochester), Melanie Hughes (Pittsburgh); Tatu Vanhanen (University of Tampere, Finland, emeritus).

*Organizations:* IDEA, IPU, U.S. Department of State.

*Studies, datasets:* Cederman *et al.* (2010); Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections (IPU); CCP



(Elkins *et al.* 2014); IDEA (Global Survey of Voter Turnout); IDEA Quota Database; Moon *et al.* (2006); Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Paxton *et al.* (2003); Paxton, Hughes, and Green (2008); US Office of Personnel Management Investigations Service (2001); U.S. Department of State Human Rights Reports; Vanhanen (2000).

## 13 Appendix D: Post-Survey Questionnaire

### Instructions to the coders (as shown in the surveys)

**Post-survey questionnaire:** Please answer this set of questions after you have completed all other sections of the survey. It consists of questions about your personal background and political perspectives, as well as some general questions about democracy. Answers to personal questions will remain strictly confidential.

**Principles of democracy:** There are many ways of conceptualizing democracy. In the following section, we ask about your own views of this subject. Specifically, we ask you to consider seven conceptions of democracy—electoral, liberal, majoritarian, consensus, participatory, deliberative, and egalitarian. After a short description of each conception, we ask you to rate how strongly you support this conception of democracy on a standard Likert scale (strongly disagree, somewhat disagree, neither agree nor disagree, somewhat agree, strongly agree).

We are interested in your own views of the subject, *i.e.*, how closely these various conceptualizations fit with your intuitive sense of what democracy means, or should mean. When you say "democracy," what do you mean to communicate? How do you think the concept is most usefully defined?

**Post-survey questionnaire – Historical:** Please answer this set of questions after you have completed all other sections of the survey. It consists of questions about your personal background and political perspectives, as well as some general questions about democracy. Answers to personal questions will remain strictly confidential.

**Principles of democracy – Historical:** There are many ways of conceptualizing democracy. In the following section, we ask about your own views of this subject. Specifically, we ask you to consider seven conceptions of democracy—electoral, liberal, majoritarian, consensus, participatory, deliberative, and egalitarian. After a short description of each conception, we ask you to rate how strongly you support this conception of democracy on a standard Likert scale (strongly disagree, somewhat disagree, neither agree nor disagree, somewhat agree, strongly agree).

We are interested in your own views of the subject, *i.e.*, how closely these various conceptualizations fit with your intuitive sense of what democracy means, or should mean. When you say "democracy," what do you mean to communicate? How do you think the concept is most usefully defined?

### 13.1 Contemporary PSQ

#### 13.1.1 Today's date (C) (v2zzdate)

*Project Manager(s):* John Gerring

*Question:* What is today's date?

*Responses:*

Date.

*Data release:* 1-12. Available upon request, subject to review and approval.

#### 13.1.2 Gender (C) (v2zzgender)

*Project Manager(s):* John Gerring

*Question:* What is your gender?

*Responses:*

0: Male

1: Female

*Data release:* 1-12. Available upon request, subject to review and approval.

### 13.1.3 Education (C) (v2zzedlev)

*Project Manager(s):* John Gerring

*Question:* What is your level of education?

*Responses:*

- 0: None.
- 1: Incomplete primary.
- 2: Primary completed.
- 3: Incomplete secondary.
- 4: Secondary completed.
- 5: Post-secondary trade/vocational school.
- 6: University undergraduate degree incomplete.
- 7: University undergraduate degree completed.
- 8: Masters degree (MA).
- 9: Ph.D.
- 10: Juris Doctor or other professional degree (medicine, business).

*Data release:* 1-12. Available upon request, subject to review and approval.

### 13.1.4 Current educational status (C) (v2zzcurred)

*Project Manager(s):* John Gerring

*Question:* Are you currently enrolled in a degree program?

*Responses:*

- 0: No.
- 1: Yes.

*Data release:* 1-12. Available upon request, subject to review and approval.

### 13.1.5 Country of education (C) (v2zzedcnt)

*Project Manager(s):* John Gerring

*Question:* In which country are you currently attending school or — if no longer in school — in which country did you complete your highest educational degree (*e.g.*, BA, MA, PhD)?

*Responses:*

Country (chosen from menu).

*Data release:* 1-12. Available upon request, subject to review and approval.

### 13.1.6 Year of birth (C) (v2zzborn)

*Project Manager(s):* John Gerring

*Question:* In what year were you born?

*Responses:*

Numeric.

*Data release:* 1-12. Available upon request, subject to review and approval.

### 13.1.7 Country of birth (C) (v2zzbornin)

*Project Manager(s):* John Gerring

*Question:* In which country were you born?

*Responses:*

Country (chosen from menu).

*Data release:* 1-12. Available upon request, subject to review and approval.

### 13.1.8 Country of residence (C) (v2zzreside)

*Project Manager(s):* John Gerring

*Question:* In what country do you live today?

*Clarification:* If your time is split between several countries, list that country where you spend the most time or that which constitutes your official residence.

*Responses:*

Country (chosen from menu)

*Data release:* 1-12. Available upon request, subject to review and approval.

#### **13.1.9 Years in country (C) (v2zztimein)**

*Project Manager(s):* John Gerring

*Question:* How much total time, in years, have you spent in the country that you worked on for this project?

*Clarification:* Please count time in residence and time visiting. You may enter fractions of years, such as 0.7. Enter only the number measured in years, not any words such as "years", "months", or "days".

*Responses:*

Numeric.

*Data release:* 1-12. Available upon request, subject to review and approval.

#### **13.1.10 Years away from country (C) (v2zzysout)**

*Project Manager(s):* John Gerring

*Question:* How many years have passed since you most recently lived in or visited the country you will be working on?

*Clarification:* If you are there now, enter 0. You may enter fractions of years, such as 0.7. Enter only the number measured in years, not any words such as "years", "months", or "days".

*Responses:*

Numeric.

*Data release:* 1-12. Available upon request, subject to review and approval.

#### **13.1.11 Country of employer or university (C) (v2zzempcnt)**

*Project Manager(s):* John Gerring

*Question:* Is your current employer or university located in the country on which you are working for this project?

*Responses:*

0: No.

1: Yes.

2: Unemployed/Retired.

*Data release:* 1-12. Available upon request, subject to review and approval.

#### **13.1.12 Employer (C) (v2zzemploy)**

*Project Manager(s):* John Gerring

*Question:* For whom do you currently work?

*Responses:*

0: Self-employed, unemployed, or retired.

1: The current executive (presidential administration/cabinet).

2: A ministry, board, or agency within the central government.

3: A ministry, board, or agency within the local/regional government.

4: A state-owned enterprise or another branch of the public administration.

5: A public university.

6: A private university.

7: A private-sector company.

- 8: An NGO or non-profit private organization.
- 9: Full-time student.
- 10: Other.

*Data release:* 1-12. Available upon request, subject to review and approval.

### 13.1.13 Democracy Scores (C) (v2zzdemsc)

*Project Manager(s):* John Gerring

*Question:* What democracy score would you assign to the following countries on a 0-100 scale?

*Clarification:* Imagine a scale that measures the degree of democracy-autocracy in countries around the world, stretching from 0 to 100. 0 represents the most extreme autocracy in the world and 100 represents the most democratic country in the world.

These scores are meant to represent the state of regimes across the world, not ideal-types. Thus, countries could become, over time, more autocratic than the most autocratic country in the world, or more democratic than the most democratic country. And they may have been so in the past. All we are concerned about here is the state of regimes.

Because some regimes are undergoing rapid change, it is important to clarify a specific date. Your coding should reflect the state of democracy in a country on 1 January, 2012.

In assigning scores we ask that you apply your understanding of democracy. This need not accord with the vision of democracy embraced by extant indices (Freedom House, Polity, *et al.*) or with the perspective of the V-Dem project (which embraces a variety of models of democracy).

All we ask is that you consider democracy-autocracy on a unidimensional scale. Of course, we realize that democracy is much more complicated than this. But we feel nonetheless that important information can be captured in a single dimension and we want to know how you view the subject.

We realize that you know more about some of these countries than about others. Do not be concerned by this. Simply enter the score that represents your best estimate.

*Responses:*

0: The country you worked on Range (Regional managers (RMs) should insert here the country that they know best within the region they are assigned to work on. Leave this question blank if you are working on numerous countries across multiple regions.) [v2zzdemyc]

1: Costa Rica Range [v2zzdemcr]

2: Cuba Range [v2zzdemcu]

3: India Range [v2zzdemin]

4: Nigeria Range [v2zzdemni]

5: North Korea Range [v2zzdemnk]

6: Russia Range [v2zzdemru]

7: Saudi Arabia Range [v2zzdemsar]

8: South Africa Range [v2zzdemsaf]

9: Sweden Range [v2zzdemswe]

10: Switzerland Range [v2zzdemswz]

11: United Kingdom Range [v2zzdemuk]

12: United States Range [v2zzdemus]

13: Venezuela Range [v2zzdemvz]

*Answer-type:* Multiple-input, cluster question. No confidence is recorded for this question in either format.

*Notes:* v2zzdemyc is available upon request, subject to review and approval.

*Data release:* 1-12. Available in coder-level dataset.

### 13.1.14 Free markets (C) (v2zzfremrk)

*Project Manager(s):* John Gerring

*Question:* Consider the following statement: "The free market, the protection of property rights, and private ownership of businesses are fundamental principles of a free society." How strongly do you agree or disagree?

*Responses:*

- 0: Strongly disagree.
- 1: Somewhat disagree.
- 2: Neither agree nor disagree.
- 3: Somewhat agree.
- 4: Strongly agree.

*Data release:* 1-12. Available in coder-level dataset.

**13.1.15 Electoral democracy sympathy (C) (v2zzelcdem)**

*Project Manager(s):* John Gerring

*Question:* The electoral principle is an important, perhaps even essential, element of democracy. Do you agree or disagree?

*Clarification:* The electoral principle — also known as contestation, competition, elite, minimal, realist, or Schumpeterian — is the idea that democracy is achieved through competition among leadership groups, which vie for the electorate's approval during periodic elections before a broad electorate. Parties and elections are the crucial instruments in this largely procedural account of the democratic process. Of course, many additional factors might be regarded as important for ensuring and enhancing electoral contestation, *e.g.*, civil liberties, an active media, a written constitution, an independent judiciary (to enforce the rules of the game), and so forth. However, these factors are viewed as secondary to electoral institutions.

*Responses:*

- 0: Strongly disagree.
- 1: Somewhat disagree.
- 2: Neither agree nor disagree.
- 3: Somewhat agree.
- 4: Strongly agree.

*Data release:* 1-12. Available in coder-level dataset.

**13.1.16 Liberal democracy sympathy (C) (v2zzlibdem)**

*Project Manager(s):* John Gerring

*Question:* The liberal principle is an important, perhaps even essential, element of democracy. Do you agree or disagree?

*Clarification:* The liberal principle identifies democracy with limited government, rule of law, and the preservation of individual liberties. The liberal model assumes a "negative" view of political power insofar as it judges the quality of democracy by the limits placed on government. Principles and procedures must be established so as to ensure that rule by the majority does not result in the loss of individual liberties.

*Responses:*

- 0: Strongly disagree.
- 1: Somewhat disagree.
- 2: Neither agree nor disagree.
- 3: Somewhat agree.
- 4: Strongly agree.

*Data release:* 1-12. Available in coder-level dataset.

**13.1.17 Majoritarian democracy sympathy (C) (v2zzmajdem)**

*Project Manager(s):* John Gerring

*Question:* The majoritarian principle is an important, perhaps even essential, element of democracy. Do you agree or disagree?

*Clarification:* The majoritarian principle (aka responsible party government) reflects the principle that the will of the majority should be sovereign. The many should prevail over the few. To facilitate this, political institutions must concentrate power (within the context of competitive elections). In practical terms, this means strong and centralized parties, a unitary rather

than federal constitution, plurality rather than proportional electoral laws (or PR with high statutory thresholds), and so forth.

*Responses:*

- 0: Strongly disagree.
- 1: Somewhat disagree.
- 2: Neither agree nor disagree.
- 3: Somewhat agree.
- 4: Strongly agree.

*Data release:* 1-12. Available in coder-level dataset.

**13.1.18 Consensus democracy sympathy (C) (v2zzcondem)**

*Project Manager(s):* John Gerring

*Question:* The consensus principle is an important, perhaps even essential, element of democracy. Do you agree or disagree?

*Clarification:* The consensus principle is the idea that democracy is achieved when consensus is achieved. This means that new policies should not be adopted by a polity unless and until a consensus (or near consensus) is reached. In order to assure that the principle of consensus is honored institutions should be set up in such a way as to assure that power is dispersed across numerous independent (or quasi-independent) bodies. In practical terms, this means a large party system or diffusely organized parties, a federal constitution, proportional electoral rules, and so forth (directly contrary to the majoritarian conception).

*Responses:*

- 0: Strongly disagree.
- 1: Somewhat disagree.
- 2: Neither agree nor disagree.
- 3: Somewhat agree.
- 4: Strongly agree.

*Data release:* 1-12. Available in coder-level dataset.

**13.1.19 Participatory democracy sympathy (C) (v2zzprtdem)**

*Project Manager(s):* John Gerring

*Question:* The participatory principle is an important, perhaps even essential, element of democracy. Do you agree or disagree?

*Clarification:* The motivation for participatory democracy is uneasiness about delegating complete authority to representatives. Direct rule by citizens is preferred, wherever practicable. And within the context of representative government, the participatory component is regarded as the most democratic element of the polity. This model of democracy thus highlights the importance of voting, but also of citizen assemblies, party primaries, referenda, social movements, public hearings, town hall meetings, and other forums of citizen engagement.

*Responses:*

- 0: Strongly disagree.
- 1: Somewhat disagree.
- 2: Neither agree nor disagree.
- 3: Somewhat agree.
- 4: Strongly agree.

*Data release:* 1-12. Available in coder-level dataset.

**13.1.20 Deliberative democracy sympathy (C) (v2zzdeldem)**

*Project Manager(s):* John Gerring

*Question:* The deliberative principle is an important, perhaps even essential, element of democracy. Do you agree or disagree?

*Clarification:* The deliberative principle focuses on the process by which decisions are reached in



a polity. A deliberative process is one in which public reasoning focused on the common good motivates political decisions—as contrasted with emotional appeals, solidary attachments, parochial interests, or coercion. In this conception, democracy requires more than a mindless aggregation of existing preferences; there should be respectful dialogue at all levels—from preference formation to final decision—among informed and competent participants who are open to persuasion. Some political institutions have a specifically deliberative function, such as consultative bodies (hearings, panels, assemblies, courts); polities with these sorts of institutions might be judged more deliberative than those without them. However, the more important issue is the degree of deliberativeness that can be discerned across all powerful institutions in a polity (not just those explicitly designed to serve a deliberative function) and among the citizenry.

*Responses:*

- 0: Strongly disagree.
- 1: Somewhat disagree.
- 2: Neither agree nor disagree.
- 3: Somewhat agree.
- 4: Strongly agree.

*Data release:* 1-12. Available in coder-level dataset.

#### **13.1.21 Egalitarian democracy sympathy (C) (v2zzegldem)**

*Project Manager(s):* John Gerring

*Question:* The egalitarian principle is an important, perhaps even essential, element of democracy. Do you agree or disagree?

*Clarification:* The egalitarian principle of democracy stresses that formal political rights and civil liberties are insufficient for political equality. The polity should also address material and immaterial inequalities that inhibit the actual exercise of these rights and liberties. Ideally, groups — as defined by income, wealth, education, ethnicity, religion, caste, race, language, region, gender, sexual identity, or other ascriptive characteristics — should have approximately equal participation, representation, agenda-setting power, protection under the law, and influence over policymaking and policy implementation. If such equality does not already exist, the egalitarian principle requires state efforts to make the distribution of socio-economic resources, education, and health more equal so as to enhance political equality. (This principle does not entail equality of power between leaders and citizens, as leaders in all polities are by definition more powerful.)

*Responses:*

- 0: Strongly disagree.
- 1: Somewhat disagree.
- 2: Neither agree nor disagree.
- 3: Somewhat agree.
- 4: Strongly agree.

*Data release:* 1-12. Available in coder-level dataset.

#### **13.1.22 Time spent for coding (C) (v2zztimespent)**

*Project Manager(s):* Brigitte Seim, Daniel Pemstein

*Question:* Approximately how much focused work time did it take you to complete your coding work in this V-Dem annual update, including time spent preparing as well as time spent in the data entry tool?

*Responses:*

Range 1-30 hours.

*Data release:* 1-12. Available in coder-level dataset.

#### **13.1.23 Coding experience (C) (v2zzsatisf)**

*Project Manager(s):* Brigitte Seim, Daniel Pemstein

*Question:* How satisfied are you with your experience coding for V-Dem?

*Responses:*

- 0: Very dissatisfied
- 1: Somewhat dissatisfied
- 2: Neither
- 3: Somewhat satisfied
- 4: Very satisfied

*Data release:* 1-12. Available in coder-level dataset.

#### **13.1.24 Reason of satisfaction (C) (v2zzreasatisf)**

*Project Manager(s):* Brigitte Seim, Daniel Pemstein

*Question:* What influenced your level of satisfaction regarding coding for V-Dem?

*Responses:*

Text.

*Data release:* 1-12. Available upon request, subject to review and approval.

#### **13.1.25 Another reason for coding (C) (v2zzanfirstreas)**

*Project Manager(s):* Brigitte Seim, Daniel Pemstein

*Question:* If you had another reason that you code for V-Dem, please specify here.

*Responses:*

Text.

*Data release:* 1-12. Available upon request, subject to review and approval.

#### **13.1.26 Another second reason for coding (C) (v2zzansecreas)**

*Project Manager(s):* Brigitte Seim, Daniel Pemstein

*Question:* If you had another reason that you code for V-Dem, please specify here.

*Responses:*

Text.

*Data release:* 1-12. Available upon request, subject to review and approval.

#### **13.1.27 Reason for coding (C) (v2zzfirstreas)**

*Project Manager(s):* Brigitte Seim, Daniel Pemstein, Kyle L. Marquardt

*Question:* Please select the most important reason you code for V-Dem.

*Responses:*

- 1) Coding for V-Dem provides me with extra income.
- 2) Coding for V-Dem is an experience that improves the quality of my work.
- 3) Coding for V-Dem provides me with additional work opportunities.
- 4) Being a part of the V-Dem network provides benefits for my reputation.
- 5) The V-Dem dataset is a valuable tool for scholars and policy makers.
- 6) Coding for V-Dem is fun.
- 7) It is important that there is accurate information about my country of expertise.
- 8) It is important that there is accurate information about my area of expertise (thematic, not country-specific).
- 9) Another reason (skip to v2zzanfirstreas)

*Ordering:* if 9 skip to v2zzanfirstreas

*Data release:* 9-12. Available in coder-level dataset.

#### **13.1.28 Materials used (C) (v2zzmaterials)**

*Project Manager(s):* Brigitte Seim, Daniel Pemstein, Kyle L. Marquardt

*Question:* In completing the coding task for V-Dem, either this year or in the past, what materials did you use to gather your information? Select all that apply.

*Responses:*

- 1) Archival documents
- 2) Popular publications, such as books or magazine articles
- 3) Academic publications, such as books or journal articles
- 4) Government news sources from the country coded (e.g. newspapers, radio, websites or TV)
- 5) Private domestic news sources from country coded (e.g. newspapers, radio, websites or TV)
- 6) International news sources (e.g. newspapers, radio, websites or TV)
- 7) Official government data or reports
- 8) Domestic NGO data or reports
- 9) Data or reports from international sources, either governmental or non-governmental.
- 10) Direct personal experiences
- 11) Personal experiences of friends, family, or acquaintances

*Answer-type:* Multiple selection

*Data release:* 9-12. Available in coder-level dataset.

### 13.1.29 Second reason for coding (C) (v2zzsecreas)

*Project Manager(s):* Brigitte Seim, Daniel Pemstein, Kyle L. Marquardt

*Question:* Please select the second most important reason you code for V-Dem.

*Responses:*

- 1) Coding for V-Dem provides me with extra income.
- 2) Coding for V-Dem is an experience that improves the quality of my work.
- 3) Coding for V-Dem provides me with additional work opportunities.
- 4) Being a part of the V-Dem network provides benefits for my reputation.
- 5) The V-Dem dataset is a valuable tool for scholars and policy makers.
- 6) Coding for V-Dem is fun.
- 7) It is important that there is accurate information about my country of expertise.
- 8) It is important that there is accurate information about my area of expertise (thematic, not country-specific).
- 9) Another reason (skip to v2zzansecreas)

*Ordering:* if 9 skip to v2zzansecreas

*Data release:* 9-12. Available in coder-level dataset.

## 13.2 Historical PSQ

### 13.2.1 Year of birth (C) (v3zzborn)

*Project Manager(s):* John Gerring

*Question:* In what year were you born?

*Data release:* 8-12. Available upon request, subject to review and approval.

### 13.2.2 Country of birth (C) (v3zzbornin)

*Project Manager(s):* John Gerring

*Question:* In which country were you born?

*Data release:* 8-12. Available upon request, subject to review and approval.

### 13.2.3 Consensus democracy (C) (v3zzcondem)

*Project Manager(s):* John Gerring

*Question:* The consensus principle is an important, perhaps even essential, element of democracy. Do you agree or disagree?

*Clarification:* The consensus principle is the idea that democracy is achieved when consensus is achieved. This means that new policies should not be adopted by a polity unless and until a consensus (or near consensus) is reached. In order to assure that the principle of consensus is honored institutions should be set up in such a way as to assure that power is dispersed across numerous independent (or quasi-independent) bodies. In practical terms, this means a large party system or diffusely organized parties, a federal constitution, proportional electoral rules, and so forth (directly contrary to the majoritarian conception).

*Responses:*

- 0: Strongly disagree.
- 1: Somewhat disagree.
- 2: Neither agree nor disagree.
- 3: Somewhat agree.
- 4: Strongly agree.

*Data release:* 8-12. Available upon request, subject to review and approval.

#### **13.2.4 Current educational status (C) (v3zzcurred)**

*Project Manager(s):* John Gerring

*Question:* Are you currently enrolled in a degree program?

*Responses:*

- 0: No.
- 1: Yes.

*Data release:* 8-12. Available upon request, subject to review and approval.

#### **13.2.5 Today's date (C) (v3zzdate)**

*Project Manager(s):* John Gerring

*Question:* What is today's date?

*Data release:* 8-12. Available upon request, subject to review and approval.

#### **13.2.6 Deliberative democracy (C) (v3zzdeldem)**

*Project Manager(s):* John Gerring

*Question:* The deliberative principle is an important, perhaps even essential, element of democracy. Do you agree or disagree?

*Clarification:* The deliberative principle focuses on the process by which decisions are reached in a polity. A deliberative process is one in which public reasoning focused on the common good motivates political decisions—as contrasted with emotional appeals, solidary attachments, parochial interests, or coercion. In this conception, democracy requires more than a mindless aggregation of existing preferences; there should be respectful dialogue at all levels—from preference formation to final decision—among informed and competent participants who are open to persuasion. Some political institutions have a specifically deliberative function, such as consultative bodies (hearings, panels, assemblies, courts); polities with these sorts of institutions might be judged more deliberative than those without them. However, the more important issue is the degree of deliberativeness that can be discerned across all powerful institutions in a polity (not just those explicitly designed to serve a deliberative function) and among the citizenry.

*Responses:*

- 0: Strongly disagree.
- 1: Somewhat disagree.
- 2: Neither agree nor disagree.
- 3: Somewhat agree.
- 4: Strongly agree.

*Data release:* 8-12. Available upon request, subject to review and approval.

### 13.2.7 Democracy Scores (C) (v3zzdemsc)

*Project Manager(s):* John Gerring

*Question:* What democracy score would you assign to the following countries on a 0-100 scale?

*Clarification:* Imagine a scale that measures the degree of democracy-autocracy in countries around the world today, stretching from 0 to 100. 0 represents the most extreme autocracy in the world today and 100 represents the most democratic country in the world today.

These scores are meant to represent the actual state of regimes across the world today, not ideal-types. Thus, countries could become, over time, more autocratic than the most autocratic country in the world today, or more democratic than the most democratic country today. And they may have been so in the past. All we are concerned about here is the state of regimes at the current time.

Because some regimes are undergoing rapid change, it is important to clarify a specific date. Your coding should reflect the state of democracy in a country on 1 January, 2012.

In assigning scores we ask that you apply your understanding of democracy. This need not accord with the vision of democracy embraced by extant indices (Freedom House, Polity, *et al.*) or with the perspective of the V-Dem project (which embraces a variety of models of democracy).

All we ask is that you consider democracy-autocracy on a unidimensional scale. Of course, we realize that democracy is much more complicated than this. But we feel nonetheless that important information can be captured in a single dimension and we want to know how you view the subject.

We realize that you know more about some of these countries than about others. Do not be concerned by this. Simply enter the score that represents your best estimate. If you are very uncertain, this should be reflected in your confidence score for that country.

*Responses:*

0: The country you worked on [range] (Regional managers (RMs) should insert here the country that they know best within the region they are assigned to work on. Leave this question blank if you are working on numerous countries across multiple regions.)

1: Costa Rica [range]

2: Cuba [range]

3: India [range]

4: Nigeria [range]

5: North Korea [range]

6: Russia [range]

7: Saudi Arabia [range]

8: South Africa [range]

9: Sweden [range]

10: Switzerland [range]

11: United Kingdom [range]

12: United States [range]

13: Venezuela [range]

*Answer-type:* Multiple-input.

*Data release:* 8-12. Available upon request, subject to review and approval.

### 13.2.8 Country of education (C) (v3zzedcnt)

*Project Manager(s):* John Gerring

*Question:* In which country are you currently attending school or – if no longer in school – in which country did you complete your highest educational degree (*e.g.*, BA, MA, PhD)?

*Data release:* 8-12. Available upon request, subject to review and approval.

### 13.2.9 Education (C) (v3zzedlev)

*Project Manager(s):* John Gerring

*Question:* What is your level of education?

*Responses:*

- 0: None.
- 1: Incomplete primary.
- 2: Primary completed.
- 3: Incomplete secondary.
- 4: Secondary completed.
- 5: Post-secondary trade/vocational school.
- 6: University undergraduate degree incomplete.
- 7: University undergraduate degree completed.
- 8: Masters degree (MA).
- 9: Ph.D.
- 10: Juris Doctor or other professional degree (medicine, business).

*Data release:* 8-12. Available upon request, subject to review and approval.

**13.2.10 Egalitarian democracy (C) (v3zzegldem)**

*Project Manager(s):* John Gerring

*Question:* The egalitarian principle is an important, perhaps even essential, element of democracy.  
Do you agree or disagree?

*Clarification:* The egalitarian principle of democracy stresses that formal political rights and civil liberties are insufficient for political equality. The polity should also address material and immaterial inequalities that inhibit the actual exercise of these rights and liberties. Ideally, groups – as defined by income, wealth, education, ethnicity, religion, caste, race, language, region, gender, sexual identity, or other ascriptive characteristics – should have approximately equal participation, representation, agenda-setting power, protection under the law, and influence over policymaking and policy implementation. If such equality does not already exist, the egalitarian principle requires state efforts to make the distribution of socio-economic resources, education, and health more equal so as to enhance political equality. (This principle does not entail equality of power between leaders and citizens, as leaders in all polities are by definition more powerful.)

*Responses:*

- 0: Strongly disagree.
- 1: Somewhat disagree.
- 2: Neither agree nor disagree.
- 3: Somewhat agree.
- 4: Strongly agree.

*Data release:* 8-12. Available upon request, subject to review and approval.

**13.2.11 Electoral democracy (C) (v3zzelcdem)**

*Project Manager(s):* John Gerring

*Question:* The electoral principle is an important, perhaps even essential, element of democracy.  
Do you agree or disagree?

*Clarification:* The electoral principle — also known as contestation, competition, elite, minimal, realist, or Schumpeterian — is the idea that democracy is achieved through competition among leadership groups, which vie for the electorate's approval during periodic elections before a broad electorate. Parties and elections are the crucial instruments in this largely procedural account of the democratic process. Of course, many additional factors might be regarded as important for ensuring and enhancing electoral contestation, *e.g.*, civil liberties, an active media, a written constitution, an independent judiciary (to enforce the rules of the game), and so forth. However, these factors are viewed as secondary to electoral institutions.

*Responses:*

- 0: Strongly disagree.
- 1: Somewhat disagree.
- 2: Neither agree nor disagree.
- 3: Somewhat agree.

4: Strongly agree.

*Data release:* 8-12. Available upon request, subject to review and approval.

#### **13.2.12 Country of employer or university (C) (v3zzempcnt)**

*Project Manager(s):* John Gerring

*Question:* Is your current employer or university located in the country on which you are working for this project?

*Responses:*

0: No.

1: Yes.

2: Unemployed/Retired.

*Data release:* 8-12. Available upon request, subject to review and approval.

#### **13.2.13 Employer (C) (v3zzemploy)**

*Project Manager(s):* John Gerring

*Question:* For whom do you currently work?

*Responses:*

0: Self-employed, unemployed, or retired.

1: The current executive (presidential administration/cabinet).

2: A ministry, board, or agency within the central government.

3: A ministry, board, or agency within the local/regional government.

4: A state-owned enterprise or another branch of the public administration.

5: A public university.

6: A private university.

7: A private-sector company.

8: An NGO or non-profit private organization.

9: Full-time student.

10: Other.

*Data release:* 8-12. Available upon request, subject to review and approval.

#### **13.2.14 Free markets (C) (v3zzfremrk)**

*Project Manager(s):* John Gerring

*Question:* Consider the following statement: "The free market, the protection of property rights, and private ownership of businesses are fundamental principles of a free society." How strongly do you agree or disagree?

*Responses:*

0: Strongly disagree.

1: Somewhat disagree.

2: Neither agree nor disagree.

3: Somewhat agree.

4: Strongly agree.

*Data release:* 8-12. Available upon request, subject to review and approval.

#### **13.2.15 Gender (C) (v3zzgender)**

*Project Manager(s):* John Gerring

*Question:* What is your gender?

*Responses:*

0: Male

1: Female

*Data release:* 8-12. Available upon request, subject to review and approval.



### 13.2.16 Liberal democracy (C) (v3zzlibdem)

*Project Manager(s):* John Gerring

*Question:* The liberal principle is an important, perhaps even essential, element of democracy. Do you agree or disagree?

*Clarification:* The liberal principle identifies democracy with limited government, rule of law, and the preservation of individual liberties. The liberal model assumes a "negative" view of political power insofar as it judges the quality of democracy by the limits placed on government. Principles and procedures must be established so as to ensure that rule by the majority does not result in the loss of individual liberties.

*Responses:*

- 0: Strongly disagree.
- 1: Somewhat disagree.
- 2: Neither agree nor disagree.
- 3: Somewhat agree.
- 4: Strongly agree.

*Data release:* 8-12. Available upon request, subject to review and approval.

### 13.2.17 Majoritarian democracy (C) (v3zzmajdem)

*Project Manager(s):* John Gerring

*Question:* The majoritarian principle is an important, perhaps even essential, element of democracy. Do you agree or disagree?

*Clarification:* The majoritarian principle (aka responsible party government) reflects the principle that the will of the majority should be sovereign. The many should prevail over the few. To facilitate this, political institutions must concentrate power (within the context of competitive elections). In practical terms, this means strong and centralized parties, a unitary rather than federal constitution, plurality rather than proportional electoral laws (or PR with high statutory thresholds), and so forth.

*Responses:*

- 0: Strongly disagree.
- 1: Somewhat disagree.
- 2: Neither agree nor disagree.
- 3: Somewhat agree.
- 4: Strongly agree.

*Data release:* 8-12. Available upon request, subject to review and approval.

### 13.2.18 Participatory democracy (C) (v3zzprtdem)

*Project Manager(s):* John Gerring

*Question:* The participatory principle is an important, perhaps even essential, element of democracy. Do you agree or disagree?

*Clarification:* The motivation for participatory democracy is uneasiness about delegating complete authority to representatives. Direct rule by citizens is preferred, wherever practicable. And within the context of representative government, the participatory component is regarded as the most democratic element of the polity. This model of democracy thus highlights the importance of voting, but also of citizen assemblies, party primaries, referenda, social movements, public hearings, town hall meetings, and other forums of citizen engagement.

*Responses:*

- 0: Strongly disagree.
- 1: Somewhat disagree.
- 2: Neither agree nor disagree.
- 3: Somewhat agree.
- 4: Strongly agree.

*Data release:* 8-12. Available upon request, subject to review and approval.

### 13.2.19 Country of residence (C) (v3zzreside)

*Project Manager(s):* John Gerring

*Question:* In what country do you live today?

*Clarification:* If your time is split between several countries, list that country where you spend the most time or that which constitutes your official residence.

*Data release:* 8-12. Available upon request, subject to review and approval.

### 13.2.20 Role in project (C) (v3zzrole)

*Project Manager(s):* John Gerring

*Question:* What is your primary role in the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project?

*Responses:*

- 0: Research assistant coding (or entering) factual data across many countries – type (A) coder.
- 1: Country research assistant – type (B) coder.
- 2: Country expert – type (C) coder.
- 3: Research assistant working at University of Gothenburg.
- 4: Research assistant working at University of Notre Dame.
- 5: Research assistant working at University of Oslo
- 6: Research assistant working at Lund University
- 7: Research assistant working at Aarhus University
- 8: Research assistant working at Harvard University
- 9: Research assistant working at Boston University
- 10: Other research assistant.
- 11: Regional manager (RM).
- 12: Project manager (PM).
- 13: Principal investigator (PI).
- 14: Not sure.

*Data release:* 8-12. Available upon request, subject to review and approval.

### 13.2.21 Years in country (C) (v3zztimein)

*Project Manager(s):* John Gerring

*Question:* How much total time, in years, have you spent in the country that you worked on for this project?

*Clarification:* Please count time in residence and time visiting. You may enter fractions of years, such as 0.7. Enter only the number measured in years, not any words such as "years", "months", or "days".

*Data release:* 8-12. Available upon request, subject to review and approval.

### 13.2.22 Years away from country (C) (v3zzyrsout)

*Project Manager(s):* John Gerring

*Question:* How many years have passed since you most recently lived in or visited the country you will be working on?

*Clarification:* If you are there now, enter 0. You may enter fractions of years, such as 0.7. Enter only the number measured in years, not any words such as "years", "months", or "days".

*Data release:* 8-12. Available upon request, subject to review and approval.

## 14 Appendix E: Comments Section

Coders are provided with the possibility to leave comments in the end of the surveys. This section lists how the request for comments were phrased in each survey. Comments made by coders are not included in the V-Dem Dataset but may be provided on request (subject to review and ethics approval).

### 14.1 Contemporary Comments

#### 14.1.1 Civil liberties comments (C) (v2clcommnt)

*Project Manager(s)*: Pamela Paxton, Svend-Erik Skaaning, and Kelly McMann

*Clarification*: Add here any comments you have about any of the previous questions on civil liberties. NOTE: Please do not include any personal identifiable information (PII) – information which can identify who you are. Your previous comments (if any) were checked and cleaned from all the possible PII for security purposes.

*Responses*:

Text.

*Data release*: 8-12. Available upon request, subject to review and approval.

*Citation*: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

#### 14.1.2 Civil society comments (C) (v2cscmmnt)

*Project Manager(s)*: Michael Bernhard, Michael Coppedge

*Question*: Add here any comments you have about any of the previous questions on civil society. NOTE: Please do not include any personal identifiable information (PII) – information which can identify who you are. Your previous comments (if any) were checked and cleaned from all the possible PII for security purposes.

*Responses*:

Text.

*Data release*: 8-12. Available upon request, subject to review and approval.

*Citation*: Bernhard *et al.* (2015 *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 2015:13); *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

#### 14.1.3 Comments deliberation (C) (v2dlcommnt)

*Project Manager(s)*: Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Staffan Lindberg

*Clarification*: Add here any comments you have about any of the previous questions on deliberation. NOTE: Please do not include any personal identifiable information (PII) – information which can identify who you are. Your previous comments (if any) were checked and cleaned from all the possible PII for security purposes.

*Responses*:

Text.

*Data release*: 8-12. Available upon request, subject to review and approval.

*Citation*: *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

#### 14.1.4 Exclusion comments (C) (v2exl\_commnt)

*Project Manager(s)*: Rachel Sigman

*Question*: Add here any comments you have about any of the previous questions or any additional information you feel would be valuable to understanding these topics. NOTE: Please do not include any personal identifiable information (PII) – information which can identify who you are. Your previous comments (if any) were checked and cleaned from all the possible PII for security purposes.

*Answer-type*: Text

*Data release:* 9-12. Available upon request, subject to review and approval.

*Citation:* V-Dem Codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

#### 14.1.5 Judiciary comments (C) (v2jucommnt)

*Project Manager(s):* Jeffrey Staton

*Clarification:* Add here any comments you have about any of the previous questions on the judiciary.

NOTE: Please do not include any personal identifiable information (PII) – information which can identify who you are. Your previous comments (if any) were checked and cleaned from all the possible PII for security purposes.

*Responses:*

Text.

*Data release:* 8-12. Available upon request, subject to review and approval.

*Citation:* V-Dem Codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

#### 14.1.6 Legislature comments (C) (v2lgcommnt)

*Project Manager(s):* Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

*Question:* Add here any comments you have about any of the previous questions on the legislature.

NOTE: Please do not include any personal identifiable information (PII) – information which can identify who you are. Your previous comments (if any) were checked and cleaned from all the possible PII for security purposes.

*Responses:*

Text.

*Data release:* 8-12. Available upon request, subject to review and approval.

*Citation:* V-Dem Codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

#### 14.1.7 Media comments (C) (v2mecommnt)

*Project Manager(s):* Pamela Paxton, Michael Coppedge

*Question:* Add here any comments you have about any of the previous questions on the media.

NOTE: Please do not include any personal identifiable information (PII) – information which can identify who you are. Your previous comments (if any) were checked and cleaned from all the possible PII for security purposes.

*Responses:*

Text.

*Data release:* 8-12. Available upon request, subject to review and approval.

*Citation:* V-Dem Codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

#### 14.1.8 Political equality comments (C) (v2pecommnt)

*Project Manager(s):* John Gerring

*Question:* Add here any comments you have about any of the previous questions on political equality. NOTE: Please do not include any personal identifiable information (PII) – information which can identify who you are. Your previous comments (if any) were checked and cleaned from all the possible PII for security purposes.

*Responses:*

Text.

*Data release:* 8-12. Available upon request, subject to review and approval.

*Citation:* V-Dem Codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

#### 14.1.9 Parties comments (C) (v2pscommnt)

*Project Manager(s):* Allen Hicken

*Question:* Add here any comments you have about any of the previous questions on political parties.  
NOTE: Please do not include any personal identifiable information (PII) – information which can identify who you are. Your previous comments (if any) were checked and cleaned from all the possible PII for security purposes.

*Responses:*

Text.

*Data release:* 8-12. Available upon request, subject to review and approval.

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

#### 14.1.10 Comments (C) (v2smcommnt)

*Question:* Add here any comments you have about any of the previous questions about the Internet, social media, and politics or any additional information you feel would be valuable to understanding these topics. NOTE: Please do not include any personal identifiable information (PII) – information which can identify who you are. Your previous comments (if any) were checked and cleaned from all the possible PII for security purposes.

*Scale:* Text.

*Data release:* 9-12. Available upon request, subject to review and approval.

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

#### 14.1.11 Sovereignty comments (C) (v2svcommnt)

*Project Manager(s):* Svend-Erik Skaaning, Michael Bernhard

*Question:* Add here any comments you have about any of the previous questions on sovereignty.  
NOTE: Please do not include any personal identifiable information (PII) – information which can identify who you are. Your previous comments (if any) were checked and cleaned from all the possible PII for security purposes.

*Responses:*

Text.

*Data release:* 8-12. Available upon request, subject to review and approval.

*Citation:* *V-Dem Codebook* (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

#### 14.1.12 Post-survey questionnaire comments (C) (v2zzcoment)

*Project Manager(s):* John Gerring

*Question:* Add here any comments you have about any of the previous questions. NOTE: Please do not include any personal identifiable information (PII) – information which can identify who you are. Your previous comments (if any) were checked and cleaned from all the possible PII for security purposes.

*Responses:*

Text.

*Data release:* 1-12. Available upon request, subject to review and approval.

### 14.2 Historical Comments

#### 14.2.1 Elections comments (C) (v3elcomcom)

*Project Manager(s):* Staffan I. Lindberg

*Question:* Add here any comments you have about any of the previous questions on electoral competition.

*Answer-type:* Text

*Data release:* 8-12. Available upon request, subject to review and approval.

#### **14.2.2 Comments subnational elections (C) (v3elcomsn)**

*Project Manager(s):* Kelly McMann

*Question:* Add here any comments you have about any of the previous questions on subnational elections and offices.

*Answer-type:* Text

*Data release:* 8-12. Available upon request, subject to review and approval.

#### **14.2.3 Entire executive comments (C) (v3excomex)**

*Project Manager(s):* Jan Teorell

*Question:* Add here any comments you have about any of the previous questions on the entire executive.

*Answer-type:* Text

*Data release:* 8-12. Available upon request, subject to review and approval.

#### **14.2.4 HOG comments (C) (v3excommhg)**

*Project Manager(s):* Jan Teorell

*Question:* Add here any comments you have about any of the previous questions on the head of government.

*Answer-type:* Text

*Data release:* 8-12. Available upon request, subject to review and approval.

#### **14.2.5 HOS comments (C) (v3excommhs)**

*Project Manager(s):* Jan Teorell

*Question:* Add here any comments you have about any of the previous questions on the head of state.

*Answer-type:* Text

*Data release:* 8-12. Available upon request, subject to review and approval.

#### **14.2.6 State comments (C) (v3stcommnt)**

*Project Manager(s):* Jan Teorell

*Question:* Add here any comments you have about any of the previous questions on the state.

*Answer-type:* Text

*Data release:* 8-12. Available upon request, subject to review and approval.

## 15 Appendix F: Changes Between Previous Versions of the Dataset

### 15.1 New in Version 11.1 compared to Version 11

- **Bug fix**

- For v11 there was a mistake in aggregating a number of A and A\* variables from country-date to country-year by using the wrong aggregation method, most often using maximum instead of last or last instead of maximum per country-year. Most indices were not affected by this as they get calculated using country-date inputs. The following indices were affected and were recalculated for v11.1, the number of changed observations in comparison to v11 are in parenthesis: v2x\_horacc (all), v2x\_accountability (all), v2x\_veracc (all), v2x\_diagacc (all), v2x\_divparctrl (45), v2x\_feduni (8), v2x\_regime (24), v2x\_regime\_amb (25), v2x\_ex\_confidence (17), v2x\_ex\_direlect (8), v2x\_ex\_hereditary (21), v2x\_ex\_military (52), v2x\_ex\_party (27). The affected A and A\* variables were re-aggregated using the correct method for v11.1.
- The coder-level dataset has been reuploaded for v11.1 such that the coder\_ids are comparable across coder-level datasets. Non-identifying post survey questionnaire variables have been added.

### 15.2 New in Version 11 compared to Version 10

- **New indicators**

- HOS party affiliation (v2exparhos).
- HOG party affiliation (v2expothog).
- Gap index (gap\_index).
- Regime survey:
  - \* Regime support location (v2regsuploc).
  - \* Regime opposition groups (v2regoppgroups).
  - \* Explicit and active regime opposition groups (v2regoppgroupsact).
  - \* Regime most important opposition group (v2regimpoppgroup).
  - \* Regime opposition groups size (v2regoppgroupssize).
  - \* Regime opposition location (v2regopploc).
  - \* Strongest pro-regime preferences (v2regproreg).
  - \* Strongest anti-regime preferences (v2regantireg).
  - \* Most powerful group in affecting regime duration and change (v2regpower).

- **Modified indices and indicators**

- v2xdd\_i\_pi has been renamed to v2xdd\_i\_ci.
- v2juhcname has been reintroduced.

- **Other new or modified information**

- First public release of the dataset construction code (see 1.6.3).
- Updated *list of countries*.
- Updated *citations* for V-Dem's reference materials.
- Updated *Country Coding Units* document.

- **Removed versions of indices and indicators**

- Historical V-Dem indicators with v3-tags are continuously merged with the corresponding contemporary V-Dem v2-indicators. This results in the removal of v3-indicators, but extension of the time series (further back in time) of the corresponding v2-indicators. The year coverage is indicated in the "years" section for each variable entry.



- **Postponed indicators**

The following variables have not been included. We have discovered mistakes in the time series and hope to be able to correct them for upcoming versions of the dataset.

- Lower chamber quota for social groups (v2lgqumin)
- Election women in the cabinet (v2elwomcab)
- Legislature amends constitution (v2lgamend)
- Legislature amnesties (v2lgamnsty)
- Lower chamber legislates by law (v2lglegllo)
- Upper chamber legislates by law (v2lgleglup)

### 15.3 New in Version 10 compared to Version 9

- **New thematic areas**

Civic and Academic Space.

- **New indices**

- Academic Freedom Index (v2xca\_academ)

- **New indicators**

- Civic Space:
  - \* Political polarization (v2cacamps)
  - \* Political violence (v2caviol)
  - \* Freedom of peaceful assembly (v2caassemb)
  - \* State of emergency (v2casoe)
- Mass Mobilization:
  - \* Mass mobilization (v2cagenmob)
  - \* Mass mobilization concentration (v2caconmob)
  - \* Mobilization for democracy (v2cademmob)
  - \* Mobilization for autocracy (v2caautmob)
- Citizen Engagement:
  - \* Engagement in state-administered mass organizations (v2castate)
  - \* Engagement in independent trade unions (v2catrauni)
  - \* Engagement in independent political associations (v2capolit)
  - \* Engagement in independent non-political associations (v2canonpol)
- Academic Space:
  - \* Existence of universities (v2cauni)
  - \* Total number of universities (v2canuni)
  - \* Constitutional protection for academic freedom (v2caprotac)
  - \* Freedom to research and teach (v2cafres)
  - \* Freedom of academic exchange and dissemination (v2cafexch)
  - \* Institutional autonomy (v2cainsaut)
  - \* Campus integrity (v2casurv)
  - \* Academics as critics (v2cacritic)
  - \* International legal commitment to academic freedom under ICESCR (v2caacadfree)

- **Modified indices and indicators**

- The Local government index (v2xel\_locelec) has been modified.
- Contemporary time series added for HOS year of death (v2exdeathos), now merged with v3exdeathos.

- Contemporary time series added for HOG year of death (v2exdeathog), now merged with v3exdeathog.
- **Other new or modified information**
  - Previously, we only conducted bridge coding; as of v10, we also treat lateral codings as vignettes (see *V-Dem Methodology*). That is, while we use the information in lateral codings to estimate coder reliability and thresholds, they do not directly contribute to the estimation of country-year scores.
  - Updated *list of countries*.
  - Updated *citations* for V-Dem’s reference materials.
  - Updated *Country Coding Units* document.
- **Removed versions of indices and indicators**
  - Historical V-Dem indicators with v3-tags are continuously merged with the corresponding contemporary V-Dem v2-indicators. This results in the removal of v3-indicators, but extension of the time series (further back in time) of the corresponding v2-indicators. The year coverage is indicated in the "years" section for each variable entry.
- **Postponed indicators**

The following variables have not been included in version 10. We have discovered mistakes in the time series and hope to be able to correct them for upcoming versions of the dataset.

  - Lower chamber quota for social groups (v2lgqumin)
  - Election women in the cabinet (v2elwomcab)
  - Legislature amends constitution (v2lgamend)
  - Legislature amnesties (v2lgamnsty)
  - Lower chamber legislates by law (v2lglegllo)
  - Upper chamber legislates by law (v2lgleglup)
- **Discontinued indicators**
  - Lower chamber term limits (v2lgtrmlup)
  - Upper chamber term limits (v2lguchatrmli)
  - HOG other appointing body in practice (v2exothhgl)
  - HOS other appointing body in practice (v2exothhs)
  - Election executive turnover nominal (v2eltvrexn)
  - HOS disadvantaged social group (v2exdighos)
  - HOG disadvantaged social group (v2exdighog)

## 15.4 New in Version 9 compared to Version 8

- **New country**

Malta (Coded: 1900-2018).
- **New thematic areas**

Exclusion, Legitimation and Digital Society.
- **The Digital Society Survey**

The Digital Society Survey, designed by the Digital Society Project, contains questions pertaining to the political environment of the internet and social media. The data collected through expert-coded surveys provides information on topics related to coordinated information operations, digital media freedom, online media polarization, social cleavages as well as state internet regulation capacity and approach.

For more information, please visit [www.digitalsocietyproject.org](http://www.digitalsocietyproject.org)

- **New indices**

- Exclusion by Gender (v2xpe\_exlgender)
- Exclusion by Social Group (v2xpe\_exlsocgr)
- Exclusion by Urban-Rural Location (v2xpe\_exlgeo)
- Exclusion by Socio-Economic Group (v2xpe\_exlecon)
- Exclusion by Political Group (v2xpe\_exlpol)
- Hereditary dimension index (v2x\_ex\_hereditary)
- Military dimension index (v2x\_ex\_military)
- Ruling party dimension index (v2x\_ex\_party)
- Direct election dimension index (v2x\_ex\_direlect)
- Confidence dimension index (v2x\_ex\_confidence)

- **New indicators**

- Regime information (v2reginfo)
- Regime end type (v2regendtype)
- Ideology (v2exl\_legitideol)
- Person of the Leader (v2exl\_legitlead)
- Performance legitimation (v2exl\_legitperf)
- Rational-legal legitimation (v2exl\_legitratio)
- Exclusion variables:
  - \* Power distributed by urban-rural location (v2pepwrgeo)
  - \* Gender equality in respect for civil liberties (v2clgencl)
  - \* Political group equality in respect for civil liberties (v2clpolcl)
  - \* Urban-rural location equality in respect for civil liberties (v2clgeoel)
  - \* Access to public services distributed by social group (v2peapssoc)
  - \* Access to public services distributed by gender (v2peapsgen)
  - \* Access to public services distributed by socio-economic position (v2peapsecon)
  - \* Access to public services distributed by political group (v2peapspol)
  - \* Access to public services distributed by urban-rural location (v2peapsgeo)
  - \* Access to state jobs by social group (v2peasjsoc)
  - \* Access to state jobs by gender (v2peasjgen)
  - \* Access to state jobs by socio-economic position (v2peasjsoecon)
  - \* Access to state jobs by urban-rural location (v2peasjgeo)
  - \* Access to state jobs by political group (v2peasjpol)
  - \* Access to state business opportunities by social group (v2peasbsoc)
  - \* Access to state business opportunities by gender (v2peasbgen)
  - \* Access to state business opportunities by socio-economic position (v2peasbecon)
  - \* Access to state business opportunities by political group (v2peasbepol)
  - \* Access to state business opportunities by urban-rural location (v2peasbegeo)
- Digital society variables:
  - \* Government dissemination of false information domestic (v2smgovdom)
  - \* Government dissemination of false information abroad (v2smgovab)
  - \* Party dissemination of false information domestic (v2smpardom)
  - \* Party dissemination of false information abroad (v2smparab)
  - \* Foreign governments dissemination of false information (v2smfordom)
  - \* Foreign governments ads (v2smforads)
  - \* Government Internet filtering capacity (v2smgovfilcap)
  - \* Government Internet filtering in practice (v2smgovfilprc)

- \* Government Internet shut down capacity (v2smgovshutcap)
- \* Government Internet shut down in practice (v2smgovshut)
- \* Government social media shut down in practice (v2smgovsm)
- \* Government social media alternatives (v2smgovsmalt)
- \* Government social media monitoring (v2smgovsmmon)
- \* Government social media censorship in practice (v2smgovsmcenprc)
- \* Government cyber security capacity (v2smgovcapsec)
- \* Political parties cyber security capacity (v2smpolcap)
- \* Internet legal regulation content (v2smregcon)
- \* Privacy protection by law exists (v2smprivex)
- \* Privacy protection by law content (v2smprivcon)
- \* Government capacity to regulate online content (v2smregcap) .
- \* Government online content regulation approach (v2smregapp)
- \* Defamation protection (v2smlawpr)
- \* Abuse of defamation and copyright law by elites (v2smdefabu)
- \* Online media existence (v2smonex)
- \* Online media perspectives (v2smonper)
- \* Online media fractionalization (v2smmefra)
- \* Online harassment groups (v2smhargr)
- \* Other online harassment groups (v2smhargrtxt)
- \* Use of social media to organize offline violence (v2smorgviol)
- \* Average people's use of social media to organize offline action (v2smorgavgact)
- \* Elites' use of social media to organize offline action (v2smorgelitact)
- \* Types of organization through social media (v2smorgtypes)
- \* Party/candidate use of social media in campaigns (v2smcamp)
- \* Arrests for political content (v2smarrest)
- \* Polarization of society (v2smpolsoc)
- \* Political parties hate speech (v2smpolhate)

- **Modified indices and indicators**

- The "Elected officials index" (v2x\_elecoff) has been modified.
- All multiple selection questions coded by country experts are now dichotomized and aggregated by mean.
- e\_v2x\_neopat has been renamed to v2x\_neopat.
- e\_v2xnp\_client has been renamed to v2xnp\_client.
- e\_v2xnp\_pres has been renamed to v2xnp\_pres.
- e\_v2xnp\_regcorr has been renamed to v2xnp\_regcorr.
- The scale for v2x\_neopat, v2xnp\_client, v2xnp\_pres and v2xnp\_regcorr has been reversed, i.e. lower scores now indicate lower levels of neopatrimonialism and higher scores indicate higher levels of neopatrimonialism.
- v2ex\_elecleg has been renamed to v2xex\_elecleg.
- v2x\_divparctrl was wrongly calculated for v7-v8 (too many observations were set to missing). This has been fixed for v9.

- **Other new or modified information**

- Updated *list of countries*.
- Updated list of variables.
- Updated *citations* for V-Dem's reference materials.
- Updated *Country Coding Units* document.

- **Removed versions of indices and indicators**

- Versions of election-specific variables for executive elections only (\*\_ex) and legislative elections only (\*\_leg) have been removed since these can easily be created (using v2xel\_elecparl or v2xel\_elecpres). For more information, please see section 3.1 (*Elections*).
- Historical V-Dem indicators with v3-tags are continuously merged with the corresponding contemporary V-Dem v2-indicators. This results in the removal of v3-indicators, but extension of the time series (further back in time) of the corresponding v2-indicators. The year coverage is indicated in the newly added "years" section for each variable entry.
- Many external variables (E) were removed, since they were considered redundant. For a list of currently available variables, see the sections labeled *Background Factors* and *Other Democracy Indices and Indicators*.
- Superfluous \*\_nr versions for multiple selection questions have been removed. There is now one \*\_nr version per multiple selection variable and not one for each category.

## 15.5 New in Version 8 compared to Version 7.1

- *Historical V-Dem*

For this version of the dataset we are for the first time including Historical V-Dem. The integration of Historical V-Dem with V-Dem means that many countries have data coverage on numerous V-Dem indicators from 1789 to the present. Historical V-Dem also contains several extra, historical polities that have ceased to exist, such as Bavaria and the Two Sicilies. To find more details about which countries are coded for historical V-Dem please refer to the country table (p. 15) or the *Country Coding Units* document.

Further, Historical V-Dem introduces several new indicators on various institutional features, some of which were particularly relevant for 19th century polities. To find more details on the Historical V-Dem variables please refer to the Historical V-Dem section of the codebook (p. 33).

To read more about Historical V-Dem visit [v-dem.net](http://v-dem.net)

- **New indices and indicators**

- Neopatrimonialism index (e\_v2x\_neopat)
- Clientelism index (e\_v2xnp\_client)
- Presidentialism index (e\_v2xnp\_pres)
- Regime Corruption (e\_v2xnp\_regcorr)
- Rule of law index (v2x\_rule)
- State fiscal capacity (v2stfiscap)
- Bureaucratic remuneration (v2strenadm)
- Bureaucratic recruitment criteria (v2stcritrecadm)
- Time-specific country name (histname), identifier variable
- Judicial variables:
  - \* Codeable (v2jucodable)
  - \* Corresponding flowchart (v2jufLOW)
  - \* Language (v2julanguage)
  - \* Team translated (v2juteamtr)

- **Modified indices and indicators**

- The aggregation formula for v2x\_delibdem was changed to match the rest of the High-Level Democracy Indices. Previously, v2x\_delib was erroneously being aggregated by a straight multiplication of v2x\_polyarchy and v2x\_delib.

- The "Regimes in the World - the RIW measure" (e\_v2x\_regime) has been renamed to the "Regimes of the World index" (v2x\_regime) and modified.
- "Expanded freedom of expression index" (v2x\_freexp\_thick) has been renamed to "Freedom of Expression and Alternative Sources of Information index" (v2x\_freexp\_altinf).
- The post-survey questionnaire has been updated.
- "Chief executive appointment by upper chamber implicit approval" (v2exapupap) has been corrected.
- Updated aggregation rules for A, C variables, and indices. See Section 1.5 Aggregation.
- The "Elected officials index" (v2xelecoff) has been modified.
- The "Legislature directly elected index" (v2ex\_elecleg) has been modified.
- The following quota variables has been corrected and reintroduced, however we advice you to not use any earlier version of these variabels:
  - \* Lower chamber gender quota (v2lgqugen)
  - \* Lower chamber gender quota threshold (v2lgqugent)
  - \* Lower chamber gender quota placement mandate (v2lgqugens)
- Other new or modified information
  - Updated list of countries.
  - Updated list of variables.
  - Updated citations for V-Dem's reference materials.
  - Updated *Country Coding Units* document.

## 15.6 New in Version 7.1 Compared to Version 7

- **New indices and indicators**
  - Accountability index (v2x\_accountability)
  - Vertical accountability index (v2x\_veracc)
  - Horizontal accountability index (v2x\_horacc)
  - Diagonal accountability index (v2x\_diagacc)
- **Modified indices and indicators**
  - Errors with E type variables in version 7 have been fixed.
  - HOS and HOG appointment in practice variables (v2expathhs, v2expathhg) in the Country Year dataset have been corrected to be aggregated by the last observation within a year.
- **Other new or modified information**
  - The issue in v7 with identifiers for the main country coded by experts has been fixed.
  - Versions of Male suffrage (v2msuffrage), Female suffrage (v2fsuffrage) and Suffrage (v2asuffrage) into executive (\*\_ex) or legislative (\*\_leg) elections have been dropped from the dataset, since the original variables are not election specific.
  - Convergence problems with Vertical accountability index (v2x\_veracc), please see "Cautionary Notes" for further details.

## 15.7 New in Version 7 Compared to Version 6

- **New indices and indicators**

- Obligatory referendum index (v2xdd\_i\_or)
- Popular initiative index (v2xdd\_i\_pi)
- Popular referendum index (v2xdd\_i\_rf)
- Plebiscite index (v2xdd\_i\_pl)
- Citizen-initiated component of direct popular vote index (v2xdd\_cic)
- Top-down component of direct popular vote index (v2xdd\_toc)
- Equal access index (v2xeg\_eqaccess)
- Regimes In the World–the RIW Measure (E) (e\_v2x\_regime)
- Regimes In the World–the RIW Measure with confidence intervals (E) (e\_v2x\_regime\_ci)
- High court size (by law) (v2juhcsizl)
- High court size (in practice) (v2juhcsizp)
- Female judges (v2jufemjdg)
- First woman appointed (v2jufrstfm)
- Lower chamber electoral system- 13 categories (v2elloelsy)
- Lower chamber election district magnitude (v2elloeldm)
- Constitutional changes popular vote (v2ddlexor)
- Obligatory referendum participation threshold (v2ddpator)
- Obligatory referendum approval threshold (v2ddappor)
- Obligatory referendum credible threat (v2ddthreor)
- Plebiscite Credible Threat (v2ddthrepl)
- Initiatives administrative threshold (v2ddadmci)
- Popular Initiative Credible Threat (v2ddthreci)
- Referendums signatures % (v2ddsigprf)
- Referendums administrative threshold (v2ddadmrf)
- Popular Referendum Credible Threat (v2ddthrerf)
- Occurrence of obligatory referendum this year (v2ddyror)
- Occurrence of plebiscite this year (v2ddyrl)
- Occurrence of citizen-initiative this year (v2ddyrci)
- Occurrence of referendum this year (v2ddyrrf)
- HOS age (v2exagehos)
- HOG age (v2exagehog)
- Legislature declares war by law (v2lgwarlaw)
- Chief executive appointment by upper chamber (v2exapup)
- Chief executive appointment by upper chamber implicit approval (v2exapupap)

- **Modified indices and indicators**

- Direct popular vote index (v2xdd\_dd) has been updated with a new aggregation formula.
- Divided party control of legislature index has been corrected to Divided party control index (v2x\_divparctrl).
- Elected executive index (v2x\_accex) has been replaced with Elected officials index (v2x\_elecoff).
- Party system institutionalization index (v2xps\_party) has been renamed to Party institutionalization index and was modified with a new aggregation formula.



- Equal protection index (v2xeg\_eqprotec) has been modified to exclude equal access to justice for men and women (v2xcl\_acjst).
- Equal distribution of resources index (v2xeg\_eqdr) has been modified to be formed by the indicators particularistic or public goods (v2dlencmps), means tested vs. universalistic welfare policies (v2dlunivl), educational equality (v2peedueq) and health equality (v2pehealth).
- Egalitarian component index (v2x\_egal) is formed by equal protection index (v2xeg\_eqprotec), equal distribution of resources (v2xeg\_eqdr) and in version 7 additionally by equal access index (v2xeg\_eqaccess).
- Freedom of expression indices (v2x\_freexp, \_thick) are no longer including Media Internet censorship (v2mecenefi).
- Election free campaign media (v2elfrcamp) is divided into executive and legislative election free campaign media (v2elfrcamp\_ex) (v2elfrcamp\_leg).
- The text for the subsets of Fraud allegations by Western monitors (v2elwestmon), has been changed to refer to Fraud allegations by Western monitors for executive/legislative elections only (v2elwestmon\_ex) (v2elwestmon\_leg).
- Stronger respect for civil liberties characteristics (v2clrgstch) is renamed to Stronger civil liberties characteristics.
- The variable tags of the following questions within Direct Democracy have been renamed:
  - \* Obligatory referendum super majority (v2ddspmjor) to (v2ddspmor)
  - \* Plebiscite permitted (v2ddlegpl) to (v2ddlexpl)
  - \* Plebiscite participation threshold (v2ddbndpl) to (v2ddpartpl)
  - \* Plebiscite approval threshold (v2ddthrcon) to (v2ddapprpl)
  - \* Plebiscite administrative threshold (v2dddistspl) to (v2ddadmpl)
  - \* Plebiscite super majority (v2ddspmlpl) to (v2ddspmpl)
  - \* Initiatives permitted (v2ddlegci) to (v2ddlexci)
  - \* Initiatives signatures (v2ddsigcin) to (v2ddsignci)
  - \* Initiatives signatures % (v2ddsigcip) to (v2ddsigpci)
  - \* Initiatives signature-gathering time limit (v2ddgrtlci) to (v2ddsiglci)
  - \* Initiatives signature-gathering period (v2ddgrgpci) to (v2ddsigdci)
  - \* Initiatives participation threshold (v2ddbndci) to (v2ddpartci)
  - \* Initiatives approval threshold (v2ddthreci) to (v2ddapprci)
  - \* Initiatives super majority (v2ddspmjci) to (v2ddspmcj)
  - \* Referendums permitted (v2ddlegrf) to (v2ddlexrf)
  - \* Referendums signatures (v2ddsigrfn) to (v2ddsignrf)
  - \* Referendums signature-gathering limit (v2ddgrtlrf) to (v2ddsiglrf)
  - \* Referendums signature-gathering period (v2ddgrgrprf) to (v2ddsigdrf)
  - \* Referendums participation threshold (v2ddbndrf) to (v2ddpartrf)
  - \* Referendums approval threshold (v2ddthrrf) to (v2ddapprrf)
  - \* Referendums super majority (v2ddspmjrf) to (v2ddspmrfr)
  - \* Number of popular votes this year (v2ddnumvot) to (v2ddyral)
  - \* Occurrence of any type of popular vote this year credible (v2ddvotcrd) to (v2ddcredal)
- The information in the codebook about Male suffrage (v2msuffrage), Female suffrage (v2fsuffrage) and Suffrage (v2asuffrage) has been corrected to indicate that responses are given in percent.
- Income inequality, Gini (e\_Unequal\_UTIP) has been corrected to measure whether the Gini coefficient is above the mean.

• **Other new or modified information**

- Updated list of countries.
- Updated list of variables.

- Updated citations for V-Dem Reference materials.
- New citation for Ordinal versions of V-Dem’s indices (Lindberg 2016).
- Gaps in coding periods should be interpreted as including the start and end year of the gap. For example, Germany is coded 1900-1945, 1949-2016, which means that the years 1946, -47, and -48 are excluded from the dataset.
- Freedom of expression index (`v2x_freexp`) was included in Electoral democracy index (`v2x_polyarchy`) in v6. This has been fixed for v7, where the Expanded freedom of expression index (`v2x_freexp_thick`) instead is included in the Electoral democracy index.

## 15.8 New in Version 6 Compared to Version 5

- **Changes:**

- All CSV files are now encoded in UTF-8. When importing CSV data on platforms where UTF-8 is not the default, ensure that the correct encoding is specified in order to properly render diacritics for text variables.
- `v2x_suffrage` and `v2elsuffrage` have been modified with small changes to their respective comprising indices.

- **Bug fixes:**

- Superfluous variables corresponding to the means of the binary versions of the following variables have been removed: `v2exdfdshg`, `v2exdfdshs`, `v2exdjcbhg`, `v2exctlhg`, `v2exctlhs`, `v2exrmhsol`, `v2exrmhgnp`.
- Country specific coding periods were previously incorrectly set for the 6.1 country-date dataset. As a result, 279 observations falling outside of the V-Dem coding periods have been removed.
- Missing data for the variables `v2expathhg` and `v2exaphogp` for Serbia from 1900 to 1941 have been filled in.
- A bug was fixed regarding the ordinalization of indices. Previously, for the corresponding 5 category ordinal variables, observations that were meant to be 0.75 were incorrectly set as 0.5.

- **New indices and indicators**

- Civil liberties index
- Private civil liberties index
- Physical integrity rights index
- Political civil liberties index
- Additive polyarchy index
- Multiplicative polyarchy index
- Divided party control of legislature index
- Division of power index
- HOG term length by law
- HOS term length by law
- Election voter turnout
- Primary school enrollment
- Secondary school enrollment
- Secondary tertiary enrollment
- Political equality comments

- **Modified indices and indicators**

- Electoral democracy index has been updated with a new aggregation formula.
- **Other new or modified information**
  - Providing a standard calculation for standard deviation which is marked with the suffix "sd" (*e.g.*, v2elmulpar\_sd). The SD might be used to compute the standard frequentist confidence intervals.
  - Providing uniqueness scores to the structure of aggregations—all indices and indicators. Uniqueness is the variance that is ‘unique’ to the variable and not shared with other variables. It is equal to 1–communality (variance that is shared with other variables). Factor loadings are the weights and correlations between each variable and the factor. The higher the load the more relevant in defining the factor’s dimensionality. A negative value indicates an inverse impact on the factor.
  - Updated lists of number of variables.
  - Updated list of countries.