

# Losers' Consent and Democratic Stability: Experimental Evidence from Chile and Estonia

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# Democratic Backsliding

- Parece existir un consenso en que algunas democracias están en riesgo de retroceder (*democratic backsliding*).
- Estos retrocesos han sido estudiados en un sinnúmero de casos.
  - Kaufman and Haggard (2019) explican que “a transition to competitive authoritarianism in the United States is unlikely, although not impossible.”
  - **Caso 2.**
  - **Caso 3.**

## Democratic Backsliding: A “Winners Bias”

Desafortunadamente, la mayoría ha concentrado sus esfuerzos en cómo el **ejecutivo agranda** sus poderes.

- Haggard and Kaufman (2021, p. 27) definen “[d]emocratic backsliding is the incremental erosion of institutions [...] that results from the actions of [...] **elected governments**.”
- Pérez-Liñán (2018, p. 2) explica que “most threats to democracy originate in the **executive**, not in congress.”
- Corrales (2020, p. 41) explica que “electoral irregularities contributed to democratic backsliding in Venezuela under **chavista rule**.”

### What about the electoral losers?

Qué ocurre con los que pierden la elección? Existen diferencias sistemáticas en cuanto la tolerancia de acciones no democráticas entre “ganadores” y “perdedores”?

## Nuestro Paper: “El baile de los que sobran”

- A diferencia de la mayoría de quienes estudian posibles violaciones de los principios democráticos por parte de los “ganadores,” nosotros estudiamos a los “**perdedores**” electorales.
- Hicimos un survey experiment (pre-registrado) en dos democracias recientes, Chile (y Estonia).
- Entender si los votantes que apoyaron al **candidato perdedor** están más abiertos a respaldar acciones anti-sistémicas **contra el ganador**.
- Para esto, incluimos una teoría enfocada en *pérdidas* y *loss aversion* (“*prospect theory*,” e.g., Kahneman and Tversky 1979).

### Findings

Encontramos que los votantes de **Kast** *no* son mas proclives que los votantes de **Boric** a apoyar acciones antisistémicas (protestas) que pongan en peligro el status quo.

# Democratic Backsliding

- Test

# Prospect Theory

- **Losses loom larger than gains:** individuals “give more weight to losses than to comparable gains” (Levy [1992](#), p. 171).
- **Loss aversion:** individuals “are more concerned with preventing a decline than increasing gains” (Levy [1997](#), p. 89).
- **Asymmetric decision making:** “[I]ndividuals tend to be risk averse in a domain of gains, and relatively risk seeking in a domain of losses” (McDermott [1998](#), p. 18).

# Pre-Registered Hypothesis

## Argument

Respondents who voted for the candidate/party that lost the the last election (Kast) would be more likely to choose a candidate who supports anti-systemic actions (protests) against the current government than respondents in the “winning side.”

## Conjoint Experiment

- Disenamos un conjoint experiment (Hainmueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto 2014).
- La muestra es representativa a nivel país ( $n = 741$ ).
- Fully randomized design (no constraints).
- Representatividad estadística de género y partido.
- Batería de socio-demográficos, intención política (Kast, Boric), evaluación de la democracia.

Dimension	Attribute Set
Gender	Male, Female.
Age	Younger than 35, Between 35-50, Over 50.
Protest	The candidate OPPOSES anti-government protest that will seek to de-stabilize the current government, The candidate SUPPORTS anti-government protest that will seek to de-stabilize the current government



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## Conjoint Experiment


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## Subgroup Marginal Means (MM)


- We depart from standard AMCE analyses (Hainmueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto [2014](#)) and instead compute **subgroup marginal means** (Leeper, Hobolt, and Tilley [2020](#)).
- In practice, when using marginal means, there's no need to set a reference category.
- “In a forced-choice conjoint design, the grand mean is by definition 0.5” (p. 209).

# Subgroup Marginal Means (MM): Boric, Kast







## Other Descriptive Results: Support for Democracy



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# Main Results

test

# Main Takeaways

✓ Test.

Thank you



to check updates on this project.

## Summary Stats

Corrales, Javier. 2020. "Democratic Backsliding Through Electoral Irregularities." *European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies*, no. 109, 41–65.

Haggard, Stephan, and Robert Kaufman. 2021. "The Anatomy of Democratic Backsliding." *Journal of Democracy* 32 (4): 27–41.

Hainmueller, Jens, Daniel Hopkins, and Teppei Yamamoto. 2014. "Causal Inference in Conjoint Analysis: Understanding Multidimensional Choices via Stated Preference Experiments." *Political Analysis* 22 (1): 1–30.

Kahneman, Daniel, and Amos Tversky. 1979. "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk." *Econometrica* 47 (2): 263.

Kaufman, Robert, and Stephan Haggard. 2019. "Democratic Decline in the United States: What Can We Learn from Middle-Income Backsliding?" *Perspectives on Politics* 17 (02): 417–432.

Leeper, Thomas, Sara Hobolt, and James Tilley. 2020. "Measuring Subgroup Preferences in Conjoint Experiments." *Political Analysis* 28 (2): 207–221.