

Losers' Consent and Democratic Stability: Experimental Evidence from Chile and Estonia

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Democratic Backsliding

- Parece existir un consenso en que algunas democracias están en riesgo de retroceder, acercándose más a sistemas autoritarios.
- Estos retrocesos han sido estudiados en un sinnúmero de casos.
 - Kaufman and Haggard (2019) explican que “a transition to competitive authoritarianism in the United States is unlikely, although not impossible.”
 - **Caso 2.**
 - **Caso 3.**

Democratic Backsliding: A “Winners Bias”

Desafortunadamente, la mayoría ha concentrado sus esfuerzos en cómo el **ejecutivo** *agrand*a sus poderes.

- Pérez-Liñán (2018, p. 2) explica que “most threats to democracy originate in the **executive**, not in congress.”
- “Democratic backsliding is the incremental erosion of institutions [...] that results from the actions of [...] **elected governments** (Haggard and Kaufman 2021, p. 27).”
- Corrales (2020, p. 41) explica que “electoral irregularities contributed to democratic backsliding in Venezuela under **chavista rule**.”

What about the losers?

Qué ocurre con los que pierden la elección? Existen diferencias sistemáticas en cuanto la tolerancia de acciones no democráticas entre “ganadores” y “perdedores”?

Nuestro Paper

- A diferencia de la mayoría de las investigaciones que se concentran en posibles violaciones de los valores democráticos por parte de los “ganadores,” nosotros dirigimos nuestra atención hacia los “**perdedores**” electorales.
- Hicimos un survey experiment (pre-registrado) en dos democracias recientes, Chile (y Estonia).
- Entender si los votantes que apoyaron al **candidato perdedor** están más abiertos a respaldar acciones anti-sistémicas **contra el incumbente**.
- Para esto, incluimos una teoría enfocada en *pérdidas* y *loss aversion* (*prospect theory*, e.g., Kahneman and Tversky 1979).

Pre-registered findings

Encontramos que los votantes de **Kast** *no* son mas proclives que los votantes de **Boric** a apoyar acciones antisistémicas (protestas) que pongan en peligro el status quo.

Democratic Backsliding

- Test

Prospect Theory

- Test

Argument

Test.

Chilean Case

- We follow a **“least-likely case design”** (Levy 2008). Finland has been consistently considered as:
 - A ‘democratic’ (Polity-V).
 - An ‘economic egalitarian’ (Walzl 2022).
 - A ‘gender egalitarian.’
 - A ‘social-mobility prone’ country (Erola 2009).
- Thus, it should be **hard to find any correlation** between **class-congruent use of status symbols** and **voting**.

...and yet, we *do*.

Functional Form and Model

$$Y_i = \text{Votes}_i \sim \text{Poisson}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \log(\text{Votes}_i) = & \beta_1 \text{Occupation-Appearance Congruence}_i \times \text{Social Class}_i + \\ & \beta_2 \text{Age}_i + \\ & \gamma_1 \text{Party}_i + \\ & \gamma_2 \text{City}_i + \\ & \Theta_i \end{aligned}$$

- In Θ we **also control for**: Attractiveness_i, Masculinity_i and Femininity_i.
- Full, but also **partition the data** (male & female).
- We focus on the **marginal effects** of the interaction term.

[▶ show regression table](#)

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[▶ show regression table](#)

Main Results

test

Main Takeaways

✓ Test.

Thank you



to check updates on this project.

Summary Stats

Test



Corrales, Javier. 2020. "Democratic Backsliding Through Electoral Irregularities." *European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies*, no. 109, 41–65.



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