H. BRIGITTE GILL

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University of Texas at Austin, Department of Philosophy

AOS: epistemology, ethics, philosophy of mind

AOC: social philosophy, applied ethics, philosophy of religion

EDUCATION

The University of Texas at Austin *August 2025*
PhD in Philosophy

University of Colorado Boulder *May 2018*
BA in Philosophy and minor in English

ACADEMIC APPOINTMENTS

Postdoctoral Researcher *Current Position*
The University of Texas at Austin

PUBLICATIONS

Agentive Phenomenology and LOC While Eating (*Synthese*, 2025)

The Ethics of Intervention (*The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy*, forthcoming)

WORKS IN PROGRESS / UNDER REVIEW

More Than Meets the Evidence: A New Look at Reasons for Belief (R&R at *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*): There are different functional roles reasons can play in doxastic deliberation. Neglecting one has created the illusion that only evidential considerations can be reasons for which we believe.

Learning How to Think: Reclaiming Control of Our Beliefs (in progress): There are striking similarities between the long-range control we have over belief (or coming to believe) and the long-range control we have over other extended activities, particularly in the digital age. Close inspection of these similarities reveals that direct doxastic involuntarism is either false or less interesting than we thought.

Better Safe than Sorry? The Ethics of Withholding Belief (in progress): Principles of non-maleficence and beneficence toward loved ones suggest that we can sometimes wrong others through non-belief, including by suspending judgment in the face of insufficient evidence. Key upshots are that 'epistemic' and moral duties can conflict, and that suspension of judgment is not the safe option it's often made out to be.

Spilling the Theoretical Tea: How to Gossip Like a Lady (in progress): Here, I develop a theory of gossip that explains its ability to both help and harm. Since both the harms and the benefits of gossip derive from changes in our beliefs and overall impressions of others, the ethics of gossip hinges critically on how we as listeners regulate our mental lives, and whether we as speakers can trust our listeners to do the same.

CONFERENCES

Understanding the #MeToo Slogan, 'Believe Women'

- Old Dilemmas, New Voices: Feminist Ethics and #MeToo, *Presented in May 2025*

GRADUATE COURSEWORK

Philosophy of Mind
Perception/Evolution in Consciousness (Tye and Sainsbury); Classics in Philosophy of Mind (Tye and Sainsbury); Mind (Montague); Substance, Structure, and Mind (Strawson)

Ethics and Value Theory
Moral Concepts and Disagreement (Dogramaci); Applied Normative Theories (Dogramaci); Recent Work in Ethics (Dancy); Recent Work in Ethics (Dancy and Schafer); Metaethics and Aesthetics (Kubala and Schafer); Metaethics (Driver and Rosati); Moral Responsibility (Driver); Hume's Moral Psychology (Schafer and Driver); Promises and Moral Commitments (Driver and Sorenson)

Epistemology
Problems of Induction (Schoenfield and Dogramaci); Questions and Belief (Drucker); Social Epistemology (Sorensen)

Metaphysics and Logic
Ground, Grain, and Generality (Litland); Expression (Sosa), Core Logic (Litland), Contemporary Arguments for God's Existence (Koons); Science and Metaphysics (Juhl)

AWARDS & FUNDING

Recruitment Fellowship (2018-2019: $20,000

Provost Supplement (2018-2019): $10,000

Provost Supplement (2019-2020): $5,000

Recruitment Fellowship (2022-2023): $20,000

TEACHING

Instructor of Record (my course design)

Contemporary Moral Problems	*Spring 2025*
Introduction to Philosophy of Religion	*Fall 2024*
Introduction to Philosophy of Religion	*Spring 2024*
Introduction to Logic	*Fall 2023*

Teaching Assistant

Problems of Knowledge and Valuation	*Spring 2022*
Mind and Body	*Fall 2021*
Contemporary Moral Problems	*Spring 2021*
Mind and Body	*Fall 2020*
Health and Justice	*Spring 2020*

Also prepared to teach...

The Ethics of Belief (any level)

Philosophy of Mind (any level)

Epistemology (any level)

Ethics (any level)

Free Will (any level)

The Ethics of Technology (introductory, intermediate)

Social Philosophy (introductory, intermediate)

Metaethics (introductory, intermediate)

SERVICE

Manuscript review for *The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy*	*2025*
Co-organizer of the social philosophy reading group	*Spring 2025*
Conference assistant for the Royal Ethics Conference	*Spring 2025*

DISSERTATION: ON MENTAL AGENCY AND BELIEF

Abstract: This dissertation challenges the view that only evidential considerations can be normative reasons for belief and complicates reductive pictures of agentive phenomenology. The first chapter highlights a neglected distinction between types of motivating reasons. Attending to this distinction reveals that doxastic transparency is false; deliberation about what to believe engages various deliberative questions that do not all neatly collapse into that of whether p is true. This creates space for non-evidential considerations to be among the reasons for which we believe. The second chapter draws on an analogy between belief formation and language acquisition to argue that these processes are often relevantly similar in terms of control, agency, and the reasons for which agents may decide to undertake them. Since language acquisition can be an extended action, given the features they have in common, we ought to think the same of coming to believe. The final chapter summarizes the psychological literature on the feeling of Loss of Control (LOC) while eating, and explains how this poses problems for views in which all phenomenology ultimately reduces to that of the familiar sensory modalities (i.e., visual, auditory, tactile, proprioceptive, etc.). Although this is topically different from the first two chapters, all are united by a general interest in mental control and agency.

Committee Members: Daniel Drucker (chair), Karl Schafer, Miriam Schoenfield, Julia Driver, and Robert Pasnau

REFERENCES

(Permission to contact all references)

Daniel Drucker

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Robert Pasnau

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Karl Schafer

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Sinan Dogramaci (teaching)

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