Henry Clausen, David Aspinall

Examining traffic microstructures for model probing

WTMC 2021






The Alan Turing Institute



# Machine learning progress




#### Prominent failures

- Ambiguous words in Translations
  - → Attention layer

- Object sizes in video enhancement
  - → Multi-scale encoders




# Model evaluation vs probing





### Machine learning progress in NID




#### **NID-datasets**

- Sparse labelling
- Difficult to read
- Hard to alter specific structures



# Machine learning progress in NID



Our case-study

Probe two NID-methods


Identify microstructures related to failures


Measure improvements



#### Traffic microstructures

- Short-term structures at packet or connection level
- manifest in IATs, frame sizes, flags etc.
- Altered by factors such as protocols, congestion, implementation ....
- Control with DetGen-tool
  Clausen et al., SecureComm 2021








# Examining a traffic classifier

- Packet-stream LSTM-classifier by Hwang et al. 2019
  - Detect SQL-injections
- Train on CICIDS-17 data (85%) + DetGen traffic (15%)
  - 96% DR, 2.7% FPR
- Probe with randomized traffic + structure labels
  - → Correlation between misclassifications and latency

#### LSTM-model activity classification









### Examining a traffic classifier

- Generate two SQL-injection connections
  - Constant microstructures
  - One with high latency

- Retransmission sequences deplete activation
- Filter RT-sequences
  - → 98% DR and 0.4% FPR








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
#### LSTM-model activity classification





### Projection sensitivity


- Kitsune 2018
  - Seq-encoding for anomaly detection
  - Botnet, man-in-middle, Brute-force,...
- Traffic groups with constant settings
- Projections should be consistent
- Sensitive to
  - connection IATs
  - half-open connections



### Projection sensitivity

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
#### Projected traffic dispersion along major axis





### Projection sensitivity

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




#### Conclusion

- Targeted probing can identify model failures
- Labelling for misclassification correlation
- Control traffic microstructures
  - Randomise for broad probing
  - Reduce variations for close examination

github.com/detlearsom/DetGen



### Controlling traffic microstructures

DetGen Clausen et al., SecureComm 2021

- Traffic generation tool
- Controlling and labelling microstructures:
  - Performed task/application
  - Implementations
  - Congestion
  - Failures
  - **-** ...
- github.com/detlearsom/DetGen

