

Browser Exploitation

Javascript Engine PWN Beginner

K1a


PWN Week 3

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INTRODUCTION

\$ Multi-process Architecture



\$ Renderer Process

- Blink
 - Rendering Engine
 - Parse HTML
 - Build DOM Tree
 - Embed V8 

\$ V8

- Google's open source high-performance JavaScript and WebAssembly engine
- compiles and executes Javascript source code




\$ V8's Public API

- Example
 - <https://chromium.googlesource.com/v8/v8.git/+HEAD/samples/hello-world.cc>



\$ V8 Pipeline




BACKGROUND

\$ Isolate

- V8 VM instance
- contain v8 heap
- Size
 - 4GB
- Align
 - 4GB

0x2e8700000000	0x2e8700003000	rw-p	3000	0
0x2e8700003000	0x2e8700004000	---p	1000	0
0x2e8700004000	0x2e87000023000	r-xp	1f000	0
0x2e87000023000	0x2e8700003f000	---p	1c000	0
0x2e8700003f000	0x2e8707e80000	---p	7e41000	0
0x2e8707e80000	0x2e8707fe0000	r-xp	160000	0
0x2e8707fe0000	0x2e8708000000	---p	20000	0
0x2e8708000000	0x2e870802b000	r--p	2b000	0
0x2e870802b000	0x2e8708040000	---p	15000	0
0x2e8708040000	0x2e870814d000	rw-p	10d000	0
0x2e870814d000	0x2e8708180000	---p	33000	0
0x2e8708180000	0x2e8708183000	rw-p	3000	0
0x2e8708183000	0x2e87081c0000	---p	3d000	0
0x2e87081c0000	0x2e8708240000	rw-p	80000	0
0x2e8708240000	0x2e8800000000	---p	f7dc0000	0

\$ V8 Heap Overview




\$ Javascript Object

- Javascript is weakly typed language
 - How to know the shape of an object?


\$ Javascript Object

```
let a = [1, 2];  
a.a = 3;  
a.b = "AAA";
```



\$ Javascript Object

```
let a = [1, 2];  
a.a = 3;  
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```



\$ Map

- Map / HiddenClass / Shape
- contains information about
 - Instance_type
 - prototype
 - Instance_descriptors
 - ...
- <v8/src/objects/map.h>

\$ Pointer Compression

- Upper 32 bits are the same

0x2e870804add8

0x2e87080025c5

0x2e87080021dd

\$ Pointer Compression

- Upper 32 bits are the same

0x2e87	0x0804add8
0x2e87	0x080025c5
0x2e87	0x080021dd

\$ Pointer Compression

- Store only the lower 32 bits

0x0804add8

0x080025c5

0x080021dd

\$ Pointer Compression

- Real Address = Base Address + Offset

	0x2e87	0x00000000
+		0x0804add8
=	0x2e87	0x0804add8

\$ Value tagging

- SMI
 - Small integer
 - lsb: 0
- HeapObject
 - lsb: 1

32 bits	
Address	1
Int31	0

\$ Example: MemDump

```
let a = [1, 2];  
a.a = 3;  
a.b = "AAA";
```

```
DebugPrint: 0x2e870804d935: [JSArray]  
- map: 0x2e8708207ce9 <Map(PACKED_SMI_ELEMENTS)> [FastProperties]  
- prototype: 0x2e87081cc151 <JSArray[0]>  
- elements: 0x2e87081d50f5 <FixedArray[2]> [PACKED_SMI_ELEMENTS (COW)]  
- length: 2  
- properties: 0x2e870804da45 <PropertyArray[3]>  
- All own properties (excluding elements): {  
  0x2e8708004cc9: [String] in ReadOnlySpace: #length: 0x2e870814426d <AccessorInfo> (const accessor descriptor), location: descriptor  
  0x2e87080082f5: [String] in ReadOnlySpace: #a: 3 (data field 0), location: properties[0]  
  0x2e8708008391: [String] in ReadOnlySpace: #b: 0x2e87081d47b5 <String[3]: #AAA> (const data field 1), location: properties[1]  
}  
- elements: 0x2e87081d50f5 <FixedArray[2]> {  
  0: 1  
  1: 2  
}
```

0x2e870804d934: 0x08207ce9

0x0804da45

0x081d50f5

0x00000004

BUGs

\$ Out-of-bounds



```
let l = [1, 2, 3]
let y = x();
l[y]
```



```
// compiler: range(0,1), real: 5
// bounds-checking elimination
```

\$ Out-of-bounds



```
let l = [1, 2, 3]
let y = x();           // compiler: range(0,1), real: 5
l[5]                   // out-of-bounds access
```


\$ Type confusion



```
y = typeA() // Compiler: typeA, Real: typeA  
x()         // Compiler: typeA, Real: typeB  
y           // Type confusion
```

EXPLOIT

\$ addrof / fakeobj Primitive

- origin: [Attacking JavaScript Engines: A case study of JavaScriptCore and CVE-2016-4622 - saelo](#)
- addrof
 - return the address of an object
- fakeobj
 - return an object point to given address

\$ WASM page (rwx page)

```
let bytes = new
  Uint8Array([0,97,115,109,1,0,0,0,1,133,128,128,128,0,1,96,0,1,127,3,130,128,128,128,0,
  1,0,4,132,128,128,128,0,1,112,0,0,5,131,128,128,128,0,1,0,1,6,129,128,128,128,0,0,7,14
  4,128,128,128,0,2,6,109,101,109,111,114,121,2,0,3,112,119,110,0,0,10,138,128,128,128,0
  ,1,132,128,128,128,0,0,65,42,11]);
let mod = new WebAssembly.Module(bytes);
let instance = new WebAssembly.Instance(mod);
let pwn = instance.exports.pwn;
```

```
0x2e8708240000 0x2e8800000000 ---p T7dc0000 0 [anon_2e8708240]
0x38378ecdb000 0x38378ecdc000 rwxp 1000 0 [anon_38378ecdb]
```

\$ ArrayBuffer Backing Store

```
DebugPrint: 0x2e870804e505: [JSArrayBuffer]
- map: 0x2e8708203289 <Map(HOLEY_ELEMENTS)> [FastProperties]
- prototype: 0x2e87081ca3c9 <Object map = 0x2e87082032b1>
- elements: 0x2e8708002249 <FixedArray[0]> [HOLEY_ELEMENTS]
- embedder fields: 2
- backing_store: 0x56522070ab50
- byte_length: 256
- max_byte_length: 256
- detachable
- properties: 0x2e8708002249 <FixedArray[0]>
- All own properties (excluding elements): {}
- embedder fields = {
  0, aligned pointer: (nil)
  0, aligned pointer: (nil)
}
```





0x2e870804e504:	0x08203289	0x08002249	0x08002249	0x00000100
0x2e870804e514:	0x00000000	0x00000100	0x00000000	0x2070ab50
0x2e870804e524:	0x00005652	0x2070ac60	0x00005652	0x00000002

\$ OOB Exploit Flow

1. Trigger bugs to get OOB access (within v8 isolate)
2. Make addrof() / fakeobj() primitives
3. Use addrof() and fakeobj() to create a fake object
4. Use addrof() and fake_object to get address of wasm page (rwx page)
5. Modify ArrayBuffer's backing_store to wasm page (arbitrary read/write)
6. Write shellcode to wasm page
7. Execute wasm function

Debugging Tools

\$ Debugging Tools

- gdbinit 
 - echo "source /PATH/TO/gdbinit" >> ~/.gdbinit
- d8 
 - --allow-natives-syntax
- natives-syntax
 - <https://gist.github.com/totherik/3a4432f26eea1224ceeb>
 - %DebugPrint() 
 - %SystemBreak() 
- Chrome
 - --js-flags

LAB

\$ LAB

**THANK YOU FOR
LISTENING!**

ANY QUESTIONS?