ONLINE APPENDIX

Executive Power and Economic Accountability

1. Variable Measurement, Coding Rules, and Summary Statistics

Here we describe each of the variables used in our analyses. All variables are summarized in Table A1 below.

Dependent Variable

Presidential Approval: The Latinobarometer asks the following question:

> *Do you approve or disapprove of the current presidential administration headed by (NAME OF PRESIDENT)?*

Individuals can answer "approve," "disapprove," or "don't know." We code "approve" as 1, "disapprove" as 0, and "don't know" as missing to create our dependent variable. Cross-sectional and temporal variance in this measure is depicted in Figure A1.

Primary Independent Variables

Retrospective Economic Evaluations: The Latinobarometer asks the following question:

> *Do you consider the current economic situation of the country to be much better, a little better, about the same, a little worse or much worse than 12 months ago?*

We code "much worse" responses as 1, "a little worse" 2, "about the same" 3, "a little better" 4, and "much better" 5. Thus, higher values indicate rosier sociotropic retrospective assessments of economic performance.

Legislative Powers of the President: We use Negretto's (2009, 2013) Comparative Index of Legislative Powers of the President. Negretto (2009, Table A1, 137-138; 2013, Table A4, 256-257) describes his measure. We reproduce the information he provides:

The variable consists of an index derived from categorical principal component analysis whose values range continuously from 1 (lowest possible level of power) to 100 (maximum possible level of power). The policy-making powers included in the analysis are the following:

• *Veto override*: ordinal variable measuring the veto override threshold. It takes values from 0 to 3, where 0 means no veto; 1, veto subject to majority override; 2, veto subject to qualified majority override; and 3, no override.

• *Veto chambers*: ordinal variable measuring the number of chambers intervening and the voting procedure in a veto override. It ranges from 0 to 3. Its codification is: 0=No veto; 1=Veto, one chamber; 2=Veto, two chambers voting together; 3=Veto, two chambers voting separately.

• *Partial observations*: ordinal variable reflecting the existence of partial (amendatory) observations and the override threshold. It is coded as follows: No partial observations=0; Partial observations subject to simple majority override=1; Partial observations subject to qualified majority override=2; No override=3.

• *Line item*: dummy variable measuring whether the president can promulgate the non-observed parts of a bill. It is coded as 1 if the president can promulgate the non-observed parts of a bill, and 0 otherwise.

• *Budget veto*: dummy variable identifying whether the president can veto the budget bill. It is coded as 1 if there is budget veto and 0 if there is not.

• *Sessions*: dummy variable measuring whether the president can convene Congress for extraordinary sessions. It is coded as 1 when the power exists, and 0 otherwise.

• *Reserved areas*: dummy variable measuring whether the president has exclusive initiative on important financial or economic legislation. It is coded as 1 when the president has the power, and 0 when he has not.

• *Urgency bills*: ordinal variable measuring the existence of urgency bills and the reversionary outcome in case of congressional inaction. Its values range from 0 to 2, where 0 means no urgency bills; 1, power to submit urgency bills; and 2, when in addition to the power to submit urgency bills, the executive proposal becomes law if Congress does not act on it in a constitutionally-defined period.

• *Residual decree*: dummy variable identifying whether the president has a residual authority to issue decrees of legislative content in emergency situations. It is coded as 1 when the president has the power, and as 0 when he has not.

• *CDA content*: ordinal variable intended to capture the existence of explicit constitutional decree authority and restrictions on its content. It ranges from 0 to 2, where 0 means no explicit decree authority; 1, decree authority restricted to certain areas; and 2, decree authority without substantive restrictions on content.

• *CDA outcome*: ordinal variable identifying the existence of explicit constitutional decree authority and the reversionary outcome in case of congressional inaction. It is coded as follows: no explicit decree authority=0; decree lapses in the absence of congressional approval=1; decree stands in the absence of congressional approval=2.

• *Referendum*: ordinal variable reflecting the existence and degree of presidential authority to submit a bill to approval by popular vote. It takes values from 0 to 2, where 0 means no presidential authority to submit a bill to referendum or authority subject to

congressional authorization; 1, unilateral authority to call a referendum but the outcome is non-binding; and 2, unilateral authority and the outcome is binding.

• *Budget spending*: dummy variable identifying whether Congress can increase spending. It is coded as 1 if Congress cannot increase spending and 0, otherwise.

• *Budget outcome*: dummy variable measuring whether the presidential proposal is the reversionary outcome in the absence of congressional approval. It is coded as 1 if the executive's proposal becomes the reversionary outcome, and 0 otherwise.

Number of Decrees Issued: We operationalize presidents' unilateral lawmaking actions as the number of decrees issued, using information from the Global Legal Information Network. This variable is measured as the raw number of decree laws and regulatory decrees issued by the president between the previous Latinobarometer survey and the time the respondent was questioned. We take the logarithm of this measure in our models.

To probe the validity of this measure, we compare it to Negretto's coding of legal decree authority. Figure A2 shows a scatterplot of the relationship between an index of decree powers created based solely on the "Residual decree," "CDA content," and "CDA outcome" items listed above. The index is rescaled to vary from 0 to 1, and points in the scatterplot are jittered to avoid overlap. The local regression curve superimposed over the scatterplot depicts a positive, linear relationship between decree powers and decree usage, which is also reflected by an associated correlation coefficient of $r = 0.73$.

Control Variables

At the survey level, we control for GDP per capita, a president's time in office, and whether the president's party held a majority of seats in the legislature. Accounting for GDP per capita is

particularly important, as our key independent variable, economic evaluations, and our dependent variable, presidential approval, are both positively related to the level of wealth. We account for time in office at the time of the survey under the assumption that presidents who have governed longer will be less popular (Gronke and Newman 2003; Mueller 1973). Lastly, we account for the residual clarity of responsibility that accompanies a president with a majority in the legislature, since his or her economic policy agenda will meet fewer obstacles (Powell and Whitten 1993). Survey-level control variables are measured as follows:

GDP/capita: measured in thousands of constant 2005 international dollars and adjusted for purchasing parity; obtained from the World Bank's World Development Indicators.[1]

Months in Office: measured as the logged number of months a president had been in office at the time a given survey was administered.

Majority of Seats: dummy variable, coded 1 if the president's party held a majority of seats in the legislature at the time of the survey.

At the individual level, we control for respondents' personal financial situations, ideological proximity to the president, age, and gender. It is important to account for personal finances since, as with GDP per capita, one's own economic situation is correlated with both individual-level economic evaluations, our key independent variable, and incumbent approval, our dependent variable. The same is true for ideological proximity; extant literature routinely finds a positive relationship between ideological proximity and incumbent support (Anderson 2000; Nadeau, Niemi, and Yoshinaka 2002; Singer 2011), and proximity also positively relates to our key independent variable, economic evaluations. We control for age and gender following convention. The individual-level variables are measured as follows:

[1] Available at: http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators. As measures for Argentina were unavailable from the World Bank, we gather the necessary data from the CIA World Factbook.

Personal Finances: This variable is created from a subjective measure of the degree to which respondents feel their income meets their needs. The question asks: *Does your salary and the total of your family's salary allow you to satisfactorily cover your needs? Which of the following situations do you find yourself in?* Response options are "It is sufficient, you can save," "It is just sufficient, without major problems," "It is not sufficient, you have problems," and "It is not sufficient, you have big problems." We code these categories as 4, 3, 2, and 1 respectively, meaning higher values correspond to more comfortable incomes.

Proximity to Incumbent: Latinobarometer asks the following question across waves:

> *In politics, people normally speak of "left" and "right." On a scale where 0 is left and 10 is right, where would you place yourself?*

We use this question to obtain respondents' left-right placements across countries, and we obtain the ideological placements of presidents in each country from the University of Salamanca's Elites Parlamentarias de América Latina (PELA) project,[2] which asks legislators to answer a series of questions of the following format:

> *When it comes to policy expressions, "left" and "right" are typically used. On a scale where 1 is the left and 10 is right, where would you place the following parties or coalitions?*

We take the average expert rating of the president's party in each country-year and transform the ratings to fit the same 0-10 scale used in the Latinobarometer. We then calculate the ideological distance between each respondent and his or her president at the time of the survey. We reverse these distances so that higher values indicate closer proximity to the incumbent.

Age: measured as age in years.

Female: a dummy variable, coded 1 for females and 0 for males.

[2] Available at: http://americo.usal.es/oir/elites/bases_de_datos.htm

All variables are summarized in Table A1 of this appendix.

Table A1: Summary Statistics

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Minimum	Maximum
Individual-Level				
Presidential Approval	0.51	0.50	0	1
Economic Evaluations	2.76	1.05	1	5
Income	2.39	0.85	1	4
Ideological Proximity	7.10	2.07	1.58	10.00
Age	38.89	16.02	16	99
Female	0.48	0.50	0	1
Education (College)	0.07	0.25	0	1
Survey-Level				
Legislative Powers	53.81	24.52	21.40	99.94
Number of Decrees	82.53	150.28	0	780
GDP/capita	10.07	4.01	3.46	18.71
Months in Office	34.42	23.95	1	127
Majority of Seats	0.43	0.50	0	1



Note: Plus signs indicate minimum and maximum values in each country between 2002 and 2009 (not including 2007).

Figure A1: Presidential Approval in Latin America



Note: The solid curve represents predicted values from a local polynomial regression. The x-axis is an index of Negretto's three indicators of decree power, rescaled to range from 0 to 1. Data points jittered to prevent overlap.

Figure A2: Decree Counts and Negretto's Coding of Decree Authority

2. Testing the Mechanism

One could argue that assigning functional and causal responsibility according to the president's power requires a fair degree of intellectual sophistication and political awareness. Specifically, one needs at least a rough idea of the president's powers and how frequently the president has taken legislation into his or her own hands. So while our theory and evidence suggest Latin Americans can and do make these connections, we would nonetheless expect intellectually sophisticated and politically engaged citizens to make these connections most forcefully. If this is true, it would bolster the causal mechanism undergirding our theory: that the impact of economic perceptions on approval varies across space and time because citizens consider presidents' ability to shape economic outcomes (role responsibility) and the extent to which they have attempted to do so (causal responsibility).

Measures of political sophistication, knowledge, or interest would, therefore, provide direct tests of our mechanism. Unfortunately none are available. Coverage for political interest in the Latinobarometer is sporadic, aligning with only about half of our sample,[3] and questions that could be used to measure sophistication or knowledge are not asked. However, the Latinobarometer consistently measures respondents' levels of education. While education may not cause political sophistication, interest, or knowledge, it correlates highly with each (cf. Althaus 2003; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Gordon and Segura 1997; Highton 2009; Luskin 1990), and it thus works well as a tool for exploring our causal mechanism.

To test whether role and causal responsibility attributions are stronger among the most educated citizens, we introduce a dummy variable for education (coded 1 for individuals with at least a college education and 0 otherwise) into our models. In re-estimating Model 3 of the main

[3] Substantive results are similar with the use of political interest in place of education, though coefficient estimates are less certain.

text, we model a three-way interaction between economic evaluations, legislative powers, and education; in re-estimating Model 4, we specify a three-way interaction between economic evaluations, decree use, and education. Numerical results of these models are in Models A1 and A2 of Table A2, respectively. The coefficients on the three-way interactions are estimated with acceptable levels of certainty, as the graphical results in Figure A3 show.

The top left-hand panel of Figure A3 charts the effect of a unit change in economic evaluations on presidential approval across the range of the legislative powers variable in two situations: when the respondent is college educated and when he or she is not. Similarly, the bottom left-hand panel of the figure plots the effect of a unit change in economic evaluations on presidential approval across the range of the decrees variable for respondents with and without a college education.

These patterns demonstrate that the relationship between economic evaluations and presidential approval is most pronounced in countries where the president has functional (legislative powers) or causal (decree usage) responsibilities, *especially* among respondents who are college educated. Legislative powers and decree usage sharpen the impact of economic evaluations on presidential approval more forcefully among those with a college education—this is illustrated by the steeper slopes of the dashed lines, as compared to the solid lines, in both left-hand panels of the figure. This is also apparent in the right-hand panels, which plot the relationships between economic evaluations and approval according the various combinations of presidential power and education.

The figure also makes it clear that the impact of economic evaluations on presidential approval is always higher among those with a college education than among those without, irrespective of the president's legislative powers or use of decrees. That is, a president will be

held most accountable for perceived economic performance by individuals with a college education, regardless of his or her constitutional powers and use of decrees.



Note: Capped vertical bars indicate 95% confidence intervals. "Low" and "High" number of decrees indicate the 10th and 90th percentile of the variable, respectively; "Weak" and "Strong" legislative powers again indicate the 10th and 90th percentile of the variable, respectively. Top and bottom rows of graphs created from results displayed in Models A1 and A2 of Table A2, respectively.

Figure A3: Presidential Approval and Economic Evaluations according to Legislative Powers, Decree Usage, and Education

Table A2: Economic Evaluations, Executive Power, and Presidential Approval, Three-Way Interactions with Education

Covariate	Model A1	Model A2
Individual-Level		
Economic Evaluations	0.439	0.531
	(0.019)	(0.011)
Income	0.098	0.099
	(0.009)	(0.009)
Ideological Proximity	0.145	0.144
	(0.004)	(0.004)
Age	0.006	0.006
	(0.0005)	(0.0005)
Female	0.021	0.020
	(0.015)	(0.015)
Education	-0.464	-0.666
	(0.234)	(0.124)
Survey-Level		
Legislative Powers	-0.008	
	(0.004)	
Number of Decrees (ln)		-0.039
		(0.036)
GDP/capita	0.068	0.066
	(0.023)	(0.022)
Months in Office (ln)	-0.324	-0.325
	(0.093)	(0.093)
Majority of Seats	0.407	0.409
	(0.177)	(0.177)
Interactions		
Legislative Powers×Economic Evaluations	0.002	
	(0.0003)	
Number of Decrees (ln)×Economic Evaluations		0.014
		(0.003)
Legislative Powers×Education	-0.008	
	(0.004)	
Number of Decrees (ln)×Education		-0.132
		(0.042)
Economic Evaluations×Education	0.152	0.169
	(0.082)	(0.042)
Legislative Powers×Economic Evaluations×Education	0.002	
	(0.001)	
Number of Decrees (ln)×Economic Evaluations×Education		0.037
		(0.014)
Constant	-2.417	-2.707
	(0.357)	(0.337)
Model Statistics		
ρ	0.202	0.203
Log-likelihood	-52399.68	-52415.49
Prob. $> \chi^2$	<0.001	<0.001
Number of Observations	94,861	94,861
Number of Country-Years	120	120

Note: Cell entries represent coefficients from multilevel logistic regressions. Standard errors in parentheses.

3. Three-Level Models

In the primary models (Models 1-5) of the main text, we considered individuals (level 1) to be clustered within survey country-years (level 2), while not explicitly modeling the clustering of surveys within countries. We made this decision because, with few surveys per country, and with just 18 countries in our Latinobarometer sample, the data may not be rich enough to model the full three-level structure (cf. Heck and Thomas 2000; Hox 2010; Stegmueller 2013).

Here we provide output from models in which, despite the potential inadvisability of doing so, we accounted for all three levels of data. That is, we considered individuals (level 1) to be clustered within survey country-years (level 2), which themselves were considered to be clustered within countries (level 3). This approach provides estimates of $\rho_{\text{country-year survey}}$ and ρ_{country}, which represent the proportion of variance arising due to unobserved country-year-level effects and unobserved country-level effects, respectively.[4]

As shown in Models A3-A7 of Table A3, the results of the three-level models are very similar to those of the two-level models reported in Table 1 of the main text. The models again indicate that individuals' evaluations of the economy have more bearing on presidential approval where the president has strong legislative powers and where the president makes frequent use of decrees.

[4] $\rho_{\text{country-year survey}}$ is defined as $\text{var}(\zeta_{jm})/[\text{var}(\varphi_m) + \text{var}(\zeta_{jm}) + \text{var}(\varepsilon_{ijm})]$ and ρ_{country} is defined as $\text{var}(\varphi_m)/[\text{var}(\varphi_m) + \text{var}(\zeta_{jm}) + \text{var}(\varepsilon_{ijm})]$, where φ_m is the residual associated with country m, ζ_{jm} is the residual associated with country-year jm, and ε_{ijm} is the residual associated with person i in country-year jm. With the use of a logistic link, $\text{var}(\varepsilon_{ijm})$ is set to $\pi^2/3$.

Table A3: Economic Evaluations, Executive Power, and Presidential Approval: Three-Level Models

Covariate	Model A3	Model A4	Model A5	Model A6	Model A7
Individual-Level					
Economic Evaluations	0.575	0.575	0.445	0.542	0.475
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.018)	(0.010)	(0.025)
Income	0.089	0.089	0.089	0.089	0.088
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Ideological Proximity	0.144	0.144	0.145	0.145	0.145
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Age	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006
	(0.0005)	(0.0005)	(0.0005)	(0.0005)	(0.0005)
Female	0.022	0.022	0.024	0.023	0.024
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Survey-Level					
Legislative Powers	-0.003		-0.010		-0.008
	(0.006)		(0.006)		(0.008)
Number of Decrees (ln)		-0.032		-0.077	-0.022
		(0.051)		(0.052)	(0.143)
GDP/capita	0.103	0.102	0.103	0.101	0.103
	(0.038)	(0.037)	(0.038)	(0.037)	(0.039)
Months in Office (ln)	-0.409	-0.416	-0.411	-0.417	-0.415
	(0.087)	(0.088)	(0.087)	(0.088)	(0.088)
Majority of Seats	0.334	0.337	0.337	0.340	0.339
	(0.207)	(0.207)	(0.206)	(0.206)	(0.206)
Interactions					
Legislative Powers×Economic Evaluations			0.003		0.002
			(0.0003)		(0.001)
Number of Decrees (ln)×Economic Evaluations				0.016	-0.009
				(0.003)	(0.009)
Legislative Powers×Number of Decrees (ln)					-0.0003
					(0.002)
Legislative Powers×Number of Decrees (ln)×Econ. Evals					0.0002
					(0.0001)
Constant	-2.693	-2.771	-2.347	-2.680	-2.388
	(0.458)	(0.418)	(0.459)	(0.417)	(0.540)
	Model Statistics				
ρ_{country}	0.058	0.060	0.058	0.060	0.059
$\rho_{\text{country-year survey}}$	0.149	0.148	0.148	0.147	0.147
Log-likelihood	-52484.88	-52484.85	-52454.07	-52472.87	-52451.79
Prob. $> \chi^2$	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001
Number of Observations	94,861	94,861	94,861	94,861	94,861
Number of Countries	18	18	18	18	18
Number of Country-Year Surveys	120	120	120	120	120

Note: Cell entries represent coefficients from multilevel logistic regressions. Standard errors in parentheses.

4. Presidential Approval, Economic Conditions, and Executive Power

In the main text, we use subjective, retrospective economic evaluations to gauge an individual's perception of the health of the economy. It is possible that people report rosier economic evaluations precisely when they approve of the executive. Such a dynamic would introduce endogeneity into our model, with our primary independent variable itself being a function of the outcome variable.

To help ensure that our results are not driven by potential endogeneity, we examine whether the relationship between macroeconomic conditions and approval is also stronger where presidents have and use more power. Specifically, we interact GDP per capita with legislative powers and decree usage in Models A8 and A9 of Table A4, respectively. In addition, in Model A10 we estimate a three-way interaction between GDP per capita, legislative powers, and decree usage. The coefficients on the interactions return the same pattern observed in our original models with regard to economic evaluations: economic conditions are positively related to presidential approval, especially when the president has strong legislative powers and/or makes frequent use of decrees.

Table A4: Economic Evaluations, Executive Power, and Presidential Approval: Interactions with GDP/capita

Covariate	Model A8	Model A9	Model A10
Individual-Level			
Economic Evaluations	0.574	0.574	0.574
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Income	0.089	0.089	0.089
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Ideological Proximity	0.144	0.144	0.144
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Age	0.006	0.006	0.006
	(0.0005)	(0.0005)	(0.0005)
Female	0.022	0.022	0.022
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Survey-Level			
Legislative Powers	-0.036		-0.049
	(0.011)		(0.021)
Number of Decrees (ln)		-0.156	-0.048
		(0.098)	(0.262)
GDP/capita (1000s)	-0.088	0.033	-0.119
	(0.054)	(0.030)	(0.078)
Months in Office (ln)	-0.335	-0.325	-0.348
	(0.090)	(0.093)	(0.088)
Majority of Seats	0.276	0.387	0.292
	(0.175)	(0.176)	(0.176)
Interactions			
Legislative Powers×GDP/capita (1000s)	0.003		0.004
	(0.001)		(0.002)
Number of Decrees (ln)×GDP/capita (1000s)		0.015	-0.031
		(0.009)	(0.031)
Legislative Powers×Number of Decrees (ln)			-0.0004
			(0.005)
Legislative Powers×Number of Decrees (ln)×GDP/cap.			0.001
			(0.001)
Constant	-1.209	-2.490	-0.492
	(0.591)	(0.382)	(0.944)
Model Statistics			
ρ	0.190	0.200	0.179
Log-likelihood	-52486.65	-52490.25	-52482.47
Prob. $> \chi^2$	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001
Number of Observations	94,861	94,861	94,861
Number of Country-Years	120	120	120

Note: Cell entries represent coefficients from multilevel logistic regressions. Standard errors in parentheses.

5. Incumbent Voting, Economic Evaluations, and Executive Power

In the main text, we use presidential approval, rather than vote choice, as our dependent variable. We made this decision for a variety of reasons. First, the Latinobarometer codebooks only provide information on vote choice in 1995, 1998, 2000, and 2004. Of these years, only 2004 is in our sample. Second, the Latinobarometer asks respondents whether they would vote for the president in a hypothetical forthcoming election, and, in many cases the next election is more than a year in the future. As such, there is a weak correspondence between vote intentions and election outcomes: the absolute difference between the percentage of respondents who say they intend to vote for the president and the incumbent party candidate's actual vote share averages 20.40 percentage points, and the two measures are weakly correlated (r = 0.32). Third, in many cases the incumbent was not constitutionally permitted to seek reelection, meaning individuals in our surveys have varying degrees of uncertainty about who might be on the ballot in an actual forthcoming presidential election.

Still, we re-estimate our primary models here, using intended vote for the incumbent (coded 1 if yes, and 0 otherwise) in place of presidential approval as the dependent variable. We include all surveys in which information on incumbent voting was available; the sample includes 56 surveys in 18 countries in 1995, 1998, 2000, and 2004. While positive economic evaluations are positively related to incumbent voting, results do not mirror our findings with regard to presidential approval. As shown in Model A13 of Table A5, the effect of economic evaluations on incumbent voting is stronger where presidents have more legislative powers. However, Model A14 shows that decree usage does not condition the impact of economic evaluations on incumbent voting, as evidenced by the large standard error associated with the coefficient on the interaction term. Finally, Model A15 shows that legislative powers and decree usage do not work

in tandem to strengthen the impact of economic evaluations on incumbent voting. This is evidenced by the negatively signed coefficient on the three-way interaction term.

Table A5: Economic Evaluations, Executive Power, and Incumbent Voting

Covariate	Model A11	Model A12	Model A13	Model A14	Model A15
Individual-Level					
Economic Evaluations	0.224	0.224	0.160	0.223	0.085
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.023)	(0.014)	(0.035)
Income	0.082	0.082	0.081	0.082	0.080
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Ideological Proximity	0.145	0.145	0.145	0.145	0.144
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Age	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Female	0.015	0.015	0.015	0.015	0.015
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)
Survey-Level					
Legislative Powers	-0.007		-0.011		-0.022
	(0.005)		(0.005)		(0.010)
Number of Decrees (ln)		-0.045		-0.047	-0.162
		(0.054)		(0.055)	(0.155)
GDP/capita	-0.029	-0.035	-0.029	-0.035	-0.031
	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.034)
Months in Office (ln)	0.029	0.019	0.029	0.019	0.016
	(0.100)	(0.101)	(0.100)	(0.101)	(0.101)
Majority of Seats	0.416	0.421	0.410	0.421	0.445
	(0.250)	(0.257)	(0.251)	(0.257)	(0.259)
Interactions					
Legislative Powers×Economic Evaluations			0.001		0.003
			(0.0004)		(0.001)
Number of Decrees (ln)×Economic Evaluations				0.001	0.018
				(0.004)	(0.011)
Legislative Powers×Number of Decrees (ln)					0.003
					(0.003)
Legislative Powers×Number of Decrees (ln)×Econ. Evals					-0.001
					(0.0002)
Constant	-3.115	-3.314	-2.939	-3.310	-2.451
	(0.465)	(0.440)	(0.469)	(0.441)	(0.594)
	Model Statistics				
ρ	0.200	0.203	0.200	0.203	0.199
Log-likelihood	-21182.76	-21183.41	-21177.74	-21183.40	-21172.12
Prob. $> \chi^2$	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001
Number of Observations	44,452	44,452	44,452	44,452	44,452
Number of Country-Years	56	56	56	56	56

Note: Cell entries represent coefficients from multilevel logistic regressions. Standard errors in parentheses.

6. Presidential Approval, Economic Evaluations, and Decree Usage—Standardized within Countries

In the main text, we use the logged number of decrees issued by the president between the previous Latinobarometer survey and the time a respondent was questioned to capture the amount of decrees issued. Since norms for decree usage and judicial interpretation may vary by country, here we re-estimate our models with a measure of decree usage standardized within countries. Specifically, we measure the deviation between the mean logged number of decrees in a country over the duration of our sample and the logged number of decrees issued by the president between the previous Latinobarometer survey and the time a respondent was questioned.

Results, shown in Table A6, emulate those reported in the main text. While country-standardized decree usage alone is unrelated to presidential approval (Model A16), it does amplify the relationship between economic evaluations and presidential approval (Model A17). Further, legislative powers and country-standardized decree usage work together to strengthen the relationship between economic evaluations and presidential approval (Model A18).

Table A6: Economic Evaluations, Executive Power, and Presidential Approval: Decree Powers Standardized within Countries

Covariate	Model A16	Model A17	Model A18
Individual-Level			
Economic Evaluations	0.574	0.574	0.451
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.018)
Income	0.089	0.089	0.089
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Ideological Proximity	0.144	0.144	0.144
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Age	0.006	0.006	0.006
	(0.0005)	(0.0005)	(0.0005)
Female	0.022	0.022	0.024
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Survey-Level			
Legislative Powers			-0.008
			(0.004)
Number of Decrees (ln), Deviation from Mean	-0.061	-0.096	0.254
	(0.099)	(0.103)	(0.309)
GDP/capita (1000s)	0.064	0.064	0.068
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.023)
Months in Office (ln)	-0.331	-0.331	-0.334
	(0.094)	(0.094)	(0.094)
Majority of Seats	0.411	0.410	0.420
	(0.177)	(0.178)	(0.178)
Interactions			
Legislative Powers×Economic Evaluations			0.002
			(0.0003)
Number of Decrees (ln), Mean Dev.×Economic Evaluations		0.012	-0.050
		(0.009)	(0.027)
Legislative Powers×Number of Decrees (ln), Mean Dev.			-0.005
			(0.004)
Leg. Powers×Number of Decrees (ln), Mean Dev.×Econ. Evals			0.001
			(0.0004)
Constant	-2.776	-2.774	-2.404
	(0.336)	(0.337)	(0.361)
Model Statistics			
ρ	0.203	0.203	0.201
Log-likelihood	-52491.44	-52490.55	-52457.20
Prob. $> \chi^2$	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001
Number of Observations	94,861	94,861	94,861
Number of Country-Years	120	120	120

Note: Cell entries represent coefficients from multilevel logistic regressions. Standard errors in parentheses.

7. Economic Evaluations, Constitutional Decree Power, and Presidential Approval

In the main text, we use Negretto's (2009, 2013) Comparative Index of Legislative Powers of the President to capture the legislative duties, powers, and limitations associated with the presidency across countries. Here we extract from Negretto's index the portions pertaining only to decree authority: residual/emergency powers, the content of constitutional decree authority (i.e. restricted to certain policy areas or virtually unrestricted), and the outcomes of constitutional decree authority (i.e. whether the decree lapse or stand in the absence of congressional approval). Following Negretto, the scores on the first component of a polychoric principal component analysis of these three indicators of decree authority are used to create an index.

We substitute this decree powers-specific index for the presidential powers index. As shown in Models A19-A21 of Table A7, results are very similar to those reported in the main text with the use of the full legislative powers index in the main text. While decree powers alone are unrelated to presidential approval (Model A19), they do amplify the relationship between economic evaluations and presidential approval (Model A20). Further, decree powers and actual decree usage work together to strengthen the relationship between economic evaluations and presidential approval (Model A21).

Table A7: Economic Evaluations, Executive Power, and Presidential Approval: Index of Decree Powers

Covariate	Model A19	Model A20	Model A21
Individual-Level			
Economic Evaluations	0.574	0.558	0.549
	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.010)
Income	0.089	0.089	0.089
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Ideological Proximity	0.144	0.145	0.145
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Age	0.006	0.006	0.006
	(0.0005)	(0.0005)	(0.0005)
Female	0.022	0.023	0.023
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Survey-Level			
Decree Powers	-0.061	-0.214	0.765
	(0.106)	(0.109)	(0.399)
Number of Decrees (ln)			0.034
			(0.047)
GDP/capita (1000s)	0.067	0.067	0.067
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)
Months in Office (ln)	-0.325	-0.326	-0.352
	(0.093)	(0.093)	(0.094)
Majority of Seats	0.376	0.383	0.392
	(0.185)	(0.185)	(0.186)
Interactions			
Decree Powers×Economic Evaluations		0.056	-0.074
		(0.010)	(0.039)
Number of Decrees (ln)×Economic Evaluations			0.003
			(0.004)
Decree Powers×Number of Decrees (ln)			-0.204
			(0.080)
Decree Powers×Number of Decrees (ln)×Econ. Evals			0.025
			(0.008)
Constant	-2.789	-2.750	-2.693
	(0.334)	(0.333)	(0.333)
Model Statistics			
ρ	0.203	0.202	0.198
Log-likelihood	-52491.47	-52475.47	-52466.96
Prob. $> \chi^2$	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001
Number of Observations	94,861	94,861	94,861
Number of Country-Years	120	120	120

Note: Cell entries represent coefficients from multilevel logistic regressions. Standard errors in parentheses.

8. Presidential Approval, Economic Evaluations, and the Use of Presidential Powers during Economic Upturns and Downturns

Do presidents who have legislative powers but fail to use them during economic downturns attract the ire of the public? While we do not explore this question in the main text, we engage it here. Specifically, we examine whether presidents who have strong legislative powers but fail to act decisively through the use of decrees are held to account for perceived economic performance more strongly during periods of low economic growth.

The model necessary to test this is rather complex in that it necessitates a four-way interaction between economic evaluations, legislative powers, decree usage, and economic growth. Thus, we added a measure of economic growth, obtained from the World Bank's World Development Indicators, to Model 5 of Table 1 of the main text. We then interacted this measure with economic evaluations, legislative powers, and decree usage, and also included all constitutive interactions. Because this leads to 11 interactive regressors in a single model, we focus on a simplified graphical interpretation of the results, displayed in Figure A4.

The patterns in the figure demonstrate that the relationship between economic evaluations and presidential approval for presidents who have strong legislative powers but fail to act decisively through the use of decrees is quite similar in times of low and high growth. (Further, unexpectedly, presidents tend to have higher levels of approval during periods of low growth.) In sum, we find no systematic evidence that economic good or bad times shape the relationships described in the main text.



Note: capped vertical bars indicate 95% confidence intervals. "Low" and "Strong/High" indicate the 10th and 90th percentile of the variables, respectively.

Figure A4: Presidential Approval and Economic Evaluations according to Legislative Powers, Decree Usage, and Economic Growth

9. Separate Analyses of the Latinobarometer Cross Sections

In the analyses reported in the main text, we pooled all available surveys from the Latinobarometer. As a result, our sample includes data from 18 countries over the years 2002-2009 (excluding 2007). As shown in Figure A5, most of the variation in our measures of presidential power is cross sectional, rather than temporal. Here we report results from replications of our primary analyses estimated separately across Latinobarometer cross sections.

Tables A8-A14 provide the results of the re-estimations of Models 1-5 of the main text. The models routinely indicate that legislative powers and decree usage amplify the relationship between economic evaluations and presidential approval, as evidenced by the positively signed coefficients on the interactions in the third and fourth models in each table. (Only in 2009 does the coefficient on the interaction between decree usage and economic evaluations return an unexpected negative sign.) While these interaction coefficients are often estimated with less certainty than their counterparts in the main text, this is likely a function of reduced sample size. The coefficient on the three-way interaction also generally indicates that legislative powers and decree usage work in tandem to strengthen the effect of economic evaluations on presidential approval, although this coefficient is estimated with quite a bit of uncertainty (and is unexpectedly negatively signed in more recent years).



Note: Plus signs indicate minimum and maximum values in each country between 2002 and 2009 (not including 2007).

Figure A5: Legislative Powers and Decree Usage in Latin America

Table A8: Economic Evaluations, Executive Power, and Presidential Approval: 2002

Covariate	Model A22	Model A23	Model A24	Model A25	Model A26
Individual-Level					
Economic Evaluations	0.421	0.421	0.360	0.377	0.479
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.054)	(0.030)	(0.076)
Income	0.102	0.103	0.102	0.103	0.105
	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)
Ideological Proximity	0.129	0.128	0.128	0.129	0.129
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Age	0.007	0.007	0.007	0.007	0.007
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Female	-0.015	-0.015	-0.015	-0.014	-0.014
	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.042)
Survey-Level					
Legislative Powers	-0.016		-0.019		-0.012
	(0.012)		(0.012)		(0.018)
Number of Decrees (ln)		-0.144		-0.190	-0.117
		(0.113)		(0.115)	(0.300)
GDP/capita	0.048	0.056	0.049	0.056	0.057
	(0.081)	(0.083)	(0.081)	(0.083)	(0.082)
Months in Office (ln)	-0.314	-0.502	-0.315	-0.508	-0.431
	(0.283)	(0.295)	(0.283)	(0.294)	(0.299)
Majority of Seats	0.135	0.222	0.133	0.214	0.151
	(0.550)	(0.541)	(0.550)	(0.539)	(0.548)
Interactions					
Legislative Powers×Economic Evaluations			0.001		-0.002
			(0.001)		(0.001)
Number of Decrees (ln)×Economic Evaluations				0.018	-0.037
				(0.008)	(0.023)
Legislative Powers×Number of Decrees (ln)					-0.0004
					(0.005)
Legislative Powers×Number of Decrees (ln)×Econ. Evals					0.001
					(0.0004)
Constant	-1.660	-1.686	-1.501	-1.557	-1.278
	(1.039)	(1.045)	(1.046)	(1.043)	(1.282)
Model Statistics					
ρ	0.259	0.261	0.258	0.260	0.247
Log-likelihood	-6704.45	-6704.54	-6703.70	-6702.25	-6698.40
Prob. $> \chi^2$	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001
Number of Observations	12,166	12,166	12,166	12,166	12,166
Number of Country-Years	17	17	17	17	17

Note: Cell entries represent coefficients from multilevel logistic regressions. Standard errors in parentheses.

Table A9: Economic Evaluations, Executive Power, and Presidential Approval: 2003

Covariate	Model A27	Model A28	Model A29	Model A30	Model A31
Individual-Level					
Economic Evaluations	0.570	0.570	0.529	0.493	0.725
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.057)	(0.032)	(0.079)
Income	0.112	0.113	0.112	0.113	0.110
	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)
Ideological Proximity	0.130	0.130	0.130	0.131	0.131
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Age	0.010	0.010	0.010	0.010	0.010
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Female	-0.019	-0.019	-0.018	-0.016	-0.016
	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.045)
Survey-Level					
Legislative Powers	-0.022		-0.024		-0.021
	(0.009)		(0.009)		(0.013)
Number of Decrees (ln)		0.101		0.013	0.043
		(0.089)		(0.092)	(0.207)
GDP/capita	0.144	0.117	0.144	0.114	0.114
	(0.056)	(0.062)	(0.056)	(0.062)	(0.054)
Months in Office (ln)	-1.519	-0.961	-1.517	-0.952	-1.365
	(0.291)	(0.305)	(0.291)	(0.303)	(0.275)
Majority of Seats	1.428	0.811	1.427	0.805	1.430
	(0.468)	(0.503)	(0.467)	(0.500)	(0.449)
Interactions					
Legislative Powers×Economic Evaluations			0.001		-0.005
			(0.001)		(0.002)
Number of Decrees (ln)×Economic Evaluations				0.033	-0.055
				(0.010)	(0.025)
Legislative Powers×Number of Decrees (ln)					-0.0004
					(0.003)
Legislative Powers×Number of Decrees (ln)×Econ. Evals					0.002
					(0.0004)
Constant	0.415	-2.238	0.513	-2.041	0.124
	(1.203)	(1.131)	(1.209)	(1.127)	(1.334)
Model Statistics					
ρ	0.130	0.159	0.130	0.158	0.103
Log-likelihood	-6183.15	-6184.97	-6182.84	-6178.98	-6167.87
Prob. $> \chi^2$	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001
Number of Observations	12,167	12,167	12,167	12,167	12,167
Number of Country-Years	16	16	16	16	16

Note: Cell entries represent coefficients from multilevel logistic regressions. Standard errors in parentheses.

Table A10: Economic Evaluations, Executive Power, and Presidential Approval: 2004

Covariate	Model A32	Model A33	Model A34	Model A35	Model A36
Individual-Level					
Economic Evaluations	0.553	0.553	0.342	0.498	0.405
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.045)	(0.026)	(0.068)
Income	0.054	0.054	0.053	0.054	0.053
	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)
Ideological Proximity	0.131	0.131	0.131	0.131	0.131
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Age	0.010	0.010	0.010	0.010	0.010
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Female	0.032	0.032	0.039	0.035	0.038
	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.040)
Survey-Level					
Legislative Powers	-0.006		-0.017		-0.040
	(0.010)		(0.010)		(0.014)
Number of Decrees (ln)		0.092		0.018	-0.227
		(0.100)		(0.102)	(0.240)
GDP/capita	0.073	0.043	0.073	0.042	0.049
	(0.070)	(0.069)	(0.070)	(0.068)	(0.060)
Months in Office (ln)	-0.509	-0.377	-0.508	-0.371	-0.419
	(0.320)	(0.335)	(0.320)	(0.332)	(0.290)
Majority of Seats	0.185	0.087	0.182	0.095	0.210
	(0.481)	(0.477)	(0.482)	(0.472)	(0.412)
Interactions					
Legislative Powers×Economic Evaluations			0.004		0.003
			(0.001)		(0.002)
Number of Decrees (ln)×Economic Evaluations				0.028	-0.022
				(0.009)	(0.023)
Legislative Powers×Number of Decrees (ln)					0.006
					(0.004)
Legislative Powers×Number of Decrees (ln)×Econ. Evals					0.0005
					(0.0004)
Constant	-1.889	-2.487	-1.350	-2.359	-0.631
	(1.062)	(1.044)	(1.067)	(1.034)	(1.098)
Model Statistics					
ρ	0.209	0.205	0.209	0.201	0.159
Log-likelihood	-7769.19	-7768.97	-7755.73	-7763.79	-7751.97
Prob. $> \chi^2$	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001
Number of Observations	14,296	14,296	14,296	14,296	14,296
Number of Country-Years	18	18	18	18	18

Note: Cell entries represent coefficients from multilevel logistic regressions. Standard errors in parentheses.

Table A11: Economic Evaluations, Executive Power, and Presidential Approval: 2005

Covariate	Model A37	Model A38	Model A39	Model A40	Model A41
Individual-Level					
Economic Evaluations	0.593	0.593	0.498	0.531	0.548
	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.043)	(0.026)	(0.066)
Income	0.117	0.117	0.116	0.116	0.116
	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)
Ideological Proximity	0.115	0.115	0.116	0.115	0.115
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Age	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Female	0.011	0.011	0.013	0.012	0.012
	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.038)
Survey-Level					
Legislative Powers	-0.005		-0.010		-0.027
	(0.007)		(0.007)		(0.014)
Number of Decrees (ln)		0.056		-0.019	-0.076
		(0.075)		(0.078)	(0.166)
GDP/capita	0.071	0.057	0.071	0.057	0.082
	(0.045)	(0.043)	(0.045)	(0.043)	(0.040)
Months in Office (ln)	-0.329	-0.376	-0.332	-0.380	-0.740
	(0.184)	(0.206)	(0.184)	(0.206)	(0.246)
Majority of Seats	0.516	0.489	0.520	0.494	0.660
	(0.328)	(0.326)	(0.328)	(0.325)	(0.300)
Interactions					
Legislative Powers×Economic Evaluations			0.002		-0.0004
			(0.001)		(0.002)
Number of Decrees (ln)×Economic Evaluations				0.028	0.008
				(0.008)	(0.021)
Legislative Powers×Number of Decrees (ln)					0.004
					(0.003)
Legislative Powers×Number of Decrees (ln)×Econ. Evals					0.0003
					(0.0004)
Constant	-2.317	-2.400	-2.066	-2.219	-0.369
	(0.679)	(0.632)	(0.686)	(0.633)	(1.080)
Model Statistics					
ρ	0.113	0.112	0.113	0.112	0.090
Log-likelihood	-8437.05	-8437.03	-8434.00	-8431.08	-8428.38
Prob. $> \chi^2$	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001
Number of Observations	14,716	14,716	14,716	14,716	14,716
Number of Country-Years	18	18	18	18	18

Note: Cell entries represent coefficients from multilevel logistic regressions. Standard errors in parentheses.

Table A12: Economic Evaluations, Executive Power, and Presidential Approval: 2006

Covariate	Model A42	Model A43	Model A44	Model A45	Model A46
Individual-Level					
Economic Evaluations	0.615	0.614	0.492	0.574	0.497
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.047)	(0.027)	(0.068)
Income	0.078	0.077	0.077	0.077	0.076
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)
Ideological Proximity	0.183	0.183	0.183	0.183	0.183
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Age	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Female	0.066	0.066	0.066	0.067	0.066
	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.038)
Survey-Level					
Legislative Powers	0.001		-0.006		-0.017
	(0.005)		(0.005)		(0.007)
Number of Decrees (ln)		0.099		0.044	-0.053
		(0.036)		(0.043)	(0.104)
GDP/capita	0.061	0.042	0.060	0.040	0.043
	(0.027)	(0.023)	(0.027)	(0.023)	(0.021)
Months in Office (ln)	-0.115	-0.167	-0.117	-0.173	-0.150
	(0.097)	(0.082)	(0.097)	(0.081)	(0.074)
Majority of Seats	0.380	0.444	0.392	0.459	0.437
	(0.215)	(0.182)	(0.215)	(0.180)	(0.163)
Interactions					
Legislative Powers×Economic Evaluations			0.002		0.002
			(0.001)		(0.002)
Number of Decrees (ln)×Economic Evaluations				0.019	0.008
				(0.008)	(0.022)
Legislative Powers×Number of Decrees (ln)					0.003
					(0.002)
Legislative Powers×Number of Decrees (ln)×Econ. Evals					-0.000005
					(0.0004)
Constant	-3.665	-3.509	-3.313	-3.369	-2.749
	(0.427)	(0.364)	(0.444)	(0.366)	(0.425)
Model Statistics					
ρ	0.051	0.036	0.051	0.036	0.029
Log-likelihood	-8111.99	-8108.92	-8107.81	-8106.26	-8102.38
Prob. $> \chi^2$	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001
Number of Observations	14,188	14,188	14,188	14,188	14,188
Number of Country-Years	18	18	18	18	18

Note: Cell entries represent coefficients from multilevel logistic regressions. Standard errors in parentheses.

Table A13: Economic Evaluations, Executive Power, and Presidential Approval: 2008

Covariate	Model A47	Model A48	Model A49	Model A50	Model A51
Individual-Level					
Economic Evaluations	0.620	0.620	0.414	0.593	0.365
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.044)	(0.024)	(0.057)
Income	0.109	0.109	0.110	0.110	0.111
	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)
Ideological Proximity	0.131	0.131	0.132	0.131	0.132
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Age	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Female	0.016	0.017	0.018	0.016	0.019
	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)
Survey-Level					
Legislative Powers	0.009		-0.003		0.001
	(0.009)		(0.009)		(0.011)
Number of Decrees (ln)		-0.139		-0.184	-0.344
		(0.082)		(0.086)	(0.250)
GDP/capita	0.010	0.041	0.010	0.041	0.020
	(0.049)	(0.046)	(0.049)	(0.046)	(0.042)
Months in Office (ln)	-0.358	-0.304	-0.358	-0.301	-0.382
	(0.212)	(0.198)	(0.211)	(0.199)	(0.179)
Majority of Seats	0.318	0.163	0.333	0.163	0.281
	(0.435)	(0.410)	(0.433)	(0.410)	(0.380)
Interactions					
Legislative Powers×Economic Evaluations			0.004		0.005
			(0.001)		(0.001)
Number of Decrees (ln)×Economic Evaluations				0.016	0.022
				(0.008)	(0.026)
Legislative Powers×Number of Decrees (ln)					0.002
					(0.004)
Legislative Powers×Number of Decrees (ln)×Econ. Evals					-0.0005
					(0.0004)
Constant	-2.453	-2.211	-1.894	-2.145	-1.816
	(0.747)	(0.693)	(0.752)	(0.694)	(0.693)
	Model Statistics				
ρ	0.168	0.155	0.167	0.156	0.123
Log-likelihood	-8677.44	-8676.60	-8663.89	-8674.83	-8659.72
Prob. $> \chi^2$	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001
Number of Observations	15,352	15,352	15,352	15,352	15,352
Number of Country-Years	18	18	18	18	18

Note: Cell entries represent coefficients from multilevel logistic regressions. Standard errors in parentheses.

Table A14: Economic Evaluations, Executive Power, and Presidential Approval: 2009

Covariate	Model A52	Model A53	Model A54	Model A55	Model A56
Individual-Level					
Economic Evaluations	0.624	0.624	0.467	0.652	0.358
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.054)	(0.028)	(0.064)
Income	0.043	0.043	0.042	0.043	0.042
	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)
Ideological Proximity	0.197	0.197	0.198	0.196	0.195
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Age	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Female	0.064	0.063	0.067	0.063	0.068
	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.043)
Survey-Level					
Legislative Powers	0.003		-0.005		-0.003
	(0.009)		(0.009)		(0.011)
Number of Decrees (ln)		-0.133		-0.071	-0.596
		(0.092)		(0.097)	(0.406)
GDP/capita	0.044	0.074	0.043	0.075	0.092
	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.052)	(0.053)	(0.049)
Months in Office (ln)	0.048	-0.090	0.042	-0.095	-0.750
	(0.454)	(0.419)	(0.453)	(0.418)	(0.512)
Majority of Seats	0.445	0.449	0.466	0.444	0.873
	(0.477)	(0.427)	(0.476)	(0.426)	(0.434)
Interactions					
Legislative Powers×Economic Evaluations			0.003		0.007
			(0.001)		(0.001)
Number of Decrees (ln)×Economic Evaluations				-0.023	0.035
				(0.011)	(0.046)
Legislative Powers×Number of Decrees (ln)					0.007
					(0.005)
Legislative Powers×Number of Decrees (ln)×Econ. Evals					-0.001
					(0.001)
Constant	-3.940	-3.389	-3.530	-3.443	-1.315
	(1.388)	(1.363)	(1.391)	(1.361)	(1.538)
Model Statistics					
ρ	0.153	0.138	0.153	0.137	0.111
Log-likelihood	-6503.71	-6502.79	-6498.46	-6500.73	-6485.92
Prob. $> \chi^2$	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001
Number of Observations	11,976	11,976	11,976	11,976	11,976
Number of Country-Years	15	15	15	15	15

Note: Cell entries represent coefficients from multilevel logistic regressions. Standard errors in parentheses.

10. Economic Evaluations, Executive Power, and Presidential Approval—Controlling for External Economic Conditions

International conditions external to a country's domestic economy may correlate with both presidential approval and the president's acquisition and use of powers. If so, the findings we report in the main text, which do not control for external economic conditions, could be spurious. To test for this possibility, we control for three separate measures of external economic conditions: the "Good Economic Times" (GET) index of Campello and Zucco (2015), growth in terms of trade, and Jenkins's (2011) estimated effect of China's demand for commodities on economic growth in Latin America. The GET index was obtained directly from the authors, growth in terms of trade is from the Inter-American Development Bank,[5] and Jenkins's index is available in his 2011 article in CEPAL Review (p. 84, Table 6; we use the minimum estimates). The GET index and growth in terms of trade cover every country-year in our data, meaning our sample size does not change in the models that include these measures. Jenkins's index is estimated only for 2007, meaning the inclusion of this measure in our models greatly reduces our temporal coverage and eliminates the Dominican Republic, which is not included in his index.

As shown in Models A57-A71 of Tables A15-A17, our results are remarkably robust to the inclusion of these controls. In the case of the models that include the GET index (Models A57-A61, Table A15) and growth in terms of trade (Models A62-A66, Table A16), coefficients and associated standard errors on our regressors of interest, the interactions of presidential powers and decree usage with economic evaluations in particular, are very similar to those in the primary estimations provided in Models 1-5 of Table 1 of the main text. For the models with the Jenkins index (Models A67-A71, Table A17), results are again quite similar, even with the greatly reduced temporal coverage and the removal of the Dominican Republic from the sample.

[5] Available at: http://www.iadb.org/en/research-and-data/latin-american-and-caribbean-macro-watch,8633.html.

Only in the re-estimation of Model 5, which is provided in Model A71, do we find a substantive difference: in this model, the coefficient on the three-way interaction flips signs. Further, while the coefficients in Models A67-A71 are often estimated with less certainty than their counterparts in the main text, this is likely a function of reduced sample size.

We take the results of these models as evidence that the key relationships we identify—a boost in the effect of economic evaluations on presidential approval as presidents' legislative powers and decree usage increase—are not driven by the omission of external economic conditions from our primary models.

Table A15: Economic Evaluations, Executive Power, and Presidential Approval: Controlling for "Good Economic Times"

Covariate	Model A57	Model A58	Model A59	Model A60	Model A61
Individual-Level					
Economic Evaluations	0.574	0.574	0.445	0.542	0.475
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.018)	(0.010)	(0.025)
Income	0.089	0.089	0.088	0.089	0.088
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Ideological Proximity	0.144	0.144	0.144	0.144	0.144
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Age	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006
	(0.0005)	(0.0005)	(0.0005)	(0.0005)	(0.0005)
Female	0.022	0.022	0.024	0.023	0.024
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Survey-Level					
Legislative Powers	-0.001		-0.008		-0.011
	(0.003)		(0.004)		(0.005)
Number of Decrees (ln)		0.012		-0.032	-0.050
		(0.034)		(0.035)	(0.097)
GDP/capita	0.058	0.054	0.058	0.053	0.054
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.023)
Months in Office (ln)	-0.349	-0.348	-0.350	-0.349	-0.348
	(0.091)	(0.091)	(0.091)	(0.091)	(0.090)
Majority of Seats	0.382	0.386	0.387	0.389	0.399
	(0.173)	(0.172)	(0.172)	(0.172)	(0.171)
Good Economic Times	0.313	0.321	0.311	0.322	0.317
	(0.114)	(0.115)	(0.113)	(0.114)	(0.113)
Interactions					
Legislative Powers×Economic Evaluations			0.003		0.002
			(0.0003)		(0.001)
Number of Decrees (ln)×Economic Evaluations				0.016	-0.009
				(0.003)	(0.009)
Legislative Powers×Number of Decrees (ln)					0.001
					(0.002)
Legislative Powers×Number of Decrees (ln)×Econ. Evals					0.0002
					(0.0001)
Constant	-2.952	-3.019	-2.608	-2.930	-2.483
	(0.353)	(0.336)	(0.354)	(0.335)	(0.407)
	Model Statistics				
ρ	0.193	0.193	0.192	0.192	0.190
Log-likelihood	-52487.81	-52487.81	-52457.11	-52475.84	-52454.20
Prob. $> \chi^2$	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001
Number of Observations	94,861	94,861	94,861	94,861	94,861
Number of Country-Years	120	120	120	120	120

Note: Cell entries represent coefficients from multilevel logistic regressions. Standard errors in parentheses.

Table A16: Economic Evaluations, Executive Power, and Presidential Approval: Controlling for Growth in Terms of Trade

Covariate	Model A62	Model A63	Model A64	Model A65	Model A66
Individual-Level					
Economic Evaluations	0.574	0.574	0.445	0.542	0.475
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.018)	(0.010)	(0.025)
Income	0.089	0.089	0.088	0.089	0.088
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Ideological Proximity	0.144	0.144	0.144	0.144	0.144
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Age	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006
	(0.0005)	(0.0005)	(0.0005)	(0.0005)	(0.0005)
Female	0.022	0.022	0.024	0.023	0.024
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Survey-Level					
Legislative Powers	-0.002		-0.009		-0.011
	(0.004)		(0.004)		(0.006)
Number of Decrees (ln)		-0.004		-0.048	-0.075
		(0.036)		(0.037)	(0.101)
GDP/capita	0.066	0.064	0.066	0.064	0.063
	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)
Months in Office (ln)	-0.320	-0.323	-0.321	-0.324	-0.322
	(0.094)	(0.094)	(0.093)	(0.094)	(0.093)
Majority of Seats	0.394	0.401	0.400	0.404	0.412
	(0.179)	(0.178)	(0.178)	(0.178)	(0.177)
Terms of Trade Growth	0.004	0.003	0.004	0.003	0.004
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Interactions					
Legislative Powers×Economic Evaluations			0.003		0.002
			(0.0003)		(0.001)
Number of Decrees (ln)×Economic Evaluations				0.016	-0.009
				(0.003)	(0.009)
Legislative Powers×Number of Decrees (ln)					0.001
					(0.002)
Legislative Powers×Number of Decrees (ln)×Econ. Evals					0.0002
					(0.0001)
Constant	-2.730	-2.796	-2.388	-2.707	-2.236
	(0.357)	(0.338)	(0.358)	(0.337)	(0.414)
	Model Statistics				
ρ	0.203	0.203	0.202	0.202	0.200
Log-likelihood	-52491.43	-52491.58	-52460.71	-52479.65	-52457.88
Prob. $> \chi^2$	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001
Number of Observations	94,861	94,861	94,861	94,861	94,861
Number of Country-Years	120	120	120	120	120

Note: Cell entries represent coefficients from multilevel logistic regressions. Standard errors in parentheses.

Table A17: Economic Evaluations, Executive Power, and Presidential Approval: Controlling for the Estimated Effect of China's Demand for Commodities on Economic Growth

Covariate	Model A67	Model A68	Model A69	Model A70	Model A71
Individual-Level					
Economic Evaluations	0.608	0.608	0.361	0.573	0.277
	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.046)	(0.025)	(0.061)
Income	0.110	0.110	0.110	0.110	0.111
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)
Ideological Proximity	0.138	0.138	0.139	0.138	0.140
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Age	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Female	-0.005	-0.004	-0.004	-0.005	-0.003
	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.038)
Survey-Level					
Legislative Powers	0.013		-0.001		-0.002
	(0.010)		(0.010)		(0.012)
Number of Decrees (ln)		-0.161		-0.218	-0.403
		(0.095)		(0.098)	(0.272)
GDP/capita	0.017	0.036	0.016	0.036	0.020
	(0.050)	(0.048)	(0.050)	(0.048)	(0.043)
Months in Office (ln)	-0.391	-0.285	-0.390	-0.281	-0.381
	(0.219)	(0.205)	(0.218)	(0.205)	(0.191)
Majority of Seats	0.327	0.199	0.344	0.200	0.292
	(0.448)	(0.431)	(0.446)	(0.432)	(0.398)
Effect of China's Demand for Commodities on Growth	-0.016	0.006	-0.016	0.006	-0.003
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.016)
Interactions					
Legislative Powers×Economic Evaluations			0.005		0.007
			(0.001)		(0.001)
Number of Decrees (ln)×Economic Evaluations				0.020	0.046
				(0.009)	(0.026)
Legislative Powers×Number of Decrees (ln)					0.003
					(0.004)
Legislative Powers×Number of Decrees (ln)×Econ. Evals					-0.001
					(0.0004)
Constant	-2.557	-2.228	-1.889	-2.140	-1.646
	(0.760)	(0.709)	(0.766)	(0.711)	(0.729)
Model Statistics					
ρ	0.170	0.161	0.169	0.162	0.129
Log-likelihood	-8130.53	-8129.99	-8112.86	-8127.22	-8108.03
Prob. $>\chi^2$	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001	<0.001
Number of Observations	14,504	14,504	14,504	14,504	14,504
Number of Country-Years	17	17	17	17	17

Note: Cell entries represent coefficients from multilevel logistic regressions. Standard errors in parentheses.

11. Granger Tests for Reverse Causality

Our primary analyses do not allow us to reject the possibility that the president's standing in the public affects his or her ability to garner additional powers or to take a more instrumental role in policymaking. To explicitly test for such a pattern, we employ the straightforward logic of Granger causality: if a variable *Y* "reverse Granger causes" *X*, then past values of *Y* should help predict *X* beyond previous values of *X* alone.

In its original form, our data analytical structure – multilevel with a nonlinear (logit) link between the covariates and dependent variable – is not amenable to Granger framework. To make it more conducive to such, we switched from our "one-step" hierarchical modeling approach to the "two-step" approach advanced by Jusko and Shively (2005) and Lewis and Linzer (2005), among others. This involves regressing group-level coefficients from a "first-step" regression on a group-level variable in the "second-step."

Reassuringly, results from this two-step strategy are nearly identical to those of the one-step models we report in Table 1 of the main text. In the two-step models, the primary estimate of interest is the effect of economic evaluations on presidential approval (which we theorize to vary according to presidents' legislative powers and decree usage). Thus, our first step is to estimate the logit coefficients of economic evaluations on approval of the president across the 120 surveys in our data set (controlling for the individual-level variables described in the main text). The mean coefficient of economic evaluations is 0.569 (p<.001, two-sided), which is very close to the coefficient of 0.574 estimated in the additive models in the main text. And, more importantly for our theory, the two-step models indicate that this effect increases with presidents' legislative powers and decree usage. A unit increase in legislative powers corresponds with a 0.0024 (p = .007, two-sided) increase in the coefficient on economic evaluations and a unit increase in the logged number of decrees used corresponds to a 0.0183 (p = .056, two-sided)

increase in this coefficient. These estimates differ little from those of 0.003 and 0.016 reported in the main text.

Turning to the Granger tests, we examine whether legislative powers and decree usage are themselves caused by the strength of the link between economic evaluations and approval. Our reverse Granger causality tests account for the time-series cross-sectional structure of our data in the two-step setup (multiple years clustered within countries) by employing the Arellano and Bond estimator (e.g. Hartwig 2010).

Table A18, shown below, summarizes the results of the Granger tests of reverse causality. We conducted both single-lag and two-lag tests under the null hypothesis of no reverse Granger causality. As such, a significant *p*-value for either a single- or two-lag test would mean that we cannot rule out the possibility that presidential powers and/or decree usage are caused by how much the public holds the president accountable for economic conditions and/or approves of the president. As demonstrated in the upper portion of the table, there is no evidence that the relationship between economic evaluations and presidential approval Granger causes legislative powers or presidential decree usage. The *p*-values associated with the lagged predictor variable (the effect of economic valuations on approval) do not reach conventional levels of statistical significance, regardless of whether we employ one or two lags. Further, in the two-lag models, the effects of the first and second lags are not jointly different from zero at $p < 0.10$.

In our theory the dependent variable is *the effect of economic evaluations on approval*, which we propose is a function of *de jure* and *de facto* presidential powers. (In fact, Models 1 and 2 in Table 1 of the manuscript indicate that presidential approval is unrelated to formal legislative powers and decree issuance, all else being equal.) Still, we recognize the importance of demonstrating that approval itself does not cause power mongering and decree usage in our

data. Accordingly, the bottom portion of Table A18 summarizes the results of reverse Granger causality tests of whether presidential approval predicts legislative power and decree usage. Again we conducted both single-lag and two-lag tests, and, encouragingly, neither provides evidence that presidential approval predicts legislative powers or decree usage. The *p*-values associated with the lagged predictor variable (presidential approval) do not reach conventional levels of statistical significance, regardless of whether we employ one or two lags. And, in the two-lag models, the effects of the first and second lags are not jointly different from zero (at $p < 0.10$).

Taken together, this battery of reverse Granger causality tests allow us to rule out, in our data at least, an endogenous relationship in which presidents acquire or use powers based on the degree to which the public holds them responsible for the economy (the outcome of theoretical interest in our paper) or their overall standing with the public. This helps to substantiate the process we lay out in the manuscript: presidents' endowment and use of power in a given time period in a given country condition the degree to which citizens hold them accountable for the economy.

Table A18: Granger Tests for Reverse Causality

	Single Lag	Two Lag	
Predictor → Outcome	**Predictor$_{t-1}$**	**Predictor$_{t-1}$**	**Predictor$_{t-2}$**
The impact of economic evaluations on presidential approval ***predicts*** legislative powers	0.593	0.782	0.722
The impact of economic evaluations on presidential approval ***predicts*** decree usage	0.257	0.302	0.495
Presidential approval ***predicts*** legislative powers	0.518	0.777	0.544
Presidential approval ***predicts*** decree usage	0.929	0.164	0.900

Note: Cell entries are two sided *p*-values. The null hypothesis for every cell is no Granger causality. In the two lag models, the effects of predictor$_{t-1}$ and predictor$_{t-2}$ are never jointly different from zero at $p<0.10$.

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